CA2349145C - Point of sale (pos) terminal security system - Google Patents

Point of sale (pos) terminal security system Download PDF

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Publication number
CA2349145C
CA2349145C CA2349145A CA2349145A CA2349145C CA 2349145 C CA2349145 C CA 2349145C CA 2349145 A CA2349145 A CA 2349145A CA 2349145 A CA2349145 A CA 2349145A CA 2349145 C CA2349145 C CA 2349145C
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CA
Canada
Prior art keywords
circuit
electrical connector
security system
conductive film
security
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
CA2349145A
Other languages
French (fr)
Other versions
CA2349145A1 (en
Inventor
Shuzhen Fu
David C. Hanley
Raymond A. Debruin
Jack R. Grenfell
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Hypercom Corp
Original Assignee
Hypercom Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Hypercom Corp filed Critical Hypercom Corp
Publication of CA2349145A1 publication Critical patent/CA2349145A1/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CA2349145C publication Critical patent/CA2349145C/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/86Secure or tamper-resistant housings
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/0806Details of the card
    • G07F7/0813Specific details related to card security
    • G07F7/082Features insuring the integrity of the data on or in the card
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H05ELECTRIC TECHNIQUES NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • H05KPRINTED CIRCUITS; CASINGS OR CONSTRUCTIONAL DETAILS OF ELECTRIC APPARATUS; MANUFACTURE OF ASSEMBLAGES OF ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
    • H05K1/00Printed circuits
    • H05K1/02Details
    • H05K1/0275Security details, e.g. tampering prevention or detection
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H05ELECTRIC TECHNIQUES NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • H05KPRINTED CIRCUITS; CASINGS OR CONSTRUCTIONAL DETAILS OF ELECTRIC APPARATUS; MANUFACTURE OF ASSEMBLAGES OF ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
    • H05K1/00Printed circuits
    • H05K1/02Details
    • H05K1/14Structural association of two or more printed circuits
    • H05K1/144Stacked arrangements of planar printed circuit boards
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2143Clearing memory, e.g. to prevent the data from being stolen
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H01ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01HELECTRIC SWITCHES; RELAYS; SELECTORS; EMERGENCY PROTECTIVE DEVICES
    • H01H2239/00Miscellaneous
    • H01H2239/032Anti-tamper
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H05ELECTRIC TECHNIQUES NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • H05KPRINTED CIRCUITS; CASINGS OR CONSTRUCTIONAL DETAILS OF ELECTRIC APPARATUS; MANUFACTURE OF ASSEMBLAGES OF ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
    • H05K2201/00Indexing scheme relating to printed circuits covered by H05K1/00
    • H05K2201/10Details of components or other objects attached to or integrated in a printed circuit board
    • H05K2201/10227Other objects, e.g. metallic pieces
    • H05K2201/10378Interposers
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H05ELECTRIC TECHNIQUES NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • H05KPRINTED CIRCUITS; CASINGS OR CONSTRUCTIONAL DETAILS OF ELECTRIC APPARATUS; MANUFACTURE OF ASSEMBLAGES OF ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
    • H05K2201/00Indexing scheme relating to printed circuits covered by H05K1/00
    • H05K2201/20Details of printed circuits not provided for in H05K2201/01 - H05K2201/10
    • H05K2201/2018Presence of a frame in a printed circuit or printed circuit assembly
    • YGENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y04INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
    • Y04SSYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
    • Y04S40/00Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them
    • Y04S40/20Information technology specific aspects, e.g. CAD, simulation, modelling, system security

Abstract

A security system for an electrical circuit comprises a first circuit board, a second circuit board, a protective casing interposed between the first and the second circuit boards, a flexible conductive film wrapped around the protective casing, a first electrical connector in contact with the first and second circuit boards, and a tamper detection circuit connected to the first electrical connector. The tamper detection circuit detects whether the first electrical connector is in contact with both the first and second circuit boards and whether the integrity of the flexible conductive film has been compromised.

