US20060099929A1 - Authentication in a roaming environment - Google Patents
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- US20060099929A1 US20060099929A1 US11/221,466 US22146605A US2006099929A1 US 20060099929 A1 US20060099929 A1 US 20060099929A1 US 22146605 A US22146605 A US 22146605A US 2006099929 A1 US2006099929 A1 US 2006099929A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0815—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities providing single-sign-on or federations
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0892—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities by using authentication-authorization-accounting [AAA] servers or protocols
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
- H04W12/062—Pre-authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/08—Access security
- H04W12/082—Access security using revocation of authorisation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
- H04W36/0005—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off
- H04W36/0011—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection
- H04W36/0033—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information
- H04W36/0038—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information of security context information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
Definitions
- cables and wires are predominately used in communication networks for transferring information such as voice, video, data, etc. from one device to another.
- Devices on a communication network can be generally categorized as two types: servers and clients. Those devices that provide services to other devices are servers; the devices that connect to and utilize the provided services are clients. Typically, cable or wire clients operate within a defined geographical area to report information back to the server.
- authentication of the intended user is a very important element of a mobile communication network.
- One way to authenticate an intended user to a mobile communication network and to allow the intended user to roam from one geographical area to another would be to allow all users to enter the mobile communication network and to authenticate and identify the intended user at a central authentication center (in a central core) of the mobile communication network.
- a central authentication center in a central core of the mobile communication network.
- using the central authentication center to authenticate and identify the intended user would not be ideal because this approach would allow an impersonator to also enter the central core of the mobile communication network and possibly tamper with the mobile communication network.
- a communication network architecture for authenticating a user in a roaming environment.
- the communication network architecture includes a server, a mobile client, a first transceiver station, a second transceiver station, an authentication center, and an authentication interface.
- the first transceiver station defines a first communication area within which the mobile client can communicate with the server.
- the second transceiver station defines a second communication area within which the mobile client can communicate with the server.
- the authentication center is coupled to the first transceiver station and authenticates an intended user of the mobile client to the first transceiver station so that the mobile client can communicate with the server via the first transceiver station.
- a method for authenticating a user of a mobile client and for allowing the mobile client to communicate with a server as the user of the mobile client roams from one communication cell to another communication cell includes coupling an authentication center to a first transceiver station that defines a first communication cell, authenticating the user of the mobile client to access the first transceiver station at the authentication center, and providing an authentication interface between the first transceiver station and a second transceiver station that defines a second communication cell.
- An appropriate authentication credential associated with the authentication of the user at the authentication is then created.
- the credential is then communicated from the first transceiver station to the second transceiver station via the authentication interface. Then, upon receiving by the second transceiver station of the credential, the method recreates the authentication of the user based on the credential received by the second transceiver station.
- FIG. 2 is a more detailed schematic diagram of a mobile client of FIG. 1 ;
- FIG. 3 is a more detailed schematic diagram of a main switching center and an authentication center of FIG. 1 ;
- FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of another mobile communication network architecture pursuant to aspects of the invention.
- FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of yet another mobile communication network architecture pursuant to aspects of the invention.
- FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of a key management system that incorporates stateless key management modules (or stateless modules) pursuant to aspects of the invention.
- FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of a key transfer embodiment between a stateless module and a smartcard pursuant to aspects of the invention.
- mobile terminal 122 may include an International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) that uniquely identifies mobile terminal 122 to network 10 .
- IMEI International Mobile Equipment Identity
- SIM card 124 may be further protected against unauthorized use by a password or personal identity number.
- each transceiver station 14 a , 14 b , 14 c , 14 d includes a radio transceiver that defines a geographical coverage area or cell and provides radio-link protocols with mobile client 12 .
- Base station controllers 16 a , 16 b manage the radio resources for transceiver stations 14 a , 14 b , 14 c , 14 d .
- Base station controllers 16 a , 16 b handle radio-channel setup, frequency hopping, and handovers of transceiver stations 14 a , 14 b , 14 c , 14 d as the mobile client moves from one transceiver station's coverage area (or cell) to another transceiver station's coverage area (e.g., the coverage area of transceiver station 14 d ).
- Central core (or component) 19 of mobile network 10 includes main switching center 18 .
- Main switching center 18 acts like a normal switching node, such as a switching node in a PSTN or ISDN, and additionally provides all the functionality needed to handle a mobile user (subscriber), such as registration, authentication, location updating, handovers, and call routing to a roaming subscriber.
- subscriber a mobile user
- FIG. 1 it is main switching center 18 that provides the connection of mobile client 12 to second network 20 (such as the LAN, the PSTN, the ISDN etc).
- main switching center 18 is shown to be coupled to (or to include) authentication center 17 .
- Authentication center 17 includes authentication register 184 .
- Authentication register 184 is a protected database that stores copies 126 a ′, 126 b ′ of the secret keys (e.g., 126 a , 126 b ) stored in each intended user's (or subscriber's) SIM card (e.g., 124 ), which are used for authentication of an intended user and encryption of data transmitted over mobile network 10 .
- authentication center 17 may include another database (not shown) that contains a list of all valid mobile terminals (e.g., 122 of FIG. 2 ) on network 10 , where each mobile client (e.g., 12 ) is identified by its International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI). An IMEI is marked as invalid if it has been reported stolen or is not type approved.
- IMEI International Mobile Equipment Identity
- a handover (or handoff) mechanism is a mechanism for switching an on-going communication session on a mobile client (e.g., mobile client 12 ) from one transceiver station (e.g., transceiver station 14 c ) and/or radio link (e.g., link 11 a ) to another transceiver station (e.g., station 14 d ) and/or radio link (e.g., link 11 b ).
- transceiver station e.g., transceiver station 14 c
- radio link e.g., link 11 a
- link 11 b transceiver station
- the four types involve switching an on-going session: (1) between radio links or channels (e.g., time slots) in the same transceiver station; (2) between transceiver stations under the control of the same base station controller; (3) between base station controllers under the control of the same main switching center; and (4) between different main switching centers.
- radio links or channels e.g., time slots
- the first two types of handovers can be categorized as internal handovers and involve only one base station controller.
- the last two types of handovers can be categorized as external handovers and are handled by the main switching centers involved.
- Handovers can be initiated by either the mobile client or the main switching center (as a means of traffic load balancing).
- the mobile client e.g., mobile client 12
- This information may be periodically passed to the base station controller and/or main switching center and is used for determining when a handover should take place.
