WO2008051365A2

WO2008051365A2 - Origin identity verified mail register system

Info

Publication number: WO2008051365A2
Application number: PCT/US2007/021526
Authority: WO
Inventors: Michael Hu
Original assignee: Michael Hu
Priority date: 2006-10-19
Filing date: 2007-10-09
Publication date: 2008-05-02
Also published as: WO2008051365A3

Abstract

Mail, electronic or physical, bears either a permission stamp containing a permission code, for senders selected by the intended recipient, or a value stamp containing a value code, for all other senders. Both permission and value codes reflect identifying data for mail participants and contain an encrypted code string that can be decoded with either a permission or value postal key by the recipient. As permission stamps are available only to senders selected by the intended recipient permission codes must reflect only the identifying data of the intended recipient while value codes, used by mail participants presumed to be unknown to the intended recipient, must reflect the identity of the sender. Value stamps, moreover, must be purchased and yield a redeemable credit to the recipient for opening or reading. Identifying data for accountable senders must be verifiable and include information for an account from which credits are available to recipients. The postal keys verify the identity of the origin of the received mail as being either a selected sender known to the intended recipient or an accountable sender known to the mail register system.

Description

DESCRIPTION Background of the Invention

The present invention relates generally to: registers; more particularly to register systems controlled by data bearing records; and most particularly to mail systems, for both electronic and physical mail, providing origin verification with use of coding generated by computer from information sensed from the records controlled by the register system.

Physical mail: i.e. postal; systems are well known in having existed throughout modern times. One fundamental aspect of the historical origins of physical mail is considered of interest presently: only the literate, by definition, could either write or read mail or messages between literates. Carriers were illiterate and, if faithful in making personal delivery to the intended recipient was assured confidentiality. In medieval and early modern Europe Latin was the language of the literate and, in being a wholly different language than the vulgar tongue used in any particular region, Latin provided an effective barrier to teasing the meaning out of these messages by illiterates which, together with reliable service, assured confidentiality in the mail.

Electronic mail (e-mail) is relatively new. But it has achieved in less than two decades a quotidian importance to communications. A measure of the recent growth and current prevalence of e-mail is provided by the ubiquity enjoyed, and iniquity instilled, by the same. How many users of the Internet lost the entire contents of their sole computer to the Melissa virus alone?

How many people have had their identities stolen and/or bank accounts exhausted, because they believed the Internet was confidential? The numbers are significant, and the damage is expected to exceed a billion dollars in the U.S. now annually (BusinessWeek, April 3, 2006) but the damages have, apparently, been far outweighed by the convenience and economics provided by the Internet and e-mail in particular as judged by its current usage by well over half the people in the U.S. (Ibid.) But, as prevalent as e-mail has become, certain fundamental social/technical aspects are only now being understood. People have lost their jobs for denigrating their employer in 'chat rooms': i.e. on-line open panel forums; thinking that these could be, somehow, anonymous, if not confidential. E-mail, as opposed to 'chat room' discussion, is as of October 2005 legally confidential thanks to an act of Congress setting forth penalties of five years imprisonment for: 'Unlawful Access to Stored Communications' (Title 18 U.S.C. Part I, Chapter 121, Section 2701). Prior this, for a year and a half, e-mail was fair game legally due to a unanimous decision by the Washington, D.C., U.S. Court of Appeals in 2004: reversing the same court's decision the year before finding violation of the Wiretapping Act of 1934; because e-mail is copied while 'in storage' and hence is not in transmission. It is noted that the title of the relevant section of this recent law specifies 'stored communications'. The law regarding e-mail, in brief, has been in a state of flux recently and legislation required to effect what is considered a fundamental public expectation with all mail: confidentiality.

With e-mail now established as being legally confidential, in a manner consistent with physical mail, the main problem today with e-mail, as with physical mail, is considered to be reception of unsolicited communication:

(a) surreptitious, insidious and malicious digital code commonly known as viruses and worms, or biological vectors including anthrax;

(b) innocuous but unsolicited e-mail or 'spam' comprised mainly of advertising, or 'junk' mail; and

(c) all types of ordinary fraud.

These categories are neither mutually exclusive nor fully descriptive but indicative of the range and characteristic of the problems that have obtained to date in e-mail as essentially the same problems faced by physical mail.

With regard to all mail, but particularly e-mail, the intended recipient is considered to be at a severe disadvantage with regard to the sender because the former does not know who the sender might actually be and what actually will be in the mail when opened which, in the case of malicious code or anthrax spores, is too late to avert disaster. With e-mail one has only an address prior opening. Physical mail arrives in an envelope that often contains nothing more than an address if that. Registered mail can necessitate a trip to the local customer service center and a wait in line to receive mail that has been identified only by a registration number. Without knowledge of the true identity of the origin of the mail a recipientis susceptible to surreptitious and malicious content, cleverly disguised fraud that is potentially ruinous financially or, at minimum, a waste of one's time. Aside from the threat of: (a) computer or biological contamination; the largest problems with mail, electronic or physical, are considered to be: (b) fraud and (c) 'spam' or 'junk' mail: unwanted if innocuous mail. The first two are illegal and the third essentially protected, at least in the U.S., by the first amendment. The three are also often found in combination.

