



CONFLICT BAROMETER | 2014

Heidelberg Institute for
International Conflict Research



disputes
non-violent crises
violent crises
limited wars
wars

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Printed in Heidelberg, Germany

The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) at the Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg is a registered non-profit association. It is dedicated to research, evaluation, and documentation of intra- and interstate political conflicts. The HIIK evolved from the research project "COSIMO" (Conflict Simulation Model) led by Prof. Dr. Frank R. Pfetsch (University of Heidelberg) and financed by the German Research Association (DFG) in 1991.

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www.hiik.de/en



HIIC

Heidelberg Institute for
International Conflict Research

CONFLICT BAROMETER | 2014

Analyzed Period: 01/01/14 – 12/31/14

PREFACE

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE HEIDELBERG INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESEARCH

The "Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung (HIK)" was founded on May 15, 1990 after it had started off as a project on conflict analysis financed by the "Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)" and the "Gesellschaft für Mathematik und Datenverarbeitung (GMD)" in 1988. Inspired by David Singer of the University of Michigan, the HIK began to collect systematic data on national and international conflicts based on a newly developed scheme which took conflicts of different intensities on the five continents into account. Originally starting with latent conflicts, then crises, severe crises and wars, the current range of conflict levels is divided into dispute, non-violent crisis, violent crisis, limited war, and war (see methodology in this edition). This new distinction enabled us to see conflict as a process. Furthermore, the institute also assembled putsches (Coups d'Etats), terrorist acts as well as measures of conflict resolution.

These data was entered into the quantitative databank KOSIMO (Konflikt-Simulations-Modell), which allowed us to analyze data according to various criteria. The databank KOSIMO 1b assembled 692 conflicts with 25 variables for the time period from 1945 to 1998. CONIS (Conflict Information System), the successor, has been collecting new data on a more differentiated scheme for ten years. Students trained by the HIK are the main contributors to the Conflict Barometer. The HIK began with seven members in 1990, almost a quarter of a century ago. Seven generations later the institute counts more than 150 members. Also the Conflict Barometer has grown in volume. After a first edition in 1990 with 8 pages, the Conflict Barometer currently encompasses roughly 150 pages. Various changes have occurred during the 25 years of existence. The HIK has established Working Groups with Heads for each of the five continents, an Editorial Staff with a Chief Editor, and an Advisory Board. In addition, students for various tasks such as design, graphs, methodology, and maps contribute to the annual publication. Besides this institutionalized form, the HIK offers workshops on topics of acute actualities. The HIK has been awarded "den Preis der Freunde" from the Heidelberg University in 2013.

The institute's aim is to inform a wider public of the conflict situations in the world, to make use of this data for further analyses and trends, to test hypotheses, and eventually to make prognoses on further developments. The HIK gives students the opportunity to gain insight in conflict research during their studies and familiarize themselves with empirical research.

Prof. Dr. Frank R. Pfetsch
March 2015

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
METHODOLOGY

Since 1991, quantitative conflict research at the HIIK has analyzed political conflicts by focusing on conflict processes rather than e.g. purely quantitative thresholds of casualties of war. Thus, the HIIK is particularly concerned with the concrete actions and communications between conflict parties. Such a process-oriented approach gives the analysis of political conflicts, especially regarding intensities, a broader and more detailed empirical foundation.

Beginning in 2011, the HIIK in cooperation with the Conflict Information and Analysis System (CONIAS) Research Institute, established in 2005 and likewise located at Heidelberg University, has taken steps to further elaborate its methodological approach. In particular, the institute has revised its definition of political conflicts and restructured its conflict intensity assessment. The latter now not only takes into account the intensity for a given conflict area in a given year, but determines the intensity of the conflict processes for subnational political units and months as well. As such, it allows for a much more detailed measurement of conflict dynamics. Furthermore, the conflict actions and communications, on which the intensity assessment is based, are now evaluated by combining qualitative and quantitative indicators measuring the means and consequences of a conflict. This is intended to further enhance exactitude, reliability, and reproducibility of the conflict information provided.

THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL CONFLICT

According to the revised definition, a political conflict is a positional difference, regarding values relevant to a society – the conflict items – between at least two decisive and directly involved actors, which is being carried out using observable and interrelated conflict measures that lie outside established regulatory procedures and threaten core state functions, the international order or hold out the prospect to do so.



CONFLICT ACTORS

A conflict actor can be either an individual, a state, an international organization or a non-state actor. Collective conflict actors are distinguished from one another through their internal cohesion and internally shared goals. An actor is regarded as decisive if his existence, actions, and communications considerably alter the practices of at least one other conflict actor pertaining to the conflict item.

CONFLICT MEASURES

Conflict measures are actions and communications carried out by a conflict actor in the context of a political conflict. They are

constitutive for an identifiable conflict if they lie outside established procedures of conflict regulations and – possibly in conjunction with other conflict measures – if they threaten the international order or a core function of the state. Established regulatory procedures are defined as those mechanisms of conflict management that are accepted by the conflict actors. Examples may include elections and court proceedings. The use of physical violence, however, is never considered to be an established regulatory procedure. Core state functions encompass providing security of a population, integrity of a territory and of a specific political, socioeconomic or cultural order. A state function or the international order is threatened if its fulfillment and persistence, respectively, becomes unlikely in a conflict actor's point of view.

CONFLICT ITEMS

Conflict items are material or immaterial goods pursued by conflict actors via conflict measures. Due to the character of conflict measures, conflict items attain relevance for the society as a whole – either for coexistence within a given state or between states. This aspect constitutes the genuinely political dimension of political conflicts. The catalog of conflict items in use up to the present Conflict Barometer covers ten different items.

System/Ideology is encoded if a conflict actor aspires a change of the ideological, religious, socioeconomic or judicial orientation of the political system or changing the regime type itself. National power means the power to govern a state. Whereas Autonomy refers to attaining or extending political self-rule of a population within a state or of a dependent territory without striving for independence, Secession refers to the aspired separation of a part of a territory of a state aiming to establish a new state or to merge with another state. Furthermore, Decolonization aims at the independence of a dependent territory. Subnational Predominance focuses on the attainment of the de-facto control by a government, a non-state organization or a population over a territory or a population. The item Resources is encoded if the possession of natural resources or raw materials, or the profits gained thereof, is pursued. Territory means a change of the course of an international border, while International Power as an item describes the change aspired in the power constellation in the international system or a regional system therein, especially by changing military capabilities or the political or economic influence of a state. The item Other is used as residual category.

THE CONCEPT OF CONFLICT INTENSITY

In addition to the three constituting elements – conflict actors, measures, and items – conflict intensity is an essential feature of political conflicts. Conflict intensity is an attribute of the sum of conflict measures in a specific political conflict in a geographical area and a given space of time. Since 2003, the HIIK has been using a five-level model of conflict intensity. Under its revised methodology, the intensity levels are now known as dispute, non-violent crisis, violent crisis, limited war and war.


METHODOLOGY

intensity Level	terminology	level of violence	intensity class
1	dispute	non-violent conflicts	low intensity
2	non-violent crisis		
3	violent crisis	violent conflicts	medium intensity
4	limited war		high intensity
5	war		

The last three levels constitute the category of violent conflicts, in contrast to the non-violent conflicts (dispute and non-violent crisis). Whereas a dispute is a political conflict carried out completely without resorting to violence, in a non-violent crisis one of the actors is threatened with violence.

ASSESSING THE INTENSITIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS

When measuring the three levels of violent conflict, five proxies are used indicating the conflict means and consequences. The dimension of means encompasses the use of weapons and personnel, the dimension of consequences the number of casualties, destruction, and refugees/internally displaced persons.



For every region-month observed – for every calendar month in every first-level subnational political unit – each of these indicators is assessed and given a score.

		conflict means		
		0 points	1 point	2 points
conflict consequences	0 points	violent crisis	violent crisis	limited war
	1 point	violent crisis	limited war	war
	2 points	limited war	war	war

In order to determine the respective region-month intensity, the five values are aggregated. Combining qualitative and quantitative research strategies, the following concrete steps are taken when assessing the conflict intensities.

WEAPONS

First, the conflict observer evaluates the type of weapon and the manner in which it was used in a measure. A catalog of keywords helps to distinguish light from heavy weapons and to evaluate the severity of the weapon's employment.

		weapons employment	
		light	heavy
weapon type	light	0 points	
	heavy	1 point	2 points

PERSONNEL

Second, the observer identifies the conflict measure of an analyzed region-month in which the highest number of personnel was employed. He or she then distinguishes between low, medium, and high numbers of personnel, based on two thresholds: 50 and 400 persons.

low	medium	high
≤ 50	> 50 ≤ 400	> 400
0 points	1 point	2 points

CASUALTIES

Third, the observer evaluates the overall number of casualties in the conflict in a region-month. The thresholds employed here are 20 and 60 persons killed.

low	medium	high
≤ 20	> 20 ≤ 60	> 60
0 points	1 point	2 points

DESTRUCTION

Fourth, the degree of destruction resulting from the conflict during the whole month and within the subnational unit is determined in four dimensions considered essential for civil populations: infrastructure, accommodation, economy, and culture.

low	medium	high
within 0 dimensions	within 1 - 2 dimensions	within 3 - 4 dimensions
0 points	1 point	2 points

REFUGEES & IDPs

Last, the conflict observer evaluates the overall number of cross-border refugees as well as internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a region-month. The thresholds employed here are 1,000 and 20,000 refugees.

low	medium	high
≤ 1 000	> 1 000 ≤ 20 000	> 20 000
0 points	1 point	2 points

The region-month intensities can be aggregated to inform about the conflict intensity in a given calendar year for a specific conflict area. A conflict area is the sum of all subnational units affected by the violent conflict in question. The area-year intensity is basically equal to the maximum region-month intensity in a given area-year. In addition, the exact area-year intensity is fine-tuned by looking at the annual and area-wide numbers of casualties and refugees as the two core indicators of conflict assessment. A violent crisis can thereby be upgraded to limited war level if there were more than 360 casualties or more than 18,000 refugees in the whole year in the conflict area. A limited war can be upgraded to war level if there were more than 1,080 fatalities or more than 360,000 refugees. In contrast, a limited war can be downgraded to a violent crisis if there were less than 120 casualties and less than 6,000 refugees. Likewise, a war can be downgraded to limited war level if there were less than 360 casualties and less than 120,000 refugees. The area-year intensity is both displayed above each conflict description in this publication as well as in the regional conflict overviews.

SPECIFIC VALUE OF THE HEIDELBERG APPROACH

The revised methodology of the HIIK and CONIAS enables a detailed analysis of conflict dynamics. In contrast to many other conflict methodologies, the Heidelberg approach rests on a broad empirical basis. The number of conflict-related deaths is not excluded from the analysis, but constitutes just one indicator among several others.


This aims at increasing the validity of the data obtained. It is also tried to facilitate researchers a better tool to investigate variances in the global conflict development and to obtain a broader, more differentiated picture. The specified set of indicators guides the institute's conflict observers through the entire research process, improving reliability and reproducibility of the data. The theoretical disaggregation of the concepts of political conflict and conflict intensity, the multitude of indicators included, as well as the differentiated evaluation on subnational and monthly levels, allow for a detailed observation, collection, and analysis of non-violent and violent political conflicts worldwide.

Nicolas Schwank, Christoph Trinn, Thomas Wencker, Lotta Mayer, Natalie Hoffmann, Stephan Giersdorf, Mark Gombert, Jens Hofmann, Gregor Pawlowski



If you are interested in an extended version of our methodology, please contact us via info@hiik.de.

GLOBAL CONFLICT PANORAMA

VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN 2014 (NATIONAL LEVEL)



VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN 2014 (SUBNATIONAL LEVEL)



HIGHLY VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN 2014

LIMITED WARS (25)

WARS (21)

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Central African Republic, DR Congo, South Sudan, Uganda (LRA)
 DR Congo (Bantu – Batwa / Katanga)
 DR Congo (inter-militia violence)
 DR Congo (Ituri militias)
 DR Congo (Kata Katanga / Katanga)
 DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)
 Kenya (inter-ethnic violence)
 Mali (Islamist groups)
 South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)

Central African Republic (Anti-Balaka – ex-Séléka)
 DR Congo, Uganda (ADF)
 Nigeria (Boko Haram)
 Nigeria (farmers – pastoralists)
 Somalia (Islamist groups)
 South Sudan (SPLM/A – in-Opposition)
 Sudan (Darfur)
 Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)
 Sudan (SPLM/A-North / Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile)

THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB

Algeria (AQIM et al.)
 Egypt (Islamist groups / Sinai Peninsula)
 Lebanon (Sunni militant groups)
 Yemen (AQAP – al-Houthi rebels)
 Yemen (al-Houthi rebels – Sunni tribal forces)

Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)
 Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territories)
 Iraq (IS et al.)
 Libya (opposition groups)
 Syria (inter-opposition violence)
 Syria (NC, Islamist Groups – KSC / Kurdish regions)
 Syria (opposition groups)
 Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)
 Yemen (AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia)

ASIA AND OCEANIA

China (Uyghurs / Xinjiang)
 India (NDFB-S – Santhals / Assam)
 Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)
 Pakistan - India
 Philippines (BIFM, BIFF – MILF, government)

Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)

THE AMERICAS

Colombia (FARC)
 Colombia (neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels)
 Colombia (inter-cartel violence, neo-paramilitary groups, left-wing militants)
 Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups)

Mexico (drug cartels)

EUROPE


Russia (Islamist militants / Northern Caucasus)
 Ukraine (opposition)

Ukraine (Donbas)

GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

In 2014, the global number of political conflicts increased by six, totaling 424 worldwide. Among these, 223 conflicts saw the use of violence, marking a decrease of six compared to the previous year. The number of highly violent conflicts decreased by five to 46, subdivided into 25 limited wars and 21 wars.

201 non-violent conflicts were counted, an increase by twelve compared to 2013. More specifically, the number of disputes rose by five whereas the number of conflicts classified as non-violent crisis increased by seven.



WARS

Of the above mentioned 21 wars, three-quarters continued as wars, while three former violent crises and two limited wars escalated to wars in 2014 [→ Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territories); Libya (opposition groups); Syria (inter-opposition violence); Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)].

In Europe the first war since 2008 erupted in Ukraine. The war over secession, the orientation of the political system, and resources left at least 4,771 people dead and more than 10,000 wounded and caused severe destruction of infrastructure. Approx. 600,000 were forced to flee to neighboring countries and an equally high number of people was internally displaced. While Russia supported several militant anti-government groups, Western countries supported the government under interim president Oleksandr Turchynov and President Petro Poroshenko [→ Ukraine (Donbas)].

Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and Maghreb both witnessed nine wars. Three wars were fought in Sudan, one in South Sudan, two in Nigeria, and one each in Somalia, and in the Central African Republic. Moreover, a war affecting both the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda was observed. The war between Boko Haram and the governments of Nigeria and Cameroon, which received wide international media coverage after the abduction of 300 school girls, continued. The violence spilled over, thus affecting neighboring Niger and Cameroon. Apart from trying to implement Sharia Law, Boko Haram aimed at establishing an Islamic caliphate in Nigeria and significantly gained military strength by capturing light and heavy weapons, as well as armored personnel carriers (APC). Heavy fighting throughout the year left at least 10,000 dead and approx. one million internally displaced [→ Nigeria (Boko Haram)].

The war between drug cartels, vigilante groups, and the Mexican government constituted the only war in the Americas, as was the case in previous years. Almost daily clashes occurred

and the violence concentrated in the states of Tamaulipas, Michoacán, and Guerrero.

The only war in Asia and Oceania took place between various Islamist groups and the Pakistani government, supported by the USA. Despite an ongoing peace dialog, the conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system left more than 3,600 people dead [→ Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)].

The Middle East and Maghreb witnessed nine wars including three wars in Syria, two in Yemen, one each in Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, and Libya. Most prominent were the wars in Iraq involving the Islamic Front and the Islamic State (IS), Syria (inter-opposition violence), and Israel [→ Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territories)]. The latter, along with the inter-opposition conflict in Syria, and the conflict between al-Houthi rebels and the government in Yemen, escalated from violent crises to wars.

Syria's highly-violent inter-opposition conflict over resources, subnational predominance, ideology, and the orientation of the political system left at least 6,000 people dead by June.

LIMITED WARS

The number of limited wars decreased by six from 31 in 2013 to 25 in 2014.

In Europe, the limited war in Russia dealing with Islamist militants continued, while the violent opposition conflict in Ukraine escalated to a limited war.

Two 2013 wars in sub-Saharan Africa de-escalated to limited wars. In Mali, the former war over ideology and subnational predominance in northern Mali between Islamist groups and the government de-escalated to a limited war. The 2013 international intervention strongly curtailed the Islamist groups' power in Mali and French troops continued launching attacks on the aforementioned groups in 2014 [→ Mali (Islamist groups)]. South Sudan's inter-ethnic violence conflict de-escalated to a limited war with an increase of ethnic groups' participation in the national power conflict.

In the Americas, two limited wars took place in Colombia. The conflict between neo-paramilitary groups, drug trafficking organizations, and left-wing militants over subnational predominance and resources continued. Despite peace talks, violence occurred between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Armed conflicts accounted for the displacement of nearly 100,000 people [→ Colombia (inter-cartel violence, neo-paramilitary groups, left-wing militants); Colombia (FARC)].

In Asia and Oceania, the 2013 non-violent conflict over subnational predominance in the Western parts of Assam state between Bodos and Santhals escalated to a limited war. More than 100,000 people were temporarily forced to leave their homes [→ India (NDFB-S – Santhals)]. More than 250 were killed in the conflict over ideology and the status of the resource-rich Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) [→ China (Uyghurs / Xinjiang)].



In addition, the sole interstate conflict at the level of a limited war took place between India and Pakistan. The parties fought over international power, resources, and the status of the Kashmir region. Throughout the year, soldiers clashed at least 81 times on the contested Line of Control, involving the use of mortar shells and 81 mm rockets on both sides. At least 130 people were injured and 41 killed.

In the Middle East and Maghreb region a limited war over subnational predominance between Sunni militant groups and the government supported by Hezbollah erupted. The wars in Syria, in which Hezbollah was involved, exacerbated

GLOBAL CONFLICT PANORAMA

the conflict [→ Lebanon (Sunni militant groups)].

with 28 and the Americas with 16. (iro)



The HIIK's five intensity levels are categorized into three groups to better analyze a long-term trend. The two non-violent levels, dispute and non-violent crisis, are summarized as low intensity conflicts, while limited wars and wars are termed conflicts of high intensity. Violent crises are labeled medium intensity conflicts.

Overall, all three graphs show an upwards trend from 1945, with 83 conflicts to 2014 with 424 conflicts. Noteworthy is the steady increase of medium intensity conflicts that increases more rapidly beginning in 1990. These trends are partly explained by more readily available information. (swa, fsc)

ANALYSIS INTRASTATE - INTERSTATE

An interstate conflict is conducted between two or more states whereas intrastate conflicts are primarily conducted between non-state actors and national governments.

In 2014, the HIIK counted 347 intrastate conflicts in contrast to 77 interstate conflicts. As in previous years, internal conflicts thus constituted about 80 percent of the global conflict count. Four intrastate conflicts and the interstate conflict between Iraq and Iran ended in 2014. While there were no interstate wars fought this year, the number of intrastate wars increased to twenty-one with one newly-erupted war in Ukraine [→ Ukraine (Donbas)]. The war in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts over secession, the orientation of the political system, and coal and iron resources was the only war in the Europe region, leaving several thousand people dead, injured, and displaced. Russia was the state with the highest involvement in inter-state conflicts, mostly conflicting with neighboring states but also with states overseas.

In sub-Saharan African, most intrastate conflicts occurred in central and eastern Africa. Ten interstate conflicts were conducted on a non-violent level. Most of the wars remained stable in their intensities while the conflict over subnational predominance and resources in DR Congo de-escalated significantly from a war to a violent crisis following a peace agreement in 2013 and the Nairobi Agreement in 2014. [→ DR Congo (ex-M23)].

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT


Similar to previous years, Asia and Oceania displayed the highest number of conflicts among the five regions, with 127 accounting for almost 30 percent of all recorded cases. Sub-Saharan Africa ranked second with 104 conflicts, followed by 74 conflicts in the Middle East and Maghreb, 67 in Europe and 52 in the Americas.


Regarding the number of highly violent conflicts in 2014, the regions of the Middle East and Maghreb and Europe saw an increase by two, now accounting for 14 and three highly violent conflicts respectively. 18 highly violent conflicts occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa, six in Asia and Oceania, and five in the Americas. The only highly violent interstate conflict occurred in Asia and Oceania after an escalation of the violent crisis between Pakistan and India over international power, resources, and the status of the Kashmir region [→ Pakistan – India].

The number of wars listed in the Middle East and Maghreb increased with nine compared to six. Sub-Saharan Africa saw a slight decrease from eleven to nine. One war was observed in the Americas, Asia and Oceania, and Europe, respectively, with Europe experiencing the first outbreak of a war [→ Ukraine (Donbas)] since 2008.

The highest number of violent crises was again observed in Asia and Oceania with 56 cases, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa with 46, the Middle East and Maghreb with 32, the Americas with 31, and Europe with 12.

Comparable to previous years, 65 non-violent conflicts were listed in Asia and Oceania, followed by Europe with 52 cases, Sub-Saharan Africa with 40, the Middle East and Maghreb





In the Americas, the interstate conflict between the USA and Mexico over border security increased to a violent crisis due to the disputed use of lethal force by US Border Patrol agents [→ USA – Mexico (border security)].

In Asia and Oceania, the conflict between Pakistan and India over international power, resources, and the status of the Kashmir region was the most violent interstate conflict of 2014 escalating from a violent crisis to a limited war [→ Pakistan – India].

In the Middle East and Maghreb, three violent crises and one limited war escalated to wars in 2014. In Syria one conflict remaining at a non-violent level concerning Syria’s nuclear program and chemical weapons [→ Syria – USA]. Additionally, the inter-opposition conflicts over resources, subnational predominance, ideology, and the orientation of the political system escalated from a violent level to a war [→ Syria (inter-opposition violence)].

The average intensity calculated for all intrastate conflicts observed (2.56) was approx. one intensity level higher than that of interstate conflicts (1.62). Apart from the higher mean intensity, intrastate conflicts also preserved a higher total number of conflicts since the beginning of the long-term analysis of conflicts. (sen)

DYNAMICS WITHIN INDIVIDUAL CONFLICTS

The intensity of 117 out of 424 reported conflicts changed in 2014. While 34 conflicts escalated by one Level, 46 de-escalated by one intensity level. A change in intensity by two levels was reported for 14 (escalation) and 20 (de-escalation) conflicts. Three conflicts, namely Nigeria, the DR Congo, and the Philippines, de-escalated by three levels from a limited war to a dispute and from wars to non-violent crises, respectively [→ Nigeria (Eggon groups / Nasarawa State); DR Congo (ex-M23); Philippines (MNLF)]. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, the subnational predominance and resources conflict in Congo between the former militant group M23 and the government de-escalated from a war to a non-violent crisis.

Change of intensity	Number
Escalation by four levels	0
Escalation by three levels	0
Escalation by two levels	14
Escalation by one level	34
No change	295
Deescalation by one level	46
Deescalation by two levels	20
Deescalation by three levels	3
Deescalation by four levels	0

14 conflicts escalated by two levels. In Europe, for instance, the 2013 dispute over the secession of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea from the Ukraine escalated to a violent crisis [→ Ukraine (Crimea)]. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the national power conflict in Niger between the government and opposition groups escalated from a dispute to a violent crisis [→ Niger (opposition)]. In Asia, the conflict between the Bodos and Santhals over subnational predominance in the Western parts of Assam state escalated by two levels to a limited war [→ India (NDFB-S – Santhals)]. In the Middle East and Maghreb, the violent crises in both Syria and Yemen escalated to wars [→ Syria (inter-opposition violence); Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)].


20 conflicts de-escalated by two levels. In Europe, the 2013 violent crisis over national power and ideology between the opposition and the government in Bulgaria de-escalated to a dispute [→ Bulgaria (opposition movement)]. In the Americas, the 2013 violent opposition conflict in Panama ended [→ Panama (opposition)]. In the Middle East and Maghreb, the conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system of Egypt de-escalated from a war to a violent crisis [→ Egypt (opposition groups)]. (swa)

CONFLICT ITEMS

The Heidelberg Methodology of Conflict Research differentiates between ten conflict items, defined as material or non-material goods which are claimed by the direct conflict actors through constituent conflict measures. Two of these represent exclusively interstate items (Territory, International Power) while five are solely subjects of internal conflicts (National Power, Secession, Autonomy, Subnational Predominance, and Decolonization). The remaining items, System/Ideology, Resources, as well as the residual item Other may be part of both intra- and interstate conflicts. Moreover, a conflict may feature several items or change its item(s) over time. As in previous years, frequent combinations of conflict items in 2014 were System/Ideology and National Power, Subnational Predominance and Resources, as well as Territory combined with Resources.

The number of conflicts that featured System/Ideology as the sole or one of several items went up to 159 of a total of 424 conflicts, thereby being once again the most prevalent conflict item. Actors in these conflicts aimed at changing or preserving the political or economic system or were concerned with ideological differences, e.g. striving for a theocracy. Of the 21 wars observed in 2014, fourteen featured this item, distributed among the Middle East and Maghreb (9), Sub-Saharan Africa (3), Asia and Oceania (1), and Europe (1). Altogether, System/Ideology formed part of 99 of the 226 violent conflicts observed.

GLOBAL FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT ITEMS IN 2014 BY INTENSITY GROUPS



National Power ranked second with 96 cases, displaying very heterogeneous regional distributions concerning violence. In total, 54 of the 96 conflicts over this item were conducted violently, including eleven wars. While violence was used by conflict actors in about a third of the National Power conflicts in Asia and Oceania (7 out of 20), Sub-Saharan Africa marked around two thirds (25/39) and the Middle East and Maghreb about three quarters (16/22). The latter included wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. In the Americas, four of the five conflicts over National Power constituted violent crises, and two out of ten in Europe.

Conflicts concerning Resources, i.e. natural resources, raw materials, or the profit generated thereof, amounted to 96 cases. Of those, 63 displayed violence and nine conflicts reached the intensity level of war. Five of these wars took place in Sub-Saharan Africa, one each in the Americas and in Europe, and two in the Middle East and Maghreb. Approx. 80 percent of the 26 conflicts pertaining to resources included violent means in the Americas, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa as well as the Middle East and Maghreb with approx. 65 percent, Asia and Oceania with 62.5 percent, and Europe with approx. 28 percent.

Subnational Predominance, defined as the de facto control of a government, a non-governmental organization, or a population over an area or a population, accounted for 90 cases. It was part of two conflicts in Europe, fifteen conflicts in the Middle East and Maghreb, twelve conflicts in the Americas, 30 in Sub-Saharan Africa and 28 in Asia and Oceania. In total, five of the nine wars over Subnational Predominance were observed in Sub-Saharan Africa, three in the Middle East and Maghreb and only one in the Americas.

A total of 105 conflicts concerned Autonomy and Secession, with the latter accounting for 52 cases. While only one conflict in the Americas dealt with Secession, it appeared more frequently throughout Asia and Oceania (20 cases), Europe (15), Sub-Saharan Africa (10), and the Middle East and Maghreb (6). Of the 29 violent conflicts over Secession worldwide, two - the conflict over the Dobas in Ukraine and the one between Israel and the Hamas - escalated to wars in 2014. Conflicts regarding Autonomy, i.e. the achievement or extension of political autonomy of a group in a state or of a dependent region without claiming independence, amounted to a total of 53 cases. Nineteen Autonomy conflicts took place in Asia, fourteen in Europe, eight in Africa, seven in the Middle East and Maghreb, and five in the Americas. Of the 53 Autonomy conflicts, 21 included the use of violence, with three cases in each Sub-Saharan Africa and in the Americas, five in the Middle East and Maghreb, and eight in Asia and Oceania. Two of the thirteen conflicts in Europe concerning this item were conducted violently.

The items least prone to violence were Territory and International Power. Conflicts over Territory, defined as the intended change of an interstate border, accounted for a total of 50. Fourteen of these disputed territories were located in Asia and Oceania, eight in Sub-Saharan Africa, ten each in Europe and the Americas, as well as eight in the Middle East and Maghreb. International Power struggles, i.e. conflicts over changes in the power structure of the international system or in one of its regional systems, totaled 35. A threat of force was observed in nineteen of these power struggles this year, whereas in seven cases states resorted to violent means against one another. Conflicts over Territory included the threat to use violence in fourteen cases and the explicit use of violence in eleven. The escalated border conflict between Pakistan and India was the first highly-violent territorial conflict since 2012. (peh)

COUPS D'ÉTAT

Throughout the year, four attempted coups were observed, two of which led to a change in the state's leadership. Three coup attempts were recorded in sub-Saharan Africa and one in Asia and Oceania. Both Thailand and Burkina Faso witnessed successful coups d'états. In Thailand, the Royal Thai Armed Forces, led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha, replaced the caretaker government headed by Minister of Commerce Niwatthamrong Boonsongpaisan on May 22. The coup was preceded by major protests across the country organized by the People's Alliance for Democracy [→ Thailand (opposition)]. The armed forces installed the National Council for Peace and Order and imposed martial law. On August 21, the National Legislative Assembly appointed General Prayuth as prime minister; he stated that he would remain in office until the next elections in 2016. In Burkina Faso, the military staged a coup after tens of thousands had protested against the government led by then-president Blaise Compaoré [→ Burkina Faso (opposition groups)]. Compaoré had tried to change the constitution enabling him to run as candidate in the presidential election for the fifth time. Following the coup on October 31, thousands protested the army's takeover and the African Union immediately demanded that power be transferred to a civilian government. On November 17, a committee comprised of religious, traditional, and military leaders named former diplomat Michel Kafando interim president. However, Lieutenant Colonel Isaac Zida, who had led the coup, remained part of the government as prime minister. Furthermore, two failed coup attempts were recorded - one in Lesotho and one in the Gambia. In Lesotho, approx. 300 soldiers, led by Kamoli, seized control of the main police stations in the capital Maseru, disarming officers of the Lesotho Mounted Police Service and seizing their weapon arsenal on August 30, which led to gun fights between the military and the police [→ Lesotho (military factions)]. Prime Minister Motsoahae Thomas Thabane, who had fled to South Africa shortly before the coup attempt, returned to Lesotho accompanied by some 300 South African Security personnel. In the Gambia, on December 30, several US citizens attacked the State House in order to overthrow the government led by President Yahya Jammeh. The assailants, partially of Gambian descent, allegedly believed parts of the military sided with them. Following a short gun battle, the assailants fled, some of them to neighboring countries. In addition, in several countries governments claimed that the opposition and/or the military were planning to stage a coup, including Niger, Venezuela, Kuwait, and Sri Lanka. (sel)

MEASURES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATIES

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Throughout the year, the highest number of negotiations and treaties was observed in sub-Saharan Africa. Before the conflict over regional power, resources and the exact demarcation of the common border between Rwanda and the DR Congo escalated to a violent crisis, Rwandan and Congolese officials had held talks over the exact location of 22 joint border landmarks [→ DR Congo - Rwanda]. At the end of June, a Congolese-Rwandan team of experts started to locate seven demarcation stones along the border. In Lesotho, the struggle over a possible no-confidence vote between opposition leader Mothetjoa Metsing and Prime Minister Thomas Thabane was mediated by South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa [→ Lesotho (military factions)]. Several meetings beginning in September led to the signing of the Maseru Facilitation Declaration on October 2. This paved the way for early elections in February 2015 and the re-opening of parliament. Also in October, the Maseru Security Accord was signed, sending out three competing security officials to Uganda, Sudan, and Algeria on November 21.

The Central African Republic's government unsuccessfully negotiated a peace treaty with the Anti-Balaka militia [→ Central African Republic (Anti-Balaka - ex-Séléka)]. In the DR Congo, the Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri held negotiations with local authorities of Walendu-Bindi over ending the violence in the area, but the talks in August did not lead to an agreement [→ DR Congo (Ituri militias)]. Despite peace talks in Mali between the MNLA, HCUA, MAA, CM-FPR, on the one hand, and governmental officials, on the other, no concrete agreements were reached until the end of the year [→ Mali (HCUA, MNLA et al. / Azawad)].

To put an end to Boko Haram's violent activities in Nigeria and Cameroon, the states France, Niger, Chad, Benin, Nigeria, and Cameroon participated in an international summit in Paris on May 17. The agreed upon Action Plan included measures such as the strengthening of cross-border intelligence, the intensification of mutual border controls, and the establishment of a Multinational Joint Task Force, which deployed a 1,700-strong contingent in November [→ Nigeria (Boko Haram)]. Additionally, four peace agreements were signed throughout the year between militants of the nomad Fulani tribe and pastoralist communities in Nigeria, but none of the accords were successful in curbing violence between the groups [→ Nigeria (farmers – pastoralists)].

In South Sudan, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) and the government of President Salva Kiir signed a ceasefire agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on January 23, which was broken by the SPLM/A-IO's attack on the city of Malakal, Upper Nile state on February 18 [→ South Sudan (SPLM/A-in-Opposition)]. The peace talks resumed on April 14, yielding a humanitarian ceasefire on May 5, which lasted until May 11. On June 11, Kiir and Riek Machar, dismissed vice-president and leader of the SPLM/A-IO, agreed to form a consensus government within 60 days, but the deadline expired with no visible progress and the fighting continued. The parties agreed upon two more ceasefires on September 30 and October 20, but violence between them continued. Other active militant groups in the country, such as the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A Cobra Faction), signed a ceasefire with the government on January 7 and a peace deal on May 9, after which the militants laid down their weapons and were integrated into the army [→ South Sudan (various militias)]. In neighboring Sudan, the war between the

Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-North) and the government in Khartoum over autonomy of the states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile led to peace negotiations in Addis Ababa between February 13 and March 2, which failed to produce results. The parties met again on November 13 under the auspices of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on Sudan to discuss a comprehensive ceasefire agreement. On December 9, however, a government's spokesperson announced the failure of the peace talks.

EUROPE

The highest number of treaties in Europe was observed in Ukraine [→ Ukraine (Donbas)]. On April 17, representatives of Russia, the USA, the EU, and Ukraine adopted the Geneva declaration on the Ukrainian crisis in order to restore peace in the region. This included the disarmament of illegal armed groups, the end of the occupation of administrative buildings, and amnesty for Maidan protesters. As heavy fighting continued, the OSCE mediated another round of peace talks between Russia, Ukraine, and representatives of the self-declared Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic. On September 5, the negotiations resulted in the ceasefire agreements of the Minsk Protocol and the Minsk Protocol II. After violating these ceasefire agreements, another ceasefire agreement, called Day of Silence, was issued. Before the outbreak of heavy fighting in Ukraine, former President Yanukovich had unsuccessfully called for dialog in January [→ Ukraine (opposition)].

Despite unsuccessful negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the conflict parties reiterated their will for a just and peaceful settlement of the conflict [→ Armenia - Azerbaijan]. Additionally, the dispute over the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), between the latter and Greece showed no progress, despite three high-level meetings that were mediated by the UN in New York [→ Greece – FYROM (official name of FYROM)].

When in November the Georgian breakaway region of Abkhazia signed an agreement on common security and defense with Russia, Georgia protested the signing, calling it a Russian attempt to annex Abkhazia [→ Georgia (Abkhazia); Russia – Georgia]. This was followed by cross-party talks in Geneva, Switzerland, between Georgia, Russia, and Abkhazia, which were mediated by the EU, UN, OSCE, and the US from March 26 on, which resulted in no agreement. Furthermore, formal 5+2 negotiations between representatives of the Moldovan government and the breakaway region of Transnistria took place in Vienna, Austria on February 27 and 28 [→ Moldova (Transnistria)]. Russia, the US, the EU, the OSCE, and Ukraine also attended the meetings. The negotiations led to an agreement upon the free movement of permanent residents of the Transnistrian region possessing foreign passports other than Moldovan.