- One method sets a minimum acceptable performance level and gives precedence to power control over handover control. That is, when the signal degrades beyond a certain level, the power level of the mobile client is increased first. If further power increases do not improve the signal, then a handover is made. The other method uses handover first to try to maintain or improve a certain level of signal quality at the same or lower power level. Thus, this method gives precedence to handover control over power control.
- Authentication involves two functional entities, a SIM card in a mobile client and an authentication center in the mobile network. Each intended user (or subscriber) is given a secret key, one copy of which is stored in the SIM card and the other in the authentication center. During authentication, the authentication center generates a random number that it sends to the mobile client. Both the mobile client and the authentication center then use the random number, in conjunction with the subscriber's secret key and an authentication (or ciphering) algorithm, to generate a signed response that is sent back to the authentication center. If the number sent by the mobile client is the same as the one calculated by the authentication center, the intended user is authenticated.
- mobile network 10 can be a GSM compliant network that authenticates the identity of an intended user through the use of a challenge-response mechanism.
- a 128-bit random number is sent to mobile client 12 from authentication center 17 .
- Mobile client 12 computes a 32-bit signed response based on the random number sent to mobile client 12 with an authentication algorithm using individual subscriber authentication key 126 b .
- authentication center 17 Upon receiving the signed response from mobile client 12 , authentication center 17 repeats the calculation to verify the identity of the user. Note that individual subscriber authentication key 126 b is not transmitted over the radio channel. It should only be present in SIM card 124 , as well as authentication register 184 . If the signed response received by authentication center 17 agrees with the calculated value, mobile client 12 has been successfully authenticated and may continue. If the values do not match, the connection to network 10 is terminated.
- SIM card 124 of FIGS. 1, 2 , and 3 contains encryption key 126 a .
- Encryption key 126 a is used to encrypt and decrypt the data transmitted between mobile client 12 and mobile network 10 .
- the encryption of the voice and data communications between mobile client 12 and network 10 is accomplished through use of an encryption algorithm.
- An encrypted communication is initiated by an encryption request command from mobile network 10 .
- mobile client 12 Upon receipt of this command, mobile client 12 begins encryption and decryption of data using the encryption algorithm and the encryption key 126 a.
- copies 126 a ′, 126 b ′ of the keys (and/or another key) in authentication center 17 (and/or another center) may be used to revoke (or erase) keys 126 a , 126 b in SIM card 124 .
- keys 126 a , 126 b (or another key) in SIM card 124 may be revoked wirelessly via mobile network 10 .
- authentication center 17 may be used to wirelessly burn and/or write a new authentication key into SIM card 124 .
- one or both authentication and/or encryption keys 126 a , 126 b of SIM card 124 may have a private key and a related but different public key, a copy of which is made available outside SIM card 124 .
- a challenge may then be supplied to SIM card 124 and a response is generated using only the private key.
- the response may be checked by the use of the related public key. Thus, if the private key is held only within SIM card 124 then only SIM card 124 can generate an authentication response that would work with the public key value.
- an embodiment of the present invention authenticates an intended user of a mobile client outside a central core (e.g., core 19 of FIG. 1 ) of a mobile communication network and allows for a credential of the authentication (including a revocation of the authentication) to roam with the mobile client as the mobile client moves from one geographical area to another.
- a central core e.g., core 19 of FIG. 1
- a credential of the authentication including a revocation of the authentication
- a mobile communication network architecture pursuant to the present invention includes base station system 215 coupled between mobile client 212 and central core 219 of a mobile communication network.
- Central core 219 includes main switching center 218 .
- Base station system 215 includes transceiver stations 214 (e.g., 214 a , 214 b , 214 c , and/or 214 d ) and base station controllers 216 (e.g., 216 a and/or 216 b ).
- Central core 219 and base station system 215 may be a wireless communication central core and base station system similar to central core 19 and base station system 15 of FIG. 1 , as well as other suitable central cores and base station systems.
- base station system 215 further includes authentication center 217 .
- Authentication center 217 is coupled to (or directly connected to) base station controller 216 a .
- Authentication center 217 includes an authentication register (similar to register 184 of FIG. 3 ) that stores copies (e.g., 126 a ′, 126 b ′) of the secret keys (e.g., 126 a , 126 b ) stored in a SIM card (e.g., 124 ) of mobile client 212 , which are used for authenticating an intended user.
- authentication center 217 since authentication center 217 is shown to be located outside central core 219 , an intended user can first be authenticated outside central core 219 . Thus, an un-authenticated user is prevented from reaching central core 219 prior to being first authenticated at authentication center 217 and an impersonator of the intended user is prevented from entry into central core 219 and tampering with components of central core 219 .
- another authentication center e.g., at central core 219 communicates this revocation information to authentication center 217 .
- the revocation information can be first provided to the authentication center at central core 219 and then all the provided revocation information can be periodically provided and/or broadcasted to authentication center 217 and/or other authentication centers located away from central core 219 .
- mobile client 212 is coupled with transceiver station 214 a via radio link 211 a .
- mobile client 212 may leave the coverage area (or cell) of transceiver station 214 a and roam to the coverage area of transceiver station 214 c via radio link 211 b , as is schematically indicated.
- transceiver station 214 a and transceiver station 214 b are coupled to authentication center 217 via base station controller 216 a .
- transceiver station 214 a and transceiver station 214 b are under the control of base station controller 216 a , it should be understood to those skilled in the art that the intended user can roam from transceiver station 214 a to transceiver station 214 b without having to be re-authenticated.
- the embodiment of FIG. 4 includes authentication interface 250 so that a credential of the authentication of the intended user at authentication center 217 can be exported to base station controller 216 b as the intended user roams to transceiver station 214 c (or transceiver station 214 d ).
- authentication interface 250 is used to export and import a credential for indicating an authentication (and/or revocation) of an intended user that had occurred on authentication center 217 .
- Authentication interface 250 has two complementary actions: (1) export authentication credential action and (2) import authentication credential action.
- export authentication credential action invoked, the appropriate authentication credential associated with the authentication of the intended user is created on base station controller 216 a and communicated to base station controller 216 b .
- the import authentication credential action is invoked, the appropriate authentication credential associated with the authentication is received from base station controller 216 a and the authentication of the intended user is recreated on base station controller 216 b .
- the intended user does not have to be re-authenticated when mobile client 212 roams to the coverage area of transceiver station 214 c via radio link 211 b (or transceiver station 214 d ).
- the invention provides a method for exporting and importing an authentication credential in a roaming environment, as diagramed in FIG. 5 .
