EP1501256A2 - System and method for automatic negotiation of a security protocol - Google Patents
System and method for automatic negotiation of a security protocol Download PDFInfo
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- EP1501256A2 EP1501256A2 EP04102520A EP04102520A EP1501256A2 EP 1501256 A2 EP1501256 A2 EP 1501256A2 EP 04102520 A EP04102520 A EP 04102520A EP 04102520 A EP04102520 A EP 04102520A EP 1501256 A2 EP1501256 A2 EP 1501256A2
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0807—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using tickets, e.g. Kerberos
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
- H04L63/205—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/14—Session management
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
Abstract
Description
- The invention relates to the field of networked computing, and more particularly to the automatic negotiation of security protocols between a security-enabled domain and one or more external nodes.
- Advances in networking technology have permitted network administrators and others to maintain greater and more sophisticated security controls on their networks and other installations. Microsoft Windows™ NT, 2000 and related products for instance permit administrators to deploy security-enabled network domains using the Active Directory™ (AD) structure. The publicly known Kerberos network standard likewise permits nodes within a network to authenticate each other, using a key/authentication platform. With these operating technologies, a network administrator may be able, for instance, to push rules, applications, patches, drives and other resources from a network server to individual workstations or other clients for uniform installation, on a secure basis. All machines within the security-enabled domain may be able to identify and authenticate the transmission of those and other types of data, transparently.
- However, the ability to deliver rules, applications or other resources to and from a workstation becomes more difficult when that node lies outside the security-enabled domain. For instance, a company may have a collection of computers located on a local area network (LAN) but also interact with computers in a remote location which are not part of the Active Directory™ or other security-enabled domain. Communicating across the boundary of a secure domain becomes more complicated, in part because establishing a connection between a machine internal to the domain a machine outside the domain requires that an agreement be reached on a mutually supported security protocol.
- Systems administrators and others are therefore forced to attempt to arrange for the entry of an external agent or node into the security-enable domain by identifying a compatible protocol between the internal and external machines, before the session takes place. For instance, an external node may be configured to communicate via a transport layer security (TLS) protocol, a Kerberos-based protocol, a secure socket layer (SSL) or other protocol with an administrative server within the security-enabled domain. That machine may in turn may in that protocol its default protocol, indicate a protocol failure, request that the protocol be switched, or make other responses to the external node or agent. Manual setting or adjusting of the security, transport and other protocols may therefore be required, a process which may be time consuming and prone to error. Other problems exist.
- The invention overcoming these and other problems in the art relates in one regard to a system and method for automatic negotiation of a security protocol, in which secure communications with an external agent or node may be established and identities authenticated, on an automated basis without a need for administrator intervention. According to the invention in one regard, a network manager or other agent or node within a security-enabled domain may initiate an attempt to establish a secure connection with an external agent or node. That request may contain a data field indicating a set of security protocols available for use by the manager. The external agent may receive the request and compare the protocols available to the internal agent or manager to a set of protocols supported by the external agent. If a match between available protocols is found, communications may proceed based on that selected protocol. In embodiments, each of the external agent and internal agent may authenticate each other, via a key, certificate, or other authentication mechanism.
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- Fig. 1 illustrates a network architecture in which an embodiment of the invention may operate.
- Fig. 2 illustrates a negotiation process between an internal node and an external node, according to an embodiment of the invention.
- Fig. 3 illustrates a comparison between protocol tables, according to an embodiment of the invention.
- Fig. 4 illustrates overall protocol negotiation processing, according to an embodiment of the invention.
