WO2005021118A1

WO2005021118A1 - System which is used to conduct a game of chance using a communication network

Info

Publication number: WO2005021118A1
Application number: PCT/ES2003/000439
Authority: WO
Inventors: Andreu Riera Jorba; Jordi CASTELLÁ ROCA; Joan Borrell Viader
Original assignee: Kroopier Technologies, S.L.
Priority date: 2003-08-27
Filing date: 2003-08-27
Publication date: 2005-03-10
Also published as: AU2003262579A1; EP1741477A2; EP1669115A1; EP1741477A3

Abstract

The invention relates to a system which is used to conduct a game of chance using a communication network. The inventive system stores the actions taken during each game and guarantees players that the game is being conducted honestly and impartially. Moreover, the system enables at least one auditing body to verify that the actions taken during the game were honest and were not manipulated. According to the invention, the system comprises: an activity register (115) which stores the actions taken during the game, said actions being interlinked in a secure manner; and a set of operating platforms and/or programs which constitute a player agent (101) by means of which at least one of said players participates in the game. In a preferred embodiment of the invention, the system comprises a set of operating platforms and/or programs which constitute an access control agent (105) which enables an access control body to authenticate said players using credentials.

Description

SYSTEM FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A GAME OF AZAR THROUGH A COMMUNICATION NETWORK

Field of the Invention

The present invention describes a system for the execution of games of chance through a communication network, so that the activity carried out in said games, that is to say the surrounding information or data, can be recorded securely through the use of operations cryptographic The electronic game system of the invention includes the elements necessary to perform an audit of the actions of the game that allows to verify its honesty. The exposition of this invention contains material that is subject to copyright protection. The holders of said Copyright have no objection regarding the reproduction of the description of this patent application document as it appears in its published or final version in the Patent Offices by third parties, but all rights are reserved as regards Copyright in other aspects derived from said document.

Background of the invention

Computer networks, and especially the worldwide interconnected network system we know as the Internet, have allowed certain common activities, such as buying, searching for information, or playing, to be done remotely. The term game as will be used in this description encompasses, either from the usual games in casinos, with roulettes, dice, cards, caster wheels or other less popular games of chance, played with a finite number of elements. Playing remotely or Online Game has a number of advantages for players, since it provides them with independence of space (they do not have to physically move to the casino), and of time (the availability of schedules of an Online Casino, that is, that operates on the Internet, can be mostly continuous, and in any case much larger than that of a traditional casino). These advantages, among others, have made the remote game experience rapid growth. However, the remote game currently has a series of security, honesty and audit problems that must be resolved. In a traditional casino, access to minors, compulsive players and dishonest players is prohibited. The casino has a list of dishonest and compulsive players. In general, all players are authenticated at the casino entrance. This authentication basically consists of the verification of an official documentation such as the national identity document, the driver's license, or the passport. If the player is of legal age and is not in any of the mentioned lists, he may Access the casino The authentication is valid since the process to obtain the mentioned documentation is rigorous, and the documentation is difficult to falsify. In an Online Casino players before accessing the casino register through the network. In [Getting Started, Casino On Net, 03-20-2002, http://www.Casinoonnet.com/default.htm] you can find a characteristic example of the registration procedure. As a general rule, Online casinos do not verify if the player's data is correct and therefore any player belonging to one of the aforementioned groups can register and access the Online Casino. The only requirement to play is to make a payment in favor of the Online Casino. Roulette, dice, cards or casters are a few elements that are used in the games of a traditional casino. Players see all the actions that occur during the game and normally the elements used are audited by the competent Legislative Authorities. Verification serves to ensure that there is no mechanism that alters the random nature of the result. In the online game the results are usually generated by the Online Casino through a random pseudo generator. However, the Online Casino can do without said generator and choose the result that benefits you the most. The players, if they suspect this fraudulent behavior, have no proof to prove the fraud. Some Online Casinos, to give confidence about their honesty, commission an audit of their benefits to reputable firms. This audit is based on the fact that the majority of casino games players play against casino banking, and it has a mathematical probability of winning in each game. If the casino is honest your winnings in the game should be approximately equal to the total amount of money wagered in the game, for your chance of winning in it. With the data provided by the Online Casino, the auditing companies verify that the benefits are close to the mentioned amount. However, these auditing firms cannot know if the Online Casino has previously altered the data presented, to adjust to the indicated margin. The audit would be valid only if the activity records could not be modified without the active collaboration of the players. Once a player finishes a game in a traditional casino, he presents the game chips to the bank and redeems the chips for legal tender money. The situation is different in an Onhne Casino. The player to collect the benefits must receive a transfer from the Online Casino. According to [Gambling Review Body, Department for Culture Media and Sport of Great Britain, chapter 13, page 167, http://www.culture.gov.uk/role/ gambling_review.html] one third of Online Casinos do not pay benefits to the players. As mentioned above, players do not have any untrue evidence of the games played, and can hardly prove the winnings obtained to a third party audit. However, Online Casino is not the only part that can perform fraudulent actions. In traditional casinos players exchange money for game chips. The players, once they have finished the game and if they have lost, they cannot claim not to have played and demand the return of the money. In the Online Casino players enter a certain amount of money in favor of the casino to play. Most users use credit cards to perform this operation, due to the ease and speed of payment they represent. Users of this payment method can repudiate the purchases or transactions they have made. Therefore, the players are in a position to play and, in case of losing, repudiate the income returned in favor of the Online Casino through the credit card. This action is detrimental to credit card entities. To reduce the losses caused by the repudiation of payments, these entities increase the percentage they charge to the Online Casino for each payment. In some cases, they even reject the operation if they detect that it comes from an Online Casino, as mentioned in [Rich M. Tel, A Credit Crisis for Web Casinos, The New York Times On The Web, 2002-01-21, http : //www.nytimes.com/2002/01/21/technology/ebusiness/21BETS.html=all]. Some countries, as is the case in Great Britain, are studying the regulation of Online gaming. This measure would allow to protect the users from the mentioned abuses, and to have a fiscal control on the Online game. It would also prevent some crimes, such as money laundering. A review of the sector's problems is found in the Gambling Review Body, mentioned above. This document defines the current problems and the actions that the administration would take to control the game. However, in order to legislate the game, tools are needed to prevent any of the parties involved in it from being dishonest or, in any case, that dishonest actions can be denounced without any doubt. Some previous inventions present systems and / or methods for remote gaming in a communications network. The most notable examples are the inventions described in US 4,926,327, US 4,958,835, US 5,038,022, US 6,196,920, GB2307184, US 5,755,621 and US 5,823,879. All these inventions only describe the operation of the remote game, but do not emphasize the security, honesty and audit problems mentioned above. A second group, with representative examples being inventions US 6,106,396, US 6,117,011, US 6,264,560 and W09811686, contemplate only network-level security. These inventions encrypt only the communications between the parties of the game to ensure their privacy, without providing any game protocol to ensure that the game is honest. Nor do they define any method to save the information that is generated during the game, so that once it is finished, there is unalterable evidence of its execution. This does not guarantee an honest audit in case of conflict, since the evidence can be altered. Inventions US 6,264,557 and US 6,165,072, contemplate the security of communications and the honesty of some of the games. However, as detailed in the application International Patent [PCT ES02 / 00485], some of its protocols have weaknesses, and do not offer a complete solution to the problems of online gaming. Currently, the peer relationship model emerges on the Internet with great force, which is called the P2P (Peer to Peer) model. In this game model players can play without the intervention of a Casino. The most significant proposals in this field are US 5,984,779 and US 6,152,824. The first invention relates to a gaming machine that allows gaming inside the casino without the need for an intermediary, also commenting on the possibility that the machines can be connected remotely through a communication network such as the Internet. The players rent the machines and all the prizes are distributed among the participants in the game. It does not describe the methods to reproduce chance, nor the security or honesty of the game system. The second invention describes an Online Casino architecture that allows the game with a central figure that distributes the messages without intervening in the game. This system encrypts the communications between the parts of the game to ensure your privacy. It does not provide any game protocol to ensure that the game is honest. Nor does it define any method to save the information generated during the game, so that there is unalterable evidence of the honest execution of the game. If the system operator conspires with some player to benefit him, the rest of the players will be defenseless. The present invention relates to a gaming system, preferably remote, which according to the arrangement of its elements allows the execution of a game with or without intermediary. In the game organization with intermediary, he actively participates in the game. The intermediary would typically be an Online Casino. In the second organization, players play directly with each other, according to a P2P model. In both architectures, honesty, audit, and security of the game are guaranteed through the use of an Activity Record 115 that stores the actions that occur in that game, linked to each other in a secure manner and by cryptographic processes and protocols in the phases of that game.