- an authentication interface between a first base station controller and a second base station controller is provided.
- a particular authentication of an intended user at an authentication center coupled to the first base station controller is identified.
- the first base station controller creates an appropriate authentication credential associated with the authentication of the intended user.
- the first base station controller communicates the created credential to the second base station controller.
- the second base station controller receives from the first base station controller the created credential.
- the authentication of the intended user is recreated at the second base station controller using the received credential (automatically and/or without requiring the intended user to re-authenticate as the user's mobile client roams or moves to the transceiver stations of the second base station controller).
- the method of FIG. 5 allows the authentication of the intended user to be recorded and provides the ability to move this authentication (including a revocation of this authentication) to a new base station controller as the mobile client roams between different coverage areas.
- the network architecture of FIG. 6 includes transceiver subsystem 415 a and base station subsystem 415 b . Both transceiver subsystem 415 a and base station subsystem 415 b are coupled between mobile client 412 and central core 419 of a mobile communication network.
- Transceiver system 415 a includes transceiver stations 414 (e.g., 414 a , 414 b , 414 c , and/or 414 d ), and base station subsystem 415 b includes base station controllers 416 (e.g., 416 a and/or 416 b ).
- transceiver system 415 a also includes authentication center 417 that is coupled to (or directly connected to) transceiver station 414 a .
- Authentication center 417 includes an authentication register (similar to register 184 of FIG.
- authentication center 417 of FIG. 6 is shown to be located outside central core 419 , an intended user can first be authenticated outside central core 419 .
- an un-authenticated user is prevented from reaching central core 419 prior to being first authenticated at authentication center 417 and an impersonator of the intended user is prevented from entry into central core 419 and tampering with components of central core 419 .
- authentication center 417 is further shown in FIG. 6 to be located outside base station subsystem 415 b , an intended user can also be first authenticated outside base station subsystem 415 b .
- an un-authenticated user is further prevented from reaching base station subsystem 415 b prior to being first authenticated at authentication center 417 and an impersonator of the intended user is prevented from entry into base station subsystem 415 b and tampering with components of base station subsystem 415 b , such as base station controllers 416 a , 416 b.
- mobile client 412 is coupled with transceiver station 414 a via radio link 411 a .
- mobile client 412 may leave the coverage area (or cell) of transceiver station 414 a and roam to the coverage area of transceiver station 414 b via radio link 411 b , as is schematically indicated.
- the embodiment of FIG. 6 includes authentication interface 450 a so that a credential of the authentication of the intended user at authentication center 417 can be exported to transceiver station 414 b .
- FIG. 6 includes authentication interface 450 a so that a credential of the authentication of the intended user at authentication center 417 can be exported to transceiver station 414 b .
- FIG. 6 shows second authentication interface 450 b for exporting the credential (and/or another credential) of the authentication at the authentication center 417 to transceiver station 414 c and third authentication interface 450 c for exporting the credential (and/or another credential) of the authentication to transceiver station 414 d.
- authentication interfaces 450 a , 450 b , 450 c are used to export and import a credential for indicating an authentication (and/or revocation) of an intended user that had occurred on authentication center 417 .
- Each authentication interface 450 has two complementary actions: (1) export authentication credential action and (2) import authentication credential action. For example, when the export authentication credential action is invoked, the appropriate authentication credential associated with the authentication of the intended user is created on transceiver station 414 a and communicated to transceiver station 414 b .
- transceiver station 414 a when the import authentication credential action is invoked, the appropriate authentication credential associated with the authentication is received from transceiver station 414 a and the authentication of the intended user is recreated on transceiver station 414 b .
- the intended user since the authentication is recreated on transceiver station 414 b , the intended user does not have to be re-authenticated when mobile client 412 roams to the coverage area of transceiver station 414 b via radio link 411 b (or transceiver station 414 c or transceiver station 414 d ).
- the invention provides a method for exporting and importing an authentication credential in a roaming environment, as diagramed in FIG. 7 .
- an authentication interface between a first transceiver station and a second transceiver station is provided.
- a particular authentication of an intended user at an authentication center coupled to the first transceiver station is identified.
- the first transceiver station creates an appropriate authentication credential associated with the authentication of the intended user.
- the first transceiver station communicates the created credential to the second transceiver station.
- the second transceiver station receives from the first transceiver station the created credential.
- the authentication of the intended user is recreated at the second transceiver station using the received credential (automatically and/or without requiring the intended user to re-authenticate as the user's mobile client roams or moves to the second transceiver station).
- the method of FIG. 7 allows the authentication of the intended user to be recorded and provides the ability to move this authentication (including a revocation of this authentication) to a new transceiver station as the mobile client roams between different coverage areas.
- smartcard 800 e.g., a hardware security module or a SIM
- SMs remote stateless modules
- Stateless modules may provide key enforcement and/or usage functions that are, in effect, separated out from the main key management functions provided by a smartcard.
- a smartcard may provide all of the services for secure key management such as generating and destroying keys, establishing and enforcing key policy, using keys, providing key backup and secure key storage and communicating with peers.
- these operations require that the smartcard keep track of its current state.
- the smartcard must keep track of all keys it generated and it must maintain state information associated with each of these keys. This information may be used, for example, to determine the entity to which each key was issued and when to destroy or revoke keys.
- the stateless modules provide a mechanism for securely receiving keys and using keys.
- the stateless modules do not generate keys or conduct peer-to-peer communication. Consequently, they typically must communicate with a key manager to obtain the keys needed by a mobile client (e.g., a mobile phone device, a PDA, etc.).
- a stateless module does not need to maintain state information to receive keys and use keys.
- the only key information it has is an identity key that was stored in nonvolatile memory. However, this information is stateless because it never changes.
- the stateless module may be configured to establish a secure connection with a smartcard using its identity key. This secure connection enables the stateless module to perform the basic operations of receiving and using keys and/or data. These operations do not, however, require that the stateless module maintain the state of these keys. Rather, the stateless module merely needs to use the keys within a secure boundary and enforce any policy received with the key.
- the stateless module may send keys to the stateless module these keys to decrypt data and/or keys for a mobile client (e.g., a mobile phone device, a PDA, etc.).
- the stateless module may send secured (e.g., encrypted and/or authenticated) data to a designated device via a secure connection.
- the stateless module provides a secure usage environment that may be remotely separated from, yet cryptographically secured to (e.g., using operations that may include encryption, decryption, authentication, etc.), the smartcard.