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- Fig. 1 illustrates an architecture in which a protocol negotiation platform and method may operate, according to an embodiment of the invention. As illustrated, in the illustrated embodiment a set of clients, servers, agents or other nodes or machines may operate in a security-enabled
domain 102. Security-enabled domain may in embodiments be or include, for instance, Microsoft Windows™ Active Directory™, a Kerberos or other certificate-based or key-based domain, or other closed or secure distributed directory or other environment. Illustratively shown within security-enabled domain are aninternal manager 104, which in embodiments may be or include a server or other node, as well as a set of internal agents 106 (illustrated as A1, A2 ... AN, N arbitrary). - In embodiments the set of
internal agents 106 may consist of or include additional servers, workstations or other clients, or other internal agents or nodes operating within the security-enableddomain 102 and communicating withinternal manager 104. In embodiments theinternal manager 104 may schedule or perform network administrative functions, such as transmitting or "pushing" network rules or other data to the set ofinternal agents 106, such as operating guidelines for storage (e.g. RAID policies, failover criteria, memory limits), bandwidth utilization or other rules or data. When communicating these or other types of data, theinternal manager 104 and set ofinternal agents 106 may take advantage of the security resources of security-enabled domain to ensure the integrity of the network and the distribution of rules and other data. - As illustrated, in embodiments the security-enabled
domain 102 may provide authentication services, for instance using certificates such ascertificate 108, which may in embodiments be or include as a certificate configured according to X.509 or other standards or formats. In embodiments keys or other mechanisms may likewise be used. As illustrated,certificate 108 may be associated with and provide authentication data for theinternal manager 104. Any one of the set ofinternal agents 106 may authenticate the rules, instructions or other data received from theinternal manager 104 by communicatingcertificate 108 to acertificate authority 110 for verification.Certificate authority 110 may itself be located within security-enableddomain 102, or as illustrated be located outside the security-enableddomain 102. - In embodiments, the
certificate authority 110 may be or include a server or other node configured to read and decodecertificate 108 or other authentication mechanisms, and return results to the set ofinternal agents 106 or other nodes. Each of the nodes in the set ofinternal agents 106 may likewise have associated with them a certificate, key or other authentication data compatible with the security-enableddomain 102. Nodes in the set ofinternal agents 106 may likewise communicate with and mutually authenticate each other, using certificate or other mechanisms. - In the embodiment illustrated in Fig. 1, an
external agent 114 may likewise be configured to communicate withinternal manager 104 viacommunications network 112. Theexternal agent 114 may also be or include a server, workstation or other node or resource. Theexternal agent 114 may likewise have associated with it acertificate 116 identifying theexternal agent 114 for authentication. Thecommunications network 112 through whichexternal agent 114 may communicate withinternal manager 104 or other internal nodes in embodiments may be, include or interface to any one or more of, for instance, the Internet, an intranet, a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), a metropolitan area network (MAN), a storage area network (SAN), a frame relay connection, an Advanced Intelligent Network (AIN) connection, a synchronous optical network (SONET) connection, a digital T1, T3, E1 or E3 line, Digital Data Service (DDS) connection, an ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode) connection, an FDDI (Fiber Distributed Data Interface), CDDI (Copper Distributed Data Interface) or other wired, wireless or optical connection. Theexternal agent 114 may in embodiments be or include a workstation, server, wireless network-enabled device, or other node, agent or platform configured for networked communications. - Unlike prior implementations of cross-domain communication, according to embodiments of the invention the
external agent 114 may initiate contact with theinternal manager 104 to establish a secure connection based on a mutually compatible protocol with manually selecting a compatible protocol, in an automatic and transparent fashion. As illustrated for instance in Fig. 2, anexternal application 130 executing onexternal agent 114 may initiate contact withinternal manager 104 viaexternal negotiation engine 126.External application 130 may be or include a systems utility, productivity or other application, such as, for instance, a data backup scheduler, a firewall, virus protection or other application.External application 130 may for example require user profiles, updates or other data to perform various tasks and therefore initiate such communication withinternal manager 104. - The
external negotiation engine 126 may process and manage the communication requested by theexternal application 130, to establish a mutually compatible communications link to theinternal manager 104 in security-enableddomain 102. As illustrated, in embodiments theexternal negotiation engine 126 may initiate and manage anegotiation module 118, illustrated as an implementation of the publicly known Simple and Protected GSS-API Negotiation (SPNEGO) protocol. Other protocols may be used. In embodiments,negotiation module 118 may be accessed, initiated or generated via an operating system ofexternal agent 114, for instance via an application programming interface (API) or other mechanisms. - The