THE AMERICAS

The limited war in Colombia between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government saw the continuation of the peace talks in Havana, Cuba. In August, victim representatives participated in the peace talks for the first time. On November 17, the government suspended the talks after the FARC's kidnapping of General Rubén Alzate. After the release of hostages on November 30, the negotiations were resumed on December 10 [→ Colombia (FARC)]. Despite the ongoing violent crisis between the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Colombian government of President Santos, exploratory peace talks began in January. Confidential preliminary talks officially began on June 10, which was praised by the UN as a "historic act". On

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

October 21, ELN officials announced an agreement with the FARC to converge the two ongoing peace processes, after having both upheld a joint unilateral ceasefire during the presidential elections from May 20 to 28 [→ Colombia (ELN)]. In Peru on March 24, the government announced the start of a dialog with informal miners hailing from four regions after they agreed to give a halt to their protests in the capital Lima. The talks produced results on March 26, when both parties reached an agreement about the miners' legalization [→ Peru (opposition movements)]. In the violent crisis between drug gangs in Jamaica, alleged gang members hailing from eight West Kingston communities initiated talks mediated by the Police on February 26 and 27, with the objective of reaching a peaceful solution to their two-year feud [→ Jamaica (drug gangs)]. On March 14, representatives of the Executive and Legislative branches of the Haitian government signed the El Rancho Accords, which established elections for two thirds of the Senate and the entirety of the House of Representatives. Following the government's failure to organize said elections, representatives from the three branches of power agreed on a new accord on December 29, which contemplated the creation of a consensus government, and the extension of the terms in office for all members of the National Assembly [→ Haiti (opposition groups)].

MIDDLE EAST AND THE MAGHREB

In Syria, the war between opposition groups and the government of President Bashar al-Assad over national power and the orientation of the political system produced no substantial agreements in the course of the year. The parties met for two rounds of negotiations from January 22 to 31 and from February 10 to 15 in Montreaux and in Geneva, Switzerland during the UN-backed Geneva II Peace Conference. The talks, however, produced no definite agreements [→ Syria (opposition groups)]. In Yemen, the several violent conflicts were marked by failed negotiations. At the end of January, al-Houthi rebels announced that they would not abide by the provisions made by the National Dialogue Conference, which led to further violence in the Amran governorate. After al-Houthi rebels seized control of the capital Sanaa on September 21, a UN-brokered peace deal was struck between the conflict parties. However, the rebels refused to hand over seized weapons and control over Sanaa. Tribesmen and Shia Houthi fighters reached a new agreement on October 19 to end hostilities. However, al-Houthi militants continued to occupy government buildings in Sanaa [→ Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)]. The limited war between al-Houthi rebels and Sunni tribal forces saw unsuccessful ceasefire negotiations, such as the June 20 agreement, which failed to materialize. On November 28, al-Houthi members and al-Islah party officials agreed to end the political stalemate [→ Yemen (al-Houthi rebels – Sunni tribal forces)].

ASIA AND OCEANIA

In Asia, few negotiations were held. In the conflict over secession, ideology, and resources between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Philippine government, the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro was signed on March 27 [→ Philippines (MILF)]. This treaty was to regulate the establishment of the Bangsamoro entity to replace Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Unsuccessful negotiations over a nation-wide ceasefire agreement were observed in Myanmar between the government on the one hand and the Kachin Independence Organization and its military wing, the Kachin Independence Army, on the other [→ Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)]. (nro, osv)

In 2014, the United Nations administered a total of 27 missions. Sixteen of these were peacekeeping missions led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Missions (DPKO). The other eleven were political missions led by the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDP), among them the mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The missions comprised a total of at least 103,700 uniformed and 18,900 civilian personnel. After fatalities of UN personnel had decreased slightly from 112 in 2012 to 104 in 2013, in 2014 the number increased to 124. As in previous years, most peacekeeping missions were carried out in Sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for eight missions (see table below). In April, DPKO launched a new mission in the Central African Republic, authorizing the deployment of 8,983 UN forces. Four peacekeeping missions were stationed in the Middle East and Magreb, and two in Europe. Although most conflicts were again reported in Asia and Oceania, there was only one DPKO administered mission in that region, as many as in the Americas. Of the total eleven political missions, eight were carried out in Sub-Saharan Africa. Three were stationed in the Middle East and Maghreb, two in Asia and Oceania. By the end of 2014, the Council of the European Union, under its Common Defense and Security Policy, administered a total of sixteen missions, five of them military. While the civilian missions in Iraq, South-Sudan, and the DR Congo ended, two new civilian missions in Mali and Ukraine as well as a military mission in the Central African Union were launched.

EUROPE

Throughout the year, the EU and the OSCE hosted and mediated several negotiations between various conflict parties. From March 26 on, the EU and the OSCE together with the USA and the UN mediated cross-party talks in the conflict between the break-away region Abkhazia and the central government of Georgia. The OSCE together with representatives of France, the US, and Russia hosted the Minsk Group Talks in order to mediate discussions between Armenia and Azerbaijan. For instance, on January 24 at a Minsk Group meeting in Paris, both conflict parties reiterated their call for a just and peaceful settlement of the conflict. The EU also took part in the peace talks in April, along with Russia, the US, and Ukraine. The parties agreed on the dissolution of illegally armed formations. In addition, the OSCE was mandated to monitor the agreement [→ Ukraine (Donbas)]. The OSCE also mediated a round of talks on September 9, in which Ukraine, Russia, and the People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk agreed on a ceasefire, a humanitarian corridor, and the exchange of POWs. In March, the EU joined sanctions imposed by the US against Russia. Several of its member states also participated in the NATO-led maneuvers "Sea Breeze" and "Rapid Trident 14". On July 22, the council of the European Union established an advisory mission for the civil security sector in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine).

MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB

After NATO had transferred the combat leadership to Afghan security forces at the end of 2013, several states that participated in the ISAF mission gradually reduced their troop numbers and prepared the end of their combat mission throughout the year. Nevertheless, NATO troops carried out airstrikes, supporting Afghan military operations. For instance, on August 1, a NATO airstrike allegedly killed 50 militants and injured 20 more. On December 28, the ISAF mission in Afghanistan officially ended. However, NATO member states agreed on a non-combat follow-up mission, called Resolute Support, comprising of 2,000 forces and starting on

MEASURES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

01/01/2015.

From January 22 to 31 and from February 10 to 14, the Geneva II Peace Conference on Syria took place in Switzerland. The conferences were backed by the UN, the EU, the Arabic League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. However, none of the talks led to any results. The OPCW-UN mission for the removal of chemical weapons in Syria continued. OPCW reported that chlorine was systematically used in several cities during April. In Yemen, the UN brokered a ceasefire between security forces and the al-Houthi rebels on September 21, after al-Houthi rebels had captured the capital Sanaa on the same day [→ Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)]. The UN Security Council (UNSC) extended the MINURSO mandate for another year to 04/30/2015. The mission was mandated to monitor the ceasefire and to ensure a free and fair referendum over the status of Western Sahara. In Gaza, 20 people died when the Israel Air Force attacked a UN school, suspecting militants to be hiding among refugees in the school.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

In the Central African Republic, the EU, the AU, and the UN supported the interim government of President Catherine Samba-Panza in her attempt to mediate between ex-Séléka and Anti-Balaka militias [→ Central African Republic (Anti-Balaka – ex-Séléka)]. On April 1, the EU approved the EU Military Operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA), a 1,000-strong peacekeeping mission for immediate deployment around the capital Bangui. Also, the 1,600-strong AU-led MISCA mission transferred its authority to MINUSCA, a 12,000-strong UN peacekeeping mission. Throughout the year, MISCA and MINUSCA personnel were involved in several clashes with militants, leaving at least three peacekeepers dead.

The EU and the UN also played a central role in Mali. Representatives of the UNSC reached an agreement with militant Tuareg groups to enter negotiations with the government about the status of the northern regions of Mali [→ Mali (HCUA, MNLA et al. / Azawad)]. Also, MINUSMA and the AU mediated negotiations between different militant groups. In this context they brokered a ceasefire and the start of peace talks. In addition to the 2013-launched military EUTM-Mali mission, the Council of the European Union established the civilian EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) on April 15.

In the ongoing war between the al-Shabaab militants and the Federal Government of Somalia, the latter was supported by the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM). On January 22, the 4,000 Ethiopian troops active in Somalia were officially integrated into the AMISOM mission, increasing its strength to a total of 22,000. On May 29, the UNDP extended its mission UNSOM by twelve months. Although carrying out a civilian mission, UNSOM personnel were attacked by militants several times. At least two UN peacekeepers were killed. AMISOM also got involved in heavy fighting while carrying out joint operations with the Somali National Army against the militants. In September, Human Rights Watch published a

report criticizing the increase of sexual abuse of Somali girls and women by AMISOM soldiers.

In the DR Congo the UN MONUSCO mission continued its support of the government against the armed group Democratic Forces. Also the head of MONUSCO, Martin Kobler, mediated between the DR Congo and Rwanda over their territorial conflict. The 2007-launched civilian EUPOL RD CONGO mission, mandated to support Congolese security forces and to protect human rights, ended in 2014.

ASIA AND OCEANIA

On February 17, the 2013 established UNHCR Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) released its final report, stating that human rights violations were systematic and widespread. Based on the report, the UNSC set the human rights situation in the DPRK to its agenda and debated on referring it to the ICJ. After the conflict over the southern Kuril Islands between Japan and Russia had escalated to a non-violent crisis due to an increase in Russian military presence near the disputed area, on November 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo met at the APEC summit in Beijing, agreeing to negotiate over a formal peace treaty. In the course of the conflict over territory, resources, and international power in the South China Sea, the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration treated the case between the Philippines and the People's Republic of China (PRC) over territorial claims. In March, the Philippines asked the court to uphold its right to exploit waters within its 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) [→ China – Vietnam et al. (South China Sea)]. After the US had urged all conflict parties to reduce tensions during the ASEAN summit on August 10, the PRC repeatedly warned the US to stay out of the dispute.

THE AMERICAS

In the Americas, human rights organizations played a role in several conflicts. In Ecuador, the environmental group Yasunidos announced it would sue the government before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Yasunidos had previously submitted a list of about 70,000 signatures to the National Electoral Council for a referendum to vote on further oil exploitation in the Yasuní National Park, which was rejected. On July 29, the International Court of Human Rights ruled over a case concerning the conflict between the indigenous Mapuche and Chile. The court ruled in favor of the Mapuche claimants, criticizing the application of an anti-terror law against the Mapuche.

In the oppositional conflict in Venezuela, UNASUR mediated negotiations between the government and the opposition coalition Mesa de la Unidad Democrática, which remained unsuccessful. Although the relations between Cuba and the US improved by the end of the year, on April 30, the US Department of State again classified Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism in its annual report. Cuba along with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States repudiated the classification. (hzi)

Overview: Current UN Missions led or supported by DPKO

Mission Acronym	Name of Mission	Start	Country
Europe			
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	1964	Cyprus
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	1999	Serbia
Sub-Saharan Africa			
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic	2014	Central African Republic
UNOCI	United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire	2004	Cote d'Ivoire
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	1999	DR Congo
UNIOGBIS	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau	2009	Guinea-Bissau
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia	2003	Liberia
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali	2013	Mali
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan	2011	South Sudan
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur	2007	Sudan
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei	2011	Sudan
The Americas			
MINUSTAH	Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haiti	2004	Haiti
Asia and Oceania			
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	1949	India, Pakistan
The Middle East and Maghreb			
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	1978	Lebanon
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization	1948	Middle East
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	1991	Morocco
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force	1974	Syria

AUTHORITATIVE DECISIONS BY THE ICJ

At the end of the year, fourteen cases remained pending at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The court delivered two rulings throughout the year. On January 27, it passed its final ruling concerning the maritime dispute between Peru and Chile in which it set the maritime border between the countries [→ Peru – Chile (border)]. It granted Chile sovereignty over one of the world's richest fishing grounds while 28,000 of the disputed 38,000 square kilometers were given to Peru. Both governments accepted the decision and stated they would implement it. However, tensions over the terrestrial border continued.

Five new cases were filed at the ICJ. Without a final ruling on the case filed by Costa Rica in 2010, on February 26 the Costa Rican government again called upon the ICJ to define its border to Nicaragua [→ Nicaragua – Costa Rica (Río San Juan)]. The ICJ was very active in the conflict during the


last year. Costa Rican President Luis Guillermo Solís accused Nicaragua of digging new canals in the disputed area, thereby violating a 2013 order by the ICJ.

After the 2013 ruling of the ICJ defining the maritime borders between Nicaragua and Colombia, the Colombian Constitutional Court and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos announced they would not accept the ruling and called it incompatible with the constitution. Santos officially asked the ICJ to reject the lawsuit filed by Nicaragua in 2013 in which it had demanded additional territory.

Concerning the dispute between Timor-Leste and Australia over the seizure and detention of certain documents, known as a spying scandal, the court handed down Timor-Leste's request for provisional measures [→ Timor-Leste – Australia]. On March 3, it ordered Australia not to impede communications between Timor-Leste and its legal advisors and protected the interests of Timor-Leste. (wih)

EUROPE

VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN EUROPE IN 2014



REGIONAL PANORAMA

A total of 67 conflicts was observed in Europe, an increase by two compared to 2013. Whereas only one highly violent conflict had been registered in Europe in 2013, 2014 was marked by a sharp increase to three high-intensity conflicts. For the first time since the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, a conflict on the highest intensity level erupted in Europe [→ Ukraine (Donbas)]. However, Europe remained the region with the highest share of non-violent conflicts, which accounted for almost 78 percent of the regions' observed conflicts; an increase by three percentage points compared to the previous year. An appreciable decrease of violent conflicts from a total of 15 to 12 was likewise observed, four of them were fought in EU member states.

The majority of European conflicts were disputes, which accounted for 43 percent of the conflicts. However, the number of disputes decreased by four compared to the previous year. The number of non-violent crises increased significantly to 23 due to the de-escalation of three violent crises and the escalation of seven disputes. All of the high-intensity conflicts in Europe were fought between non-state actors and the respective government. With 18 conflicts concerning system/ideology, the latter was the most frequent item, followed by secession, autonomy, international power, territory, and national power. In addition, the conflict between Flemish parties, such as N-VA and Vlaams Belang on the one hand, and the Belgian government and Walloon parties on the other, ended after N-VA had become part of the newly formed Belgian government [→ Belgium (Flemish nationalists / Flanders)].



Furthermore, the overthrow of the Ukrainian government under Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions in February was accompanied by the re-emergence of the conflict over the secession of Crimea as well as the eruption of two new violent conflicts [→ Ukraine (Crimea); Ukraine (right-wing militants); Ukraine (Donbas)]. The fighting between Russian backed militias in eastern Ukraine and the central government, backed by Western countries, constituted the sole war in Europe. Despite several negotiations, combat action continued throughout the year leaving at least 4,800 people dead. Protests against the new government and occupations of administrative buildings took place in several southern and eastern Ukrainian cities in March and April. After the newly formed government under interim president Oleksandr Turchynov had launched a military offensive to regain control over the affected areas in mid-April, heavy fighting between government forces and armed groups in the oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk broke out. In addition, the developments in Ukraine led to rising tensions between the EU, USA, and several other Western countries on the one hand, and Russia on the other, culminating in multiple rounds of mutual sanctions [→ USA, EU et al. – Russia].

Furthermore, two limited wars were observed. First, the system/ideology and secession conflict between Islamist militants and the Russian government in the Northern Caucasus Federal District (NCFD) remained highly violent, resulting in the deaths of approx. 340. Aside from the NCFD, Russian authorities stepped up security measures in the course of the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi taking place from January 7 to February 23 [→ Russia (Islamist militants / Northern Caucasus)]. Second, after a first wave of street battles in January, the violent crisis between opposition parties, pro-EU-demonstrators, civil society groups, and right-wing militants, on the one side, and the Yanukovych government, on the other, escalated to a limited war in February, with at least 90 people killed within three days [→ Ukraine (opposition)].

Of the twelve violent crises observed in total, three were recorded in Ukraine. Simultaneous with the escalation of intrastate conflicts in Ukraine, the interstate conflict between Russia and Ukraine turned violent [→ Russia – Ukraine]. Ukraine repeatedly blamed Russia for supporting Donbas militants by deploying troops and supplying weapons as well as violating or attacking its territory. Russia, in turn, accused Ukraine of conducting artillery attacks on its territory.

In Greece, the former dispute between right-wing militants and the government escalated, while social protests and the conflict between left-wing and right-wing militants continued on a violent level [→ Greece (right-wing militants); Greece (social protests, left-wing militants); Greece (left-wing militants – right-wing militants)].

The overall number of violent conflicts in the Western Balkans remained unchanged. In the Caucasus region, the conflicts between the government of Nagorno-Karabakh and the central government of Azerbaijan continued on a violent level. The interstate conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as the intrastate conflict between the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and the Azerbaijani government continued. At least 42 casualties were counted in both conflicts [→ Armenia – Azerbaijan; Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)]. The sole violent crisis in Western Europe remained the secession conflict between the antagonistic communities of Northern Ireland. Furthermore, two independence referenda were held. In Scotland, the conflict escalated to a non-violent crisis in the run-up to the referendum on September 18, while the conflict involving the constitutionally contested referendum in Catalonia continued as a dispute [→ Spain (Catalan nationalists / Catalonia); United Kingdom (SNP / Scotland)]. (iti, jme, mcm, okl)



EUROPE

Overview: Conflicts in Europe in 2014

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Armenia (opposition)	ANC, ARC, Heritage, PAP vs. government	national power	2003	↘	2
Armenia – Azerbaijan	Armenia vs. Azerbaijan	territory	1987	•	3
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)*	Nagorno-Karabakh government vs. government	secession	1988	•	3
Azerbaijan (opposition groups)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2003	↓	1
Azerbaijan – Iran*	Azerbaijan vs. Iran	international power	2011	↘	1
Belarus (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1994	↘	1
Belarus – Poland*	Belarus vs. Poland	international power	1994	•	1
Belgium (Flemish nationalists / Flanders)	N-VA, Vlaams Belang et al. vs. government, Walloon parties	autonomy	2007	END	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian Croats / Herzegovina)*	Croat parties vs. Bosniak parties, Bosniak-Croat Federation, government	autonomy	1991	•	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian Serbs / Republic of Srpska)	Republic of Srpska vs. Bosniak-Croat Federation, government	secession	1995	•	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Wahhabi militants)	Wahhabi militants vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2007	↗	2
Bulgaria (opposition movement)	opposition movement vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2013	↓	1
Croatia (Croatian Serbs / Krajina, West and East Slavonia)*	Croatian Serbs vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
Cyprus (TRNC / Northern Cyprus)*	TRNC vs. government	secession, resources	1963	•	2
Cyprus – Turkey	Cyprus vs. Turkey	territory, international power, resources	2005	•	2
Denmark – Canada (Hans Island)*	Denmark vs. Canada	territory	1973	•	1
Estonia (Russian-speaking minority)*	Russian-speaking minority vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
France (FLNC / Corsica)	FLNC vs. government	secession	1975	•	2
FYROM (Albanian minority)*	Albanian minority vs. ethnic Macedonians	autonomy	1991	•	3
Georgia (Abkhazia)	Abkhazian separatists vs. government	secession	1989	•	2
Georgia (Armenian minority)*	Armenian minority vs. government	autonomy	2004	•	1
Georgia (Azeri minority)*	Azeri minority vs. government	autonomy	2004	↗	2
Georgia (opposition groups)	UNM, various opposition groups vs. GD	national power	2007	↘	2
Georgia (South Ossetia)*	South Ossetian separatists vs. government	secession	1989	•	2
Greece (left-wing militants – right-wing militants)*	leftist militants vs. Golden Dawn, right-wing militants	system/ideology	2005	•	3
Greece (right-wing militants)	Golden Dawn, right-wing militants vs. government	system/ideology	2013	↑	3
Greece (social protests, left-wing militants)	left-wing militants, social groups vs. government	system/ideology	1973	•	3
Greece – FYROM (official name of FYROM)*	Greece vs. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	other	1991	•	1
Hungary (right-wings - minorities)	Jobbik, National Labour Party, Hungarian National Guard, Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement et al. vs. Jewish community, Roma community	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2008	•	2
Hungary – Romania (minority)*	Hungary vs. Romania	international power	1990	•	1
Hungary – Slovakia (minority)*	Hungary vs. Slovakia	international power	1993	•	1
Latvia (Russian-speaking minority)*	Russian-speaking minority vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
Moldova (opposition)	PCRM, PSRM, Homeland vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2009	↗	2
Moldova (Transnistria)*	Transnistrian regional government vs. government	secession	1989	↘	2

EUROPE

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Romania (Hungarian minority / Transylvania)*	Hungarian minority vs. government	autonomy	1989	↗	2
Romania (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power, other	2012	↘	2
Russia (Islamist militants / Northern Caucasus)	Caucasian Emirate vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1989	•	4
Russia (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2001	•	2
Russia – Estonia*	Estonia vs. Russia	territory, international power	1994	↗	2
Russia – Finland	Russia vs. Finland	international power, other	1992	•	2
Russia – Georgia*	Russia vs. Georgia	international power	1992	•	1
Russia – Kazakhstan et al. (Caspian Sea)*	Russia vs. Kazakhstan vs. Azerbaijan vs. Turkmenistan vs. Iran	territory, international power, resources	1993	↘	1
Russia – Latvia*	Russia vs. Latvia	international power	1994	•	1
Russia – Lithuania	Russia vs. Lithuania	international power	2014	NEW	2
Russia – Norway et al. (Arctic)*	Russia vs. Norway vs. Denmark vs. Canada vs. United States	territory, resources	2001	•	1
Russia – Ukraine	Russia vs. Ukraine	territory, international power, resources	2003	↗	3
Serbia (Albanian minority / Presevo Valley)*	Albanian minority vs. government	autonomy	2000	↘	1
Serbia (Bosniak minority/ Sandzak)*	Bosniak minority vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
Serbia (Kosovo)	Kosovar government vs. government	secession	1989	•	1
Serbia (Serbian minority – Kosovar government)	Serbian minority vs. Kosovar government	system/ideology, other	2012	•	3
Serbia (Vojvodina)*	regional parties vs. government	autonomy	1989	•	1
Serbia (Wahhabi militants / Sandzak)*	Wahhabi militants vs. government	system/ideology	2007	•	1
Slovakia (Hungarian minority / southern Slovakia)*	Hungarian minority vs. government	autonomy	1993	•	1
Slovenia - Croatia (border)*	Slovenia vs. Croatia	territory	1991	•	1
Spain (Catalan nationalists / Catalonia)	Catalan regional government, CiU, ERC vs. government	secession	1979	•	1
Spain (ETA, PNV / Basque Provinces)	Basque regional government, ETA, PNV vs. government	secession	1959	•	1
Spain – United Kingdom (Gibraltar)*	Spain vs. United Kingdom	territory	1954	•	2
Turkey – Armenia*	Turkey vs. Armenia	international power, other	1991	•	2
Turkey – Greece (border)	Turkey vs. Greece	territory, resources	1973	•	2
Ukraine (Crimea)	Pro-Russian opposition groups vs. Crimean regional government, government	secession	1992	↑	3
Ukraine (Crimean Tatars)	Crimean Tatars vs. Crimean regional government, pro-Russian activists	autonomy, system/ideology	1988	↗	3
Ukraine (Donbas)	DNR, LNR et al. vs. government, National Guard, State Border Guard, volunteer battalions	secession, system/ideology, resources	2014	NEW	5
Ukraine (opposition)	Fatherland, Svoboda, UDAR, Right Sector, pro-EU-demonstrators et al. vs. Communist Party, government, Party of Regions, pro-government-demonstrators	system/ideology, national power, other	2013	↗	4
Ukraine (right-wing militants)	Right Sector, Svoboda, Radical Party, right-wing militants vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2014	NEW	3
United Kingdom (Nationalists / Northern Ireland)	CIRA, RIRA, SDLP, Sinn Féin vs. UUP, UDA, Orange Order, government, DUP, Alliance Party, UVF	secession	1968	•	3
United Kingdom (Scottish nationalists / Scotland)	SNP, Scottish Green Party, SSP et al. vs. government, Labour Party, pro-union supporters	secession	2007	↗	2
USA, EU et al. – Russia	USA, EU, Canada, Norway, Moldova vs. Russia	system/ideology, international power	1992	↗	2

¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description


² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review

³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change

⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

SELECTED CONFLICT DESCRIPTIONS

ARMENIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: ANC, ARC, Heritage, PAP vs. government


Conflict items: national power

The conflict over national power between the opposition and the government of President Serge Sarkisian de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. However, in March, four opposition parties, the Armenian National Congress (ANC), Prosperous Armenia (PAP), Armenian Revolutionary Federation, and Heritage, announced to initiate a motion of no confidence in the National Assembly, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Tigran Sarkisian. He resigned on April 3.

On October 10, the ANC, PAP, and Heritage organized a rally in Liberty Square in the capital Yerevan. About 12,000 protesters demonstrated against a constitutional reform proposed by the ruling Republican Party of Armenia. The amendments would make the prime minister head of state, granting him additional powers. Opposition parties criticized the reform, claiming that such a change would allow Serge Sarkisian to run for prime minister in 2018 after the end of his second and final term as president.

The opposition accused the government of being responsible for a series of violent attacks against opposition groups in November and December, resulting in several injuries. The perpetrators were not identified. mma

ARMENIA – AZERBAIJAN

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1987**

Conflict parties: Armenia vs. Azerbaijan

Conflict items: territory

The conflict over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan continued on a violent level.


Throughout the year, at least twelve soldiers from both sides as well as one Azerbaijani civilian were killed and another 14, including two civilians, were injured during skirmishes and a landmine detonation along the Azeri-Armenian border and the Line of Contact (LoC) between the Nagorno-Karabakh region and Azerbaijan. Breaches of the 1994 ceasefire intensified. On January 23, Azerbaijan blamed Armenian forces for firing on Azerbaijani positions in the Fizuli district which left one soldier dead. Four days later, Armenian troops allegedly killed another soldier near the border with Nagorno-Karabakh. Further Azerbaijani casualties were reported on March 28, April 8, May 22 and 28, June 19, and November 20. Armenian authorities blamed Azerbaijani forces for killing Armenian soldiers on June 5 and 19 at the LoC and the Azeri-Armenian border, respectively.

Armenian and Azerbaijani high-ranking officials held several meetings mediated by the French, US, and Russian co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group. For instance, on January 24, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and his Armenian counterpart Eduard Nalbandian met in the French capital Paris continuing their talks on Nagorno-Karabakh. Both

parties reiterated their call for a just and peaceful settlement of the conflict. On August 10, a two-day meeting between Armenian President Serge Sarkisian and his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev was hosted by Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi, Russia. Sarkisian and Aliyev agreed on the need for a political solution to the conflict. Concessions were made on October 27 in Paris, when both agreed to exchange information regarding the people who had gone missing during the conflict.

Clashes with more than 30 casualties occurred between forces of the internationally unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan, peaking when Azerbaijani forces downed a Karabakh helicopter on November 11 [→ Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)]. jme, mto

BELARUS (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **1** | Change:  | Start: **1994**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict between the government and opposition groups over system and national power de-escalated to a dispute. Throughout the year, state authorities detained, fined, and reprimanded journalists, activists, and opposition politicians. Arrests of opposition activists particularly increased in the run-up to the March 23 local elections.

On March 25, 1,500 people participated in an authorized opposition rally in the capital Minsk. On April 26 and November 2, opposition groups held rallies in Minsk drawing 500 and 300 participants respectively. Police detained between three and eight protesters during each of the rallies.

State authorities arrested opposition candidates, such as United Civic Party's (UCP) leader Anatol Lyabedzka, and confiscated campaign material. Lyabedzka was sentenced to 15 days in prison. On March 18, the UCP claimed the local elections were illegitimate. On April 7, the Ministry of Justice issued a formal warning to the UCP, potentially leading to the party's prohibition. On June 21, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka pardoned head of the Viasna Human Rights Center Ales Belyatsky. The UN, EU, and USA called for the release of the remaining political prisoners and welcomed Belyatsky's release. The US extended their sanctions against Belarus for another year on June 11, with the EU following on October 30.

jkr

BELGIUM (FLEMISH NATIONALISTS / FLANDERS)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **END** | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: N-VA, Vlaams Belang et al. vs. government, Walloon parties

Conflict items: autonomy

The autonomy conflict between the Flemish nationalist parties, such as the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) and Vlaams Belang, and the government, as well as various Walloon parties, ended. In the federal elections on May 25, the N-VA

outpolled its opponents with 20.2 percent. The following day, Prime Minister Elio di Rupo from the Walloon Socialist Party resigned. On October 7, an agreement between the Flemish parties (Christian Democratic and Flemish, N-VA, and Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats) and the Walloon Reformist Movement (MR) led to a center-right-wing coalition government headed by Charles Michel, MR. The former main opposition party, the N-VA, became part of the governing coalition. The N-VA announced it would not pursue its goal to turn Belgium into a loose confederation in the current legislation period. The elections also represented a major setback for the Flemish far-right separatist party, Vlaams Belang, which lost three quarters of its parliamentary seats. [mma](#)

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (BOSNIAN SERBS / REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1995**

Conflict parties: Republic of Srpska vs. Bosniak-Croat Federation, government

Conflict items: secession

The dispute concerning secession between the Republic of Srpska (RS) and the central government of Bosnia and Herzegovina continued.

On April 1, the President of the RS, Milorad Dodik, referring to the Crimean referendum [→ Ukraine (Crimea)], reiterated his demand for the creation of a Bosnian confederation comprising of three states and threatened to hold a referendum. However, on May 13, Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić rejected the proposal and reaffirmed Serbia's commitment to Bosnia's territorial integrity. On May 15, the UN Security Council also condemned the use of the events in Crimea to advance Bosnian Serbs' separatist agenda. On June 28, Bosnian Serbs boycotted the official commemorations of the 100th anniversary of Franz Ferdinand and his wife's assassination. Instead, they organized a separate event to pay tribute to the Bosnian Serb assassin, Gavrilo Princip.

In the general elections on October 12, Dodik was confirmed as the president of the RS, however, he lost the Serb seat in the state presidency. [ado](#)

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (WAHHABI MILITANTS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: Wahhabi militants vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational predominance

The dispute between the Wahhabi militants and government over system, ideology, and subnational predominance escalated, but remained non-violent. Throughout the year, an estimated 300 citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina fought in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Of the 300 citizens, 50 of them returned [→ Afghanistan (Taliban et. al); Iraq (Sunni militant groups); Syria (inter-opposition violence)].

The parliament passed a law punishing fighting in or recruiting for foreign conflicts with a prison sentence of up to ten years, on April 29. The State Information and Protection

Agency (SIPA) carried out the "Operation Damascus", a police action aimed at cracking down on groups that financed and organized the recruitment of Bosnian Islamists to fight abroad. The operation took place in several cities on September 3, with police arresting 16 Islamists, including Husein Bilal Bosnić, leader of the Wahhabi community in Krajina, who allegedly recruited fighters for the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Throughout the year, Wahhabis bought several houses in Bosanska Bojna, Una-Sana Canton, with the intention of establishing an Islamist community. On November 13, SIPA resumed "Operation Damascus", arresting another eleven persons suspected of terrorism in Sarajevo, Kakanj, Zenica, Maglaj, and Živinice.

In response to the operation, people posting on Islamist websites such as "Esune" and "Put vjernika" threatened law-enforcement officials. [ado](#)

BULGARIA (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **1** | Change: ↓ | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: opposition movement vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and ideology between the opposition movement and the government de-escalated to a dispute. In the capital Sofia in the eponymous oblast, on January 25, students occupying Sofia University demanded the government's resignation and the dissolution of parliament due to a number of recent corruption scandals. Two days later, counter-occupiers attempted to enter the university and demanded the end of the occupation. The next day, students voluntarily lifted the occupation, though further demonstrations took place in Sofia on May 12 and June 14 as well as in Plovdiv, Varna, and Burgas, in their eponymous oblasts.

On January 28, nearly 1,000 people in Sofia as well as demonstrators in other cities protested construction plans in the protected area of the Strandzha mountains. On March 19, the cabinet decided to enable a different construction project in Karadere, Varna oblast. Four days later, about 1,000 demonstrators rallied in Sofia while dozens demonstrated in Varna and Plovdiv, in their homonymous oblasts.

On June 27, leaders of the parties Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), the Bulgarian Socialist Party, and Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) agreed upon holding early parliamentary elections on October 5. After GERB had outpolled its opponents with 32.7 percent, nearly 700 people rallied in Sofia on October 27. They criticized the appointment of DPS MP Aleksandar Metodiev, blaming him for electoral fraud. [dve](#)

CYPRUS – TURKEY

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: Cyprus vs. Turkey

Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The conflict over international power, territory, and resources between Cyprus and Turkey continued on a non-violent level. On February 1, a Turkish warship ordered a Norwegian seis-

mic vessel searching for oil and gas within Cyprus's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to leave Turkish-claimed waters. On April 2, President of the House of Representatives of Cyprus, Yiannakis Omirou, demanded that Turkey abandon its expansionist policies. After Turkey had announced new boundaries between Turkey and Cyprus to the UN Secretary General, Omirou sent a complaint letter to the President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, on May 6. On October 3, Turkey issued a navigational warning to seafarers, excluding some sectors within the EEZ for seismic research, from October 20 to December 30. Cyprus's government immediately contested the legality of the measure. In addition, Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades declared the suspension of the UN-led peace talks on the reunification of Cyprus on October 7 [→ Cyprus (TRNC / Northern Cyprus)]. Two days later, Cyprus's House of Representatives adopted a resolution against Turkish actions in the EEZ, calling on the international community to exert pressure on Turkey to comply with international law. On October 20, a Turkish research vessel started explorations in the EEZ, as previously announced, accompanied by a naval vessel. Subsequently, Cyprus announced its opposition to any progress in Turkey's EU accession talks. On November 13, the European Parliament approved a resolution urging Turkey to withdraw its vessels from the EEZ and to recognize Cyprus as an EU member state. In response, Turkey's Minister for EU Affairs, Volkan Bozkir, declared that the EU's resolution had no validity. fmb

FRANCE (FLNC / CORSICA)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: FLNC vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The non-violent crisis between the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) and the government continued.

On June 25, the FLNC announced its disarmament and called for a political solution to the conflict. For the first time the group unilaterally offered to give up arms without any preconditions. Corsican politicians welcomed the statement while the French government remained skeptical, and violence continued. Throughout the year, gunmen killed eleven people. The circumstances of the attacks remained unclear. Police assumed that they had been tit-for-tat killings among rival criminal groups rather than revenge shootings within FLNC factions. For instance on April 14, former militant nationalist Georges Moretti was shot dead. Perpetrators also committed attacks on a secondary home in Bonifacio on June 29 and a nightclub in Cargèse on September 14, damaging both. No one confessed to the attacks.

On April 5, police arrested suspected FLNC member Cédric Courbey for having killed Christian Leoni, an alleged member of the criminal organization Sea Breeze, in 2011. The FLNC had taken responsibility for the murder in a statement on 11/28/11.

Police and judiciary continued to investigate the 2012 series of attacks against houses owned by non-Corsicans. On May 13, the Magistrates' Court in Paris sentenced Paul-André Contadini to four years in prison for arson. On June 2, police arrested another five suspects. In the context of the attacks on police stations in Ajaccio and Bastia on 05/12/13, police detained a dozen people, believed to be affiliated with the FLNC, on October 6. ado

GEORGIA (ABKHAZIA)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: Abkhazian separatists vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The non-violent crisis over secession between the break-away region Abkhazia and the central government continued. Following protests of the Abkhazian opposition, Abkhazia's de facto President Alexander Ankvab resigned on June 1, calling it an 'armed coup attempt'. Opposition leader Raul Khadjimba won the presidential elections on August 24. Prior to the elections, more than 22,000 ethnic Georgians from Abkhazian regions were deemed to have illegally obtained Abkhaz citizenship and were removed from the voter lists.

In early October, President Raul Khadjimba announced that four out of five checkpoints along the Administrative Boundary Line with Georgia would be closed. On November 24, Khadjimba signed an agreement on common security and defense with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The agreement included financial support of economic and export revitalization measures in which Russia would spend USD 110 million in 2015. Georgia protested the signing of the treaty as a Russian attempt to annex Abkhazia [→ Russia – Georgia]. Cross-party talks continued in Geneva, Switzerland, between Georgia, Russia, and Abkhazia mediated by EU, UN, OSCE, and the USA, from March 26 on. Four rounds of talks were held, albeit without yielding significant progress. The main points of contention continued to be the drafting of a joint agreement on the non-use of force, the question of IDP, and refugee return of ethnic Georgians to Abkhazia. mak

GEORGIA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ▼ | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: UNM, various opposition groups vs. GD

Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between various opposition groups, most prominently the United National Movement (UNM), and the government of the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party de-escalated.

In October 2013, Giorgi Margvelashvili, GD, was elected president. He succeeded Mikheil Saakashvili, UNM, who had been constitutionally barred from running for a third consecutive term. On March 27, dozens of Saakashvili supporters clashed with GD supporters in the capital Tbilisi during a rally after a GD supporter had attempted to tear down a Saakashvili poster. Police detained two protesters. On March 30, perpetrators injured UNM MP Nugzar Tsiklauri in Tbilisi. The UNM blamed GD for the attack.

