CN102026201B - Game type selection-based method for realizing dynamic spectrum allocation - Google Patents

Game type selection-based method for realizing dynamic spectrum allocation Download PDF

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CN102026201B
CN102026201B CN 201010591646 CN201010591646A CN102026201B CN 102026201 B CN102026201 B CN 102026201B CN 201010591646 CN201010591646 CN 201010591646 CN 201010591646 A CN201010591646 A CN 201010591646A CN 102026201 B CN102026201 B CN 102026201B
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crbs
frequency spectrum
spectrum
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任品毅
吴广恩
王熠晨
龚敏康
尹稳山
晏双成
张世娇
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Xian Jiaotong University
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Abstract

The invention relates to a game type selection-based method for realizing dynamic spectrum allocation. With the development of the wireless communication technology, the traditional fixed spectrum allocation mode which leads to the waste of resources and has low spectrum utilization rate, has become the key factor of limiting the further development of the wireless communication network. The cognitive radio-based dynamic spectrum allocation technology is considered as a key technology for effectively solving the problem. In the method of the invention, by comparing the perfect dynamic game with the return of Nash Bargaining, the cognitive base station and the secondary user can separately choose an optimal strategy flexibly and fairly, namely an optimal spectrum quoted unit price and a spectrum purchase quantity. Meanwhile, in order to realize the selection operations of the both sides, a simple spectrum access procedure is designed to be compatible with the traditional mobile call access procedure. By adopting the invention, the returns of the cognitive base station and the secondary user can be effectively increased and the spectrum utilization can be promoted.

Description

The implementation method of the dynamic frequency spectrum deployment of selecting based on game types
Technical field
The invention belongs to the dynamic spectrum resource management method for designing of the cognition network of wireless communication technology field, relate in particular to a kind of implementation method of the dynamic frequency spectrum deployment of selecting based on game types.
Background technology
Along with the sustainable growth of radio communication service demand, the frequency range that is suitable at present radio communication service has become very crowded, and regulator has realized that traditional fixed frequency spectrum mode is unusual poor efficiency.Dynamic frequency spectrum deployment based on cognitive radio allows secondary user's (unauthorized user) under the prerequisite of not disturbing naive user (authorized user) communication, with the idle frequency range of the mode dynamic access naive user consulting and select a good opportunity, thereby improve the availability of frequency spectrum.Therefore, dynamic frequency spectrum deployment is considered to alleviate the wireless frequency spectrum shortage, improves one of key technology of the availability of frequency spectrum.
In cognition wireless network, subscriber equipment equipment has certain cognitive ability, and the frequency spectrum decision-making of unique user can be subject to the impact of self other users' decision-making; Simultaneously, user's decision-making is autonomous.Therefore, game theoretical model is the common tool of research trends spectrum allocation may, and many scholars have launched research to this.Zhu has provided the summary based on game theoretic dynamic frequency spectrum deployment research.Zhao etc. utilize game theory that cognition network is carried out Performance Evaluation, and have provided measure and utility function.Be the QoS of assurance PU and the BER requirement of SU, Attar etc. have proposed a kind of distribution frame based on cooperative game and Na Shi negotiation.For user's selfish characteristic, Wang etc. have proposed the Mechanism Design problem, become player's best strategy so that tell the truth.Wu etc. have proposed a kind of repeated game model based on punishment, so that the user has the real information of motivation exchange oneself.Frequency spectrum leasing and secondary frequency spectrum trade market are the important kind that realizes dynamic frequency spectrum deployment.Jayaweera etc. have studied the dynamic spectrum Rental of having realized heterogeneous network by the game of power control.In the secondary frequency spectrum marketing model of the foundation such as Niyato, a plurality of PU launch non-cooperative game for winning SU.Mihaela etc. utilize Stochastic Game to analyze multiple centralized and distributed secondary frequency spectrum access market, and have provided the optimal policy that can satisfy effectiveness and fairness tolerance target.Huang and Gandhi have analyzed the Auction Game Theory problem under the interference-limited constraint.