Brief Exhibition of the Invention

The present invention describes a system for the execution of a game of chance through a communication network that stores the actions developed in said game and guarantees to some players of said game that the execution thereof is honest and impartial. Allowing at least one Audit Authority to verify that said actions in said game have been honest and have not been manipulated. The system comprises an Activity Record 115 that stores said actions in said game, linked together in a secure manner, and a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute a Player Agent 101 by means of which at least one of said Players participate in that game. According to a preferred version of execution of the invention, the system additionally recommended comprises a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute an Access Control Agent 105 that allows an Access Control Authority to authenticate said players by means of credentials. . Additionally, the recommended system comprises a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute a Certification Agent 103 through which a Certification Authority creates and makes said identification credentials accessible to at least one of said players. In general, the recommended system additionally includes a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute a Virtual Game Table 113, intended to centralize and distribute said actions in said game to said players that have been authenticated by said Control Agent of Access 105. In order to audit the system, the invention additionally provides a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute an Audit Agent 111 with which said Audit Authority verifies the honesty of the game by reviewing said actions occurring in said game that are included in said Activity Record 115. According to an example of execution of the invention, the recommended system further comprises a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute a Bank Agent 123, by means of the which a Trust Entity, such as a Casino Banking or a Financial Entity, creates and makes available to at least one of said players a proof of the credit that said at least one of said players has to participate in said game. For a better control of the system for the execution of a game of chance through a communication network, the proposed invention further comprises a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute an Impartial Agent 107. In a first alternative said Agent Impartial 107 makes said Player Agent 101 accessible to said players. In a second alternative said Impartial Agent 107 generates game events such as a roulette position, a card from a deck, or a face of a dice. According to an implementation example, the recommended system additionally comprises a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute a Croupier Agent 109, destined to perform the actions corresponding to a Croupier in a Casino type game. A characteristic aspect of the invention consists in the use of a data chain by means of which said actions are securely linked to each other, where each link of said data chain is formed by a first part describing one of said actions and a second part which is a summary calculated with a cryptographic summary function of said first part of said link and the second part of at least one previous link of said data chain. The authenticity of said second part of each link is guaranteed by a digital signature with the private component of at least one pair of asymmetric keys owned by the author of said link, which can be said Player Agent 101, said Agent

Access Control 105, a Certification Agent 103, an Audit Agent 111, a

Bank Agent 123, an Impartial Agent 107, or a Croupier Agent 109. Other aspects and details of the invention are referred to in the detailed exposition thereof with the help of figures.

Brief Description of the Figures

Figure 1 shows the elements that make up the system for the impartial execution of a game of chance through a communication network. Figure 2 shows an example of how the elements of said system of the present invention interact with each other through a Communication Network 201. In Figure 3 the phases that a player performs in the execution of the game can be seen. Figure 4 shows the phases of the development of the game.

Detailed description of the invention

The essence of gambling is the random obtaining of at least one event (the position of a roulette, a card of the deck, a face of a dice, etc.), the outcome of the game being determined based on At least this event. In the games developed in person the events are obtained through a roulette, a deck of cards, or some dice for example. The honesty of the game depends very directly on these elements, and the conditions of its manipulation. For this reason the organisms that regulate, the games in which events of chance take part dictate some specifications or a regulation that must fulfill the elements used in the game. The review and certification that these elements comply with the regulation is usually carried out by an audit firm. The players are protected against possible manipulations thanks to this regulation and certification of the elements of the game. In addition to these measures, the players themselves see these elements during the game. This eye contact, and in some cases also physical, gives players confidence that the game is honest and if they detect an irregular situation during the game they can report it. The rest of the players can help solve the doubts of the player, and if the Casino has a recording system that records the game, the recording allows to solve possible disputes. If you analyze a conventional game system (Casino) you can see that the main figures involved in gambling are: players, responsible for access control, issuers of players' credentials, croupiers, casino banking , the game's legislators and finally the auditors. The definitions that are used hereafter to describe the remote gaming system of this invention are introduced below. A game hand is the set of actions that players and the Croupier perform in a card game to obtain the result of the game. This result, and actions, depends on each particular game. A roll is the set of actions that players and the Croupier perform to obtain the result of the game, which is based on obtaining a single random value. This group includes roulette, dice and coin machines. In the case of roulette the player is the winner if he had previously bet on the result. In the dice or in a coin machine the player wins if the result he obtains corresponds to a pre-established prize. A game is a set of playing hands, or rolls, made by the player at a Game Table. A player's game starts when he enters the Game Table, and ends when he leaves. A player's credit is the maximum amount of money he can bet on a Game Table. A player to be able to play at a table must have a minimum amount of credit. Each player, independently, must be able to verify that any other player can cover his bets with his credit. For a better understanding of the invention, the notation to be used in the description hereafter is introduced: • J: The ith player. • Summary message of, obtained by means of a unidirectional and collision-free hash function. • mι \ m ₂ : Concatenation of messages i and ₂ . "Pentidad, S entity 'Pair of asymmetric keys entity, corresponding P _tity public component, and S _{in dad} private component." S _in tity {ιri}' - Encrypt the message m, made with Key asymmetric private entity. ^m PenUdad {ϊ} - Encryption of the message m, created with the public asymmetric entity key. 'S _en tidad i ™,)' - Digital signature of the message m. Understanding the digital signature as the calculation of the summary of the message m through a hash function, and the encryption of this summary with the private asymmetric entity key. A detailed description can be found in [PKCS # 7, Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note, Version 1.5, November 1, 1993]. K ^' _{in d} d'- Secret symmetric key entity. 'Eκ _ent i _{da, d} { ^m } ^: Encryption of the message m created with the symmetric entity key. m Dκ _entity {c}: Decryption of the message c obtained with the symmetric entity key.