On June 15, GD outpolled the UNM in nationwide local elections with 51 percent of the vote. Allegedly, several contestants had withdrawn their candidacy due to local police and official pressure. 80 such complaints were investigated, and four criminal cases were opened. On November 4, Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili, GD, dismissed Defense Minister Irakli Alasania who had claimed the arrests of defense ministry staff were politically motivated. Subsequently, Alasania-led

Our Georgia - Free Democrats party withdrew from the GD coalition, thus leaving it three mandates short of a majority. Throughout the year, law enforcement continued to charge former UNM officials. For instance, Saakashvili was charged with exceeding authority and the misuse of public funds. In contrast to their former policies, the ruling GD further pursued a Western-oriented foreign policy. On June 27, Georgia and the EU signed an association agreement which was ratified on December 18. jd

GREECE (RIGHT-WING MILITANTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: Golden Dawn, right-wing militants vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The conflict between the militant-backed, far-right-wing party Golden Dawn (GD) and the government over system and ideology escalated to a violent crisis.

GD supporters and police forces clashed outside a court building in the capital Athens, Attica, as three GD members, including party leader Nikolaos Michaloliakos, were transferred from jail to give testimonies on July 4. In reaction, police used teargas. GD supporters injured at least two journalists. Two additional peaceful demonstrations by GD supporters took place on February 1 in Athens, the largest involving 3,000 participants.

Throughout the year, criminal investigators took six GD MPs into custody. A total of nine GD MPs were in pre-trial custody. On October 10, public prosecutors accused 69 GD members and supporters, including all MPs, of being part of a criminal organization. The killing of leftist musician Pavlos Fyssas by a GD supporter on 09/18/13 had triggered the investigations [→ Greece (left-wing – right-wing militants)]. The investigations revealed that GD was holding paramilitary trainings. In the course of the year, parliament lifted the immunity of 14 GD MPs, the majority of whom had been already in pre-trial custody. In addition, two GD MPs were placed under house arrest.

In nationwide local elections on May 18, GD won 8.1 percent. One week later, GD won 9.4 percent in the European Parliament elections, corresponding to three seats. On September 9, the parliament passed a tightened anti-racism bill. The law contained prison sentences of up to three years for inciting acts of discrimination, hatred, or violence over race, religion, or disability. jme

GREECE (SOCIAL PROTESTS, LEFT-WING MILITANTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1973**

Conflict parties: left-wing militants, social groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The conflict over system and ideology between social groups and left-wing militants and the government continued on a violent level. Despite various peaceful protests against austerity measures, several violent clashes between protesters and the riot police as well as bomb attacks and threats by

left-wing militant organizations occurred.

The monthly demonstrations peaked on November 27, when 30,000 demonstrators took to the streets in the capital Athens, Attica, accompanied by a countrywide 24-hour general strike of private and public sectors against governmental austerity measures. The strike shut down public services such as transport, schools, and state hospitals, as did five other strikes throughout the year. Non-violent protests with more than 10,000 participants each took place in the capital on April 9, May 1, and November 1 and 27.

During a dozen smaller protests, demonstrators and riot police clashed in Athens and Thessaloniki, Central Macedonia. Throwing Molotov cocktails and stones, left-wing militants injured at least seven policemen in total and destroyed cars and shops. Police used teargas, batons, and water cannon to disperse the crowds. On November 17, commemorating the student uprising of 1973 against the then-military dictatorship, approx. 18,000 protesters took to the streets in Athens. They clashed with riot police resulting in five injured policemen and seven detained protesters. On December 2, left-wing militants and police clashed after a demonstration in central Athens in support of the 2008 jailed left-wing militant Nikos Romanos, who had gone on hunger strike on November 10. The rioters set a public transport bus and three cars on fire, destroyed shops, and threw stones. More clashes erupted during the following weekend, leaving one police officer injured. Police detained 37 persons.

Throughout the year, left-wing militant groups conducted eight bomb attacks on ruling parties, ministries, court buildings, police stations, and financial institutions, none of which caused casualties. The anarchist militant group Revolutionary Struggle claimed responsibility for the explosion of a car bomb outside the central bank in Athens on April 10. Left-wing militant group Conspiracy of Nuclei Fire was responsible for a parcel bomb filled with nails and bolts they had sent to a police station in Itea, Central Greece, on April 29. On the scene, police investigators found the DNA of the fugitive left-wing militant Christodoulos Xiros. jme

HUNGARY (RIGHT-WINGS - MINORITIES)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: Jobbik, National Labour Party, Hungarian National Guard, Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement et al. vs. Jewish community, Roma community

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance

The non-violent crisis over ideology and subnational pre-dominance between far-right-wing groups, most prominently among them the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), on the one hand, and ethnic and religious minorities, on the other hand, continued.

Throughout the year, manifestations of intolerance and racially motivated violence took place in many parts of the country, whereby Roma were the most affected minority. For instance, perpetrators threw two patrol bombs on a Roma inhabited house in Ónod, Northern Hungary region, on May 19, damaging it.

In Miskolc, Northern Hungary region, the city council, headed by the nationwide governing Fidesz party, convened on May 8. It decided to demolish 13 Roma neighborhoods, while providing conditional financial compensation. Roma activists

protested against the resolution, calling it unconstitutional. In the run-up to the planned demolition, 500 people rallied in Miskolc on June 25. However, Ákos Kriza, member of Fidesz and mayor of the city, evicted 450 predominantly Roma families in mid-July and several demolitions took place in the course of the following months. On October 19, 65 Miskolc Roma sought asylum in Switzerland but were denied and 41 of them returned on November 7. On November 29, 300 members of several far right-wing groups, such as Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement and Hungarian National Guard, held a demonstration against alleged Roma criminality in Nagykáta, Central Hungary region.

Anti-Semitic incidents also continued in the course of the year. On July 24, Jobbik urged the EU to suspend its Association Agreement with Israel and called on Hungarians to boycott Israeli products. On August 2, Jobbik-affiliated Mayor of Érpatak, Northern Great Plain region, Mihály Zoltán Orosz held a mock-execution of puppets representing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli President Shimon Peres. The Jewish community as well as the foreign ministry condemned Orosz's actions. afo

MOLDOVA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: PCRM, PSRM, Homeland vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between the pro-EU government and the opposition, formed by the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM), the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), and the Homeland party, escalated but continued on a non-violent level.

Throughout the year, opposition parties demonstrated against the planned Association Agreement between Moldova and the EU and campaigned in favor of a Moldovan entry to the Customs Union between Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. For instance on May 1, several thousands of people demonstrated in the capital Chisinau, demanding further integration with Russia and to join the Customs Union. However, the government signed the Association Agreement on June 27. On July 2, parliament backed the signing, while politicians from the opposition left the meeting in protest.

In the run-up to the November 30 parliamentary election, members of the opposition accused the government several times of planning electoral fraud. In an operation on November 26, police forces arrested five people, among them Homeland member Grigori Petrenko who was suspected of planning violent protests after the election. Petrenko then fled to Moscow, according to government officials. Police found several weapons, allegedly for the use in the protests. The same day, the Central Electoral Commission voted to ban Homeland from the election on the grounds that it had been funded with about USD 543,000 from abroad. PSRM as well as international monitors criticized the decision, while the constitutional court, PCRM, and the government backed it. On election day, PSRM turned out as the strongest party, outpolling its opponents with 20.51 percent of the vote, but the pro-EU coalition won the election. In the aftermath, PSRM and Homeland criticized the election, claiming that it had been manipulated on various occasions, and accused the government of opening not enough polling stations for

Moldovan citizens living in Russia.

Police forces raided Homeland party offices in Chisinau, Comrat, and Bălți, on December 14 and arrested several party members for alleged plans to destabilize the country. About one hundred relatives of the arrested demonstrated in Chisinau on December 16, demanding their release. tka

RUSSIA (ISLAMIST MILITANTS / NORTHERN CAUCASUS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: Caucasian Emirate vs. government

Conflict items: secession, system/ideology

The limited war over ideology and secession between Islamist militant groups fighting under the umbrella of the Caucasian Emirate (CE) and the central as well as regional governments continued. The CE aimed at establishing an independent Islamic Emirate under Sharia law in the North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD), comprising of the republics of Dagestan (RoD), Chechnya (RoC), Ingushetia (Rol), Kabardino-Balkaria (RoKB), Karachay-Cherkessia (RoKC), and North Ossetia Alania (RoNOA), as well as the region Stavropol Krai (SK). Aside from the NCFD, authorities stepped up security measures in the course of the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, Krasnodar region, taking place between January 7 and February 23. The government deployed approx. 40,000 policemen and 10,000 soldiers and Federal Security Service agents, respectively, to the region. On 07/05/2013, CE leader Dokku Umarov had threatened to attack the Winter Olympics. However, no terror acts during the Olympic Games occurred.

The number of violent incidents declined compared to 2013. However, approx. 341 people, among them 55 officials, were killed and 184 were injured. Attacks on officials and civilians were carried out frequently in RoC, Rol, RoKB, and RoD, whereas in RoNOA and SK violence occurred occasionally and in RoKC no victims were reported. Throughout the year, militants conducted about 28 bombings and 144 attacks on police officers and military servicemen. Reportedly, government forces killed more than 240 militants and their supporters and detained over 300.

On March 18, the CE officially confirmed the death of former leader Umarov and appointed Dagestani Jamaat leader Aliaskhab Kebekov alias Abu Mukhammad as his successor. RoD remained the epicenter of militant activities with approx. 200 deaths. Special forces killed at least eight Dagestani militant leaders in the course of the year. For instance on March 25, the leader of the most active Dagestani militant group, Khasavyurt Jamaat, and three other militants were killed in an operation in the village of Pervomaiskoe in the Khasavyurt district. A special agent died in the fight and three others were wounded.

In RoC, militants carried out three major attacks. On April 3, an explosive device killed four soldiers and injured seven in an infantry vehicle near the village of Yandi, Achkhoy-Martan District. On October 5, a suicide bomb attack killed five policemen and injured twelve others in front of the city hall in Grozny, where a concert attended by Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov took place. On December 4, suspected members of the militant group led by Aslan Byutukaev alias Amir of Chechnya attacked a traffic police checkpoint in Grozny, killing three policemen. Afterwards they seized a press building as well as an abandoned school in the city center. Security

forces subsequently launched a counterterrorism operation with heavy weapons to clear the building, which later burned down. The operation left eleven militants, fourteen agents and one civilian dead. 36 security forces were wounded. One day later, Kadyrov called for the expulsion of the militants' family members from RoC and the demolition of their houses. By December 28, unknown thugs burned down at least 15 houses in RoC belonging to relatives of alleged militants. On December 18, President Vladimir Putin stated at a press conference that nobody had the right to carry out pre-trial executions.

In Kabardino-Balkaria, violence occurred nearly every month, accounting for almost 50 deaths. On May 23, authorities killed Kabardino-Balkaria Jamaat leader Astemir Berkhamov alias al-Bara in a counter-terrorist operation in the city of Baksan. Berkhamov and three other suspected militants entrenched themselves in a private house and were shot dead when security forces stormed the building.

In Ingushetia, violence decreased significantly compared to last year. On May 24, special forces killed Ingushetia Jamaat leader Arthur Getagazhe during a fire exchange in Sagopshi village, Malgobek district. Six other people died.

Aside from NCFD, up to 1,700 CE militants reportedly operated in Syria and Iraq on the side of the Islamic State (IS) [→ Syria (opposition groups); Syria (inter-opposition violence); Syria (NC, Islamist Groups - KSC / Kurdish Regions); Iraq (IS et al.)]. At least six Chechen and Dagestani commanders pledged allegiance to the IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in December 2014, among them the Amir of Dagestan Rustam Aselderov alias Abu Mukhammad. In a video message on December 28, Kebekov accused Aselderov of betrayal and appointed Said of Arakan as the new Amir of Dagestan. okl

RUSSIA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The non-violent conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between various opposition groups and the government continued.

Throughout the year, opposition groups continued to stage rallies and protest campaigns. At the largest demonstration since 2012 on March 15, between 30,000 and 50,000 people protested in the capital Moscow against Russia's intervention in Crimea. 15,000 people gathered to support the government. Opposition groups held additional anti-war marches on March 2 and September 21 in Moscow and St. Petersburg, with 5,000 to 20,000 participants respectively, as well as smaller unsanctioned rallies with up to 100 participants in other cities like Novosibirsk and Yekaterinburg. Several thousand government supporters rallied at the same time. Police detained about ten opposition rally participants.

Prosecutors continued to pursue judicial and executive actions against former participants of the Bolotnaya Square demonstration on 05/06/12, accusing them of mass disturbance and attacks on policemen.

On February 24, July 24, August 18, and October 10, a total of 13 demonstrators were given prison sentences ranging from two-and-a-half to four years. Several thousand supporters of the defendants rallied on February 2 and 24. Police detained about 240 protesters who had gathered outside the court on February 24, including leading opposition figures

Aleksey Navalny and Boris Nemtsov. They were sentenced to seven and ten days in jail, respectively. Navalny was released from jail three days later but was put under house arrest on February 28 and barred from using social media until April for allegedly violating travel restrictions. The sentence was later extended an additional six months. On December 30, Moscow Zamoskvoretsky District Court convicted Navalny and his brother, Oleg Navalny, for embezzling money and sentenced both of them to three and a half years in prison, with Navalny receiving parole. That day, several thousand protesters gathered in the center of Moscow to protest the verdict. Aleksey Navalny attended the rally but was immediately arrested for breaking his house arrest. Riot police dispersed the rally and arrested more than 100 participants. On January 4, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree which banned mass protests during the Olympic Games in Sochi from February 7 to 23. Protests erupted on the eve of the Olympic Games which opposition activists deemed corrupt and discriminatory of sexual minorities. Police detained one Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender (LGBT) rights activist during the Olympic Torch Relay in Voronezh on January 18, as well as further four protesters in St. Petersburg and ten in Moscow on February 7.

On March 13, the mass media watchdog Roskomnadzor restricted access to a number of websites which called for mass protests, such as Navalny's blog. A new information security law came into force on August 1, requiring bloggers with more than 3,000 daily readers to register by name and allowing authorities to access users' information through internet companies. lmv

RUSSIA – FINLAND

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: Russia vs. Finland

Conflict items: international power, other

The non-violent crisis between Russia and Finland over international power continued. In particular, both sides disagreed about Ukraine crises-related sanctions, air space violations, and an incident between Russian navy and a Finnish navy research vessel in the Baltic Sea. In the wake of the Ukrainian crises, Finland joined all EU sanction rounds against Russian individuals and companies [→ USA, EU et al. vs. Russia] while Russia did not exclude Finland from sanctions against EU member states.

On April 2, Finland's Foreign Ministry postponed a session of the Russian-Finnish Intergovernmental Commission for Economic Cooperation referring to the "difficult international situation". On August 27, Finnish Minister of Defense Carl Haglund announced Finland would broaden military cooperation with NATO. Both sides signed a Host Nation Agreement on September 4, enabling the military alliance to station troops for military training and cooperation on Finnish territory. As in previous years, Finland joined several maneuvers by NATO states and again hosted the Baltic Sea maneuver "Northern Coasts", with thirteen EU and NATO member states participating, between August 29 and September 12. Russian officials repeatedly criticized the Finnish joining of sanctions and approach towards NATO. For instance on June 13, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs deemed that such measures did not reflect "the spirit of friendly Russo-Finnish relations". In the course of the year, Finland claimed that Russian fighter jets and military planes had violated its airspace at least

five times. For instance, on August 24, Finnish Ministry of Defense stated that a Russian military plane had briefly violated Finnish airspace west of Hango Peninsula, Uusimaa region, the day before. Russia denied the allegation. After two more violations of Finnish airspace during the following days, Finland intensified airspace surveillance, especially in the Gulf of Finland. On October 11, Haglund accused Russian navy of disrupting the work of Finnish research ship Aranda in the Baltic Sea on August 2 and September 2. According to him, Russian warships and a helicopter had attempted to inhibit the vessel from accessing international waters near the Swedish island of Gotland. mcm

RUSSIA – LITHUANIA

Intensity: **2** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: Russia vs. Lithuania
 Conflict items: international power

A non-violent crisis over international power emerged between Russia and Lithuania. In the light of the Ukraine crises, tensions between Russia and Lithuania intensified, culminating in Lithuania's active support for sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia [→ Ukraine (opposition); → Ukraine (Crimea); → Ukraine (Donbas)]. In response, Russia applied sanctions against Lithuania as an EU member state [→ USA, EU et al. – Russia].

Throughout the year, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė repeatedly called for the tightening of sanctions and an arms embargo against Russia. In addition, Lithuania enforced travel bans against several Russian government-affiliated persons on July 29. Since the end of June, relations between the countries worsened. On June 22, in the first of a series of harsh statements, Grybauskaitė compared Russia's President Vladimir Putin's action to those of dictators. The member of the Federation Council's International Affairs Committee Igor Morozov stated in response that Russia needed to cut diplomatic ties and impose economic sanctions.

On September 8, Russian authorities reopened criminal cases against Lithuanian citizens who had refused to serve in the Soviet Army in 1990-1991. Lithuania called the action a provocation and warned its affected citizens of traveling to Russia.

On September 18, Russian coast guards detained a fishing vessel for allegedly having entered and illegally fished in its waters. The EU condemned the action as a forced apprehension on September 30 and demanded the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) to mediate between both countries. However, on November 4, Lithuania withdrew its charges, accusing the NEAFC of having failed to inform Lithuania over changes in Russia's exclusive economic zone. Russian border guards restricted the entrance to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad for Lithuanian road vehicles with EU goods following another rhetorical attack by the Lithuanian president on November 21.

MEP Petras Austrevicius addressed the European Commission (EC) on November 27, demanding the EC to take action against Russia. okl, jkr

RUSSIA – UKRAINE

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: Russia vs. Ukraine
 Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The non-violent conflict over territory, international power, and resources between Russia and Ukraine escalated to a violent crisis. Relations worsened after the overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich and his government in February [→ Ukraine (opposition)] and the appointment of an interim government. In particular, both sides disagreed on the secession of the Crimean peninsula, maneuvers, airspace violations, violent border incidents, illegal border crossings, the support of anti-government militants in eastern parts of Ukraine, and economic issues.

Following the developments in the Ukrainian capital Kiev, Russia withdrew its ambassador to Ukraine on February 23. The next day, it announced that it regarded Ukraine's new government as illegitimate, hosted the ousted president Yanukovich on its territory, and refused Ukrainian requests for his extradition.

In the wake of unrest in Crimea on February 28, the Ukrainian interim-government accused Russia of deploying troops with the objective of annexing the peninsula. On April 17, Russia admitted its troops had supported Crimean self-defense forces [→ Ukraine (Crimea)].

Both parties held various maneuvers throughout the year. Russia held military exercises in its Western, Southern, and Central Military Districts, especially along the Russian-Ukrainian border. For instance, military exercises from February 26 until March 7 involved some 150,000 troops and included military facilities in Crimea. On March 21, the Ukrainian Air Force started an exercise comprising 80 military planes and about 9,000 servicemen. After the Ukrainian government launched military operations against anti-government militants in Donbas [→ Ukraine (Donbas)], Russia ordered further military exercises in its Southern and Western military districts bordering Ukraine on April 24. The same day, Ukrainian interim president Oleksandr Turchynov demanded Russia to pull back its troops and halt the maneuvers. Two days later, Ukraine accused the Russian air force of having violated Ukrainian airspace seven times within 24 hours, which was later denied by Russia. However, Russian maneuvers ended officially on May 19. On October 12, after another series of maneuvers in August and September that were criticized by Western countries as part of troop buildup on the Ukrainian border [→ USA, EU et al. - Russia], Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that 17,600 soldiers would be withdrawn.

Throughout the year, Ukrainian officials accused Russia of planning an invasion, which Russian representatives repeatedly denied. On April 7, Ukrainian interim prime minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk stated that Russia would orchestrate the occupations of official buildings in Ukraine's southern and eastern oblasts as a pretext for an invasion. Russia denied the allegations. After fighting in Donbas intensified following a counterattack by militants in late August, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko accused Russian forces on August 28 of having entered Ukraine in support of the militants. Russian officials again denied the allegations.

Both sides accused each other of shelling border areas in the course of the year. For instance, Russia accused Ukraine of

having shelled the Russian town of Donetsk, Rostov oblast, on July 13, allegedly leaving one civilian dead and two injured. Ukraine denied responsibility for the attack. In contrast, on July 29, Ukrainian officials blamed Russia for dozens of attacks on crossing points and border areas since June 5, which had allegedly left 27 border guards killed and 185 injured. Russia denied any involvement.

Both conflict parties accused each other of illegal border crossings as well. For example, between 311 and 438 Ukrainian soldiers and border guards crossed into Russia after heavy fighting with Donbas militants on August 4. Four days later, Russia arrested five Ukrainian officers for committing war crimes in Donbas. All servicemen, except the arrested, returned to Ukraine within the following days. Ukraine arrested ten Russian paratroopers for having illegally crossed the border on August 26. Russia stated the soldiers had been part of a border patrol and had crossed the border accidentally. After negotiations, Ukraine released the soldiers on August 31, and Russia freed 63 Ukrainian soldiers in exchange.

On August 11, Russia sent a convoy, consisting of some 260 trucks, to Donbas. While Russia stated that the convoy was to deliver aid to civilians in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, Kiev and Western countries claimed it "a Trojan horse". Three days later, the convoy halted near a militia-controlled border crossing after Ukraine denied access. Ukrainian officials called the convoy's crossing on August 22 a "direct invasion". However, trucks returned to Russia the next day. By the end of the year, Russia had sent an additional nine convoys to Donbas.

Ukraine accused Russia of supplying the Donbas militants with troops and ammunition after fighting had broken out in April. Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov blamed Russia for sending three combat tanks into Donbas on June 12. On November 7, Ukraine accused Russia of sending a column, consisting of 32 combat tanks, sixteen 122-mm howitzers, and 30 trucks carrying troops and ammunition into Donbas. Furthermore, it stated that at least 5,000 Russian soldiers would fight alongside the militants. Russia denied the allegations.

After alleged Donbas militants shot down a Ukrainian Il-76 transport plane in Novohannivka, Ukraine, on June 14, several hundred protesters, among them members of Right Sector [→ Ukraine (Right-wing militants)], rallied in Kiev the same day, blaming Russia of shooting down the plane. Riots ensued and masked activists attacked the Russian embassy with eggs, stones, smoke grenades, paint, Molotov cocktails, and fire crackers. They smashed the building's windows, tore Russian flags, overturned diplomatic cars, and blockaded the entrances. Russia condemned the attack and accused Ukrainian police of not having intervened.

Following the ongoing protests in Ukraine, on February 9 Russia refused to buy Ukrainian bonds despite the 12/17/13 Russian-Ukrainian agreement. On March 2, Russia said it would not provide Ukraine with natural gas for the price of USD 268.5 per 1,000 cubic meters that both sides had agreed upon in the same deal. Russian gas company Gazprom revoked two natural gas discounts on April 1 and 4, increasing gas prices for Ukraine to USD 485 per 1,000 cubic meters. Ukrainian officials criticized the increase and claimed it was politically motivated. After negotiations in Brussels, Belgium, had failed in June, Russia halted gas deliveries to Ukraine on June 16. Further rounds of negotiations led to an EU-mediated deal on October 31, with Ukraine paying Gazprom USD 385 per 1,000 cubic meters. After Ukraine had transferred a pre-payment worth USD 378 million on December 7, Russia resumed gas flows the next day. Between July 28

and 31, Russian authorities banned Ukrainian dairy products, canned vegetables, fish, and juices. jdr

SERBIA (KOSOVO)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: Kosovar government vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The dispute over secession between the Kosovar government and the central government continued on a non-violent level.

On May 8, Kosovo's President Atifete Jahjaga scheduled parliamentary elections for June 8. Early elections were announced as a result of deadlock in parliament on a number of issues, including the creation of Kosovo's armed forces, which Serb deputies, who sought more guarantees for their minority, opposed [→ Serbia (Serbian minority – Kosovar government)]. The June 8 elections resulted once again in a political deadlock. As the MPs of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) were unable to elect a parliamentary speaker, a new government could not be formed. Hashim Thaci's PDK received 31 percent of the vote, while the rival Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) received 26. Serbia had encouraged Kosovo Serbs to vote, and ultimately 53,000 did. Regardless of the turnout, the Kosovo constitution guaranteed Serbs ten of the 120 seats.

On October 23, Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj became the first minister to officially visit Serbia since the secession. He urged Serbia to agree to a peace treaty that would recognize Kosovo's independence. On November 10, Albania's Prime Minister Edi Rama visited Serbia calling on Belgrade to accept the independence of Kosovo. The Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic called his remarks a provocation, saying that Serbia would never recognize Kosovo's independence.

On December 9, Kosovo's parliament elected a new regional government with Isa Mustafa, leader of LDK. Mustafa replaced Thaci as Kosovar prime minister ending the political deadlock. Thaci was appointed foreign minister as well as deputy prime minister. On December 19, the Serbian government stated its willingness to resume EU-led talks on the normalization of relations with Kosovo. iti

SERBIA (SERBIAN MINORITY – KOSOVAR GOVERNMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: Serbian minority vs. Kosovar government

Conflict items: system/ideology, other

The conflict between the Serbian minority in Kosovo and the Kosovar government continued at a violent level.

On June 26, police in Kosovo fired teargas and plastic bullets at ethnic Albanian rioters burning police cars and throwing stones in the ethnically divided town of Mitrovica. The violence broke out when several hundred ethnic Albanians, protesting the Serbs' closure of the Mitrovica bridge for the past three years, began hurling stones and bottles at Kosovo police. They set cars on fire that belonged to police offi-

cers and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Kosovo police responded with teargas. In the end, 13 police officers and ten civilians were wounded and five people were arrested.

On December 26, Kosovo police arrested a Serbian national suspected of planning a terrorist attack in the capital Pristina, the location of many Western embassies. Police found 12.2 kg of explosives in the suspect's car.

iti

SPAIN (CATALAN NATIONALISTS / CATALONIA)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: Catalan regional government, CiU, ERC vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The secession dispute between the Catalan regional government and the central government continued.

Throughout the year, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy reiterated his rejection of a referendum on Catalan independence. On March 25, the Spanish Constitutional Court declared the envisaged Catalan independence referendum unconstitutional. On September 11, supporting the planned referendum in November, about half a million Catalans formed a "V" for vote in Barcelona, Catalonia. Eight days later, Catalonia's parliament passed a law for a binding referendum. On September 27, Artur Mas, President of the Catalan government, signed a decree calling for an independence referendum. Two days later, the Spanish Constitutional Court declared the planned referendum unconstitutional. In reaction, the Catalan government stated on October 14 that the envisaged referendum would be non-binding. Five days later, thousands of Catalans protested against the court's decision in Barcelona. On November 4, the Spanish Constitutional Court declared the non-binding referendum initiated by the Catalan government unconstitutional. Five days later, about two million Catalans, out of 5.4 million eligible voters, participated in a symbolic poll. About 80 percent voted in favor of independence. Subsequently, on December 22, the Superior Justice Tribunal of Catalonia launched an investigation against Mas for organizing the November 9 poll. pih

SPAIN (ETA, PNV / BASQUE PROVINCES)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1959**

Conflict parties: Basque regional government, ETA, PNV vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The dispute between Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) and the Basque regional government formed by the Basque National Party (PNV) on one side, and the Spanish government on the other, concerning the secession of the Basque Country from Spain continued. On January 11, about 100,000 protesters demonstrated in Bilbao, Basque Country, calling for the Spanish and French governments to take part in the peace process with ETA and to make concessions regarding ETA prisoners. On June 8, several thousands of Basque people, supported by PNV, formed a 123 km human chain from Durango, Basque Country, to Pamplona, Navarre, demon-

strating for independence. On January 19, ETA members confirmed rumors of abandoning their armed struggle. In February, Ram Manikkalingam, leader of the International Verification Commission (IVC), announced that masked ETA members had handed in some of their weapons to IVC members. The central government did not recognize the IVC. On December 20, the Basque government proposed a plan for ETA's disarmament. In the course of the year, the Spanish Civil Guard took thirteen suspected ETA members into custody. pih

TURKEY – GREECE (BORDER)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1973**

Conflict parties: Turkey vs. Greece

Conflict items: territory, resources

The conflict between Turkey and Greece over the demarcation of the continental shelf, territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, airspace, and resources continued on a non-violent level. The countries' repeated accusations of territorial sovereignty rights violations by military vessels and jets prevented the conflict from de-escalating. Further tensions arose between both countries concerning recent developments in the conflict between Cyprus and Turkey [→ Cyprus - Turkey]. Reportedly, Turkish fighter jets intruded into Greek-claimed airspace on January 9 and 22, March 7, May 30, July 9, October 27, and December 29. On April 15, Greek and Turkish jets engaged in a dogfight near Greek Samothraki Island, according to Greek military sources. On April 26, May 6, and December 22, Turkish military accused the Greek Air Force of harassing Turkish fighters. Throughout the year, both sides reported several incidents occurring in disputed waters between naval vessels.

Despite the accusations, both conflict parties tried to resolve the conflict diplomatically, most notably on December 5 and 6 when both prime ministers met in the Greek capital Athens to stress the improvement of relations. Both sides stated the intention to de-escalate tensions by strengthening economic relations. jra

UKRAINE (CRIMEA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↑ | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: Pro-Russian opposition groups vs. Crimean regional government, government

Conflict items: secession

The dispute over the secession of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea between pro-Russian opposition groups, backed by Russia, and the government under interim president Oleksandr Turchynov as well as President Petro Poroshenko escalated to a violent crisis.

Formerly part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union (SU), the majoritarian ethnic Russian-populated Crimean peninsula had been transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954. Following the dissolution of the SU in 1991, Crimea became part of the independent Ukraine as an autonomous republic. Conflicts between the Crimean government and Kiev concerning

sovereignty rights and the status of the region lasted from 1992 to 1995. The 1997 Partition Treaty between Russia and Ukraine included the stationing of up to 25,000 troops of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and basing rights until 2017 in Crimea. In 2010, basing rights were extended until 2042. Sporadic pro-Russian demonstrations took place throughout the years.

Secessionist intentions increased in the beginning of the year. Sergei Tsekov, member of the 2008 founded pro-Russian party Russian Unity, launched an initiative asking Russia to guarantee "the security of the Crimean population" on January 7. In the wake of the overthrow of the Yanukovich government [→ Ukraine (opposition)], protests intensified. On February 23, tens of thousands of pro-Russian protesters rallied in Sevastopol protesting against the interim government, appointed the previous day. Violent protests spread to several other cities. On February 27, dozens of pro-Russian activists equipped with guns and flash grenades seized the Crimean parliament and the regional government building in Simferopol and hoisted the Russian flag. During the ongoing unrest, Crimean parliament replaced Prime Minister Anatoly Mohylyov with Sergey Aksyonov from Russian Unity. The Ukrainian interim government called the dismissal of Mohylyov unconstitutional. The next day, armed pro-Russian activists backed by Russian soldiers began to seize several representative buildings and key locations such as the airports of Simferopol and Sevastopol. Russia initially denied its involvement but later admitted to it on April 17.

On March 1, Aksyonov appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin asking for help. The same day, the Russian parliament approved Putin's request for deploying Russian forces to Ukraine. During the following three weeks, pro-Russian activists and Russian troops took control over strategic points such as the border crossings between Crimea and the rest of Ukraine and all Ukrainian military bases in Crimea. During the takeover, several clashes took place in different Crimean cities and bases. For instance, Russian Unity members abducted three journalists at the Perekop Checkpoint on March 9, releasing them two days later in Sevastopol. A Ukrainian soldier and a member of armed pro-Russian activists were killed, and another two people from each side were injured at a Ukrainian military base in Simferopol on March 18. On April 7, a Russian soldier killed a Ukrainian navy officer and injured another on a military base in Novofedorivka. Ukrainian and Russian officials blamed each other for the violence.

On March 6, the Crimean parliament voted unanimously in favor of joining Russia and scheduled the referendum for March 16. The Ukrainian government announced it would not recognize the referendum, while Russia approved of the Crimean legislation the following day. According to Crimean authorities, on referendum day, 97 percent of Crimean voted in favor of joining Russia. Three days later, Ukraine started to withdraw its troops from the peninsula. However, at least half of the 18,000 Ukrainian soldiers deployed in Crimea defected to Russia. According to the UN, 19,000 people from Crimea had fled to other parts of Ukraine by October. bew

The non-violent conflict over the orientation of the political system and autonomy between the Crimean Tatar minority and the Russian-backed, self-declared government of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea under Prime Minister Sergey Aksyonov escalated.

In 1944, Soviet authorities deported the entire Crimean Tatar population to Central Asian Soviet republics and other parts of the country accusing it of collaborating with Nazi Germany. Even though Soviet authorities did not allow Crimean Tatars to remigrate until 1988, some had already returned in the 1960s. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Crimean Tatars supported the status of Crimea as part of an independent Ukraine as well as pro-Western policies and the so-called Orange Revolution in 2004. However, sporadic clashes between Crimean Tatars and the Slavic population erupted in the course of the years, for instance in 2006.

After the overthrow of the Yanukovich government on February 22 [→ Ukraine (opposition)], Crimean Tatars opposed secessionist movements in Crimea and held demonstrations in favor of the Ukrainian interim government. About 5,000 members of the Tatar community rallied in Simferopol on February 24. On March 14, several hundreds of Crimean Tatars rallied in Simferopol to express their rejection of the announced referendum [→ Ukraine (Crimea)]. Further demonstrations took place throughout the year. On February 25, Aksyonov assured that Crimean Tatars would not have to fear discrimination under the new authorities. On April 11, the newly implemented constitution of Crimea acknowledged Crimean Tatar as an official language, among other concessions. Ten days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an act rehabilitating the Tatar community for the repression under Stalin.

Despite Aksyonov's announcements, Crimean authorities searched numerous houses, mosques, and other institutions of the Crimean Tatar community throughout the year. Russia claimed that the searches had been part of anti-terrorist measures. According to Mustafa Jemilev, former chairman of the Crimean Tatar parliament Mejlis, more than 40 searches took place until October 10. For instance, Russian law-enforcers searched the Mejlis in Simferopol on September 16. Six days later, Aksyonov denied the legal status of the Mejlis. In addition, Crimean authorities banned Jemilev from entering Crimea for five years on April 22, accusing him of destabilizing the region. They banned further Crimean Tatar representatives throughout the year. In reaction, about 2,000 Crimean Tatars gathered at the Armyansk border checkpoint on May 3. Some of them tried to break through a police cordon, attempting to enable Jemilev to enter Crimea. Scuffles broke out and Russian soldiers fired in the air to stop the crowd. Local courts later imposed fines on at least 140 protesters. Crimean authorities prohibited several Crimean Tatar rallies, for example, a rally in Simferopol on May 18. On October 6, Jemilev accused pro-Russian activists of having abducted and tortured about 18 members of the Tatar community since the secession of Crimea in March. Three were found dead. bew



UKRAINE (CRIMEAN TATARS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1988**

Conflict parties: Crimean Tatars vs. Crimean regional government, pro-Russian activists

Conflict items: autonomy, system/ideology

UKRAINE (DONBAS)



NO VIOLENT CONFLICT MEASURES VIOLENT CRISIS LIMITED WAR WAR

UKRAINE (DONBAS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: DNR, LNR et al. vs. government, National Guard, State Border Guard, volunteer battalions

Conflict items: secession, system/ideology, resources

A war over secession, the orientation of the political system, and the resources of the coal and shale gas-rich Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts broke out between several militant anti-government groups, supported by Russia, and the government under interim president Oleksandr Turchynov and President Petro Poroshenko supported by Western countries. According to the UN, the fighting left at least 4,771 people dead and more than 10,360 wounded by December 25, though several estimates were considerably higher. Approx. 593,609 people from Donbas fled to neighboring countries, most of them to Russia. Another 610,413 were internally displaced. The UN and human rights groups blamed both sides for abductions, torture, committing war crimes, and using banned weapons such as phosphorus weapons and cluster bombs.

Fighting concentrated in the southeastern parts of the country, especially the mainly Russian-speaking Donbas, consisting of the oblasts of Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Luhansk, which had been the longtime stronghold of President Viktor Yanukovich and his Party of Regions. The Donbas had already shared close ties with the bordering Russian oblasts.