Existing research supposes that the game types of dynamic frequency spectrum deployment is constant more, and in fact, player's game types can change with Requirement along with different bidding in the spectrum allocation may process.The bid that can reduce oneself such as CRBS to be exchanging more spectrum requirement for, thereby improves the income of oneself.In this patent, we have studied also is the access request that multiple types of terminals equipment is faced in cognitive base station, how to improve the income of oneself, the spectrum utilization of encouraging simultaneously the user by man-to-man Pricing Game.Studies show that the base station can select game types to maximize the income of oneself according to the spectrum utilization ability of SU neatly, does not damage the income of SU simultaneously, and encourages the spectrum utilization of SU.The spectrum allocation may flow process that proposes can guarantee carrying out smoothly of game effectively, and compatible with existing flow process.
Summary of the invention
The object of the present invention is to provide a kind of repayment that effectively increases cognitive base station and secondary user's, and promote the implementation method of the dynamic frequency spectrum deployment of selecting based on game types of spectrum utilization.
For achieving the above object, the technical solution used in the present invention is: in communication scenes, cognitive base station (cognitive radio base station, CRBS) and the behavior of secondary user's (secondary users, SU) had with the next stage:
(1) CRBS proposes frequency spectrum quotation w;
(2) SU observes (and acceptance) w, selects subsequently frequency spectrum use amount L;
(3) repayment of CRBS and SU is respectively U (w, L) and π (w, L);
For any quotation w that CRBS in the phase I proposes, SU decides optimum spectrum requirement L by maximizing its repayment in second stage *(w), namely
max L ≥ 0 π ( w , L ) = max L ≥ 0 { R ( L ) - wL }
Try to achieve optimum spectrum requirement L *(w);
Backstepping is to the phase I, and CRBS selects w *Make U (w *, L *(w *)) reaching maximization, this quotation is called as the optimum quotation per unit under the dynamic game, is designated as the solution of following formula:
max w ≥ 0 U ( w , L * ( w ) )
If launch to receive assorted negotiation with regard to a frequency spectrum use between CRBS and the SU, if both sides can not reach an agreement, then both sides' utility level all is 0; If both sides reach an agreement, the utility level of CRBS is u 1, the utility level of SU is π 1, corresponding optimization aim is:
max w , L U ( w , L ) π ( w , L )
Get the CRBS optimal spectrum quotation per unit w of this moment BWith SU optimal spectrum purchase volume L B
Method for allocating dynamic frequency spectrums is as follows:
(1) CRBS periodically announces the repayment function U (w, L) of oneself, and SU announces the repayment function π (w, L) of oneself in the networking initialization procedure;
(2) CRBS proposes the frequency spectrum w that initially offers *, this quotation is the optimum bid of the CRBS in the conventional dynamic game;
(3) SU observes w *, and at oneself dynamic optimal spectrum use amount L *With Nash negotiation solution frequency spectrum use amount L BIn select one and report CRBS;
(4) CRBS is that SU assigns corresponding frequency spectrum quantity, but contract quoting is at L *Be w *, at L BBe w B, SU will offer as agreed and repay the frequency spectrum cost of use.
The present invention is by the repayment of more complete and perfect dynamic game and Na Shi negotiation, and cognitive base station and secondary user's can be selected optimal strategy separately, i.e. optimum frequency spectrum quotation per unit and frequency spectrum purchase volume flexibly liberally.Simultaneously, for realizing both sides' selection operation, designed a kind of simple frequency spectrum access process, compatible with traditional mobile calls access process.Can effectively increase the repayment of cognitive base station and secondary user's, and promote spectrum utilization.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the spectrum allocation may figure of the cognitive residential quarter of multiple access;
Fig. 2 is the poor efficiency figure of dynamic game equilibrium;
Fig. 3 is that the repayment function of CRBS and SU is with the situation of change (DG: dynamic game of α; NB: receive assorted negotiation);
Fig. 4 is that α changes the impact (DG: dynamic game on SU frequency spectrum purchase volume; NB: receive assorted negotiation);
Fig. 5 is that α changes the impact (DG: dynamic game on CRBS frequency spectrum quotation per unit; NB: receive assorted negotiation).
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing the present invention is described in further detail.
