


Bulletin

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
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In Memory of Robert K. Merton

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Calendar

**Saturday,
October 9, 2004**

National Induction Ceremony and 1882nd
Stated Meeting – Cambridge

Location: Sanders Theatre, Harvard
University

Time: 4:00 p.m.

**Saturday,
October 30, 2004**

1883rd Stated Meeting, Western Center –
Seattle

Location: Seattle Art Museum

**Wednesday,
November 10, 2004**

1884th Stated Meeting – Cambridge

*“Name Worshippers: Religion, Russian and French
Mathematics, 1900 – 1930”*

Speakers: Loren Graham, MIT, and Jean-
Michel Kantor, University of Paris

Location: House of the Academy

**Saturday,
November 13, 2004**

1885th Stated Meeting, Midwest Center –
St. Louis

Speaker: Peter Raven, Missouri Botanical
Garden

Location: Missouri Botanical Garden

**Wednesday,
December 15, 2004**


1886th Stated Meeting – Cambridge

“A Bach Cult”

Speaker: Christoph Wolff, Harvard
University

Location: House of the Academy

*For information and reservations, contact the
Events Office (phone: 617-576-5032; email:
member-events@amacad.org).*



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Academy Sponsors Joint Meeting with the Cambridge Public Library Ambassador Peter Galbraith Speaks on Iraq

Addressing an audience at the House of the Academy on March 31, the day an Iraqi mob murdered and mutilated four American civilian contractors, Peter W. Galbraith asserted that Iraq is “not salvageable as a unitary state.” The former Ambassador to Croatia, known for his work in brokering peace in the Balkans during the 1990s, described a loose federation of self-governing republics as the only feasible solution to the increasingly contentious situation in Iraq. In contrast with the Bush administration’s vision of a pluralistic, Western-style democracy uniting Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis, Galbraith’s plan would result in three distinct states founded on the differing aspirations of Iraq’s major groups.

Entitled “How to Get Out of Iraq: What Went Wrong and What it Means,” Galbraith’s talk inaugurated the John Kenneth Galbraith Honor Lectures, a series the Cambridge Public Library sponsored in collaboration with the Academy to celebrate the contributions of community residents to the wider world. Janet Axelrod, Chairperson of the Library’s Board of Trustees, thanked the Academy for hosting the event, pointing out that the collaboration “reflects the shared mission [of the Academy and the Library] to promote knowledge and to stimulate discourse.”

John Kenneth Galbraith, longtime Academy Fellow, whom Academy Vice President Louis Cabot introduced as a distinguished economist, prolific author, advisor to several presidents, recipient of numerous honorary degrees, and “the tallest man in Cambridge,” attended the event with his wife Catherine. An international scholar and statesman, and a beloved member of the Harvard and Cambridge community, Galbraith received a warm ovation from the audience.

In the title of his speech, Ambassador Galbraith intentionally paid homage to his father’s tract of forty years ago called “How to Get



Peter W. Galbraith

Out of Vietnam.” He asserted his belief that the American experience in Iraq, like that in Vietnam, “may define the United States’ role in the world for much longer than the actual involvement in the country.” Unlike his father in the Vietnam era, however, he did not oppose American intervention in the current war.

Ranking Saddam’s reign with Pol Pot’s in Cambodia as “the two most cruel and inhumane regimes in the second half of the twentieth century,” Galbraith told the Academy audience that “in a more lawful world, the international community would have acted and should have acted to remove this regime long before 2003.” An eyewitness to the devastation follow-

Excerpt from the Inaugural John Kenneth Galbraith Honor Lecture, given by Ambassador Peter Galbraith at the House of the Academy on March 31, 2004

In my view, Iraq is not salvageable as a unitary state. From my experience in the Balkans, I feel strongly that it is impossible to preserve the unity of a democratic state where people in a geographically defined region almost unanimously do not want to be part of that state. And I have never met an Iraqi Kurd who preferred membership in Iraq if independence were a realistic option.

The best hope for holding Iraq together – and thereby avoiding civil war – is to let each of its major constituent communities have as much of what they want as possible. This too provides the only path that can get American forces out of Iraq . . .

The Iraq interim constitution defines the country as a federal state but centralizes power in ways that cannot be implemented. Les Gelb, the former president of the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote a piece in *The New York Times* last December proposing a three-state solution for Iraq, modeled on the constitution of the former Yugoslavia. Applying a Yugoslavia model (my understanding of how it would apply in Iraq, not Gelb’s), each of Iraq’s constituent peoples – the Kurds, the Sunni Arabs,

and the Shi’ite Arabs – would have their own republics which would be self-governing, financially self-sustaining, and with their own territorial military and police forces. The central government’s role would be limited to foreign affairs, monetary policy, and some coordination of defense policy. I would only add to this Yugoslav model that there should be some sharing of revenue, as an impoverished Sunni region is in neither the interest of the other two regions nor of the international community . . .

A loose federation will allow the United States and its allies to disengage from most of Iraq. The outcome will not be optimal. The country will remain whole more in name than in reality. Western-style human rights are likely to take root only in the Kurdish north (and there only partially). The legal status of women is likely to be set back in the south, even as compared to the Saddam Hussein regime. But the alternative is an indefinite U.S. occupation of Iraq in which we have fewer and fewer allies. It is an occupation that we cannot afford and that prevents us from addressing more serious threats to our national security . . .

ing Saddam’s genocide of the Kurdish people in the 1980s, Galbraith had been among the first to document Saddam’s use of chemical warfare against his own people.

It is not the Bush administration’s decision to bring down Saddam that Galbraith criticizes, but “the horrific mistakes” of the immediate postwar period. As part of the ABC news team reporting on the

war, Galbraith landed in Baghdad in April 2003 just four days after the U.S. military took the city. “Already,” he said, “it was apparent to me that things were going catastrophically wrong.” Galbraith personally witnessed the looting of public buildings in the ensuing two months. He spoke with marines stationed near the Iraqi

Continued on page 29



Archduke Rudolph photograph courtesy of the Historisches Museum der Stadt Wien.

Beethoven and His Royal Disciple

Lewis Lockwood

Introduction by Jessie Ann Owens

This presentation was given at the 1877th Stated Meeting, held in Cambridge on December 3, 2003.

Lewis Lockwood, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1984, is Fanny Peabody Professor of Music Emeritus at Harvard University.

Jessie Ann Owens is the Louis, Frances and Jeffrey Sachar Professor of Music at Brandeis University. She has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 2003.

Jessie Ann Owens

It is an honor to introduce Lewis Lockwood, one of the most distinguished musicologists of our time. Lockwood, the Fanny Peabody Professor Emeritus at Harvard University, has done

seminal work in two quite different fields – Renaissance music and Beethoven studies. Certain themes – or habits of mind – are clearly distinguishable in his work in both areas.

His earliest scholarship was on Renaissance music. He was a student of Edward Lowinsky at Queens College and of Oliver Strunk and Arthur Mendel at Princeton University. He wrote his dissertation about the masses of the sixteenth-century Italian composer, Vincenzo Ruffo, who was grappling with how to respond to changes in musical style that were part of the Council of Trent and related reform initiatives. Some thirty years after its publication, his monograph on Ruffo and the Counter-

Reformation has yet to be superseded. He continued with a series of important articles on major figures such as Josquin, Willaert, and Palestrina, and on topics such as *musica ficta* – traditions of performance in which musicians added sharps and flats that the composers had not written into the music – and imitation technique – the reworking by one composer of a composition by another composer. What seems less predictable in his career was the decision to undertake archival research on the Este court. His book *Music in Renaissance Ferrara 1400 – 1505: The Creation of a Musical Center in the Fifteenth Century* won the Kinkeldey Award for the best book in musicology. He also received an honorary degree from the University of Ferrara – surely a signal recognition for an American scholar.

Lewis's other field, the study of Beethoven, has been a lifelong passion, and not just because they share the same birthday! Lewis entertained himself on the long subway ride from the Bronx to the High School of Music and Art by memorizing Beethoven opus numbers. Starting in 1970, he published a series of articles about Beethoven's compositional process that helped define what has now become a standard subfield of musicology – working with autographs, sketches, and drafts to understand the stages through which a piece of music passes. His first major article about Beethoven, devoted to the autograph of Opus 69 – the A-major cello sonata – won the Einstein Award of the American Musicological Society for the best article by a scholar in the early stages of his career.

In the late 1980s, Lewis used his term as president of the American Musicological Society as a bully pulpit to argue for the importance of writing not just for other musicologists but more broadly for colleagues in other disciplines and indeed for the larger audience of music-lovers and concertgoers. His recent book, *Beethoven: The Music and the Life*, a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize, establishes a new model of musicological discourse with its sophisticated account of the complex relationship between biography and the musical work. Those of us in the music business marvel that he has managed to write an entire volume using little technical language and only a few music examples, and yet offer insights that can be appreciated by specialists as well as the literate public.

What brings the two halves of his professional life together, Renaissance and Beethoven, is precisely what we will hear tonight: a deeply contextual analysis of the relationship between patronage and musical creativity.

Lewis Lockwood

The Problem of Artistic Biography

The poet Rainer Maria Rilke once said of Rodin and Tolstoy, both of whom he knew personally, that their artistic commitment was so intense that the other parts of their lives seemed simply to wither “like some organ they no longer require.” Extravagant as it may seem, Rilke’s remark captures the most basic problem of artistic biography – how to determine relevant connections between what happens in the life and what happens in the work, how to discover the ways in which these two dimensions shed light on one another. To the conscientious biographer of a major artist, the artist’s imaginative works themselves, in all their fullness of expression, occupy the foreground.

Beethoven’s behavior with patrons, and with the world in general, was erratic, unpredictable, demanding, and hostile . . .

Seen from this point of view, much of what we can know of the artist’s “life,” in the ordinary sense, is what seems to be left over from his or her all-consuming concentration on the work. It forms part of the context in which we seek to understand the work, but only part of it.

There are many ways to approach this problem, without supposing that there is any universal formula for its solution. In my own recent biography of Ludwig van Beethoven (1770 – 1827) I tried to subdue this problem by putting the music first, balancing it with extensive discussion of the composer’s life. I found it useful to imagine a three-part division, in which Beethoven’s “career,” that is, the part of his life devoted to the production and dissemination of his works, might furnish traceable threads of connection. Beethoven’s deafness, isolation, lifelong physical suffering and irascible personality are the stuff of legend, and, indeed, some well-known commentators attribute the powerful and heroic aspects of his works to his will to overcome his deafness and isolation. Attractive as it seems, such a viewpoint tends to overlook or minimize his many important works, and styles within works, that don’t fit the “heroic” model, leaving us dissatisfied with the narrowness of this or any single critical category. We sense that, with Beethoven as with other artists on his level, a unified creative per-

sonality underlies the diversity of styles in his work, as well as the seemingly separate domains of “life” and “art” – but gaining access to that deeper person through sheer biographical study is difficult.

I’d like to come at this issue by focusing on one of the most important personal relationships of Beethoven’s later life, one that enables us to trace an unusually close connection between the personal and the aesthetic. It emerges from Beethoven’s close attachment in his later years to Archduke Rudolph, a member of the Habsburg ruling family, who became his patron and at the same time his pupil in composition.

Beethoven and His Patrons

Beethoven’s patrons loom large in his biography. The names of Waldstein and Razumovsky need no introduction to music lovers, and hardly less important are the other Viennese aristocrats (along with some friends and acquaintances) to whom he dedicated compositions or had close relations during his career. His dedicatees included members of the high nobility, such as the Princes Karl Lichnowsky, Franz Joseph Lobkowitz, and Ferdinand Kinsky, along with others who bore lesser titles, and also women such as the Countesses Josephine Deym, Marie von Erdödy, Babette von Keglevics, and Giulietta Guicciardi. His situation was entirely different from that of Joseph Haydn (1732 – 1809), who spent nearly thirty productive years in the service of a single family, the Esterházy, and lived on this patron’s landed estates at Eisenstadt and Eszterháza. More like Mozart, who spent his Viennese years (1781 – 1791) as a freelance pianist, composer, and teacher, Beethoven lived a precarious life as an independent artist through all his thirty-five years in Vienna, from 1792 to his death in 1827. Since he never had a fixed position with a regular salary at any time, despite his hopes for one, he needed patrons to support him. His livelihood depended on their financial help and on what he could gain from publishers in an age without copyright. His need to publish helps to account for the mixture of works, including the arrangements and revisions, that comprise his lifetime publications from Opus 1 to Opus 135, plus the many works that he issued without opus numbers. It also helps us understand why he spent so much time and effort dealing with publishers and worrying about money.

Beethoven’s behavior with patrons, and with the world in general, was erratic, unpredictable, demanding, and hostile, not only in later life when his deafness and isolation were becoming absolute, but even in his earlier years

when he was forging his career. In the 1790s in Vienna he had no more devoted friend than Prince Karl Lichnowsky, who gave Beethoven a matched set of Italian stringed instruments (still preserved at the Beethoven-Haus in Bonn) to encourage him to write quartets. Lichnowsky housed Beethoven, took him to Prague in 1796 on a concert tour, and paid him an annuity of six hundred florins from 1800 to about 1808. “He really is,” Beethoven wrote of Lichnowsky in 1805, “surely a rare example among persons of his social class – one of my most faithful friends and promoters of my art.” But if the tale is true, it was to Lichnowsky that he said, after an angry falling-out, “Prince, what you are, you are through an accident of birth. What I am, I am through myself. There have been and will be thousands of princes; there is only one Beethoven.”

Beethoven’s ambivalence toward his supporters and publishers was part of his innate resistance to the blandishments of the outer world – except when he gave way to flattery, as at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, where he met the crowned heads of Europe, including Czar Alexander and Empress Elisabeth of Russia. In view of his stubborn posture of rugged independence, his relationship to the Archduke Rudolph was all the more remarkable.

The Archduke Rudolph (1788 – 1831)

Born in 1788, the Archduke Rudolph was Beethoven’s junior by seventeen years. He was the youngest son of the Austro-Hungarian Emperor Leopold II, who had succeeded Joseph II in 1790 but lived only two more years. So in 1792 the Habsburg throne fell to Rudolph’s oldest brother, Francis II, a quiet and cautious ruler who survived until 1835. He was the “Kaiser Franz” for whom Haydn wrote his famous Austrian national anthem in 1798. Francis lived through the whirlwind set loose on Europe by Napoleonic France, and then through the first twenty years of the post-Napoleonic Restoration. He went to war with France in 1792 and eventually had to watch his Austro-Hungarian dominions fall piece by piece to the Napoleonic war machine. He presided over the formal demise of the traditional Holy Roman Empire in 1806, thus ending a regime that had lasted for eight centuries. Having started as Francis II of the greater Austrian Empire, he now became Francis I, Emperor of Austria.

Most of the emperor’s younger brothers were slated for military careers or high administrative posts. The exception was Rudolph, the dreamer of the group, who tried to become a

Beethoven in an engraving made by Lazarus Gottlieb Sichling between 1830 and 1863 after an 1823 portrait by Ferdinand Georg Waldmüller.



Image © akg-images

cadet but turned instead to music and eventually to the church. Rudolph's portraits show a delicacy of features and demeanor unlike the masculinity of his brothers. Rudolph had serious aspirations as a pianist, and all indications are that, until epilepsy and gout caught up with him, he could play extremely well. He also turned out later, under Beethoven's tutelage, to be a surprisingly competent professional composer.

Beethoven may have met Rudolph as early as 1803, but by 1808 they were in contact and from then on to the end of Beethoven's life Rudolph was his principal benefactor. In 1809, when Beethoven was threatening to take a position with Jerome Bonaparte in Westphalia, Rudolph set up a contract along with Princes Lobkowitz and Kinsky to pay him a handsome annuity of four thousand florins, as long as Beethoven agreed to stay in the Austrian dominions. When the other two partners or their estates stopped paying by reason of bankruptcy or death, Rudolph continued to pay his share scrupulously, and in 1811 he even raised the nominal amount to make up for the loss in revenue brought on by the Austrian financial debacle. This annuity remained Beethoven's only regular source of income over the years.

Despite the suffering of the royal family and all of Austria from the incessant wars and invasions that lasted until Waterloo in 1815, Rudolph never wavered in his support of the composer who had come to be the central figure in the musical world of his time. And so, fittingly, he received the dedications of more Beethoven compositions than any other pa-

tron: nine major works, including the Fourth and Fifth Piano Concertos; the Piano Sonata in E-flat Major, "Lebewohl," Opus 81a; the Violin Sonata in G Major, Opus 96; the Piano Trio in B-flat Major, Opus 97 (the "Archduke"); the Piano Sonata in B-flat Major, Opus 106 ("Hammerklavier"); the Piano Sonata in C

Mixed with his beliefs in the egalitarian ideals of the French Revolution and the rights of man was Beethoven's urgent desire that the world should recognize his superiority as an artist.

Minor, Opus 111; the Missa Solemnis, Opus 123; the Grand Fugue in B-flat Major, Opus 133; and some other lesser works and canons. From 1809 on Rudolph became Beethoven's devoted composition pupil, the only such pupil of Beethoven's later years.

It was clear from early on that Rudolph would eventually go into the church. As early as 1805, at age seventeen, he took minor vows as a priest and became coadjutor to the Archbishop of Olmütz in Moravia; thus his succession as archbishop was assured fifteen years before his installation in 1820. It was for this event that Beethoven composed his Missa Solemnis (actually finished in 1823).

At this point I want to pay tribute to the path-breaking work of Susan Kagan, who carried out research on Rudolph's life and works some years ago. Kagan has written an important book on Rudolph, published some of his music, and, as pianist, has also recorded some of his keyboard works.

