US8433925B2 - Cryptographic system for performing secure computations and signal processing directly on encrypted data in untrusted environments - Google Patents
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/76—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in application-specific integrated circuits [ASIC] or field-programmable devices, e.g. field-programmable gate arrays [FPGA] or programmable logic devices [PLD]
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
- G06F21/6245—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/72—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/008—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols involving homomorphic encryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/04—Masking or blinding
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/08—Randomization, e.g. dummy operations or using noise
Definitions
- Disclosed embodiments relate to cryptography methods and systems. Specifically, they relate to cryptosystems for the execution of operations directly on encrypted data.
- the secure clinical data management system containing the encrypted clinical data and physiological time-series corresponding to a particular study, research, or clinical trial requires the authorized researcher to decrypt the data in order to perform the needed mathematical analysis, signal processing, and statistical analysis in order to generate the study results.
- this conventional framework does not meet the security requirements, that is, in order to analyze and process the encrypted data, such data should not be first decrypted (i.e. the data should be kept encrypted at all times).
- data should be completely private even to researchers, clinical administrators, and system administrators. This may be due to purely privacy reasons or due to research considerations. For instance, certain studies may require scientists and researchers to be completely blinded and the hypothesis and analysis methods to be chosen a-priori. In order to accomplish this, methods for performing the typical mathematical operations and computations including statistical analysis techniques, algebraic methods, signal processing methods, and other computation operations directly on the encrypted datasets are needed.
- the availability of such secure methods and cryptosystems is limited.
- the proposed system involves a cryptographic system (i.e. a cryptosystem) for the execution of operations directly on encrypted data, that is, a system designed to address the problem of efficiently processing signals in untrusted environments, where not only the communication channel between parties is unsecure, but also the parties that perform the computation cannot be trusted.
- a cryptographic system i.e. a cryptosystem
- Disclosed embodiments include a cryptographic system implemented in at least one digital computer with one or more processors or hardware such as FPGAs for performing secure computations, analysis, and signal processing directly on encrypted data in untrusted environments.
- the proposed cryptographic system comprises: (a) at least one secure protocol for performing matrix multiplications in the encrypted domain, and (b) at least one secure protocol for solving systems of linear equations in the encrypted domain.
- the system comprises a plurality of privacy-preserving protocols for solving systems of linear equations (SLE) directly based on homomorphic computation and secret sharing. More specifically, according to a particular embodiment, and without limitation, the system uses a protocol whereby systems of linear equations are solved securely by direct Gaussian elimination using a secure protocol without imposing any restrictions on the matrix coefficients.
- FIG. 1 shows a block diagram to illustrate the cryptographic system according to one embodiment.
- FIG. 2 shows a high level block diagram to illustrate the operation of the cryptographic system.
- FIG. 3 shows a block diagram to illustrate the secure protocol for solving systems of linear equations in the encrypted domain according to one embodiment.
- FIG. 1 shows a block diagram of the cryptographic system 102 according to one embodiment.
- the embodiments disclosed describe how to realize a cryptographic system 102 for performing secure mathematical computations, signal processing, statistical signal processing, statistics, and data analysis directly on encrypted data 100 in untrusted environments.
- the system involves a cryptosystem 102 for the execution of operations directly on encrypted data 100 , that is, a system designed to address the problem of efficiently processing signals in untrusted environments, where not only the communication channel between parties is unsecure, but also the parties that perform the computation cannot be trusted.
- aspects of the disclosed embodiments may also be practiced in distributed computing environments where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network.
- program modules may be located in both local and remote storage media including memory storage devices.
- the cryptographic system 102 is implemented in a digital computer with one or more processors for performing secure computations and signal processing directly on encrypted data 100 in untrusted environments, said cryptographic system 102 comprises: (a) at least one secure protocol for performing matrix multiplications in the encrypted domain 104 , and (b) at least one secure protocol for solving systems of linear equations in the encrypted domain 106 .
- the system uses a protocol whereby systems of linear equations are solved securely by direct Gaussian elimination using a secure multiplication protocol to directly generate the results 112 of such secure mathematical computations, signal processing, statistical signal processing, statistics, and data analysis directly on encrypted data 100 in untrusted environments.
- the disclosed cryptosystem can be implemented in other hardware besides a digital computer including microcontrollers, DSPs, FPGAs or ASICs, as well as in firmware and software.
- the disclosed embodiments of the cryptosystem 102 and associated secure protocols have specific and substantial utility by themselves as systems and methods for cryptography and secure (encrypted) computation but also in a variety of practical applications in diverse fields including secure clinical data management systems, secure web-enabled platforms for collaboration involving privacy data, secure law enforcement systems, secure financial systems, and secure military systems involving transmission of encrypted data to be processed in real-time without decryption.