Viruses and other forms of malicious digital code are generally acquired through unknown and unsolicited electronic communications, inclusive of spam, often disguised as ordinary e-mail. The only means available of distinguishing 'safe' and desirable e-mail from malicious code vectors and otherwise undesirable communications in the guise of e-mail is the address of the sender. But if all unknown senders are ignored, i.e. deleted without opening, there is another problem: the intended recipient is incapable of receiving honest enquiries, or other messages in good faith, from people including potential clients and customers, that not only provide potential benefit but may well be necessary for the operation of a business or one's livelihood.

For most people the problem is generally characterized by an overload of spam that is not readily distinguishable by the intended recipient from mail that might be of interest or even of importance to the intended recipient who, generally, cannot easily and reliably determine without 'opening' the e-mail whether a particular e-mail is of potential utility or, at best, a waste of time. And once the e-mail is opened, as far as any insidious or malicious computer code is concerned, contamination has already occurred.

In brief a poignant need is hence recognized for the ability to distinguish 'safe' e-mail from that possibly containing malicious code in order to prevent recipient computer contamination while also providing a means of honest enquiry by parties unknown to the recipient. Although malicious code is not an issue in physical mail, real or biological viruses, i.e. pathogens including anthrax, are indeed a concern and the principle is the same: the address on the mail can seem unsuspicious, it can even appear to be that of an old friend, a bank in which an account is held, or a government agency; and once it is opened it is too late: contamination has occurred. Similarly, a need is recognized for a means of diminishing the amount of unwanted mail, be it spam or junk mail, without closing the door to honest and potentially beneficial enquiries or advertising. And thirdly, a need is recognized for a means of inhibiting fraud particularly in e-mail, largely because it is still fairly new and unfamiliar to people perhaps, but also in physical mail.

Unsolicited e-mail or 'spam¹, is a modern phenomenon, and a large problem for many people worldwide who may hope for a technological solution to the problem, while others, e.g. Germany, have taken a legislative approach. But, in the U.S. at least, First Amendment rights must be recognized and it is considered that spam is fundamentally an economic problem: cost vs. benefit; hence requiring an economic solution. When the cost of sending ten million e-mails is less than a few hundred dollars even instances of fraud considered obvious by most will find enough 'buyers' to make the effort worthwhile.

Looking at spam, or junk mail, from the honest advertiser's point of view the problem is the inverse of that faced by the intended recipient: with so much unsolicited mail being sent very little is actually opened or read. The honest advertiser doesn't benefit from duping one person out of hundreds of thousands or in being ignored. Repetitious e-mails mailed to unresponsive addresses because it costs little or nothing more to do so are of no benefit to anyone and are particularly detrimental to honest use of mail by advertisers and others. When the sender lacks the ability of knowing whether an intended recipient even opened or read the mail there is no incentive for, or even a means of, focusing upon recipients who actually are interested in the mail sent. The sender benefits from people opening and reading the mail sent and not simply by sending mail that isn't read.

A need, therefore, is hence recognized for a means of determining which mail is opened and read by intended recipients in addition to the other needs defined above.

Conversely, it is also considered that not only do senders of mail often assume an anonymous or fraudulent identity, preferably using another existing address and identity, but senders also may deny that their actual address and identity are true. The latter condition is known as repudiation and the former has acquired the label of 'pre-texting¹, at least in the context of telephonic communication but considered extendable to other communication inclusive of electronic or physical mail. Repudiation is mainly a concern of printed documents but as the same are increasingly sent by mail, electronic or physical and as opposed to direct receipt by the recipient in the office concerned, repudiation is a concern if mainly in countries experiencing official, government, corruption. Pre-texting, in a mail system context, is generally simple fraud but a minor distinction between assuming another's address and identity for the purpose of stealing their property: usually financial assets; and pretending to be someone else to obtain private information used to damage a reputation is recognized. Perhaps more broadly, both repudiation and pre-texting are considered aspects of the larger problem, extending beyond but inclusive of mail as a vehicle, commonly known as identity theft, and a need is recognized for deterring the use of mail, electronic or physical, as a vehicle for repudiation of, and pre-texting, origin identity.

Summary of the Invention

A first object of the present invention is prevention of contamination:

(a) of computers with reception of insidious and malicious digital code via electronic mail (e-mail); and

(b) of humans by biological vectors such as anthrax or other deadly surprises.

A second object of the present invention is the inhibition of fraud, particularly in e- mail, but also in physical mail.