Consider the scene of single cognitive multiple access residential quarter, as shown in Figure 1.Cognitive base station has the usable spectrum that obtains in secondary frequency spectrum marketing, and can reshuffle flexibly self with and the terminal communication of polytype (such as types such as WCDMA, CDMA2000EV-DO).Dissimilar users (SU) needing from the communication of acquisition frequency spectrum in base station with oneself to thirst in the residential quarter.Because the spectrum opportunities of CRBS is paid acquisition, so being necessary for the frequency spectrum use of oneself, SU pays a price.CRBS proposes the unit frequency spectrum and uses price w, has used the SU of L unit's frequency spectrum to need to pay expense wL to CRBS.
The repayment function of supposing CRBS is U (w, L).Obviously
Figure BDA0000038469800000041
Be that U is the increasing function of quotation w and use amount L.The repayment function of SU is π (w, L)=R (L)-wL, and wherein R (L) is the communication revenue function of SU.Obviously, income is larger more at most for the frequency spectrum that SU uses, but the marginal benefit that its frequency spectrum uses is then more and more less.Therefore, R (L) is the increasing function of L and is concave function.R ' (0)=∞, R ' (∞)=0, namely R ' (L) ∈ [0, ∞).
In the communication scenes of routine, the behavior of CRBS and SU had with the next stage:
(1) CRBS proposes frequency spectrum quotation w;
(2) SU observes (and acceptance) w, selects subsequently frequency spectrum use amount L;
(3) repayment of CRBS and SU is respectively U (w, L) and π (w, L).
Therefore, CRBS and SU all are faced with and how obtain maximum repayment in the frequency spectrum transaction.
For SU, it is clear knows that the repayment U (w, L) of CRBS is equal to the in-and-out price difference of frequency spectrum, namely has:
U(w,L)=(w-w 0)L
W wherein 0Be CRBS per unit frequency spectrum secondary market transaction cost.Obviously, w 〉=w 0〉=0.
CRBS can be configured to different mode and communicate by letter with SU, for example be converted to the CDMA2000 pattern to satisfy the access request of certain EV-DO type SU from the WCDMA pattern, then CRBS knows the complete characteristic of knowing the CDMA2000 terminal, therefore, it also knows the structure of the repayment function π (w, L) of SU.Simply, order:
π(w,L)=R(L)-wL
R ( L ) = L
The repayment function (net profit) of SU equals frequency spectrum and uses income R (L) to deduct cost of use wL.It is the increasing function of L that the frequency spectrum of SU uses income, but its growth slows down gradually.This can explain like this: have more frequency spectrum, SU just can carry out more business (such as video calling) or improve the professional income (as reducing power consumption) that obtains; But, L hour, the frequency spectrum purchase volume can not satisfy the business of SU carries out, and increases purchase volume and can improve significantly business income; When L was larger, the traffic load of SU was substantially saturated, increased purchase volume and promoted very little to improving business income.
Because the version of repayment function is known to the both sides before transaction beginning and CRBS and SU all can observe the other side's action, sees that according to game theoretic viewpoint this communication scenes is a complete and perfect dynamic game.Player 1 is CRBS, and its strategic space is { to propose frequency spectrum quotation w}; Player 2 is SU, and its strategic space is { to determine frequency spectrum use amount L}.
For complete and perfect dynamic game, can use reverse induction to find the solution.
For any quotation w that CRBS in the phase I proposes, SU decides optimum spectrum requirement L by maximizing its repayment in second stage *(w), namely
max L ≥ 0 π ( w , L ) = max L ≥ 0 { R ( L ) - wL }
By first-order condition R ' (L)=w solves:
L * = L * ( w ) = 1 4 w 2
Backstepping is to the phase I now, and CRBS selects then w *Make U (w *, L *(w *)) reach maximization, namely CRBS in the target of phase I is
max w ≥ 0 U ( w , L * ( w ) )
Can obtain best CRBS quotation and corresponding SU use amount is:
w * = 2 w 0 L * = 1 16 w 0 2
Then after complete and perfect information game, both sides' income is:
U = 1 16 w 0 π = 1 8 w 0
Fig. 2 has provided the picture specification of above solution procedure.U 2And U 0Be the indifference curve of CRBS, (w, the L) of all each points combination brings identical repayment to CRBS on the indifference curve, obviously U 2>U 0π 2And π 0The indifference curve (waiting acknowledge line) of SU, when using identical frequency spectrum quantity (income is identical), the quotation that the upper curve correspondence is larger, obviously π 2>π 0L *(w) be the optimal spectrum purchase volume of the different quotations of SU reply CRBS, therefore, curve L *(w) and the point of contact of CRBS indifference curve be exactly the equilibrium point of game.