The Composer and his Royal Pupil

What was the nature of Beethoven's relationship to Rudolph? First and foremost, that of grateful artist to generous patron, a patron whose status in the top rank of the nobility conferred undeniable prestige. As much as Beethoven scorned other aristocrats, he was deferential to the Archduke, and he took pride in this high social connection. He once told his friend Gleichenstein that it was a shame that Gleichenstein hadn't come to a certain soiree, because he would have met the Archduke there, and, "as the friend of his friend, you would not have been made to feel his high rank." The relationship plays strongly into Maynard Solomon's biographical theme of Beethoven's lifelong "nobility pretense." In 1818, when Beethoven's legal case against his sister-in-law for custody of his nephew Karl was transferred from the court of the nobility to one for commoners, he was outraged, and the great democrat complained to his lawyer that he was now being bracketed with "innkeepers, shoemakers, and tailors." As Solomon points out, for some years Beethoven let the Austrian-German world think that the "van" in his name, derived from his Flemish ancestors and having no implication of rank, was the equivalent of the German "von," a token of nobility.

Mixed with his beliefs in the egalitarian ideals of the French Revolution and the rights of man was Beethoven's urgent desire that the world should recognize his superiority as an artist and admit him into the higher echelons of society. As Solomon puts it, "Beethoven, through his nobility pretense, was able to put himself in the place of the mighty, to partake of aristocratic power, to share the insignia of social supremacy, and to 'conquer' the nobility by pretending to be of it." His close relationship to Rudolph must have seemed to confer an aura of reality on his dreams of exerting power and influence in the world. And he cultivated this relationship with an apparent depth of feeling that forces us to take it very seriously.

Beginning in 1808 he began to dedicate major works to Rudolph. The dedications of the Fourth and Fifth Piano Concertos broadly reflected the Archduke's pianistic ability in big works intended for public concerts. But

Beethoven sustained his work through all the vicissitudes of physical illness, deafness, and alienation, not only by his obsessive devotion to his craft but also by maintaining his faith that great music could benefit humankind.

then came, as a much more personal gesture, the Piano Sonata in E-flat Major, “Lebewohl,” Opus 81a. Written in the late spring and summer of 1809, it is Beethoven’s only fully programmatic piano sonata. Its subject is the Archduke’s departure, absence, and eventual return from the royal family’s exile during Napoleon’s siege and occupation of Vienna. (The title originally planned for the sonata was to be “Der Abschied – am 4ten Mai – gewidmet und aus dem Herzen geschrieben S[einer] K[aiserliche] H[hoheit],” “The Farewell – on the 4th of May – dedicated and written from the heart to His Royal Highness.”) Beethoven remained in Vienna during the fearful French bombardment and the long occupation, but managed to compose this sonata and other important works (including the “Harp” Quartet, Opus 74), besides compiling extracts from theorists in order to teach counterpoint, figured bass, and strict composition to the Archduke when he should return.

He never had a more devoted pupil. Susan Kagan counts about twenty-four finished works by Rudolph, plus dozens of unfinished ones. Most of Rudolph’s compositions are for solo piano or are keyboard chamber music, and it can’t be accidental that Rudolph’s special proclivity for fugue and fugato coincides with Beethoven’s own emphatic turn to counterpoint in his later years. Rudolph amassed a very large music library in the royal palace, which he made available to Beethoven, and it soon became easier for Beethoven to locate his works in Rudolph’s collection than in his own chaotic household. Rudolph let Beethoven use rooms in the royal palace for rehearsals and performances, provided extra financial donations, used his influence to help Beethoven in his litigation over nephew Karl, guaranteed loans – in general, treated him “as a friend and not a servant,” as Beethoven said in a letter of 1819.

Needless to say, however, Beethoven grumbled about his teaching duties. In a letter he com-

plained to Ries in 1823 that while the Archbishop was to be back in Vienna for four weeks he expected Beethoven to give him a lesson every day, of two and a half to three hours each. It’s hardly surprising that Beethoven’s intense concentration on his own work made him angry about the regular routine of trudging over to the royal palace two or three times a week to give Rudolph his lessons, and he often wrote him short notes canceling the lessons and pleading illness, sometimes giving considerable detail about his current physical problem. One senses that he knew the epileptic prince would sympathize with him. As Beethoven wrote, “He understands music and is quite absorbed in it. He is so talented that I am sorry not to be able to take as much interest in him as I used to.” On the other hand, Beethoven took pride in Rudolph’s accomplishments. And even if he once compared Rudolph to King Richard the Lion Heart and himself to Blondel, Richard’s minstrel, he worked hard at correcting Rudolph’s work. Nothing is more suggestive than the contemporary report that when Beethoven in his last years was stone deaf to conversation, he could somehow hear the Archduke’s soft voice through the smallest of his ear trumpets.

“I never . . . shall succeed in being a courtier”

The complexity of their relationship is visible in Beethoven’s letters. We catch a glimpse of it in a letter of March 1819, in which Beethoven offers fulsome congratulations to Rudolph on the news of his accession, while reminding him that “this new honor will not be accepted without some sacrifices.” He thanks Rudolph for a large new composition that he has sent him, which in fact was a set of forty variations on a theme that Beethoven had given him. Beethoven calls the variations “masterly” and lauds Rudolph’s “truly fine talents and really excellent gifts of imagination” – but he also points out “several little slips” in the composition and urges Rudolph to keep on striving to improve. Later in the same letter, Beethoven drops the mask of humility and reminds Rudolph that, although he is a royal prince, he cannot dictate to Beethoven as if he were a servant: “Your . . . command that I should come, and again your intimation that [you] would let me know when I should do so, I was never able to fathom, for I never was, still am not, and never shall succeed in being a courtier.” Now comes the heart of the matter: “Your Imperial Highness can . . . create in two ways – both for the happiness and welfare of very many people and also for yourself. For in the present world of monarchs, creators of music and benefactors of humanity

have hitherto been lacking.” Thereafter Beethoven declares that, eventually, when “a High Mass composed by me will be performed during the ceremonies solemnized for Your Imperial Highness [it] will be the most glorious day of my life.” When Beethoven finished the *Missa Solemnis* in 1823, three years after Rudolph’s actual installation, he inscribed the autograph manuscript to Rudolph with the words, “From the heart – may it go to the heart.”

Some of the other works he dedicated to Rudolph reflected his personal allegiance in other ways. For example, while he was composing the “Hammerklavier” Sonata in 1817, Beethoven was also planning a choral piece for Rudolph’s name day. A now lost sketchbook of 1817, which was described in the late nineteenth century by the great Beethoven scholar Gustav Nottebohm, contained sketches for both the choral piece and the piano sonata; two of these sketches carried the text “Vivat Rudolphus” (“Long live Rudolph”). The motifs of both choral sketches relate directly to the dramatic opening gesture of the “Hammerklavier” Sonata, with its powerful upward leap and continuation, and suggest that these words of praise for Rudolph are encoded in the opening motif and thus the work as a whole. It is certainly interesting that to open the “Lebewohl” Sonata, eight years earlier, he had written the word “Le-be-wohl” (“Farewell”) into the score, as if to make explicit the heartfelt meaning of the opening musical gesture. It is as if the piano is singing this word, one note to each syllable.

The “Archduke” Trio, Opus 97

The “Archduke” Trio, Opus 97 (which was admirably played by the Boston Trio as part of this presentation) is generally known by Rudolph’s title for no other reason than that it was dedicated to him; the same nickname could just as reasonably have been applied to the great piano sonata, Opus 106 that he called “Hammerklavier” (Beethoven was then insisting on the use of German rather than Italian on the title pages of his publications). The Trio Opus 97 was composed in 1811, during the twilight years of his second period. It is the last of Beethoven’s works for piano trio, a genre that he took over from Mozart and Haydn and to which he contributed a series of works – the three Trios of Opus 1; the Clarinet Trio, Opus 11; and the two magnificent Trios of Opus 70 – that were innovative in their structural and aesthetic qualities, not least in the ways in which the violin and cello match in importance the powerful resonances of the piano.

Beethoven had known for most of his career that in his works he was speaking not only to his own time but to the future.

The “Archduke” Trio is among the bigger works of his middle period, which I have called elsewhere his “second maturity.” It is set up not in the three movements traditional in piano trios, but in four large movements, like his symphonies and quartets. It has a substantial Allegro first movement; a long Scherzo and Trio; a massive slow movement, here in variation form; and an attractive and brilliant finale. It embraces both the monumental and the lyrical aspects of Beethoven’s style, and every movement has the length and complexity that we find in some other of his large cyclic works of this time, including the String Quartet in F Major, Opus 59 No. 1 and the Seventh Symphony in A Major, Opus 92. Especially noteworthy is the memorable opening paragraph, initiated by the piano alone, with the strings gradually joining in the ensemble and then elaborating new figures as they prepare for the restatement of the main theme in which they will now be the dominating voices. The scheme of the whole movement is innovative in its use of harmonies related by descending thirds, rather than the tonic and dominant polarity characteristic of most works in major keys at this period. It uses one of Beethoven’s adroit opening gambits in beginning with a lyrical theme that subdivides into shorter motifs that develop later in the movement, thus organically connecting the parts to the whole. It is a process similar to the opening of the first movement of the “Pastoral” Symphony in F Major, Opus 68.

The Scherzo is a brilliant tour de force of intricate dialogue among the three instruments; and the contrasting “Trio” section presents a chain of contrasts that begins with the fugue-like exposition of a slithering chromatic theme and moves on to a brilliant Viennese waltz. The slow movement, a chain of variations based on a long hymn-like theme, brings a vein of solemnity to the work. The variations gain in gravity as they proceed, culminating in a freely elaborated Coda, or closing section. The slow movement ends by preparing the way for the finale – a brilliant, at times jocular, sonata-rondo movement that makes much use of instrumental interplay and completes the whole work by lightening the atmosphere.

The Missa Solemnis

For Rudolph’s installation Beethoven planned and executed his greatest choral work, the Missa Solemnis. “As difficult as it is for me to speak about myself,” he declared to his publisher, “nevertheless I do believe that it is my greatest work.” Written on a symphonic scale for soloists, chorus, and full orchestra, it stands with the Ninth Symphony (which he wrote directly afterward) as a monumental expression of his belief in humanity’s relationship to God. Though not a churchgoer, Beethoven was a born Catholic who had been deeply influenced by Enlightenment ideals. This mass symbolizes not only the power of belief but the individual’s interior experience of faith; in these ways it resonates with the then current revisionist views in Austrian and German religious circles that were seeking to reinforce the importance of highly personal forms of devotion. Its final movement, the “Dona nobis pacem,” contains a telling subtitle: “Prayer for inner and outer peace.” It is a representation of the struggle between war and peace familiar to everyone in Beethoven’s lifetime, and reflects his hope for the *pax humana*, the ideal of human life unblemished by war and anxiety. Musically it belongs with Bach’s B Minor Mass (which Beethoven knew as early as 1810, at least in part, and which he may have seen in its entirety through contemporary copies). But in the personal sense, this mass is his largest tribute to his royal disciple.

“In the world of art . . . freedom and progress are the main objectives”

In Beethoven’s letter of March 1819 we saw a mixture of his self-assertion as a great artist, his pride in his royal pupil, and his encouragement to Rudolph to use his new position as a benefactor of his people and also to continue as a composer. Equally lofty ideals emerge in a letter of July 1819. Beethoven had been to the royal palace to consult some older music in Rudolph’s music library. “The older composers do us a double service,” Beethoven writes in praise of the music of earlier eras, “since there is generally real artistic value in their works (among them, of course, only the German Handel and Sebastian Bach possessed genius).” And now Beethoven comes to the crux: “in the world of art, as in the whole of our great creation, freedom and progress are the main objectives. And although we moderns are not quite as far advanced in solidity as our ancestors, the refinement of our customs has enlarged our sphere of action. My eminent music pupil, who himself is now competing for the laurels

of fame, must not bear the reproach of being one-sided.”

On the one hand, he is giving Rudolph avuncular advice to steep himself in the solid techniques of the masters of earlier music, above all Bach and Handel. But his main purpose is to underscore that by returning to earlier models, Rudolph (like Beethoven himself) can achieve a connection to the past and can bring “freedom and progress” to his artistic work.

We do not think of Beethoven as an especially literate artist, but as he once claimed, “from my childhood I have striven to understand what the better and wiser people of every age were driving at in their works.” Behind this 1819 letter to Rudolph stands a lifetime of belief in the ideals of freedom and progress that had fired the French Revolution, coupled with an awareness of the successive betrayals of those beliefs that had come about through the Reign of Terror, through Napoleon’s despotism, and through the repressive regimes that had succeeded Napoleon after 1815. Beethoven had grown up at a time when Kantian idealism was the new intellectual dogma, and through all his disillusionment with contemporary politics he held to that broad image. In a conversation book of 1820 he wrote, “The starry sky above us and the moral law within us – Kant!!!!”

In music his strongest statement of sustained belief in these ideals – that “all men shall be brothers” – was the Ninth Symphony (1822 – 1824), but in personal terms his vision of Rudolph as benevolent prince and archbishop follows a parallel line. Beethoven sustained his work through all the vicissitudes of physical illness, deafness, and alienation, not only by his obsessive devotion to his craft but also by maintaining his faith that great music could benefit humankind – that his aim was not to provide cultural entertainment but to make a significant difference in the world. Such music could not be merely effective, simple, and popular, but had to live up to the highest standards of artistic tradition, purpose, and expression. Such a view, possible for artists in the Romantic era but agonizingly difficult today, is akin to Shelley’s claim that “poets are the unacknowledged legislators of mankind.”

For Beethoven, then, his royal pupil seemed to personify an ideal. Beethoven saw in Rudolph the rarest of patrons: a member of the high ruling class who gave him generous support and had become his pupil and disciple, thus replacing the typical political values of his class with an acceptance of artistic ones. In a deeper sense, Beethoven’s vision of Rudolph was really an imagined vision of himself. Though Ru-

dolph was a perfectly competent composer, none of his work rose above the average levels of Beethoven's lesser contemporaries. But Beethoven had known for most of his career that his capacities and accomplishments were far above those levels, and that in his works he was speaking not only to his own time but to the future. Which is in fact what has happened.

Suggestions for further reading and listening

Emily Anderson, ed., *The Letters of Beethoven*, 3 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1961); William Drabkin, *Beethoven: Missa Solemnis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Susan Ka-

gan, *Archduke Rudolph, Beethoven's Patron, Pupil, and Friend* (New York: Pendragon Press, 1988); Susan Kagan, "Beethoven and His Pupils" CD, Koch International Classics No. 3-7351-2 HI (containing Archduke Rudolph's Forty Variations on a Theme by Beethoven, Susan Kagan, pianist); Lewis Lockwood, *Beethoven: The Music and the Life* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2003); Maynard Solomon, *Beethoven*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Schirmer Books, 1998). ■

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1.
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2.
Irina Murisanu (Boston Trio), Bernard Burke (MIT), and Louis Cabot (Cabot-Wellington, LLC)

3.
Owen Gingerich (Harvard University), Arnold Relman (Harvard Medical School), and Marcia Angell (Harvard Medical School)



4



5

4.
Leslie Berlowitz (American Academy) and Christoph Wolff (Harvard University)

5.
Lewis Lockwood, Karen Painter (Harvard University), and Reinhold Brinkmann (Harvard University)




Image © Fujita Art Museum, Japan.

Xuanzang [Hsüan-Tsang] returns to China with Sanskrit manuscripts from India in A.D. 645.

What's the Point of Democracy?

Amartya Sen

Introduction by Thomas Scanlon

This presentation was given at the 1878th Stated Meeting, held at the House of the Academy on February 11, 2004.

Amartya Sen is Lamont University Professor at Harvard University. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 1981.

Thomas Scanlon, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1993, is Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity at Harvard University.

Thomas Scanlon

The size of the audience here tonight bears out the fact that Amartya Sen is a distinguished economist and philosopher, Nobel Prize laureate, recent Master of Trinity College in the other Cambridge, and a friend to all of us. We welcome him back to this Cambridge as the Lamont University Professor at Harvard University.

I imagine – indeed more than imagine – that all economists are, at heart, deeply concerned with human welfare. After all, they have devoted their lives to the perfection of the institutions on which our welfare depends. But, to the uninitiated anyway, it seems that, perhaps out of shyness or embarrassment, economists' concern with welfare is sometimes humbly concealed behind a certain amount of mathematical formulae, which obscure their heartfelt motivation. Something of the same can be said of moral and political philosophy, which I am

guilty of practicing myself: we who go into this field are supposed to be deeply concerned with the right and the good, but out of a desire to appear professional we cover our papers with technical terminology and analytical distinctions, the human significance of which may not always be apparent.

But Amartya's analyses, and Amartya himself, have none of this shyness or indirection. A concern for human welfare is the guiding and evident first principle of all of his work in economics, in philosophy, as a social scientist, and as an effective advocate for justice and advancement in the world. It is also, no doubt, responsible for his being more of a consequentialist in moral philosophy than some of the rest of us.

Economics is not always seen to be entirely friendly to democracy. To many, Kenneth Arrow's famous "impossibility theorem" questions the very possibility of adequate democratic decision-making procedures. Some of Amartya's early work was devoted to the interpretation and generalization of this theorem, putting its results in context so that its import could be properly understood.

Another criticism, coming from a different direction, maintains that if people have full democratic rights, they're likely, under many circumstances, to exercise them in a way that will be inimical to their own good: in a demo-

cratic state, citizens may use their rights to block measures that are necessary for real development and prosperity because they are painful in the short term. Those of us who are firm believers in rights may say, "If people are unwise, and exercise their rights unwisely, things won't go as well as they might have otherwise. But nonetheless, they have those rights." We accept that the exercise of democratic rights may lead to worse outcomes, but we refuse to take this as a reason to qualify our commitment to democracy. In some of his most exciting work in recent years, Amartya goes farther, and challenges the view that democracy is at odds with the goals of development and well-being. He argues that, in fact, democratic institutions have an important positive role to play in warding off the worst things that can happen to us, such as serious famines, and in promoting our welfare in varied ways. This is an important theme of his lecture this evening.

Amartya Sen

Many notable things have happened over the twentieth century. In the domain of political ideas perhaps the most important change to occur has been the recognition of democracy as an acceptable form of government that can serve any nation – whether in Europe or America, or in Asia or Africa. Only sixty years

ago, Winston Churchill, the prime minister of Britain, while fighting valiantly for democracy in Europe, insisted that Britain's vast non-European empire, over which the sun was unable to set, was altogether unready for democracy. However, within a few years from then, that view was quite obsolete, and rightly so.