Description

M-aaas us EXPRESS MAIL LABEL NO:
HPtI 109926.' POINT OF SALE (POS) TERMINAL SECURITY SYSTEM
Shuzhen Fu David C. Hanley Raymond A. DeBruin Jack R. Grenfell BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
Field of the Invention The present invention relates generally to 10 security systems and, more specifically, to security systems for electronic circuits.
Related Art Point of sale (POS) terminals allow customers to make payments using a variety of payment instruments such as credit cards, debit cards, smart cards, ATM
cards, etc. To ensure that the payment information transmitted from the POS terminals to a payment center is not intercepted, this information is typically encrypted and secured through other means (e. g., digital authentication) during transmissions.
However, confidential payment information entered by the user into the POS terminal could still be intercepted by tampering with the POS terminal. To curb such interception and any tampering of the keypad 25 and processor, processors and other circuitry in the POS terminal are typically embedded in material such as epoxy resin which is potted to the keypad, thereby integrating the keypad and the circuits into a single module.
30 A cross-section of a typical prior art potted POS
terminal 100 is shown in Fig. 1. Potted POS terminal 100 includes a top case 110, a bottom case 120, keys HP# 1099262 130 and security components 140. The circuitry within POS terminal 100 is enclosed within a PCB 160 and potted in an epoxy compound 150. Security components 140 are connected to and detect any interruption in PCB
160. In an attempt to drill through PCB 160, the PCB
circuit would be interrupted and a detection circuit would trigger a security response (e.g. erasing any confidential information stored in the circuitry of POS
terminal 100).
While these security measures are sufficient to deter some tamperers, they could still be circumvented (e. g. by opening the POS terminals and using appropriate chemical substances to remove the potting material).
In addition, epoxy potting is expensive and prevents both authorized and unauthorized access to the circuitry within the POS terminal. For example, once a circuit is potted it can no longer be accessed for repair and maintenance purposes. This has the undesirable effect of increasing repair and replacement costs and, at least potentially, of reducing manufacturing yields. Furthermore, the epoxy potting process is both lengthy and generates fumes that must be removed by a special ventilation system.
As a result, there is a need for a less expensive, more secure technique for preventing unauthorized access to the circuitry within a POS terminal.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
The system and method of the present invention provide a security system for electronic circuits (e. g.
the electronic circuits within a secure POS terminal) HPti 109926 that is both more tamper resistant and less expensive than the prior art epoxy potting. This is achieved by inserting an electrical connector between a first and a second circuit board contained within a case of the POS
5 terminal. The first and the second circuit boards are any type of circuit board known in the art, including but not limited to, rigid circuit boards, flexible circuit boards, printed circuit boards, etc. If the case is opened the connectors no longer provide an 10 electrical connection between the first and the second circuit boards, triggering a tamper detection circuit.
In some embodiments of the invention, a flexible conductive film is wrapped around the circuit boards and the connector. If a tamperer attempts to drill 15 through the case of the POS terminal to disable the tamper detection circuit, the circuit on the flexible security film is interrupted, in turn triggering the tamper detection circuit.
As a result, the secure POS terminal of the 20 present invention overcomes the limitations of prior art potted terminals. By eliminating the potting process, in fact, the cost of manufacturing the terminal is reduced and there is no need for a special ventilation system. In addition, the circuitry within 25 the terminal can be accessed for repair and maintenance purposes.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
Fig. 1 is a cross°section of a prior art POS
30 terminal.
Fig. 2A shows a POS terminal, in accordance to an embodiment of the present invention.
HP# 1099262 f' Fig. 2B is a cross-section of the POS terminal of Fig. 2A.
Fig. 3A is a diagram illustrating the components of a security fence module, in accordance with an embodiment of the invention.
Fig. 3B is a diagram of an assembled security fence module of Fig. 3A.
Figs. 4A and 4B are a block diagram of the circuitry within the POS terminal of Fig. 2.
Figs. 5A-5F illustrate the process of assembling security fence module of Fig. 3A.
Fig. 6 is a flow diagram of the operation of the tamper detect circuit of Fig. 4A.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
A secure POS terminal 200, in accordance with an embodiment of the invention, is shown in Fig. 2A.