external negotiation engine 126 may likewise include or generate anexternal transport specifier 120 indicating a message-based or other channel whichexternal agent 114 may employ to execute the protocol negotiation process. For instance, in embodiments theexternal transport specifier 120 may specify a Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI) protocol, as part of the Microsoft .NET architecture, permittingexternal application 130 or other software or modules to access for instance dynamic link libraries (dlls) or other resources supporting standard cryptographic or other encoding schemes. Other protocols may be used or specified inexternal transport specifier 120. Theexternal negotiation engine 126 may consequently communicate a datagram indicating that or other data to aninternal negotiation engine 128 associated withinternal manager 104, as illustrated in Fig. 2. -
Internal negotiation engine 128 may likewise include or interface to anegotiation module 122 andinternal transport specifier 124.Internal negotiation engine 128 may in turn communicate with aninternal application 132 executing on or accessed byinternal manager 104.Internal application 132 may, for example, be or include a systems administration, productivity or other application. Upon receipt of a request to establish communication with theinternal manager 104, theinternal negotiation engine 128 may establish a message-based or other channel withexternal agent 114 viainternal transport specifier 124, for instance confirming channel communications using the SSPI protocol. - With a preliminary channel established between
external agent 114 and theinternal manager 104, theexternal negotiation engine 126 andexternal negotiation engine 128 may initiate protocol negotiation and reduction. In embodiments, theexternal agent 114 may transmit an external protocol table 134 as illustrated in Fig. 3 to theinternal manager 104. The external protocol table 134 may specify which protocolsexternal agent 114 may be configured to use. When received by theinternal manager 104, the external protocol table 134 may be compared to an internal protocol table 136, indicating a set of security protocols available for use byinternal manager 104. Either one or external protocol table 134 and internal protocol table 136 may include fields indicating, for example, transport layer security (TLS), secure socket layer (SSL), Kerberos, secure IP (IPSec) or other available protocols or standards. Thenegotiation engine 128 associated with theinternal manager 104 may identify one or more protocols mutually supported byexternal agent 114 andinternal manager 104, as illustrated in Fig. 3. -
Negotiation engine 128 may in embodiments likewise communicate internal protocol table 136 to thenegotiation engine 126 associated withexternal agent 114, for similar protocol comparison.Negotiation engine 126 andnegotiation engine 128 may consequently negotiate the selection of a mutually available protocol to establish secure communications across security-enabled domain. For instance, if only a single common protocol is available to both external agent andinternal manager 104, theexternal agent 114 and theinternal manager 104 may agree to set up a session using that protocol, such as TLS or another protocol. If thenegotiation engine 126 andnegotiation engine 128 agree that no common protocol may be found, the attempt to establish cross-domain communications may be terminated. Conversely, if thenegotiation engine 126 andnegotiation engine 128 identify multiple protocols in common, a protocol may be selected based on network criteria, such as transfer speed, bit depth of keys or other security mechanisms, or other factors. - With a mutually compatible protocol in place, a secure session between
external agent 114 andinternal manager 104 may be established. In embodiments, for added security each ofexternal agent 114 and internal manager may likewise perform authentication steps to verify the identity, privilege level or other security details of the opposite node. As illustrated in Fig. 1, this may be performed using certificates or other security mechanisms.External agent 114 may authenticateinternal manager 104 by communicatingcertificate 108 tocertificate authority 110.Internal manager 104 may conversely authenticateexternal agent 114 by communicatingcertificate 116 tocertificate authority 110. Other security mechanisms may be used. - The type or content of data exchanged between the
external agent 114 andinternal manager 104 may in embodiments depend on the mutual authentication between the two nodes. For instance, access to network administrative rules or parameters may be reserved for internal or external nodes only indicating a given level of access privilege. Other authentication rules or criteria may be used. After the operational security protocol has been established and any authentication processing is complete, theexternal agent 114 andinternal manager 104 may exchange data, applications, rules or other information. When the traffic is complete,negotiation engine 126 andnegotiation engine 128 may release or terminate the communications link. - Overall network negotiation processing according to an embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Fig. 4. In
step 402, processing may begin. Instep 404, a request to establish a secure connection across the security-enablednetwork 102 may be generated in either ofexternal agent 114,internal manager 104 or other clients, agents or nodes. Instep 406, the request to establish a secure connection may be transmitted to the recipient node, whetherinternal manager 104,external agent 114 or another client, agent or node, the request incorporating a first protocol set compatible with the transmitting node. Instep 408, the request may be received by the recipient node. Instep 410, the recipient node whetherinternal manager 104,external agent 114 or another client, agent or node may compare the first protocol set with a second protocol set of the recipient node, to determine if a match may be found amongst available protocols. - If a match is found between the first protocol set and the second protocol set, processing may proceed to step 412 where a determination may be made whether more than one matching protocol has been found. If more than one matching protocol set has been found, processing may proceed to step 414 where one of the matching protocols may be selected for use based on protocol criteria, such as transfer speed, bit depth of keys or other security mechanisms, or other factors. Processing may then proceed to step 416, where a secure connection or session may be initiated between