It would be tragic indeed if this hard-earned understanding were now lost in the intense dialectics surrounding the current events in Iraq. Questions can and should be raised about whether democracy (to adapt an old Maoist phrase) can come out of the barrel of a gun, especially when the aim of the gun seems so confused. But it is extremely worrying to see that the understandable opposition to global unilateralism and to underinformed military action sometimes takes the drastic form of disputing the very possibility of having a democratic Iraq or, for that matter, a democratic Middle East.

This is one immediate reason for returning to the old question: What's the point of democracy? There are, of course, others. Let me mention two. First, despite the normative acceptance of democracy as the appropriate form of government, there remains practical skepticism about the effectiveness of democracy in the poorer countries. Democracy, it has been alleged by many, does far worse than authoritarian rule, especially in fostering economic growth and development. The contrasting of India with China is only one of many empirical arguments that are presented in support of this castigation of democracy.

A second line of criticism involves high theories of cultures and civilizations. It is argued that democracy is a peculiarly Western norm – not in tune with the foundational values of other societies. The thesis that democracy is a quintessentially Western idea has been championed in different ways by both non-Western cultural separatists and Western theorists who write about clashing cultures and clanging civilizations.

I have argued elsewhere against this cultural critique (in particular in my essay "Democracy and Its Global Roots," published in *The New Republic* in October 2003). I shall draw on some of the evidence I presented there, along with other data, but I will also try to interpret the overall picture in the perspective of the central theme of tonight's presentation: *What is the point of democracy?*

Democracy does not, of course, rely on just one singular point, but involves many inter-related ones. It is, however, worthwhile to ask

What is the *central* point of democracy? What (to borrow a phrase from T. S. Eliot) is "the still point of the turning world"? A good clue to the "still point" can be found, I believe, in the analysis of the foremost political philosopher of our time, John Rawls. Democracy, Rawls has taught us, has to be seen not just in terms of ballots and votes – important as they are – but primarily in terms of "public reasoning," including the opportunity for public discussion as well as interactive participation and reasoned encounter. Democracy must include, to invoke a Millian phrase, "government by discussion." Indeed, voting and balloting are part of that broader public process.

In the field of politics, Rawls has argued that *objectivity* demands "a public framework of thought" that provides "an account of agreement in judgement among reasonable agents." Reasonableness requires the political willingness of individuals to go beyond the limits of their specific self-interests. But it also makes social demands to help fair discernment, including access to relevant information, the opportunity to listen to varying points of view, and exposure to open public discussions and debates. In its pursuit of political objectivity, democracy has to take the form of constructive and efficacious public reasoning.

The belief that democracy is a quintessentially Western idea – a unique feature of the history of Western civilization – is often linked to the practice of voting and elections in ancient Greece, especially in Athens. There is certainly priority there. Indeed, by taking note of the broader tradition of public reasoning that flourished in different ways in ancient Greece, early Greek connections to the origin of democracy can be seen to be even larger. But the jump from there to the thesis of the quintessentially Western or European nature of democracy is a resolute leap into confusion. This is so for three distinct reasons.

The first difficulty is mainly classificatory and concerns the partitioning of the world into largely racial categories representing discrete civilizations, in which ancient Greece is seen as part and parcel of an identifiable "European" or "Western" tradition. In this classificatory perspective, no great difficulty is seen in considering the descendants of, say, Goths and Visigoths as proper inheritors of the Greek tradition ("they are all Europeans"), while there is great reluctance in taking note of the Greek intellectual links with ancient Egyptians, Iranians, and Indians, despite the greater interest that the ancient Greeks showed in talking to them, rather than in chatting up the ancient

In the domain of political ideas perhaps the most important change to occur has been the recognition of democracy as an acceptable form of government that can serve any nation.

Goths. Being incurably mealy-mouthed, I will call this a taxonomic difficulty, but perhaps a stronger comment would have been possible.

Second, while Athens was unique enough in getting balloting started, there were many regional governments that went that way in the centuries to follow. There is nothing to indicate that the Greek experience in electoral governance had much immediate impact in the countries to the west of Greece and Rome, in, say, France or Germany or Britain. In contrast, some of the cities in Asia – in Iran, Bactria, and India – incorporated elements of democracy in municipal governance to a great extent under Greek influence. For example, for several centuries from the time of Alexander the Great, the city of Susa in southwest Iran had an elected council, a popular assembly, and magistrates who were proposed by the council and elected by the assembly. The battle for electoral freedom that is going on right now in Ayatollah Khamenei's Iran (with the reformists fighting with their back to the wall) is concerned with political rights that had some acknowledgment in Iran even two thousand years ago.

The third difficulty, which is particularly central to tonight's theme, concerns the important historical point that while public reasoning flourished in many ways in ancient Greece, it did that also in several other ancient civilizations – sometimes spectacularly so. For example, some of the earliest open general meetings aimed specifically at settling disputes between different points of view took place in India in the so-called Buddhist councils, where adherents of different points of view got together to argue out their differences. The first of these large councils was held in Rajagriha shortly after Gautama Buddha's death twenty-five hundred years ago. The grandest of these councils – the third – occurred under the patronage of Emperor Ashoka in the third century B.C.E. in Pataliputra, then the capital of India and what is now called Patna. Ashoka also tried to codify and propagate what must have been among the earliest formulations of rules for public dis-

cussion – a kind of ancient version of the nineteenth-century “Robert’s Rules of Order.” He demanded, for example, “restraint in regard to speech, so that there should be no extolment of one’s own sect or disparagement of other sects on inappropriate occasions, and it should be moderate even in appropriate occasions.” Even when engaged in arguing, “other sects should be duly honoured in every way on all occasions.”

I doubt that these good rules of verbal engagement were actually followed most of the time in popular debates, but public discussion certainly received considerable championing in Indian traditions. Even the all-conquering Alexander was treated to a good example of what today’s diplomats would call a full and frank discussion, as he roamed around in northwest India around 325 B.C.E. When Alexander asked a group of Jain philosophers why they were neglecting to pay any attention to the great conqueror, he received the following forceful reply:

King Alexander, every man can possess only so much of the earth’s surface as this we are standing on. You are but human like the rest of us, save that you are always busy and up to no good, travelling so many miles from your home, a nuisance to yourself and to others! . . . You will soon be dead, and then you will own just as much of the earth as will suffice to bury you.

We are told by Arrian that Alexander responded to this egalitarian reproach with the same kind of admiration as he had shown in his encounter with Diogenes, even though his actual conduct remained completely unchanged (“the exact opposite of what he then professed to admire”).

Indeed, the importance of public discussion is a recurrent theme in the history of many countries in the non-Western world. To choose another historical example, in Japan in A.D. 604, the Buddhist Prince Shotoku, who was regent to his mother, Empress Suiko, produced the so-called constitution of seventeen articles. The constitution insisted, much in the spirit of the Magna Carta to be signed six centuries later in A.D. 1215: “Decisions on important matters should not be made by one person alone. They should be discussed with many.”

To take another example from a much later period, when in the 1590s the great Moghal Emperor Akbar was making his pronouncements in India on the need for tolerance, and was busy arranging organized dialogues between holders of different faiths (including Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsees, Jains,

Public reasoning, in various forms, has had a long history across the world, and these traditions in diverse cultures make it hard to see democracy as an essentially Western idea.

Jews, and even – it must be noted – atheists), the Inquisitions were still flourishing in Europe. Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome, in Campo dei Fiori, for heresy in 1600, even as Akbar was lecturing on tolerance and holding interfaith dialogues in Agra.

Public reasoning, in various forms, has had a long history across the world, and these traditions in diverse cultures make it hard to see democracy as an essentially Western idea. This recognition does not reduce, in any way, the far-reaching relevance of the fact that the contemporary concepts of democracy and of public reasoning have been very deeply influenced by European and American experiences and ideas over the last few centuries. But to extrapolate that experience backward to construct a long dichotomy running through the past is no more than potted history – indeed it is somewhat more pot than history.

In his autobiography, *Long Walk to Freedom*, Nelson Mandela describes how influenced he was, as a young boy, by observing the democratic nature of the local meetings that were held in the regent’s house in Mqhekezweni:

Everyone who wanted to speak did so. It was democracy in its purest form. There may have been a hierarchy of importance among the speakers, but everyone was heard, chief and subject, warrior and medicine man, shopkeeper and farmer, landowner and laborer . . . The foundation of self-government was that all men were free to voice their opinions and equal in their value as citizens.

Mandela’s “long walk to freedom,” his search for “the still point of the turning world,” began distinctly at home.

I move now to the effectiveness critique, based on the claim that authoritarian regimes do better than democratic ones in economic development. There are two points to be made in response. The first is the basic valuational point that democratic rights are among the *constitutive components* of development, and they do

not have to be justified by their indirect contribution to economic growth. Politically unfree citizens – whether rich or poor – are deprived of a basic liberty and of a fundamental constituent of good living.

Second, the empirical claim of a negative relation between democracy and economic growth has not been confirmed by the extensive inter-country comparisons that have been undertaken. The often repeated claim is based on selective empiricism. Also, even in interpreting the success of South Korea or Singapore, empirical analysis has to distinguish between *post hoc* and *propter hoc*. It is increasingly clear – even from India’s recent experience – that economic success depends on a friendly economic climate, rather than a fierce political one.

Furthermore, aside from economic growth, there is also the issue of human security. Democracy gives political power to the vulnerable by making the rulers accountable for their mistakes. The fact that no major famine has ever occurred in a democratic country with a relatively free media merely illustrates the most elementary aspect of this protective power. Indeed, democracy’s contribution to human security extends far beyond famine prevention. The poor in booming South Korea or Indonesia may not have given much thought to democracy when the economic fortunes of all seemed to go up and up together in the 1980s and early 1990s, but when the economic crises came in 1997 (and divided they fell), democracy and political and civil rights were desperately missed by those whose economic means and lives were unusually battered. Democracy has become a central issue in these countries now, as it also has in many other countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

But what about the specific comparison of China and India? Certainly, China has outperformed India in many respects, not just in recent economic growth, but also through its commitment to basic education and health care for all, in which Maoist China made an early start. Even though China had the largest famine in history during 1958 to 1961 – a famine linked directly to the government’s refusal to correct its course for more than three years, a refusal that could not have persisted in any functioning multiparty democracy – it did eventually pull out of that terrible crisis. By the time the economic reforms were introduced in China in 1979, China had a lead of thirteen or fourteen years over India in longevity. The Chinese life expectancy – at least sixty-seven or sixty-eight years by 1979 – was almost a decade and a half longer than India’s puny figure of fifty-four years.

Then came the economic reforms of 1979, with the Chinese economy surging ahead and growing much faster than India's more modest performance. However, despite China's much faster economic growth, since 1979 the rate of expansion of life expectancy in India has been about three times as fast, on average, as that in China. China's life expectancy, which is now just about seventy years, compares with India's figure of sixty-three years, so that the life-expectancy gap in favor of China, which was thirteen or fourteen years in 1979 when the Chinese reforms were first implemented, has now been halved to only seven years.

Indeed, China's life expectancy of seventy years is lower than that in parts of India. It is particularly instructive to look at the Indian state of Kerala – home to thirty million people – which is particularly distinguished in combining Indian-style multiparty democracy with the kind of social intervention of which pre-reform China was perhaps the world leader. At the time of the economic reforms in 1979, when China had a life expectancy of about sixty-seven years or so, Kerala had a similar figure. By now, however, Kerala's life expectancy, estimated to be around seventy-five years, is substantially higher than China's seventy. Going further, if we look at specific points of vulnerability, the infant-mortality rate in China has declined extremely slowly since the economic reforms, whereas it has continued to fall very sharply in Kerala. While Kerala had roughly the same infant-mortality rate as China – thirty-seven per thousand – at the time of the Chinese reforms in 1979, Kerala's present rate of ten per thousand is a third of China's thirty per thousand (where it has stagnated over the last decade).

There is clearly some problem with the “reach” of the benefits of the Chinese economic reforms. First, the reforms led to the eschewal of free public health insurance, so now individuals had to pay for private health insurance (except when provided by the employer, which happens only in a small minority of cases). This retrograde movement in the coverage of health care received little public resistance – as it undoubtedly would have met in any multiparty democracy.

Second, democracy also makes a direct contribution to health care by bringing social failures into public scrutiny. India's health services are quite terrible – I have discussed elsewhere how defective they are, and only two months ago in December 2003 I had the dubious privilege of presenting in a news interview in Calcutta the depressing findings of the first health report of the Pratiche Trust (a trust I was privileged to set up with the help of the Nobel money that came my way some years ago).

But the possibility of such intense criticism is also a social opportunity to make amends. In fact, the persistent reporting of the deficiencies of Indian health services is, ultimately, a source of India's dynamic strength, reflected in the sharp reduction in the China-India gap in life expectancy and the broadening of the gap (in the opposite direction) between China and Kerala. Kerala has been helped by the combination of the benefits of a vigorous democracy with those of a social and political commitment rather similar to what had put China ahead of India in the first place.

I end with a final remark on the relevance of democracy at the global level. The point is of-

ten made, with evident justice, that it is impossible to have, in the foreseeable future, a democratic global state. This is indeed so, and yet if democracy is seen in terms of public reasoning, that need not put the issue of global democracy in indefinite cold storage. Many institutions have a role here, including of course the United Nations, but there is also the committed work of citizens' organizations, of many NGOs, and of independent parts of the news media.

There is also an important role for the initiative taken by a great many activist individuals. Washington and London may be irritated by the widely dispersed criticism of the Coalition strategy in Iraq, just as Paris or Tokyo or Chicago may be appalled by the spectacular vilification of global business in parts of the so-called anti-globalization protests (which is perhaps the most globalized movement in the world today). The points that the protesters make are not invariably sensible, but many of them ask very relevant questions and thus contribute constructively to public reasoning.

This is part of the way global democracy is already being pursued, without waiting for the global state. The challenge today is the strengthening of that participatory process. It is not a negligible cause. Nor is it culturally parochial. ■

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1. Amartya Sen and Thomas Scanlon
2. Daniel Bell and Zeph Stewart (both, Harvard University)



NASA: HST image of SN1994D. Figure courtesy of NASA.

Are There Limits To Our Cosmic Arrogance?

Michael S. Turner

This essay is based on Michael Turner's presentation that was given at the Academy's Midwest Center's Stated Meeting, held at the Adler Planetarium in Chicago on November 1, 2003.

Michael S. Turner, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1996, is the Rauner Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago and Assistant Director for Mathematical and Physical Sciences at the National Science Foundation.

From Quark Soup to the Expanding Universe

Cosmologists are arrogant. They believe they can determine how the universe began and how it has evolved thus far. They also aspire to understand its ultimate destiny. As a cosmologist, I must defend this arrogance. Without it, we would have never undertaken the seemingly impossible task of trying to figure out the universe – fourteen billion years of history (thus far) stretched across a trillion trillion kilome-

ters of observable space. And, as if that were not enough, we have to do this sitting on a tiny rock, which orbits a very ordinary star within a slightly above average galaxy.

The past century's cosmologists have much to fuel their arrogance. The hot big bang theory charts the evolution of the universe from the hot, formless, quark soup that existed earlier than 0.00001 seconds, to the universe we see fourteen billion years later, one comprised of hundreds of billions of galaxies. The grand adventure began in the 1920s when Edwin Powell Hubble established that galaxies are the building blocks of the universe and discovered that all the galaxies visible in the sky (in Hubble's time, only a few hundred) are moving away from our own Milky Way. Einstein's theory of gravity provided the theoretical foundation:

space and time are flexible, and Hubble's observations are a manifestation of an expansion of space that moves galaxies away from one another.

Since then, cosmologists have imaged hundreds of millions of galaxies and mapped the large-scale features of the universe, including great clusters of galaxies, superclusters of clusters, giant voids (great regions of space populated with very few galaxies), and great walls (sheets comprised of tens of thousands of galaxies). The Hubble Space Telescope has revealed the birth of galaxies (figure 1); the Chandra X-ray Observatory has glimpsed billion-solar-mass black holes that formed less than a billion years after the beginning; and microwave telescopes have imaged the universe as it was when it was only four hundred thousand years old and atoms were forming (figure 2).

Still, cosmologists are not satisfied. We aspire to trace our cosmic origins back to before the quark soup – to the subatomic quantum fluctuations that we think seeded the galaxies, clusters of galaxies, and even larger structures. We want to understand the nature of the mysterious dark matter that holds the universe together, and of the dark energy that is causing its expansion to speed up. With ideas as bold as was Einstein's relativity theory ninety years ago, and new, more powerful instruments made possible by great technological advances, the flyboys of today's science speak of a golden age in cosmology – and it is hard to argue with us!

Inner Space/Outer Space Connections

The key idea powering the current cosmological revolution is the deep connection that exists between the inner space of the elementary particles and the outer space of the cosmos. These connections go well beyond the fact that the infant universe was a soup of elementary particles, and they are well illustrated by the guiding paradigm of cosmology today, "Inflation + Cold Dark Matter." This theory holds that "our universe" was created in a burst of expansion (called cosmic inflation) powered by "false-vacuum" energy. Because of that explosive growth spurt, all that we can and will ever be able to see originated from the tiniest bit of the pre-inflationary landscape. This explains why the universe we observe is so uniform (on the large scale, it looks the same everywhere and in all directions), and predicts space is uncurved, or is "flat" (Einstein's theory allows for space to be curved; the inflationary burst flattens any spatial curvature).

Cosmologists are arrogant. They believe they can determine how the universe began and how it has evolved thus far. They also aspire to understand its ultimate destiny. As a cosmologist, I must defend this arrogance.

This burst of expansion was our big bang event, and the demise of the false-vacuum energy that caused it was the origin of the heat of the big bang (seen today in the cosmic microwaves that fill space) and ultimately all forms of matter and energy within it. If inflation occurred once, there is every reason to believe that it has occurred an infinite number of times in the past and will continue with this frequency in the future. Inflation sidesteps the issue of “The Beginning,” changes “The Big Bang” into countless “big bangs,” and leads to a universe that is actually a multiverse comprised of countless bubble universes.