Players, to participate in the game through a communication network, need a set of programs and / or execution platforms. Hereafter referred to as Player Agent 101 is this set of programs that can be an application with secure remote connection capability, or a Plug-In in a browser available to the player. The execution platform as its name indicates allows the execution of Player Agent 101, and has the ability to connect to a communication network. The execution platform can be a personal computer, a personal digital assistant, or a mobile telephone terminal, for example. To offer a greater security guarantee to the player, the Player Agent 101 must be audited and certified by an Audit Authority of recognized prestige. In a preferred option, each player has a pair of asymmetric keys indicated as (PJ, SJ). Player Agent 101 has access to this pair of player keys with his or her prior consent. In most cases to access a conventional Casino players show an identification card that has been issued by the authorities of the player's country. However, in a remote game system, the player can hardly show his conventional credentials so that they can be validated reliably. These credentials are a digital certificate of a pair of player keys. If the player does not have a digital certificate, the present invention incorporates a set of programs and / or execution platforms that are called Certification Agent 103, to create and make accessible these credentials with which players can authenticate remotely . The Certification Agent 103 is controlled by a Certification Authority that is responsible for ensuring the validity of the data provided by the player. In a preferred option, the Certification Authority has a pair of asymmetric keys denoted as (PR, SR). Certification Agent 103 has access to this pair of player keys with the prior consent of said Certification Authority. In the present invention the functions of access control to the remote game system (responsibility of an Access Control Authority) are performed by a set of programs and / or execution platforms that are called the Control Agent of Access 105. The Access Control Agent 105 validates credentials issued by the Certification Authority. In a preferred option, the Access Control Authority has a pair of asymmetric keys denoted as (PE, SE), and the Access Control Agent 105 uses said key pair 5 with the prior consent of said Access Control Authority . In a traditional system, the authorities in charge of regulating the game do not participate in it, but specify the characteristics that the elements used in the game must meet, who can access the game, taxation in the game, the conditions that the game must meet. place where the game takes place, etc. In the remote game, the same control actions must be carried out through a communication network 0. The present invention considers the possibility of an Impartial Entity to have a set of programs and / or execution platforms so that it can participate more actively in the remote game, for example by generating the game events or making the Player Agent accessible 101 to the players. Hereinafter this set will be called Impartial Agent 107

15 programs that are preferably an application with secure remote connection capability. The associated execution platform, as the name implies, allows the execution of said Impartial Agent 107. Such an execution platform can be a computer, or a secure tamper-proof module capable of executing applications inside it, such as Hardware Secure Module (HSM) nShield from manufacturer nCipher

20 [http://www.ncipher.com/nshield/ 06/16/2003]. The Impartial Entity has a pair of asymmetric keys that will be denoted as (P ₇ , Yes), which is used by the Impartial Agent 107 with the prior consent of the Impartial Entity. In games like Black Jack or Roulette, players play against the Casino, and the

25 Crupier is the one who represents the Casino at the Game Table, and controls game development. In games where players play with each other, Poker would be an example, the Crupier is one more player who plays on behalf of the casino. In a remote game system, the functions of the Crupier can be performed automatically by means of communication and / or associated programs. Hereafter this

The set is called Croupier Agent 109. Croupier Agent 109 has a pair of asymmetric keys denoted as (Pe, S _C ). In a first option the Impartial Agent 107 executes a cryptographic protocol for the impartial generation of game events, together with the Croupier Agent

35 109. In a second option, Impartial Agent 107 impartially generates game events. In a third option the Crupier Agent 109 executes a cryptographic protocol for the impartial generation of game events, together with the Agent of the Player 101. In any of the three options mentioned, pseudo-random values are obtained. Obtaining any random value during the game process is done through routines generating pseudo-random numbers (PRNG). These routines use an initial value called seed to generate a sequence of unpredictable values. In general, all sources of random numbers of the present invention will use sources of natural noise in obtaining the seeds. Examples of such sources may be the cadence of mouse movements or keystrokes caused by players, or the use of a device specially designed for this purpose. Some examples of pseudo-random generators are found in [FIPS PUB 140-2: Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, http: /csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-2.htm, April 2003], [Appendix 3 of FIPS PUB 186: Digital Signature Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fipsl86-2 / fipsl86-2-changel.pdf, April 2003] and [RFC 1750: Randomness Recommendations for Security, http: //www.ietf.org/rfc/rfcl750.txt, April 2003]. Typically the game elements of a traditional Casino are examined by an independent auditing company. This audit company verifies that the elements comply with the legislation. Once the audit has been carried out, and if it is satisfactory, the elements are certified. Before starting the game the participants can verify the certification of the elements of the game, so that they are certain that these elements have not been altered after their certification, and do not tend to favor any part in particular. In a remote gaming system it is also necessary to perform similar audits, that is, to verify the certification of its elements, periodic and random tests of the proper functioning of the system, and to review the traces that collect the actions of the game. To perform these tasks, an Audit Authority has some computing means and / or associated programs that are called the Audit Agent 111. The Audit Authority through the Audit Agent 111 verifies and certifies the elements of the gaming system, and check those game actions that have been stored in a Database (BD) of the game system. As mentioned above, in the present invention the game elements are a set of programs and / or execution platforms. The certification of these elements depends on whether they are computer programs or execution platforms. The certification of a computer program consists of a digital signature of the computer program with a pair of asymmetric keys owned by the Audit Authority denoted as (PA, SA) - The public PA component of this pair of keys can be certified by an Authority of Certification of recognized prestige, such as Verisign [www.verisign.com, 2003]. This public component is available to any interested party in the validation of the certificate of the computer program. The execution platforms are certified through a seal that ensures that they have not been altered once audited. As the Game Table has already indicated in a traditional casino, it is the place where players and the Croupier meet to develop the game. In the present invention, the Virtual Game Table 113 is called a set of programs and / or execution platforms that centralize, and distributes the messages generated by the players during a game. For example, when a player wants a card, the Player Agent 101 makes the request to the Virtual Game Table 113 and it makes it accessible that said request has been made to the rest of the Agents of the Players 101. In the game system of the In the present invention there are several Virtual Game Tables 113 depending on the number of players, and each of them has a unique IdM identifier, which allows to know the table of each player. A player can choose if he wants to play only with the Croupier, without any other player being able to access the Virtual Game Table 113, or enter a Virtual Game Table

113 where there is a plurality of players. In the first alternative the Virtual Table of

Game 113 is called Private Game Virtual Table 113, and the second alternative

Virtual Game Table 113 shared. Additionally all the actions that are sent to the Virtual Game Table 113 are stored in a BD. The review of these actions allows a subsequent audit of the game. Conventional Casinos can give rise to situations that raise questions for casino participants. To solve them usually the Casinos record with a video system all the actions that occur in the enclosure. In a remote game system the actions of the participants, that is, the messages that are sent during the game, must be recorded for the same reason. Known remote game systems store some of the game actions in a BD, so that this information can be used in an audit of the remote game system. However, control of the BD by a BD administrator or an external attacker could modify the data. The Auditor must be certain that the data comes from a registered player, that they have not been modified, and what the sequence of the actions is. If the data of the BD are altered they must show an inconsistency that demonstrates the modification in a certain way. A characteristic aspect of the present invention resides in the fact that the actions of the players in a game are stored in an Activity Log 115, linked together in a secure manner. More specifically, such actions are represented by Player Agent 101 as a link in a CDNE chain. A detailed description of the construction and properties of the CDNE chains is found in the international application PCT / ES02 / 00485, of the same applicant. For greater clarity of this exposure, these properties are briefly described below.

• A chain link can only be added at the end of the CDNE chain. If added. at any other point it is necessary to redo the entire chain until the end, a task that is not computationally possible. m If a link in the chain is removed, the chain will present a jump that can be detected upon verification. • If an entry is modified the chain is inconsistent, and the modification is verifying the construction process. m Tickets let you know the exact moment, and the order in which they occurred. • The entries in the registry incorporate information about its author, and any third party can verify this information. Additionally, the author of the entry cannot repudiate it because the information could only be calculated by it. • The calculation of the pieces of the chain is done in parallel when the game protocol allows it. This measure improves its efficiency while maintaining the previous properties.