- keys and data within the stateless module are protected by hardware (e.g., the physical constraints provided by the integrated circuit, aka chip).
- the stateless module may be configured to prevent the keys and data from being exported from the chip without encryption (or in the clear).
- a key transfer protocol may be established between stateless module 910 and smartcard 900 to allow keys generated in smartcard 900 to be securely transferred to stateless module 910 .
- encrypted link (communication channel) 930 may be used to effectively extend the security boundary of smartcard 900 to include the stateless module 910 .
- Encrypted link 930 allows for key material to be transferred over an insecure communication medium (i.e. network and/or Internet) between smartcard 900 and stateless module 910 .
- FIG. 9 also illustrates that stateless module 910 may receive encrypted key material from smartcard 900 for use with local cryptographic accelerator 940 .
- Cryptographic accelerator 940 also may be implemented within the effective security boundary.
- cryptographic accelerator 940 and stateless module 910 may be implemented on the same integrated circuit.
- keys and data transferred between these components may be encrypted.
- cleartext and ciphertext may be sent to cryptographic accelerator 940 without exposing the key material outside of the security boundary.
- any key material that is decrypted locally by stateless module 910 may never be exposed outside the security boundary.
- a stateless module is embedded inside a mobile client that uses cryptographic services.
- the stateless module may be implemented in mobile clients or end-user devices, such as cell phones, laptops, etc., that need some form of data security.
- the stateless module should be integrated into other chips (e.g., a main processor) within these devices.
- the stateless module may provide cost effective remote key management for a mobile client (e.g., a mobile phone device, a PDA, etc.).
- the security boundary to this mobile client is contained and managed through the stateless module by the smartcard key management system with minimal impact on the rest of the mobile client.
- a stateless module provides mechanisms for securely loading one or more keys into the stateless module, securely storing the keys and securely using the keys.
- Embodiments of exemplary stateless modules that provide such mechanisms are provided in copending provisional patent application Ser. No. 60/515,290, entitled Stateless Hardware Security Module, filed on Oct. 1, 2004, and assigned to the assignee of the present application, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference.
Abstract
Description
- This application claims priority to and the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/621,578, filed Oct. 22, 2004, the entire content of which is incorporated herein by reference.
- The invention relates generally to the field of data communications and, more particularly, to systems and methods for authenticating an intended user in a roaming environment.
- Currently, cables and wires are predominately used in communication networks for transferring information such as voice, video, data, etc. from one device to another. Devices on a communication network can be generally categorized as two types: servers and clients. Those devices that provide services to other devices are servers; the devices that connect to and utilize the provided services are clients. Typically, cable or wire clients operate within a defined geographical area to report information back to the server.
- However, there is a growing desire to have network clients be portable or to have a mobile client that can operate beyond a defined geographical area. For example, a typical mobile client can send and receive information wirelessly while moving (or roaming) from one defined geographical area to another. To ensure that the mobile client is connected to its mobile communication network, a handover (or handoff) mechanism is used to switch an on-going wireless communication session from one network geographical area (or cell) to another.
- Since information such as voice, video, and data are transmitted and received wirelessly in a mobile communication network, this information can be intercepted by an impersonator posing as an intended user. Thus, authentication of the intended user is a very important element of a mobile communication network. One way to authenticate an intended user to a mobile communication network and to allow the intended user to roam from one geographical area to another would be to allow all users to enter the mobile communication network and to authenticate and identify the intended user at a central authentication center (in a central core) of the mobile communication network. However, using the central authentication center to authenticate and identify the intended user would not be ideal because this approach would allow an impersonator to also enter the central core of the mobile communication network and possibly tamper with the mobile communication network. Accordingly, it would be desirable to provide a system and method that can authenticate and identify the intended user to the mobile communication network outside the central core of the mobile communication network. In addition, there is a need to ensure that a mobile client of the authenticated user can switch or roam from one geographical area to another with little to no notice and/or interaction by the authenticated user.
- The invention relates to systems and associated methods for authenticating an intended user in a roaming environment. Embodiments of the present invention authenticate an intended user of a mobile client outside a central core of a mobile communication network and allows a credential of the authenticated user to roam with the mobile client as the mobile client moves from one geographical area to another.
- In an exemplary embodiment according to the present invention, a communication network authenticates a user of a mobile client and allows the mobile client to communicate with a server as the user of the mobile client roams from one communication cell to another communication cell. The communication network includes a first base station controller, a second base station controller, an authentication center, and an authentication interface. The first base station controller is coupled to a first transceiver station that defines a first communication cell. The authentication center is coupled to the first base station controller. The second base station controller is coupled to a second transceiver station that defines a second communication cell. The authentication center authenticates the user of the mobile client to access the first base station controller. The authentication interface is coupled between the first base station controller and the second base station controller. The authentication interface allows a credential of an authentication of the user at the authentication center to be moved to the second base station controller as the user of the mobile client roams from the first communication cell to the second communication cell.
- In another exemplary embodiment according to the present invention, a communication network architecture for authenticating a user in a roaming environment is provided. The communication network architecture includes a server, a mobile client, a first transceiver station, a second transceiver station, an authentication center, and an authentication interface. The first transceiver station defines a first communication area within which the mobile client can communicate with the server. The second transceiver station defines a second communication area within which the mobile client can communicate with the server. The authentication center is coupled to the first transceiver station and authenticates an intended user of the mobile client to the first transceiver station so that the mobile client can communicate with the server via the first transceiver station. The authentication interface is coupled between the first transceiver station and the second transceiver station and allows a credential of the authentication made at the authentication center to be transmitted from the first transceiver station to the second transceiver station when the mobile client moves to utilize the second transceiver station for communication with the server.
- In yet another exemplary embodiment according to the present invention, a method for authenticating a user in a roaming environment is provided. The method includes coupling an authentication center to a first base station controller and providing an authentication interface between the first base station controller and a second base station controller. The first base station controller and the second base station controller respectively control a first transceiver station and a second transceiver station. In addition, the method identifies a particular authentication of an intended user of a mobile client at the authentication center, creates an appropriate authentication credential associated with the particular authentication, and communicates the credential from the first base station controller to the second base station controller via the authentication interface. Upon receiving by the second base station controller of the credential, the method recreates the authentication of the intended user based on the credential received by the second station controller.