The Cold Dark Matter part of the theory purports that the matter holding our universe together is not the star stuff that we are made of, but rather slowly moving elementary particles (called Cold Dark Matter) left over from the earliest fiery moments (see figure 3). Owing to quantum fluctuations on subatomic scales blown up to astronomical size during inflation, the Cold Dark Matter is not uniformly distributed; it is a little lumpy (with variations in the density of around 1 part in 100,000). Gravity acting over the past fourteen billion years has turned this lumpiness into all the cosmic structure that we see today. The gravity of the Cold Dark Matter particles provides the cosmic infrastructure that holds together galaxies including our own Milky Way, the great clusters of galaxies and superclusters. The atomic matter within galaxies further condenses and forms the stars that light up these objects.

Evidence for an Inflationary Beginning

The first solid evidence supporting this remarkable picture came in 1998. Measurements of the tiny variations in the intensity of the cosmic microwave background radiation across the sky indicated that the universe is flat, as predicted by inflation. The detailed pattern of these tiny




Figure 1: The HST Ultra Deep Field. In this small patch of the sky (one ten millionth of the entire sky), imaged by the Hubble Space Telescope for almost two weeks, there are ten thousand galaxies. The light from most of the galaxies originated when the universe was a few billion years old or less. This is as far as one can see because one is looking back to the time when galaxies were just forming. Figure courtesy of NASA.




Figure 2: A several hundred square-degree patch of the microwave sky imaged by the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP). The tiny variations in microwave intensity (parts in 100,000) are displayed as color variations and indicate the slightly lumpy distribution of Cold Dark Matter four hundred thousand years after the beginning. According to inflation theory, these variations arose from quantum fluctuations during inflation, and thus, this WMAP image is a picture of subatomic quantum fuzziness blown up and projected across the sky by enormous expansion during inflation. Figure courtesy of WMAP and NASA.

MOOSE DIAGRAM of DARK MATTER CANDIDATES



Figure 3: List of particle candidates for the dark matter. Some of the dark matter (1 percent of the critical density or less) is now known to be made of neutrinos; the bulk is believed to be made of an as of yet undiscovered elementary particle, with the axion and the neutralino being the leading candidates.

COSMIC STUFF

0-5% STARS + 33% DARK MATTER + 66% WEIRD ENERGY



Figure 4: The composition of our critical density, flat universe. Less than 1 percent exists in the form of stars, 4 percent in atoms, 30 percent in Cold Dark Matter, and 66 percent in weird dark energy. The bulk of matter and energy are in as of yet unidentified forms of matter and energy. While the photons in the CMB (Cosmic Microwave Background) contribute much less than 1 percent of the total, they are an invaluable relic today, and at an early time provided the bulk of the mass/energy density.

variations was consistent with a quantum origin of the lumpiness. Further, the “missing energy” needed to bring the total mass/energy density to the critical value was found: a flat universe must have the critical density, and matter only accounts for 30 percent. Evidence for the other 70 percent came in the unexpected discovery of “cosmic speed up.”

For seventy years cosmologists tried to measure the gravitational slowing of the expansion; when they finally succeeded they found that the universe is actually speeding up. This odd twist was good news for inflation, because the speed up implies the existence of a weird form of dark energy that contributes 70 percent of the critical density and whose gravity is repulsive. When added to the 30 percent known to exist in matter, this totals 100 percent (see figure 4). Now we just have to figure out exactly what the dark energy is – but, of course, we are confident that we will.

A host of evidence since – from the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe’s (WMAP) recent measurements of the cosmic microwave background to the mapping of structure in the universe by the Sloan Digital Sky Survey – has further strengthened the case for Inflation + Cold Dark Matter. But this is just the tip of the cosmic iceberg. A veritable avalanche of cosmological data will definitively test this para-

digm: a higher resolution map of the cosmic microwave background from experiments at the South Pole to the new Planck satellite; and measurements of the expansion rate by a variety of techniques to get at the dark energy. In the laboratory, some will attempt to directly detect the Cold Dark Matter particles that hold our own galaxy together, and others will try to create them with powerful particle accelerators at Fermilab and CERN. The James Webb Space Telescope, successor to HST, will take us deeper into space and further back in time to view the first stars.

The End of Cosmology?

There is much work to be done, and many questions still to be answered. But will proving that Inflation + Cold Dark Matter is correct finally satisfy cosmologists and lead to the end of cosmology? Arrogance is pretty powerful stuff, so probably not. But are there limits to how much we can learn about the universe? There are the obvious worries – money and public interest in spending for an activity with no practical application, for instance. I doubt these factors will set the limit, however. Curiosity about the beginning has been and always will be unlimited.

A more serious worry is that cosmology is an archaeological science. Since experiments as

grand as creating a universe cannot be carried out, we must rely upon relics, such as the cosmic microwave echo, the lightest elements in the periodic table that were cooked in the big bang, and both forms of matter, atoms and dark matter. I cannot resist mentioning that the father of inflation theory, MIT’s Alan Guth, undertook a serious study of how to create a universe in the laboratory and concluded that it is possible. Need I say more about arrogance? Maybe our bubble universe is a freshman physics lab experiment in another universe gone awry. It is certainly possible that we will run out of relics before our curiosity is satisfied, but I am too optimistic to believe that this will be our demise.

The most interesting obstacles are more fundamental. A key feature of inflation – that it makes the present state of the universe insensitive to how it began – throws up a kind of screen that blocks knowledge of earlier times. Further, inflation multiplies the possibilities and exponentially increases the territory to be explored. With an infinite number of inflationary bubbles that will never communicate with one another, even complete knowledge of our universe amounts to infinitesimal knowledge of the whole. If the Copernican principle, the guiding principle in cosmology for the past four hundred years, is correct, then this is not an obstacle in practice. (The Copernican princi-

I am bullish on cosmology. During the next two decades there will be exciting developments, new surprises, and great advances in our understanding of the universe.

ple, sometimes known as the principle of cosmic mediocrity, holds that we occupy a typical place in the cosmos.)

However, in a universe of infinite possibilities, even the extremely improbable happens. It could be that our bubble universe is very atypical. For example, it may be that the typical bubble never evolves living creatures. If this is the case, then our view of the universe depends critically upon our existence. While a handful of cosmologists have long advocated the anti-

Copernican or anthropic principle – namely, that the laws of physics and the universe itself are the way they are so life could evolve and become aware of them – few took this view seriously. I am not a fan of the anthropic principle (which I like to call the narcissistic principle), because it strikes me as giving up on a hard problem by looking in the back of the book for the answer. Inflation, however, makes us take a more serious and more scientific look.

According to string theory (the most promising attempt to unify all the forces and particles of nature), while there are universal laws of physics, there can be different realizations of these laws (local bylaws) within individual bubbles. The variations can be quite profound and include the number of spatial dimensions, whether or not matter is stable, and other factors that determine whether or not life will develop. Further, even within identical bubbles, historical accidents could make

the difference between a barren universe and one teeming with life. It might be that an extremely improbable event shortly after inflation led to a future that is conducive to life. If anthropocentric considerations and not simply the laws of physics have determined the character of the bubble in which we find ourselves, there may truly be a fundamental limit to what we can infer about the universe as a whole.

Fundamental limits or not, I am bullish on cosmology. During the next two decades there will be exciting developments, new surprises, and great advances in our understanding of the universe. Still, the question remains, are the limits to our understanding of the universe set by our own creativity and boldness? Or are there fundamental limits to our understanding? ■

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In Memory of Robert K. Merton

Robert C. Merton and Robert M. Solow

This presentation was given at the 1876th Stated Meeting, held at the House of the Academy on November 12, 2003.

Robert C. Merton is John and Natty McArthur University Professor at Harvard Business School. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 1986.

Robert M. Solow, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1956, is Institute Professor, Emeritus, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Robert C. Merton

Robert K. Merton was my father for nearly six decades – and he was my best friend for the last four. In the early years we talked on the phone at least once nearly every day. Later, when email came, he mastered it before I did – it relaxed the constraint in his being a lark and me an owl, so

our interchanges multiplied. We also edited each other's papers, although both relative need and skill ensured that I could never produce anything like the amount of red ink on his papers that he put on mine. I know that, over the years, many of you came to know what I mean about that red ink.

We would sit by the fire in East Hampton in his last ten or fifteen years and talk for hours. When I got that early morning phone call in October of '97 saying, "We have something interesting to tell you," it was RKM (I never called my father RKM but the initials did come in handy in talking about him to others) who got the next phone call from me. At the Nobel banquet in Stockholm there is a center table for the laure-

ates and their significant others, and I chose him as my significant other. In the last ten years he took pleasure in signing his letters "Father of the Economist." I tried to reciprocate using "Son of the Sociologist" – but it didn't start out that way.

When I was a child, my father was surely there and he taught me many important things, not least about the stock market, poker, and magic. Only the magic didn't stick – I didn't have the discipline. As a teenager, I had very little interest in the intellectual or academic life. I was interested in cars. I started building hot rods, if you can believe it, and racing them. It seemed I did almost everything that took me as far away as possible from what he did. As we began to discuss college, I said, "I think the General Motors Technical Institute would be good." That didn't happen, but neither did I apply to Harvard – I wouldn't have gotten in if I had. I went to Columbia Engineering School and majored in engineering mathematics, but my plan was still to be an auto engineer, which was a small move away from becoming a mechanic. I should mention that during my sophomore year at Columbia I took a required course in English, and I wrote what was to become my first published paper, entitled "The 'Motionless Motion' of Swift's Flying Island." When I turned it in to my English instructor, for whom to that point I had done D work, he said, "Well, this has some possibilities for us; maybe we can get it published." Fortunately, I had a father who knew something about such matters. So I asked for his advice and eventually told the instructor, "No, I think it would be just fine if I wrote the paper alone." So, I have a D in English on my transcript, but I also have a paper published in the *Journal of the History of Ideas*.

After a few summers working for the Ford Motor Company, I decided perhaps academia might not be such a bad choice and so, some thirty-five years ago, I went off to Caltech to do a Ph.D. in applied math. After finishing all my courses and passing my qualifiers at Caltech, I was all set to do my thesis when I began to wonder whether water waves in a tank or plasma physics was right for me. Perhaps it was the fact that I used to get up every morning and go down to a local brokerage house for the 9:30 a.m. opening of the New York Stock Exchange – 6:30 a.m. my time. I would trade all kinds of securities – stocks, convertible bonds, warrants, and options – and then go off to class. One day, I came upon a very bad book on mathematical economics; it was so bad that I said to myself, "I can do better." If I had seen a book by Bob Solow or Ken Arrow, I might still be doing fluid mechanics, but instead I

My research is very mathematical, very quantitative, and seemingly very far away from what my father did. Nevertheless I found myself using many of his ideas.

decided to switch to economics – a move that everyone thought was crazy, except my father who was smiling. You can see where this is heading: I was now in academe and, furthermore, into one of the social sciences.

My research is very mathematical, very quantitative, and seemingly very far away from what my father did. Nevertheless I found myself using many of his ideas. I will list a few examples. There is the concept of *post-factum* interpretation after the observation to provide an explanation, which he paid a lot of attention to and was pretty derisive about. Of course, in economics, *post-factum* interpretations are made daily: read *The Wall Street Journal* today and you can learn exactly why the market did what it did yesterday. *Post-factum* applies even more materially to measuring the performance of money managers, and in that regard it is not a trivial matter.

The next one on the list, the self-fulfilling prophecy, or *SFP* as he called it: Some economists have speculated that the option pricing model that Fischer Black, Myron Scholes, and I derived might not have been descriptive of market pricing before its public release, but if enough people believed in it, maybe prices adjusted so the model became accurate afterwards.

Then there was RKM's concept of manifest and latent functions, well cited in my early papers but even more so in my later work applying functional analysis to better understand financial innovation and institutional change. Consider a speculative market, say the stock market. Its manifest function is to permit transactions that allow firms to raise funds by issuing shares that investors can buy and trade amongst each other. So if you were never going to do any transactions in the market, why then would you have any interest in it? One answer is that the market gives you information. Managers who might never issue equity in their firms nevertheless need to look to the market for information to help them make effective decisions about the firm's investments – thus providing information is an important latent function of speculative markets.

Still another one of RKM's formulations, the concept of unanticipated and unintended consequences of social actions, came into my work when I was analyzing the implications of the U.S. government providing guarantees for corporate pensions. In the last decade I've focused on developing the so-called functional perspective in finance to examine the evolving financial system. This perspective uses financial functions instead of institutions as "anchors," or framing elements of the system – thus freeing us to think about the dynamics of change in economic institutions as an endogenous process. You can imagine the discussions I had with my father about that. So I find myself very, very close to precisely where I was trying not to be at the start, more than four decades ago – and darn happy about it!

Now, apart from our endless talks, my father and I did actually work together: in 1981 we had a draft of a theory including a mathematical model on problem choice and the functions and dysfunctions of priority in the reward system in science. Although subsequently both of us became very involved in our other separate research projects, we continued to work together to expand on the ideas and potential applications. In fact, in 1989, our joint paper was going to be the lead article in *Rationality and Society*, the journal that James Coleman had just started, but my father did what he had done more than once before. As it was about to go to press he said, "No, it's not quite good enough." Fifteen years later, it's still not good enough, but I'm going to try to make it right. In the fall of 2002, my father published his last book, *The Travels and Adventures of Serendipity* (coauthored with Elinor Barber), which actually originated in the 1950s. So, in terms of his holding back and delaying publication, our joint project is nowhere close to the record.

In sum, try as I could to do otherwise, I ended up not at all far from my father. He was indeed a role model in the deepest sense of that term. He was so aware and so active and so intellectually productive up to the end of his life – and that's a heck of a role model to have going forward.

I am really delighted that this meeting is taking place here. This was a very important institution in my father's life, and I had the great good fortune to join the Academy and be a part of it while he was too. Indeed, we had several such shared connections, including membership in the National Academy, and we were the only father and son ever to hold honorary degrees from the University of Chicago.

I cannot end my remarks without noting another collaboration that never occurred – the one in which the two of us coauthor a piece with Robert Merton Solow. My father said to me, "We simply must do a joint piece with Bob." And I immediately reacted, "That's great . . . let's do it! I surely wouldn't mind being sandwiched between the two of you." He elaborated, "Of course, there can be only one way to order the authors – Robert Merton Solow and Robert Merton Duo."

Robert M. Solow

I am not a sociologist, as you know, nor have I ever taught at Columbia University. So far as I can recall, in fact, I have never been formally or institutionally associated with Bob Merton, senior. There is, however, one thread of connection between Robert K. Merton and Robert Merton Solow that goes back more than sixty years – to January 11, 1942, to be precise. (There is someone here this evening who goes back even further: Ruth Smullin, the wife of my MIT colleague Louis Smullin, was Merton's tutee as a Radcliffe student in 1938.)

If you look at the bibliography in the 1970 reprint of Merton's 1938 classic *Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England*, you will find a reference to a paper by one Robert Solow entitled, of course, "Merton's *Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England*." The paper is dated January 11, 1942. On January 11, 1942, I was a sophomore at Harvard College, a little less than seventeen and a half years old. I had been taking Talcott Parsons's course on the sociology of science, and had turned in my term paper on time. Parsons gave it an A and sent it on to Merton. With his usual grace, Bob Merton read it, entered it in his bibliography, and found it unnecessary to comment on it. I live in hope that the paper is irretrievably lost or destroyed. I am afraid I can imagine what it was like. I didn't get to know Merton personally until much later.

There is no mystery in the fact that he was unappeasably attracted to all kinds of ideas, especially ideas about social institutions, but really about anything. What is more mysterious is that somehow ideas were attracted to him, as if he were some kind of intellectual flypaper. If we took any six of us here and put us in a room with Bob Merton and released an idea somewhere near the chandelier, the odds are two to one that it would flutter down and come to rest on Merton. You realize what that means: the random idea had a two-thirds probability of finding its way to Merton and a probability of

just one-eighteenth of coming to rest on one of us. And we are intelligent, idea-friendly people or we wouldn't be here. He must have emitted some pheromone-like come-on.

It struck me that the obviously right way for me to pay tribute to my friend – and everybody's mentor – is to stick to ideas. So I reread one of Bob Merton's most celebrated papers, and I propose to describe it and discuss it now. The paper I have in mind is "On Sociological Theories of the Middle Range." I chose it partly for selfish reasons: I think of myself as an economic theorist of the middle range, so I am curious about parallels and differences between the disciplines.

Merton tells us that this essay expands some comments he had made on a paper read by Talcott Parsons at the 1947 meeting of the American Sociological Society. Merton's essay can be read as a sort of declaration of independence from his teacher and friend, because Parsons was then the leading advocate and exemplar of the tendency in social theory that Merton was opposing. He says that serious work in sociology ranges from single, isolated empirical studies of particular situations with little or no potential for generalization or even for interconnection, all the way to grand, all-inclusive systems of sociological theory. He thinks that the best prospects for progress in sociology lie in theories of the middle range: "theories that lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social behavior, social organization and social change." And later: "Middle-range theories consist of limited sets of assumptions from which specific hypotheses are logically derived and confirmed by empirical investigation . . . These theories do not remain separate but are consolidated into wider networks of theory."

Merton offers, as sociological examples of the middle range, the theory of reference groups, the theory of social mobility, of role conflict, and of the formation of social norms; and he thinks of these as analogous to such classical instances as a theory of prices, a germ theory of disease, or a kinetic theory of gases.

A difficult question arises about the relation of middle-range theories to total systems of sociological theory, like those associated with such names as – I have to quote this – "Marx and Spencer, Simmel, Sorokin and Parsons." (It was certainly not lost on Merton when he wrote down that passage that neither Karl Marx nor Herbert Spencer had even a microscopic sense

of humor.) It is clear that Merton does not think it is fruitful to start by deducing middle-range theories from such comprehensive theoretical systems. In the first place, all those grand theories in sociology are more like "theoretical orientations" than they are like tight, rigorous theories. So it may not be possible to get from some grand theory to a particular middle-range theory. Merton points out explicitly that a successful middle-range theory may be logically compatible with more than one grand theory. I don't remember that he says so explicitly, but it seems to me that, in sociology, one grand theory may be compatible with more than

There is no mystery in the fact that he was unappeasably attracted to all kinds of ideas What is more mysterious is that somehow ideas were attracted to him, as if he were some kind of intellectual flypaper.

one middle-range theory aimed at the same group of observable facts. But it is pretty clearly Merton's view that if a successful – that means empirically successful – middle-range theory is incompatible with some overarching system, so much the worse for that grand system.