Each link πi _k of the chain consists of two fields, the first field contains the data (D _k ) and the second contains a chained summary (X _k ) 'm _k = D _k , X _k (1) The data field Dk typically describes an action performed by the player, although it can also be a step in a game protocol performed by Player Agent 101 with other Agents. The chained summary of link X _k is constructed in three phases: First, the chained summary of the previous link X _k -ι is concatenated with the data of the current message Dk. Next, the summary of the concatenated set is calculated, and finally said summary is digitally signed with the private key of the link author:

Each player will normally have an execution platform with a different computing power. If the construction is sequential, the total time for the execution of a step of the game will be the sum of all the individual times. In the case of a parallel execution, the time will be equal to the time of the slowest platform. The logic of the Casino-type games and the CDNE chain allow the links to be built in parallel. The expression 3 shows the parallel calculation of some links using the chained summary of the previous link X _k -i-

When the logic of the game requires players to participate in the game sequentially, a link is built that reunifies the chain. In expression 4, you can see how this link is calculated. First, the data D _k is concatenated with all the chained summaries of the previous links { _fc i ₁ | . . . | _fc " ₁ }, then the summary of this concatenated message is calculated and finally the summary is signed with the pair of asymmetric keys of the author of the link.

Each game has a CDNE chain. The set of CDNE chains are stored in a database that receives the name of Activity Record 115. The Audit Authority with the Audit Agent 111 accesses the Activity Record 115 and can know the items that have been made and all the actions that They have happened in them. This data can also be used to carry out a fiscal control of the participants in the game.

Bank Agent 123 (described below) accesses the Activity Log

115 to calculate a player's winnings in a game. The information generated during the game is not the only one necessary to carry out a complete audit, it is also important to know who accesses the casino, the monetary movements of the players and their protests in case they are raised. The monetary movements made by each player are also saved in the form of a CDNE chain. This chain is built by the Player Agent 101 and the Bank Agent 123, this chain being similar to a Bank book because it shows the player's credit and all his movements without being modified. This chain is called Monetary Registry 117 and is in the possession of the player and the Banking Agent

123. The CDNE chain data field indicates whether the operation is an income or a refund, and links the movement with the reason that originated it. The concepts related to the credit increase are the following: «Credit purchase: The data field includes the transaction number of the entry made by the player. "Collection of winnings of a game: The data field includes the Virtual Game Table number 113 corresponding to the game in which the player has won, and also incorporates a signed summary of the game. ~ Prize: The player is graceful with an amount of money, and the data field includes the reference of the prize awarded.If the operation is a refund the concept collects the following data:

• Entry into a Virtual Game Table 113: Each time the player enters a Virtual Game Table 113, a refund is made for a fixed amount. This refund is made transparently to the player, and can be modified by him at any time. "Credit increase for a Virtual Game Table: If a player needs, or wants to have more credit during a game, he can request proof of his credit for that game table (see detail below). • Reimbursement of the benefits of game: The player can withdraw a part, or the totality, of the capital that he has in the Bank. The data field includes the request for refund of the user, the payment method, and the data related to this payment (entity and number of the player's current account, for example) • Fine: In the event that a player performs an operation that is not allowed, a fine can be imposed with a direct charge to his credit.

If Player Agent 101 receives a link that is poorly constructed and does not belong to the chain of the game, it generates an incident. This issue is a link in another chain

CDNE that is stored in a database that is called Incident Registry 119.

In the data field of the link, the evidence is attached to show that an anomalous event has really occurred. Basic operations such as the entry and exit of the players of the remote game system, the creation or closing of the Virtual Game Tables 113 are also links of another CDNE chain created by the Access Control Agent 105. The BD that stores this chain CDNE receives the name of Access Control Registry 121. Players to bet inside a traditional casino use chips issued by the casino, which are only valid inside. Casino Banking is in charge of exchanging the player's legal money for chips, and vice versa. In the present invention the functions of the Bank are performed by a set of programs and / or execution platforms that are called the Agent of Bank 123. The Agent of Bank 123 is managed by a Trusted Entity, such as the Banking of an Online Casino, or a Financial Entity. Bank Agent 123 provides proof of the credit available to the player, which is made accessible to other players so that they can know the credit of the new player, and is also stored in Activity Record 115. Once a player leaves a Virtual Game Table 113 the Bank Agent 123 updates the credit of this player by reviewing Activity Record 115. Activity Record 115 reflects the initial amount available to the player and all bets with the consequent earnings and loses. The Banking Agent has a pair of certified asymmetric keys, which are denoted as (PJB, SB). The certification of the keys is preferably carried out by a certification authority of recognized prestige. In a conventional casino, players know the credit of the rest of the participants according to the value of the chips they have on the table. When one of them makes a bet, he puts the chips on top of the bet value, or in the center of the table, depending on the game. Players know that the bettor covers the bet because they see the chips. However, there are no physical tokens in the remote game. Digital tokens should have similar properties to digital currencies. In Okamoto and Ohta [T. Okamoto and K. Ohta, Universal Electronic Cash, Advances in Cryptology: Proc. of Crypt'91, LNCS 576, pp. 324-337, Springer-Verlag, 1992.] These problems are described and a complete solution is presented. However, the proposed solution has a high computational cost, and the part of Banking needs to participate in each monetary transfer between the players. In the present invention, to know the credit available to each player in a game, a proof of credit is used, which is called Digital Check. When a player wants to enter a Virtual Game Table, the Agent of Player 101 makes the request for an amount to the Agent of Bank 123. If the player has the requested credit, the Agent of Bank 123 issues the corresponding Digital Check. The Digital Check is used for a single Virtual Game Table 113, and can only be used once. Additionally, the Digital Check has a unique serial number and is linked to an instant of the game. The entry of a player in a game is indicated by a link in the CDNE chain of departure. The Digital Check is entered in the data field of the link and in this way players can know the credit of the new player. The properties of this chain guarantee that any manipulation of an entry will be detected, and therefore by reviewing the chain (initial capital, increases, and credit decrements) the credit of each player is known reliably. When a player asks to enter a Virtual Game Table 113, the Player's Agent 101 obtains the identifier of the Virtual Game Table 113 and the last link in the chain

CDNE of the game you want to enter. With this data build the request Q _k , which sends the Agent of Bank 123:

Sj is the private component of the key pair of the player who makes the Digital Check request. T _k is the time in which the player asks to enter the Virtual Game Table 113. C _k is a description, which indicates that the player wants to enter the Virtual Game Table 113. The description Ck contains the identifier of the Virtual Game Table 113 IdM, and the last entry of the Activity Record 115 M _k . V _k is the value that corresponds to the credit that you want to have to enter the Virtual Game Table 113. The Bank verifies the digital signature on the request Q, and that the player has the amount V _k . Then, if the previous verifications are correct, issue the CHk check in favor of the player.

SB is the private component of the Bank's asymmetric key pair, T _k is the instant of issuance of the check, C _k is the description indicated by the table, the point at which the player asked to enter, the player's request Q _k , and the serial number of the check that has been issued. Vk is the credit available to the player at the Virtual Game Table 113. The Bank makes this Digital Check accessible to Player Agent 101 and Croupier Agent 109. In certain Casino games a player may request that a deck be used of new cards, or that the Croupier be replaced. The manufacturer of card decks does not mark the cards because his reputation depends on it. When the player sees a new deck of cards open, he increases his confidence. The substitution of the Crupier is also a measure to generate more confidence to the player, because if he has any suspicion about the behavior of the Crupier he can request his substitution. In a remote game system there must be ways to give players confidence. The present invention provides for this purpose a set of programs and / or execution platforms, preferably safe tamper-proof, that constitute an Impartial Agent 107. In a first alternative said Impartial Entity makes the Player Agent 101 accessible to said Players by means of said Impartial Agent 107. The download of Player Agent 101 from a trusted site would be equivalent to opening a deck of cards in front of the player. In a second alternative the Impartial Agent 107 can generate the game events, or participate with the Croupier Agent 109 in obtaining the game events by means of a cryptographic protocol for the joint generation of game events. So far, the system elements shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 have been described as an example of implementation. The following describes how they interact with each other to ensure an honest and safe game. This interaction, as shown in Figure 3, includes the basic operations performed in a Casino: Registration of