- the proposed cryptographic system 102 comprises: (a) at least one secure protocol for performing matrix multiplications in the encrypted domain 104 , and (b) at least one secure protocol for solving systems of linear equations in the encrypted domain 106 whereby systems of linear equations are solved securely by direct Gaussian elimination using a secure multiplication protocol based on homomorphic computation 108 and secret sharing 110 without placing any restrictions on the nature of the matrix coefficients (i.e. the matrix coefficients can be real numbers or complex numbers).
- the embodiments of the disclosed cryptosystem 102 can be used to perform direct analysis and processing in encrypted clinical, financial, national security, military, law enforcement, and political data without the need to decrypt said data prior to performing said analysis and processing.
- the disclosed cryptosystem 102 can be used to realize and implement a secure clinical system wherein all patient data, clinical history, clinical data, physiologic data and time series, biochemical data, and drug therapy data are encrypted at all times for secure transmission, management, and collaboration among researchers and clinicians; and all operations, processing, and statistical analysis performed on such data is conducted on the encrypted domain (i.e. with the data encrypted at all times).
- a specific particular embodiment of such secure clinical data management and analysis system comprises (a) at least one secure protocol for performing matrix multiplications in the encrypted domain 104 , and (b) at least one secure protocol for solving systems of linear equations in the encrypted domain 106 in addition to the well-known elements comprising clinical management systems.
- such protocol for solving systems of linear equations in said secure clinical data management system is based on a direct implementation of Gaussian elimination using a secure protocol.
- FIG. 2 shows a high level diagram to illustrate the operation of the cryptographic system according to one embodiment.
- the first party owns an encrypted matrix [[A]] and an encrypted vector [[b]], as well as the key for producing encryptions using a homomorphic encryption 202 .
- the party owns both the encryption and decryption key 216 for the same homomorphic encryption.
- This cryptographic system comprises a protocol of communication between both ends 208 and 214 that defines the operations performed and the format of the interchanged numbers in order to interactively solve the system without disclosing any information.
- This communication takes place over any communication channel 210 (e.g., a wired or wireless medium or a sole device).
- Secure matrix multiplication linear transformations
- linear transformations linear transformations
- linear systems of equations in the encrypted domain are fundamental mathematical building blocks to solve a great variety of problems involving data analysis, time-series analysis, digital signal processing, statistical signal processing, optimal filtering, adaptive filtering, digital communications, coding, encryption, information theory, and any other problem involving the least squares framework and representation of signals in vector spaces.
- the encryption of a number x is represented by [[x]]
- the vector (matrix) formed by the encryptions of the vector x (matrix X) is represented by [[x]] ([[X]]).
- the complexity of basic modular operations like additions (A), products (P) and exponentiations (X) is denoted by Comp A , Comp P , Comp X respectively, prefixing an E (i.e. EA, EP, EX) when they are performed under encryption.
- E i.e. EA, EP, EX
- the factor ct ⁇ 1 denotes the ratio between the size of a clear-text value and that of an encrypted value.
- the subscript cm denotes communication complexity, measured in number of sent encryptions, while cp indicates computational complexity, with an indication of the party whose complexity is represented.
- the cryptographic system 102 uses secure multiparty computation techniques including homomorphic encryption and secret sharing.
- the cryptographic system 102 makes use of homomorphisms between the groups of clear-text and cipher-text, that allow for the execution of a given operation directly on encrypted values, without the need for decryption.
- the methods implemented are not restricted to the use of cryptosystem for the presented protocols, as far as it presents an additive homomorphism.
- the system 102 uses an extension of Paillier encryption in its threshold and non-threshold form; that is, a k out of M threshold public key encryption system is a cryptosystem where the private key is distributed among M parties, and at least k of them are needed for decryption.
- the cryptographic system 102 makes use of secret sharing.
- a given value (the secret) is divided among several parties, such that the cooperation among a number of these parties is needed in order to recover the secret. None of the parties alone can have access to the secret.
- the scheme is based on polynomials, and the need of k points in order to completely determine a degree (k ⁇ 1) polynomial.
- the disclosed embodiment uses secret sharing for two-party protocols based on linear functions, without limitation, since each party can represent a plurality of entities.
- the system supports the computation of sums and products directly on the shares as follows: 1) let be the domain of the secrets; 2) then, a share of a secret x is defined as two values x A and x B , owned by their respective parties, such that x A +x B ⁇ mod n; 3) hereinafter, randomizing an encrypted value x means obtaining one share and providing the encryption of the other (through homomorphic addition).