It is very important for him that middle-range theories have the potential to interconnect with one another and form networks of related hypotheses that can give rise to broader generalizations; but the examples of this that he mentions, without developing them, seem to involve fairly small increments in generality. It is not clear to me whether Merton harbored the thought that very general social theory could be built from the bottom up by this process of accretion. But he made no bones about where he thought the opportunities for productive work in sociology and social theory were to be found – and my experience in economics leads me to believe that he was right.

Not every sociologist agreed with him. The paper gives some examples of polarized arguments pro and con the middle range. I am not knowledgeable enough about what went on before and after to try for a balanced interpretation. But I will say that Merton's discussion of the controversy is distinguished by sanity,

and that comes as no surprise. He cannot have had a monopoly on sanity, but he had a healthy market share; it was clearly his natural temperament.

I want to illustrate this discussion of the interconnection issue by an anecdote. Bob Merton was not a participant, but I dearly wish he had been. To begin with, in the course of the middle-range essay he mentions that Durkheim's *Suicide* is his nominee for the Academy Award for middle-range theory, with Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* maybe a close second. (The Academy Award locution is mine, not his. Like many of you, I have read both books, but missed the movie versions.)

Now the story continues. Back in 1957 – 1958, by chance, Talcott Parsons, David Landes, and I were all fellows at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Palo Alto. One afternoon, Landes was giving the weekly seminar. He had (serendipitously) come upon a treasure trove of personal letters written by members of some entrepreneurial textile-manufacturing families in the cities of Roubaix and Turcoing in northern France. The letters included hortatory messages from fathers and uncles to sons and nephews. These people were all pious, unquestioning Catholics. But the messages they were transmitting and the advice they were giving sounded exactly as if they had been lifted from Weber's Calvinists.

So what is then to be made of the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism? Could Weber's middle-range theory have been wrong? It was in Bob Merton's mind that one of the great advantages of middle-range theories is that they could be wrong and you could show them to be wrong. Talcott Parsons, who sort of owned Max Weber in those days, would not allow the possibility of error. Weber hadn't actually meant Protestantism, but maybe just some appropriate religious orientation, or even some ethically sanctioned canons of behavior that could in principle originate outside of formal religion altogether.

What would Merton have said had he been there? I think he might have said: "OK, so it's not exactly Protestantism, and Weber erred. But there is a research project here. Where, across time and space, have there arisen similar ethical injunctions to achieve demonstrated goodness by worldly success? And where have they been broadly accepted? And what do those instances have in common? Are there other well-documented middle-range theories that bear obliquely on this sort of thing?" This would, of course, have been put elegantly, and with a reminder that to proceed in that direc-

tion would be to stand on the shoulders of Max Weber rather than to sit at his feet.

The spirit of Merton's stern but reasonable essay went down so smoothly with me that I naturally began to think about its relevance for economics. It seems to me that there are two characteristics of economics as a discipline that matter in this respect. The first is that the very objects that economic theorists think about are very narrowly defined: economic theory is about explaining and understanding prices and quantities of goods and services. If what you are saying is not at least indirectly about prices and quantities, then you are not talking about economics. I don't want to ask whether this restriction is somehow inevitable, or whether there could be a recognizable economics that was about something else. The fact is that prices and quantities are what essentially all economics is about.

This fact – historical or logical or accidental – creates two contrasts with sociology. The first is that it limits drastically one's freedom to create grand theories in economics. Grand theories often differ from other ones because they change the subject, they introduce wholly new, or apparently new, concepts. If it all has to come down to the price of orange juice in the end, you can try to go at the problem differently, but not too differently.

The other contrast is that prices and quantities are numerical. There is no getting away from the fact that economics has to be quantitative. I don't think that the use of mathematics is all-important, though it certainly matters for the day-to-day business of working economists. It is fundamentally the more-or-lessness that focuses economists on the middle range.

Merton had thought about this too. He speaks of the virtue of "bring[ing] out into the open the array of assumptions, concepts, and basic propositions employed in a sociological analysis. They thus reduce the inadvertent tendency to hide the hard core of analysis behind a veil of random, though possibly illuminating comments and thoughts. . . . [S]ociology still has few formulae – that is, highly abbreviated symbolic expressions of relationships between sociological variables. Consequently, sociological interpretations tend to be discursive. The logic of procedure, the key concepts, and the relationships between them often become lost in an avalanche of words." He suggests that one of the important functions of mathematical symbols is to provide for the simultaneous inspection of all terms entering an analysis.

By the time I knew him, his breadth of knowledge and depth of penetration were lightly covered over by good nature. But no one after five minutes would have mistaken him for a harmless old codger.

All this has led to a situation in economics that would have amused Bob Merton. I think it has to do with the focusing role of prices and quantities. Only one overarching system, or paradigm, survives: it is what is uninformatively and vaguely called "neoclassical economics." As an inclusive theory it has serious problems of its own. Generally, however, even important subversive movements seem rather to modify it but not to replace it, although some of its characteristic conclusions have to be given up. I will mention two outstanding examples: Keynesian economics gives up on the assumption that prices and wages move flexibly and quickly to equate supply and demand for labor and goods; this is a big deal, but leaves the basic paradigm still quite recognizable. Secondly, so-called behavioral economics wants to give up, in some circumstances, the clearly over-simple assumption that economic decision making is governed exclusively by greed and rationality. It is not so clear what to put in its place, however. Recent research on the role of reciprocity in economic behavior would have fascinated Merton; he would also have noticed that this is middle-range theory of the best kind. In any case, the findings of behavioral economics would change some of the implications of the paradigm, but not fundamentally its basic outline.

Is this resiliency a good thing? Too much resiliency eases over into flabbiness. I didn't like it much when Parsons tried to defend Weber against Landes's observations. But that was a middle-range theory, not a "paradigm." A middle-range theory is supposed to live or die by its empirical bite. Neoclassical economics is, in Merton's phrase, a "theoretical orientation." This is another case where I can imagine my half of a conversation with Merton, but I am not so sure about his.

All that is interesting but not amusing. What would have brought a smile to Bob Merton's

face is the fact that defenders of the pure, unadulterated neoclassical system have found themselves forced by the threat of Keynesian subversion to reduce the all-inclusive system to a single middle-range sort of model and then try applying this to the data of everyday macroeconomic life, where it has, on the whole, had no real success. Merton, thou shouldst be with us at this hour.

I hope I have said enough to show you that intellectual engagement with Bob Merton was always an exhilarating experience for a social scientist, even for an economist. He was right about the useful scope for social theory, and he had an unerring eye for intellectual puffery and pomposity. Sadly for me, I only got to know him well in his later years; and this leaves me uncertain about what he was like in his forties and fifties, at Columbia and, with Paul Lazarsfeld, at the Bureau of Applied Social Research.

I had intended to leave aside the celebrated *On the Shoulders of Giants* and the soon-to-be-celebrated *Travels and Adventures of Serendipity*. After all, they are just books about the origins of particular words and phrases and how they acquire and change their meanings as they are transmitted from person to person and place to place and time to time. But I decided at the last minute that I couldn't just forget them: those books say too much about the Merton I knew.

They are, of course, a lesson in how to wear learning gracefully. Maybe it is a lesson we don't need, because so few of us have that much learning to wear. They also demonstrate a much more complex quality. They tell their story. Then they think about the social relations of the people who populate and carry the story, mostly scientists and other intellectuals. Then they reflect on the act of doing the sociology of science and the sociology of knowledge. And then somehow they take an unbemused but tolerant view of the whole act of writing the book. There may be further layers that I am not clever enough to detect. One does first think of Tristram Shandy. But Sterne is artless compared with Merton. No, that's not fair: Merton knew about Tristram Shandy, stood on his shoulders.

What I wonder about in particular is how much of the later Merton persona was already visible in those earlier years. By the time I knew him, his breadth of knowledge and depth of penetration were lightly covered over by good nature. But no one after five minutes would have mistaken him for a harmless old codger. He was in fact the embodiment in the intellectual sphere of Muhammad Ali's description of his

own style: Float like a butterfly, sting like a bee. I believe firmly that anything worth doing is worth doing light-heartedly; and I could point to Bob Merton as an adequate demonstration.

I said that I had never been formally associated with him. That is true. But I did overlap with his wife Harriet for some years on the board of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. Sharing breakfasts with Bob and Harriet in the hotel dining room before those meetings taught me what I wanted to be when I grew up. I don't even care that I never made

it. He used to say that he would sometime like to write a joint paper with his son Bob and with me. He wasn't sure about the topic, but it should be signed Robert Merton Duo and Robert Merton Solow. Two thirds of the authorship of that unwritten paper are here, but the best third is missing. ■

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1. Robert C. Merton and Robert M. Solow



2

2. Harriet Zuckerman (Andrew W. Mellon Foundation) and Academy President Patricia Meyer Spacks



3

3. Barbara Rosenkrantz (Harvard University) and Werner Sollors (Harvard University)



4

4. Victor Brudney (Harvard Law School), Patricia Albjerg Graham (Harvard University), and Loren Graham (MIT)



5

5. Visiting Scholars Jonathan Hansen and Adam Webb



Photograph courtesy of *The Post-Crescent*.

Senator Joseph McCarthy (on the right) and Army counsel Joseph Welch (on the left) say it with gestures during the celebrated Army-McCarthy hearings in Washington in June 1954.

“Have You No Sense of Decency?” McCarthyism 50 Years Later

Nathan Glazer, Anthony Lewis, and Sam Tanenhaus

This presentation was given at a symposium held at the House of the Academy on January 26, 2004.

Nathan Glazer, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1969, is Professor Emeritus of Sociology and Education at Harvard University.

Anthony Lewis was a columnist for The New York Times from 1969 to 2001. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 1991.

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Nathan Glazer

It seems a fiftieth anniversary – and it was just fifty years ago that the enormous power that Senator Joseph McCarthy had accumulated began to unravel – is a good time for evaluating what the phenomenon that we label with his name meant for the United States, and what its long-range consequences have been. We have this year a new large book by Ted Morgan, *Reds*:

McCarthyism in Twentieth-Century America; a new biography of Elizabeth Bentley by Lauren Kessler, *Clever Girl: Elizabeth Bentley, The Spy Who Ushered in the McCarthy Era*; a book by Thomas Doherty on the role of television in McCarthyism, *Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American Culture*; and undoubtedly there are a few more new titles on the topic that I haven't noticed. It seems we have come to agreement on at least one aspect of McCarthyism – yes, there *were* Americans who spied for the Soviets, some in fairly high places. But I don't think there is yet any agreement on the significance of the phenomenon of McCarthyism. And that is one reason we are holding this meeting.

Fifty years ago today Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin was at the very height of the remarkable power he had created for himself. It was generally known to the journalists who covered him that he was indifferent to the truth, that his charges of Communist affiliation

harmed people, that he was a bully, a womanizer, and a heavy drinker who had been involved in various shady efforts to make money since he had become a senator in 1946. But even the popular president of the United States, Eisenhower, who despised him, did not think it wise to take him on directly. McCarthy had become a unique figure in American public life. He had been launched into a prominence he knew how to exploit by his charges that the Truman administration harbored Communists in the State Department and elsewhere, despite the security program Truman had instituted. Many right-wing Republicans were saying the same thing, but none with the same ability to arouse a Communist-fearing and obsessed American public, nor with the same skill in making use of the press. The reporters had to report what a prominent and controversial senator said, but unfortunately their efforts to find out if there was any substance in what he charged lagged far behind the damning charges themselves.

McCarthy had among others denounced George Marshall, Eisenhower's respected patron, secretary of defense under Truman, in a sixty-thousand-word speech, which he had published as a book. This was only one of the things for which Eisenhower could not forgive him. McCarthy, using his typical, ingeniously poisoned turns of speech, asserted he did not know "whether General Marshall was aware he was implementing the will of Stalin . . . If Marshall was merely stupid, the laws of probability would dictate that part of his decisions would serve America's interests. . . I do not think that this monstrous perversion of sound and understandable national policy was accidental." In other words, Marshall was a traitor.

The national media, the major columnists, and the leading newspapers regularly exposed and attacked McCarthy, but with little effect. It was a rare senator who disputed him, and a number of those who did had been defeated in the election of 1952. This was the election that brought Eisenhower to the presidency, the Republicans to a majority in the Senate, and McCarthy to the chairmanship of a formally minor committee, but one from which he could conduct his amazing terrorization of a good part of America's ruling class.

And terrorization it was. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State under Eisenhower, asking a subordinate who had come under attack to resign, said, "Don't you know I went through this kind of thing?" (As a trustee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Dulles had defended Alger Hiss, the president of the Endowment.) "You can't pacify these people. There's no reasoning with these people." (I quote here and elsewhere in this article from David M. Oshinsky, *A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy* [New York: Free Press, 1983], an excellent account of Senator McCarthy's rise and fall.) Leaders of American industry, leading newspaper publishers, friends, and his brother Milton urged Eisenhower to do something. As the board chairman of General Electric wrote to him after a trip to Europe, "People in high and low places see in him a potential Hitler . . . the stature of your administration . . . is impaired in the countries I visited. The impression of abject appeasement should be corrected, not only for general consumption but because I have never seen the morale of State Department people, at home and abroad, so shattered." Walter Lippmann, the influential and statesmanlike columnist, wrote, "McCarthy's influence has grown as the President has appeased him . . . His power will cease to grow and will diminish when he is resisted, and it has been shown to our people that those we look to for leadership and to preserve our

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institutions are not afraid of him." But as Eisenhower said on a number of occasions, "I just will not – I refuse to – get into the gutter with that guy."

Looking at McCarthy's record and impact during the four years of his power, one is tempted to paraphrase the famous line from *Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid*: "Who is this guy?" We cannot imagine anyone today exercising such near universal intimidation.

But fifty years ago the McCarthy phenomenon collapsed within a few months. McCarthy had unwisely appointed Roy Cohn, a young New York lawyer who had been a federal prosecutor in the trials of leaders of the Communist Party and in the Rosenberg trial, as chief counsel for his investigating committee. Cohn's friend G. David Schine – Harvard College, Adams House, and scion of a wealthy family – came along with Cohn to work for the committee. After a highly publicized investigation of the United States Information Agency (USIA) libraries abroad, which helped bring McCarthy to the attention and astonishment of a European public, Cohn began investigating presumed Communists – all of whom were already well known to the Army – who had worked in the Army Signal Corps research facility in New Jersey. Most of them had already been dismissed. Cohn's investigators then ran into the case of Irving Peress, a dentist just recently called to the service. He had been an undergraduate at City College, where he had known Julius Rosenberg and Morton Sobell. This was red meat to McCarthy – an almost or likely Communist in the Army, even if all he did was dentistry!

The Army was in the process of releasing Peress for security reasons. But it was slow and bureaucratic in its procedures, and McCarthy hoped to make something of this. At the same time, G. David Schine had been drafted into the Army, and Cohn was busy harassing top civilian and military figures in the Army to get special treatment for his friend, who, he asserted, was crucial to the committee's investigations. As

so often happens in congressional investigations, the issue of executive privilege arose: could the committee badger officials in the executive branch on just what they had done in the Peress and in other cases? On February 24, the Secretary of the Army, meeting with Senator McCarthy, had caved in and agreed the committee could. On this occasion, *The Times of London* wrote, "Senator McCarthy this afternoon achieved what General Burgoyne and General Cornwallis never achieved – the complete surrender of the American army." Philip Graham, publisher of *The Washington Post*, wrote to Sherman Adams, Eisenhower's chief of staff, "do believe me that if you do not break now with this monster you will become his pawns."

Finally Eisenhower decided action had to be taken. With his approval it was agreed a full record of Cohn's obnoxious efforts to get preference in the Army for Schine should be prepared: Cohn's behavior could be the weak link in McCarthy's armor. On March 11, on orders from the White House, this record of telephone calls and abuse was delivered to all the members of the McCarthy committee. The clear implication was that the motivation for the McCarthy-Army investigations was to put pressure on the Army to release Schine from Army duties. In response, McCarthy released a set of predated memoranda, which clearly had just been prepared, whose theme was that the Army was persecuting Schine to put pressure on McCarthy to back off from his own investigation into the Army's handling of Communists. Someone was lying, and so we come to that familiar place so often reached in great moments of American politics, when the issue becomes not who is right and who is wrong, but who is telling the truth and who is not.

The Army selected a special counsel for the hearings, and so Joseph Welch, of Grinnell College, Harvard Law School, and Hale & Dorr of our own Boston, went to Washington to encounter the phenomenon of a McCarthy hearing.

The hearings were televised and reached an enormous audience. The key moment came on June 9, 1954. Welch had brought an assistant with him – a young lawyer from Hale & Dorr, Fred Fisher, who told him that he had been a member of the National Lawyers Guild, a Communist-dominated lawyers group. Welch sent him back to Boston. But the McCarthy people had already found out (*The New York Times* had already told the story), and Welch was worried. He engineered a deal with Cohn: Welch wouldn't raise the issue of Cohn's own record of evasive maneuvers to avoid the draft, and Cohn would not bring up Fred Fisher.

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But McCarthy couldn't resist: "in view of Mr. Welch's request that the information be given once we know of anyone who might be performing any work for the Communist Party, I think we should tell him that he has in his law firm a young lawyer named Fisher whom he recommended, incidentally, to do work on this committee, who has been for a number of years a member of an organization which was named, oh, years and years ago, as the legal bulwark of the Communist Party . . . I am not asking you at this time why you tried to foist him on this committee . . ." And so on, in vintage McCarthy. Welch had of course not recommended Fisher for work on the committee, and Fisher had left the National Lawyers Guild some years before – but no matter.