On February 22, in the wake of the overthrow of the Yanukovich government [→ Ukraine (opposition)], the first of numerous pro- and anti-interim-government rallies in the East took place in Kharkiv, in the eponymous oblast. At the beginning of March, anti-interim-government protesters stormed and occupied the regional administrative buildings in the cities of Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk. Their demands ranged from extended autonomy rights and the improvements of social conditions to secession and unification with Russia. Police retook control of most of the buildings by March 11. Nevertheless, rallies and clashes between pro- and anti-interim-government protesters continued throughout the following weeks and led to sporadic outbursts of violence, usually with the connivance of local police. Several people were killed or injured. Kiev blamed Russia for organizing the protests and occupations as well as for fuelling tensions [→ Russia - Ukraine]. In the wake of the incidents, on March 13 parliament decided to reestablish a 60,000-strong National Guard (NGU), mainly consisting of armed Maidan activists, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. On April 6, anti-interim-government and pro-Russian protesters forcefully broke through police lines in front of government and state security buildings in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Luhansk. At least 1,000 protesters were involved in each case. They demanded referendums on independence similar to that in Crimea [→ Ukraine (Crimea)] as well as immediate unification with Russia. The same day, activists proclaimed the so-called Donetsk People's Republic (DNR). Activists in Luhansk followed suit, creating the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) on April 27. While the government retook the occupied building in Kharkiv on April 8 for a second time, militants stayed in control of the government buildings in the other oblasts for the rest of the year. The next day, interim

interior minister Arsen Avakov issued an ultimatum to all Donbas activists. On April 11, interim prime minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk offered the Donbas oblasts more autonomy in an attempt to ease tensions. However, by mid-April, militants had taken control over Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Mariupol, and several other towns and cities in Donbas. In several cases, they equipped themselves with automatic weapons by plundering police stations. On April 13, the interim-government deployed the police and its Armed Forces (ZSU) in a so-called anti-terrorist operation to retake control over the affected areas in Donbas, using artillery, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and combat helicopters. The next day, local residents and armed activists blockaded a column of at least six APCs in Kramatorsk, Donetsk oblast, and disarmed ZSU soldiers. Furthermore, clashes ensued in several parts of the oblasts and continued throughout the following days. Reportedly, soldiers and police forces defected on several occasions. The USA, Russia, the EU, and Ukraine held talks in Geneva, Switzerland on April 17. The parties agreed that illegally armed formations nationwide should be dissolved and all illegally occupied buildings should be vacated. They mandated the OSCE to observe the agreement. The next day, Kiev announced to halt its operation, while anti-government activists stated they would not leave the occupied buildings until the interim government had resigned. After an Easter truce, the interim government relaunched its offensive on April 22. Both sides accused each other of violating the terms of the Geneva agreement.

Fighting intensified in the first half of May. Beginning on May 2, ZSU, NGU, and pro-government police launched a large-scale operation to retake the city of Sloviansk, Donetsk oblast, using artillery, APCs, combat tanks, and helicopters. Under heavy fighting, government forces reportedly captured all militant checkpoints around the city on the same day. Militants shot down two Mi-24 helicopter gunships and damaged an Mi-8 transport helicopter, killing at least two soldiers and wounding seven more. Clashes in Mariupol, Donetsk oblast, on May 9 left at least seven militants and anti-government protesters dead as well as 39 other people injured. On May 11, the self-proclaimed People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk organized independence referendums. According to their representatives, 89 percent in Donetsk oblast and 96.2 percent in Luhansk oblast voted in favor of independence. Five days later, the self-declared parliament of the DNR appointed Russian citizen Alexander Borodai as prime minister. LNR followed with Valery Bolotov on May 18. Subsequently, both republics united in the so-called Federal State of New Russia. Violence intensified in the second half of the month with dozens killed and wounded. For instance on May 22, militants ambushed an ZSU checkpoint near Olginka, Donetsk oblast, using anti-aircraft guns, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). They destroyed three APCs, killed 18 soldiers, wounded at least 27, and seized their weapons. On May 26 and 27, heavy fighting intensified at the Donetsk Airport when approx. 200 DNR militants with automatic weapons and anti-aircraft guns tried to seize it. ZSU troops responded by using artillery, Mi-24 combat helicopters, and Su-25 aircraft. The fighting left at least 33 militants as well as several civilians dead. On May 29, militants killed 13 soldiers and a general when downing a Mi-8 helicopter near Kramatorsk with an RPG.

Heavy fighting continued throughout June in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. During the siege of Sloviansk and nearby Kramatorsk, militants responded with mortar fire to the almost daily shelling by ZSU. On June 2, between 150 and 500 LNR-fighters attacked a State Border Guard (DPSU) headquarter

ter in the outskirts of Luhansk city, using automatic weapons, mortars, RPGs, machine guns, and sniper rifles. DPSU, supported by ZSU aircraft, returned the fire. After two days of fighting, militants took control of the border post and a nearby NGU base. Several civilians and at least five militants were killed. LNR blamed the government for an air strike on the occupied regional administrative building in Luhansk, which left eight people dead and 28 wounded on June 2. The next day, OSCE confirmed that the building had been hit by rockets shot from an aircraft. In the course of the month, ZSU resumed its offensive to retake the militant-controlled towns and cities, capturing several settlements, among them Mariupol. On June 14, LNR militants shot down an Il-76 transport plane in Novohannivka, Luhansk oblast, killing 49 soldiers. On June 19 and 20, heavy fighting between government forces and DNR fighters took place in and around Yampil, Donetsk oblast. Both sides accused each other of using combat tanks, APCs, and artillery. Newly-elected president Petro Poroshenko declared a ceasefire on June 20 and proposed a 15-point peace plan. Despite DNR and LNR joining the agreement three days later, violence continued. For instance on June 24, DNR fighters shot down a Mi-8 helicopter carrying nine soldiers near Bylbasovka, Donetsk oblast. Both sides blamed each other for breaking the truce.

After the ceasefire officially ended on June 30, ZSU renewed its offensives on July 1, attacking militant-held positions with aircraft and artillery. The same day, ZSU took control over several villages in Donetsk oblast and intensified its attacks on the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. After four days of fighting, militants and supporters broke through government lines and withdrew to Donetsk city. At least ten militants were killed. In the first half of July, fighting mainly concentrated in the suburban areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, their airports, industrial and mining areas, and districts close to the Russian-Ukrainian border. Both sides blamed each other for attacking civilian settlements with heavy artillery, leaving hundreds of civilians dead or wounded and forcing tens of thousands to flee. On July 11, militants with BM-21 Grad multiple-rocket launchers (MRLs) attacked a border post near Zelenopillya, Luhansk oblast, killing at least 19 ZSU and four DPSU servicemen and wounding more than another 120. The next day, ZSU carried out air strikes on a militant base near Perevalsk, Donetsk oblast, allegedly killing 500 and destroying about a dozen APCs and combat tanks. By mid-July, militants shot down at least five ZSU fighter jets and transport planes with MANPADs and anti-aircraft guns, among them Strela-1 missiles. In addition, Kiev blamed Russia for shooting down a transport plane near Isvaryne, Luhansk oblast, killing two, by allegedly using a Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft rocket.

On July 17, Malaysia Airlines flight MH 17 crashed near Hrabove, Donetsk oblast, after having been hit by an unidentified missile, killing all 298 passengers on board. Government forces and militants accused each other of shooting down the plane as well as for interfering in the Dutch-led investigation of the crash.

In the weeks following July 21, ZSU, supported by NGU and volunteer battalions, tightened its attempts to encircle and capture the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, while militants impeded the advance of government forces with heavy counterattacks. Reportedly, militants encircled government forces on several occasions. Violence left at least 1,900 people dead and hundreds of thousands displaced by September 3. Fighting concentrated in the cities' suburbs as well as on the heavily industrialized areas Lysychansk, Pervomaisk, Popasna, and Sievierodonetsk, Luhansk oblast, and Debaltseve, Horlivka, Shaktarsk, Torez, Yasynuvata, as well as

the Saur-Mogila hill, Donetsk oblast. On August 8, Borodai resigned as prime minister of DNR with Bolotov following six days later. Alexander Zakharchenko (DNR) and Igor Plotnitsky (LNR) replaced them. DNR fighters ambushed a bus carrying Right Sector members of a volunteer battalion near Donetsk city on August 13, killing at least twelve pro-government militants and taking several prisoners of war (POW). Five days later, Kiev blamed militants for a mortar and MRL attack on a refugee convoy near Novosvitlivka, Luhansk oblast, leaving at least 17 people dead and six wounded. Militants denied the allegations and accused the government of attacking the area with artillery and aircraft.

Heavy fighting lasted in and around the important rail hub of Ilovaisk, Donetsk oblast. While Kiev claimed its forces had captured the city on August 20, DNR stated it had fought off the attack. The next day, DNR fighters targeted positions of ZSU, NGU, and volunteer battalions in the city's seized areas, leaving at least 19 pro-government militants dead. In the ensuing battle, DNR fighters, allegedly backed by Russian troops, encircled hundreds of government forces in Ilovaisk that mainly consisted of Azov and Donbas volunteer battalions and the NGU. They announced to surrender the town on August 30 under the condition of safe passage, which was reportedly granted by DNR. On surrender day, pro-government forces left Ilovaisk in a column of about 60 vehicles. DNR fighters allegedly ambushed the column with mortars and machine guns, killing at least 200 and capturing several hundreds. However, the exact circumstances of the incident remained unclear. On August 23, DNR and LNR militants and supporters launched a counteroffensive in several parts of Donbas, especially in areas of Donetsk oblast bordering Russia like the town of Novoazovsk. The government and Western countries blamed Russia for supporting the offensive by shelling ZSU positions and directly sending troops with armed vehicles into Donbas [→ USA, EU et al. - Russia]. Russia denied the allegations. Heavy fighting continued throughout the following days with militants repelling government forces and capturing several strategic areas, among them Novoazovsk, the Luhansk Airport, and the Saur-Mogila hill.

On September 5, the OSCE mediated another round of talks between Russia, Ukraine, and representatives of DNR and LNR in Minsk, Belarus. The parties agreed on a ceasefire, the creation of humanitarian corridors, and the exchange of POWs. On September 16, the parliament passed several bills granting militant-held regions a "special status" with additional autonomy rights. Three days later, another round of talks in Minsk ended with the signing of a nine-point memorandum, including the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the establishment of a buffer zone.

Despite the agreements, fighting and shelling persisted on a daily basis. According to the UN, approx. 1,600 people were killed and 500,000 displaced between September 11 and December 25. Both sides accused each other of violating the ceasefire and other points of the Minsk Protocol. Intense fighting over the control of Donetsk Airport culminated on September 28. It continued in the course of the months with almost daily shelling and attacks by both sides. In addition, armed clashes took place in other parts of the oblasts, especially in the districts of Avdiivka, Debaltseve, Krasnyi Lyman, Makiivka, Donetsk oblast, and Kirovsk, Novoaidar, and Stanytsia-Luhanska, Luhansk oblast.

On November 2, DNR and LNR held government and parliamentary elections, reaffirming Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky. While the government declared the elections illegitimate and OSCE stated they would not be in line with the Minsk Protocol,

Russia announced it respected the outcome one day later. On November 6, the government officially announced it would halt the payment of social welfare to militant-controlled areas of Donbas and withdrew all government services and personnel by December 1. OCHA repeatedly criticized the decision. Following a series of failed attempts, both sides agreed on a renewed ceasefire on December 9. In the aftermath, the government blamed the militias for illegally removing coal and scrap metal from Kiev-controlled area. The OSCE stated various times that coal trucks and trains left militant-held territory towards Russia. From December 24 to 26, another round of talks took place in Minsk, resulting in further exchanges of POWs. vap, mcm

UKRAINE (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: Fatherland, Svoboda, UDAR, Right Sector, pro-EU-demonstrators et al. vs. Communist Party, government, Party of Regions, pro-government-demonstrators

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power, other

The violent crisis over national power, socio-economic conditions, and the orientation of the political system between pro-EU-demonstrators, various societal groups, including far-right-wing nationalists, and three opposition parties (Fatherland, Svoboda and UDAR), and the government of President Viktor Yanukovich from the Party of Regions escalated to a limited war. Demonstrations and clashes around Independence Square (Maidan) in the capital Kiev, which had begun on 11/21/13 after the Yanukovich government had suspended the signing of an association agreement with the EU, and which had spread to several other parts of the country, intensified in the first two months of 2014. This culminated in an outburst of violence in Kiev in mid-February. Following the overthrow of the Yanukovich government on February 22, further pro- and anti-government protests and clashes took place nationwide. In total, the conflict left at least 167 people dead and hundreds more injured.

After the protests decreased in the last two weeks of December 2013, minor scuffles as well as pro- and anti-government demonstrations occurred with several hundred anti-government protesters continuing to camp on Maidan in the first weeks of January. On January 16, parliament passed several laws restricting freedom of opinion, demonstration, and assembly. While several oppositional factions, among them communists and independent MPs, also backed the bills, Fatherland, Svoboda, and UDAR criticized them as illegitimate. The same day, about 10,000 pro-government protesters rallied in front of the parliament.

Three days later, about 200,000 demonstrators took to the streets in Kiev against the government and the new anti-protest laws. That evening, several hundred demonstrators and rioters, among them right-wing militants from Svoboda and Right Sector [→ Ukraine (Right-wing militants)], attacked police forces with sticks, chains, stones, petards, and fire-bombs and set a number of police vehicles on fire. Police forces responded by using plastic bullets, stun grenades, teargas, and water cannon. Maidan activists blamed the government for deploying agent provocateurs. Riots and demonstrations in Kiev continued the following two days,

leaving three demonstrators dead and about 1,500 injured, according to opposition activists. At least 195 police officers sought medical treatment and police detained at least 71 people. On January 20, Yanukovich called for dialog and an end to violence. The following days, several talks between government and leaders of the opposition took place with the latter refusing an invitation to form a national unity coalition. Meanwhile, protests in other parts of the country intensified. On January 23, hundreds of demonstrators and activists stormed regional government buildings in several western oblasts, among them Lviv, Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Ternopil. For instance in the city of Lviv, about 2,000 demonstrators occupied the regional state administration building and forced the local governor to resign. The occupation of government buildings in Kiev and several oblasts continued throughout the following days and left several people dead or injured. On January 27, the government announced it would revoke the criticized anti-protest laws and offered amnesty for arrested anti-government activists on the condition that they leave all occupied buildings. The next day, parliament annulled the laws and Prime Minister Mykola Azarov and his cabinet resigned. Nevertheless, the opposition continued to call for Yanukovich's resignation and protests persisted.

Two days after the last of the 234 detainees had been released on February 14, anti-government activists vacated the occupied buildings in Kiev and in several other cities. On February 18, thousands of demonstrators started a rally from Maidan to parliament demanding that the constitutional reforms limiting presidential powers be sped up. Clashes ensued after activists had attacked police lines with bricks, paving stones, clubs, air pistols, petrol bombs, and automatic weapons. Several activists stormed administrative buildings as well as offices of the ruling Party of Regions. Police forces responded by using smoke and stun grenades, teargas, water cannon, and plastic bullets attempting to repel demonstrators and to storm the protest camp on Maidan. Opposition activists accused police snipers of shooting demonstrators. The same day, activists stormed regional government and security buildings in the western cities of Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, and Zhytomyr and formed parallel regional governments. Renewed clashes took place in Kiev on February 20. Police forces and protesters accused each other of instigating the violence. Street battles erupted after activists broke through police lines near Maidan. Demonstrators attacked police forces with axes, knives, truncheons, and petrol bombs and set a number of cars on fire. Police forces responded with stun grenades and water cannon. In addition, both sides accused each other of using sniper rifles. Activists reoccupied government buildings, forced riot police to retreat and captured 67 of them, who were released the next day. In total, the clashes between February 18 and 20 left at least 90 people dead, among them 17 police officers. An investigation on the killings, later initiated by the interim government, resulted in the detention of three former heavily armed riot police members, but the exact circumstances remained unclear.

Through the mediation of the EU, Yanukovich and opposition leaders signed a deal to overcome the political crisis the next day. They agreed to restore the 2004 Constitution, to form a national unity coalition, and to hold early elections. However, anti-government protesters still demanded the resignation of Yanukovich, who went to the eastern city of Kharkiv on January 21. The next day, parliament removed Yanukovich from power and decided to hold early presidential elections on May 25. In the following days, parliament appointed Oleksandr Turchynov and Arseniy Yatsenyuk, both members of the Fatherland Party, as interim president and as interim

UKRAINE (RIGHT-WING MILITANTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: Right Sector, Svoboda, Radical Party, right-wing militants vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

A violent crisis over national power, the orientation of the political system, and ideology emerged between the far-right-wing parties Svoboda and Radical Party as well as paramilitary organizations such as the Right Sector, and the government. Far right-wing activists actively took part in clashes and occupations of government buildings in the wake of protests against the government of Viktor Yanukovich [→ Ukraine (opposition)]. In January and February, according to Right Sector leader Dmytro Yarosh, at least 500 Right Sector fighters engaged in clashes with police forces in the capital Kiev. For instance, Right Sector members took part in the seizing of the ministry of agrarian policy on January 24. After the overthrow of the Yanukovich government in February, three members of Svoboda were appointed ministers of the interim government on February 27.

On March 15, Right Sector created the eponymous party. Three days later, at least five men, among them Svoboda party members, seized the office of Oleksandr Panteleymonov, president of the National Television Company of Ukraine (HTKY). They beat him and tried to force him to sign a resignation letter after HTKY had broadcasted the Crimea ascension ceremony [→ Ukraine (Crimea)]. Svoboda leader Oleg Tyahnybok as well as members of the interim government condemned the attack. Right Sector member Oleksandr Muzychko was abducted and shot dead in Rivne, in the eponymous oblast, under unclear circumstances on March 24. At least 1,000 Right Sector members rallied in Kiev three days later, attempting to storm the parliament building, blaming the interim interior ministry under Arsen Avakov and demanding his resignation. After further incidents, parliament ordered on April 1 the disarmament of all unofficial vigilante groups, mainly affecting right-wing paramilitaries. Right Sector members repeatedly criticized the decision. However, far right-wing activists attacked and stormed other government buildings in the course of the year.

Several hundreds of members of far right-wing parties and organizations engaged in the violence in the east, after fighting had erupted between government forces and Russian backed anti-government militants in the eastern oblasts of Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Luhansk [→ Ukraine (Donbas)]. For instance, Yarosh announced the formation of a volunteer battalion named "Donbass" to support pro-government forces in Donbas on April 24. In the wake of several arrests of right-wing militants nationwide, Yarosh issued a 48-hours ultimatum, demanding the release of the detainees as well as the dismissal of Deputy Interior Minister Vladimir Yevdokimov and threatening to withdraw his fighters from Donbas on August 17. Yarosh canceled the ultimatum after the government had fulfilled some of the demands the same day.

Throughout the year, human rights organizations such as Amnesty International (AI) blamed right-wing militants from Ukraine and Russia for committing war crimes in Donbas. For example, AI blamed Right Sector for blockading the delivering of humanitarian aid to Donbas oblasts on December 24. In the course of the year, right-wing militants were accused of dozens of attacks on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender

prime minister, respectively. Members of Yanukovich's Party of Regions backed the bills and appointments. While the EU and several Western European countries acknowledged the interim government on February 24, Russia called the dismissal of Yanukovich and the interim government unconstitutional. Russia granted Yanukovich asylum, suspended financial assistance to Ukraine, and recalled its ambassador [→ Russia - Ukraine]. In late February, protests for and against the interim government took place countrywide. On February 23, protests in the East escalated after parliament banned Russian as a second official language. Protesters supporting the interim government demonstrated especially in western oblasts, but also in several eastern and southern parts of the country, for instance in Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa on March 2. Protesters in favor of the ousted government in particular rallied in eastern oblasts, the stronghold of the Party of Regions, for instance in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Luhansk [→ Ukraine (Donbas)]. Further anti-interim-government demonstrations took place in the Southeastern cities of Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa on March 1 and in Zaporizhia on April 6. On April 7, clashes erupted in Mykolaiv, in the homonymous oblast, between several hundreds of pro and anti-interim-government activists, which left 15 people injured. On April 25, a grenade attack on a pro-interim-government checkpoint in Odesa left seven people injured, including one police officer.

On May 2, about 1,500 pro-interim-government protesters, hooligans, and members of the Right Sector as well as 300 anti-interim-government demonstrators and pro-Russian activists rallied in Odesa. Clashes erupted with both sides attacking each other with petrol bombs and automatic weapons. According to UN, clashes left eight people dead. Later that day, anti-interim-government and pro-Russian protesters withdrew to a trade-union building which was stormed by pro-interim-government activists. The building was set on fire, killing at least 38. The circumstances of the fire remained unclear. In total, about 247 people, among them 22 police officers, were injured. Police arrested at least 105 people. Two days later, hundreds of pro-Russian activists stormed the police headquarter in Odesa and released 67 detainees.

After the Odesa clashes, sporadic protests and rallies continued. In particular, protesters did not vacate occupied buildings in Kiev and maintained a permanent camp on Maidan. Clashes erupted between activists and the police as well as the National Guard when municipal workers began to clear Maidan on August 7. Activists attacked police forces with Molotov cocktails, bats, and stones. Security forces responded with teargas. Clashes continued until August 9 and left several people, among them at least four police officers, injured.

On May 25, Petro Poroshenko was elected president with 55 percent of votes. He signed the Association Agreement between Ukraine and EU on June 27. After the dissolution of parliament on August 25, parliamentary elections took place on October 26. The government took measures against members and supporters of the ousted government as well as against opposition groups. On May 19, the Ministry of Justice launched prohibition proceedings against the Communist Party, but deferred them indefinitely on September 4. On September 25, the Interior Ministry launched an investigation against 24 MP's from the Party of Regions and the Communist Party for infringement of territorial integrity and sovereignty. On October 9, Poroshenko signed a so-called lustration law aimed at excluding officials who had worked under the Yanukovich government for more than one year.

bew, mcm

(LGBT) and communist activists as well as on members of the Jewish community and supporters of the ousted Yanukovich government nationwide.

Despite Svoboda and Right Sector not meeting the five percent threshold for parliamentary elections on October 26, members of far right-wing organizations and groups became MPs on the lists of other parties or as independent candidates. In the same elections, the Radical Party won 22 of the 450 seats. vap

UNITED KINGDOM (NATIONALISTS / NORTHERN IRELAND)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1968**

Conflict parties: CIRA, RIRA, SDLP, Sinn Féin vs. Alliance Party, DUP, government, Orange Order, UDA, UUP, UVF

Conflict items: secession

The violent crisis between the antagonistic communities over the secession of Northern Ireland (N-IRL) from the United Kingdom continued.

After the 2013 talks on parades, flags, and the legacy of the past had ended without any agreement on 12/31/2013, First Minister of N-IRL Peter Robinson (Democratic Unionist Party) stated on January 1 and 10 that the US mediator Richard Haass's proposals were not balanced and more work was needed to reach consensus. While nationalist parties Sinn Féin (SF) and the Social Democratic and Labour party backed the proposals, unionists criticized them. A new round of cross-party talks started on October 16 and lasted for several weeks. Parties reached an agreement over several controversial issues on December 23. For instance, they settled on establishing a special commission on flags, culture, and tradition by 06/15 as well as on reforms in the welfare sector. Members of the British and Irish governments welcomed the agreement.

Police arrested SF-leader Gerry Adams on April 30 after he had voluntarily presented himself to a police station in Antrim, N-IRL, to testify over Jean McConville's murder by the Irish Republican Army in 1972. Adams denied his involvement. Members of SF claimed the arrest was politically motivated and held a rally demanding the release of their leader in East Belfast on May 3. Adams was released the next day.

Sectarian violence continued throughout the year, leaving several members of the communities and police officers injured. The Parades Commission, set up to mediate disputes concerning parades in N-IRL, convened on July 3. For the second year in a row, they banned the Protestant Orange Order's parade along a contentious road in north Belfast on Twelfth of July, an Ulster Protestant celebration day. Members of the Orange Order expressed their disappointment with the decision. On the day of the parade, tens of thousands of people took part in celebrations across N-IRL. Compared to previous years, the number of clashes decreased. Nevertheless, clashes in various parts of Belfast left three people injured. Police arrested eight suspects. Furthermore, the Orange Order accused republicans of targeting their meeting places in N-IRL and the Republic of Ireland (IRL). For instance, an Orange Hall burned down and a Presbyterian church was allegedly set on fire by republicans in Convoy, County Donegal, IRL, on October 3. First and deputy first ministers of N-IRL condemned the attacks. By the end of October, at least 1,267

police officers were injured on duty, the majority of them in clashes during sectarian parades and protests, according to the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

As in previous years, republican and loyalist paramilitary activity continued. The Loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) was blamed for attacks on party offices, private houses, and republican institutions. For instance, Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness from SF blamed the UVF for a series of paint and petrol bomb attacks on offices of the cross-community Alliance Party in East Belfast beginning on April 29. Dissident republicans took responsibility for dozens of attacks. For instance, members of the Real Irish Republican Army sent letter bombs to career offices of the British army in south-east England between February 11 and 13. At least 50 so-called punishment attacks, carried out by loyalist or republican groups against members of their own community, occurred in the course of the year, the highest number of paramilitary shootings in N-IRL in years. Attacks concentrated on Belfast and Londonderry. mcm

UNITED KINGDOM (SCOTTISH NATIONALISTS / SCOTLAND)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: SNP, Scottish Green Party, SSP et al. vs. government, Labour Party, pro-union supporters

Conflict items: secession

The secession conflict between the Scottish regional government, formed by the Scottish National Party (SNP), backed by several minor parties and social groups, and the central government, backed by the Labour Party and pro-union groups, escalated but remained non-violent.

In the run-up to the referendum on Scottish independence on September 18, British Prime Minister David Cameron (Conservative Party) called several times on the people of Scotland to stay in the United Kingdom (UK), while Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond (SNP) pushed for an independent country. Both camps accused each other of negative campaigning throughout the year.

On September 1, police chiefs and Scottish politicians urged both sides to keep their campaigns civil and peaceful after minor scuffles had erupted in several parts of the country. With Cameron, Ed Miliband (Labour Party), and Nick Clegg (Liberal Democrats), the leaders of Britain's biggest parties went with up to 100 other British politicians to Scotland on September 9, aiming at support the no-independence-campaign. They reiterated promises to grant Scotland more tax and law-making powers if it opted to remain part of the UK.

After 55 percent of Scottish voters had rejected independence on referendum day, Salmond accepted the outcome and announced his resignation as first minister. Cameron welcomed the result and announced the establishment of a commission on granting more powers to the Scottish Parliament under the direction of businessman Robert Smith. On November 14, Salmond's designated successor Nicola Sturgeon stated that another referendum was still a possibility in the near future. The Scottish Parliament elected Sturgeon as first minister of Scotland on November 19. The Smith commission published its recommendations on November 27. Sturgeon criticized them the same day, stating that too

few powers would be transferred to Scotland.

Despite a peaceful referendum campaign throughout the year, several arrests and scuffles took place. For instance, police arrested six people in Glasgow on September 20, after a group of pro-union supporters had broken through police lines and attacked pro-independence supporters. mcm

USA, EU ET AL. – RUSSIA

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: USA, EU, Canada, Norway, Moldova vs. Russia

Conflict items: system/ideology, international power

The dispute over international power and ideological differences between the USA and Russia escalated to a non-violent crisis. The EU, Canada, Moldova, and Norway joined the US in the handling of the Ukrainian crises. In particular, both sides accused each other of supporting the respective parties in Donbas and fuelling tensions Ukraine-wide.

Throughout the year, both sides applied various rounds of sanctions against each other. In response to Russian military maneuvers [→ Russia - Ukraine] and the Russian-backed secession of Crimea [→ Ukraine (Crimea)], the US imposed negative sanctions such as travel bans and asset freezes on Russia on March 17. The same day, EU also issued restrictive measures. Canada and Norway joined the sanctions against Russia on March 17 and March 31. In the course of year, further countries, such as Japan [→ Japan – Russia], joined them. On March 20 and 23, Russia responded by issuing

travel bans to nine members of the US administration and 13 Canadian officials, including MPs. After further rounds of mutual sanctions, Russia issued import restrictions regarding food, agricultural products, and raw material imports from countries that had issued or supported sanctions against the country, including the US, Canada, all EU member states, and Moldova, on August 6.

In response to the crises in Ukraine, the US also discontinued talks over further disarmament of nuclear missile systems with Russia on April 3. Before the NATO summit in Newport and Cardiff, United Kingdom, on September 4, the US and three other NATO member states officially announced for the first time that Russia was to be part of the Alliance's Missile Defense measures.


Both sides held multiple maneuvers throughout the year. The US as well EU and NATO member states, for instance, conducted the "Sea Breeze" mission in the Black Sea which lasted from September 8 to 10 and the mission "Rapid Trident 14" under participation of Moldova from September 15 to 26, which started in Yavoriv, Ukraine. Furthermore, both conflict parties redeployed troops in the course of the year. Following NATO's announcement to deploy AWACS aircraft to Poland and Romania on March 10, Russia sent three SU-27 fighter jets and three transport planes to Belarus three days later. A series of Russian maneuvers took place from August 5 to October 12. On August 29, several NATO and EU member states accused Russia of airspace and border violations of multiple nations [→ Ukraine (Donbas); Russia - Finland; Russia - Estonia] during the maneuvers and direct support for Donbas militants.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new military doctrine on December 26 stating that the US and NATO posed an external threat to Russia.

pan

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 2014



INTENSITY

- WAR
- LIMITED WAR
- VIOLENT CRISIS
- NO VIOLENT CONFLICT

REGIONAL PANORAMA

With a total of 104, the number of conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa increased by four compared to 2013, thereby accounting for nearly a quarter of the world's conflicts. New conflicts erupted in Uganda, Somalia, Burkina Faso, and Lesotho [→ Uganda (Kingdom of Rwenzururu / Rwenzururu); Somalia (ASWJ); Burkina Faso (opposition groups); Lesotho (military factions)]. However, the number of highly violent conflicts, i.e. limited wars and wars, decreased by six to a total of 18. In addition, the number of violent crises increased only slightly from 44 to 46. In total, conflicts of high and medium intensity decreased from 68 to 64, while the number of conflicts of low intensity increased by eight to 40. Compared to the previous year, the number of wars decreased from eleven to nine. The 2013 war in the DR Congo involving the former rebel group M23 de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. Furthermore, two conflicts de-escalated from the level of war to limited wars [→ Mali (Islamist groups); South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)]. The conflict between the Islamist rebels ADF and the Congolese and Ugandan governments reached war level, with major strikes being executed against the militants. In addition, Sudan and South Sudan alone saw the continuation of four wars. Furthermore, two wars continued in Nigeria, one in the Central African Republic, and one in Somalia.

In western Africa, two wars and one limited war were observed. The war between the Islamist group Boko Haram and the Nigerian government continued, reaching unprecedented levels of violence [→ Nigeria (Boko Haram)].

The group captured and held significant territory in the states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe and announced the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Trans-border attacks by Boko Haram also increased, prompting a strengthened international response of the Multinational Joint Task Force, consisting of troops from Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Furthermore, the conflict over arable land in Nigeria's Middle Belt between the predominantly Christian farmers of Berom and Tiv tribes, on the one hand, and the mainly Muslim Fulani nomads, on the other, continued at war level [→ Nigeria (farmers – pastoralists)]. The conflict between northerners and southerners also remained violent as supporters of the ruling PDP and supporters of the opposition party APC repeatedly clashed in the context of upcoming elections in 2015. The parties notably mobilized along the old geographic cleavage between north and south [→ Nigeria (Northerners – Southerners)].

In Mali, the conflict between Islamist groups and the government de-escalated to a limited war [→ Mali (Islamist groups)]. After the intervention of international forces had curtailed the power of AQIM and MUJAO in 2013, Islamist attacks on civilians as well as Malian, French, and MINUSMA soldiers were restricted to the northern regions Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu in 2014. In neighboring Niger's Tillabéry region, MUJAO launched several attacks in October and November [→ Niger (Islamist groups)].

In early August, France replaced its Mali-based "Operation Serval" with "Operation Barkhane", extending its geographic range to combat Islamist militant groups in the Sahelian Zone. Meanwhile, peace talks started between northern militant groups, such as the Tuareg MNLA and the Malian government [→ Mali (HCUA, MNLA et al. / Azawad)]. However, both sides clashed on several occasions. Furthermore, several militant groups participating in the peace talks fought over subnational control in the northern regions [→ Mali (AQIM, MUJAO – HCUA, MAA, MNLA – GATIA / northern Mali)]. Violent opposition conflicts were observed in Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, and Burkina Faso. In the latter, President Blaise Compaoré resigned following days of violent protests.

In western Côte d'Ivoire, militant groups allegedly loyal to former president Laurent Gbagbo continued their fight for national power conducting cross-border attacks from Liberian territory. In Senegal, the secession conflict between MFDC and the government de-escalated with continuing negotiations over a peace agreement. In neighboring Guinea-Bissau, the national power conflict between military factions and the government ended, following peaceful elections and the dismissal of former coup leader General Antonio Indjai. In Guinea and Sierra-Leone, the year was marked by a de-escalation of the opposition conflicts, with the respective governments focusing on fighting Ebola.

In the Central African Republic (CAR), the conflict between forces of the former rebel group Séléka and Anti-Balaka militias continued at war level [→ Central African Republic (Anti-Balaka – ex-Séléka)]. After Anti-Balaka had overthrown the Séléka government in January, paving the way for an interim government, they increasingly engaged in killings, mutilations, and expulsion of the muslim population. By the end of the year, factions of both ex-Séléka and Anti-Balaka had founded political parties in order to participate in the 2015 elections.

In the eastern parts of neighboring DR Congo, over 40 militias remained active attacking the civilian population and engaging in skirmishes with the military and other militant groups [→ DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi); DR Congo (inter-militia violence)]. 2.7 million people remained displaced. While in 2013, international forces and the government focused on the fight against M23, 2014 was marked by an escalation of violence in North Kivu's Beni territory, when the military, supported by MONUSCO, engaged in fierce fighting with the Ugandan Islamist group ADF [→ DR Congo, Uganda (ADF)]. This was followed by significant ADF violence against civilians. Up to 1,000 soldiers, militants, and civilians were killed over the year.

The DR Congo's conflict with Uganda de-escalated to a dispute, while its confrontation with Rwanda over regional power and the exact border demarcation turned violent, leaving several people dead. In Burundi, ahead of the 2015 presidential elections, the ruling Hutu-dominated CNDD-FDD increasingly engaged in violent action against opposition parties and its junior government partner, the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA [→ Burundi (opposition)].

In the Horn of Africa, the war between the Islamist group al-Shabaab and the Somali government remained the most violent conflict. Al-Shabaab lost territory through the advances of the military and AMISOM. However, al-Shabaab continued to carry out bomb attacks and assassinations, mainly in South Central Somalia. Furthermore, several militias, often affiliated with different clans, fought over the creation of new federal states and over control of newly captured areas [→ Somalia (inter-militia rivalry / Jubaland)].

Accordingly, Puntland temporarily ended its political collaboration with the federal government following the formation of a new federal state partly comprising Puntland territory [→ Somalia (Puntland)]. In this context, a new conflict erupted between the federal government and the militia Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a, which had supported the former in their fight against al-Shabaab for several years [→ Somalia (ASWJ)]. In addition, the conflict between Puntland and the self-proclaimed inde-

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

pendent state of Somaliland over the control of areas within Khatumo State escalated [→ Somalia (Puntland - Somaliland)]. Furthermore, numerous reports argued that Eritrea and Ethiopia were supporting militant groups in Somalia as well as in their respective territories. In addition, militias such as al-Shabaab and the Ethiopia-based ONLF allegedly supported each other. The latter, amongst other militant groups, continued its fight against the Ethiopian government [→ Ethiopia (ONLF / Ogaden); Ethiopia (OLF / Oromiya)]. While Ethiopia and Egypt continued disputing over the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its consequences for the down river countries' water supply, Sudan signaled its support for the project.


In South Sudan, the year was marked by the escalation of fighting between government troops under President Salva Kiir Mayardit and defectors led by former vice president Riek Machar [→ Sudan (SPLM-IO)]. The power struggle evolved along ethnic lines, reinforcing tribal tension. In neighboring Sudan, the government intensified its military action against rebels in the peripheral regions of Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan, launching the so-called operation "Decisive Summer" forcing hundreds of thousands to flee. Prior to the 2015 presidential elections, various opposition parties and armed groups signed the "Sudan Call" in December, reaffirming their common agenda for political change. Furthermore, President al-Bashir urged UNAMID to leave the region after the latter had accused the military of having raped around 200 women. While Sudan and South Sudan continued to trade accusations of supporting rebel groups on their respective territories, the two states also increased their diplomatic relations [→ Sudan – South Sudan]. Meanwhile, the ongoing conflicts in both countries led to severe food crises, especially in South Sudan.