A third object of the present invention is reduction of the amount of undesired mail: 'spam' or 'junk mail¹ depending on format; presented for reception.

A fourth object of the present invention is a means of providing timely 'feedback' to the senders of unsolicited mail from the intended recipients: of answering the question of whether the mail was opened or read or not; thus enabling senders to focus upon responsive recipients rather than rely upon mass, relatively blind, mailings.

A fifth object of the present invention is facilitation of mail from unknown addresses that is neither insidious nor malicious and particularly mail from addresses unknown to the intended recipient that are potentially of interest, or beneficial to, the intended recipient in comprising honest business enquiries: e.g. an enquiry from a potentially new client or buyer or advertising of goods or services pertinent to the business of the intended recipient. In fulfillment of the above stated objects it is first suggested that origin verification means of verifying the origin of the mail: electronic or physical; delivered or presented for reception, be provided in a form assuring the intended recipient that the origin is either that of a party known:

(a) to and specified by the intended recipient; or

(b) to the mail provider as 'accountable'; wherein 'accountable' is defined as having provided to the mail provider verifiable identity information. It is further suggested that this identity information be inclusive of: (a) name; (b) addresses: electronic, physical, mailing; (c) telephone numbers: land line and/or cellular, facsimile; and (d) an account with a bank or other financial institution.

It is suggested that a stamp comprised of a string of encrypted code generated using factors or keys specific to the intended recipient and sender be utilized in a manner corresponding to the division above: with the sender either known and selected by the intended recipient or known to the mail provider as being accountable. It is suggested that a 'permission stamp' for mail addresses both known and specified by an intended recipient be utilized to ensure that the mail did originate from these known and specified addresses and further suggested that permission stamps be available to the senders specified without charge or other financial obligation to the sender.

For accountable parties providing verifiable identification to the mail provider it is suggested that a value stamp be available for unsolicited mail, having technical attributes: i.e. coding; similar to that used for a permission stamp, which provides a credit to the recipient if opened or read. It is for this reason that bank account information is desired of the sender.

A basic irredeemable charge for value stamps is suggested as opposed to free permission stamps. And a redemption code within the content of mail bearing a value stamp is further suggested that can be returned to the mail provider or stamp issuer as proof that the mail was opened or read. For electronic mail particularly a smaller credit for opening as opposed to reading is suggested and for both electronic and physical mail it is suggested that the charge for each value stamp include a the cost of a credit, available to each of the intended recipients demonstrating that the mail has been opened or read, additional to the basic charge for a value stamp. It is suggested that the redemption code be returned on line for either electronic or physical mail bearing a value stamp, and that the credit be redeemable as cash, applied toward an account the intended recipient has with the mail provider, stamp issuer, or the sender, or donated to a charity specified by the recipient. The redemption code can be returned to the mail provider in any manner desired including entering the same in a computer in a kiosk at the local post office, for example, or even handwritten on the envelope in which the physical mail arrived and handed back to the carrier in another envelope bearing a permission stamp provided by the sender. It is also specifically suggested that the face, i.e. credit, value of the value stamp be redeemable using direct deposit with, for example, Automatic Clearing House: an existing direct deposit system utilizing the Internet.

The intended recipient of mail, electronic or physical, bearing a value or permission stamp enters the code, or a specified portion thereof, into an origin identity verification software program having a decryption key, i.e. a mathematical algorithm, that verifies the stamp: i.e. the pertinent code string; as genuine or highly unlikely, mathematically, to have been generated without a coding key, i.e. encryption, that is conjugate with the decoding key, i.e. decryption, held by or assigned to the intended recipient.

The encryption for this purpose is generally separate and distinguished from any encryption used for the content of any mail. It is suggested that the code string for stamps, permission or value, be generated using data reflecting:

(a) the intended recipient's address;

(b) the sender's address;

(c) date and time; and

(d) stamp face value: i.e. amount available with redemption; as necessary but insufficient to recreate the encrypted code string in an economic manner without the encryption coding key or algorithm used for this encryption. The face value of a permission stamp is presumed, generally, to be zero and it is suggested that this value be utilized in computer processing of data to distinguish between permission and value stamps with the two being virtually identical in other regards. In addition to these data a virtually irreversible mathematical operation is recommended for generation of each encrypted string code. A modulo operator is specifically recommended. It is also suggested that single or double key encryption be utilized including: public, secret, and single keys in private/public key encryption; in a manner similar to the use of encryption disclosed in U.S. 7,011,245 issued to the present inventor and incorporated herein by reference, but with time as a factor in code string generation used in a manner that effectively invalidates the stamp after a predetermined period selected either by the intended recipient: particularly for permission stamps; or by the mail provider: particularly for value stamps.