Welch was prepared: "Until this moment, Senator, I think I never really gauged your recklessness and cruelty. . . . Little did I dream you could be so reckless and so cruel as to do an injury to that lad. It is true he is still with Hale & Dorr. It is true that he will continue to be with Hale & Dorr. It is, I regret to say, equally true that he shall always bear a scar needlessly inflicted by you. If it were in my power to forgive you for your reckless cruelty, I would do so. But your forgiveness will have to come from someone other than me."

But McCarthy returned to the attack. Welch responded: "Let us not assassinate this lad further, Senator. You have done enough. Have you no sense of decency, sir, at long last?" Welch's performance – and he was a performer – received a thunderous burst of applause. To quote David Oshinsky, whose account I am following, "McCarthy . . . knew he had come off poorly, but he did not seem to understand why. 'What did I do?' he kept asking the people around him. 'What did I do?'"

I think had our meeting today been simply labeled "Have you no sense of decency?" with no subtitle, most of this audience would have known what we were going to talk about. It is a famous quotation.

Oshinsky writes, "The reviews were now pouring in and they were not kind to McCarthy. It wasn't the Fisher incident or any single mistake: it was rather the cumulative impression of his day-to-day performance – his windy speeches, his endless interruptions, his frightening outbursts, his crude personal attacks. In Wisconsin newspapers long sympathetic to McCarthy were describing his behavior as 'brutal' and 'inexcusable.' In Washington Republican leaders were cutting his speaking engagements and his role in the 1954 campaign." His approval ratings were also dropping – from 50 percent "favorable" in February to 34 percent in June.

In the Senate, negotiations for some kind of motion of criticism proceeded, and led eventually to a vote on a motion of "censure," sixty-seven to twenty-two. McCarthy was censured specifically for his attacks on fellow senators and Senate procedures, for his failure to cooperate with the very first committee set up to examine his charges in 1950 and his abuse of its members, and for his attack on the select committee that had been assembled to examine the question of his own censure. He had attacked this committee as the "unwitting handmaiden," "involuntary agent," and "attorneys in fact" of the Communist Party. These attacks, the resolution read, "tended to bring the Senate into dishonor and disrepute, to obstruct the constitutional processes of the Senate, and to impair its dignity."

McCarthy was only forty-six, but he had been in and out of the Bethesda Naval Hospital for various ailments exacerbated by his drinking. With the 1954 elections, the Democrats regained control of the Senate and McCarthy lost the chairmanship of his committee and control of its staff. His departure from the front pages was as rapid as his ascent to dominate them in 1950. His fellow senators now ignored or shunned him. Supreme Court decisions were meanwhile limiting the reach of congressional investigations and of state sedition laws, and limiting dismissals of faculty members who had taken the Fifth Amendment. The atmosphere of hysteria over American Communists in which McCarthy had flourished began to lighten. McCarthy died on May 2, 1957. But he had given his name to a phenomenon, and we have to ask, what did it all mean?

In all this, I have as yet said nothing about Communism – and indeed much of the writing about McCarthy has little to say about Communism: McCarthy, rather, becomes the main issue, which is why many anti-Communists, including Whittaker Chambers, believed he hampered the cause. McCarthy had almost nothing to do

with the conflicts that divided the country on the issue of Communism in American life: the Hiss trials, the Rosenberg case, the trials of Communist leaders under the Smith Act, the investigation into Hollywood, the loyalty oaths on college and university campuses – all these for the most part preceded him. All his bluster about Communists and Communist influence produced only one major case, the indictment of Owen Lattimore, the China scholar, for perjury – a charge that was eventually dismissed. And yet McCarthy's name has, for many of us, come to embody the anti-Communism of the late 1940s and 1950s.

So the original question that McCarthyism obscured remains: What was the weight of Communism and Communists in American life? Did it warrant to any degree the hysteria – we can call it that – over Communists that prevailed during the McCarthy years?

We do have to note that some very alarming things were going on in the world as McCarthy burst onto the scene, and these certainly affected American reactions. During the very year in which McCarthy became a front-page phenomenon, Alger Hiss was found guilty of perjury – in fact, of being a Communist spy; the United States decided to build the hydrogen bomb, perhaps in response to the shocking discovery a few months before that the Soviet Union had an atom bomb; Klaus Fuchs was arrested as an atom spy; the Rosenbergs were arrested and various persons thought to be part of their espionage group fled the country before they could be arrested; North Korea launched a massive and destructive attack on South Korea; and, by the end of the year, American troops were in retreat before a huge Chinese counter-attack. It was generally believed that the Soviets had acquired the atom bomb through Communist espionage. We were engaged not only in a cold war heightened by the fear of nuclear war, but in a real war in Korea, in which Americans were being killed at a greater rate than later in the Vietnam War. How do we slot the real issue of Communism into the McCarthyite phenomenon?

When I first agreed to revisit McCarthyism for this meeting, I thought I would certainly find discussion of this issue prominent. I thought of the very well known, indeed notorious, comment of Irving Kristol in an article on McCarthyism in *Commentary* in March 1953: "there is one thing the American people know about Senator McCarthy; he, like them, is unequivocally anti-Communist. About the spokesmen for American liberalism, they feel they know no such thing." This article was a sensation in the circles in which I lived at the time, New

York intellectuals. I was so alarmed about what it would do to *Commentary's* reputation among liberals – Kristol and I were both editors of *Commentary* at the time – that I immediately rushed to write an article for *Commentary* that was more unequivocally anti-McCarthy. But it seems these agitations, however large they loomed in my life, and the life of many of those here I would guess, did not make much of a mark in the larger McCarthy debates. In the half dozen books on McCarthy I have consulted, I have found to my surprise no reference at all to Kristol's article or to that quotation, and very little discussion of the real scale of Communist influence in American life and of what response it warranted.

But isn't *that* the issue? If we are interested in understanding McCarthy and McCarthyism, don't we have to take account of the reality of Communism in America first? Dwight Macdonald, of *Partisan Review* and *Politics*, whose subsequent political course was very different from Kristol's, had very much the same thing to say at the time (as I learned from Geoffrey Wheatcroft's review of Ted Morgan's book on McCarthyism). Macdonald wrote, "the liberals have never honestly confronted their illusions in the 30's and 40's about Communism but have instead merely interposed a disingenuous defense, a blanket denial to McCarthy's equally sweeping attack" (*New York Times Book Review*, January 4, 2004). Leslie Fiedler had made the same point even more sharply: Liberals had accepted the paradox "that (a) there were really no Communists, just the hallucinations of 'witch hunters,' and (b) if there were Communists, they were, despite their shrillness and bad manners, fundamentally on the side of justice" ("Hiss, Chambers, and the Age of Innocence," *Commentary*, December 1950).

There were three issues intermingled here. One concerned the weight of Communism in various sectors of American life and the specific role of Communist espionage in weakening the United States during the Cold War with the Soviet Union. The second was whether this role justified the huge crackdown on Communists and anyone connected with Communist-influenced organizations during this period. The third was whether American liberal opinion had been derelict in judging the significance of Communist influence and in guiding opinion on it. All big questions, still disputed. The short answers I would give are, respectively: Communist influence, particularly in intellectual life, was greater than modal liberal opinion recognized; despite that, the American response was indeed hysterical and excessive; but Kristol, Macdonald, and Fiedler had a point – liberals had been derelict in recognizing the

true nature of Communism and Communist influence, and that helped discredit liberalism in American public opinion. But I believe we in the New York anti-Communist world made too much of liberalism's response to Communism at a time when the greater problem was to bring American opinion to some kind of reasonable balance on the kind of threat posed by American Communists.

Anthony Lewis

I thought I might begin by saying where I was on the day that Joseph Welch made his famous plea. It was the day my first child was born. I had been covering the Army-McCarthy hearings for *The Washington Daily News* – a paper that, alas, no longer exists – but I missed that day.

Even for those of us who lived through McCarthy's time close up, it is shocking now to hear or even read his words. I did a bit of reading in preparation for this discussion, especially Richard Rovere's wonderful book, *Senator Joe McCarthy*. When Nat cited a few quotes from it earlier, I noticed that there was an undercurrent of laughter at some points. It's so extreme, it's so absurd, that you're tempted to laugh; but it wasn't funny. I think many of the people in this room were there, and you know it wasn't funny. Read those words again, as I just have, and their brutality is still shocking.

I'll give another quote about George Marshall. Nat spoke quite rightly of Marshall as a principal target of Joe McCarthy. I don't have to tell you that Marshall was a man of enormous reputation: Chief of Staff of the Army during World War II, the person who really organized the American military campaigns, Secretary of State, the author of the Marshall Plan, and, above all, in virtually everyone's mind, a symbol of honor. Here is what McCarthy said of Marshall: "A man steeped in falsehood . . . who has recourse to the lie whenever it suits his convenience . . . Part of a conspiracy so immense and an infamy so black as to dwarf any previous venture in the history of man . . . [His activities show] a pattern which finds his decision . . . always and invariably serving the world policy of the Kremlin."

The power McCarthy held at his zenith is hard to believe. Rovere writes: "He held two American presidents captive – or as nearly captive as any presidents of the United States have ever been held." Truman and Eisenhower, from 1950 through 1954, could never act without weighing the effect of their plans upon McCarthy and the forces he led; in consequence, there were

times when because of this man, they could not act at all. Yet at his peak, 50 percent of Americans polled said they had a "favorable" opinion of him and another 21 percent had no opinion.

William F. Buckley observed at the time, "McCarthyism is a movement around which men of good will and stern morality can close ranks." I remember one more quote, because it meant something to me at the time. During the 1952 presidential election campaign, when Adlai Stevenson was opposing Eisenhower, McCarthy called Stevenson "a graduate of Dean Acheson's College of Cowardly Communist Containment." He had a way with alliteration. I want to mention one other example of McCarthy's style. He

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always used to speak of "twenty years of treason": twenty years going back, twenty years of Democratic power, four terms of Roosevelt and four after Truman was elected on his own. During the Army-McCarthy hearings, at one point, he suddenly spoke of twenty-one years of treason. That was a message about Eisenhower.

Nat has spoken of the reasons underlying Americans' susceptibility to McCarthy's demagoguery: the fear of Communism, the reality of Soviet extravagant aggressiveness in the world, and America's fear of that power. But it wasn't the first time in American history that fear has paralyzed American political thinking. Fear of foreign or alien-seeming power has been a periodic characteristic of American life from the very beginning. In 1798, Congress passed and President Adams signed into law the Sedition Act, which made it a crime to criticize the President of the United States. It did so on the argument that the statute was needed to combat French Jacobin terror: the notion, at the time, that French Jacobins were going to infiltrate the United States, a brand-new country, and overthrow its government. It wasn't just radicals who held that view. Abigail Adams, who I suppose most people in this room would regard as rather admirable and sensible, spoke of the Jeffersonians, who were her husband's opponents, as the "French party."

There is something that is absolutely essential about Joe McCarthy, and it's the reason I may disagree a little bit with Nat. America was lucky because McCarthy was not a serious demagogue. He did it all just to get his name in the paper and to have something to talk about that would make him famous. He didn't believe that there were 205 Communists in the State Department when he stood up in Wheeling, West Virginia, and said, "I have in my hand a list of 205 Communists" in the State Department. He didn't believe it and he didn't care, one way or the other. He was completely cynical, and his cynicism was evident in a very peculiar way.

The first senator to speak against him was Ralph Flanders, a rather mild Republican from Vermont. After Flanders denounced McCarthy in the Senate, I saw McCarthy go over to Flanders, put his arm around him, and sort of "chat him up." That's the way he was. He didn't understand why people that he denounced shouldn't like him, because it was all just a game. According to Rovere, after verbally attacking Dean Acheson, McCarthy encountered Acheson in one of the small elevators in the Senate office building and gave him a big hello. Acheson just looked at him icily and said nothing. McCarthy was hurt: "Why is he doing this to me?"

The press learned some important lessons from McCarthy. Nat remarked – and I quote him on this important point, not just about then, but about now: "Reporters had to report what a prominent Republican senator said." But what happened then was that the press treated itself too often as a stenographic machine. They just recorded it. "Senator McCarthy said today that he would announce tomorrow [very often, he announced a day ahead what he was going to say the next day] the name of America's leading Communist spy." But the next day came, and he either did or didn't; usually he didn't, because all he cared about was the headline of the moment, and anyway, he didn't know the name of America's leading Communist spy. But then some members of the press began to realize that they were not really being detached, neutral, or fair; they were playing McCarthy's game. Two reporters, in particular, did a wonderful job of reporting McCarthy's record of promised proof that never panned out: Philip Potter of *The Baltimore Sun* (I thought then and I think now that, like Cassius, he had a lean and hungry look) and Murrey Marder of *The Washington Post*. They followed him, reported what he said, and then put it in the context of his previous remarks.

Their work reached a climax at the Army-McCarthy hearings. It's hard to believe now, even to imagine, what those hearings were sup-

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posed to be about. McCarthy's counsel in the committee investigations, Roy M. Cohn, was determined to help his friend G. David Schine escape the draft. He made strenuous efforts, going as far as the Secretary of the Army, Robert Ten Broeck Stevens, to move Schine out of regular Army service and into other roles, including an assignment to the McCarthy committee. Stevens gave way to Cohn's demands up to a point, but in the end, he drew the line, leading to the hearings.

As Nat has said, the Army charged that it was pressured and threatened by McCarthy and Cohn to gain favors for Schine. McCarthy countered by claiming that Stevens and his colleagues were protecting Communists and compromising Army security. Throughout the hearing, McCarthy focused on one unfortunate man: Irving Peress, an Army dentist who took the Fifth Amendment when questioned about his membership in the Communist Party, but was later ordered to active duty, promoted, and honorably discharged. McCarthy's constant rallying cry was "Who promoted Peress?" – as if it were the most important issue about freedom and Communism since the arrival of Lenin at the Finland Station.

During the time I covered the hearings for *The Washington Daily News*, I really misunderstood what the Army's lawyers, especially the wily Joe Welch – a superb lawyer – were doing. There were some completely absurd events in the course of the hearings. At one point, McCarthy displayed a photograph of himself with Secretary of the Army Stevens, showing both of them smiling and appearing friendly. As McCarthy said, "Well, how can you say I'm against him? Look at this photograph. We're pals." The next day, Welch demonstrated that McCarthy's photo had been cropped from the original picture that included a large number of people. I don't know if that incident was terribly serious, but Welch made it seem as though this was a

piece of knavery and trickery by McCarthy to make it look as though just the two of them were together. "Who cropped the photograph?" became the great question of the day – but it was never answered. I was frustrated when such issues were left unresolved. I knew some of the lawyers involved and I kept saying, "Well, why don't you get at some of these things?" But, as I eventually realized, that wasn't the point. The facts were unimportant. Joe Welch wanted to destroy McCarthy by showing the country what he was really like – and he did.

Finally, I want to say a word about McCarthy and Harvard University, and specifically about Wendell J. Furry, then an associate professor in the department of physics, and Leon J. Kamin, a researcher. McCarthy called Furry to testify in connection with a charge of espionage at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. At first, Furry invoked the Fifth Amendment. The Harvard administration was, to put it mildly, not supportive: President Nathan Pusey said that Harvard "deplored" Furry's response. But many Harvard faculty members felt and acted otherwise. Eminent figures in the physics department formed a committee to raise money for Furry's defense. Furry's lawyer, Gerald Berlin of Boston, consulted with law school professors whose names sound like an honor roll: Paul Freund, Albert Sacks, Mark Howe, Kingman Brewster, and Benjamin Kaplan. The provost of the university, Paul Buck, was also helpful.

At a hearing held in Boston, Professor Furry finally testified about his past, admitting that he had been a member of the Communist Party for a brief period, ending in 1947, but he refused to name others. He was indicted on the charge of contempt of the Senate. But, in 1956, Federal District Judge Bailey Aldrich dismissed the charge, finding that the McCarthy committee had exceeded its authority during the hearing at which Furry appeared. The Harvard Corporation placed Professor Furry on probation for three years and delayed his promotion, but the incident eventually righted itself. Judge Aldrich also dismissed a second charge arising from that hearing, this time against Leon Kamin, who did not have tenure at Harvard and subsequently went to Canada to teach at McGill University.

The McCarthy episode showed us how easy it is to instill fear in this country. The late Richard Hofstadter spoke famously about "the paranoid strain in American politics." From the Sedition Act to the outrageous prosecutions during World War I to the World War II detention of Japanese-Americans in what amounted to prison camps, fear has pervaded American society – and it remains with us today.

Sam Tanenhaus

It's a pleasure to speak after two of my intellectual heroes, although I'm going to disagree with them a bit. I want to begin by asking a different question: Try to imagine what it was like to be someone who wasn't afraid of Joe McCarthy because, as we've heard, about half the country wasn't. In fact, 65 percent of the Republican Party supported him at his height. On the Senate censure vote – sixty-seven to twenty-two for censure – the Republican Party was split in half, with twenty-two voting not to censure McCarthy. To the very end, he retained the loyalty of some of the most influential Republicans in the United States, including the Republican Senator who would become, in effect, his heir as leader of the conservative movement in America: Barry Goldwater.

Why was half the country impressed by McCarthy, or, at least, why did they respond favorably to him? There are several explanations. The reference to twenty years of treason resonated with American conservatives in the early 1950s. They had been concerned about FDR's management of the country: first, the appropriation of the nation's economic forces, then a massive military build-up, and, in 1940, the unprecedented run for a third term. Speaking in support of Wendell Wilkie, the Republican candidate for president in 1940, Herbert Hoover said: "We have seen the rise of totalitarianism in Germany, Russia, and Japan, and now we see it here at home. We see a president who has nationalized the economy, who has eliminated political opposition, and who now will create a military-industrial state." Well it happened, only it happened a generation later, during the Cold War.

Tony Lewis quite rightly mentioned a series of repressive acts that were committed by administrations, going all the way back to the Sedition Act in 1798; but he left out the McWilliams case. In 1942, FDR decided to prosecute several dozen Americans – some of them fascists, some of them fascist sympathizers, some of them merely opponents of intervention – on the grounds that they were Nazi spies. A judge threw the case out of court two years later. In their 1954 book, *McCarthy and His Enemies*, William F. Buckley and L. Brent Bozell wrote, "Where were the liberals 15 years ago, when those who were on the right, some fascists, some not fascists, stood in the dock and were called the same names that McCarthy now calls liberals?"