- the protocols are based on two parties, and , both using an additively homomorphic cryptosystem in an asymmetric scenario, where can only encrypt, but also possesses the decryption key, and can perform both encryption and decryption.
- the system requires that owns an encrypted version of the system matrix [[A]], and of the independent vector [[b]].
- the SLE may have A being either a positive definite matrix or a strictly diagonally dominant matrix. In this particular case, it can be guaranteed both a solution to the system and the convergence of the studied methods, as detailed later.
- the cryptosystem 102 is especially adapted for semi-honest parties, in the sense that they adhere to the established protocol, but they can be curious about the information they can get from the interaction.
- the protocols can be proven private; informally, both parties and can only get the information leaked from the solution to the system, and no information is leaked from the intermediate steps of the protocols.
- the secure protocol and without limitation, it is assumed that there exists an additively homomorphic cryptosystem with plaintext in such that can decrypt and both and can encrypt.
- the procedure is analogous, with the exception that the random values must be generated by both parties.
- the protocol is exactly the same as the scalar-scalar case, with L ⁇ M scalar products in parallel.
- all the scalar products are performed using the scalar-scalar product protocol in parallel, with only one randomization per matrix coefficient, and the remaining operations are sums, that can be performed homomorphically.
- in order to minimize the computation and communication complexity may let perform all the partial additions that can do in the clear and would need to do homomorphically.
- FIG. 3 shows a block diagram of the direct method for solving systems of linear equations in the encrypted domain according to one embodiment.
- the cryptosystem 102 includes a method for solving systems of linear equations directly on the encrypted data 100 (i.e. without the need to decrypt the data). The method is based on Gaussian elimination, using the secure multiplication protocol for implementing the needed multiplications. Due to the lack of a division operation under encryption, according to one embodiment of the method and cryptosystem 102 the obtained result vector is scaled, but the scale factors are stored in a second vector s, so that the solution can be recovered after decryption through a component-wise division.
- the protocol ends with two vectors x′ and s, being the solution to the system
- L denote the dimension of the system matrix A.
- the system repeats the following steps: randomizes the encryptions of [[C (k) ]] 300 ; sends the randomized encryptions of [[C (k) ]] to 302 ; calculates the products [[D (k) ]] and [[E (k) ]], using the received encryptions 304 ; sends the encrypted [[D (k) ]] and [[E (k) ]] to 306 ; calculates [[G (k) ]] and [[C (k+1) ]], using the received encryptions 308 .
- a ⁇ L ⁇ L( ) be a quantized symmetric positive-definite matrix, or a diagonally dominant matrix
- b ⁇ be a quantized column vector.
- the quantization step ⁇ is such that the absolute value of every quantized element is upper bounded by a constant T.
- the protocol is described in detail as follows.
- the algorithm is executed in L ⁇ 1 steps. At each step k, the matrix G is modified to obtain an equivalent system G (k) in which the k-th unknown is not present in the last L ⁇ k equations.
- the first k ⁇ 1 elements of the L ⁇ k+1 last rows of G (k ⁇ 1) are zero; owns an encrypted version of the non-zeroed elements of G (k ⁇ 1) .
- the secure protocol proceeds as follows:
- both parties initiate the process of back substitution under encryption, consisting of L iterations: in each iteration, an element of the vector x′ and the corresponding element of the scale vector s are obtained. As they are revealed at the output, and they are needed in order to calculate the subsequent elements of x′, they can be decrypted before the next iteration in order to lower the complexity by reducing the number of the needed multiplication protocols.
- L iterations in each iteration, an element of the vector x′ and the corresponding element of the scale vector s are obtained. As they are revealed at the output, and they are needed in order to calculate the subsequent elements of x′, they can be decrypted before the next iteration in order to lower the complexity by reducing the number of the needed multiplication protocols.
- the system does not disclose any element of the original matrix A nor of the independent terms vector b. Furthermore, every step of the protocol can be proven secure with semi-honest parties, due to the semantical security of the underlying homomorphic cryptosystem, the security of the used multiplication protocols, and the fact that all the unencrypted values (besides the result and the scaling vector) that each party can access are random and uncorrelated. Nevertheless, the scaling vector reveals the diagonal of the upper triangular matrix of an equivalent system, which gives information about the eigenvalues of the original matrix. This information affects L scaled elements out of
- this disclosed embodiment constitutes a clear advantage in terms of conditioning and efficiency: before executing the back substitution protocol, the rows of G (L) can be multiplied by appropriate factors in order to lower the condition number and minimize error propagation due to working with a fixed point precision. Also, the vector of multiplicative factors s i can be adequately quantized in the clear to achieve this same goal.