Secure POS terminal 200 includes a keypad 210, a card reader 220 and a display 230. To perform a payment transaction, a user of secure POS terminal 200 slides a card through card reader 220. The transaction details are then displayed to the user on display 230. The user can then enter additional information regarding the transaction, such as a security verification code or a PIN number via keypad 210. The information entered by the user is encrypted and transmitted through a secure communication channel to a bank or other transaction clearinghouse. Once the transaction is approved, the user is notified via display 230.
A cross-section of secure POS terminal 200 is shown in Fig. 2B. The circuitry that receives, stores and processes confidential information within POS
HP# 109926 terminal 200 is encased within security fence module 250. If security fence module 250 is penetrated, a security response is triggered deleting any confidential information contained within secure POS
S terminal 200. In addition, PCBs 260A and 260B are constructed with an inner serpentine trace layer and auxiliary security components 270A and 270B, which are functional components of secure POS terminal 200, are positioned to provide a complete enclosure to security 10 fence module 250 (e.g. on top and on the bottom of security fence module 250). Those skilled in the art realize that arrangements other than the ones described herein could be employed. For instance, if security fence module 250 were positioned in a vertical 15 dimension, PCBs 260A and 260B could be positioned on the left and the right of security fence module 250, again to provide a complete enclosure.
Figs. 3A and 3B are diagrams illustrating a security fence module 300, in accordance with an 20 embodiment of the invention. As shown in Fig. 3A, security fence module 300 includes a security shell 330, a connector holder 335, a security film 340, a security film connector 310 and a keypad connector 320.
Fig. 3B illustrates how the components of Fig. 3A are 25 assembled to form security fence module 300. First, security film 340 is wrapped around security shell 330 in such a manner than one end of security film 340 is placed on an interior surface of security shell 330.
Connector holder 335 is then inserted in security shell 30 330. Security film connector 310 is inserted in connector holder 335 and is held in contact with security film 340 by a clamping action of connector HP# 1099262 holder 335 being inserted into the shell. Similarly, keypad connector 320 is inserted within a holder built into security shell 330.
Figs. 4A and 4B is a block diagram of the circuitry 400 within secure POS terminal 200.
Circuitry 400 includes a system board 410 and a display board 420. A tamper detect circuit 460 is provided in part on system board 410 and in part on display board 420. When security film connector 310 is placed between pads 450A and 450B on system board 410 and display board 420, the two portions of tamper detect circuit 460 are electrically connected. Security film connector 310 is shaped such that it can only provide an electrical connection between pads 450A and 450B
while the case of POS terminal 200 is closed. When the case is opened, security film connector 310 is no longer in contact with both pads 450A and 450B. As a result, tamper detect circuit 460 is triggered by the interruption of the electrical connection between the two portions of tamper detect circuit 460. In addition, since security film connector 310 also provides an electrical connection with security film 340, if security film 340 is tampered with, tamper detect circuit 460 is also triggered by an interruption in the electrical connection.
In some embodiments, the display portion of tamper detect circuit 460 employs a Maxim MAX933 ultra-low-power comparator to monitor the current through security film 340 and serpentine traces on system board 410 and display board 420. If any of the traces on system board 410 and display board 420 or security film 340 are broken, or if two traces of security film '340 HP~ 109926 are short circuit together, the output of the comparator would trigger_ erasing of the on-chip RAM of internal pinpad circuit 490, which renders the circuit non-functional.
Similarly, keypad connector 320 is shaped so as to provide an electrical connection between pads 440A and 440B provided on system board 410 and display board 420 only when the case of POS terminal 200 is closed.
Keypad connector 320 further provides an electrical connection between keyboard 470 and processor 480.
Since this connection is contained within security fence module 300, the connection between keyboard 470 microprocessor 480 is secured. Thus, both security film connector 310 and keypad connector 320 act as case-open connectors.
During assembly of POS terminal 200, an assembled security fence module 300 (Fig. 3B) is placed between system board 410 and display board 420. As a result, the circuitry encased by system board 410, display board 420, security shell 330 and wire mesh security film 340 cannot be physically accessed without interrupting a circuit connected to tamper detect circuit 460.