external agent 114 and theinternal manager 104, based on the selected protocol. Likewise, if instep 412 only one matching protocol is found, processing may proceed to step 416 where a secure connection or session may be initiated. For instance, in embodiments specified ports may be opened under the TCP/IP or other communication or other protocols. - In
step 418, a protocol-specific exchange may be initiated between theexternal agent 114 andinternal manager 104, with handshaking and other steps proceeding according to the matching protocol employed. Instep 420, either one ofexternal agent 114 andinternal manager 104 or both may authenticate the corresponding other node by transmitting the corresponding certificate 116 (of the external agent 114) or certificate 108 (of the internal manager) tocertificate authority 108, as appropriate. In embodiments, thecertificate 116 orcertificate 108 or other security data may be or include certificate objects conforming to the X.509 standard, or other standards or formats. With appropriate authentication complete, processing may proceed to step 422, in which a secure connection or session may be conducted betweenexternal agent 114 andinternal manager 104. For instance, network or other rules may be communicated between the two nodes, for systems administration or other purposes. - When the secure session is complete, processing may proceed to step 424 where the secure connection between the
external agent 114 andinternal manager 104 may be terminated or released. Instep 426, processing may terminate, repeat, return to a prior processing point or take other action. Likewise if no matching protocol may be identified in the determination ofstep 410, processing may proceed to step 426 to terminate, repeat, return to a prior processing point or take other action. - The foregoing description of the invention is illustrative, and modifications in configuration and implementation will occur to persons skilled in the art. For instance, while the invention has generally been described in terms of a single
external agent 114, in embodiments multiple external agents or nodes may be configured to automatically negotiate a matching protocol withinternal manager 104 or other clients or nodes within security-enableddomain 102. Similarly, while an authentication mechanism has generally been described as being supported by asingle authentication entity 110 using X.509 or other standards, in embodiments multiple authentication entities or other authentication or authorization platforms may be used. Other hardware, software or other resources described as singular may in embodiments be distributed, and similarly in embodiments resources described as distributed may be combined. - Moreover, while instances in which one or the other of nodes or agents external to the security-enabled
domain 102 and nodes or agents internal to that domain have been described at times as initiating the negotiation of a secure protocol, it will be understood that any node or agent configured according to the invention, external or internal to the domain, may initiate protocol processing. Likewise either one or both of internal and external agents may initiate authentication of the opposite agent or node. The scope of the invention is accordingly intended to be limited only by the following claims.
Claims (62)
- A method for automatically negotiating a security protocol, comprising: receiving a security authorization request to establish a secure connection between an internal node, the internal node being internal to a security-enabled domain, and an external node, the external node being external to the security-enabled domain; comparing a first protocol set associated with the internal node to a second protocol set associated with the external node; and establishing a secure connection between the external node and the internal node when a matching protocol between the first protocol set and the second protocol set is found.
- A method according to claim 1, wherein the external node comprises at least one of a computer and a network-enabled wireless device.
- A method according to claim 1, wherein the internal node comprises at least one of a client computer and a server.
- A method according to claim 1, wherein the security-enabled domain comprises a distributed directory domain.
- A method according to claim 1, wherein the security-enabled domain comprises a certificate-based domain.
- A method according to claim 5, wherein the certificate-based domain comprises a Kerberos-enabled domain.
- A method according to claim 6, wherein the matching protocol comprises an X.509 certificate.
- A method according to claim 1, wherein the security authorization request is generated by the external node.
- A method according to claim 8, wherein the step of receiving the security authorization request is executed by the internal node.
- A method according to claim 1, wherein the security authorization request is generated by the internal node.
- A method according to claim 10, wherein the step of receiving the security authorization request is executed by the external node.
- A method according to claim 1, further comprising a step of terminating the secure connection when a session between the external node and the internal node is complete.
- A method according to claim 1, further comprising a step of terminating connection processing when no match between the first protocol set and the second protocol set is found.
- A method according to claim 1, further comprising a step of selecting a protocol to use in establishing the secure connection when a plurality of matching protocols are found.