Kenya was also heavily affected by al-Shabaab attacks, especially in Mombasa and the counties along the border with Somalia. Furthermore, ethnic tensions remained high in many parts of the country [→ Kenya (inter-ethnic violence)].


In southern Africa, conflicts were generally less violent and tended to involve opposition groups rather than armed militants. In Tanzania, the opposition staged country-wide demonstrations to protest the propositions for the new federal constitution and formed a coalition against the ruling CCM for the 2015 elections. In Mozambique, the government and RENAMO reached a peace deal in September, following frequent attacks by the group in the first half of the year. In Lesotho, a new conflict erupted when military factions attempted a coup d'état. After Prime Minister Thomas Thabane had fled to South Africa, his return was secured by the latter's security forces. SADC subsequently brokered negotiations.

The most frequent conflict items in Sub-Saharan Africa were national power, followed by subnational predominance, resources, and system/ideology. In more than two-thirds of all highly violent conflicts, the actors aimed at subnational predominance, often in combination with resources. The two items were mainly pursued by militias and ethnic groups. Many violent conflicts over ideology involved Islamist militant groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Mali. (nab, sel, qgu, jli, ats, jas)

CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 2014 COMPARED TO 2013



FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT ITEMS IN 2014 IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA BY INTENSITY GROUPS



SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Overview: Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2014

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Angola (FLEC / Cabinda)*	FLEC vs. government	secession, resources	1975	•	1
Angola (UNITA)*	CASA-CE, UNITA vs. government	national power	1975	↓	1
Angola – DR Congo*	Angola vs. DR Congo	territory, resources	2009	•	1
Botswana (Basarwa)*	Basarwa vs. government	resources	1997	•	1
Burkina Faso (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. CDP	system/ideology, national power	2014	NEW	3
Burundi (FNL)	FNL vs. government	national power	2005	•	3
Burundi (Hutu – Tutsi)*	Hutu vs. Tutsi	system/ideology, other	1962	↓	1
Burundi (opposition)	ADC-Ikibiri et al. vs. government	national power	2006	•	3
Cameroon (militants / Bakassi)*	BSDF vs. government	secession	2006	•	1
Central African Republic (Anti-Balaka – ex-Séléka)	Anti-Balaka vs. ex-Séléka	national power, resources	2005	•	5
Central African Republic, DR Congo, South Sudan, Uganda (LRA)*	LRA vs. Central African Republic, DR Congo, South Sudan, Uganda	subnational predominance	1987	•	4
Chad (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	1990	•	3
Chad (rebel groups)*	FPR, various rebel groups vs. government	national power, resources	2005	•	3
Côte d'Ivoire (militant groups)	militant groups vs. government	national power	2012	•	3
Côte d'Ivoire (opposition)	FPI vs. government	national power	1999	•	3
Djibouti (FRUD)*	FRUD vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1991	•	3
Djibouti (opposition)	MJO, USN vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	↘	2
DR Congo (Bantu – Batwa / Katanga)	Balubakat, Kata Katanga vs. Batwa	subnational predominance	2013	•	4
DR Congo (ex-M23)	ex-M23 vs. government	subnational predominance	2004	↓	2
DR Congo (FDLR)	FDLR vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2000	↘	3
DR Congo (inter-militia violence)	FDC vs. APCLS vs. Mayi-Mayi Nyatura vs. Raia Mutomboki vs. NDC vs. Mayi-Mayi Kirikicho et al.	subnational predominance, resources	2003	•	4
DR Congo (Ituri militias)*	FRPI et al. vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	1999	•	4
DR Congo (Kata Katanga / Katanga)	Kata Katanga vs. government	secession, resources	2011	•	4
DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)	Mayi-Mayi militias vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2003	•	4
DR Congo (MRAN)*	MRAN vs. government	national power	2013	↓	2
DR Congo (opposition)*	UNC, UPDS et al. vs. government	national power	1997	↗	3
DR Congo – Rwanda	DR Congo vs. Rwanda	territory, international power	1998	↗	3
DR Congo, Uganda (ADF)	ADF vs. DR Congo, Uganda	subnational predominance, resources	1995	↗	5
Equatorial Guinea – Gabon (Mbanié, Cocotier, Conga islands)*	Equatorial Guinea vs. Gabon	territory, resources	1970	•	1
Eritrea (RSADO)*	RSADO vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2001	↗	3
Ethiopia (ARDUF)*	ARDUF vs. government	autonomy	1995	•	2
Ethiopia (OLF / Oromiya)	OLF vs. government	secession	1973	•	3
Ethiopia (ONLF / Ogaden)*	Ogaden National Liberation Front vs. government	secession, resources	1984	•	3
Ethiopia (opposition)*	Ginbot 7, Semayawi Party, UDJ vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2005	↘	2
Ethiopia (TPDM)*	TPDM vs. government	subnational predominance, other	2002	•	2
Ethiopia – Egypt	Ethiopia vs. Egypt	resources	2011	•	2
Ethiopia – Eritrea*	Ethiopia vs. Eritrea	territory	1961	•	1
Gabon (opposition groups)*	various opposition groups vs. government	national power	2009	↗	3
Guinea (Guerze – Konianke)*	Guerze vs. Konianke	subnational predominance	2001	↓	1

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Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Guinea (opposition)	UFDG, UFR et al. vs. government	national power	2006	↘	2
Guinea-Bissau (coup plotters)	military factions vs. government	national power	2009	END	1
Guinea-Bissau (opposition)*	PAIGC vs. PRS	system/ideology, national power	1998	•	1
Kenya (inter-ethnic violence)	Turkana vs. Pokot vs. Ilchamus vs. Tugen; Uasin Gishu vs. Siria; Degodia vs. Garre; Auliyahan vs. Abdiwak; Borana vs. Gabra; Masaai vs. Somali et al.	subnational predominance, resources	1963	•	4
Kenya (MRC / Coast)	MRC/PDM vs. government	secession	2008	•	3
Kenya (Mungiki)	Mungiki factions vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	1997	•	3
Kenya (TNA – ODM)	TNA vs. ODM	national power	1999	•	3
Lesotho (military factions)	military factions vs. government	national power	2014	NEW	3
Madagascar (TGV - TIM)*	TGV vs. TIM	national power	2009	↗	2
Mali (AQIM, MUJAO – HCUA, MAA, MNLA – GATIA / northern Mali)	AQIM, MUJAO vs. HCUA, MAA, MNLA vs. GATIA	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2012	•	3
Mali (HCUA, MNLA et al. / Azawad)	HCUA, MNLA et al. vs. government	autonomy	1989	•	3
Mali (Islamist groups)	al-Mourabitoun, Ansar al-Din, AQIM, MUJAO vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2009	↘	4
Mali (military factions)*	red berets vs. CNRDRE/Sanogo supporters vs. government	national power, other	2012	↓	1
Mali (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2012	↓	1
Mozambique (RENAMO)	RENAMO vs. government	national power	2012	•	3
Niger (Islamist groups)	AQIM, MUJAO vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2008	•	3
Niger (opposition)	opposition groups vs. government	national power	2009	↑	3
Nigeria (Boko Haram)	Boko Haram vs. Cameroon, Nigeria	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2003	•	5
Nigeria (Christians – Muslims)*	Christians vs. Muslims	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1960	•	3
Nigeria (Eggon groups / Nasarawa State)*	Eggon, Eggon militia (Ombatse) vs. Fulani, Alago, Agatu, Gwandara, Migli	subnational predominance	2012	↓	1
Nigeria (farmers – pastoralists)	farmers vs. pastoralists	subnational predominance, resources	1960	•	5
Nigeria (Ijaw groups / Niger Delta)*	Ijaw Youths, MEND vs. government, International Oil Companies in the Niger Delta	subnational predominance, resources	1997	•	3
Nigeria (MASSOB / Biafra)*	MASSOB vs. government	secession	1967	↘	2
Nigeria (MOSOP, Ogoni / Niger Delta)*	MOSOP vs. government	autonomy, resources, other	1990	•	2
Nigeria (Northerners – Southerners)	northerners vs. southerners	system/ideology, national power	1960	↑	3
Nigeria – Cameroon (Bakassi)*	Nigeria vs. Cameroon	territory, resources, other	1961	↓	1
Rwanda (FDLR)*	FDLR vs. government	national power	1990	•	3
Rwanda (opposition)	DGPR, PS-Imberakuri, RDI, RDU, RNC, UDF vs. government	national power	2003	•	2
Rwanda – France*	Rwanda vs. France	other	2004	•	1
Senegal (June 23 Movement)*	June 23 movement vs. government	national power	2011	•	1
Senegal (MFDC / Casamance)	MFDC vs. government	secession	1982	↘	2
Sierra Leone (APC - SLPP)*	APC vs. SLPP	national power	2007	↘	1
Somalia (ASWJ)	ASWJ vs. FGS	subnational predominance, other	2014	NEW	3
Somalia (Habr Gedir – Biymal / Lower Shabelle)*	Habr Gedir militias vs. Biymal militias	subnational predominance	2013	•	3
Somalia (Hawadle – Surre)*	Hawadle militias vs. Surre militias	subnational predominance, resources	2012	•	3
Somalia (inter-militia rivalry / Jubaland)*	militia loyal to Hirale vs. Interim Jubaland Administration	subnational predominance	1991	↘	3

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Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Somalia (Islamist groups)	al-Shabaab vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2006	•	5
Somalia (Puntland – Somaliland)	autonomous region of Puntland vs. regional government of Somaliland	subnational predominance	1998	↑	3
Somalia (Puntland)*	autonomous region of Puntland vs. FGS	autonomy	1998	•	1
Somalia (Somaliland – Khatumo State)*	Somaliland vs. Khatumo State	subnational predominance	2009	•	3
Somalia (Somaliland)*	regional government of Somaliland vs. FGS	secession	1991	•	1
South Africa (KwaZulu-Natal)	ANC vs. IFP vs. NFP	subnational predominance	1990	•	3
South Africa (xenophobes – immigrants)*	xenophobes vs. immigrants	subnational predominance	1994	•	3
South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)	Lou Nuer vs. Murle vs. Dinka, Kok-Awac vs. Kok-Keer, Dinka Kueli vs. Dinka Rup, Dinka Amotnhiiim vs. Dinka Panguerkur vs. Dinka Nyan et al.	subnational predominance, resources	2011	↘	4
South Sudan (SPLM/A-in-Opposition)	SPLM/A-IO vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2013	•	5
South Sudan (various militias)*	South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A Cobra Faction), various militias vs. government	system/ideology, resources	2011	↘	2
Sudan (Darfur)	LJM-TH, SLM-AW, SLM-MM, SRF, et al. vs. government, RSF	subnational predominance, resources	2003	•	5
Sudan (Eastern Front)*	Eastern Front vs. government	autonomy, resources	2005	•	1
Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)	Al-Rezeigat Abballa vs. Beni Hussein vs. Misseriya vs. Salamat vs. Al-Gimir vs. Bani Halba vs. Ma'alia vs. Hamar vs. Taisha et al.	subnational predominance, resources	2011	•	5
Sudan (opposition)	Alliance of the Sudanese Civil Society Organizations, NCF, student-led groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	↘	3
Sudan (SPLM/A-North / South Kordofan, Blue Nile)	SPLM/A-North vs. government	autonomy	2011	•	5
Sudan – Eritrea*	Sudan vs. Eritrea	other	1994	•	1
Sudan – South Sudan	Sudan vs. South Sudan	territory, resources, other	2011	•	3
Swaziland (opposition)	COSATU, PUDEMO, SFTU, SNUS, SWACOPA, SWAYOCO, TUCOSWA vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1998	↘	2
Swaziland – South Africa*	South Africa vs. Swaziland	territory	1902	•	1
Tanzania (Chadema, CUF – CCM)	Chadema, CUF vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1993	•	3
Tanzania (Christians – Muslims)*	Christians vs. Muslims	subnational predominance	2012	•	3
Tanzania (Uamsho / Zanzibar)*	Uamsho vs. government	secession, system/ideology	2003	•	3
Togo (opposition)	ANC, CST vs. government	national power	1963	•	3
Uganda (inter-ethnic rivalries / Rwenzururu)*	Bakonzo vs. Bamba, Banyabindi, Basongora	subnational predominance, resources	2012	↑	3
Uganda (Kingdom of Buganda / Buganda)*	Kingdom of Buganda vs. government	autonomy, other	1995	↘	1
Uganda (Kingdom of Rwenzururu / Rwenzururu)	Kingdom of Rwenzururu vs. government	autonomy, resources	2014	NEW	3
Uganda (opposition)*	DP, FDC, FUF, Jeema, UPC vs. government	national power	2001	•	3
Uganda – DR Congo (Lake Albert)*	Uganda vs. DR Congo	territory, resources	2007	↘	1
Zimbabwe (opposition groups)	MDC-T, MDC-Renewal, NCA, O AUS, TZ, WOZA et al. vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2000	•	3

^{1 2 3 4} cf. overview table for Europe

Please note: The intensity of each conflict as shown in the tables is the highest intensity reached in the course of the year. Therefore, conflicts may, for instance, be classified as limited wars although there may have been no more fighting in the second half of the year.

If a conflict revolves around a territory whose name is disputed by the conflict parties, both variations will be named, separated by an "/" [e.g. Japan – China (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands); Argentina – UK (Falkland Islands/Islands Malvinas)]. If, in contrast, the conflict actors strive for subnational predominance, secession, or autonomy of or in a certain region, the region is separated from the actors by " / " [e.g. France (FLNC / Corsica); Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)].

SELECTED CONFLICT DESCRIPTIONS

BURKINA FASO (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. CDP
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

A new conflict over national power erupted between opposition groups and President Blaise Compaoré's Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP). In reaction to Compaoré's attempt to modify Article 37 of the Constitution thereby enabling himself to run for president for a fifth time, hundreds of thousands of protesters demonstrated all over the country demanding his removal. On October 31, the military ousted Compaoré and replaced him with an interim government led by Lieutenant Colonel Isaac Zida, second-in-command in the presidential guard.

After Compaoré had allegedly said that he might seek to change the Constitution in December 2013, opposition leader Zephirin Diabré called for protests against Compaoré, accusing him of preparing a constitutional coup in early January. At least 10,000 anti-government protesters marched peacefully in the capital Ouagadougou on January 18. On March 17, Gilbert Noël Ouedraogo, chairman of a party allied with Compaoré, stated his opposition to the constitutional amendment. Approx. 50,000 supporters of the government rallied in Ouagadougou on April 12, calling for a constitutional amendment. On May 31 and August 23, tens of thousands of anti-government protesters attended rallies in Ouagadougou. On October 21, Interior Minister Jerome Bougouma said that the government would demand a parliamentary referendum over modifying Article 37. In reaction, Diabré called for nationwide civil disobedience one day later. On October 21, anti-government protests demanding the parliament not to vote on the constitutional amendment started all over the country. One week later, hundreds of demonstrators clashed with police using teargas when they tried to enter the National Assembly. The same day, security forces used teargas to disperse several dozens of stone-hurling youths barricading the country's main highway. Five people were reportedly injured. The following day, trade unions and civil society groups called for a general strike to increase the pressure on Compaoré.

On October 30, the day of the vote on the constitutional amendment, violence escalated in the capital. Hundreds of protesters stormed the headquarters of the state television station. Houses of government officials were looted and burned. When protesters attacked the home of Compaoré's brother, the police killed one of them. After tens of thousands of protesters burned the parliament building, Compaoré imposed a state of emergency but canceled it a few hours later. In total, at least 19 people were killed and 500 injured in the course of the actions. The same day, Army General Honoré Traoré announced the dissolution of the government and the creation of a transitional government. When Compaoré resigned and fled to Ivory Coast on October 31, Traoré declared his intention to take over power.

However, the military named Zida as head of the interim government. When several thousands protested against the military's takeover on November 2, the army fired in the air in order to disperse the protests. One person was allegedly shot

dead by a stray bullet. The following day, Zida announced the installation of a unity government. The same day, the AU announced sanctions should the army not transfer power to civilian authorities within two weeks. On November 13, a committee of political, military, religious, and traditional authorities agreed on a charter of transition, providing the legal framework for a civilian-led transitional government, which would stay in control until November 2015.

On November 17, the committee named the retired diplomat Michel Kafando interim president. Two days later, Kafando appointed Zida as interim prime minister. Protests resumed when Zida appointed Adama Sagnon to the interim cabinet, who was widely accused of being involved in a journalist's murder in 1998. On November 25, Sagnon resigned after two days of demonstrations. On December 15, the interim government banned the CDP. jas

BURUNDI (FNL)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: FNL vs. government
 Conflict items: national power

The conflict over national power between the National Liberation Front (FNL) and the government led by President Pierre Nkurunziza continued at the level of a violent crisis. FNL remained split into various factions. The officially recognized political party was led by Jacques Bigirimana, while another wing was led by FNL's historical leader Agathon Rwaswa. In addition, armed FNL splinter groups were active both in Burundi and in the neighboring DR Congo.

In the run-up to the 2015 general elections, tensions rose between FNL and other opposition parties and the government [->Burundi (opposition)]. One issue of contention was the planned constitutional changes, and a planned new electoral code requiring presidential candidates to hold a university degree. The latter would exclude Rwaswa from running for presidency. As the electoral code passed by parliament on April 25 did not contain this clause, Rwaswa and other opposition leaders welcomed the law. In mid-December, Rwaswa and all other opposition leaders jointly criticized fraud in the process of voter registration after they had called for a delay due to increasing political violence in vain. Rwaswa tried to overcome the opposition's division, urging the two main FNL factions to reunite ahead of the 2015 elections and, in November, form an alliance with the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA party, its former enemy during the civil war. Rwaswa accused the government of systematically murdering FNL supporters.

In the ongoing prosecutions concerning the 2004 massacre in a refugee camp near Gatumba, Rwaswa was summoned to court on December 15 [-> Burundi (Hutu - Tutsi)]. However, the session was postponed. In spite of the government's reiterated request to the UN Security Council (UNSC) to close down the UN office in Burundi (BNUB), the UNSC, on February 13, renewed BNUB's mandate. On December 12, BNUB officially ended. Rwaswa called the end of the mandate premature, fearing a resurgence of violence.

On the night of February 2, an FNL faction commanded by Aloys Nzabampema and under the political leadership of

BURUNDI (OPPOSITION)

 Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: ADC-Ikibiri et al. vs. government

 Conflict items: national power

The national power conflict between opposition parties, primarily organized under the Democratic Alliance for the Change-Ikibiri (ADC-Ikibiri), and the government continued at a violent level. The latter was led by the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) which was supported by its militant youth wing Imbonerakure. ADC-Ikibiri comprised around ten opposition parties, such as the Union for National Progress (UPRONA), Movement for Solidarity and Democracy (MSD), and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU).

At the beginning of the year, tensions arose in the ruling coalition between the Hutu-dominated CNDD-FDD and the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA. The latter increasingly opposed the CNDD-FDD's plans to revise the constitution in order to allow President Pierre Nkurunziza (CNDD-FDD) to run for a third term and to lower the constitutional threshold for passing laws. Furthermore, with the constitutional amendment all references to the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi would be removed. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi ensured a power sharing mechanism between the two ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi, after the civil war [→ Burundi (Hutu – Tutsi)]. After parliament had failed to pass the amendment by just one vote on March 21, on March 25, Minister of Interior Edouard Nduwimana announced that Nkurunziza would run for a third presidential term.

On January 29, Minister Nduwimana dismissed Charles Nditije from his presidential post of UPRONA. After his UPRONA party comrade, the country's Vice-President Bernhard Buskoza, had declared this action illegal, Buskoza was dismissed by President Nkurunziza. In reaction, the three UPRONA ministers, Jean-Claude Ndiokubwayo, Leocadie Nihaza, and Victoire Ndikumana, resigned from their posts. All five positions were filled with UPRONA members considered loyal to CNDD-FDD in late February. This led to deepening tensions between the pro-CNDD-FDD and pro-opposition wings of UPRONA, escalating on March 17 when alleged members of the latter faction hurled a hand grenade into the house of former UPRONA Secretary-General Gaston Sindimwo, injuring two. In late June, UPRONA's new president Concilie Nibigira confirmed the exclusion of her predecessor Charles Nditije from the party.

In mid-April, the government banned 15 parties, among them political splinter factions of the rebel group National Liberation Front [→ Burundi (FNL)]. On April 25, parliament unanimously adopted the new electoral code for the 2015 elections, signed by all 44 political parties in mid-June. On September 20, the government barred opposition parties from nominating candidates in the upcoming communal and municipal elections. On October 2, a court sentenced FRODEBU's president Leonce Ngendakumana to one year in prison for slander. Agathon Rwasas' FNL faction and UPRONA formed a coalition for the 2015 elections on November 20. Seven days later, ADC-Ikibiri members agreed to field a single presidential candidate. In mid-December, ADC-Ikibiri and another eight opposition parties called for the immediate resignation of the National Electoral Commission, citing massive

Ambassador Isidore Nibizi attacked an army position near Gihanga in the Rukoko marshes, Bubanza province, near the DRC border. The rebels claimed to have killed five soldiers. The said group twice attacked military bases near Bujumbura in March. In the first attack, the rebels allegedly killed six soldiers, while three rebel fighters died. The second attack, on March 12, targeted two military bases at Buringa, near Bujumbura, employing rocket launchers, grenades, and automatic weapons. According to the rebels, twelve soldiers were killed. On October 5, Nzabampema's FNL faction attacked an army outpost in Gihanga. While the rebels stated that six soldiers had been killed, the government claimed that the only casualty was a rebel fighter. Nzabampema's FNL faction claimed responsibility for at least ten attacks in eastern Burundi in 2014, and announced it would intensify fighting prior to the 2015 presidential elections.

FNL forces, allied with the Mayi-Mayi Yakutumba, were also active in the DR Congo's South Kivu province [→ DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)]. For example, on April 23 and 24, a patrol of the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC), engaged FNL rebels with heavy artillery and light weaponry in the Muhungu area, Uvira territory, South Kivu. At least three rebels and one soldier died in the fight. In the same area, FNL and FARDC clashed again on August 21, employing heavy weaponry and causing a massive displacement.

FNL forces also repeatedly clashed with Burundian troops on Congolese territory. For example, on the night of February 8, FNL rebels attacked two Burundian army positions in the border area. Three rebels were killed. While both locals and an anonymous Burundian officer stated the army positions were located on the DR Congo's territory, Congolese officials denied it. Nzabampema's forces clashed with Burundian troops in Kiliba-Ondesi, South Kivu, on June 22, causing 500 families to flee. The army rejected the rebels' claims that it had been supported by Imbonerakure members.

Throughout the year, both Burundi and the DR Congo repeatedly refuted allegations that up to 900 Burundian soldiers were active in South Kivu, and that Imbonerakure were being trained in the DR Congo. In early October, the Burundian army finally confirmed the presence of a small number of its soldiers in the DR Congo in accordance with an agreement between the two states. However, the DR Congo denied the existence of any such agreement. Only a few days later, the Burundian troops reportedly withdrew from the DR Congo. Following the withdrawal and two FNL attacks in the area in early November, the army destroyed shepherds' homes and confiscated some 20,000 head of cattle in the Rukoko forest bordering the DR Congo on November 13, citing environmental reasons.

On the night of December 30, a 200-strong armed group coming from the DR Congo's Kivu province crossed the border into Burundi's Cibitoke province. Army and police engaged them in fighting and killed at least eight rebels that night. The battles concentrated around Buganda and were still ongoing on December 31, the end of the observation period. The group's identity remained unclear, with the army stating its members spoke a Burundian language, and Nzabampema's FNL denying any involvement. hm

fraud during voter registration, including mass distribution of identification cards to supporters of CNDD-FDD. FNL leader Agathon Rwaso led the opposition alliance.

Throughout the year, police prevented and raided several opposition party meetings in the capital Bujumbura. On February 16, police dispersed an UPRONA meeting in Bujumbura, using teargas while opposition members threw stones. Two policemen and three UPRONA members were injured. On February 28, unknown attackers torched the local MSD headquarters in Gatete, Bururi province. After police had dispersed a demonstration of thousands of MSD members using teargas on March 8, demonstrators sought refuge in their headquarters, taking two policemen hostage. After failed negotiations, police stormed the building using live ammunition and teargas and arrested 70 to 80 MSD members. At least thirteen people were injured. 21 of the suspects were sentenced to lifelong imprisonment on March 21 while 26 received shorter sentences. On March 12, the government issued an arrest warrant against MSD president Alexis Sinduhije who had fled to Belgium. Five days later, the government suspended MSD from undertaking any political activities until July.

In at least five incidents, Imbonerakure youths attacked opposition members in the provinces Bujumbura, Ngozi, and Kirundo, killing one opposition youth leader and injuring at least eight people. Imbonerakure comprised approx. 100,000 members. On March 14, three members of the group, two soldiers, and two local politicians took part in the killing of FRODEBU member Ananias Nsabaganga. Clashes between Imbonerakure and MSD youths in Gihanga, Bubanza province left four people injured on April 21.

After a cable of the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB) was leaked on April 10, the government declared BNUB's security chief a persona non grata seven days later. The information passed from BNUB to the UN Secretary-General indicated that CNDD-FDD had provided arms and combat training to its youth wing Imbonerakure. nbe

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (ANTI-BALAKA – EX-SÉLÉKA)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: Anti-Balaka vs. ex-Séléka

Conflict items: national power, resources

The war over national power and resources between ex-Séléka and Anti-Balaka groups continued. While the former comprised three factions, the Popular Front for the Rebirth of Central Africa (FPRC), Unity for the Central African Republic (UPC), and the Patriotic Rally for the Rebirth of the Central African Republic (RPRC), Anti-Balaka was primarily divided into the camps of Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona and Sebastien Wenezoui. The interim government led by President Catherine Samba-Panza tried to mediate between the conflict parties in order to restore security. The UN, AU, EU, and France supported the government in the attempt.

The mainly Muslim Séléka, led by Michel Djotodia, was formed as an alliance of armed groups against the government led by then-president François Bozizé in 2012, and overturned the government on 03/24/2013. Once in power, Séléka focused on economic ventures, such as mining. In reaction to Djotodia's rise to power, in late 2013 local so-called self-defense militias and parts of the former security forces united under the name "Anti-Balaka", meaning "anti-machete." However,

the alliance was primarily armed with machetes and rifles. In September 2013, Djotodia officially disbanded Séléka. Nevertheless, some factions continued to refer to themselves as Séléka. Unable to control his own forces and following international pressure as well as an Anti-Balaka attack on the capital Bangui on 12/05/2013, Djotodia agreed to resign on January 10. Thereafter, ex-Séléka forces began to retreat from Bangui and the western parts of the country. On January 20, Samba-Panza, former mayor of Bangui, was appointed president of the interim government. As of July, ex-Séléka factions were comprised of 7,000 to 10,000 fighters, according to their own estimation. Anti-Balaka claimed to comprise 50,000 to 70,000 fighters, whereas a UN Panel of Experts estimated the number of active and armed personnel to be as low as 1,500. Throughout the first half of the year, Anti-Balaka militias seized control of the western parts of the country, increasingly targeting the Muslim population.

On April 1, the EU approved the European Union Military Operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA), a 1,000-strong peacekeeping mission for immediate deployment around Bangui. France deployed Operation Sangaris on 12/05/2013, with around 2,000 troops in the country to support the AU-led MISCA mission. On September 15, MISCA transferred its authority to MINUSCA, a UN peacekeeping force with a mandated size of 12,000 personnel. After Chadian soldiers shot dead around 30 civilians and seriously injured more than 300 at a market in Bangui on March 29, Chad withdrew all its 833 MISCA peacekeepers until April 13. The Chadian military was repeatedly accused of siding with the Muslim population.

Throughout January, Anti-Balaka forces conducted several attacks on the towns of Boyali and Bossembele, Ombella-M'Poko prefecture, killing around 150 civilians, most of them reportedly Muslims. Ex-Séléka and Anti-Balaka fighters held a reconciliation meeting in the Sibut area, Kémo prefecture, on January 16. Although ex-Séléka fighters promised not to harm the three attending Anti-Balaka representatives, they executed them and killed 16 more attendants. On January 25, Joseph Kalite, a Muslim and former health minister, was hacked to death in Bangui by Anti-Balaka members. Between January 30 and February 3, at least 75 civilians were killed and approx. 500 houses burned when ex-Séléka forces set fire to several towns in Kémo. On February 1 and 5, Anti-Balaka attacks in Guen, a village 250 kilometers north of Bangui, left 72 Muslims dead and forced more than 2,500 civilians to flee. The next day, ex-Séléka members attacked citizens of Ngaoudaye, Ouham-Pendé prefecture, killing 22 and burning down numerous buildings. During French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian's visit to Mbaiki, Lobaye prefecture, on February 12, Samba-Panza declared war on Anti-Balaka militias in order to end violence against Muslim civilians. Ex-Séléka fighters, together with Fulani cattle herders, killed 19 civilians in the village of Yakongo, 30 km from Guen, on February 22. In mid-March, the government unsuccessfully tried to negotiate a peace agreement with the Anti-Balaka militia. On April 10, Anti-Balaka militants killed approx. 13 ex-Séléka fighters in an attempt to seize the town Dekoa, Kémo. Inter-militant violence peaked between April 11 and 16, when ex-Séléka killed 95 Anti-Balaka fighters in Grimari, Ouaka prefecture. On April 26, ex-Séléka ambushed a hospital in the Boguila region, Ouham-Pendé, killing 16 civilians. Supported by armed Fulani herdsmen, ex-Séléka raided the town of Markounda, Ouham-Pendé, on May 1, killing 15 people. On May 14 and 15, clashes between ex-Séléka and Anti-Balaka outside Dekoa, Kémo, left at least 31 people dead. In fierce skirmishes in Bambari in June and July,

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more than 100 civilians and combatants died, tens of thousands fled, and at least 200, mostly civilians, were injured.

On July 12, ex-Séléka factions reconstituted themselves under the name Popular Front for the Rebirth of Central Africa (FPRC). The group's leadership comprised Michel Djotodia as president, Noureddine Adam as vice-president, and Joseph Zoundeiko as military commander.

From July 21 to 23, representatives of the transitional government, civil society, as well as FPRC and Anti-Balaka delegates held peace talks in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo. FPRC demanded the country's break up into Muslim and Christian sections as a non-negotiable condition. Nevertheless, at the end of the National Reconciliation Forum, the group's representative Mohammed Dhaffane dropped the claim and signed a ceasefire deal on July 23.

On August 4, FPRC's leadership suspended Dhaffane for "high treason" and reiterated their rejection of the ceasefire agreement. Following recommendations agreed upon in the Brazzaville talks, on August 5, President Samba-Panza dissolved the government and appointed Mahamat Kamoun as the country's first Muslim prime minister on August 10. FPRC denounced the move, declaring it would not take part in the proposed government of unity as they had not been consulted on the choice of prime minister. At the beginning of August, fighting between Sangaris and MISCA peacekeepers, on the one hand, and the FPRC, on the other, left several militants and two MISCA peacekeepers dead in Batangafo, Ouham. On August 17, FPRC declared the creation of an independent state called Dar al-Kouti in the north-east of the country, with Djotodia as president. Just days later, the group denied having issued such a statement. On August 22, Prime Minister Kamoun formed a new government of national unity, including three representatives from FPRC and two from Anti-Balaka. FPRC denounced the decision, claiming that the choice of ministers did not represent their interests. Starting on August 27, three days of heavy fighting between ex-Séléka and Anti-Balaka in Boda, Lobaye, left approx. 50 people dead. At the end of August, Anti-Balaka fighters ambushed a Fulani camp near Ngakobo, Ouaka, killing eleven. In September, internal tensions within FPRC rose between fighters loyal to Zoundeiko and those loyal to the two former Chadian rebel leaders Ali Darassa and Mahamat Al Khatim. The latter two then created the Republican Front for Change (FRC). The internal disagreements allegedly concerned the control of territory, the sharing of revenues from illegal taxation, as well as FPRC's aim to split the country.

Fighting between Anti-Balaka and Sangaris troops in Bossangoa, Ouham, left two people dead and several others wounded on September 7. On September 25, Anti-Balaka leader Sébastien Wenezoui declared his intention to transform the movement into a political party called the Patriotic Movement for the Future (MPA-İK). On October 1 and 2, ex-Séléka fighters, Anti-Balaka members, and ethnic Fulani pastoralists clashed in Bambari. French peacekeepers tried to contain the fighting that left 16 to 25 people dead. Between October 7 and 9, during the first ever MINUSCA combat operation, at least nine people died in Bangui, including one peacekeeper. On October 10, ex-Séléka attacked IDPs with grenades and rifles inside a church in Dekoa, Kémo, killing nine people. Ex-Séléka groups attacked the largely Christian village Yamale, Ouaka, killing 30 and injuring dozens between October 21 and 22. On October 24, further attacks on the villages of Tchimanguere and Gbakimalekpa, Ouaka, resulted in the killing of dozens and the displacement of hundreds of people. The following day, ex-Séléka leaders Al Khatim and Darassa created a new Bambari-based group named Unity

for the Central African Republic (UPC). It remained unclear whether this move implied the dissolution of the FRC.

Violent encounters between MINUSCA forces and Anti-Balaka fighters at Cantonnières, Mambéré prefecture, resulted in approx. six fatalities and ten wounded on November 19. Three days later, ex-Séléka's Joseph Zoundeiko and Djono Ahaba created the political party named Patriotic Rally for the Rebirth of the Central African Republic (RPRC), stating to seek peace and dialog with the government. This was followed by a statement by Anti-Balaka leader Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona on November 29 that the group also sought to lay down its weapons and transform into the political party named Central African Party for Unity and Development (PCUD).

Two separate clashes between Anti-Balaka and ex-Séléka militias in mid-December, in Mbrès, Nana-Grébizi prefecture and in Bambari, Ouaka, resulted in at least 48 fatalities, dozens injured, and 70 houses burned down.

Throughout the year, violence between ex-Séléka factions was reported. For instance, infighting in Markounda and Paoua, Ouham, on May 5, led to at least 100 fatalities, including many civilians. Between December 2013 and the end of 2014, more than 5,000 people were killed in the conflict and at least one-fifth of the country's 4.6 million-strong population was displaced. The war also had significant implications for neighboring countries. By the end of the year, 200,000 people had fled to Cameroon, 45,000 to Chad, 35,000 to the DR Congo, and 26,500 had sought refuge in the Republic of Congo. lmp

CÔTE D'IVOIRE (MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: militant groups vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The conflict over national power between various militant groups fighting for former President Laurent Gbagbo, on the one hand, and the current government of President Alassane Ouattara, on the other, continued on the level of a violent crisis.

Following the post-election violence in 2011, approx. 220,000 Ivoirians sought refuge in neighbouring Liberia, among them pro-Gbagbo fighters along with Liberian mercenaries who supported Gbagbo. Since then, they continued their fight against the government with cross-border attacks. In the first half of 2014, members of the so-called "Compagnie Armageddon" attacked villages in various incidents in western Côte d'Ivoire. On February 12 and 14, Liberia handed suspects for alleged recruiting of mercenaries for pro-Gbagbo militias over to Côte d'Ivoire. On February 23, approx. 25 militants attacked bases of the Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) in Fete and Grabo, Bas-Sassandra district, leaving four soldiers and one assailant dead. During the fighting, two UNOCI forces, supporting FRCI, were injured. Following the attack, militants captured several AK-47 rifles and a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. The next day, armed militants established several roadblocks in the area, as part of a hit-and-run tactic. Government forces arrested up to 34 suspects on February 27, transferring them to the Security Service in Abidjan, eponymous district. On May 15, approx. 40 militants attacked and looted Fete, killing three soldiers and ten civilians. The following day, FRCI launched a counter-offensive, forcing 3,500 residents to flee. ats

CÔTE D'IVOIRE (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1999**

Conflict parties: FPI vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The conflict over national power between the party of former president Laurent Gbagbo, the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), and the Rally of the Republicans (RDR) of President Alassane Ouattara continued as a violent crisis.