More particularly it is suggested that, for both permission and value stamps, one of several encryption techniques be employed:

(a) one way functions, inclusive of a secure hash algorithms or modulo operators, for the creation of short code strings, i.e. of relatively few characters or digits, that are virtually irreversible;

(b) public key encryption techniques to obtain 'bijective', i.e. one on one reversible, encryption; and

(c) single key encryption as utilized in generation of the 'pedigree code' as defined in US 7,011,245;

(d)) double key encryption as utilized in generation of the 'pedigree code' as defined in US 7,011,245;

(e) private/public key encryption as utilized in generation of the 'pedigree code¹ as defined in US 7,011,245;

All of these techniques require computer processing of data inclusive of the addresses and/or other identifying data involved.

Neither the permission nor the value stamp will absolutely guarantee that the mail will be free of unwanted surprises and appropriate auxiliary measures inclusive of anti-virus software for e-mail and irradiation of physical mail may be prudent but such measures are strictly complementary to the safeguard mechanism provided by adherence to the principles relating to the present invention whereby the subterfuge generally relied upon in both the practice of fraud and the transmission of deliberately insidious, i.e. surreptitious, malicious digital or biological vectors is eliminated. The amount of unsolicited mail presented for reception, moreover, is reduced by the potential expense involved for the prospective sender. By the same principle, however, the credit that is available to the recipient renders advertisement and other honest enquiries more effective. A 'virtuous cycle' is created whereby the prospective sender restricts the addressee list used to those considered to have a high level of potential interest and the prospective recipient, in turn, is presented with less mail of greater interest, thereby increasing the likelihood of it being opened and of value to the sender.

Regardless of the payment schedule for value stamps the credit received by the intended recipient for either opening and/or reading e-mail or opening and reading physical mail, together with the assurance that this mail is from accountable parties that have provided verifiable identification, can be easily traced, and are not surreptitious attempts at contamination, fraud, or 'shotgun' type advertising, 'turns the table' on mail with regard to intended recipient and sender especially in e-mail.

Not only is there less mail but in being willing to pay for the recipient's attention to their unsolicited mail, the unknown sender is at least accountable and the mail quite possibly of genuine interest to the recipient in addition to offering some small remuneration for one's time and attention. The intended recipient is accorded, in a word, respect by the sender and this simple but indispensable token of civility is considered to comprise a large benefit directly attributed to a system or method in accordance with the principles relating to the present invention.

The intended recipient is assured that mail from known addresses is actually from the parties expected and that no unwanted surprises inclusive of deliberately insidious and malicious digital code or biological vector will be found in mail bearing permission or value stamps. Rather than being deluged by mail that is difficult to distinguish into 'friend or foe', and having to tread a virtual, i.e. electronic, minefield in the attempt to retrieve all accountable and potentially beneficial e-mail, the intended recipient now has mail clearly identifiable as being from parties known and selected by them or accountable parties not only willing to provide verifiable identification information but also willing to pay for the intended recipient's attention. Not only does a system or method in accordance with the principles relating to the present invention effectively eliminate deliberate transmission of malicious digital code, and provide rapid remedy against accidental transmissions, but said system or method also provides the framework for a virtuous cycle whereby the volume of the mail is reduced, enhanced in quality, made more interesting, and hence more valuable. A proper framework for the conduct of business, in brief, is provided that respects and provides for general expectations in the public regarding all mail including safety, free personal mail delivery, and a clear distinction between personal mail and advertisements or other unsolicited mail.

It is emphasized that advertisers and other accountable parties desirous of sending unsolicited mail and willing to respect the intended recipients by agreeing to credit the same for opening and/or reading the mail sent, are provided with a means of conducting business in a manner that rewards discretion, courtesy, and honesty. Rather than benefiting from anonymity and deception the accountable sender benefits from a more effective means of unsolicited mailing, especially for electronic, but also physical. In having a means of knowing who opened and/or read the mail received in an unsolicited mailing, which in the case of electronic mail can be immediate, the sender is freed to pursue honest economic activity with much greater effectiveness beneficial to all parties concerned. The means of obtaining what is commonly known in economics as an efficient market is enabled and the savings for modern society: in time, money, confusion, aggravation and genuine sorrow; is considered readily appreciable.

Detailed Description of Preferred Embodiment

It is first emphasized that the present invention, as clearly stated in the above 'Field of Invention¹, is: related to register systems controlled by data bearing records, particularly mail register systems, electronic or physical, "providing origin verification with use of coding generated by computer from, and controlled by, information sensed from the records"; and while various encryption techniques are mentioned in the summary of the present principles above, there is nearly no mention of records or register systems other than the definition of data required. This is largely the result of describing the register system in terms applicable to a mail system, to which the present invention is considered to most nearly resemble, including data definitions primarily comprised of names and addresses. Account information is also mentioned and the transfer of redeemable credit is considered one principal aspect that is generally absent from conventional mail systems, and in brief, the principles of the present invention are considered to transcend pedestrian categorization but are well encompassed by the U.S. Patent Office Classification System's definition for subclass 235/375, the sole classification for US 7,011,245 incorporated herein by reference.