- the disclosed embodiment of the protocol does not limit the number N of SLEs sharing the same system matrix A and with different independent term vectors b i that can be solved in parallel; all the vectors b i can be appended to the system matrix, forming a L ⁇ (L+N) matrix G ext and at each step of the previous protocol, the operations that must be performed on the last column of G (k) are replicated for the last N columns of G ext (k) .
- the Gaussian Elimination (GE) protocol is performed in (L ⁇ 1) rounds of communication, with total complexity
- Comp cmBS 2 ⁇ L ⁇ ( 1 + ct ) Comp cpBS
- A 1 2 ⁇ ( L 2 + L - 2 ) ⁇ Comp EP + 1 2 ⁇ ( L 2 - L ) ⁇ Comp EA Comp cpBS
- B 2 ⁇ LComp Decrypt .
- the coefficients of the system matrix A are quantized versions of the real-valued coefficients, with a quantization step ⁇ . Furthermore, the absolute value of the quantized coefficients is bounded by an integer T>0. Then, it is possible to estimate the value of T needed to fit all the performed operations inside a cipher that can represent integers in the range [0, n) without rounding problems.
- each iteration multiplies two numbers that were obtained in the previous iteration and adds them up, so the previous bound gets squared and doubled:
- the diagonal elements can be re-quantized in order to make them relative to the lowest scale and lower the bit-size requirements of the cipher; but in the worst case, without re-quantizing the scale factors, the largest number present after running the whole protocol is 2 2 L ⁇ 1 T 2 1+L ⁇ 4 . That also constrains the size of the cipher.
- the protocol presented in the earlier section does not impose any restrictions on the matrix coefficients. It can be used for both unrestricted real coefficients and complex coefficients. In this section we explain how the protocol can be implemented in the case of complex coefficients.
- the complex addition operation can be performed through two real additions; thus, it can be performed homomorphically between two encrypted complex numbers as two homomorphic real additions.
- the complex product when it involves one known factor and one encrypted number, it can also be performed homomorphically as four homomorphic multiplications and two homomorphic additions.
- it is performed through four parallel (real) scalar multiplication protocols and two homomorphic additions.
- the matrix multiplication protocol disclosed in the previous section works on complex numbers by adopting the proposed encrypted complex representation, and by substituting the real additions and products by their corresponding complex operations.
- the communication complexity is doubled, the number of performed products is multiplied by four, and the number of performed additions is doubled.
Abstract
Description
[[x 1 ·x 2 ]]=[[z 1 ·z 2 ]]−r 1 [[x 2 ]]−r 2 [[x 1 ]]−r 1 r 2.
CompcmMULT(L,M,N)=M·(L+N)+L·N
CompcpMULT,A(L,M,N)=L·N·M·(3CompEA+2CompEP)
CompcpMULT,B(L,M,N)=M·(L+N)CompDecrypt +M·L·NCompP +L·N·((M−1)CompA+CompEncrypt).
E. Secure Computational Engine and Method for Solving Linear Equations in the Encrypted Domain.
i=1, . . . , L.
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- 1. provides randomized encrypted versions of the submatrix C(k) formed by the last (L−k+2) columns of the last (L−k+1) rows of G(k−1);
- 2. , through decryption and reencryption, calculates the (randomized) products of the (L−k)×(L−k+1) matrices D(k) and E(k), defined as [[dj,m (k)]]=[[c1,m+1 (k)·cj+1,1 (k)]], and [[ei,j (k)]]=[[c1,1 (k)·ci+1,j+1 (k)]], and sends the randomized encryptions to .
-
- where [[F(k)]] is an (L−k)×(L−k+1) matrix with elements [[fi,m (k)]]=[[ei,m (k)]]−[[di,m (k)]].
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- 1. sends {[[gi,i (L−1)]]}i=1 L and [[gL,L+1 (L−1)]].
- 2. obtains, through decryption, the scaling vector s, with si=Πl=i (L)gl,l (L−1), and the value x′L=gL,L+1 (L−1), and sends them back to .
|t 1 |,|t 2 |,|t 3 |,|t 4 |<T |t 1 ·t 2 −t 3 ·t 4|<2T 2.
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US13/761,448 US8972742B2 (en) | 2009-09-04 | 2013-02-07 | System for secure image recognition |
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US8837715B2 (en) | 2011-02-17 | 2014-09-16 | Gradiant, Centro Tecnolóxico de Telecomunicacións de Galica | Method and apparatus for secure iterative processing and adaptive filtering |
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