Players 301, Authentication of Players 303, Purchase of Credit 305, Opening of a Game Table 307, Entry into a Game Table 309, Development of Game 311, and

Leaving the Game Table 313. When two people who meet are left to play, they identify easily and the fact of knowing each other creates confidence. The situation is different when the players do not know each other, because the fact of not knowing them creates a certain distrust. In this case the players can identify themselves by showing the official documentation (identity card, driving license, passport, etc.), in this way they know who they play with and if there is any dispute they can identify the adversary. However, in a remote game system, players cannot see, that is, reliably validate, the official documentation of the other players. Therefore in a remote game system it is necessary to use an authentication mechanism that provides guarantees similar to those of traditional authentication, and that the credentials of the players are issued with a similar rigor to that of the official documentation. In the present invention it is necessary that players have credentials with which they can identify remotely. If players do not have them, they must be issued by the Certification Authority with the Certification Agent. The Agent of

Certification 103 collects credential requests, and issues credentials once the

Certification Authority has validated the request data. Players request credentials through Player Agent 101, and therefore the first step that players take is the download of Player Agent 101. In a preferred implementation, Player Agent 101 is downloaded from Impartial Agent 107, through a secure connection such as SSL, TLS or WTLS in the case of mobile telephony. The player, once he has Player Agent 101, enters his data so that his credentials are generated. Player Agent 101 makes this data accessible to Certification Agent 103, preferably using a secure communication protocol, examples mentioned being: SSL, TLS, or WTLS. If it is not possible to use a secure communication protocol, the privacy of the player's data can be protected by a digital envelope, as detailed in the notation. The digital envelope is prepared with the public key PR of the Certification Authority. The data provided by the player in the credentials request are at least one of the following: name, surname, date of birth, name of the parents, place of birth, address where he resides, the number of the National identity document, social security number, address where you reside, telephone number, and email address. Identification credentials are a digital certificate of a pair of keys owned by the player. If the player does not have an asymmetric key pair, Player Agent 101 generates a pair of asymmetric keys that are called, (Pj, Sj). The private component, Sj, is encrypted with a symmetric cryptosystem and a high entropy password. This protection prevents anyone, except the player, from using it. Some examples of symmetric cryptosis are the old DES encryption standard [National Bureau of Standards, NBS

FIPS PUB 46-1, Data Encryption Standard, US Department of Commerce, January 1988], triple DES [ANSÍ X9.17 (Revised), American National Standard for Financial Institution Key Management (Wholesale), American Bankers Association, 1985], or Rijndael [Daemen, J. and Rijmen, V. The Block Cipher Rijndael, Smart Card Research and Applications, LNCS 1820, J.-J. Quisquater and B. Schneier, Eds., Springer-Verlag, pp. 288-296, 2000]. Optionally, the player can make the protected key accessible to the Certification Authority as a backup, with the certainty that no one will have access to it because the password is only known by the player. With the data entered by the user and the public component Pj of its key pair, the Player Agent 101 generates a certificate request, which is sent to the Certification Agent 103. The Certification Agent 103 stores the certificate requests until The Certification Authority has verified the data provided by the players. Verification of this data is done by accessing official BDs, such as the police BD, and optionally also requires the physical presence of the player to present their documentation. If the data is correct, the Certification Authority issues the digital certificate of the public component of the player's key pair through the Certification Agent 103. The player can only use this key pair in the remote game system, or in a further implementation Securely create a key pair for each of the following functions: • Authentication keys, (P, S _j ): The player uses this key pair to authenticate. Once the key pair has been created and the public component, P _j , with the private key Sj, sends the certificate to the Access Control. The authentication key pair is renewed after a fixed period of time, or if the private component is compromised. • Game keys, (P _j , S): To speed up the game protocols the player creates a pair of keys of smaller length for the game. This key pair is only used in one game. The time needed to break the cryptosystem is much longer than the duration of the game. * Management Keys, (PJ, SJ): Credit request operations, opening of a Virtual Game Table 113, etc., are performed with this pair of keys.

Player authentication is a necessary step, because only registered players can participate in the game. This measure prevents access to the game for players who belong to the aforementioned groups (minors, dishonest players, or players from other regions). The Access Control Agent 105 additionally contacts authenticated players and allows players to view existing Virtual Game Tables 113, and create new ones. The player is authenticated in the Access Control Agent 105 by means of a strong cryptographic authentication protocol. Some characteristic examples of strong authentication protocols are contained in the ISO / IEC 9594-8 (X.509) [ISO / IEC 9594- 8 "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Overview of concepts, models, and services ", International Organization for Standardization, Geneva, Switzerland, 1995 (equivalent to ITU-T Rec. X.509, 1993)]. These protocols allow a two-sided authentication of the two parties, with the optional exchange of keys. The strong term is used here to differentiate this authentication from the simplest password-based one. In the protocol the Player Agent 101 uses the player's asymmetric key pair and the Access Control Agent 105 uses the asymmetric key pair of the Access Control Authority. In a first alternative the Player 101 Agent uses the key pair (PJ, SJ), and in a second alternative it uses the Authentication key pair

In a traditional Casino a player to participate in the game, which takes place at a game table, must exchange his legal course money for chips. In the remote game system of the present invention, players obtain a Digital Check for a Virtual Game Table 113, which is issued by the Trust Entity. The player must have an account in the Trust Entity open with enough money to play, and when the player makes a request through Player Agent 101, the Trust Entity issues the Digital Check. The Digital Check request is signed by Player Agent 101 with the key pair owned by the player. If the key pair is duly certified and the private component is adequately protected, the digital signature may have legal validity, and the player may not subsequently repudiate the request. Additionally, the digital signature also prevents the amount of the request from being modified. The Digital Check is included in the Monetary Record 117 and in the Activity Record 115. The inclusion in the Monetary Record 117 allows you to have control of all the capital movements of the player, and the inclusion in the Activity Record 115 allows the Other participants in the game may know the credit available to the player. In a traditional Casino the number of gaming tables is limited, and in some cases Players must wait to enter one of them. However, in a remote game system the number of Virtual Game Tables 113 may vary according to the number of players, and as mentioned the player can choose if he wants to play alone (Virtual Game Table

113 Private), or with other players (Virtual Table 113 Public Game). Additionally in a Virtual Table 113 Public Game players can allow entry only to the players they want. If a player wants to create a new Virtual Game Table 113, he makes a request C _k to the Access Control Agent 105 through the Player Agent 101. The request C _k details the type of Virtual Game Table 113 (public or private), the game you want to play, and if you want a Croupier Agent 109 to control the game. Player Agent 101 signs the request C _k , N _k = with the private component of the Player's key pair

(Ck), and sends the digital signature N _k to the Access Control Agent 105. The Access Control Agent 105 creates an identifier Id of the Virtual Game Table 113, which allows subsequent control of the Virtual Tables of Game 113. Assigns the created identifier (Idjyj) to an instance of the Virtual Game Table 113, and if the request indicates that a Croupier Agent 109 controls the game, the Access Control Agent 105 obtains an instance of the Croupier Agent 109 associating it with the Virtual Game Table 113. The Access Control Agent 105 creates the CDNE chain of the game, where in the data field of the first link you have the request to create the Virtual Game Table 113 N _k . In a traditional casino or Bingo players cannot enter the game whenever they want, the game has some guidelines and the entry of a player is made at the points allowed by the game. A player may request entry into a Virtual Game Table 113 at any time, but will only be admitted once the roll or hand that is being played at that time is finished. The moment a player enters a Virtual Game Table 113, the game of said player begins. As mentioned to enter a Virtual Game Table 113 it is necessary to have credit. The player shows his credit to the rest of the participants by means of a Digital Check, CH _k , which is only valid for a Virtual Game Table 113, and a given time. When a player wants to access a Virtual Game Table 113 the Player Agent 101 obtains the IdM identifier of the Virtual Game Table 113, and the last entry of the Virtual Game Table 113. Makes a Digital Check request to the Game Agent Bank 123, for the Virtual Game Table 115, at one point of the game. Optionally to increase the speed of the cryptographic operations performed during the execution of the game the Player Agent 101 creates a pair of starting keys (P, S _j ), and certifies the public component with the private component of its key pair (Pj , Sj). Finally, Player 101 Agent makes the Digital Check available to the Board Virtual Game 113, and if you have created a starting key pair also makes the digital certificate of the key pair accessible. The Agent of Croupier 109, or the Agent of Player 101 who performs the functions of the