As shown in Figs. 4A and 4B, the circuits protected by security fence module 300 are processor 480, tamper detect circuit 460, internal pinpad circuit 490 and the interface between processor 480 and keyboard 470 provided by keypad connector 320.
In some embodiments of the invention, processor 480 is a Motorola 68302 processor running at 15 MHz.
The Motorola 68302 processor is a 32-bit processor with interrupt controller, 1152 bytes of on-chip dual ported _7_ HPit 1099262(.
RAM, a DMA controller, 3 serial ports, a communications co-processor, 2 parallel ports, 3 timers, an address decoder and bus interface circuitry. The 68032 processor further supports a 24-bit address bus and a selectable 8- or 16-bit data bus. In some embodiments, the 8-bit data bus mode is selected.
In some embodiments, internal pinpad circuit 490 includes an 8Mhz clock and a Mitsubishi 38207 processor with 16k bytes MASK ROM, 512 bytes RAM, and 2k bytes EPROM. When the tamper detection circuit 460 detects an attempt to tamper with the circuitry within POS
terminal 200, internal pinpad circuit 490 is disconnected from the power supply via FET and shorted to ground via two additional redundant FET circuits.
When this happens, the internal RAM of internal pinpad circuit 490 is erased.
As Shawn in Figs. 4A and 4B, POS terminal 200 further includes a 3 track magnetic card reader, a vacuum fluorescent display that can display 2 rows of 16 characters each, where each character is made up by a 5x7 dot matrix, a serial to parallel converter, a 256k x 8-bit flash memory with a maximum access time of 90 nanoseconds that stores operating system software used during the operation of POS terminal 200, a static RAM having a capacity of up to lMbyte with a maximum access time of 70 nanoseconds, a display timer, a watchdog timer, an electronic cash register (ECR) interface, an RS232 interface, a LAN/RS232 interface, a power supply, a power failure detect circuit and a backup battery.
Figs. 5A-5F illustrate the process of assembling security fence module 300. Fig. 5A shows a single _g_ HP# 109926:
molded plastic structure that includes both security shell 330 and connector holder 335. In step 1, connector holder 335 is separated from security shell 330. In step 2 (Fig.SB), one end of security film 340 is inserted into security shell 330 using a locating pin to secure it into place. In step 3 (Fig. 5C), connector holder 335 is inserted within security shell 330. Security film connector 310 is then inserted into connector holder 335. Similarly, keypad connector 320 is inserted in a slot of security shell 330. In step 4 (Fig. 5D), connector holder 335 is snapped into place into an appropriate holder provided within security shell 330. In step 5 (Fig. 5E), security film 340 is wrapped around and attached using a self-adhesive film to an outside surface of security shell 330. Finally, in step 6 (Fig, 5F) Security film connector 310 and keypad connector 320 are centered within security shell 330 to form an assembled security fence module 300, as shown in Fig. 3B.
Fig. 6 is a flow diagram of the operation 600 of tamper detect circuit 460 (Fig. 4A). Initially, in stage 610, tamper detect circuit monitors the current in the circuit contained in security fence module 300 e.g. by comparing a detected voltage level to a preset level). Stage 620 then determines whether the circuit has been disrupted, in which case operation 600 proceeds to stage 630» Otherwise, stages 610 and 620 are repeated until a disruption in the circuit is detected. In stage 630, the on-chip R.AM of internal pinpad circuit 490 is erased to prevent unauthorized access to the information stored therein and render the pinpad circuitry non-operational.
_g_ HP# 1099262C
In some embodiments, the security system described above is used to protect sensitive circuits in devices other than a POS terminal. In fact, the security system of the present invention can be used to protect any type of electronic circuitry that stores sensitive and/or confidential information during operation and that may be tampered with. Tn such embodiments, a security fence module is provided that is shaped to conform to the circuits or portions of circuits to be protected by the security system. A tamper detection circuit is employed to monitor a voltage within a circuit contained in the security fence module and appropriate security measures are taken in the event tampering with the security fence module is detected.
Embodiments described above illustrate but do not limit the invention. For example, connectors other than elastomeric connectors could be used in place of the elastomeric connectors described herein.
Furthermore, the invention is not limited to any specific shape or placement of the security fence module. Numerous modifications and variations are possible in accordance to the principles of the present invention, as described by the following claims.