- In still another exemplary embodiment according to the present invention, a method for authenticating a user of a mobile client and for allowing the mobile client to communicate with a server as the user of the mobile client roams from one communication cell to another communication cell is provided. The method includes coupling an authentication center to a first transceiver station that defines a first communication cell, authenticating the user of the mobile client to access the first transceiver station at the authentication center, and providing an authentication interface between the first transceiver station and a second transceiver station that defines a second communication cell. An appropriate authentication credential associated with the authentication of the user at the authentication is then created. The credential is then communicated from the first transceiver station to the second transceiver station via the authentication interface. Then, upon receiving by the second transceiver station of the credential, the method recreates the authentication of the user based on the credential received by the second transceiver station.
- A more complete understanding of the authentication of a user of a mobile client in a roaming environment will be afforded to those skilled in the art, as well as a realization of additional advantages and objects thereof, by a consideration of the following detailed description. Reference will be made to the appended sheets of drawings which will first be described briefly.
- These and other features, aspects and advantages of the present invention will be more fully understood when considered with respect to the following detailed description, appended claims and accompanying drawings, wherein:
-
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a mobile communication network architecture pursuant to aspects of the invention; -
FIG. 2 is a more detailed schematic diagram of a mobile client ofFIG. 1 ; -
FIG. 3 is a more detailed schematic diagram of a main switching center and an authentication center ofFIG. 1 ; -
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of another mobile communication network architecture pursuant to aspects of the invention; -
FIG. 5 is a flowchart representative of an embodiment of operations pursuant to aspects of the invention; -
FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of yet another mobile communication network architecture pursuant to aspects of the invention; -
FIG. 7 is a flowchart representative of another embodiment of operations pursuant to aspects of the invention; -
FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of a key management system that incorporates stateless key management modules (or stateless modules) pursuant to aspects of the invention; and -
FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of a key transfer embodiment between a stateless module and a smartcard pursuant to aspects of the invention. - The invention is described below, with reference to detailed illustrative embodiments. It will be apparent that the invention can be embodied in a wide variety of forms, some of which may be quite different from those of the disclosed embodiments. Consequently, the specific structural and functional details disclosed herein are merely representative and do not limit the scope of the invention.
-
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a mobile communication network architecture that uses a smartcard (e.g., a subscriber identity module card) for authentication and/or encryption. Exemplary embodiments of the present invention can be applied to the network architecture ofFIG. 1 , as well as other suitable architectures. - The network architecture of
FIG. 1 includesmobile network 10 that facilitates communications between one or moremobile clients 12 and one ormore servers 24.Mobile network 10 may be a wireless communications system that supports the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) protocol. However, other multi-access wireless communications protocol, such as General Packet Radio Services (GPRS), High Data Rate (HDR), Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) and/or Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE), may also be supported.Mobile client 12 may be any device that is adapted for wireless communications withmobile network 10, such as a cellular telephone, pager, personal digital assistant (PDA), vehicle navigation system, and/or portable computer. -
Mobile network 10 includesbase station system 15 andcentral core 19.Base station system 15 includes one or more transceiver stations 14 (e.g., 14 a, 14 b, 14 c, and/or 14 d) and one or more base station controllers 16 (e.g., 16 a and/or 16 b).Central core 19 includesmain switching center 18 andauthentication center 17.Mobile network 10 connectsmobile client 12 to one or more servers either directly (not shown) and/or throughsecond network 20, such as a Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), an Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN), a Packet Switched Public Data Network (PSPDN), a Circuit Switched Public Data Network (CSPDN), a local area network (LAN), the Internet, etc.Mobile network 10 is operated by a carrier that has an established relationship with an intended user (or subscriber) ofmobile client 12 to use the wireless services provided throughmobile network 10. - Referring now to
FIG. 2 ,mobile client 12 includes mobile terminal 122 (e.g., a mobile equipment or a phone) andsmartcard 124. More specifically,smartcard 124 ofFIG. 2 is a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). SIM (or SIM card) 124 containsencryption key 126 a that encrypts voice and data transmissions to and frommobile network 10 andauthentication key 126 b that specifies an intended user so that the intended user can be identified and authenticated tomobile network 10 supplying the mobile services.SIM 124 can be moved from onemobile terminal 122 to another terminal (not shown) and/or different SIMs can be inserted into any terminal, such as a GSM compliant terminal (e.g., a GSM phone). - To provide additional security,
mobile terminal 122 may include an International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) that uniquely identifiesmobile terminal 122 tonetwork 10.SIM card 124 may be further protected against unauthorized use by a password or personal identity number. - Referring now back to
FIG. 1 , eachtransceiver station mobile client 12.Base station controllers transceiver stations Base station controllers transceiver stations transceiver station 14 d). - In
FIG. 1 ,mobile client 12 is shown to be coupled withtransceiver station 14 c viaradio link 11 a. Further,FIG. 1 shows thatmobile client 12 may leave the coverage area (or cell) oftransceiver station 14 c and roam to the coverage area oftransceiver station 14 d viaradio link 11 b, as is schematically indicated. - Central core (or component) 19 of
mobile network 10 includesmain switching center 18.Main switching center 18 acts like a normal switching node, such as a switching node in a PSTN or ISDN, and additionally provides all the functionality needed to handle a mobile user (subscriber), such as registration, authentication, location updating, handovers, and call routing to a roaming subscriber. InFIG. 1 , it ismain switching center 18 that provides the connection ofmobile client 12 to second network 20 (such as the LAN, the PSTN, the ISDN etc). - Referring now to
FIG. 3 ,main switching center 18 is shown to be coupled to (or to include)authentication center 17.Authentication center 17 includesauthentication register 184.Authentication register 184 is a protected database that storescopies 126 a′, 126 b′ of the secret keys (e.g., 126 a, 126 b) stored in each intended user's (or subscriber's) SIM card (e.g., 124), which are used for authentication of an intended user and encryption of data transmitted overmobile network 10. - Moreover, to provide an addition level of security, authentication center 17 (or another component of mobile network 10) may include another database (not shown) that contains a list of all valid mobile terminals (e.g., 122 of
FIG. 2 ) onnetwork 10, where each mobile client (e.g., 12) is identified by its International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI). An IMEI is marked as invalid if it has been reported stolen or is not type approved. - Referring now back to
FIG. 1 , the fact the entire area covered bymobile network 10 is divided into cells (as defined bytransceiver stations - Specifically, in the context of the present application, a handover (or handoff) mechanism is a mechanism for switching an on-going communication session on a mobile client (e.g., mobile client 12) from one transceiver station (e.g.,
transceiver station 14 c) and/or radio link (e.g., link 11 a) to another transceiver station (e.g.,station 14 d) and/or radio link (e.g., link 11 b). Typically, there are four different types of handovers that may occur. The four types involve switching an on-going session: (1) between radio links or channels (e.g., time slots) in the same transceiver station; (2) between transceiver stations under the control of the same base station controller; (3) between base station controllers under the control of the same main switching center; and (4) between different main switching centers. - The first two types of handovers can be categorized as internal handovers and involve only one base station controller. The last two types of handovers can be categorized as external handovers and are handled by the main switching centers involved.