Crupier, once the roll or hand in progress is finished, verifies the Digital Checks and the certificates received and makes a new entry in the CDNE chain of the game. The data field indicates the players who enter the Virtual Game Table 113, their digital checks and their corresponding certificates. As Figure 4 shows, casino-type games have a common denominator which are the phases of the game: Start of the Roll or Hand of Game 401, Betting 403, Obtaining

Game Events 405, and Final of the Roll or Game Hand 407. Each of these phases is one, or several new links of the CDNE chain of the game. These stages and the links of the CDNE chain of the game implemented by the Player Agent 101 and / or by the Croupier Agent 109 are detailed below, according to the proposed system. The Croupier's Agent 109, or the Player's Agent 101 who performs this task, marks the Start of the Roll or Hand of Game 401, and thereby marks the end of player entry. Players can enter the Virtual Game Table 113 in the period between the end and the start of the game hand or roll. The data field of the link in the starting chain details that a new game hand is started. All players know or can meet the other participants in the game, and their credit. A player in a traditional casino cannot repudiate a bet, nor can it be modified by him or another player once the betting period has ended. In the recommended game system each bet is a link in the CDNE chain, and therefore it is signed with the player's key pair and is made accessible to the rest of the members of the Virtual Game Table 113, that is, the bet is not can repudiate or modify. When the player makes a Bet 403 the Player Agent 101 constructs a link in the CDNE chain that indicates in the data field the specific type of bet, and the value. Bets 403 can be made in parallel by all players, because a sequential order is not necessary. This operation involves an expansion of the CDNE chain of the game. Once the Betting Period 403 is over, the Croupier Agent 109, or the Player 101 Agent who performs the actions of a Croupier, accepts the valid Betting 403 with a new link in the CDNE chain of the game. The data field includes an operation code that denotes the end of Bets 403 and the start of the game. The CDNE chain of the game contracts at this point. With this measure all players can see the Bets 403 made, and cannot modify them. A bet is valid if it conforms to the rules of the game, and the player has credit to place it. Each casino game is different and therefore to guarantee honesty in each of them different problems must be solved. For example, in the Black Jack the cards They are distributed openly, but in Poker they should only know their recipient. In roulette, the result is based on a single value obtained at random, in the Black Jack several values are obtained. Depending on your requirements, casino games can be divided into the following groups: card games, open card games, and covered card games. In the first group we can find the roulette, and the dice. A characteristic example of the second group is the Black Jack. A significant example of the third group is Poker. As mentioned in a first option, the Croupier Agent 109 executes a cryptographic protocol for the Impartial Generation of Game Events 405, together with the Impartial Agent 107. Below are five non-limiting examples of execution of said Game. first option. In the execution examples, a cryptographic commitment protocol is used as the base tool. A first commitment protocol was introduced by Blum in 1982 [Blum M., Coin ñipping by telephone: a protocol for solving impossible problems, Proc. IEEE Computer Conference, pages 133-137, IEEE, 1982]. In a commitment protocol, one party, or party, commits to certain information X, before other parties, or verifiers of the commitment. A commitment protocol C _p consists of two phases, a commitment phase followed by a commitment release phase. In the commitment phase the compromise calculates a transformation T of the information X, T = C _P {X}, and makes T accessible to the verifiers of the commitment. In the second phase the commitment reveals X and / or the information to verify the commitment, T_C _P {X}. The procedure can be described with the following physical example: In the first phase each participant enters a certain information in a box, which closes with a key and delivers said box to the rest of the participants. In the second phase, he gives the key to open the box and retrieve the information inside the initial box. The verifiers of the commitment cannot know anything about X from T, and the compromised information X cannot be altered by the owner between the first and second phases. An overview of the state of the art in relation to compromise protocols can be found in [Schneier B., Applied Cryptography: protocols, algorithms, and source code in C, Second Edition, Wiley, 1996]. In a first example of execution of said first option the player makes a bet A through his Player Agent 101. The Player Agent 101 commits to bet A through a cryptographic commitment protocol C _p , and obtains a transformation T, T = C _P {A}. The Agent of Player 101 makes the Agent of Croupier 109 accessible. The Agent of Croupier 109 obtains a value V _\ randomly from which the outcome of the game is derived, and makes V _\ the Agent of Player 101 accessible. Next Player Agent 101 makes Player A's bet accessible to Croupier Agent 109, which verifies the correctness of the T lC _p {A} commitment protocol. Said first example of execution of the first option is safer if additionally The following steps are performed: • Croupier Agent 109 digitally signs Vi with the private component Se of its key pair, X = So (Vi) and makes Player Agent 101 accessible X. m Player Agent 101 digitally signs A with the private component of a pair of asymmetric keys of its property, such as (Pj, Sj), (P, S _j ), (P _j , Sj), (Pj, S). 5 In a second example of the execution of said first option, the player makes a bet A through the Agent of Player 101. The Agent of Player 101 executes a commitment protocol C _p with the bet, and obtains a transformation of the bet Ti, Ti = C _P {A}. The Agent of Player 101 makes the Agent of Crupier 109 accessible to me. The Agent of Crupier 109 obtains a first Vi value randomly and executes a commitment protocol with

10 Vi obtaining a transformation T ₂ , T ₂ = C _p {Vι}. Croupier Agent 109 makes Ti and T ₂ accessible to Impartial Agent 107. Impartial Agent 107 obtains a second value V¿ and through the private component Si from the key pair of the Impartial Authority (S, Pι) calculates a digital signature X _λ over {V ₂ , Tι, T ₂ }, Xi = S ( ₂ | Tι | T ₂ ). Impartial Agent 107 makes Vi and Xι accessible to Croupier Agent 109. Croupier Agent 109 makes Vi accessible,

15 V¿, and Xι to Player Agent 101. Player Agent 101 makes A available to Croupier Agent 109. At this moment Croupier Agent 109 and Player 101 Agent derive said game event from Vi and V _% In a third example of execution of said first option the Player Agent 101 makes available a request from the player to obtain a game event. The Croupier's Agent

20 109 obtains a first Vi value randomly and executes a commitment protocol C _p with Vi obtaining a transformation Ti, T = C _p {Vι}. Croupier Agent 109 makes Ti accessible to Player Agent 101 and to the Impartial Agent. Player Agent 101 makes a player's bet A available to Croupier Agent 109. Impartial Agent 107 obtains a second value V¿ and through the private component Si of the key pair of the

25 Impartial Authority (P, S ') calculates a digital signature Xi on {V¿, Tι}, Xι - S (V ₂ \ ι). Impartial Agent 107 makes V¿ and Xi accessible to Croupier Agent 109. Croupier Agent 109 makes Vi, Ti, V¿ and Xι accessible to Player 101 Agent. Croupier Agent 109 and Player 101 Agent derive said Game event from Vi and V¿. In a fourth example of execution of said first option the Player Agent 101

30 makes a player's bet A accessible to Croupier Agent 109. Croupier Agent 109 obtains a first Vi value randomly and executes a commitment protocol C _p with Vi obtaining a transformation Ti, Ti = C _p {Vι}. Croupier Agent 109 makes Ti and A accessible to Impartial Agent 107. Impartial Agent 107 obtains a second V-value and through private component S of the key pair of the Impartial Authority (Pj, Si)