The RDR and the FPI repeatedly clashed in April due to the March 22 government decision to transfer Charles Blé Goudé, former leader of the youth pro-Gbagbo movement, Young Patriots, to the International Criminal Court. On April 6, RDR supporters destroyed equipment installed for a planned public speech by FPI leader Pascal Affi N'Guessan in Duékoué, Lagunes district. The same day, RDR supporters violently prevented him from going to Doropo, Zanzan district. The following day, three alleged members of the army damaged infrastructures and attacked three FPI supporters and a policeman in Abidjan, eponymous district, leaving them injured. Police detained one of the attackers. On May 8, police dispersed FPI supporters with teargas and arrested ten of them outside a police station in Abidjan where four members of the FPI leadership were being questioned. On July 3, the FPI declared that approx. 1,000 of its supporters were still in prison, some of whom were being tortured and killed.

On November 18, dozens of soldiers protested the government and raised barricades in Bouake, Vallée du Bandama district. Some of the protesters were former pro-Gbagbo soldiers who claimed to be discriminated by the current regime. The rest of them were former rebels integrated into the army claiming they had not received their payments for their fight in favor of president Ouattara during the 2011/2012 post-electoral crisis. The same day, 50 soldiers took over the state TV and radio station in Bouake, while protests spread to the rest of the country. On November 19, soldiers returned to barracks after the government had agreed to pay the wages and overdue benefits. From December 2 to 25, hundreds of pro-Gbagbo prisoners went on a hunger strike, demanding the start of their trials and the end of ill-treatment.

es

DJIBOUTI (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↘ | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: MJO, USN vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between the opposition coalition Union for National Salvation (USN) and the Opposition Youth Movement (MJO) on the one hand, and the government on the other, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. The conflict dates back to the 2011 presidential elections when thousands protested against President Ismail Omar Gulleh and his party, People's Rally for Progress (RPP). One year before, an amendment to the Constitution had abolished term limits for presidency, paving the way for the president's re-election. Prior to the 2013 parliamentary elections, the opposition formed USN in order to effectively contest Gulleh's coalition Union for a

Presidential Majority (UPM). The UPM was formed from RPP as well as three other pro-government parties, among them the ethnic Afar Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), whose militant faction was frequently involved in armed struggles against the government [→ Djibouti (FRUD)]. In the 2013 parliamentary elections, opposition candidates won seats in the National Assembly for the first time since the country's independence. In the aftermath of the elections, protests by opposition members against alleged fraud were violently dispersed, leaving hundreds arrested and at least six dead. Following the 2013 elections, the opposition boycotted parliament.

In 2014, the government repeatedly arrested opposition members. For instance, USN's president Hamed Youssouf Hamed and spokesperson Daher Ahmed Farah were detained in May. After one month in prison, Farah was released on June 22.

On May 2, police and paramilitary allegedly arrested about 100 opposition activists and journalists leaving a mosque after a Friday prayer. On May 17, police closed the headquarters of USN member Republican Alliance for Development (ARD) in the capital Djibouti City. On November 3, MJO organized protests in the streets of Djibouti City, demanding transparent democratic elections. On December 31, the government and USN signed an agreement intended to integrate opposition parties into parliament. According to USN, the document set a 30-day ultimatum for both sides to find solutions for points of disagreement, such as the establishment of an independent electoral commission.

Throughout the year, the government repeatedly arrested journalists close to the opposition or those who covered the protests by USN. Furthermore, NGOs indicated that security forces used violent means during the arrests of opposition activists.

nab

DR CONGO (BANTU – BATWA / KATANGA)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: Balubakat, Kata Katanga vs. Batwa

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The conflict over subnational predominance in eastern Katanga province between Balubakat of the ethnic Bantu as well as Bantu members of the secession movement Kata Katanga, on one side, and ethnic Batwa, on the other, continued on the level of a limited war [→ DR Congo (Kata Katanga / Katanga)].

The conflict started in the first quarter of 2013, when alleged Kata Katanga militants attacked Batwa in Lwela and Nsange, Manono territory, leaving 19 people dead and around 200 houses destroyed. They allegedly blamed Batwa for having collaborated with the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC). On April 20, 174 Batwa militiamen surrendered to FARDC in Mukebo, Manono. On June 4, clashes between Batwa and Bantu militias left nine Bantu and eight Batwa injured in Lubaba, Manono. The Bantu Popular Auto Defense Force (FAP) killed ten in the Batwa village Maloba, Manono, on June 20 and 23. On June 23, 17 Kata Katanga fighters seized Batwa settlements in Mbuyu-Kabusu, Manono, and FARDC recaptured the village two days later. On July 12, Batwa killed three Balubakat women in Sange, north-eastern Manono. The following day, Balubakat militias attacked Lwizi village, Kabalo territory, burning 17 Batwa houses. Following the

attacks, between July 15 and 20, around 1,800 Batwa fled to the city Kabalo. On August 7, Balubakat allied with Kata Katanga mutilated and killed three Batwa, while burning several houses in Kasinge, Kabalo. Two days later, hundreds of Batwa demonstrated in the capital Kinshasa, denouncing what they called massacres against them and pleading for peaceful cohabitation between the communities. On August 9, a leaked MONUSCO report stated that Bantu militias attempted an extermination of the Batwa people, committing massacres, murders, acts of cannibalism, mass rape, and burning of houses. On August 10, MONUSCO reported that 2,000 Batwa found refuge in Ankoro, Manono, while 3,000 Bantu fled villages near Kansonza, north of Ankoro. On August 22, Head of MONUSCO Martin Kobler called upon both sides to end violence. The government arrested 33 alleged instigators of the inter-ethnic violence on August 24. Three days later, Batwa militia leader Nyumba Issa was captured by MONUSCO in Kabeke, Manono. On November 29, a Batwa militia attacked Muzozo village in Manono, killing ten civilians.

Between July and September alone, up to 345 people died in the course of the conflict and up to 80,000 people were displaced by September. [esc](#)

DR CONGO (EX-M23)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↓** | Start: **2004**

Conflict parties: ex-M23 vs. government
 Conflict items: subnational predominance

The conflict over subnational predominance in the east between the former militant group M23 and the government, supported by MONUSCO, de-escalated from a war to a non-violent crisis. M23 originated from the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), a former rebel group mainly composed of ethnic Tutsi. From early 2012 to November 2013, M23 controlled large areas of Rutshuru territory, North Kivu, temporarily occupying the provincial capital Goma.

After the UN Security Council (UNSC) had established the MONUSCO Intervention Brigade (FIB) with an offensive mandate to eliminate militant groups in the east, the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) and the FIB defeated M23 militarily between 10/26/2013 and 11/05/2013. This was followed by the government and M23 signing a peace agreement in Nairobi, Kenya on 12/13/2013. 1,320 M23 fighters fled to Uganda, among them military leader Sultani Makenga and political leader Bertrand Bisimwa. Furthermore, 767 fighters surrendered in Rwanda. In the Nairobi Agreement, the government and M23 agreed on an amnesty and a demobilization program for the group's remnants. Nevertheless, no agreement was reached over the details of the amnesty.

In January, head of MONUSCO Martin Kobler urged the government to fast-track the demobilization of ex-M23 fighters and called upon Uganda and Rwanda to prevent the militants from regrouping within their territory.

On February 11, the government issued an amnesty bill which excluded more serious war crimes, such as crimes against humanity, torture, rape, and child conscription. Nevertheless, ex-M23 demanded full amnesty for all of their members, including their military and political leaders. By December, only 250 former fighters were granted amnesty. In March, ex-M23 declared they sought participation in a government of national unity.

On June 9, the International Criminal Court (ICC) charged former M23 leader Bosco Ntanganda with war crimes and crimes against humanity. 320 demobilized M23 fighters had escaped from camps in Rwanda by the end of August, according to the Rwandan government. On September 15, Bisimwa announced that the former rebels planned to form a political party. On November 7, Bisimwa, who like Makenga had lived in Uganda's capital Kampala since M23's defeat, announced that if the government did not grant amnesty to all their fighters, ex-M23 would not hold to the peace deal. On December 16, the Ugandan military arrived at Camp Bihanga, southwest Uganda, to deport the remaining 1,320 ex-M23 fighters to the DR Congo. When around 1,200 of them fled into the bushes, the military opened fire, wounding some of them. The remaining 120 ex-M23 members were flown out to the DR Congo. On December 17, the 1,200 fugitives were found in the Rwamwanja UNHCR refugee camp in Western Uganda. Ex-M23 president Bisimwa called the repatriation of the demobilized fighters to the DR Congo a violation of both international law and the Nairobi Agreement.

Ex-M23 repeatedly complained about the conduct of the demobilization process by FARDC. The group accused military intelligence services of having tortured and executed ten ex-M23 prisoners in July and August. Furthermore, ex-M23 accused the government of having killed two of their members in Rubare and Rutshuru, North Kivu, on September 28 and October 19, respectively. From December 2013 to September this year, at least 100 demobilized fighters of various rebel groups, including ex-M23, died of starvation in the Kotakoli camp, Equateur province. [jhe](#)

DR CONGO (FDLR)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↘** | Start: **2000**

Conflict parties: FDLR vs. government
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The conflict over subnational predominance and resources between the armed group Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the government, supported by MONUSCO, de-escalated to a violent crisis. FDLR originated from parts of the former Rwandan army and the Interahamwe militia, which both entered the DR Congo in 1994 after having been involved in the genocide in Rwanda. Apart from their activities in the DR Congo, they continued to seek national power in Rwanda [[→ Rwanda \(FDLR\)](#)]. In total, at least 40 people died in fighting between the FDLR and the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) as well as in FDLR attacks against civilians throughout the year.

At the beginning of the year, 1,200 to 1,500 FDLR combatants still operated in the east of the country, with over 1,000 in North Kivu and less than 400 in South Kivu. The UN repeatedly called on FDLR fighters to demobilize, while FDLR representatives repeatedly stated they would abstain from armed combat and pursue their aims politically. On December 3, MONUSCO claimed that around 600 ex-fighters and dependants were transferred to Kisangani, Orientale province. Nevertheless, according to the UN, the group was still recruiting and training individuals at the beginning of July. Two of their leaders, Ferdinand Nsengiyumva and Hamada Habimana, had rejoined FDLR's ranks in March. On December 24, nine days before the expiration of an ultimatum to disarm, MONUSCO claimed FDLR's demobilization efforts were insuf-

ficient.

Violence related to FDLR concentrated in North Kivu. On January 16, an ambush by FDLR in Virunga National Park left one park ranger and three fighters dead. At the end of January, FDLR reportedly committed rapes and lootings in the village of Mumole, Beni territory, forcing residents of six neighboring villages to flee towards locations controlled by FARDC. On February 2, about 6,000 residents fled from FDLR presence in Bukalo towards Muhangi, Buyinda and Kasuho, Lubero territory. On March 7, FARDC regained control of the area around Miriki, Lubero, occupied by the group for the previous two years. Similarly, the military repelled FDLR from Kahumo, Lubero, in mid-March. Between May 21 and 27, FDLR clashed with the FARDC, supported by MONUSCO, resulting in the death of twelve militants in Rutshuru. In early June, the military dislodged FDLR fighters from Kihito and Nyabanyera villages in Rutshuru, which had been occupied by FDLR for over eight years.

On June 26, four leaders of the rebel group met with UN Special Representatives Martin Kobler and Mary Robinson, as well as special envoys of the United States, the EU and Belgium, and delegates of the Congolese government in Rome, Italy. The international representatives rejected FDLR's demand to establish a dialog with the Rwandan government and to permit FDLR representation in the leadership of Rwandan security forces.

On August 9, FDLR assailants allegedly killed four people and injured one in Mungomba Forest, Rutshuru. Between November 3 and 5, FDLR reportedly killed 13 people and raped ten in Misau and Misoke, Walikale territory.

In South Kivu, FDLR allegedly extorted USD 100 from every household in Mushinga, Walungu territory, in the beginning of February. On November 17, soldiers blocked an FDLR group crossing from South Kivu into Katanga province, killing one militant in the process.

FDLR was also active in Katanga. The FARDC stopped an FDLR incursion into Kabulo, Kalemie territory on April 5, killing three rebels. On August 7, FDLR fighters allegedly shot dead one civilian and injured two others in Kanyangwe. The group repeatedly pillaged travelers on the route between Kalemie and Bendera in September. reh

year. A series of clashes between Nyatura and the FDC in Masisi resulted in 35 to 70 fatalities in late January and early February. Six villages were torched, and several churches and schools were pillaged. On February 17, APCLS combated the FDC and Nyatura near North Kivu's capital Goma, causing twelve fatalities. Nyatura attacks on APCLS in Masisi in June displaced 6,800 people. In late November, one week of fighting in Masisi between the Nyatura faction named Forces for the Defense of Human Rights and the group Democratic Forces of Congo caused massive displacements. Furthermore, internal fighting over the control of villages in Masisi between two Nyatura factions on May 19 and 20 forced around 200 people to flee.

On July 14 and 15, fighting between a Raia Mutomboki (RM) faction and Mayi-Mayi Kirikicho left two people dead, several injured, and about 1,200 displaced in the southeast of Minova, Kalehe. In addition, RM factions repeatedly clashed throughout the year, leaving at least 20,000 people displaced in North and South Kivu. For instance, fighting between the Makombo and Bravo factions in Shabunda territory from October 20 to November 5 left 38 RM militants dead, including the RM Bravo leader, and around 50 wounded. Two other RM factions led by Mbongolo Kikwama and Kikuni Juriste fought in Shabunda from mid-October to late November, displacing inhabitants of several villages. Local leaders tried to mediate between the groups and appealed to MONUSCO to intervene. Most RM inter-factional fighting in South Kivu concerned the control of mining sites in Shabunda. Furthermore, in North Kivu's Walikale territory, RM Ntoto and RM Nsindo clashed on December 13, leaving at least nine people dead.

Throughout the year, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and Ndumba Defense of Congo (NDC) repeatedly engaged in skirmishes in northern Walikale. Starting in April, fighting in Lubero, which also involved Nyatura fighters, forced around 20,000 people to flee. In Walikale, clashes between NDC and FDLR from May to July left at least two FDLR militants and one civilian dead. In mid-September, they fought for several days north of Goma, forcing around 10,000 people to flee. Furthermore, NDC gained control of several villages in Walikale in mid-November, and claimed to protect the population from FDLR. hsp

DR CONGO (INTER-MILITIA VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: FDC vs. APCLS vs. Mayi-Mayi Nyatura vs. Raia Mutomboki vs. NDC vs. Mayi-Mayi Kirikicho et al.

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The conflict between militant groups over subnational predominance and resources in eastern DR Congo continued at a highly violent level. Throughout the year, some of the over 40 active militias repeatedly clashed in the territories Masisi, Walikale, and Lubero in North Kivu province and Shabunda territory in South Kivu province. At the same time, many of them engaged in fighting against the Armed Forces of the DR Congo, as well as violent attacks against the population [→ DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)].

Violence between the Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS), the Federation of Defense for the Congolese (FDC), and Mayi-Mayi Nyatura, a coalition of loosely collaborating militias, repeatedly erupted over the

DR CONGO (KATA KATANGA / KATANGA)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Kata Katanga vs. government

Conflict items: secession, resources

The conflict between Kata Katanga and the government concerning the secession of the resource-rich province Katanga continued as a limited war. Kata Katanga, a loose network of political camps and armed groups including Mayi-Mayi militias, emerged in 2011, demanding Katanga's secession. However, the internal organization of the movement remained unclear. UN sources presumed Gédéon Kyungu to be the head of Kata Katanga, however, there were smaller factions operating independently. According to the UN Group of Experts report of January 23, John Numbi Banza Tambo, former Inspector General of the National Police, had provided Kata Katanga fighters with arms as well as logistical and financial support.

On January 20, police searched Numbi's residences around Katanga's capital Lubumbashi and seized several arms, among them a rocket launcher. Kata Katanga factions operated

mainly in the northern territories of Pweto, Mitwaba, and Manono, also referred to as the “triangle of death”, attacking civilians and looting villages. From January 17 to 21, Kata Katanga fighters led incursions into several villages in Pweto, burning about 600 houses, including medical centers and schools. Kata Katanga burned over 60 houses in Kyona Nzini, Pweto, on October 4, causing 3,000 people to flee. In late October, the group carried out at least ten attacks in the space of a week in Moero sector, Pweto, looting and burning houses.

Throughout the year, Kata Katanga groups repeatedly clashed with government forces, such as on January 1. The clash in Kiziba village near Lubumbashi lasted eight hours and left 26 dead, with the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) driving off the militants. One of the areas most affected by violence was Manono. Clashes between the FARDC and Kata Katanga fighters in March and May displaced a total of 31,000 people. On May 19, FARDC captured one of the group’s leaders, Fidèle Ntumbi, in Mbale, Manono, and transferred him to Lubumbashi. After having expelled Kata Katanga from their headquarters on Mount Kibawa, Moba territory, in early October, FARDC dislodged Kata Katanga fighters from their new headquarters near Musumari village in Mitwaba on November 5. Many Mayi-Mayi fighters were killed and several soldiers wounded.

In March, Egyptian blue helmets arrived in Pweto and left in mid-May. Following their departure, Katanga Governor Moïse Katumbi requested MONUSCO to continue its presence in the area. On April 30, the government issued an amnesty bill for 100 militants, among them 25 detained Kata Katanga members. In mid-May, about 400 Kata Katanga fighters surrendered to the FARDC in Kalemie territory. In June, Kyungu declared that he would surrender himself to MONUSCO on the condition that they would extend their presence to Mitwaba and Pweto. According to the UN, the FARDC and Kata Katanga committed human rights abuses. Other reports indicated that, as the FARDC had no logistics in rural northern Katanga, the military exploited the population for food and housing. UNICEF claimed that Kata Katanga had recruited at least 2,000 children between the age of seven and 17 into their ranks since October 2012. Additionally, between January and September, 139,000 people were displaced due to violence in Katanga. This included violence between Bantu and Batwa [→ DR Congo (Bantu – Batwa / Katanga)]. fb

DR CONGO (MAYI-MAYI)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: **Mayi-Mayi militias vs. government**
 Conflict items: **subnational predominance, re-
 sources**

The conflict over subnational predominance and resources between Mayi-Mayi groups and the government, supported by MONUSCO, continued as a limited war. Mayi-Mayi as a general term refers to various, mostly independent, local militias claiming to represent the population against perceived foreigners. The militias ranged from well-organized, larger groups to smaller, localized units and were usually named after their commanders. Throughout the year, numerous Mayi-Mayi groups operated in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, Orientale, Maniema, and Katanga. They repeatedly clashed with the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) and targeted civilians, but were also confronted by

other militias [→ DR Congo (inter-militia violence)]. Continuous activities by the groups significantly contributed to the approx. 2.7 million IDPs in the country.

Divided into at least four major groups, Raia Mutomboki (RM) was active in the territory Walikale, North Kivu province, the territories Kalehe, Kabare, Walungu, and Shabunda, South Kivu province, as well as the eastern edge of Pangî, Maniema province. RM, which had initially been created to protect local populations from attacks by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), increasingly engaged in the extortion of civilians and aimed to control mines. In January, RM created bases in the Musenge area, Walikale and on March 3, they occupied Busolo in Walungu. Between April 7 and 8, RM clashed with the FARDC in Mulungu, Shabunda. Similar fighting in the same area in March and June led to the displacement of 31,550 people. On June 7, RM attacked civilians in the Banamesa Bakwami area on the border between the territories of Shabunda and Punia, kidnapping 40 people and setting several houses on fire. Three days later, the group raided Wakenge village, Shabunda, raping civilians and taking hostages. From July 7 to 8 and again on August 3, RM and the military clashed in Chifunzi, Kalehe, causing nine fatalities, including three civilians. Fighting in Kambali and Kambegete, South Kivu between the FARDC and RM caused 12,400 people to flee in August. At the end of August, RM seized areas in Penekusu, Shabunda, and in Chifunzi, Kalehe, clashing again with military forces. However, in late August and the beginning of September, several RM commanders and more than 60 fighters surrendered to the FARDC in Bunyakiri, South Kivu. On September 7, RM and the military clashed in Kibeleketa, Punia, resulting in three RM deaths and the FARDC regaining control of the area. Paul Ngumbi Wangozi, leader of the RM faction Sisawa, died in a skirmish with FARDC in Lugungu, Shabunda on September 14. At the end of November, the military regained control of several villages in Shabunda that had been under RM control since April, killing at least four militants.

The Nduma Defense of Congo (NDC), led by mineral trader Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, was mainly active in Walikale, North Kivu. In February, the group took control of ten mining sites on the Walikale-Masisi axis. In June, following the withdrawal of the army, NDC fighters seized Fatua in Lubero territory, as well as Kibati, Busi, Ndurumo, and Abulo in Walikale, displacing thousands in the process. The NDC imposed taxes on the newly controlled areas. On June 30, the military launched an operation against the NDC in Ihana on the Walikale-Kibua road and in Luberiki on the Kashebere-Kibua road. Consequently, 14,000 fled the area. In early August, the FARDC expelled the NDC from locations in north-west Walikale, killing at least seven militants armed with AK-47 and machine guns.

The militias Mayi-Mayi Nyatura and Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) mainly operated in Walikale, Masisi, and Rutshuru territories of North Kivu, collaborating multiple times. Fighting between APCLS and the FARDC in Kitchanga, Masisi, resulted in the displacement of 8,000 people in January. In late January, the military killed at least four militants in repeated clashes with APCLS and Nyatura in the localities of Kasira and Mutembere, Masisi. More than 700 families fled the area. On February 7, Nyatura and APCLS pushed the military out of Kitshanga and Muhanga, Masisi. Two days later, the FARDC regained control of the areas. On April 23, the FARDC seized APCLS bases in Matembe, Mirenge, and Maniema in Walikale. One week later, APCLS attacked positions of MONUSCO peacekeepers and the FARDC in Nyabiondo, Masisi, and Goma, Nyiragongo,

leaving at least six people dead on April 30. On June 5, the FARDC repelled an APCLS attack on its camp Kikamata II in northern Masisi, pushing the militants back to their position in Matembe. On July 2, APCLS and Nyatura raided Burungu village, Masisi, and imposed taxes on local farmers. This led to the displacement of 1,600 people. In September, the chief of Ufamandu I, an isolated, fertile area in Masisi controlled by the Mayi-Mayi groups Nyatura and Kifuafua, appealed to the government to deploy military and police in order to restore security. On September 15, the leader of Mayi-Mayi Kifuafua, Delphin Mbaenda, surrendered to military forces in North Kivu, followed by the capitulation of 25 of his men in late September.

Mayi-Mayi Yakutumba, led by ex-FARDC major William Amuri, continued to be active in Fizi territory, South Kivu province, as well as the territories Nyunzi, Kalemie, and Moba in Katanga province. Amuri also urged the government to free detained political sympathizers of his group in Uvira, Bukavu, Kalemie, Lubumbashi, and Kinshasa. In January, Yakutumba established a base in the Madjaga forest on the border between Fizi and Tanganyika district in Katanga. At the beginning of April, 18,000 people were displaced along the Lulimba–Kalemie route in Uvira due to Yakutumba activities. Between May 6 and 8, fighting between military and Yakutumba in Ngandja forest, Fizi, caused several casualties. The FARDC accused the militants of having used civilians as human shields. Another two-day skirmish in Fizi in mid-May left Amuri’s close collaborator Abwe Mapigano severely injured. In the second half of June, the military continued its offensive along Lake Tanganyika, expelling Yakutumba from several villages in Fizi. The operation resulted in the death of at least two soldiers and twelve militants. However, Yakutumba seized the villages Lusombe and Kasaka in Fizi in clashes with the FARDC on July 20. By the end of August, FARDC had regained control of all localities along the coastline of Lake Tanganyika in northern Kalemie which Yakutumba had occupied in July. Fighting in northeastern Fizi on August 28 and 30 caused the death of 17 Yakutumba fighters and one soldier.

Many smaller Mayi-Mayi militias were also active in the east. For instance on April 14, the FARDC killed the leader of Mayi-Mayi Morgan, Paul Sadala, near Badengaido, Ituri district in Orientale province, after negotiations over his group’s surrender had escalated into a shootout. Several soldiers and militants were killed or injured. Subsequently, some 8,000 people fled the Morgan-controlled areas in Ituri. The militia elected a new leader and conducted reprisal attacks against the population between April 14 and 18. More than 20,000 people fled due to Morgan activities from Orientale to Beni territory, North Kivu, between June and July alone. cke

DR CONGO – RWANDA

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1998**

Conflict parties: DR Congo vs. Rwanda
 Conflict items: territory, international power

The conflict over regional power, resources, and the exact demarcation of the common border between Rwanda and the DR Congo escalated to a violent crisis.

Between June 5 and 9, Congolese and Rwandan officials held consultations in Goma, North Kivu, over the exact location of the 22 joint border landmarks for the second time since 2009.

On June 11, the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) and the

Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) engaged in two separate firefights using light weaponry along the border between Nyiragongo territory in DR Congo’s North Kivu province and Rubavu district in Rwanda’s Western province. In total, five FARDC soldiers were killed and one RDF member wounded. The two parties accused each other of having started the violence. The same day, Rwandan Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo requested DR Congo to stop aggressions and stated that the RDF was ready to take action. That afternoon the head of MONUSCO, Martin Kobler, visited Rwanda’s capital Kigali to ease the tensions. Nevertheless, in the morning of June 12, Rwandan forces reportedly fired into Congolese territory. Both countries deployed troops to the area, including tanks on the FARDC’s side. A report by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region’s Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM) contained a list of potential causes of the confrontation. Those included the theft of cows on the Rwandan side by FARDC soldiers, the violation of territory by both forces, provocation by the RDF against the FARDC camp Kanyesheja I, the alleged capture of an FARDC soldier by the RDF, and the contested territorial status of the FARDC position Kanyesheja II. Confronted with the leaked EJVM report at the end of June, Rwanda distanced itself from the above mentioned conclusions, denying any ongoing border dispute with its neighbor. At the end of June, a joint team of experts began with establishing seven demarcation stones along the border.

On June 17 and 20, Rwandan military arrested 26 Congolese fishermen on Lake Kivu near Gisenyi, Western province, for allegedly having entered Rwandan waters. However, they were released several days later.

On December 10, Rwanda requested the EJVM to investigate the firing of an RPG at Bereshi village in the Rwandan Western province, which had allegedly been launched by the FARDC from the Congolese side of the border one day before. reh

DR CONGO, UGANDA (ADF)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1995**

Conflict parties: ADF vs. DR Congo, Uganda
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The conflict over subnational predominance and resources between the Ugandan rebels of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the governments of the DR Congo and Uganda, supported by MONUSCO, escalated to war.

ADF’s proclaimed long-term goal was to overthrow the Ugandan government and to establish an Islamic state. However, the group mainly focused on gaining control of areas and resources in the DR Congo. With an estimated strength of 800 to 1,500 fighters at the beginning of the year, the group operated in the mountainous region of Beni territory in DR Congo’s North Kivu province, close to the border with Uganda. The rebels conducted forced recruitment and killings of civilians and maintained cross-border economic and logistic networks, especially taxi businesses, illegal logging, and gold mining. Although ADF was significantly weakened in the first half of the year, UN sources claimed that the chain of command was still intact and the group might be able to reconstitute. While the Ugandan government repeatedly accused the rebels of collaborating with other militant Islamist groups, a UN expert group found no direct link between ADF and groups like al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab.

On January 2, Colonel Ndala of the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) was killed in an ambush. Ndala had been one of the leading officers in the fight against militant groups in North Kivu. The attack was blamed on ADF. In November, a Congolese court found four FARDC soldiers with alleged connections to ADF guilty of the murder. On January 5, the rebels killed an FARDC soldier and attacked a helicopter of the UN peacekeeping mission MONUSCO near Kamango in Beni territory. Supported by MONUSCO, FARDC launched operation "Sukola 1" against rebel groups in North Kivu, mainly ADF, on January 16. On February 15, ADF killed one journalist and injured two civilians near Kamango. By the end of February, FARDC had dislodged rebels from several of their bases and regained control of the Mbau-Kamango axis, as well as the group's training ground in Mwalika. The fighting resulted in the death of 22 soldiers and 230 rebels. On March 1, MONUSCO launched an airstrike against the rebels' command center near Kikingi, south of Kamango. Throughout March, FARDC took control of the groups' bases, Makoyoya 3, Nadui, and Sasi-Tasa, leaving approx. 72 rebels and nine soldiers dead. In April, five improvised explosive devices, allegedly planted by ADF, detonated in different locations in Beni territory, including one in Beni town, injuring at least seven civilians and four FARDC soldiers. On April 13, the army captured the group's stronghold Madina after ten days of fighting. According to the military, ADF had killed 217 soldiers and injured 444, while the army had killed 531 militants and had freed 21 hostages in the course of "Sukola 1" by early May. A UN report stated these figures might be exaggerated. FARDC seized the villages Abia and Lesse on May 28 after four days of intense fighting, allegedly leaving 64 rebels and one soldier dead. By early June, most of the rebels had abandoned their bases, with some reportedly fleeing to locations in North Kivu, including the Virunga National Park, and Orientale Province. Further skirmishes in Beni territory in August left 21 soldiers and five rebels dead.

In the last quarter of the year, there were several killings of civilians in Beni territory that the government linked to ADF. Nevertheless, at least some of the incidents were allegedly instigated by local politicians with no direct link to the group. In October, suspected ADF militants killed 83 to 95 civilians and abducted twelve in Beni town and near gold mines in Bango and Kampi ya Chuyi, northern Beni territory. In November, ADF allegedly killed up to 100 civilians and two FARDC soldiers in several villages in Beni territory and in Beni town. The police arrested over 200 suspects in connection with the killings. In December, alleged members of the group killed over 30 civilians in Beni territory. A further 33 people were killed and at least eleven injured in suspected ADF attacks in Orientale province. On December 19, alleged ADF militants attacked the central prison in Beni town. Security forces fought back, killed one of the assailants and arrested eight. Following rumors about misconduct of MONUSCO, local residents violently protested against the mission in November and December. On December 26, protesters demonstrated in front of the Idou headquarters of MONUSCO, Orientale province. When UN peacekeepers fired warning shots they killed one civilian.

In Uganda, police accused ADF of having killed two Muslim clerics near the capital, Kampala, in late December.

According to UNHCR, around 88,000 people were displaced due to ADF activities in the DR Congo. On June 30, the UN Security Council imposed economic and travel sanctions on the group for the recruitment of child soldiers, killings, maiming, sexual abuse of women and children, and attacking UN peacekeepers. bbr

ETHIOPIA (OLF / OROMIYA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1973**

Conflict parties: OLF vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The conflict over the secession of the Oromiya region between the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and its armed wing, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and the government remained violent.

Throughout the year, the OLF stated they had conducted several attacks on security forces, which were neither confirmed nor denied by the government.

On March 4, an OLA command unit allegedly killed four and wounded three government soldiers in East Harerge, Oromiya. In another incident on March 26, OLA fighters killed three and wounded two soldiers in East Harerge, according to the group. During the last week of April, security forces killed dozens during student-led demonstrations at universities throughout Oromiya against the government's plan of extending its power in the region. On May 24, OLA militants reportedly killed five soldiers and wounded more than seven others in East Harerge Zone.

In a speech on May 28 in the capital Addis Ababa, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn said that his government would take action against Eritrea-backed groups aiming at destabilizing the country, among them the OLF [→ Ethiopia - Eitrea]]. On July 9, an OLA command unit allegedly killed five Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) soldiers and wounded seven in Sasiga and Guto Wayo, East Welega Zone, Oromiya. On September 1, the OLA claimed to have raided a jail in Biyo, Eastern Oromiya, destroying a police vehicle, equipment, and various documents. On September 8, an OLA command unit allegedly killed five ENDF troops and wounded several others in Dembi Dolo, West Welega Zone. The OLA purportedly killed three policemen in Darba, East Welega Zone on October 12. On October 23, the OLF rejected media reports on the dismissal of OLF chairman, Brig-Gen Kamal Gelchu. On October 28, a human rights organization reported that the government had arrested, tortured, and killed ethnic Oromo for their alleged support of the OLF. Throughout the year, the group repeatedly stated to have killed people whom they suspected of spying for the government. sga

ETHIOPIA – EGYPT

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Ethiopia vs. Egypt


Conflict items: resources

The conflict over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) between Egypt and Ethiopia continued. The GERD, located on the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia, once realized, would be one of the largest hydropower dam projects in Africa. Egypt, highly dependent on Nile water, repeatedly raised concerns over the negative effects of the dam. The north-African country expressed fears of a possible reduction of the Nile's downstream flow and the violation of its historical rights over the Nile, ensured by treaties signed in 1929 and 1959. Ethiopia maintained that the dam would not bring disadvantages to anyone and that it would be willing to

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share its benefits. On January 8, Ethiopia refused to suspend the construction of the dam, as demanded by Egypt. On April 6, a potential candidate for the Egyptian presidency, Mortada Mansour, threatened that he, once in office, would use military force if the construction of the dam was not suspended. In May, the US government urged Egypt and Ethiopia as well as Sudan to settle their conflict. On June 25, Ethiopia agreed to hold a new round of tripartite meetings with Egypt and Sudan, the fourth in two years. The following day, newly elected Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi met Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn at the African Union Summit in Equatorial Guinea. They agreed on seven key principles on the use of Nile water to solve the crisis. On August 25 and 26, the Tripartite Ministerial Meeting on the GERD project took place in Sudan's capital Khartoum. The countries agreed to hire an international firm to study the hydrological and socio-environmental impacts of the dam. By mid-October, Ethiopia started to export hydropower-processed electricity to Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti. Due to alleged disagreements between the countries, the session of the Tripartite Meeting scheduled for December 4 to 6 was cancelled. Nevertheless, in a meeting between December 15 and 18, Egypt and Ethiopia stressed the need to generally promote their inter-governmental relations. By December, more than 40 percent of the dam had been finished. gap

GUINEA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: UFDG, UFR et al. vs. government
Conflict items: national power

The crisis over national power between the opposition coalition and the government de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. After the first free presidential election on 11/07/10 and several postponements of the legislative elections, the first parliamentary election took place on 09/29/13. The opposition coalition consisting of numerous parties was led by former presidential candidates Cellou Dalein Diallo, Union of Guinea's Democratic Forces (UFDG), and Sidya Touré, Union of Republican Forces (UFR). Claude Kory Kondiano of the ruling party Rally of the Guinean People (RPG) was elected as head of the National Assembly by 64 of 114 parliamentarians on January 13. On January 15, together with his cabinet, Prime Minister Mohamed Saïd Fofana resigned due to the transition process, only to be reinstated by President Alpha Condé three days later. On January 20, Condé announced a new government consisting of 34 ministers, 19 of whom stayed on from the old cabinet, and excluding any member of the opposition. On February 17, an extra parliamentary opposition was built by 14 political parties, including the Liberal Bloc of Faya Millimono, Union for the New Republic (UNR) of Barry Boubacar, UFDG of Bah Mamadou Badikko, and Guinea People's Party (PPG) of Charles Pascal Tolno. On June 9, the opposition pulled out of parliament and announced further street protests. On the same day, a group of people burned down the headquarters of the ruling RPG in Siguiri, close to the Malian border. However, on July 25, opposition parties suspended public protests in order to prevent the spreading of the Ebola virus disease. On November 9, the opposition coalition announced they would resume public protests and they accused the government of taking advantage of the Ebola outbreak to slow down the transition process. The outbreak of Ebola and the Guinean government's handling of

it encountered resistance. On November 11, 20 leaders from Wome, Nzérékoré region, camped in front of the National Assembly, starting a hunger strike to raise awareness of the situation in Wome, Nzérékoré, where allegedly 6,000 people fled the village which had been forcefully isolated due to the spread of the Ebola virus.

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GUINEA-BISSAU (COUP PLOTTERS)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **END** | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: military factions vs. government
Conflict items: national power

The dispute over national power between military factions that had staged a coup in 2012 and the government ended as peaceful elections were held in April and coup leader General Antonio Indjai was dismissed in September. On February 22, interim president Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo announced the postponement of both parliamentary and presidential elections from March 16 to April 13. In response, the UN Security Council (UNSC) reiterated its readiness to impose sanctions against civilian or military actors interfering in the process of democratic consolidation.

On April 13, the first round of elections was held. The African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cap Verde (PAIGC) gained 55 of 102 parliament seats. No presidential candidate was able to achieve a majority. José Mario Vaz of the PAIGC, which had provided most of the country's presidents, won the following run-off vote on May 18. His rival candidate, the independent Nuno Gomes Nabiam, initially announced he would contest the outcome. Nevertheless, Nabiam accepted the result on May 22, ending concerns over military intervention in the elections. On June 17, the African Union ended the suspension of Guinea-Bissau, acknowledging the elections.