Obviously, if the combined spot of w and L is arranged in Fig. 2 dash area, namely the quotation of CRBS is than w *Reduce, the frequency spectrum purchase volume of SU is than L *(w *) increase, then the repayment of CRBS and SU all can improve simultaneously, and namely new combined spot is Pareto Efficiency with respect to the equilibrium point.
Carrying out unlimited repeated game can be so that the game both sides selects the strategy combination of Pareto Efficiency, and still, the mobility of SU and professional bursting property are so that the probability that infinite repeated game occurs is very little.A more real model is to receive assorted bargaining model, also is to use the expansion consultation with regard to a frequency spectrum between CRBS and the SU, if both sides can not reach an agreement, then both sides' utility level all is 0; If both sides reach an agreement, the utility level of CRBS is u 1, the utility level of SU is π 1Corresponding optimization aim is:
max w , L U ( w , L ) π ( w , L )
In view of U (w, L) and π (w, L) are continuous function while bounded on the domain of definition, so must there be optimal solution in the problems referred to above, and the assorted negotiation of namely receiving can obtain (u 1, π 1), the both sides that then participate in the frequency spectrum transaction have two selections, dynamic game or the assorted negotiation of receiving.
Find the solution this optimization problem, can be at point
w B = 3 2 w 0 L B = 1 4 w 0 2
Obtain maximum:
U B = 1 8 w 0 π B = 1 8 w 0
The cotype dynamic game compares, and both sides' effectiveness that the assorted negotiation of obviously receiving obtains is better than the effectiveness of dynamic game.This mainly is the quotation that reduces oneself by CRBS, has encouraged the frequency spectrum of SU to use, thereby improved the repayment of oneself under the prerequisite of not damaging the SU repayment.
The Ruo Nashi negotiation is more excellent solution, and then CRBS or SU wish participating in this negotiation.Wish that such as CRBS SU can improve the frequency spectrum use amount when oneself reduces quotation.But the analyzing examples of front shows, this moment, SU can not make a profit the assorted negotiation from receiving, and therefore, its strategy can be to keep original purchase volume, and this can damage the interests of CRBS.Therefore, need to introduce certain constraint so that both sides participate in receives in the assorted negotiation under the prerequisite of not damaging number one.
For this reason, introduce new spectrum allocation may flow process:
(1) CRBS periodically announces the repayment function U (w, L) of oneself, and SU announces the repayment function π (w, L) of oneself in the networking initialization procedure;
(2) CRBS proposes the frequency spectrum w that initially offers *
(3) SU observes w *, calculate and at oneself dynamic optimal spectrum use amount L *With Nash negotiation solution frequency spectrum use amount L BIn select one and report CRBS;
(4) CRBS is that SU assigns corresponding frequency spectrum quantity, but contract quoting is at L *Be w *, at L BBe w BSU will offer as agreed and repay the frequency spectrum cost of use.
The frequency spectrum that SU uses is that CRBS distributes, so its purchase volume need to be through the affirmation of CRBS.As the base station that long-term communication service is provided can be for the profit of once transaction wrong valuation (demand L BThe time by the quotation w *Charging) or the wrong frequency spectrum quantity of paying, can damage like this prestige of oneself.Therefore, it is feasible receiving assorted negotiation.
Analyze now the optimal policy of CRBS and SU under general situation.Both sides' repayment function is as follows:
U(w,L)=(w-w 0)L
π(w,L)=R(L)-wL
R(L)=L α?α∈(0,1)
Be cost price w 0Be variable, the income of SU also is variable.Then in dynamic game, quotation and the frequency spectrum purchase volume that can obtain the best are:
w * = w 0 α L * = ( w 0 α 2 ) 1 α - 1
Corresponding both sides' repayment this moment is:
U 0 = ( α - α 2 ) ( w 0 α 2 ) α α - 1 π 0 = ( 1 - α ) ( w 0 α 2 ) α α - 1
Best quotation and frequency spectrum purchase volume is after the assorted negotiation receiving:
w B = w 0 α α + 1 2 L B = ( w 0 α ) 1 α - 1
Corresponding both sides' repayment this moment is:
U B = 1 - α 2 ( w 0 α ) α α - 1 π B = 1 - α 2 ( w 0 α ) α α - 1
Can find out from top formula no matter be dynamic game or receive assorted negotiation, given both sides' repayment function, it is very little that the player makes more required amount of calculation.Therefore, the selection of this spectrum allocation may strategy can be carried out fast in existing type equipment and base station survey.