35 calculates a digital signature Xi on {Tι, V ₂ , A}, Xi - S (V ₂ | Tι | A). The Impartial Agent 107 makes V ₂ accessible, and Xi to Croupier Agent 109. Croupier Agent 109 makes Vi, V, Ti and Xι accessible to Player 101 Agent. Croupier Agent 109 and Player 101 Agent derive said game event from Vi and V ₂ . In a fifth example of the execution of said first option, the player places a bet A through the Agent of Player 101. The Agent of Player 101 executes a protocol of 5 commitment C _p with A, and obtains a transformation Ti, Ti = C _P { TO}. Player Agent 101 makes Ti accessible to Croupier Agent 109. Croupier Agent 109 obtains a first Vi value randomly and executes a commitment protocol C _p with i obtaining a transformation T, T ₂ = C _P {V1} . Croupier Agent 109 makes T available to Player Agent 101. Player 101 Agent makes Croupier Agent A accessible, and it makes

10 accessible A, and T to the Impartial Agent 107. The Impartial Agent 107 obtains a second value V and through the private component Si from the key pair of the Impartial Authority (P¡r, Si) calculates a digital signature Xi on {T, A, V¿], Xι = Si (V ₂ \ T ₂ \ A). Impartial Agent 107 makes V ₂ , and Xi accessible to Croupier Agent 109. Croupier Agent 109 makes Vi, V ₂ , and Xi accessible to Player Agent 101. Croupier Agent 109 and Player Agent

15 101 derive said game event from Vi and V ₂ . Said second, third, fourth and fifth examples of execution of said first option are safer if the following steps are additionally performed:

• Player Agent 101 digitally signs A with the private component of a pair of asymmetric keys owned, such as (Pj, S), (P _j , S), (P _j , S _j ), (Pf, S ).

20 • Croupier Agent 109 digitally signs Ti with the private component So of its key pair (Pe, Se), Xo = Se (Vi) and makes XQ accessible to Impartial Agent 107. Impartial Agent 107 includes X ₀ in X , Xι = Yes (V ₂ \ Tι \ T ₂ \ Xo). • The Croupier Agent 109 makes the IÚM identifier of the Virtual Game Table 113 accessible to the Impartial Agent 107. The Impartial Agent 107 includes IdM in the signature

25 digital X Xι = Yes (V ₂ \ Tι \ T ₂ \ Id _M ). • Impartial Agent 107 includes a serial number N ¿in each digital signature it makes.

As mentioned in a second option, Impartial Agent 107 impartially generates game events. The impartial generation of these events is carried out through a PRG PR such as the one described previously. In a first example of the execution of the second option, the Impartial Agent attaches the digital signature of the game event. The digital signature is generated with the private component S of the key pair of the Impartial Authority (P, S). In a second example of the execution of the second option, the Impartial Agent attaches the result of applying a summary function with code to the game event. The password used is kept secret and is only in the possession of the Agent of Player 101 and the Impartial Agent. Summary functions with code are typically called MAC, in [Menezes, AJ, Oorschot, PC, Vanstone, SA, Handbook of Applied

Cryptography, CRC Press, 1997] is a detailed description of its different variants and properties. As mentioned in a third option the Player Agent 101 executes a cryptographic protocol for the Impartial Generation of Game Events 405, together with the Croupier Agent 109. In a first example of the third option execution the Agent of the Game Player 101 and Croupier Agent 109 perform one of the protocols described in the international application [PCT ES02 / 00485]. In a second example of the execution of the third option, the Player Agent 101 and the Croupier Agent 109 perform one of the protocols described in the invention US 6,264,557. In a third example of the execution of the third option the Player Agent 101 and the Croupier Agent 109 perform one of the protocols described in the invention US 6,165,072. The messages sent by Players Agents 101 and / or Croupier Agent 109 during the game cryptographic protocol are links in the CDNE chain of the game. At the End of the Roll or Game Hand 407 it can be verified that the game has been honest with the data of the CDNE chain of the game. In the event that one of the Players Agents 101 detects any irregularity, it generates an incident that is stored in the Incident Register 119 that will be verified by the Audit Authority through the Audit Agent 111 is responsible for verifying the incidents. If all Players Agents 101 agree with the result, they build a new link in the CDNE chain that indicates that the player accepts the result and the CDNE chain of the game expands. Once an established time has elapsed, the Agent of the Croupier 109, or the Agent of the Player 101 who performs the Croupier's actions, marks the end of the roll or hand of play, with a new entry that contracts the CDNE chain of the game. At this time the period begins so that players can enter or leave the Virtual Game Table 113. When a player leaves the Virtual Game Table 113 ends his game and collects his benefits. Players can only leave the Virtual Game Table 113 after the end of the game or roll, and if they leave it before, without justification, they can be fined. When a player wants to leave a Virtual Game Table 113 the Player Agent 101 performs the following actions: Constructs a link in the chain where the data field indicates that the player wants to leave the Virtual Game Table 113. At this point it is performed an expansion of the CDNE chain, because all players can perform this operation at the same time. After the time established for players to leave or join the game, the Croupier Agent 109, or the Player Agent 101 who performs the Croupier's actions, creates a new link in the CDNE chain of the game and the chain contracts. The data field of the chain shows the ups and downs of the Mesa

Virtual Game 113. Player Agent 101 asks the Bank Agent 123 to collect benefits. Bank Agent 123 accesses Activity Record 115 and based on

Digital Check of the player and the bets that he has made calculates the benefits of the player. The Agent of the Bank 123 builds a link in the CDNE chain of the Monetary Registry 117, indicating in the data field that the income comes from a certain item, the amount to be entered, the Virtual Game Table 113, and a cryptographic summary of The game played. If the Player 101 Agent agrees with the link in the Monetary Record chain 117, he accepts the link, and otherwise generates an incident that is stored in the Incident Record 119. Some of the Agents described above can be grouped together a more complex set of programs and / or platforms that is called Game Agent, and that is similar to the Online Casinos currently in existence. A first group that forms a Game Agent is constituted by the Access Control Agent 105, the Agent of the Bank 123, and a plurality of Virtual Game Tables 113. A second group that forms a Game Agent is constituted by the Access Control Agent 105, the Agent of Bank 123, a plurality of Virtual Tables of

Game 113, and the Certification Agent 103. A third grouping that forms a Game Agent is constituted by the Access Control Agent 105, and a plurality of Virtual Game Tables 113. A fourth grouping that forms a Game Agent is it constitutes by means of the Access Control Agent 105, the Certification Agent 103, and a plurality of Virtual Game Tables 113. A fifth grouping that forms a Game Agent is constituted by the Access Control Agent 105, the Agent of the Bank 123, a plurality of Agents of the Crupier

109 and a plurality of Virtual Game Tables 113. A sixth grouping that forms a Game Agent is constituted by the Access Control Agent 105, the Bank Agent 123, a plurality of Virtual Game Tables

Game 113, a plurality of Croupier Agents 109, and the Certification Agent 103. A seventh grouping that forms a Gaming Agent is constituted by the Access Control Agent 105, a plurality of Croupier Agents 109, and a plurality of

Virtual Game Tables 113. An eighth grouping that forms a Game Agent is constituted by the Access Control Agent 105, the Certification Agent 103, a plurality of Croupier Agents 109 and a plurality of Virtual Game Tables 113. Additionally any of the previous groupings can incorporate a system of Remote access port filtering, typically called a firewall, and an intruder detection system. The intruder detection system monitors the system to detect possible unauthorized access, and records the actions taken. This information allows measures to eliminate weakness.