- Handovers can be initiated by either the mobile client or the main switching center (as a means of traffic load balancing). During its idle time, the mobile client (e.g., mobile client 12) scans the broadcast control channels of a plurality of neighboring transceiver stations (e.g., transceiver stations 14), and forms a list of best transceiver station candidates for possible handover, based on the received signal strength. This information may be periodically passed to the base station controller and/or main switching center and is used for determining when a handover should take place.
- There are two basic methods used to determine when a handover should take place. One method sets a minimum acceptable performance level and gives precedence to power control over handover control. That is, when the signal degrades beyond a certain level, the power level of the mobile client is increased first. If further power increases do not improve the signal, then a handover is made. The other method uses handover first to try to maintain or improve a certain level of signal quality at the same or lower power level. Thus, this method gives precedence to handover control over power control.
- Since the radio medium can be accessed by anyone, authentication of users to prove that they are who they claim to be, is a very important element of a mobile network. Authentication involves two functional entities, a SIM card in a mobile client and an authentication center in the mobile network. Each intended user (or subscriber) is given a secret key, one copy of which is stored in the SIM card and the other in the authentication center. During authentication, the authentication center generates a random number that it sends to the mobile client. Both the mobile client and the authentication center then use the random number, in conjunction with the subscriber's secret key and an authentication (or ciphering) algorithm, to generate a signed response that is sent back to the authentication center. If the number sent by the mobile client is the same as the one calculated by the authentication center, the intended user is authenticated.
- Specifically, referring now back to
FIGS. 1, 2 , and 3,mobile network 10 can be a GSM compliant network that authenticates the identity of an intended user through the use of a challenge-response mechanism. A 128-bit random number is sent tomobile client 12 fromauthentication center 17.Mobile client 12 computes a 32-bit signed response based on the random number sent tomobile client 12 with an authentication algorithm using individualsubscriber authentication key 126 b. Upon receiving the signed response frommobile client 12,authentication center 17 repeats the calculation to verify the identity of the user. Note that individualsubscriber authentication key 126 b is not transmitted over the radio channel. It should only be present inSIM card 124, as well asauthentication register 184. If the signed response received byauthentication center 17 agrees with the calculated value,mobile client 12 has been successfully authenticated and may continue. If the values do not match, the connection to network 10 is terminated. - In addition,
SIM card 124 ofFIGS. 1, 2 , and 3 containsencryption key 126 a.Encryption key 126 a is used to encrypt and decrypt the data transmitted betweenmobile client 12 andmobile network 10. The encryption of the voice and data communications betweenmobile client 12 andnetwork 10 is accomplished through use of an encryption algorithm. An encrypted communication is initiated by an encryption request command frommobile network 10. Upon receipt of this command,mobile client 12 begins encryption and decryption of data using the encryption algorithm and theencryption key 126 a. - Further,
copies 126 a′, 126 b′ of the keys (and/or another key) in authentication center 17 (and/or another center) may be used to revoke (or erase)keys SIM card 124. In one embodiment,keys SIM card 124 may be revoked wirelessly viamobile network 10. - Moreover,
authentication center 17 may be used to wirelessly burn and/or write a new authentication key intoSIM card 124. - Lastly, one or both authentication and/or
encryption keys SIM card 124 may have a private key and a related but different public key, a copy of which is made available outsideSIM card 124. A challenge may then be supplied toSIM card 124 and a response is generated using only the private key. The response may be checked by the use of the related public key. Thus, if the private key is held only withinSIM card 124 then onlySIM card 124 can generate an authentication response that would work with the public key value. - As envisioned, an embodiment of the present invention authenticates an intended user of a mobile client outside a central core (e.g.,
core 19 ofFIG. 1 ) of a mobile communication network and allows for a credential of the authentication (including a revocation of the authentication) to roam with the mobile client as the mobile client moves from one geographical area to another. - Referring to
FIG. 4 , a mobile communication network architecture pursuant to the present invention includesbase station system 215 coupled betweenmobile client 212 andcentral core 219 of a mobile communication network. -
Central core 219 includesmain switching center 218.Base station system 215 includes transceiver stations 214 (e.g., 214 a, 214 b, 214 c, and/or 214 d) and base station controllers 216 (e.g., 216 a and/or 216 b).Central core 219 andbase station system 215 may be a wireless communication central core and base station system similar tocentral core 19 andbase station system 15 ofFIG. 1 , as well as other suitable central cores and base station systems. - However, unlike
FIG. 1 , the embodiment ofFIG. 4 shows thatbase station system 215 further includesauthentication center 217.Authentication center 217 is coupled to (or directly connected to)base station controller 216 a.Authentication center 217 includes an authentication register (similar to register 184 ofFIG. 3 ) that stores copies (e.g., 126 a′, 126 b′) of the secret keys (e.g., 126 a, 126 b) stored in a SIM card (e.g., 124) ofmobile client 212, which are used for authenticating an intended user. - In
FIG. 4 , sinceauthentication center 217 is shown to be located outsidecentral core 219, an intended user can first be authenticated outsidecentral core 219. Thus, an un-authenticated user is prevented from reachingcentral core 219 prior to being first authenticated atauthentication center 217 and an impersonator of the intended user is prevented from entry intocentral core 219 and tampering with components ofcentral core 219. - Alternatively or in addition of the embodiment of
FIG. 4 , if the credential of the intended user is to be revoked and/or if themobile client 212 is lost, another authentication center, e.g., atcentral core 219 communicates this revocation information toauthentication center 217. In particular, the revocation information can be first provided to the authentication center atcentral core 219 and then all the provided revocation information can be periodically provided and/or broadcasted toauthentication center 217 and/or other authentication centers located away fromcentral core 219. - As is also shown in
FIG. 4 ,mobile client 212 is coupled withtransceiver station 214 a viaradio link 211 a. During a roaming operation,mobile client 212 may leave the coverage area (or cell) oftransceiver station 214 a and roam to the coverage area oftransceiver station 214 c viaradio link 211 b, as is schematically indicated. As discussed above and shown inFIG. 4 ,transceiver station 214 a andtransceiver station 214 b are coupled toauthentication center 217 viabase station controller 216 a. Thus, since both thetransceiver station 214 a andtransceiver station 214 b are under the control ofbase station controller 216 a, it should be understood to those skilled in the art that the intended user can roam fromtransceiver station 214 a totransceiver station 214 b without having to be re-authenticated. In addition, to ensure that the intended user does not have to unnecessarily re-authenticate, the embodiment ofFIG. 4 includesauthentication interface 250 so that a credential of the authentication of the intended user atauthentication center 217 can be exported tobase station controller 216 b as the intended user roams totransceiver station 214 c (ortransceiver station 214 d). - Specifically,