The operation of a register, controlled by information sensed in its records, is considered the only means of attaining the encompassing object of the present invention, of obtaining, in a word, 'accountability' in both electronic and physical mail systems so that neither can be utilized as a means of intimidation or terror.

The present invention is considered to provide a new paradigm to mail systems, not wholly dissimilar to that of globalization vs. colonial and feudal societies, while encouraging human values commonly associated with feudal society by eliminating surreptitious use of the mail system and rewarding discretion, courtesy, and honesty. This relies upon the first tasks given to modern technology: data management and mathematics; in the compilation of data and generation of encrypted codes in accordance with data held in records and enabling instant verification with the use of decryption.

Accountability in a mail system in accordance with the present invention is attained by providing a mail participant in the capacity of intended recipient with virtually instant means of verifying the origin of mail as that of another mail participant selected by the intended recipient: i.e. a 'selected sender¹; or as that of an 'accountable sender¹: i.e. a party that has provided verifiable identity data inclusive of name, addresses, and account information as necessary to provide remuneration to the recipient for taking the time to at least open and preferably read the mail. If a selected sender desires to transfer redeemable value to an intended recipient a redemption code can be included in the mail and redemption of the value to be transferred made in a similar manner as that for mail from an accountable sender except that there is no basic charge as for a value stamp. Origin verifiable mail is categorized into only two categories: (a) mail with an origin having express permission; and (b) mail from accountable senders each presumed to be unknown to the intended recipient but having provided verifiable identity data including that of a financial account in addition to name, addresses, physical and e-mail; and preferably other communication access including fixed and portable telephone, and facsimile numbers. Two types of 'stamps' are generated accordingly: permission stamps and value stamps, each bearing a postal code that is verifiable by the recipient as valid with a decryption key preferably contained in software operable upon a computer or smaller digital device and recognized by the mail register system as valid for mail delivery.

Value stamps bear a value code, separate from or incorporated into the postal code, recognizable by the mail register system. The postal code borne by a value stamp is preferably mathematically related to a value code preferably mathematically related to the verifiable data provided by the accountable sender. The postal code contains an encrypted code string enabling verification of the origin by the intended recipient with a decryption key. This decryption preferably confirms a visible redemption value amount and the identity of the sender. The postal code, redemption code found in the text of the mail, and value code each preferably depend upon a single time factor resulting in an invalid code after a predetermined time duration preferably selectable by the accountable sender from a plurality of available duration periods. A time factor operable on a permission stamp is also preferably selectable by the intended recipient from a plurality of available durations.

Permission stamps bear a permission code, separate from or incorporated into the postal code, recognizable by the mail register system. The permission code is preferably related mathematically to the identity verification codes of the selected sender and the intended recipient through encryption that is continued, mathematically, through generation of the postal code from the permission code if only a single level of encryption is utilized, as the final encryption must contain an encrypted code string that can be decrypted by the decryption key used by the intended recipient.

All postal codes must contain an encrypted code string that can be decrypted by the intended recipient with a decryption key. One decryption key can be used for all postal codes if desired in which case double or single private key public key encryption is recommended. With double private key public key encryption of a code string contained in the postal code generated from a permission code each private key assigned to one mail participant is preferably utilized. This is most preferred for postal codes derived from permission codes and further facilitates use of a single decryption key for each intended recipient for all mail with mail sent by accountable senders preferably having single key encryption with the private key associated with a public key conjugate to the intended recipient utilized alone.

Single private key public key encryption can also be utilized for all mail sent to a given mail participant in the role of intended recipient in a very similar manner, by simply using the private key associated with the intended recipient alone for the postal codes borne by permission stamps as well as the postal codes borne by value stamps. If desired, one decryption key for postal codes carried by all value stamps and one decryption key for all postal codes carried on permission stamps is easily facilitated by use of single private key public key encryption. Bijective, one on one, simple reversal encryption is recommended for generation of permission codes between an intended recipient and a single selected sender, particularly, with the decryption key selected in accordance with the name.

The type of encryption used for the code string borne by every valid postal code decrypted by a decryption key held by the intended recipient does not preclude use of a second encryption, moreover, and association between the two encryptions utilized only in a record of the mail register system facilitates multiple levels of encryption as well as full use of double private key public key encryption whereby each mail participant has both a private key for encryption of an outgoing mail address, if not also the content of the mail, and also a public key that is operable upon the postal codes borne by all valid incoming mail.