- A method according to claim 1, further comprising a step of authenticating at least one of the internal node and the external node.
- A method according to claim 15, wherein the step of authenticating comprises communicating a certificate to a certificate authority.
- A system for automatically negotiating a security protocol, comprising: a first interface to an internal node, the internal node being internal to a security-enabled domain, the internal node having an associated first protocol set; a second interface to an external node, the external node being external to the security-enabled domain, the external node having an associated second protocol set; and a negotiation engine, the negotiation engine receiving a security authorization request to establish a secure connection between the internal node and the external node, comparing the first protocol set associated with the internal node to the second protocol set associated with the external node, and establishing a secure connection between the external node and the internal node when a matching protocol between the first protocol set and the second protocol set is found.
- A system according to claim 17, wherein the external node comprises at least one of a computer and a network-enabled wireless device.
- A system according to claim 17, wherein the internal node comprises at least one of a client computer and a server.
- A system according to claim 17, wherein the security-enabled domain comprises a distributed directory domain.
- A system according to claim 17, wherein the security-enabled domain comprises a certificate-based domain.
- A system according to claim 21, wherein the certificate-based domain comprises a Kerberos-enabled domain.
- A system according to claim 22, wherein the matching protocol comprises an X.509 certificate.
- A system according to claim 17, wherein the security authorization request is generated by the external node.
- A system according to claim 24, wherein the security authorization request is received by the internal node.
- A system according to claim 17, wherein the security authorization request is generated by the internal node.
- A system according to claim 26, wherein the security authorization request is received by the external node.
- A system according to claim 17, wherein the negotiation engine terminates the secure connection when a session between the external node and the internal node is complete.
- A system according to claim 17, wherein the negotiation engine terminates connection processing when no match between the first protocol set and the second protocol set is found.
- A system according to claim 17, wherein the negotiation engine selects a protocol to use in establishing the secure connection when a plurality of matching protocols are found.
- A system according to claim 17, wherein at least one of the internal node and the external node authenticates the other.
- A system according to claim 31, wherein the authenticating comprises communicating a certificate to a certificate authority.
- A system for automatically negotiating a security protocol, comprising: first interface means for interfacing to an internal node, the internal node being internal to a security-enabled domain, the internal node having an associated first protocol set; second interface means for interfacing to an external node, the external node being external to the security-enabled domain, the external node having an associated second protocol set; and negotiation means, the negotiation means for receiving a security authorization request to establish a secure connection between the internal node and the external node, comparing the first protocol set associated with the internal node to the second protocol set associated with the external node, and establishing a secure connection between the external node and the internal node when a matching protocol between the first protocol set and the second protocol set is found.
- A system according to claim 33, wherein the external node comprises at least one of a computer and a network-enabled wireless device.
- A system according to claim 33, wherein the internal node comprises at least one of a client computer and a server.
- A system according to claim 33, wherein the security-enabled domain comprises a distributed directory domain.
- A system according to claim 36, wherein the security-enabled domain comprises a certificate-based domain.
- A system according to claim 37, wherein the certificate-based domain comprises a Kerberos-enabled domain.
- A system according to claim 38, wherein the matching protocol comprises an X.509 certificate.
- A system according to claim 33, wherein the security authorization request is generated by the external node.
- A system according to claim 40, wherein the security authorization request is received by the internal node.
- A system according to claim 33, wherein the security authorization request is generated by the internal node.
- A system according to claim 42, wherein the security authorization request is received by the external node.
- A system according to claim 33, wherein the negotiation means terminates the secure connection when a session between the external node and the internal node is complete.
- A system according to claim 33, wherein the negotiation means terminates connection processing when no match between the first protocol set and the second protocol set is found.
- A system according to claim 33, wherein the negotiation means selects a protocol to use in establishing the secure connection when a plurality of matching protocols are found.
- A system according to claim 33, wherein at least one of the internal node and the external node authenticates the other.
- A system according to claim 47, wherein the authenticating comprises communicating a certificate to a certificate authority.
- A computer readable medium, the computer readable medium being readable to execute a method for automatically negotiating a security protocol, the method comprising: receiving a security authorization request to establish a secure connection between an internal node, the internal node being internal to a security-enabled domain, and an external node, the external node being external to the security-enabled domain; comparing a first protocol set associated with the internal node to a second protocol set associated with the external node; and establishing a secure connection between the external node and the internal node when a matching protocol between the first protocol set and the second protocol set is found.