Can prove that for SU the superiority of assorted negotiation received depends on the parameter alpha in the revenue function.And CRBS always wishes to receive assorted negotiation.Less cost price can encourage frequency spectrum to use simultaneously.This provides an instrument that the regulation and control frequency spectrum uses for frequency spectrum supervision mandate department.
Utilize Matlab software that the conclusion that obtains is previously carried out the system emulation checking.The cost price that Fig. 3 has provided at CRBS is 1 o'clock, and the variation of α is on the impact of CRBS and the final repayment of SU.Can find out that when α<0.5, SU tends to dynamic game, and in α>0.5 o'clock, the assorted negotiation that participates in receiving will bring more income for SU.This is consistent with the conclusion in 3.4.For CRBS, the repayment of negotiation (note the repayment curve of this moment and SU negotiation repayment curve overlap) always be better than dynamic game.
The cost price that Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 have provided respectively at CRBS is 1 o'clock, and the variation of α is on the impact of SU frequency spectrum purchase volume and CRBS quotation per unit.Can find out that the quotation the when quotation of CRBS when participating in receiving assorted negotiation always is lower than dynamic game correspondingly therewith is that SU always is higher than the purchase volume of dynamic game receiving frequency spectrum purchase volume after the assorted negotiation.This has verified that the analysis conclusion of Fig. 2: CRBS can reduce bid and use more frequency spectrum with stimulation SU, thereby improves the repayment (referring to Fig. 3) of self.

Claims (1)

1. the implementation method of the dynamic frequency spectrum deployment of selecting based on game types is characterized in that:
In communication scenes, the behavior of cognitive base station CRBS and secondary user's SU had with the next stage:
(1) CRBS proposes frequency spectrum quotation w;
(2) SU observes and accepts w, selects subsequently frequency spectrum use amount L;
(3) the repayment function of CRBS and SU is respectively U (w, L) and π (w, L);
For any quotation w that CRBS in the phase I proposes, SU decides optimum spectrum requirement L by maximizing its repayment function in second stage *(w), namely
max L ≥ 0 π ( w , L ) = max L ≥ 0 { R ( L ) - wL }
Try to achieve optimum spectrum requirement L *(w), wherein R (L) is the communication revenue function of SU;
Backstepping is to the phase I, and CRBS selects w *Make U (w *, L *(w *)) reaching maximization, this quotation is called as the optimum quotation per unit under the dynamic game, is designated as the solution of following formula:
max w ≥ 0 U ( w , L * ( w ) )
If launch to receive assorted negotiation with regard to a frequency spectrum use between CRBS and the SU, if both sides can not reach an agreement, then both sides' utility level all is 0; If both sides reach an agreement, the utility level of CRBS is u 1, the utility level of SU is π 1, corresponding optimization aim is:
max w , L U ( w , L ) π ( w , L )
Get the CRBS optimal spectrum quotation per unit w of this moment BWith SU Nash negotiation solution frequency spectrum use amount L B
Method for allocating dynamic frequency spectrums is as follows:
(1) CRBS periodically announces the repayment function U (w, L) of oneself, and SU announces the repayment function π (w, L) of oneself in the networking initialization procedure;
(2) CRBS proposes the frequency spectrum w that initially offers *, this quotation is the optimum bid of the CRBS in the conventional dynamic game;
(3) SU observes w *, and at oneself dynamic optimal spectrum use amount L *With Nash negotiation solution frequency spectrum use amount L BIn select one and report CRBS;
(4) CRBS is that SU assigns corresponding frequency spectrum quantity, but contract quoting is at L *Be w *, at L BBe w B, SU will offer as agreed and repay the frequency spectrum cost of use.
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