McCarthy was not, in fact, the inventor but the galvanic force, the inheritor, of a kind of rhetoric that had been growing in American

politics for over a generation. We have already heard about Dwight Macdonald's quite nuanced discussions of McCarthyism. Macdonald published a book, *Henry Wallace: The Man and the Myth*, in time for Wallace's third-party candidacy, a candidacy that seemed to be – or was accused of being by Macdonald, among others – a Communist front. It was the last great gasp of so-called fellow-traveling in American politics. At the very end of that little book, Macdonald says, "Henry Wallace may not be a Soviet agent, but he acts like one" – a statement that is precisely the same formulation that Joe McCarthy made about George Marshall, Dean Acheson, and Owen Lattimore.

Let me say a few words about Owen Lattimore, a China specialist and a journalist who taught briefly at Johns Hopkins University. Lattimore was a kind of ad-hoc informal advisor to the State Department who traveled to Russia in 1944 with Henry Wallace when Wallace was Vice President. Lattimore was the subject of one of McCarthy's most notorious lies. When pressed to reveal the identities of the 205 Communists he claimed were in the State Department, McCarthy responded: "Well, I'm going to identify the most important espionage agent in America, the guy who runs the whole show, Alger Hiss's boss." It was Owen Lattimore, who might have been called a fellow-traveling intellectual, but never an espionage agent. When McCarthy and his defenders were challenged on this statement, their defense was precisely the one that Dwight Macdonald had made in the case of Henry Wallace: "Who cares whether Owen Lattimore is really a Communist agent, since he acts like one?" – that is, he supported the purges, defended the show trials, and had edited a magazine that included documents on Communism stolen from the State Department.

These examples further underline McCarthy's enormous power, which both Nat and Tony mentioned earlier. However, I would point out that during the Eisenhower presidency, John Foster Dulles was more paralyzed than Eisenhower. Eisenhower took office in January 1953 and within about six months or so, he had begun the process of neutralizing McCarthy. Actually, by the time the hearings began, McCarthy was more or less finished. His popularity peaked in the very end of 1953 and in any case, never exceeded 50 percent.

Both my fellow panelists are quite right to say that McCarthy was not a "Hitlerian" figure. Did McCarthy terrorize America? I think that's an open question. Did he cause a great deal of damage? Absolutely. Did he destroy reputations? No question. Was he a bane for democracy? Certainly. But I'm not sure to what extent he

really threatened the fabric of society. The polls show that, by the end of 1954, only 1 percent of Americans thought Communism and threats to civil liberties were a major concern in the country.

The question of interventionism was really the great cause of the American Right, and it continues to be. In his new book, *Reds: McCarthyism in Twentieth-Century America*, Ted Morgan described the most interesting, but not surprising, new finding about McCarthy, namely that he was an isolationist leading up to World War II. McCarthy came from Wisconsin, a real center of antiwar sentiment in World War II with a large German population. In addition, the

McCarthy was not, in fact, the inventor but the galvanic force, the inheritor, of a kind of rhetoric that had been growing in American politics for over a generation.

famous progressive political family the La Follettes were antiwar. McCarthy was a state judge in Wisconsin when he made one of his first statements that gained him public attention. During a visit to Washington, D.C., shortly before Pearl Harbor, he denounced Congress, including the Wisconsin delegation, for trying to push the country into war.

One of the mysteries to me, as I write about American conservatism, is how quickly and seamlessly the American Right moved from an isolationist, anti-interventionist position leading up to Pearl Harbor to an extreme interventionist position afterwards, particularly when it came to the Soviet Union. Why was it that, suddenly, conservatives wanted to fight the "great war" they hadn't wanted to fight before? The answer is that most of them didn't. Robert Taft and Joe McCarthy both opposed the Korean War initially. Yet some of us remember that when Douglas MacArthur wanted to take the war to China, Harry Truman fired him, and MacArthur became a martyr to the Right. In fact, the American conservative movement opposed almost all those interventions early on, and McCarthy identified the perfect surrogate enemy. McCarthy's approach was, in its crude way, a very clever formulation. Basically, he said, "Why send American soldiers to die in Korea when all the Communists we have to fear are here at home? If we can get Dean Acheson and George Marshall and all the other bad

McCarthy actually took the language of the anti-Communist Left and turned it into the language of the extremist anti-Communist Right.

guy out of the State Department, they won't lure us into these death traps overseas."

In other words, isolationism never really went away; it remained one of the submerged themes in American foreign policy that is still evident today. Isolationism was reborn as unilateralism. In fact, the two consort fairly easily. In the years leading up to World War II, the antiwar argument from the Right was that we did not want to involve ourselves in European wars. It actually doesn't take a great leap from that to say we, alone, will fight the Cold War: We'll oppose NATO and the Marshall Plan as, again, the conservatives did and we'll make it our single crusade against the enemy. And we are seeing this again in the war in Iraq.

In his presentation, Nat quoted a 1953 comment by Irving Kristol to the effect that the American people knew that McCarthy was an anti-Communist but "about the spokesmen for American liberalism, they knew no such thing." Last summer, William Kristol, Irving's son and the editor of the *Weekly Standard*, wrote a column in *The Washington Post* on the Democrats' views on Iraq that included this line: "The American people know George Bush will fight a war against terror. About Dick Gephardt, they know no such thing."

The important point is that McCarthy sustained this rhetoric: He actually took the language of the anti-Communist Left and turned it into the language of the extremist anti-Communist Right; now it has become the standard currency of the American Right. If you were an admirer of McCarthy at the time of the hearing we just saw, you didn't believe that he got the worst of the exchange with Joseph Welch. And – I would suggest – some of the Right still don't think so. If you read Ann Coulter's new book, *Treason*, McCarthy is a hero. He not only wins that exchange, but he becomes the leader of the new conservative movement. In a way, she's right.

The subject of my next book, Bill Buckley, joined McCarthy's cause because Buckley knew exactly what McCarthy was and saw how effective he was politically. McCarthy gave a tinge of populism to smoldering sentiments, which led New Dealers like Walter Winchell to become rabid McCarthyites. He sounded like the old leftists. He borrowed their language in a down-market version. The New York journalist Murray Kempton once reported on a book publishing party for Buckley and Bozell's *McCarthy and His Enemies*, where the star attractions were Joe McCarthy and Roy Cohn. He observed that among the guests most fascinated by McCarthy were old ex-Communists including Max Eastman. They came to see Joe McCarthy, because McCarthy kept the old fight alive. He had the same enemies that the old Left had: the well-bred, Ivy-League-educated, establishment-reared intellectual class. In the 1930s, it had come from the Left; now it was coming from the Right. ■

© 2004 by Nathan Glazer, Anthony Lewis, and Sam Tanenhaus, respectively.



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1. Nathan Glazer
2. Anthony Lewis
3. Sam Tanenhaus



4



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4. Leon Eisenberg (Harvard Medical School) and Arthur Pardee (Dana-Farber Cancer Institute)
5. Richard Parker (Harvard University) and John Shattuck (John F. Kennedy Library Foundation)

Project Update

Academy Sponsors Humanities Research

Through the Initiative for the Humanities, the Academy is advancing our understanding of the state of the humanities today by developing the research and statistical tools necessary for sound policy-making. In the initial discussions leading to the creation of the Initiative, many Academy Fellows identified a need for gathering reliable data on the humanities and pointed to the influential *Science and Engineering Indicators* as an invaluable tool for decision-making. A similar tool for the humanities is long overdue, according to Academy Editor Steven Marcus (Columbia University), who co-chairs the overall planning committee of the Initiative.

Before a set of Humanities Indicators can be developed, a number of methodological and definitional issues need to be resolved. To address these methodological issues, the Academy convened a group of experts from humanities associations and educational research centers and commissioned research on undergraduate career paths and on the level of financial support within the colleges and universities for the humanities.

Two of these studies are now complete. In “Humanities Pathways: A Framework for Assessing Post-Baccalaureate Opportunities for Humanities Graduates,” Professor Edward St. John and co-author Ontario Wooden (both from Indiana University) have examined a variety of existing federal surveys to tease out conclusions about the future of undergraduates who take humanities degrees. Decisions about careers or further education in graduate or professional schools cannot be explained without reference to a large number of variables – including the availability

of financial aid, student loan burdens, family background, and previous work experience. But it is possible to draw some broad generalizations about patterns of undergraduate enrollments and later career choices:

- The percentage of college graduates choosing humanities majors declined substantially from the 1970s to the mid 1990s. However, in recent years, the humanities have regained some “market share” and now represent about 8 to 10 percent of all undergraduate degrees (see figure 1);
- Humanities graduates who enter the workforce with a B.A. degree typically earn less than graduates with degrees in all other fields except teaching and social work;
- A recent survey of the class of 2000 found that only 69 percent of all humanities graduates found full-time employment a year after graduation. While this figure is an improvement over the 59 percent

employment rate reported in 1991, humanities graduates still display one of the highest unemployment rates among all disciplines.

Perhaps the most important finding in St. John and Wooden’s survey of the data is that the undergraduate degree in the humanities, as the figure for full-time employment suggests, is becoming merely a stepping stone to advanced professional degrees. “Having undergraduate preparation in the humanities provides advanced problem-solving skills that are critical to many professions,” St. John and Wooden note, “but these professions now usually require advanced degrees.”

And, despite the discouraging findings about immediate post-employment, the authors point out that humanities majors tend to fare as well as, if not better than, other undergraduate degree holders in competitive examinations for admission to law, medical, and business schools.


The authors also address the question of how to invest scarce funds for further research in this area. St. John and Wooden suggest that

existing federal databases, especially the on-going surveys in the *Baccalaureate and Beyond* series conducted by the National Center for Educational Statistics (a unit of the U.S. Department of Education) could be better employed to discern patterns of course taking, post-graduate employment, and graduate education that may be unique to the humanities. They cautiously suggest that with the saturation of the academic market for Ph.D.s in the humanities, students might be better served both by better undergraduate advising and by new hybrid graduate programs that would combine academic preparation in a specific discipline with internships in other professional areas besides university teaching. A key goal of new research studies should be to analyze the linkages between choice of graduate fields, the types of undergraduate institutions attended, and post-graduate employment.

Despite the relative optimism of some observers about the career prospects for humanities majors, critics of the contemporary university have argued that the hu-

Continued on page 29

Figure 1: Humanities as a Percentage of all Bachelor’s Degrees in the United States, 1951 – 2002



American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2004. Sources: 1986 – 2002: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Educational Statistics, IPEDS survey [Computer File]. 1968 – 1985: U.S. Dept. of Ed., NCES, HEGIS survey [computer file]. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI (distributor). 1948 – 1966: U.S. Dept. of Ed., NCES, “Earned Degrees” series. Note: Education Department data on total degrees before 1961 counted all first professional degrees along with bachelor’s degrees: Academy numbers disaggregate bachelor’s degrees from 1948 – 1961 by extrapolating historical ratios of bachelor’s to first professional degrees.

Iraq continued from page 1

equivalent of the Center for Disease Control who had received no orders to secure the building despite reports of looters carrying away live HIV virus. Galbraith described his own tour of the abandoned Foreign Ministry, where vital information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction may have been stored. He saw documents strewn everywhere and found looters "lighting small fires" with original government treaties.

"If it can be said that the United States lost Iraq, it did so in the chaotic days of April 2003 when U.S. forces permitted the systematic and preventable looting of every significant public institution in Baghdad," Galbraith said. He

believes the looting had profound effects. "It demoralized the very Iraqi professionals on whom we would count to rebuild the country because, after all, virtually all of them are associated with public institutions. And more important, it served to undermine Iraqi confidence in and respect for the U.S. occupation authorities."

The three-state solution that Galbraith now regards as the best conceivable outcome of the war will permit each of Iraq's "major constituent communities [to] have as much of what they want as is possible." It is a solution that will come at a cost, however. "Western-style human rights are likely to take root only in the Kurdish north," he said, "and in the south the legal status of women in Iraq is likely to



Front (left to right): Catherine Galbraith, John Kenneth Galbraith, Janet Axelrod (Cambridge Public Library); back (left to right): Louis Cabot (Cabot-Wellington, LLC), Henry Rosovsky (Harvard University), Jeremy Knowles (Harvard University), Carl Kaysen (MIT), and Matthew Meselson (Harvard University)

be set back even as compared to the Saddam Hussein regime."

In December of 2002, the Academy published *War with Iraq: Costs,*

Consequences, and Alternatives. Copies are available on the Academy's website at www.amacad.org. ■

Humanities Research continued from page 28

manities are losing ground not only in the labor marketplace but, more alarmingly, inside the university itself. A second Academy-sponsored research paper, "Funding the Core: Understanding the Financial Contexts of Academic Departments in the Humanities," by Professor James Hearn (Vanderbilt University) and his graduate assistant, Alexander Gorbunov, examines the methodological challenges involved in measuring internal university financing of humanities departments. Hearn cautions that it is easy to draw invidious comparisons between academic units if cross-subsidization or other hidden subsidies are not calculated. State subsidies at public universities, recovery of university overhead through indirect cost rates, and the allocation of general endowment funds must be taken into consideration along with the number of student credit hours and tuition revenues. In the end, Hearn and Gorbunov find that no existing study, including

an in-depth examination of the costs of instructional time at three hundred colleges and universities commissioned by the U.S. Department of Education, adequately covers all of these factors.

Even with the complexities of internal accounting, there are some areas of agreement. The Delaware study of instructional costs, the extensive review of three hundred participating institutions mentioned earlier, found that humanities departments consistently ranked among the lowest in costs per student credit hour. At the same time, Hearn and Gorbunov note that the variation among humanities disciplines is often substantial, and that departments teaching large survey courses have an inherent advantage in these comparisons. So, while the humanities as a whole remain among the least expensive units within the modern research university, some instructional programs – notably in foreign languages and the performing arts – have much higher costs associated with the

need in these fields for intensive faculty-student interactions.

Hearn and Gorbunov think that a carefully controlled comparative study, ideally surveying a range of institutions and not just research universities, would be the best way to fully understand how these factors interact. Before such an examination can be launched, case studies could be especially useful next steps in refining a research model. The Academy has identified one such study, an in-depth look at the University of Washington by Donald Summers, which the Academy will publish as a companion piece to the methodology paper. Summers, who serves as director of development for the humanities at the University of Washington, employs a number of measures, including comparisons of instructional costs, teaching loads, and student demand, to look at the status of the humanities at one well-regarded public university. On the whole, Summers' existing data tends to support the more pessimistic claims about the humanities, but he intends to build upon

his case study by obtaining comparable data from other public research universities.

The Academy is also interested in external sources of support for the humanities and is working with the Foundation Center to create a long-term study of private support for the humanities. While Foundation Center reports on funding for the arts include some partial data about the humanities, they employ a very limited definition of the humanities that excludes certain fields (such as foreign language study and comparative religion) normally viewed as intrinsic parts of the humanities. The Academy has commissioned an analysis of foundation funding from 1992 to 2002, to be conducted by the Foundation Center, that takes a comprehensive view of the humanities at both academic and non-academic institutions. The results, which will be released by the Academy and the Foundation Center in the early summer, should provide a useful baseline for subsequent studies. ■

Around the Country

University of California, Berkeley

On February 27 – 28, the Academy and the Earl Warren Legal Institute at the University of California, Berkeley, co-sponsored a conference on *Earl Warren and the Warren Court: A Fifty-Year Retrospective*. Organized by Harry Scheiber, the symposium, held at Boalt Hall on

the Berkeley campus, opened with a keynote address by Jesse Choper, followed by a set of lectures by leading constitutional lawyers, legal historians, and political scientists, including several members of the Academy. The meeting also included a reception for confer-

ence participants and Academy Fellows in the Berkeley area.

The summer 2004 *Bulletin* will feature papers by Philip Frickey and Gordon Silverstein and commentaries by Nelson W. Polsby and Neil Devins, which were present-

ed at a special panel session on “Congress and the Court in the Warren Years.” Both Frickey and Polsby are members of an ongoing Academy study group analyzing the relationship of the Court and Congress today.



Jesse Choper, Philip Frickey, and Harry Scheiber



Lawrence Evans and Karl Pister

University of California, San Diego

Gordon Gill, the new co-chair of the Western Center, Robert McCormick Adams, co-chair of the Committee on Studies, and Leslie Berlowitz, Executive Officer of the Academy, greeted Fellows at an informal lunch and conversation held on the UC San Diego campus on March 3, 2004. The meeting was an opportunity for Fellows in the San Diego – La Jolla area to learn more about the Academy’s research programs. Berlowitz described several of the Academy’s ongoing projects, ranging from the gathering of data on the humanities to a study of corporate responsibility. She emphasized the importance of planning campus-based meetings to create a more informed and interested community of Fellows across the country, and urged the San Diego group to propose topics for regional symposia to mark the 225th anniversary of the Academy in 2005 – 2006.



Vincent Crawford and Clive W. J. Granger



Gordon Gill, John West, and Helen Ranney




Ruth Adams, Robert McCormick Adams, Daniel Yankelovich, and Harry Suhl

University of California, Irvine

“Reliable Information in a Democracy: A Case Study” was the topic of an understated meeting held at the University of California, Irvine, on March 16, 2004. Patrick Morgan, professor of political science and the Tierney Chair in Peace Studies at Irvine, discussed the issues involved in gathering, interpreting, and disseminating intelligence information. Referring to the search for weapons of mass destruction and other incidents in Iraq, he observed that “intelligence analysis should always be separated from politics; when it is not, the result is distorted information.” With the Iraq situation as the immediate focus of concern, Morgan also warned that other nations, particularly Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia, and North Korea, represent serious challenges to the intelligence community.

The Irvine meeting was organized and hosted by Walter Fitch, who recently concluded his term as co-chair of the Western Center.