Utilization of single private key public key encryption technology with a mail register system in accordance with the principles relating to the present invention in the context of separate decryption keys for the postal codes borne by permission stamps and value stamps, which are preferably visually different in presentation and otherwise readily distinguishable from each other in use, facilitates equation of the permission code with the postal codes borne by permission stamps, with or without a time sensitive factor regarding validity duration, and equation of the value code with the postal code borne by value stamps, preferably with a time sensitive factor regarding validity duration. Permission codes are preferably generated directly from the identity verification codes of the two mail participants involved using the encryption key assigned to the intended recipient as a modulo operator operating upon the mathematical identity verification codes which are associated with the identity verification data for both participants. Since the intended recipient selected these selected senders, i.e. identified these mail participants in a manner sensible to the mail register system such that a record of selected senders controls operability of the encryption key assigned to the intended recipient, said system can safely utilize bijective, one on one reversible, encryption in addition to single and double private key public key encryption.

Accountable senders purchasing value stamps are preferably verifiable and identifiable directly through use of another decryption key operable on valid postal codes borne by value stamps conjugate to a private encryption key held by the mail register system operator. This is as opposed to a postal code borne by a permission stamp in a system utilizing double private key public key encryption with each mail participant of a correspondent pair having a private encryption key utilized for mail sent to the other participant. The single private key preferably held by the system operator, and conjugate public keys held by intended recipients, are preferably different for different mail participants but not exclusively: it is preferred that a large number of key pairs be used and randomly distributed among the larger population of mail participants. A record in the register system must control, of course, the generation of value, redemption, and postal codes accordingly.

Regardless of the type of encryption utilized, or the number of levels of encryption, all valid postal codes contain a code string that can be decrypted by the intended recipient in verification of the mail origin as either a selected sender or an accountable sender. Postal codes borne by value stamps from accountable senders preferably confirm the identity of the sender in addition to verifying the same as an accountable sender and also preferably contain a value code that preferably indicates the redeemable value with the decryption verifying the sender as accountable. Mail from an accountable sender includes a redemption code recognizable by the mail register system, preferably with confirmation of the recipient identity, as necessary and sufficient for transfer of credit from a financial account held by the accountable sender to the recipient. The recipient identifies, or returns to a specified address, the redemption code in an action sensible to the mail register system as indicating that this mail has been opened and preferably read by the recipient intended. It is noted that in electronic mail (e-mail) recipient identification of the redemption code can be done instantly while with physical mail the redemption code can be written on the envelope received, or circled and returned, via the mail carrier to the postal service or the accountable sender or most preferably to a third party that functions as a financial clearing house which effects transfer of the value redeemed from a financial account specified by the accountable sender to an account in the name of the redeemer who preferably provides the register system with account information necessary for crediting or deposits preferably held in a data bearing record controlling the crediting of accounts with redeemed value.

While redemption of value stamps preferably distinguishes value stamps from permission stamps the more fundamental distinction is between selected senders and accountable senders presumed to be unknown to the intended recipient and having provided verifiable data inclusive of account information. A parent or some other person known to the intended recipient might prefer the convenience of including a redemption code in the content of mail bearing a permission stamp, as opposed to a physical cheque or other form of fund transfer, particularly if the amount is comparatively small: i.e. less than ten times the fee associated with a conventional fund transfer performed by a bank; and a permission stamp is still considered wholly appropriate, as opposed to a value stamp, because the origin is one known to and selected by the intended recipient.

And hence the ability of a selected sender to send some money to an intended recipient is recognized as a desirable option readily facilitated by a mail register system in accordance with the principles relating to the present invention. The main intent is to ensure that the mail received is first verifiable as from either a selected sender who is known and was selected by the recipient or an accountable sender who has provided verifiable information including name, address, and an account from which some small compensation for opening or preferably reading the mail sent is available. This promotes the virtuous cycle of senders focusing advertisements upon those who might actually be interested in the same and reduction in the amount of advertisement sent out blindly in broadsides. It is hence preferred that the identity of the accountable sender be discernable through the postal code borne by a value stamp and that this information be available to the intended recipient, along with the postal code verification and hence assurance that the mail is from an accountable sender, before opening the mail. But the fact that the origin of the mail is verifiable prior opening is sufficient. And, at minimum, this verification is obtained by at least one encryption for which the intended recipient has an operable decryption key. But encryption is simply coding, and inclusive of 'pig Latin', and while the use of computers necessarily requires digital code, this isn't encryption, not in the ordinary sense used herein. Encryption entails use of an algorithm that is fundamentally mathematical even if applicable to alphabetic characters, as in pig Latin, as the transposition of alphabetic characters is dictated by character position.

Algorithms, moreover, can be of various mathematical types as distinguished by the mathematics utilized. An arithmetic algorithm is technically still algebraic but as commonly understood and intended herein algebraic algorithms make use of multiplication and division in addition to addition and subtraction. Digit transposition or operation upon values in accordance with predetermined digit position is another type of algorithm coding that is still algebraic, fundamentally, and in contrast to the preferred type of encryption used to provide verification of origin identity: virtually irreversible 'one way¹ functions typically utilized in secure hash algorithms and inclusive of modulo operators and other elevated mathematics as compared with the four basic operations of algebra: addition, subtraction, multiplication and division.