authentication interface 250 is used to export and import a credential for indicating an authentication (and/or revocation) of an intended user that had occurred onauthentication center 217.Authentication interface 250 has two complementary actions: (1) export authentication credential action and (2) import authentication credential action. When the export authentication credential action is invoked, the appropriate authentication credential associated with the authentication of the intended user is created onbase station controller 216 a and communicated tobase station controller 216 b. Conversely, when the import authentication credential action is invoked, the appropriate authentication credential associated with the authentication is received frombase station controller 216 a and the authentication of the intended user is recreated onbase station controller 216 b. Thus, since the authentication (and/or a revocation) can be recreated onbase station controller 216 b, the intended user does not have to be re-authenticated whenmobile client 212 roams to the coverage area oftransceiver station 214 c viaradio link 211 b (ortransceiver station 214 d). - In general, according to the foregoing, the invention provides a method for exporting and importing an authentication credential in a roaming environment, as diagramed in
FIG. 5 . Atblock 300, an authentication interface between a first base station controller and a second base station controller is provided. Atblock 310, a particular authentication of an intended user at an authentication center coupled to the first base station controller is identified. Atblock 320, the first base station controller creates an appropriate authentication credential associated with the authentication of the intended user. Atblock 330, the first base station controller communicates the created credential to the second base station controller. Atblock 340, the second base station controller receives from the first base station controller the created credential. Then, atblock 350, the authentication of the intended user is recreated at the second base station controller using the received credential (automatically and/or without requiring the intended user to re-authenticate as the user's mobile client roams or moves to the transceiver stations of the second base station controller). Thus, the method ofFIG. 5 allows the authentication of the intended user to be recorded and provides the ability to move this authentication (including a revocation of this authentication) to a new base station controller as the mobile client roams between different coverage areas. - Referring to
FIG. 6 , another mobile communication network architecture pursuant to the present invention is shown. The network architecture ofFIG. 6 includes transceiver subsystem 415 a andbase station subsystem 415 b. Both transceiver subsystem 415 a andbase station subsystem 415 b are coupled betweenmobile client 412 andcentral core 419 of a mobile communication network. -
Central core 419 includesmain switching center 418. Transceiver system 415 a includes transceiver stations 414 (e.g., 414 a, 414 b, 414 c, and/or 414 d), andbase station subsystem 415 b includes base station controllers 416 (e.g., 416 a and/or 416 b). In addition, transceiver system 415 a also includesauthentication center 417 that is coupled to (or directly connected to)transceiver station 414 a.Authentication center 417 includes an authentication register (similar to register 184 ofFIG. 3 ) that stores copies (e.g., 126 a′, 126 b′) of the secret keys (e.g., 126 a, 126 b) stored in a SIM card (e.g., 124) ofmobile client 412, which are used for authenticating an intended user. - Similar to the embodiment shown in
FIG. 4 , sinceauthentication center 417 ofFIG. 6 is shown to be located outsidecentral core 419, an intended user can first be authenticated outsidecentral core 419. Thus, an un-authenticated user is prevented from reachingcentral core 419 prior to being first authenticated atauthentication center 417 and an impersonator of the intended user is prevented from entry intocentral core 419 and tampering with components ofcentral core 419. - In addition, since
authentication center 417 is further shown inFIG. 6 to be located outsidebase station subsystem 415 b, an intended user can also be first authenticated outsidebase station subsystem 415 b. Thus, an un-authenticated user is further prevented from reachingbase station subsystem 415 b prior to being first authenticated atauthentication center 417 and an impersonator of the intended user is prevented from entry intobase station subsystem 415 b and tampering with components ofbase station subsystem 415 b, such asbase station controllers 416 a, 416 b. - As is also shown in
FIG. 6 ,mobile client 412 is coupled withtransceiver station 414 a viaradio link 411 a. During a roaming operation,mobile client 412 may leave the coverage area (or cell) oftransceiver station 414 a and roam to the coverage area oftransceiver station 414 b viaradio link 411 b, as is schematically indicated. To ensure that the intended user does not have to unnecessarily re-authenticate, the embodiment ofFIG. 6 includesauthentication interface 450 a so that a credential of the authentication of the intended user atauthentication center 417 can be exported totransceiver station 414 b. In addition,FIG. 6 showssecond authentication interface 450 b for exporting the credential (and/or another credential) of the authentication at theauthentication center 417 totransceiver station 414 c andthird authentication interface 450 c for exporting the credential (and/or another credential) of the authentication totransceiver station 414 d. - Specifically, authentication interfaces 450 a, 450 b, 450 c are used to export and import a credential for indicating an authentication (and/or revocation) of an intended user that had occurred on
authentication center 417. Each authentication interface 450 has two complementary actions: (1) export authentication credential action and (2) import authentication credential action. For example, when the export authentication credential action is invoked, the appropriate authentication credential associated with the authentication of the intended user is created ontransceiver station 414 a and communicated totransceiver station 414 b. Conversely, when the import authentication credential action is invoked, the appropriate authentication credential associated with the authentication is received fromtransceiver station 414 a and the authentication of the intended user is recreated ontransceiver station 414 b. Thus, since the authentication is recreated ontransceiver station 414 b, the intended user does not have to be re-authenticated whenmobile client 412 roams to the coverage area oftransceiver station 414 b viaradio link 411 b (ortransceiver station 414 c ortransceiver station 414 d). - In general, according to the foregoing, the invention provides a method for exporting and importing an authentication credential in a roaming environment, as diagramed in
FIG. 7 . Atblock 500, an authentication interface between a first transceiver station and a second transceiver station is provided. Atblock 510, a particular authentication of an intended user at an authentication center coupled to the first transceiver station is identified. Atblock 520, the first transceiver station creates an appropriate authentication credential associated with the authentication of the intended user. Atblock 530, the first transceiver station communicates the created credential to the second transceiver station. Atblock 540, the second transceiver station receives from the first transceiver station the created credential. Then, atblock 550, the authentication of the intended user is recreated at the second transceiver station using the received credential (automatically and/or without requiring the intended user to re-authenticate as the user's mobile client roams or moves to the second transceiver station). Thus, the method ofFIG. 7 allows the authentication of the intended user to be recorded and provides the ability to move this authentication (including a revocation of this authentication) to a new transceiver station as the mobile client roams between different coverage areas. - Referring now to
FIG. 8 , an embodiment of a key management system that incorporates stateless key management modules (hereafter referred to as stateless modules or SMs for convenience) is illustrated. InFIG. 8 , smartcard 800 (e.g., a hardware security module or a SIM) is configured to manage multiple remote stateless modules (or SMs) 810. - Stateless modules may provide key enforcement and/or usage functions that are, in effect, separated out from the main key management functions provided by a smartcard. For example, a smartcard may provide all of the services for secure key management such as generating and destroying keys, establishing and enforcing key policy, using keys, providing key backup and secure key storage and communicating with peers. Inherently, these operations require that the smartcard keep track of its current state. For example, the smartcard must keep track of all keys it generated and it must maintain state information associated with each of these keys. This information may be used, for example, to determine the entity to which each key was issued and when to destroy or revoke keys. In contrast, the stateless modules provide a mechanism for securely receiving keys and using keys. The stateless modules do not generate keys or conduct peer-to-peer communication. Consequently, they typically must communicate with a key manager to obtain the keys needed by a mobile client (e.g., a mobile phone device, a PDA, etc.).