On September 15, President José Mário Vaz discharged General Antonio Indjai, who had been army chief since 2010, had led the coup in 2012, and had been charged with drug trafficking by the US Drug Enforcement Administration. Two days later, Vaz appointed Biague Na Ntan, former chief of the presidential guard, as Indjai's successor. Throughout the year, the UNSC extended the peacekeeping mission UNIOGBIS twice to promote political stabilization. It was last extended to 02/28/2015.

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KENYA (INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **1963**

Conflict parties: Turkana vs. Pokot vs. Ilchamus vs. Tu-gen; Uasin Gishu vs. Siria; Degodia vs. Garre; Auliyahan vs. Abdiwak; Borana vs. Gabra; Masaai vs. Somali et al.
Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The limited war over resources and subnational predominance between various ethnic groups continued. Clashes erupted over cattle rustling, land use, grazing and water rights, as well as competition over political representation

both between different ethnic groups and among sub-clans within ethnic groups. Most affected areas were located in Turkana, West-Pokot, and Baringo County in north-western Kenya, and the counties Marsabit, Mandera, and Wajir in the country's north-east. Throughout the year, over 300 people were killed, hundreds injured, and over 220,000 displaced, most of them from Wajir and Mandera counties.

In the north-west, Pokot and Turkana repeatedly clashed over cattle and grazing grounds in the counties of West Pokot and Turkana, leaving at least 84 people dead, hundreds injured, and thousands displaced. In addition, both sides stole several thousand heads of cattle destroyed property. On the night of October 31, Pokot militiamen killed up to 24 people, including 21 police officers in Kapedo, Baringo County, stating they had mistaken them for Turkana. Following President Uhuru Kenyatta's call to surrender the attackers and to hand over the guns seized in the attack, the Kenya Defence Forces launched an air and ground offensive in the area. Subsequently, approx. 3,000 Pokot, some of which were armed, fled their homes to Marigat sub-county predominantly populated by Ilchamus and Tugen. On July 6, Pokot, Ilchamus, and Tugen leaders held a peace meeting organized by the county government in the cattle rustling-prone Mukutani area in Baringo. However, throughout the year, Pokot and Ilchamus repeatedly clashed over resources in Arabal area, Mukutani, and Sirata in Baringo. Up to six people were killed, 8,000 displaced, around 30 buildings burned, and thousands of livestock stolen in clashes between the two groups. Further clashes erupted between Pokot and Tugen in December. Following the killing of a former Pokot soldier and his son in Mochongoi, Baringo, armed Pokot raided Chesiran village and Loruk, Baringo, leaving one person dead and at least two injured. In addition, they burned more than 30 houses and stole at least 500 goats, forcing thousands to flee.

Along the Somalian border during the dry summer months between May and August, clashes between the communities Degodia, a subclan of the Somali Hawiye tribe, and Garre escalated. In a sequence of attacks and counter-attacks that included the use of heavy artillery, 74 people were killed, at least 56 injured, over 70,000 of people displaced, and several houses were burned in the counties Wajir and Mandera. On June 25, Kenyatta summoned political leaders from the two clans to State House, Nairobi, telling them to resolve their issues.

In Qabobey, Garissa County, Auliyahan and Abdiwak clashed over pasture and water, leaving more than ten people dead and property destroyed between May 24 and June 27. The border region of Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa also saw an increase in attacks conducted by Somali Islamist groups in recent years [→ Somalia (Islamist groups)].

In Marsabit County, near the Ethiopian border, confrontations between Borana and Gabra over livestock, grazing grounds, and water rights continued. Clashes between the two groups left more than 30 people dead and more than 32,000 displaced in 2013, after violence had erupted when the Borana candidate lost his seat in the parliamentary elections against the allied tribes Rendille, Gabra, and Burji. Continued violence in the first six weeks of 2014 left at least 14 people dead and thousands of families displaced. After President Kenyatta had formed the Marsabit Peace Restoration Committee, leaders of the warring communities signed a peace treaty on February 22. Among others, several UN agencies joined the negotiations to ensure lasting peace. However, unknown attackers raided pastoral camps along the Ethiopian border on June 18, leaving two people dead. Furthermore, Desaanach and Gabra violently clashed after attempted cat-

tle rustling in North Horr village on November 19, leaving ten people dead and twelve injured.

In Isiolo County in central Kenya, clashes over water and pasture between Borana and Samburu erupted. On August 22 and 23, raiders attacked Koom village along the Samburu-Borana border, killing five people and stealing more than 400 head of cattle. Furthermore, on November 11, raiders suspected to be Samburu from the eponymous county, ambushed Turkana herders at Loruko, leaving ten people dead and four injured. Six days later, around 100 Samburu militiamen raided Gachuru village, Isiolo, killing four people, including two police reservists, who had tried to intervene.

At the coast, in the south-east, confrontations between Maasai and Somali in Kinango sub-county erupted after efforts to resolve differences had failed. On December 17, over 30 Maasai youths killed ten Somali herdsmen whose cattle were grazing in the area. One day later, elders from both communities discussed ways to peacefully co-exist in a meeting summoned by Kwale County Commissioner Evans Achoki. [vm](#)

KENYA (MRC / COAST)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: MRC/PDM vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The conflict between the banned secessionist movement Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) and the government over the secession of Kenya's coastal region remained violent. In the second half of 2013, the conflict de-escalated when President Uhuru Kenyatta issued tens of thousands of title deeds in the coastal region to end long lasting land disputes, and MRC had declared its willingness to drop secession calls. Subsequently, the government and MRC stated their readiness to engage in peace talks. However, authorities claimed that MRC had recruited new members throughout the year and reformed itself as the Pwani Democratic Movement. A series of attacks were launched in the coastal region in the second half of the year especially in the counties of Lamu and Mombasa. As in previous years, officials repeatedly accused MRC of being responsible for the attacks against security personnel and recently also blamed them for inciting violence against tourists. MRC rejected allegations concerning any involvement in violent assaults and insisted on being a political movement campaigning for the independence of the coastal region. MRC also denied links to the Somali Islamist group al-Shabaab, which claimed responsibility for most attacks, stating they were retaliatory measures for Kenya's military presence in Somalia [→ Somalia (Islamist groups)].

The largest of these attacks in the coastal region was launched on the village of Mpeketoni in Lamu County near the Somali border, where 65 people were killed on June 15 and 16. Despite al-Shabaab claiming responsibility, Kenyatta accused MRC. After unidentified assailants had killed eleven people in another attack in Lamu on June 24, the next day police arrested 13 alleged MRC members suspected of planning further attacks. In Kilifi County, a further seven suspected MRC members were arrested in a police raid on July 3 conducted in the Kaya Choni forest between the towns of Mombasa and Kilifi.

At the beginning of November, attackers launched several assaults on security personnel throughout the coastal region. On November 1 and 2, about 20 suspected MRC members attacked a police camp in Malindi, Kilifi, as well as the Nyali

military barracks in Mombasa County. In the second attack, six of the assailants and one officer were killed. Another policeman was killed when 20 raiders attacked a police camp in Kinarani, Kilifi, on December 11. Subsequently, 53 suspected MRC members were arrested and the Mombasa High Court charged them with involvement in the raids.

As in previous years, police repeatedly arrested MRC leader of Kwale County Omar Mwamnuadzi along with other MRC members for holding illegal gatherings and inciting violence. However, Mwamnuadzi was released on bond in all cases. thg

KENYA (MUNGIKI)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: Mungiki factions vs. government
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The conflict over subnational predominance and resources between the banned sect Mungiki and the government as well as between rivalling Mungiki factions continued at a violent level.

Internal rivalry between a faction based in Kitengela, Kajiado county, and another faction based in capital Nairobi's Central Business District had already surfaced in the previous year. The Kitengela faction was allegedly led by former sect leader Maina Njenga, who had officially left the group in 2010, while the Nairobi faction was reportedly led by Thiong'o Kagicha, a former associate of Njenga. In May, violent clashes between the two factions concerning land left at least seven dead and more than 20 wounded in Kitengela and Athi River, Machakos county, south of Nairobi. In the same area, 30 people were reported missing or had gone into hiding. On May 4, clashes between the two factions left seven people dead in Kitengela, including at least three members of the Nairobi faction. The following day, Mungiki from the Nairobi faction armed with machetes attacked alleged Njenga supporters in Kitengela, leaving ten injured. Subsequently, the police arrested 32 suspects. Six days later, approx. 60 armed Mungiki assembled in Kitengela. Following an attempt by the police to disperse them, many fled to Njenga's Hope International Church, where a subsequent confrontation between the Mungiki and the police left several injured. On May 24, gunmen attacked Njenga, killing at least five people in Nyandarua County, including Njenga's wife. Njenga later accused the police of being behind the assault. The police, however, denied any involvement and linked the attack to the fighting between the two Mungiki factions. In June, the police closed down the Hope International Church due to the fear of further violence and the ongoing investigations into the involvement of members of the church in criminal activities.

Njenga stated that the government was trying to kill him in order to stop him from taking part in the case against President Uhuru Kenyatta at the International Criminal Court (ICC). In October, Kenyatta appeared in front of the ICC where he was accused of crimes against humanity [→ Kenya (TNA – ODM)]. He was suspected to have instructed Mungiki members to carry out killings in the aftermath of the 2007 general elections.

In August, ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda also accused Kenyatta of instigating the killing of Mungiki leaders, as well as of payments in return for their silence during the trial. The case was marked by suspicions of witness bribery. During

the trial, many witnesses withdrew their allegations, died, or disappeared. On December 5, the court dropped all charges due to a lack of evidence.

emh

KENYA (TNA – ODM)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1999**

Conflict parties: TNA vs. ODM
 Conflict items: national power

The conflict over national power between the political parties Orange Democratic Front (ODM) and The National Alliance (TNA) remained at the level of a violent crisis. No fatalities, however, were reported. President Uhuru Kenyatta won the presidential elections in 2013, leading the coalition Jubilee with his party, TNA, against his challenger Raila Odinga, who led the opposition Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) with his party ODM. The elections were followed by a violent escalation of the conflict. Kenyatta faced a trial at the International Criminal Court in which he was charged with crimes against humanity in the aftermath of the 2007 general elections. Following the elections, clashes along ethnic lines left more than 1,100 people dead and up to 600,000 displaced. The trial was repeatedly postponed due to a lack of evidence. Eventually, on December 5, all charges against Kenyatta were dropped [→ Kenya (Mungiki)].

Throughout the course of the year, the opposition held numerous rallies in the country. For instance on May 31, during his reception rally in Nairobi, CORD leader Odinga urged the president to engage in a national dialog and set a deadline for July 7. The government deployed 10,000 security personnel. On June 21, Odinga wrote an open letter to the president in which he listed the issues that should be addressed through national dialog such as the inspection of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, corruption, ethnic tensions, and insecurity in the country [→ Kenya (inter-ethnic violence)]. On July 7, thousands of CORD supporters took part in a rally in Nairobi on the symbolic Saba Saba Day. The rally was accompanied by a deployment of 15,000 security forces, including military personnel. Police used teargas against stone-throwing protesters and locked down some neighborhoods where CORD had the majority of their supporters. On August 11, at the by-elections in Nairobi's Mathare constituency, supporters of TNA and ODM clashed in a brief quarrel at the polling station over accusations of bribery. On November 18, Odinga called for the arrest of electoral agency officials suspected of having taken bribes during the presidential election 2013. Odinga repeatedly claimed that the election had been rigged and he challenged the result in the Supreme Court. On November 27, CORD once again pushed Kenyatta to resign over the lack of security in reference to the Mandera attacks in which 28 people were shot dead on a bus by al-Shabaab [→ Somalia (Islamist groups)]. On December 23, CORD went to court because of the anti-terrorism law passed by Kenyatta on December 19, stating they saw human rights and basic law endangered. On December 28, during an ODM rally for the Homa Bay County's senatorial by-election, gunshots fired by youths injured up to seven people and the vehicles of several ODM supporters were destroyed.

els

LESOTHO (MILITARY FACTIONS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: military factions vs. government
Conflict items: national power

A new violent conflict over national power between the military and the government erupted.

On June 10, at the request of Prime Minister Motsoahae Thomas Thabane, King Letsie III suspended parliament for nine months to prevent a vote of no confidence. In the ensuing gridlock between the opposition, led by Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and the ruling party All Basatho Convention (ABC), the South African Development Community (SADC) bargained a compromise between opposition leader and deputy PM Mothetjoa Metsing, LCD, and Thabane, ABC. The compromise failed when Thabane refused to reopen parliament.

On August 29, on behalf of Thabane, the King suspended commander of the Lesotho Defense Force (LDF), Chief Lieutenant General Tlali Kamoli, allegedly loyal to the opposition, from office while appointing Lieutenant General Maaparankoe Mahao as new commander.

In an attempted coup d'état on August 30, approx. 300 soldiers, led by Kamoli, seized control of the main police stations in the capital Maseru, eponymous district, disarming officers of the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS) and seizing their weapon arsenal. Subsequently, a gunfight between soldiers and the police left one police officer dead and up to nine wounded. At the same time, soldiers surrounded the residence of Thabane, who had fled shortly before to South Africa. Radio and telephone networks were blocked. The next day, military returned to barracks while police stations remained abandoned and police officers remained in hiding. Under protection of 150 South African security forces, PM Thabane returned to Lesotho on September 3. The following day, police officers returned to work, supported by South African security forces deployed to the stations. That night, suspended military commander Kamoli fled with 200 fellow soldiers and a full weapon arsenal into the hills surrounding Maseru. On September 22, an SADC observer team of 39 Namibian police officers was deployed to Lesotho. Two police officers were injured during gunfire between military and police on September 30.

After the alleged coup attempt in August, SADC under South African deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa resumed the mediation between Thabane and opposition leader Metsing. Regular meetings since the beginning of September led to the signing of the Maseru Facilitation Declaration on October 2, paving the way for early elections in 02/15 and the re-opening of parliament. King Letsie III reopened parliament on October 17 on condition that opposition would not mount a vote of no confidence until December and focus solely on the discussion of budget and upcoming elections. On October 23, the Maseru Security Accord was signed, resulting in the leave of absence of the three competing security officials to Uganda, Sudan, and Algeria. Lieutenant General Kamoli, LDF, Lieutenant General Mahao, Kamoli's appointed successor, and Police Commissioner Lhotatso Tsooana departed Lesotho on November 21. King Letsie III dissolved parliament on December 5 as part of the SADC peace deal reached. On December 11, LDF returned around 50 automatic weapons seized from police stations during the coup in August. On

the same day, a Memorandum of Understanding between the LDF and LMPS was signed. les

MALI (AQIM, MUJAO – HCUA, MAA, MNLA – GATIA / NORTHERN MALI)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: AQIM, MUJAO vs. HCUA, MAA, MNLA vs. GATIA
Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational predominance

The violent crisis between different militant groups in northern Mali over ideology and subnational predominance continued.

In the beginning of 2012, the Tuareg group National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), temporarily allied with Islamist groups, launched an offensive against the government in order to establish their own state Azawad, consisting of the northern regions Kidal, Timbuktu, and Gao. Due to disagreement over the ideological orientation of the newly established Azawad, heavy fighting between the Islamist groups al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), on one side, and MNLA, on the other, erupted in May 2012. While in February and May 2013, MNLA had clashed with the Tuareg group High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) and the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA), four months later the three groups met for talks, working out a common position towards a peace agreement with the Malian government [→ Mali (HCUA, MNLA et al. / Azawad)].

During a 2014 meeting with a UN Security Council delegation in the capital Bamako on February 2, MNLA, HCUA, and MAA expressed their willingness to continue peace talks with the government. Twelve days later, MAA shut out some of its members from the preparations for peace talks, accusing them of serving the government's interests. The resulting dissident faction of MAA subsequently clashed with members of MAA and MNLA in Tabankort, Gao region, on May 24. Seven people died, among them at least one MNLA militant, and 15 were injured. Between July 11 and 22, clashes between MNLA and MAA, on one side, and MAA dissidents and the newly founded Self-Defense Group of Imrad Tuareg and Allies (GATIA) on the other, resulted in the deaths of at least 37 militants in Anefis, Kidal region. In mid-August, GATIA declared its loyalty to the government while opposing any potential northern autonomy. On August 9, MAA and MNLA members clashed with MAA dissidents in Lerneb, Timbuktu region, leaving seven people dead. Fights on October 16 between GATIA and MNLA claimed the lives of at least seven when GATIA took over N'Tillit village, Gao region, previously controlled by MNLA. On December 29, GATIA and MAA dissidents clashed with the MAA in the outskirts of Bamba, Gao region, and left at least one MAA member dead.

Throughout the year, MNLA also clashed with Islamist groups. On January 13, unidentified militants kidnapped Abounehiya Ag Attayoub, a high-ranking MNLA member, in Tessalit, Kidal region. MNLA accused AQIM of being responsible for the kidnapping. In a village near Tamkoutat in Gao region, Fulani fighters accused of being allied with MUJAO killed approx. 30 people in Tuareg on February 6. In retaliation, MNLA reportedly killed at least six MUJAO members three days later in the same region. Confrontations between members of MNLA

and MUJAO in Bourem, Gao region, between April 29 and May 1 resulted in the deaths of approx. ten people, allegedly including at least two Tuareg and six MUJAO fighters. Furthermore, MNLA captured at least nine MUJAO members. Government accused MNLA, HCUA, and MAA of receiving support from AQIM and MUJAO in clashes with the army in Kidal, Kidal region, in mid-May. maw

MALI (HCUA, MNLA ET AL. / AZAWAD)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: HCUA, MNLA et al. vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy

The violent crisis between various militant groups, specifically between the Tuareg groups National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), on one side, and the government, on the other, in the northern regions continued. The two sides disagreed over the degree of autonomy for the northern regions Kidal, Timbuktu, and Gao, where MNLA had established its own state, Azawad, in a temporary alliance with Islamist groups in 2012 [→ Mali (Islamist groups)]. However, MNLA suspended their secessionist goal in December 2012, declaring their willingness to enter negotiations with the government.

After an unsuccessful ceasefire and violent clashes between both sides at the end of 2013, MNLA, HCUA, and members of the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) met with a delegation of the UN Security Council in the capital of Bamako on February 2. The three groups agreed to the immediate resumption of negotiations with the government and underlined their respect for the territorial integrity of Mali. However, they renewed their demand for Azawad's special status and refused to lay down their weapons. On March 12, a former official of MNLA, Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh, formed a new movement called Coalition for the People of Azawad (CPA). Two weeks later, CPA proposed to hold MINUSMA-mediated peace talks with the government.

Against the backdrop of the announced visit of Prime Minister Moussa Mara, MNLA, reportedly supported by HCUA, and the army clashed in Kidal, Kidal region, on May 16. In the following days, heavy gunfights between both parties left eight soldiers and 28 Tuareg dead and internally displaced nearly 3,000 people. On May 19, the army sent 1,500 troops to retake the MNLA-controlled Kidal. The next day, the army recaptured key positions in Kidal without fighting. On May 23, MNLA, HCUA, MAA, and the government brokered a new ceasefire mediated by Mohamed Ould Aziz, chairman of the AU and UN special representative in Mali. Subsequently, MNLA handed over the governorate of Kidal region to MINUSMA and agreed on a prisoner exchange as well as on the investigation of the incidents in Kidal by an independent commission.

In early June, government representatives and delegations of MNLA, HCUA, MAA, and the Fulani-Songhai group Coordination of Patriotic Resistance Forces and Movements (CM-FPR), which declared its loyalty to the government, met in Nouakchott, Mauritania, as a prelude to the presumed negotiations. On June 10, the first round of peace negotiations was held in Algiers, Algeria. MNLA, HCUA, and MAA committed to the AU-brokered ceasefire. On June 14, MAA, CPA, and CM-FPR signed a statement asserting full respect for the territorial integrity of Mali. On August 14, the Self-Defense Group of

Imrad Tuareg and Allies (GATIA) was founded. GATIA declared its loyalty to the government while opposing any northern autonomy [→ Mali (AQIM, MUJAO – HCUA, MAA, MNLA – GATIA / northern Mali)]. The following day, the Popular Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MPSA), an MAA splinter group, was founded. On August 17, the second round of the Algiers peace talks started. On September 14, MNLA, CPA, CM-FPR, HCUA, MAA, and MPSA declared they spoke with one voice during the talks. In mid-October, MNLA, HCUA, MAA, CPA, CM-FPR, GATIA, MPSA, and the government held the third round of peace talks.

Despite peace negotiations, the army clashed with HCUA in Boleksy village, Timbuktu region, on November 2, which resulted in a number of deaths on both sides. Further peace talks on November 20 ended without concise agreements. However, both sides confirmed their willingness to continue the peace process in January 2015. jsa

MALI (ISLAMIST GROUPS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: ▾ | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: al-Mourabitoun, Ansar al-Din, AQIM, MUJAO vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational predominance

The conflict over ideology and subnational predominance in northern Mali between the Islamist groups Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Mourabitoun, and Ansar al-Din, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, de-escalated to a limited war. Though Islamist groups had successfully maintained their presence in northern Mali since 2012, the intervention of international forces in 2013 strongly curtailed their power in the country. While the militant groups had pushed south extending their territory toward the towns of Mopti and Konna, Mopti region, in January 2013, they mostly launched targeted attacks on the government, its allies, and civilians in remote northern areas in 2014. Throughout the year, MUJAO proved to be the most active militant group, frequently carrying out attacks in the three northern regions Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu.

For instance, clashes between villagers and MUJAO fighters left 17 civilians and 13 Islamists dead near the border of Niger on February 10. In the second half of February, clashes with local people in Tlatit, Timbuktu region at the Mauritanian border resulted in the deaths of about 50 people.

In early March, French troops intensified their counter-terrorist activities, mostly conducting airstrikes. For instance, on March 4, French troops killed several MUJAO fighters, among them the group's speaker Oumar Ould Hamaha, in Amettetai Valley, Kidal region. The following day, French troops killed ten AQIM fighters in the Tigharghar Mountains, Kidal region. On April 17, French forces freed a Red Cross team, killing ten MUJAO fighters north of Timbuktu, Timbuktu region. MUJAO had kidnapped the team while they were travelling from Kidal to Gao on February 8. On April 22, MUJAO announced it had killed a French hostage taken in 2012.

In late April, French troops killed an Ansar al-Din leader north of Kidal, Kidal region. In April and May, an AQIM death squad was blamed for killing ten people suspected of cooperating with foreign or government troops in Kidal. On May 7, a French soldier died due to the detonation of an improvised explosive device (IED) in the Ifoghas Mountains, Kidal. At

the end of April, al-Mourabitoun leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar announced the group's allegiance to al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri. In early July, AQIM issued a fatwa against local Malians collaborating with foreign troops. On July 14, al-Mourabitoun claimed responsibility for a suicide attack that had killed a French soldier approx. 100 km north of Gao. Two weeks later, French forces arrested a leader of MUJAO, Yoro Ould Daha, whom they suspected of being behind the assault.

On August 1, France launched "Operation Barkhane", replacing "Operation Serval". They deployed approx. 3,000 soldiers as well as six fighter jets, 20 helicopters, 200 armored vehicles, ten transport aircraft, three drones, and established four permanent military bases in Niger, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania in order to combat militant groups [→ Mauritania (AQIM); Niger (Islamist groups)]. Between June and October, Islamist fighters launched several attacks against MINUSMA in the regions of Kidal, Timbuktu, and Gao, leaving 18 peacekeepers dead. In one of those attacks, MUJAO fighters armed with rocket-propelled grenades killed nine UN peacekeepers in Gao region on October 3. On September 16, suspected AQIM militants abducted a group of five civilians in Zoueira, Timbuktu and beheaded one of them eight days later.

A large-scale French-led military operation in Amettetai valley and Tigharghar mountain range, Kidal, lasting from October 28 to November 7, resulted in the deaths of 24 Islamist fighters and one French soldier.

Using an IED, Islamist fighters attacked an army checkpoint in Almoustrate, Gao, killing two and wounding four Malian soldiers on November 2. In Aguelhoc, Kidal, twelve children were abducted on November 22. Militants reportedly recruited them as child soldiers. On December 9, France announced the release of one of its citizens who had been taken hostage by AQIM in 2011. Two days later, French forces killed Ahmed el Tilemsi, an al-Mourabitoun leader, in Gao. On December 29, Ansar al-Din fired rockets at a MINUSMA camp in Tessalit, Kidal, with no casualties reported. Despite ongoing attacks by Islamist groups, thousands of refugees who had fled their homes in 2012 and 2013 returned to Mali throughout the year. bkm

MOZAMBIQUE (RENAMO)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: RENAMO vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between the main opposition party, Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and the government, consisting of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), continued. RENAMO accused FRELIMO of monopolizing the wealth derived from the exploitation of oil and gas resources.

Throughout the year, at least 72 people died, including many soldiers, some civilians, and to a lesser extent, RENAMO members. More than 6,700 people were internally displaced. In the first six months, RENAMO repeatedly attacked vehicles driving under military escort on the country's main highway EN1 between Save river and Muxungue in Sofala province. In addition, RENAMO and government forces repeatedly clashed near regional RENAMO bases in Pembe in Inhambane province, Dimba in Sofala, and Nhamaibue in Tete province. For instance, in skirmishes in Tete on March 29 and

30, RENAMO reportedly killed 30 soldiers. Frequent fighting also occurred in Grongosa, Sofala, where RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama was believed to be hiding. Additionally, RENAMO hit a police station and a health center, both in Mavume, Inhambane, on January 14, and in Matenje, Tete, on June 21.

RENAMO and the government negotiated ways to end the violence. While on March 18 the government agreed to RENAMO demands that foreign observers monitor the talks, it rejected the demand that RENAMO members be integrated into the armed forces on April 23. On May 23, Dhlakama announced that he would run as presidential candidate in the October 15 elections.

Negotiations progressed in July, and on August 12 parliament passed amnesty laws for all those involved in the recent armed RENAMO-government conflict. After a ceasefire agreement had been signed on August 24, Dhlakama and President Armando Guebuza met in the capital Maputo on September 5 to sign the finalized peace agreement. According to the agreement, RENAMO members were to be integrated into the armed forces. On October 15, FRELIMO presidential candidate Filipe Nyusi won the elections with 57 percent of the vote while Dhlakama gained 36.6 percent. RENAMO rejected the results, citing irregularities during the elections. RENAMO complained to the National Elections Commission and later appealed to the Constitutional Court. The latter rejected RENAMO's appeal on December 4 and approved the election results on December 30. In November and December, Dhlakama repeatedly called for a caretaker government. Later, Dhlakama threatened that he would create a parallel government if FRELIMO did not accept his suggestion.

las

NIGER (ISLAMIST GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: AQIM, MUJAO vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance

The ideology and subnational predominance conflict between Islamist groups and the government remained violent. On August 1, France launched "Operation Barkhane", replacing "Operation Serval" to combat Islamist militant groups in the Sahelian Zone [→ Mauritania (AQIM); Mali (Islamist groups); Nigeria (Boko Haram)]. The operation included the deployment of approx. 3,000 soldiers as well as six fighter jets, 20 helicopters, 200 armored vehicles, ten transport aircraft, three drones, and the establishment of four permanent military bases in Niger, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania. One day after the US-Africa Leaders Summit in the US capital Washington, DC, from August 4 to 6, President Mahamadou Issoufou approved the establishment of a second US-led drone base in Agadez, eponymous region, to monitor militant Islamist groups. On October 9, French and Nigerien forces destroyed an AQIM convoy transporting weapons from Libya to Mali, capturing several militants and seizing a large number of weapons in Agadez region. In the end of October, a temporary "Operation Barkhane" military base was established in Madama, Agadez region, close to the border of Libya. On October 30, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) simultaneously launched three attacks in the department of Oualla, Tillabéry region. The first attack on the Mangaize refugee camp resulted in the deaths of nine

security forces and a civilian, while two assailants were killed and four detained. 58 prisoners, including members of MUJAO, escaped from Oualla's prison after another attack by the group. The third attack was launched against a military patrol in Bani-Bangou, Tillabéry region. Further clashes erupted in Bani-Bangou on November 19, leaving one member of security forces dead and at least two wounded. In the course of the fighting, MUJAO destroyed an army vehicle, seized a police car, and a large amount of ammunition. Subsequently, Niger sent army helicopters to its border with Mali to repel the attackers. On November 20, militants attacked a military camp near Oualla, leaving three members of security forces wounded. Several attackers were killed during the ensuing fight. jas

NIGER (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The national power conflict between opposition groups and the government escalated and concentrated in the capital Niamey.

Throughout the year, police carried out various arrests of journalists and civil society activists. For instance, police briefly arrested four journalists and a civil society representative in the end of January, charging them with plotting against state security. On February 17, gunmen fired at the home of Hama Amadou, leader of the opposition Nigerien Democratic Movement for an African Federation (MODEN) and National Assembly president, when he was not at home. On May 11, 70 out of 113 deputies of the National Assembly demanded Amadou's resignation. On May 19, gunmen fired at the home of Mohamed Ben Omar, member of the ruling coalition.

After attacking a government agency, hundreds of University of Niamey students complaining about delays in payment of living stipends clashed with police on May 20. Police used teargas and truncheons and injured at least ten students and arrested around 20. On May 21, police detained the son of Amadou as well as two other MODEN-affiliated people for several hours. One day later, people threw three Molotov cocktails at the ruling party's headquarters, injuring three party members, one of them severely. On May 24, 40 opposition politicians accused of organizing a terror campaign to promote a military coup were arrested. Some of them reportedly belonged to MODEN. On May 31, judicial authorities prohibited anti-government protests in the capital. On June 3, six MODEN-affiliated politicians accused of violating the security of the state were arrested. Twelve days later, at least 3,500 anti-government protesters, among them Amadou, demonstrated against the arrests.

On June 23, 17 people, one of Amadou's wives, were arrested for alleged involvement in baby trafficking in Niamey. Four days later, parliamentary leaders allowed Amadou to be arrested, because he was suspected for being involved in the aforementioned trafficking ring. On August 27, the National Assembly lifted Amadou's immunity. The same day, he fled to Burkina Faso and later to France. After 14 opposition MPs had challenged the lifting of Amadou's immunity, the Constitutional Court confirmed the legality of the parliament's decision on September 4. On September 29, judicial authorities announced it had issued an arrest warrant for Amadou. Four days after the Constitutional Court had declared the par-

liament speaker post vacant on November 20, 71 out of 113 members of the National Assembly elected Amadou Salifou to the post. 23 opposition MPs tried to block the vote and proposed a no-confidence vote on the government. jas

NIGERIA (BOKO HARAM)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: Boko Haram vs. Cameroon, Nigeria

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance

The conflict over system and ideology and subnational pre-dominance between the Islamist group Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram) and the governments of Nigeria and Cameroon continued at war level.

The northeastern Nigerian states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa were most-affected by combat actions, though Boko Haram also targeted Plateau state, Kano state, and Federal Capital Territory. Boko Haram was also active in adjacent countries, Niger and Cameroon [→ Niger (Islamist groups)]. The latter was heavily affected by Boko Haram operations, which resulted in hundreds of deaths. Cameroon increased its military efforts to fight the Islamist group.

In reaction to Boko Haram's transnational activities, Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Benin, and France held a summit in Paris on May 17. The participants agreed on an action plan, including strengthening cross-border intelligence and intensifying mutual border controls. One of the main actions was moving the headquarters of the Multi National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which was established in 1998 with troops of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Benin, to Baga, Borno, in November and deploying a first contingent of 1,700 MNJTF troops.

Boko Haram was radically opposed to secular ideals and expanded its goal from implementing Sharia law to the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Nigerian territories in 2014. The conflict experienced its most violent year, counting at least 10,000 battle-related deaths and approx. one million IDPs and 150,000 refugees. Boko Haram gained military strength through raids on military bases, where they captured light and heavy weapons and vehicles, including armored personnel carriers (APCs). The group gained control over parts of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states and proclaimed the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. In order to defend villagers from recurring attacks, local vigilante groups, including government-supported Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), increasingly clashed with Boko Haram. Referring to lacking progress in the fight against Boko Haram, President Goodluck Jonathan dismissed all military chiefs on January 16. On January 26, Boko Haram stormed a church in Wada Chakawa, Adamawa, killing approx. 100 Christians by gunfire and explosives.

On January 26, Boko Haram attacked Kawuri, Borno, planting explosives before they encircled and invaded the village, torched 300 homes, destroyed a market, and shot fleeing inhabitants. The attack left 83 people dead. In a similar attack on February 11, Boko Haram massively destroyed Konduga, Borno state. Approx. 39 people were killed and more than 1,000 homes were razed to the ground. For the first time, Boko Haram planted a black flag in the town center, marking their territory. Throughout the month, Boko Haram attacked several villages and clashed with military forces in Borno and Adamawa states. For instance, on February 15, about 200 militants looted Izghe village, Borno, and killed approx.

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150 mostly Christian residents. One week later, Boko Haram returned to Izghe and razed the village to the ground. More than 200 Boko Haram militants attacked Bama, Borno state, on February 19, destroying at least 500 houses, local government buildings, schools, markets, and phone masts in order to obstruct communications systems and governmental access to the area. Heavy fighting between CJTF and Boko Haram left approx. 100 Islamists as well as 98 civilians and vigilantes dead. Subsequently, the military conducted airstrikes on suspected Boko Haram hideouts in the region.

On February 24, in an overnight attack on a school in Buni Yadi, Yobe state, about 50 Boko Haram members slit the throats of 59 students and burned the building. In another series of attacks at the beginning of March, Boko Haram killed about 260 people in the northeast. The Islamists killed 52 people by detonating car bombs in the capital of Borno state, Maiduguri. An additional 39 inhabitants were killed in a village raid on Mainok, Borno state, and 120 people in Mafa, Borno state, on March 2.

On March 14, hundreds of heavily armed militants on APCs stormed the Giwa military base in Borno's capital Maiduguri, engaging in heavy gunfights with security forces. The militants freed dozens of imprisoned Boko Haram members. CJTF joined the battle. In total, more than 350 attackers, civilians, and security force members died in the fighting. On April 14, two bomb attacks on a bus station in the capital Abuja left 75 people dead.

The same day, approx. 300 girls were abducted from their school in Chibok, Borno, in an overnight attack. Some 234 were still believed to be Boko Haram hostages by the end of the year. The abduction received global attention and was followed by the deployment of 80 US and Israeli military advisers.

On May 5, 354 civilians were killed and 3,000 fled, when Boko Haram raided Gamboru Ngala, Borno, equipped with APCs, RPGs, guns, and machetes. Up to 200 Boko Haram members and 60 civilians died in clashes with local vigilantes when Boko Haram attacked Rann, Borno, and surrounding villages on May 13. In Jos, Plateau state, a bomb attack left 118 people dead on May 20.

On June 2, up to 300 civilians were massacred in Gwoza, Borno, when Boko Haram attackers, disguised as military personnel, gathered residents and shot them. Aerial bombardment by the military stopped the attack. Throughout June, a series of bomb attacks, village raids, and clashes with security forces resulted in up to 1,000 fatalities in Adamawa, Yobe, and Borno. Approx. 500 Boko Haram members captured Damboa, Borno state, on July 17, employing APCs, IEDs, and anti-aircraft RPGs. Up to 100 residents were killed and about 15,000 fled the town. For the first time, Boko Haram was capable of holding the town against enforced military attempts to regain control. In August, Boko Haram increasingly seized villages and occupied administration buildings in the northeast, marking a shift in their strategy from the implementation of Sharia law to holding territories in order to establish an Islamic caliphate. Following weeks of intense fighting with the military, Boko Haram captured Gwoza, and, on August 24, its leader Abubakar Shekau proclaimed the establishment of an Islamic caliphate with Gwoza as its capital. About 100 Boko Haram members as well as some 100 security personnel were killed, and approx. 10,000 civilians fled.

In many incidents even security forces fled the scene. For instance, 480 Nigerian troops crossed the nearby border to seek refuge in Cameroon on August 25, when Boko Haram captured Gamboru Ngala, Borno.

When a renewed attempt to seize Konduga was repelled by military forces, 200 Boko Haram members were killed on September 12. On October 17, the government announced it had reached a ceasefire deal with Boko Haram. Nevertheless, Boko Haram continued its attacks, and Shekau later denied that any such deal had been concluded.

On October 29, Boko Haram seized Mubi, Adamawa, killing an unknown number of civilians, mostly Christians, and displacing approx. 10,000. The city's churches were destroyed, Boko Haram announced the rule of Sharia law, and renamed the city to Madinatul Islam.