Secure hash algorithms utilizing modulo or other elevated mathematical operators yield encryption that, with use of sufficiently large prime numbers in the operators, are virtually irreversible or one way functions because the mathematical odds of reversal without the correct conjugate decryption key are overwhelming. This is why public key encryption, single and especially double private key public key encryption, is preferred for the encryption of the code string contained in the postal code of valid mail for a given intended recipient and decrypted by a decryption key held by that intended recipient in verification of the origin of mail as either a selected sender or an accountable sender is most preferred in embodiment of the principles relating to the present invention.

Claims

1. A register system intended to assure mail accountability comprising: compilation of identity data identifying a plurality of mail participants each by a name and an address into a data bearing record and generation of an identity verification code for each said mail participant; compilation of said identity verification codes into a data bearing record controlling

(a) generation of permission codes and (b) issuance of permission stamps each bearing a postal code recognizable by the register system as valid for sending mail to an intended recipient by a selected sender, i.e. another mail participant selected by said intended recipient; compilation of verifiable data inclusive of name, address, and financial account of accountable senders into a data bearing record controlling (a) generation of value codes and

(b) issuance of value stamps each bearing a postal code recognizable by the register system as valid for sending mail to an intended recipient and redeemable by a recipient with an action sensible to the register system indicating opening of said mail; generation of postal codes each mathematically related to a particular permission code or value code; generation of a permission postal key mathematically operable upon valid postal codes borne by permission stamps used to send mail to a given recipient and provision of said permission postal key to said recipient; generation of a value postal key mathematically operable upon valid postal codes borne by value stamps used to send mail to a given recipient and provision of said value postal key to said recipient; whereby the origin of all valid mail can be verified as being either a selected, or an accountable, sender and both repudiation and 'pretexting', i.e. false representation, of origin identity is precluded.

2. The register system of claim 1 wherein said identity verification codes are mathematically related to said identity data.

3. The register system of claim 1 wherein said identity verification codes are randomly assigned with respect to said identity data.

4. The register system of claim 1 wherein permission codes are generated from the identity verifications codes of an intended recipient and the selected senders selected by said intended recipient.

5. The register system of claim 4 wherein said permission codes are generated from said identity verification codes utilizing a virtually irreversible, one way, function.

6. The register system of claim 5 wherein said permission codes are generated from said identity verification codes utilizing a secure hash algorithm.

7. The register system of claim 5 wherein said permission codes are generated from said identity verification codes utilizing a modulo operator.

8. The register system of claim 4 wherein said permission codes are generated from the identity verification codes for both said intended recipient and one said selected sender.

9. The register system of claim 8 wherein bijective, one on one, reversible encryption is utilized in generation of said permission code.

10. The register system of claim 8 wherein double private key public key encryption is utilized in generation of said permission code.

11. The register system of claim 4 wherein said permission codes are generated from the identity verification code for the intended recipient only.

12. The register system of claim 11 wherein bijective, one on one, reversible encryption is utilized in generation of said permission code.

13. The register system of claim 11 wherein single private key public key encryption is utilized in generation of said permission code.

14. The register system of claim 4 wherein each said permission code is generated from the identity verification code for one selected sender.

15. The register system of claim 14 wherein bijective, one on one, reversible encryption is utilized in generation of said permission code.

16. The register system of claim 14 wherein single private key public key encryption is utilized in generation of said permission code.

17. The register system of claim 1 wherein said postal code is generated with time as a factor limiting validity duration for said postal code.

18. The register system of claim 1 wherein said permission stamps are issued with time as a factor limiting validity duration.

19. The register system of claim 18 wherein said permission codes are generated with time as a factor limiting validity duration for said permission codes.

20. The register system of claim 19 wherein an intended recipient can select from a plurality of validity durations for permission codes to be used by selected senders selected by said intended recipient.

21. The register system of claim 19 wherein said intended recipient can terminate validity duration for specified permission codes used by selected senders selected by said intended recipient.

22. The register system of claim 1 wherein said value stamps are issued with time as a factor limiting validity duration.

23. The register system of claim 22 wherein said value code is generated with time as a factor limiting validity duration.

24. The register system of claim 23 wherein an accountable sender can select from a plurality of validity durations for value codes to be used by intended recipients in redemption.

25. The register system of claim 1 wherein value codes are generated from the identity verification data of an accountable sender and the identity verification codes of intended recipients.

26. The register system of claim 25 wherein said value codes are generated from said identity verification data of an accountable sender and the identity verification codes of intended recipients utilizing a virtually irreversible, one way, function.