Claims (28)

1. A security system for an electronic circuit, the system comprising:
a first circuit board;
a second circuit board;
a first electrical connector in contact with the first and the second circuit boards;
and a tamper detection circuit connected to the first electrical connector, wherein the tamper detection circuit detects whether the first electrical connector is in contact with both the first and the second circuit boards.
2. The security system of claim 1, further comprising:
a protective casing interposed between the first and the second circuit boards; and a .flexible conductive film wrapped around the protective casing, wherein the tamper detection circuit detects whether the integrity of the flexible conductive film has been compromised.
3. The security system of claim 2, wherein the flexible conductive film is connected to the first electrical connector.
4. The security system of claim 1, further comprising a second electrical connector in contact with the first and the second circuit boards.
5. The security system of claim 1, wherein the first circuit board further comprises contact pads that provide an electrical path between the first circuit board and the first electrical connector during operation of the electronic circuit.
6. The security system of claim 1, wherein the second circuit board further comprises contact pads that provide an electrical path between the second circuit board and the first electrical connector during operation of the electronic circuit.
7. The security system of claim 1, wherein the first electrical connector comprises an elastomeric material.
8. The security system of claim 1, wherein the first electrical connector comprises a conductive layer of silicone.
9. The security system of claim 8, wherein the conductive layer of silicone contains,carbon fibers.
10. The security system of claim 8, wherein the first electrical connector further comprises a non-conductive layer of silicone.
11. The security system of claim 1, wherein the tamper detect circuit comprises a voltage comparator.
12. The security system of claim 1, further comprising:
a protective casing interposed between the first and the second circuit boards; and a flexible conductive film printed on the outside of the protective casing, wherein the tamper detection circuit detects whether the integrity of the flexible conductive film has been compromised.
13. The security system of claim 12, wherein the flexible conductive film is connected to the first electrical connector.
14. The security system of claim 1, wherein the security system is part of a secure POS terminal.
15. A method for securing information in an electronic circuit, the method comprising:
monitoring a current through a circuit connected to a tamper detect circuit;
determining based on the monitoring whether the electronic circuit is being tampered with; and erasing and/or corrupting information stored in the electronic circuit in response to detecting tampering with the electronic circuit.
16. The method of claim 15, wherein the circuit further comprises:
a first circuit board;
a second circuit board;
a first electrical connector in contact with the first and the second circuit boards;
and wherein the tamper detection circuit is connected to the electrical connector and detects whether the first electrical connector is in contact with both the first and the second circuit boards.
17. The method of claim 15, wherein the circuit further comprises:
a protective casing interposed between the first and the second circuit boards; and a flexible conductive film wrapped around the protective casing; and wherein the method further comprises detecting whether the integrity of the flexible conductive film has been compromised.
18. The method of claim 17, wherein the flexible conductive film is connected to the first electrical connector.
19. The method of claim 16, wherein the circuit further comprises a second electrical connector in contact with the first and the second circuit boards.
20. The method of claim 16, wherein the first board further comprises contact pads that provide an electrical path between the first circuit board and the electrical connector during operation of the electronic circuit.
21. The method o.f claim 16, wherein the second circuit board further comprises contact pads that provide an electrical path between the second circuit board and the electrical connector during operation of the electronic circuit.
22. The method of claim 16, wherein the first electrical connector comprises an elastomeric material.
23. The method of claim 16, wherein the first electrical connector comprises a conductive layer of silicone.
24. The method of claim 22, wherein the conductive layer of silicone contains carbon fibers.
25. The method of claim 22, wherein the first electrical connector further comprises a non-conductive layer of silicone.
26. The method of claim 15, wherein the tamper detects circuit comprises a voltage comparator to determine whether the electronic circuit is being tampered with.
27. The method of claim 15, further comprising:
disconnecting a memory storing the information from a power source; and grounding the memory power input.
28. The method of claim 15, wherein the electronic circuit is part of a secure POS terminal.
CA2349145A 2000-06-01 2001-05-29 Point of sale (pos) terminal security system Expired - Lifetime CA2349145C (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US09/586,678 2000-06-01
US09/586,678 US6646565B1 (en) 2000-06-01 2000-06-01 Point of sale (POS) terminal security system

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CA2349145A1 CA2349145A1 (en) 2001-12-01
CA2349145C true CA2349145C (en) 2011-01-04

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US (2) US6646565B1 (en)
EP (1) EP1160647B1 (en)
AU (1) AU781587B2 (en)
CA (1) CA2349145C (en)
DE (1) DE60130829T2 (en)

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US6646565B1 (en) 2003-11-11
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US6917299B2 (en) 2005-07-12
CA2349145A1 (en) 2001-12-01

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