- A stateless module does not need to maintain state information to receive keys and use keys. When a stateless module boots up, the only key information it has is an identity key that was stored in nonvolatile memory. However, this information is stateless because it never changes. To perform its tasks, the stateless module may be configured to establish a secure connection with a smartcard using its identity key. This secure connection enables the stateless module to perform the basic operations of receiving and using keys and/or data. These operations do not, however, require that the stateless module maintain the state of these keys. Rather, the stateless module merely needs to use the keys within a secure boundary and enforce any policy received with the key. As an example, after the smartcard securely sends keys to the stateless module these keys may be used to decrypt data and/or keys for a mobile client (e.g., a mobile phone device, a PDA, etc.). In addition, the stateless module may send secured (e.g., encrypted and/or authenticated) data to a designated device via a secure connection.
- The stateless module provides a secure usage environment that may be remotely separated from, yet cryptographically secured to (e.g., using operations that may include encryption, decryption, authentication, etc.), the smartcard. In particular, keys and data within the stateless module are protected by hardware (e.g., the physical constraints provided by the integrated circuit, aka chip). In addition, the stateless module may be configured to prevent the keys and data from being exported from the chip without encryption (or in the clear). Moreover, as illustrated in
FIG. 9 , a key transfer protocol may be established betweenstateless module 910 andsmartcard 900 to allow keys generated insmartcard 900 to be securely transferred tostateless module 910. - As is shown in
FIG. 9 (and discussed above), encrypted link (communication channel) 930 may be used to effectively extend the security boundary ofsmartcard 900 to include thestateless module 910.Encrypted link 930 allows for key material to be transferred over an insecure communication medium (i.e. network and/or Internet) betweensmartcard 900 andstateless module 910. -
FIG. 9 also illustrates thatstateless module 910 may receive encrypted key material fromsmartcard 900 for use with localcryptographic accelerator 940.Cryptographic accelerator 940 also may be implemented within the effective security boundary. For example,cryptographic accelerator 940 andstateless module 910 may be implemented on the same integrated circuit. Alternatively, keys and data transferred between these components may be encrypted. - Thus, cleartext and ciphertext may be sent to
cryptographic accelerator 940 without exposing the key material outside of the security boundary. As a result, any key material that is decrypted locally bystateless module 910 may never be exposed outside the security boundary. - Typically, a stateless module is embedded inside a mobile client that uses cryptographic services. For example, the stateless module may be implemented in mobile clients or end-user devices, such as cell phones, laptops, etc., that need some form of data security. The stateless module should be integrated into other chips (e.g., a main processor) within these devices. In this way, the stateless module may provide cost effective remote key management for a mobile client (e.g., a mobile phone device, a PDA, etc.). The security boundary to this mobile client is contained and managed through the stateless module by the smartcard key management system with minimal impact on the rest of the mobile client.
- To support the above described key management scheme (i.e., to provide a high level of security at a relatively low cost, while consuming a relatively small amount of space on a mobile client), a stateless module provides mechanisms for securely loading one or more keys into the stateless module, securely storing the keys and securely using the keys. Embodiments of exemplary stateless modules that provide such mechanisms are provided in copending provisional patent application Ser. No. 60/515,290, entitled Stateless Hardware Security Module, filed on Oct. 1, 2004, and assigned to the assignee of the present application, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference.
- While certain exemplary embodiments have been described in detail and shown in the accompanying drawings, it is to be understood that such embodiments are merely illustrative of and not restrictive of the broad invention. It will thus be recognized that various modifications may be made to the illustrated and other embodiments of the invention described above, without departing from the broad inventive scope thereof. For example, a system using SIM cards and GSM mobile network has been illustrated, but it should be apparent that the inventive concepts described above would be equally applicable to systems that use other types of smartcards and/or other types of mobile network. In view of the above it will be understood that the invention is not limited to the particular embodiments or arrangements disclosed, but is rather intended to cover any changes, adaptations or modifications which are within the scope and spirit of the invention as defined by the appended claims and equivalents thereof.
Claims (30)
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US14/062,570 Abandoned US20140050322A1 (en) | 2004-10-22 | 2013-10-24 | Authentication in a roaming environment |
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US20150334093A1 (en) * | 2014-05-13 | 2015-11-19 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | method for generating a key in a network and user on a network and network |
US9282458B2 (en) * | 2013-06-04 | 2016-03-08 | Mark Rodney Anson | Method and system for reporting, securing and controlling mobile phones which are lost (misplaced\stolen) |
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CN106131813B (en) * | 2016-08-30 | 2019-09-17 | 广州二六三通信有限公司 | Roam interoperation A platform, SIM card, services of roaming system, services of roaming method |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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US8600356B2 (en) | 2013-12-03 |
US8190124B2 (en) | 2012-05-29 |
US20140050322A1 (en) | 2014-02-20 |
US20120289198A1 (en) | 2012-11-15 |
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