27. The register system of claim 26 wherein said virtually irreversible, one way, function is retained in said postal code mathematically related to that particular value code and operation of said value postal key upon said postal code yields the identity of said accountable sender.

28. The register system of claim 1 wherein said value codes are generated from the verifiable data of the accountable sender.

29. The register system of claim 28 wherein said value codes are generated from said identity verification data of an accountable sender utilizing a virtually irreversible, one way, function.

30. The register system of claim 29 wherein said virtually irreversible, one way, function is retained in said postal code mathematically related to that particular value code and operation of said value postal key upon said postal code yields the identity of said accountable sender.

31. The register system of claim 1 wherein said action sensible to the register system indicating opening of said mail is inclusive of returning a designated portion of said mail to a specified address.

32. The register system of claim 1 wherein said action sensible to the register system indicating opening of said mail is inclusive of designating an account in the name of said intended recipient for crediting by accountable senders.

33. The register system of claim 1 wherein said value stamps are redeemable by direct deposit by a recipient with an action sensible to the register system indicating opening of said mail.

34. The register system of claim 33 wherein said value stamps are redeemable by direct deposit to an account specified by said recipient and on record with the register system by a recipient with an action sensible to the register system indicating opening of said mail.

35. The register system of claim 1 wherein said action sensible to the register system indicating opening of said mail includes identification of a redemption code within that mail.

36. The register system of claim 35 wherein said action sensible to the register system indicating opening of said mail includes return by mail of said redemption code to a specified address.

37. The register system of claim 1 wherein said permission postal key and said value postal key are the same for a given intended recipient.

38. The register system of claim 1 wherein said permission postal key and said value postal key are different for a given intended recipient.

39. The register system of claim 1 wherein a given intended recipient is assigned a single permission postal key for a plurality of selected senders.

40. The register system of claim 1 wherein a given intended recipient is assigned a single value postal key for a plurality of accountable senders.

41. The register system of claim 1 wherein said permission code comprises a portion of the postal code borne by a permission stamp.

42. The register system of claim 1 wherein said value code comprises a portion of the postal code borne by a value stamp.

43. The register system of claim 1 wherein said postal codes each related mathematically to a particular permission code are generated with a computer using a virtually irreversible one way function.

44. The register system of claim 43 wherein said postal codes each related mathematically to a particular permission code are generated with a computer using a secure hash algorithm.

45. The register system of claim 43 wherein said postal codes each related mathematically to a particular permission code are generated with use of a modulo operator.

46. The register system of claim 43 wherein said postal codes each related mathematically to a particular permission code are generated with use of public key encryption.

47. The register system of claim 1 wherein said postal codes each related mathematically to a particular value code are generated with a computer using a virtually irreversible one way function.

48. The register system of claim 47 wherein said postal codes each related mathematically to a particular value code are generated with a computer using a secure hash algorithm.

49. The register system of claim 47 wherein said postal codes each related mathematically to a particular value code are generated with use of a modulo operator.

50. The register system of claim 47 wherein said postal codes each related mathematically to a particular value code are generated with use of public key encryption.

51. The register system of claim 1 wherein said permission postal key is mathematically operable upon at least one particular digit of a valid postal code according to digit position.

52. The register system of claim 51 wherein said permission postal key is mathematically operable upon more than one particular digit of a valid postal code according to digit position.

53. The register system of claim 51 wherein said permission postal key is mathematically operable upon at least one particular digit in a valid postal code according to digit position by arithmetic.

54. The register system of claim 51 wherein said permission postal key is mathematically operable upon at least one particular digit in a valid postal code according to digit position by algebra.

55. The register system of claim 1 wherein said permission postal key is mathematically operable upon said valid postal code through utilization of public key decryption.

56. The register system of claim 55 wherein said permission postal key is mathematically operable upon said valid postal code through utilization of single key public key decryption.

57. The register system of claim 55 wherein said permission postal key is mathematically operable upon said valid postal code through utilization of double key public key decryption.

58. The register system of claim 1 wherein said value postal key is mathematically operable upon at least one particular digit of a valid postal code according to digit position.

59. The register system of claim 58 wherein said value postal key is mathematically operable upon more than one particular digit of a valid postal code according to digit position.

60. The register system of claim 58 wherein said value postal key is mathematically operable upon at least one particular digit in a valid postal code according to digit position by arithmetic.

61. The register system of claim 58 wherein said value postal key is mathematically operable upon at least one particular digit in a valid postal code according to digit position by algebra.

62. The register system of claim 1 wherein said value postal key is mathematically operable upon said valid postal code through utilization of public key decryption.

63. The register system of claim 62 wherein said value postal key is mathematically operable upon said valid postal code through utilization of single key public key decryption.

64. The register system of claim 62 wherein said value postal key is mathematically operable upon said valid postal code through utilization of double key public key decryption.