Claims

1.- A system for the execution of a game of chance through a communication network that stores the actions developed in said game and guarantees to some players of said game that its execution is honest and impartial allowing at least one Audit Authority verify that said actions in said game have been honest and have not been manipulated, comprising the following elements: a) an Activity Record (115) that stores said actions in said game, linked together securely; and b) a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute a Player Agent (101) through which at least one of said players participates in said game;

2.- A system for the execution of a game of chance through a communication network that stores the actions developed in said game and guarantees to some players of said game that its execution is honest and impartial allowing at least one Audit Authority verify that said actions in said game have been honest and have not been manipulated, comprising the following elements: a) an Activity Record (115) that stores said actions in said game, linked together securely; b) a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute a Player Agent (101) through which at least one of said players participates in said game; and c) a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute an Access Control Agent (105) that allows an Access Control Authority to authenticate said players through credentials.

3. A system according to claim 2, characterized in that it further comprises a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute a Certification Agent (103) by means of which a Certification Authority creates and makes said credentials accessible to at least One of those players.

4. A system according to claim 2, characterized in that it further comprises a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute a Virtual Game Table (113), intended to centralize and distribute said actions in said game to said players which have been authenticated by said Access Control Agent (105).

5. A system according to claim 2, characterized in that it further comprises a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute an Audit Agent (111) with which said Audit Authority verifies the honesty of the game through the review of said actions in said game that are included in said Activity Record (115).

6. A system according to claim 2, characterized in that it further comprises a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute a Banking Agent (123), by means of which a Trust Entity, such as the Casino Banking or a Financial Entity, creates and makes accessible to at least one of said players a proof of the credit available to said at least one of said players to participate in said game.

7. A system according to claim 2, characterized in that it further comprises a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute an Impartial Agent (107) by means of which an Impartial Entity makes said Player Agent (101) accessible to said players .

8. A system according to claim 2, characterized by further comprising a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute an Impartial Agent (107) by means of which an Impartial Authority generates game events such as a position of a Roulette, a card from a deck, or a face of a dice.

9. A system according to one of claims 7 or 8, characterized in that said execution platforms of said Impartial Agent (107) are safe against tampering.

10. A system according to claim 2, characterized in that it further comprises a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute a Croupier Agent (109), intended to perform the actions corresponding to a Croupier in a Casino type game .

11. A system according to claim 2, characterized in that at least one of said players has at least one pair of asymmetric keys, intended to be used by said Player Agent (101) with the consent of said at least one of said players.

12. A system according to claim 3, characterized in that said Certification Authority has at least one pair of asymmetric keys, intended to be used by said Certification Agent (103) with the consent of said Certification Authority.

13. A system according to claim 2, characterized in that said Access Control Authority has at least one pair of asymmetric keys, intended to be used by said Access Control Agent (105) with the consent of said Authority Access Control.

14. A system according to claim 6, characterized in that said Trust Entity has at least one pair of asymmetric keys, intended to be used by said Banking Agent (123) with the consent of said Trust Entity.

15. A system according to claim 8, characterized in that said Impartial Entity has at least one pair of asymmetric keys, intended to be used by said Impartial Agent (107) with the consent of said Impartial Entity.

16. A system according to claim 10, characterized in that said Croupier Agent (109) has access to at least one pair of asymmetric keys.

17. A system according to claim 2, characterized in that said actions stored in said Activity Record (115) are securely linked to each other by means of a data chain, where each link of said data chain is formed by a first part which describes one of said actions and a second part which is a summary calculated with a cryptographic summary function of said first part of said link and the second part of at least one previous link in said data chain.

18. A system according to claim 17, characterized in that the authenticity of said second part of each link is guaranteed by a digital signature with the private component of at least one pair of asymmetric keys owned by the author of said link, which can be said Player Agent (101), said Access Control Agent (105), a Certification Agent (103), an Audit Agent (111), a Banking Agent (123), an Impartial Agent (107), or a Croupier Agent (109).

19. A system according to claim 2, characterized in that said Activity Record (115) is accessible to at least one of the following elements: said Player Agent (101) which is at least one, said Access Control Agent (105), a Certification Agent (103), an Audit Agent (111), a Banking Agent (123), an Impartial Agent (107), or a Croupier Agent (109).

20. A system according to claim (12), characterized in that said credentials of at least one of said players include a digital certificate of the public component of a pair of asymmetric keys of said at least one of said players, intended to be used by said Player Agent (101), said certificate being prepared by said Certification Authority, and because said Access Control Authority has at least one asymmetric key pair, intended to be used by said Access Control Agent (105) , with the consent of said Access Control Authority in a strong authentication cryptographic protocol with said Player Agent (101).

21. A system according to claim 11, characterized in that it comprises a strong authentication protocol between said Access Control Agent (105) and said Player Agent (101) using said pair of asymmetric keys of said player.

22. A system according to one of claims 20 or 21, characterized in that steps of said strong authentication cryptographic protocol are stored in an Access Control Register (121).

23. A system according to claim 14, characterized in that said credit test of at least one of said players includes a digital signature made with the private component of said pair of asymmetric keys of said Trust Entity of at least one monetary amount .

24. A system according to claim 23, characterized in that it further comprises a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute a Virtual Game Table (113), intended to centralize and distribute said actions in said game to said players. that have been authenticated by said Access Control Agent (105), said Virtual Game Table (113) having a unique identifier, and because said digital signature of said credit test includes at least one of said elements: said unique identifier of said Virtual Game Table (113) and said credentials of said players that are at least one.

25. A system, according to claim 23, characterized in that said digital signature of said credit test includes a time stamp, such as the time it is generated, or one of the most recent entries in said Activity Record ( 115).

26.- A system according to claim 6, characterized in that said Activity Record (115) stores said credit test of at least one of said players.

27. A system according to claim 26, characterized in that benefits of at least one of said players in said game are available to said Banking Agent (123) through a review of said Activity Record (115).

28. A system according to claim 2, characterized in that it comprises a cryptographic protocol for the impartial generation of game events, such as a roulette position, a card of a deck, or a face of a dice, with the cooperation of at least two of said Player Agents (101).

29. A system according to claim 10, characterized in that it comprises a cryptographic protocol for the impartial generation of game events such as a roulette position, a card of a deck, or a face of a dice, with the cooperation of at least one of said Player Agents (101) and said Croupier Agent (109).

30. A system according to claim 10, characterized in that it comprises a cryptographic protocol for the impartial generation of game events such as a roulette position, a card of a deck, or a face of a dice, with the cooperation of said Croupier Agent (109) and a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute an Impartial Agent (107).

31. A system according to claim 15, characterized in that said game events are signed by said Impartial Agent (107) with the private component of said pair of keys of said Impartial Entity.

32. A system according to claim 6, characterized in that said Access Control Agent (105), said Bank Agent (123), and a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute a Virtual Game Table (113), intended to centralize and distribute said actions in said game to said players who have been authenticated by said Access Control Agent (105), are grouped together forming a Game Agent.

33. A system according to claim 32, characterized in that said Game Agent additionally comprises a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute a Certification Agent (103) by means of which a Certification Authority creates and makes said credentials to at least one of said players.

34. A system according to claim 4, characterized in that said Virtual Table of

Game (113) and said Access Control Agent (105) are grouped together forming a Game Agent.

35. A system according to claim 34, characterized in that said Game Agent additionally comprises a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute a Certification Agent (103) by means of which a Certification Authority creates and makes said credentials to at least one of said players.

36. A system according to one of claims 32, 33, 34 or 35, characterized in that said Game Agent additionally comprises a set of programs and / or execution platforms that constitute a Croupier Agent (109), intended to perform actions that correspond to a Croupier in a casino type game.