- A computer readable medium according to claim 49, wherein the external node comprises at least one of a computer and a network-enabled wireless device.
- A computer readable medium according to claim 49, wherein the internal node comprises at least one of a client computer and a server.
- A computer readable medium according to claim 49, wherein the security-enabled domain comprises a distributed directory domain.
- A computer readable medium according to claim 49, wherein the security-enabled domain comprises a certificate-based domain.
- A computer readable medium according to claim 53, wherein the certificate-based domain comprises a Kerberos-enabled domain.
- A computer readable medium according to claim 54, wherein the matching protocol comprises an X.509 certificate.
- A computer readable medium according to claim 49, wherein the step of generating a security authorization request is executed by the external node.
- A computer readable medium according to claim 56, wherein the step of receiving the security authorization request is executed by the internal node.
- A computer readable medium according to claim 49, wherein the step of generating a security authorization request is executed by the internal node.
- A computer readable medium according to claim 58, wherein the step of receiving the security authorization request is executed by the external node.
- A computer readable medium according to claim 49, wherein the method further comprises a step of terminating the secure connection when a session between the external node and the internal node is complete.
- A computer readable medium according to claim 43, wherein the method further comprises a step of terminating connection processing when no match between the first protocol set and the second protocol set is found.
- A computer readable medium according to claim 43, wherein the method further comprises a step of selecting a protocol to use in establishing the secure connection when a plurality of matching protocols are found.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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US608334 | 2003-06-30 | ||
US10/608,334 US7526640B2 (en) | 2003-06-30 | 2003-06-30 | System and method for automatic negotiation of a security protocol |
Publications (3)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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EP1501256A2 true EP1501256A2 (en) | 2005-01-26 |
EP1501256A3 EP1501256A3 (en) | 2007-02-21 |
EP1501256B1 EP1501256B1 (en) | 2013-07-24 |
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EP04102520.6A Not-in-force EP1501256B1 (en) | 2003-06-30 | 2004-06-04 | System and method for automatic negotiation of a security protocol |
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US (1) | US7526640B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP1501256B1 (en) |
JP (1) | JP4819328B2 (en) |
KR (1) | KR101086576B1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN1578215B (en) |
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WO2007065333A1 (en) * | 2005-12-07 | 2007-06-14 | Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. | A method and system for authenticating the identity |
EP1990969A1 (en) * | 2007-05-09 | 2008-11-12 | Nokia Siemens Networks Oy | Method for data communication and device as well as communication system comprising such device |
WO2015065789A1 (en) | 2013-11-01 | 2015-05-07 | Intuit Inc. | Method and system for automatically managing secure communications in multiple communications jurisdiction zones |
US9684791B2 (en) | 2013-10-14 | 2017-06-20 | Intuit Inc. | Method and system for providing a secure secrets proxy and distributing secrets |
US9894069B2 (en) | 2013-11-01 | 2018-02-13 | Intuit Inc. | Method and system for automatically managing secret application and maintenance |
US10021143B2 (en) | 2013-11-06 | 2018-07-10 | Intuit Inc. | Method and apparatus for multi-tenancy secrets management in multiple data security jurisdiction zones |
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WO2019045861A1 (en) * | 2017-08-29 | 2019-03-07 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc | Detection of the network logon protocol used in pass-through authentication |
US10587611B2 (en) | 2017-08-29 | 2020-03-10 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc. | Detection of the network logon protocol used in pass-through authentication |
US10635829B1 (en) | 2017-11-28 | 2020-04-28 | Intuit Inc. | Method and system for granting permissions to parties within an organization |
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Also Published As
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US7526640B2 (en) | 2009-04-28 |
CN1578215A (en) | 2005-02-09 |
JP4819328B2 (en) | 2011-11-24 |
CN1578215B (en) | 2010-05-12 |
US20040268118A1 (en) | 2004-12-30 |
KR101086576B1 (en) | 2011-11-23 |
KR20050002628A (en) | 2005-01-07 |
EP1501256A3 (en) | 2007-02-21 |
EP1501256B1 (en) | 2013-07-24 |
JP2005025739A (en) | 2005-01-27 |
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