A. Kimball Romney and F. Sherwood Rowland



R. Duncan Luce and William Daughaday



Patrick Morgan, Jack Peltason, and Walter Fitch

University of Wisconsin-Madison

Fellows at the University of Wisconsin-Madison attended a campus understated meeting on March 30, 2004. Following opening remarks by Chancellor John Wiley on the challenges facing large public research universities, Cora Marrett, professor emeritus of sociology and Afro-American studies and senior vice president for academic affairs, introduced a panel of three professors from diverse fields who spoke on their latest research. Leonard Berkowitz, professor of psychology, spoke on human aggression; Judith Kimble, professor

of genetics and medical genetics, discussed the regulation of animal development at the molecular level; and Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, professor of anthropology, spoke about her recent book, *Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese History*. The Academy is grateful to Fellow Virginia Sapiro, professor of political science and women’s studies and associate vice chancellor for teaching and learning, for planning the event.



Cora Marrett, Judith Kimble, Leonard Berkowitz, and Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney

Forthcoming Academy Publications

From the Committee on International Securities Studies *The Russian Military: Power and Policy*

Contents

Steven E. Miller

“Introduction: Moscow’s Military Power: Russia’s Search for Security in an Age of Transition”

Pavel K. Baev

“The Trajectory of the Russian Military: Downsizing, Degeneration, and Defeat”

Aleksandr Golts

“The Social and Political Condition of the Russian Military”

Alexei G. Arbatov

“The Military Reform: From Crisis to Stagnation”

Roy Allison

“Russia, Regional Conflict, and the Use of Military Power”

Vitaly V. Shlykov

“The Economics of Defense in Russia and the Legacy of Structural Militarism”

Rose Gottemoeller

“Arms Control and the Management of Nuclear Weapons”

Dmitri V. Trenin

“Conclusion: Gold Eagle, Red Star”

This volume is edited by Steven E. Miller (Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government) and Dmitri V. Trenin (Carnegie Moscow Center).

Russia’s military policy and power remain a major consideration in Eurasia and its nuclear arsenal retains global significance. A new volume in the *American Academy Studies in Global Security* series offers analysis of the Russian military that now exists and of the further reforms that could (and, many believe, should) shape the future of Russian military power. In the excerpt below, Alexei Arbatov, a contributor to the volume, reflects on the difficulty of implementing meaningful reform due to the continuing obstacles to public debate on military affairs in Russia.

A shroud of secrecy severely limits access to information regarding the state of affairs in and plans for the armed forces and defense industry. This in turn makes it difficult to assess the real situation and prospects for reform. Indeed, basic facts and essential information are simply missing from Russia’s public debate on defense. From the limited information that is made available, it is impossible to make even a broad determination about the structure of the armed forces and their deployment; the number of main units and amount of weapons and other combat-related equipment; and principal research and development (R&D) and procurement programs – that is, the basic facts and figures necessary to have at least a general idea about Russian military policy and development. Presumably the Russian army should be prepared to fight and to achieve some clearly stated objectives. But what kind of wars with which weapons, against what kind of probable opponents, in which military theaters, and how soon? Because it does not provide much public information, the Russian defense establishment is not forced to lay bare the fundamental premises of its policies. Further, it is impossible to know how much ongoing military operations, including the war in Chechnya, will ultimately cost. Hence, there is no basis on which to have an informed discussion of the plans for reforming the armed forces and defense industry or the relevance of various arms control and disarmament proposals, peacekeeping missions, or combat operations – except in purely theoretical terms

Two factors help to explain the lack of transparency in the Russian debate over security policy and military reform. First, neither the executive branch (except the ministry of defense), nor parliament, nor society at large has an informed understanding of potential threats to the state that would require greater efforts in the defense area. Thus, there is no sense of urgency to press for more useful information. Second, although the need to rescue the armed forces and defense industry from further degradation through military reform is commonly accepted, whether the current military high command is capable of developing and implementing a financially sound military reform program and military policy more generally remains an open question. In the meantime, a tacit agreement has developed between the civilian authorities, who provide what most Russian experts agree is inadequate spending for defense, and the military, which is allowed to spend the appropriated money as it wants. Meanwhile, the military enjoys a monopoly on information and immunity from criticism for using the funds as they desire.

Alexei G. Arbatov is a member of the Yobloko faction and served, until recently, as a member of the Russian Duma, where he was Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee and Chairman of the Subcommittee for International Security and Arms Limitations. He is currently a scholar in residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

The Russian Military: Power and Policy is the third in a series of studies to emerge from the American Academy’s Committee on International Security Studies and its project on International Security in the Post-Soviet Space. The Academy thanks the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its generous support of this project.

From the Corporate Responsibility Project

Restoring Trust in American Business

The Corporate Responsibility Project's forthcoming Occasional Paper, titled *Restoring Trust in American Business*, presents the results of the project's initial phase. Participants have focused on the role and responsibilities of various "gatekeepers" – including corporate directors, lawyers, and accountants, among others – in constructively shaping corporate conduct. The Occasional Paper examines how gatekeepers failed in the recent corporate scandals and provides a set of recommendations for future practice that reconceptualizes the gatekeeper roles. Excerpts from four essays follow:

"The Professionalization of Corporate Directors"

Martin Lipton and Jay W. Lorsch

In spite of this progress, the bad news was the series of corporate scandals that started with Enron in the fall of 2001 and has continued to the present. Many who had been active in encouraging boardroom reform, including a lot of directors themselves, were shocked by the fact that such scandals could take place at a time in which boards seemed to be increasingly diligent and effective The professionalization of corporate directors would . . . lead to a clearer understanding of what the goals of boards should be We would argue that for a large public company, the goal of the professional director should be the long-term success of the company.

"Professional Independence and the Corporate Lawyer"

William T. Allen and Geoffrey Miller

It is important that business lawyers recognize that the duty energetically to facilitate a client's lawful wishes must be supplemented with a duty, to the law itself, of independence. This is a duty to exercise independent (good faith) judgment concerning whether a proposed action falls within the law. We suggest that in representing clients in negotiating or structuring transactions, or in otherwise assisting clients in their ongoing efforts to do business within the law, lawyers are obliged to strive to advance, and not to thwart, the detectable spirit animating the law.

"The Financial Scandals and the Demise of the Traditional Investment Banker"

Felix G. Rohatyn

What we call investment banks today bear no resemblance to what we knew as investment banks in the decades after World War II. The evolution of finance and of capital markets, the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, and the explosion in the technology of finance have totally changed the function of investment banks, which traditionally offered advice to corporations and protection to investors. Today's so-called investment banks bear no more relationship to their predecessors than yesterday's family doctors bear to HMOs.

"Journalists and the Corporate Scandals: What Happened to the Watchdog?"

Geneva Overholser

A final and, indeed, overarching challenge stems from the conduct of media executives today. The extraordinary pressure brought to bear on newsgathering organizations – by corporations seeking to improve their profit margins, quarter by quarter; by executive compensation plans that reward short-term success; and by the primacy of shareholder interests – is steadily undermining the ability of the press to serve the needs of democracy.

Volume Essays

John S. Reed, "Values and Corporate Responsibility: A Personal Perspective"

Rakesh Khurana, Nitin Nohria, and Daniel Penrice, "Management as a Profession"

Donald C. Langevoort, "The Regulators and the Financial Scandals"

Martin Lipton and Jay W. Lorsch, "The Professionalization of Corporate Directors"

Margaret M. Blair, "Comment: Should Directors Be Professionals?"

Damon Silvers, "Comment: Professionalization Does Not Mean Power or Accountability"

William R. Kinney, Jr., "The Auditor as Gatekeeper"

John H. Biggs, "Comment: The Auditor as Gatekeeper"

William T. Allen and Geoffrey Miller, "Professional Independence and the Corporate Lawyer"

Richard Painter, "Comment: The Dubious History and Psychology of Clubs as Self-Regulatory Organizations"

Felix G. Rohatyn, "The Financial Scandals and the Demise of the Traditional Investment Banker"

Gerald Rosenfeld, "Comment: The Role of Investment Bankers"

Geneva Overholser, "Journalists and the Corporate Scandals: What Happened to the Watchdog?"

This volume is edited by Jay Lorsch (Harvard Business School), Andy Zelleke (The Wharton School), and Leslie Berlowitz (American Academy).

Noteworthy

Select Prizes and Awards

2004 – 2005 Phi Beta Kappa
Visiting Scholars

Steven Chu (Stanford University)

Andrew Delbanco (Columbia University)

Wendy Doniger (University of Chicago)

Stanley L. Engerman (University of Rochester)

Linda Greenhouse (*The New York Times*)

Werner Gundersheimer (Folger Shakespeare Library)

Gary C. Jacobson (University of California, San Diego)

Elliot M. Meyerowitz (California Institute of Technology)

Katherine Verdery (University of Michigan)

Sir Michael Francis Atiyah (University of Edinburgh) and **Isadore Singer** (MIT) share the 2004 Abel Prize in Mathematics, awarded by the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters.

Allen Bard (University of Texas at Austin) has received the \$300,000 Welch Award in Chemistry from the Welch Foundation.

Timothy Berners-Lee (MIT) has been awarded the first Millennium Technology Prize, administered by the Finnish Technology Award Foundation.

Allan M. Campbell (Stanford University) has received the 2004 Abbott-ASM Lifetime Achievement Award from the American Society for Microbiology.

Federico Capasso (Harvard University) has won the 2004 Caterina Tomassoni and Felice Pietro Chiesi Prize, given by the University of Rome "La Sapienza."

Stanley N. Cohen (Stanford University) and **Herbert W. Boyer** (University of California, San Francisco) have been awarded the Albany Medical Center Prize in Medicine and Biomedical Research.

Nick Holonyak, Jr. (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) has been awarded the 2004 Lemelson-MIT Prize for invention.

Stanley Korsmeyer (Dana-Farber Cancer Institute) received the seventh annual Pezcoller Foundation-American Association for Cancer Research International Award for Cancer Research.

Elizabeth Loftus (University of California, Irvine) received the 2003 Distinguished Scientific Award for the Applications of Psychology by the American Psychological Association.

Fumihiko Maki (Maki and Associates) has won the competition to design a new building for the United Nations. The competition was open only to recipients of the Pritzker Architecture Prize.

Steven B. Sample (University of Southern California) has been awarded the Charles P. Norton Medal by SUNY Buffalo.

Helen Vendler (Harvard University) has been named the 2004 Jefferson Lecturer in the Humanities.

William A. Wulf (National Academy of Engineering) is the recipient of the IEC Fellow Award, presented by the International Engineering Consortium.

Shing-Tung Yau (Harvard University) is among the recipients of the Award for International Scientific and Technological Cooperation presented by the Chinese government.

New Appointments

David T. Ellwood (Harvard University) has been appointed Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

Gerald R. Fink (Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research) has been appointed to the Scientific Advisory Board of Dyadic International, Inc.

M. Judah Folkman (Harvard Medical School) has been appointed to the Scientific Advisory Board of Synta Pharmaceuticals.

Marye Anne Fox (North Carolina State University) has been appointed Chancellor of the University of

California, San Diego, effective August 16, 2004.

Lawrence Gold (SomaLogic, Inc.) has been appointed to the Scientific Advisory Board of Archemix Corp.

Robert H. Grubbs (California Institute of Technology) has been appointed to the Science and Engineering Advisory Board of ORFID Corporation.

Kurt Isselbacher (Massachusetts General Hospital) has been elected to the Board of Trustees of the Marine Biological Laboratory.

Harold Koh (Yale University) has been appointed Dean of Yale Law School.

Martin Leibowitz (New York City) has joined Morgan Stanley as Managing Director on the U.S. Equity Strategy team.

Susan Lindquist (Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research) was elected to the Board of Directors of Johnson & Johnson.

Select Publications

Poetry

Michael Fried (Johns Hopkins University). *The Next Bend in the Road*. University of Chicago Press, April 2004

Fiction

E. L. Doctorow (New York University). *Sweet Land Stories*. Random House, May 2004

Louise Erdrich (Minneapolis, Minnesota). *Four Souls*. HarperCollins, July 2004

Non-Fiction

Graham Allison (Harvard University). *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*. Times Books, August 2004

James Carroll (Boston, Massachusetts). *Crusade: Chronicles of an Unjust War*. Henry Holt (Metropolitan Books), July 2004

Stanley Cavell (Harvard University). *Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral*

Life. Harvard University Press, May 2004

Jean-Pierre Changeux (Institut Pasteur). *The Physiology of Truth: Neuroscience and Human Knowledge*. Harvard University Press, April 2004

Lewis Cullman (Cullman Ventures, Inc). *Can't Take It With You: The Art of Making and Giving Money*. John Wiley & Sons, April 2004

James Cuno (Courtwald Institute of Art, London). *Whose Muse? Art Museums and the Public Trust*. Princeton University Press, December 2003

John Demos (Yale University). *Circles and Lines: The Shape of Life in Early America*. Harvard University Press, May 2004

Charles Fried (Harvard Law School). *Saying What the Law Is: The Constitution and the Supreme Court*. Harvard University Press, March 2004

John Kenneth Galbraith (Harvard University). *The Economics of Innocent Fraud: Truth for Our Time*. Houghton Mifflin, April 2004

Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (Harvard University) and Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham (Harvard University), eds. *African American Lives*. Oxford University Press, April 2004

Rene Girard (Stanford University). *Oedipus Unbound: Selected Writings on Rivalry and Desire* (edited and with an introduction by Mark Anspach). Stanford University Press, March 2004

Hans Gumbrecht (Stanford University). *Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey*. Stanford University Press, March 2004

Thomas P. Hughes (University of Pennsylvania). *Human Built World: How To Think About Technology and Culture*. University of Chicago Press, May 2004

Samuel P. Huntington (Harvard University). *Who Are We? The Cultural Core of American National Identity*. Simon & Schuster, May 2004

Michael Kammen (Cornell University). *A Time to Every Purpose: The Four Seasons in American Culture*. University of North Carolina Press, March 2004

Robert P. Kirshner (Harvard University). *The Extravagant Universe: Exploding Stars, Dark Energy, and the Accelerating Cosmos*. Princeton University Press, May 2004

Julia Kristeva (University of Paris). *Colette*. Columbia University Press, May 2004

Wendy Lesser, ed. (*Threepenny Review*, Berkeley, California). *The Genius of Language: Fifteen Writers Reflect on their Mother Tongues*. Pantheon, July 2004

Seymour Martin Lipset (George Mason University) et al. *The Paradox of American Unionism: Why Americans Like Unions More than Canadians Do But Join Much Less*. Cornell University Press, April 2004

Edmund S. Morgan (Yale University). *The Genuine Article: A Historical Look at Early America*. Norton, June 2004

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Robert O. Paxton (Columbia University). *The Anatomy of Fascism*. Knopf, March 2004

Hilary Putnam (Harvard University). *Ethics without Ontology*. Harvard University Press, March 2004

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Immanuel Wallerstein (SUNY Binghamton). *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*. Duke University Press, August 2004

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Exhibitions

Jules Olitski: *Half a Life's Work*, Mizel Center for Arts and Culture, Denver, CO, through June 2, 2004.

Sebastiao Salgado: *Photography month*, Ludwig Museum Budapest, through June 27, 2004.

Wayne Thiebaud: *Pop! From San Francisco Collections*, San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, through September 19, 2004.

Cy Twombly: *Fifty Years of Works on Paper*, Serpentine Gallery, London, through June 13, 2004.

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Eulogy on General George Washington February 19, 1800, Boston, Massachusetts

On Wednesday, the 19th of February of 1800 at 11:00 A.M., the Academy met pursuant to adjournment at the Senate Chamber of the Old State House and from there went in procession, at 12 o'clock, to the Meeting House on Brattle Street where a Eulogy on General George Washington was pronounced before the Academy by Dr. John Davis, Recording Secretary.

The eulogy was printed in the second volume of the Academy's *Memoirs* (1804).

The illustrious Man, whose loss we now deplore, was among the first of your elected associates. It was a time of multiplied calamities. The military operations of the enemy were to be opposed in five different states of the union. A mind occupied with such immense concerns, could not be expected to apply itself to the immediate objects of your institution. Yet he accepts your invitation; looking forward, doubtless, to the happier days, when the arts of peace should succeed the horrors of war. As the first among the public characters of the age; as the pride and defense of your country, he was entitled to the earliest and most respectful expressions of your attention: but he was your associate by still more appropriate characters, by dispositions and accomplishments, altogether congenial to the nature and end of your institution.


It is among the declared objects of your inquiry, to examine the various soils of the country, to ascertain their natural growths and the different methods of culture: to promote and encourage agriculture, arts, manufactures and commerce: to cultivate the knowledge of the natural history of the country, and to determine the uses, to which its various productions may be applied.

Pursuits of this nature always commanded his attention, and to some of them he was peculiarly attached. They were frequently the topic of his conversation, and the subject of his correspondence, with ingenious and public spirited men, in different parts of the world.

[Yet] . . . he did not lose sight of *Learning* and of the *Arts*. "There is nothing," said he, (in his address to the first congress) "that can better deserve your attentive "patronage, than the promotion of Science and Literature. "Knowledge is in every country, the surest basis of public "happiness. In *one*, in which the measures of government "receive their impression so immediately from the sense of "the community, it is proportionably essential." To the Trustees and Faculty of the University of Pennsylvania, in reply to their respectful address, he acknowledges himself gratified *in being considered, by the patrons of literature, as one of their number*; being *fully apprized of the influence which sound learning has on religion and manners, on government, liberty and laws*; and expressing his confidence *that the same unremitting exertions, which under all the blasting storms of war, caused the arts and sciences to flourish in America, would bring them nearer to maturity, when invigorated by the milder rays of*

peace. To the University of Harvard, he communicates *his sincere satisfaction in learning the flourishing state of their literary republic. Unacquainted, he adds, with the expression of sentiments which I do not feel, you will do me justice in believing, confidently, in my disposition to promote the interests of science and true religion.*

It would require little aid from the imagination, to render the significant emblem of your society an apt memorial of your late illustrious associate. Let Minerva with the spear and shield, represent his venerable form. The implements of husbandry, the hill crowned with oaks, and the field of native grain, indicate his favorite employment. The rising city, the instruments of philosophy, the approaching ship, and the sun above the cloud, are lively images of the benign and happy influence of his life, on commerce and the arts, and the advancing greatness of his country. ■



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