Following the territorial gains by Boko Haram, local vigilante groups and the CJTF became increasingly involved. In Sabon Gari, Borno, CJTF beheaded Boko Haram attackers on October 30. After four days of joint efforts, military, CJTF, local hunters, and vigilantes regained control over four towns including Mubi, in Adamawa, on November 17. Over 30,000 local hunters and CJTF members had been mobilized, and up to 400 insurgents were killed. One week later, Boko Haram recaptured the city.

On November 25, two female suicide bombers killed 78 in Maiduguri. In similar bombings in markets and mosques, 245 were killed in Azare, Bauchi state, and Kano, Kano state, at the end of November. Following a statement by the Emir of Kano, who had called on Muslims to take up arms against Boko Haram, at least 36 people died in a twin bomb attack on the Central Mosque in Kano on November 28.

Pushing further westwards, Boko Haram attacked Damaturu, the capital of Yobe state, on December 1.

Clashes with security forces at a police base, a university, and a school left approx. 59 dead. On December 11, a twin bomb attack hit a market in the center of Jos, leaving at least 32 people dead. On December 14 in an attack on Gumsuri, Borno, at least 35 were killed and over 172 women were abducted.

While several towns were heavily embattled for months, Boko Haram held territory of more than 20,000 sq km and controlled some 25 towns in the states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa by the end of the year.

In Cameroon, Boko Haram continued its practice of abducting civilians in order to demand ransom. In one such incident, the militants kidnapped the wife of Cameroonian Vice-Prime Minister Amadou Ali in Kolofata, Far North Province, on July 27. In comparison with previous years, the number of violent Boko Haram attacks on Cameroonian territory increased significantly. For instance, when Boko Haram attacked a village near Fotokol, Far North, six Boko Haram members and one Cameroonian soldier were killed in the ensuing fights on March 2. At the end of May, some 60 Boko Haram members retreating to Cameroon were killed by Cameroonian military in Dabanga. Battles between the Cameroon military and Boko Haram near Moloko, Cameroon, left 118 people dead on June 2. Cameroonian defense forces repelled a Boko Haram attack on Fotokol with mortar fire on September 6. Over the course of October, 250 people died in recurring clashes between Cameroonian troops and Boko Haram along the border to Borno state, Nigeria. When Boko Haram attacked a military base in Amchide, northern Cameroon on December 17, Cameroonian military killed 116 militants. Further, on December 27, approx. 1,000 Boko Haram members entered Cameroon and engaged in fierce fighting with Cameroonian military over several villages. Two days later, Boko Haram took control over a military base in Achigachia, Cameroon, before it was repelled by the first airstrikes of the Cameroonian military on the militants. 41 militants were reported dead, while an unknown number of civilians died.

Niger's territory was also affected. On February 17, a Nigerian battalion captured 20 members of Boko Haram in Diffa, Diffa region. Alleged Boko Haram members attacked an army patrol in the east of Diffa region on May 6. At the end of November, schools and health centers were closed in Diffa region, in light of possible future attacks by Boko Haram. seb, asg

NIGERIA (FARMERS – PASTORALISTS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **1960**

Conflict parties: farmers vs. pastoralists
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The conflict between farmers and pastoralists over resources and subnational predominance remained at war level. While the main cause of conflict concerned arable land in Nigeria's Middle Belt, it was further fueled by differences concerning political, ethnic, and religious issues between the predominantly Christian farmers of Berom and Tiv tribes and the mainly Muslim Fulani nomads. As desertification reduced fertile grounds, farmers appealed to their right to use their ancestor's farmland, while Fulani nomads claimed the areas as grazing areas for their cattle.

Several peace agreements were reached between different groups but had no significant impact as violence continued. On January 5 and 6, pastoralists conducted attacks on several villages in Riyom Local Government area (LGA), Plateau state. Armed with AK-47 rifles and machetes, they stormed and raided the villages from different directions, opening fire on residents, burning dozens of houses, and stealing cattle. The attack left 71 people dead and more than 600 displaced. Throughout February, communal violence between farmers and pastoralists was reported in the states of Kaduna, Plateau, Adamawa, Zamfara, and Benue.

Attacks conducted by Fulani militias most heavily affected Plateau state with attacks on villages in Dajak, Atakar, Barkin Ladi, and Wase claiming about 164 lives in total. On February 5 in Barkin Ladi, Plateau, hundreds of Fulani gunmen killed 30 villagers and looted livestock. Christian villagers retaliated on February 20, raiding a nearby Fulani settlement and killing twelve people. Two days later, Fulani pastoralists barricaded a highway in Barkin LGA and attacked passengers, killing 29. Another 80,000 were reportedly displaced by violence in Benue, where clashes between Tiv farmers and Fulani pastoralists left 35 people dead on February 20 and 21. Throughout March, due to a series of clashes between groups disputing over land, up to 50,000 Benue villagers were displaced and 321 killed. For instance, several hundred attackers armed with AK-47 rifles, guns, and machetes killed more than 60 people and abducted 15 in a raid on Agena village, Benue, on March 25. Kaduna and Katsina states experienced heavy violence during March as raids on villages left 103 people dead in Faskari and Sabuwa in Katsina state and more than 200 in Ugwar Sankwai, Ungwan Gata, and Chenshyi in Kaduna state. In Galadima, Zamfara state, Fulani gunmen stormed a meeting on security challenges held by villagers, killing at least 150 people on April 5. The attackers laid siege to the village for one day, temporarily displacing hundreds of residents. On April 15, following protests by Tiv youths against increasing Fulani attacks in Wukari, Taraba state, severe clashes between the two groups left 50 dead and property destroyed. Subsequently, the local government

implemented a curfew to prevent further violence. On April 30, both sides agreed on a peace agreement, which was broken when 72 armed pastoralists invaded Wukari on May 25. At least 16 of them were killed when Tiv youths repelled the attack. Furthermore, Jukun and Fulani clashed in Ibi and Wukari communities, Taraba, which resulted in 44 fatalities. Some 1,500 houses, five churches, and four gasoline stations were destroyed. In the most fatal attacks, Fulani herdsmen armed with machetes and AK-47 rifles raided seven villages in Kaduna from June 25 to 29. According to local media, 15,000 people were displaced and approx. 200 killed by gunfire or were burned in their houses in Kobin and surrounding villages. Several villages in Lafia LGA, Nasarawa, were hit by a series of deadly clashes between Eggon and Fulani youths in August. From August 24 to 27, some 53 people were killed in clashes and 5,000 fled Tudun-Ababu, Wamba and Akwanga. In total, clashes in Lafia LGA throughout the second half of the year resulted in some 350 fatalities. On September 18, dozens of Fulani herdsmen ambushed a group of soldiers near Fadan Karshi in Kaduna state, killing seven of them. Afterwards, they invaded several villages, killing 43 people and burning houses and farmland. Suspected Fulani gunmen armed with AK-47 rifles, axes, and machetes killed 42 people when they stormed Gidan Kaso, Zamfara. On November 25, seven soldiers and 50 civilians were shot dead as they tried to repel an attack of pastoralists in Lilo, Zamfara. Hundreds fled the area. In total, the conflict resulted in more than 2,500 fatalities and the displacement of approx. 300,000 people. seb

NIGERIA (NORTHERNERS – SOUTHERNERS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **1960**

Conflict parties: northerners vs. southerners
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between northerners and southerners escalated to a violent crisis due to increased rivalries between the governing People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the main opposition party, All Progressives Congress (APC), regarding upcoming general elections on 02/14/15.

In February 2013, three main opposition parties had merged to form the APC. The origin of the presidential candidates underlined regional disparities as the PDP's candidate President Goodluck Jonathan from the Niger Delta was widely supported by Christian southerners and the APC's candidate Muhammadu Buhari from Katsina state was said to represent the mostly Muslim-inhabited north. The APC and the pressure group Northern Elders Forum (NEF) rejected Jonathan's plans to run for another term, stating that this would contravene the PDP's unwritten agreement, according to which presidency should shift between a northern candidate and a southern candidate. The PDP was also divided internally, leading to defections from PDP politicians to the APC, especially by members from northern Nigeria. Jonathan had succeeded a northerner, President Yar'Adua, after his death during the first term of his presidency in 2010, and was then elected as President in 2011. Following his election, violent clashes between northerners and southerners had left up to 1,000 people dead in 2011.

The NEF, former Niger Delta militant leaders, and various other groups repeatedly threatened violent action in the run-up to the February 2015 elections. APC and PDP repeat-

edly accused each other of using inflammatory language in their political campaigning. Throughout the year, a number of rallies by the parties were followed by violent clashes, leaving a total of 18 people dead and dozens injured. In addition, numerous attempted assaults on political aspirants from both parties were reported. Following the defection of several APC members to the PDP, approx. 100 members of both parties clashed in Ilorin, Kwara state, on June 20. Armed rioters attacked intervening police forces which resulted in the death of five rioters and the arresting of 14. In Ilesa, Osun state, clashes between supporters of rival governorship candidates left two dead when alleged PDP supporters burned APC billboards and shot sporadically on July 25. Numerous residents fled the area. On August 18, four died in similar clashes in Daddeere, Nasarawa state, following a visit by Sidi Bako, a PDP member of the Nasarawa House of Assembly. In a similar occasion on September 9, allegedly hired gunmen in Ohaohia Mbeiri, Imo state, shot Kingsley Nkemka who was running for the House of Representatives for the APC. Following a PDP campaigning event, involving President Jonathan, in Lagos, Lagos state, clashes between APC and PDP supporters left five people dead on September 20. On October 14, hundreds of rioters, armed with cudgels, pickaxes, bows, and arrows, stormed the PDP's north-eastern office in Bauchi, Bauchi state, attempting to lynch PDP spokesman Sani Alamin Muhammed who escaped. The turmoil followed a statement by the NEF, warning that those who would vote for Jonathan and the PDP in 2015 would be considered enemies of the north. seb

RWANDA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: DGPR, PS-Imberakuri, RDI, RDU, RNC, UDF vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The conflict over national power between opposition groups, such as Democratic Green Party (DGPR), PS-Imberakuri, Rwandan Democratic Union (RDU), Rwandan Dream Initiative (RDI), Rwandan National Congress (RNC), and Unified Democratic Forces (UDF), and the government continued at a non-violent level. Throughout the year, the government arrested several opposition leaders and was suspected to have been involved in violent attacks on exiled former regime figures outside the country.

On 12/31/13, armed men had killed former Rwandan intelligence chief and co-founder of RNC, Patrick Karegeya, in his hotel room in Johannesburg, South Africa. In the following days, Rwandan President Paul Kagame and three of his ministers threatened so-called "traitors of the country" with death. Four suspects in Karegeya's murder, among them a senior official of the Rwandan military, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Gakwerere, were arrested in Mozambique on January 14. On March 3, armed men attempted to assassinate RNC leader and former Rwandan military chief of staff, Kayumba Nyamwasa, in Johannesburg.

Following a meeting in Brussels, Belgium in February, the parties PS, RDI, and UDR formed a non-parliamentary coalition with the armed group Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Coalition of Rwandan Political Parties for Change, aiming to establish dialog with the government and prepare for the return of exiled Rwandans [→ Rwanda (FDLR)].

After it had elected a new leadership on May 31, RNC declared it would not participate in the 2017 presidential elections. In June, government released PS-Imberakuri founder Bernard Ntaganda after four years in prison. On June 27, DGPR's Organizing Secretary Jean Munyeshyaka was reported missing. On August 17 and 23, police arrested Frank Rusgara, former secretary general of the army, and Colonel Tom Byabagamba, respectively. In late October, imprisoned UDF leader Victoire Ingabire filed a complaint with the African Court on Human and People's Rights based in Arusha, Tanzania, to revise her case and to abolish imprisonment on charges of so-called "genocide denial" and spreading of rumors. In 2012, a Rwandan court had convicted her of acts of terrorism, genocide denial, and support of FDLR. The sentence had been raised to 15 years in December 2013. nbe

SENEGAL (MFDC / CASAMANCE)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↘ | Start: **1982**

Conflict parties: MFDC vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The conflict between the Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces (MFDC) and the government over the secession of the Casamance region de-escalated to a non-violent level. Both sides continued negotiations to reach a peace agreement.

In early January, the MFDC threatened to retaliate, in case the government went ahead with a mining project planned in the Casamance region. On January 24, the Platform of Women for Peace in Casamance organized a march from their region to the capital Dakar, Dakar region. 300 women demanded a resolution of the conflict between the government and MDFC. On February 26, government authorities withdrew an international arrest warrant against MFDC leader Salif Sadio. On March 1, approx. 100 people protested in Zinguinchor, Casamance region, demanding the government to strengthen its efforts to demine the region. On April 29, Sadio declared an unilateral ceasefire. Throughout the year, the Catholic Community Sant'Egidio acted as mediator in the ongoing talks between the different factions of the MFDC and the government in Rome, Italy. On July 23, they announced the signing of a humanitarian treaty between the parties. The following day, Moustapha Diakhaté, chairman of the leading coalition group Unite to Share Hope Together, accused the Senegalese ambassador to Portugal, Abdoulaye Fall, of complicity with the MFDC. The government called him back to Dakar and the latter resigned on August 3. On November 25, alleged members of the MFDC armed with machine guns and mortars stopped a delegation from Guinea-Bissau headed by Interior Minister Botche Candé for several hours on northern Guinea-Bissauan territory. Later that day in a meeting between Candé and a delegation of MFDC, the group was instructed to leave the country. Throughout the year, members of the MFDC used Guinea-Bissauan territory as a base to steal cattle from Senegalese farmers. In reaction to this, many border villages created surveillance brigades. joh

SOMALIA (ISLAMIST GROUPS)



SOMALIA (ASWJ)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2014**Conflict parties: ASWJ vs. FGS
Conflict items: subnational predominance, other

A new violent crisis between the Sufi paramilitary group Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a (ASWJ) and the federal government over subnational predominance erupted. ASWJ, founded in 1991, took up arms against al-Shabaab in 2008 and two years later signed a power sharing agreement with the Transitional Federal Government granting ASWJ offices within the government in exchange for their military support against al-Shabaab. Between 2008 and 2014, ASWJ, comprising some 2,000 fighters, captured several cities previously under al-Shabaab control and established strongholds most notably in Galgaduud region. Following disagreements over ASWJ's integration into the military and the formation of a new Federal Member State in central Somalia, violence erupted at the end of 2014. However, throughout the year, ASWJ supported the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in their fight against al-Shabaab [→ Somalia (Islamist groups)].

Following the formation of a new cabinet by Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed, ASWJ chairman Ibrahim Hassan Gurey announced that the group would end their cooperation with the government stating that no members of his group were part of the new government. In March, ASWJ and FGS held several meetings discussing the status of ASWJ and the role it had played in the fight against al-Shabaab. In mid-May, ASWJ clashed with a militia loyal to Dolow district commissioner Abdirashid Janan in Beled Hawo, Gedo region, leaving at least ten people dead. The FGS emphasized to be uninvolved in the clashes and called for an end to the violence.

On July 30, representatives of the FGS, ASWJ, and Galmudug State signed an agreement on the foundation of a new Federal Member State comprising several regions in central Somalia including Mudug. Stating that northern Mudug was an integral part of the autonomous region of Puntland, the latter called the agreement unconstitutional and withdrew all its Members of Parliament from the capital Mogadishu [→ Somalia (Puntland)]. Furthermore, while the agreement was signed by Gurey, it was rejected by another ASWJ leader, Ashcari, showing the internal division of the militia.

Following negotiations between FGS and Puntland in October, the two parties agreed that northern Mudug would remain under Puntland control, while southern Mudug would become part of Central State. In response, ASWJ dismissed the agreement on October 15 and announced to end their participation in the state formation process. Two weeks later, ASWJ defense secretary Sheikh Issack Hussein Mursal rejected the government's plan to integrate ASWJ into the Somali National Army (SNA). On December 12, an ASWJ faction clashed with SNA forces in Galgaduud's capital Dhusamareb, leaving at least 15 people dead. According to Galgaduud governor Hussein Ali, the fighting was preceded by ASWJ capturing the nearby town of Gureel. He further stated that the SNA had regained control over the towns.

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SOMALIA (ISLAMIST GROUPS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2006**Conflict parties: al-Shabaab vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict between al-Shabaab and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) over national power as well as system and ideology continued at war level for the ninth consecutive year. The FGS was internationally supported by the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) including the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), and the USA. Furthermore, the moderate Sufi paramilitary group Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a (ASWJ) and the paramilitary Raskamboni Movement fought al-Shabaab enabling the federal government and AMISOM to regain control of several regions. However, Raskamboni and ASWJ aimed at subnational predominance themselves with ASWJ engaging in combat action with the Somali military at the end of the year [→ Somalia (ASWJ)].

In the course of the year, al-Shabaab lost much of the territory previously under its control through the advances of the Somali National Army (SNA) and AMISOM.

However, AMISOM forces did not maintain full presence in the captured territory. Furthermore, the FGS was unable to effectively spread its control beyond Mogadishu towards those areas. Accordingly, some of the captured areas were still besieged by al-Shabaab, restricting humanitarian efforts. The group's leader Ahmed Abdi Godane, also known as Mukhtar Abu Zubair, was killed in a US drone strike in September. Godane was quickly replaced by Sheikh "Ahmad Umar" Abu Ubaidah. Nevertheless, the Islamist group continued conducting guerrilla-style bomb and suicide attacks, as well as assassinations, throughout the country. As in previous years, most attacks took place in the capital Mogadishu and South Central Somalia. In early March, SNA and AMISOM launched the joint "Operation Eagle", whereas follow-up "Operation Indian Ocean" started in August. At the end of 2014, al-Shabaab's controlled territory comprised the countryside of Bay, Lower Shabelle, Middle Juba, Lower Juba, Gedo, and Galgaduud regions in South Central Somalia.

In early January, the United States sent military advisers to Somalia to support AMISOM. In July, the US disclosed that its troops had been stationed in Somalia since 2007. On January 22, the over 4,000 Ethiopian troops active in Somalia, were formally incorporated into AMISOM, making AMISOM over 22,000-strong. A UN report by the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group published on February 6, alleged "systematic abuses" of the FGS within the management of weapons and ammunition stockpiles, which had led to weapons being diverted to al-Shabaab and clans. Despite this revelation, the UN Security Council (UNSC) extended the partial easing of the arms embargo against Somalia for seven months on March 5. ASWJ formally declared war on al-Shabaab on March 23. On May 29, the UN Security Council extended UNSOM by twelve months. In September, Human Rights Watch published a report on the widespread sexual abuse of girls and women in Somalia by AMISOM soldiers. Like his predecessor last year, Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed was ousted by a parliamentary no-confidence vote on December 6, after a falling out with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud who reappointed former Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Shar-marke five days later.

On January 1, al-Shabaab detonated two car bombs in Mogadishu followed by gunfire between al-Shabaab militants and security officials which left at least eleven people dead. Most of the following attacks in Somalia also took place in Mogadishu and surroundings, within Banaadir region. Al-Shabaab fighters mostly used improvised explosive devices (IED) or guns. The attacks were mostly targeted at pro-FGS officials, Members of Parliament (MPs), journalists, SNA soldiers, and at their international supporters. At least five MPs and one former MP were assassinated. The presidential palace "Villa Somalia" and the parliament were attacked several times. On February 21, al-Shabaab blasted through the gate of the presidential palace in Mogadishu. The ensuing battle left five soldiers and all nine al-Shabaab militants dead. On May 24, al-Shabaab militants attacked the Somali parliament, leading to the deaths of four policemen and six militants. Al-Shabaab attacked Villa Somalia again on July 8 and November 16, killing 14 and none, respectively. Twelve people were killed in an attack on the Somali Intelligence Headquarters in Mogadishu on August 31. In December, al-Shabaab attacked AMISOM's Halane base in Mogadishu twice, claiming 19 lives in total. A car bomb attack on a UN convoy near the airport of Mogadishu left seven people dead, most of whom were Somali bypassers, on February 13. Outside of Mogadishu, most clashes took place the South-Central Somalia regions Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Lower Juba, Middle Juba, Gedo, Hiraan, Bay, Bakool and Galgaduud regions.

On January 9, Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) conducted an airstrike on an alleged al-Shabaab training camp in Garba-haareey, Gedo region, which led to the death of ten to 30 suspected al-Shabaab militants. On March 5, the joint SNA and AMISOM "Operation Eagle" started. Between March 6 and mid-July the forces captured strategic towns in Bakool, Hiraan, Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, Galgaduud and Bay. In response to the loss of territory, al-Shabaab intensified its attacks on AMISOM in April and May. Between May 18 and 20, KDF and AMISOM launched airstrikes against al-Shabaab bases in Jilib, Middle Juba, resulting in at least 60 casualties. At the end of August, SNA and AMISOM launched "Operation Indian Ocean" and captured territory in Lower Shabelle in the following months, most notably al-Shabaab's last coastal stronghold Barawe, a key town for the group's illicit charcoal trade. In the campaign further territory was reclaimed in Middle Shabelle, Gedo, Hiraan, Galgaduud and, with extensive military support by the Interim Jubaland Administration, in Lower Juba.

Fewer attacks took place in Mudug and Bari regions in the autonomous northern region of Puntland [→ Somalia (Puntland)]. For instance, a clash between al-Shabaab and Puntland soldiers left three soldiers and ten fighters dead in Bossaso, Bari, on January 25. On March 17, the militants killed Puntland commander Colonel Jama Said Warsame in a bomb attack near Bosaso. Al-Shabaab militants killed two UN officials at Galkayo airport, Mudug region, on April 7.

Al-Shabaab or al-Shabaab-affiliated groups also increasingly conducted attacks on Kenyan soil throughout the year. Most of the attacks took place in Mombasa and close to the border with Somalia, in the counties of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, and Lamu. Between May 3 and 4, three separate attacks were carried out on public buses in capital Nairobi and Mombasa, resulting in at least 63 fatalities.

Several Muslim clerics, who allegedly recruited fighters in Kenya's predominantly Muslim coastal region, were assassinated in Mombasa in the course of the year. The killings were often followed by riots by local Muslim youths. On June 15, suspected al-Shabaab-affiliated fighters launched an eight-

hour attack on Mpeketoni, Lamu county, killing 49. Although al-Shabaab claimed responsibility, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta accused local militant groups and political rivals of being behind the attacks [→ Kenya (MRC / Coast)]. On July 5, another attack in Hindi, Lamu, claimed the lives of 29. On November 22, al-Shabaab fighters killed 22 people on a bus that was travelling from Mandera to Nairobi. Two weeks later, on December 2, al-Shabaab killed 36 quarry workers in Mandera, after which President Kenyatta sacked his interior minister [→ Kenya (TNA - ODM)]. As in the previous year, al-Shabaab and affiliated groups also conducted several attacks in Nairobi, leaving at least 23 people dead. In early April, the Kenyan government requested all Somali refugees living in urban areas to return to the refugee camps Dadaab in the east and Kakuma in the northwest. The Kenyan government was increasingly scrutinized by human rights organizations for violations of human rights targeted at Somalis, Kenyans of Somali descent, and the larger Muslim population in Kenya. On May 24, al-Shabaab launched its only attack outside of Somalia and Kenya, on the popular restaurant La Chaumière in Djibouti, killing two security officials and wounding at least eleven, among them Dutch and French soldiers.

Throughout the year, at least 3,000 people were killed, and more than 120,000 people were internally displaced or fled to neighboring countries. svh

SOMALIA (PUNTLAND – SOMALILAND)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **1998**


Conflict parties: autonomous region of Puntland vs. regional government of Somaliland

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The conflict between the self-declared independent state of Somaliland and the autonomous region of Puntland over subnational predominance escalated to a violent crisis. Both parties as well as Khatumo State claimed the regions Sanaag, Sool, as well as Todgheer region's Cayn section (SSC) as being part of their territory [→ Somalia (Somaliland - Khatumo State)]. While Khatumo and Puntland considered themselves as part of Somalia, Somaliland declared independence in 1991.

On January 8, Puntland's parliament elected Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gas as new president. Subsequently, Gas announced his new cabinet with two former presidents of Khatumo State as ministers. On February 4, Gas stated that Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn should be under Puntland control. According to regional sources, Somaliland reacted by deploying heavily armed troops to Las'anod, Sool region, at the end of February. On March 16, Somaliland's President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud Silanyo visited Lasqooray district in the disputed Sanaag region, which Puntland officials called a direct aggression. One week later, Puntland stated that Somaliland had deployed several hundred soldiers and armored vehicles to Armale, 75 km away from Sanaag's regional capital Baran. Furthermore, Puntland officials accused Somaliland of supporting the Islamist group al-Shabaab in Puntland's Galgala area [→ Somalia (Islamist groups)]. Somaliland rejected both accusations. On April 15, Somaliland military forces entered Taleh district, Sool, capital of the self-declared Khatumo State. In response, Puntland stated to take immediate action against Somaliland. On April 25, Somaliland seized the area around Holhol in Sool which supposedly had large oil deposits. Somaliland's foreign minister stated to

SOUTH SUDAN (INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **4** | Change:  | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Lou Nuer vs. Murle vs. Dinka, Kok-Awac vs. Kok-Keer, Dinka Kuei vs. Dinka Rup, Dinka Amotnhiim vs. Dinka Panguerkur vs. Dinka Nyan et al.

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources


The conflict over subnational predominance and resources between various ethnic groups de-escalated to a limited war, violence having shifted after the civil war between forces loyal to Riek Machar and the government erupted in late 2013 [→ South Sudan (SPLM/A-IO)]. Throughout the year, inter-tribal fighting between ethnic Dinka and Nuer not directly related to the clashes between government and defected troops as well as intra-tribal fighting over cattle between Dinka sub-clans continued.

In Jonglei state, where fighting between Lou Nuer, Bor Dinka, and ethnic Murle had been highly violent in recent years, the situation de-escalated. Furthermore, prominent Murle rebel leader David Yau Yau signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on January 31 which was followed by a peace deal on May 9. [→ Sudan (various militias)]. However, on February 5 alleged Murle fighters attacked a Bor Dinka village in Kolnyang payam district, Jonglei, resulting in at least 30 fatalities.

Other attacks concentrated on the primarily Dinka-populated Lakes state, marking an increase in inter- and intra-tribal fighting in the area. On January 1, the two Dinka sub-clans Kuei and Rup fought at cattle camps in Manyiel and Jahla, leaving a total of 37 people dead and 30 wounded. On March 30, clashes arose when the Nyan, Amotnhiim, and Panguerkur clans of the Dinka group attacked the Dhiei clan during a spiritual Dinka ceremony in Timyic. Eight people died and over 14 were injured. On May 21, several pastoralists belonging to rival ethnic clans engaged in a gunfight over cattle in Cueibet and Rumbek North counties, killing 28 people and wounding 26. Tit-for-tat attacks continued for two days, leaving 156 people dead. Subsequently, the government of Lakes planned a peace conference to stop the inter-ethnic attacks. On May 28, three people died of gunshots when the Kok-Awac and Kok-Keer sub-clans of the Dinka tribe provoked an exchange of fire in Branaam area in Rumbek East county. Between June 14 and 15, an inter-clan clash between youths of the counties Rumbek Central, North, and East left 51 dead and 68 wounded. Fighting subsided between July and November. On September 26, a UNMISS delegation visited Rumbek to determine possibilities for conflict resolution. Fighting in Lakes continued in December. On December 11, members of the Pagok clan attacked the Pathiong clan, following the alleged murder of two Pagok clan members, killing 26 and injuring 62. Fighting reportedly continued for two days, leaving another ten people dead. On December 27, Dinka sub-clans Kok-Awac and Kok-Keer engaged in renewed clashes in Panawac village, Rumbek East, killing five government troops that had tried to separate the groups. The same day, at least 53 were killed in fighting between Gony and Thuyic clans of the Athoi Dinka. The fighting started in August when an alleged Thuyic member killed Gony leader and chief of the local administration Chut Dhuol. His death

have met with Puntland's President Gas in Ethiopia at the end of April, which remained uncommented by Puntland authorities. In mid-May, Somaliland forces allegedly entered Sahdher town in Sool. On June 12, Somaliland forces captured Taleh during the third Khatumo conference. According to Khatumo sources, subsequent clashes in several towns in Sool between Somaliland and Khatumo forces left over 40 people dead [→ Somalia (Somaliland - Khatumo State)]. Simultaneously, Somaliland deployed hundreds of soldiers to Sanaag. In response, Gas announced to be ready to take action against neighboring Somaliland. On July 5, Somaliland President Silanyo announced the foundation of a new Somaliland administrative unit within Sool called 'Haysimo' with Taleh as its capital. On August 26, Somaliland troops again entered Sahdher town, Sool, during the inauguration ceremony of newly-elected president of Khatumo. On September 25, clashes between Puntland and Somaliland forces in Dhahar, Sanaag, left at least two people dead and several injured. rbr

SOUTH AFRICA (KWAZULU-NATAL)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1990**

Conflict parties: ANC vs. IFP vs. NFP

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The conflict in KwaZulu-Natal between two of the opposition parties, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the National Freedom Party (NFP), and the ruling African National Congress (ANC) over subnational predominance continued at a violent level.

The conflict between the parties themselves was principally dominated by the general elections held on May 7. The parties accused each other of electoral fraud and vote buying through the distribution of food stamps. IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelez claimed that the elections were neither free nor fair. Hence, the conflict between the parties was still carried out on a rhetorical and symbolic level. On May 10, the ANC was declared winner of the general elections with 62.15 percent of the votes. The IFP obtained 2.4 percent and the NFP 1.57 percent of the votes. In provincial elections held on the same date as the general elections, the ANC secured the majority of votes in eight of nine provinces, gaining 64.52 percent in KwaZulu-Natal province. The IFP gained 10.86 percent and the NFP 7.31 percent. Following provincial by-elections in KwaZulu-Natal, the Democratic Alliance won five municipal wards on November 27, while the ANC and the IFP won one each. In the course of the elections, an approximation between the the NFP and the ANC occurred when NFP leader Zanele Magwaza-Msibi accepted a post in President Jacob Zuma's cabinet.

However, violence continued between members of the opposing parties outside the political platform, resulting in at least 23 killings of officials and members of the conflicting parties throughout the year. For instance, on February 20, IFP branch leader Nonhlanhla Biyela was shot dead. In most cases, despite several arrests and investigations, it remained uncertain who had conducted the assaults. The KwaMashu hostel in Durban, KwaZulu-Natal and its surroundings were the location of 16 of the killings. Several of the assaulted had changed their party membership shortly before.

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

led to a series of revenge attacks, including incidents of rape and killings.

In addition, violent incidents between South Sudanese ethnic groups, especially between Nuer and Dinka, were reported in refugee camps in neighboring countries. For example, on October 28, fighting broke out in the Kakuma refugee camp in north-western Kenya between South Sudanese Dinka and Nuer groups, killing six. According to UN OCHA, by the end of the year, the number of refugees who had fled into neighboring Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda reached 474,769 since the start of the civil war in December 2013. lib

SOUTH SUDAN (SPLM/A-IN-OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: SPLM/A-IO vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The war between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) breakaway faction led by sacked vice-president Riek Machar and the government led by President Salva Kiir Mayardit over national power and the orientation of the political system continued. Ethnic Nuer primarily supported Machar's group, named SPLM/A-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), while mainly ethnic Dinka supported the government. While Sudan accused the government of supporting armed groups on its territory, especially the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), South Sudan alleged Sudanese support of SPLM/A-IO [→ Sudan – South Sudan]. Uganda was another supporter of the government and deployed troops to South Sudan in December 2013. In January, army spokesman Paddy Ankunda confirmed the presence of 1,600 soldiers in the country. On October 14, Defense Minister Kuol Manyang Juuk said that the government had signed a long-term agreement on military cooperation with Uganda.

Both sides possessed and made use of heavy artillery such as T-72 tanks and massive anti-tank weapons. Forces of the SPLM/A-IO attacked Malakal, capital of the country's main oil-producing state Upper Nile, on January 18, leaving at least 100 people injured. On January 23, SPLM/A-IO negotiators signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In the most severe break of the ceasefire agreement, SPLM/A-IO again attacked government-controlled Malakal and pushed forward into the city center on February 18. An UNMISS patrol stated that SPLM/A-IO forces had killed at least ten civilians in a Malakal hospital on the basis of their ethnic background. Between February 21 and 23, SPLM/A-IO forces attacked a military base in Giadang and several villages in Duk County, both in Jonglei state, killing ten soldiers, injuring 17, and destroying three villages completely. The attacks left 173 SPLM/A-IO fighters dead and 43,000 residents displaced. The following day, SPLM/A-IO forces attacked an army position in Golguk, Upper Nile. 70 SPLM/A-IO fighters were killed during the fighting. On April 15, SPLM/A-IO troops captured Unity state's capital Bentiu, killing more than 200 people and injuring 400. On April 17, 350 armed youths employing rocket-propelled grenades attacked a UN base in Bor, capital of Jonglei. The assault left 58 people dead and more than 100 injured. Several reports assumed the government had staged the attack in retaliation for SPLM/A-IO's capture of Bentiu. One day later, SPLM/A-IO claimed they had killed 57 soldiers in Pariang county, near Bentiu.

Peace talks between the conflict parties continued on April 14

in Addis Ababa. On May 5, they signed a humanitarian ceasefire agreement in order to avert a famine that could affect an estimated million South Sudanese. On May 7, US President Barack Obama imposed economic sanctions, particularly asset freezes and travel bans for General Peter Gadet, loyal to Machar, and Major General Marial Chanuon, loyal to Kiir. On May 11, the ceasefire was violated when the opposing forces clashed near Bentiu, leaving 27 SPLM/A-IO dead. On June 11, Kiir and Machar agreed on forming a transitional government within 60 days. On July 14, pro- and anti-government forces clashed in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, leaving 29 people dead. Throughout the year, the number of skirmishes between the conflict parties' respective supporters increased. On July 21, SPLM/A-IO attacked Nassir, Upper Nile. In the ensuing fighting, 100 soldiers and 83 SPLM/A-IO fighters were killed. After the June 11 deadline for forming a transitional government had expired with no actions having been taken, new clashes between the opposing forces erupted in Upper Nile, leaving 32 SPLM/A-IO dead. On August 15, SPLM/A-IO forces attacked a military position in Ayod county, Jonglei, leaving at least 120 people dead, among them six soldiers. On August 25, the opposing parties signed a new ceasefire agreement in Addis Ababa. Meeting on September 30, Kiir and Machar agreed on installing a federal government system. On October 10, SPLM/A-IO forces attacked army positions in Doleib Hill and Achabanil, Upper Nile, and captured two T-72 tanks. The opposing parties signed an agreement on October 20 in Arusha, Tanzania, where they acknowledged their collective responsibility for the crisis. Fighting continued in November, where SPLM/A-IO troops attacked government positions in Dukduk, Renk county, Upper Nile, and Phom El Zaref, Fangak county, Jonglei. The parties used heavy artillery and five soldiers and 27 SPLM/A-IO were killed. On December 10, SPLM/A-IO spokesman Brigadier General Lul Ruai Koang claimed the group had retaken control over Phom al Zaref and killed 78 government soldiers.

By the end of the year, the war had claimed tens of thousands lives. In addition, 3.4 million were internally displaced while some 250,000 had fled to neighboring countries. Humanitarian agencies placed South Sudan as a humanitarian emergency on the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification scale, with 2.5 million people being at risk of starvation by the end of the year. des

SUDAN (DARFUR)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: LJM-TH, SLM-AW, SLM-MM, SRF, et al. vs. government, RSF
Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources

The war over subnational predominance and resources in Sudan's western states, South Darfur, North Darfur, West Darfur, East Darfur, and Central Darfur between the government, represented militarily by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), on the one hand, and various armed groups, on the other, such as the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), continued. The umbrella coalition SRF was formed in 2011, thus uniting militant groups from the different regions Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan [→ Sudan (SPLM/A-North / Blue Nile, South Kordofan)].

On December 12, International Criminal Court (ICC) prose-

cutor Fatou Bensouda announced that she had suspended investigations into war crimes in Darfur due to a lack of support by the UN Security Council. Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir was the first head of state to be indicted by the ICC for war crimes and crimes against humanity, but he remained at large. On April 9, Aicha el Basri, a former UNAMID spokeswoman, criticized the mission for its failure to protect civilians and its unwillingness to call out the Sudanese government troops for their attacks on civilians. She also criticized the poor cooperation of Sudan's government. About 17,000 UNAMID personnel were stationed in Darfur. On May 24, tribal militiamen killed one Rwandan peacekeeper and wounded three others in North Darfur. On October 13, three Ethiopian peacekeepers were killed by unknown assailants in Korma, North Darfur. On November 30, al-Bashir demanded UNAMID to leave Darfur.

On March 7, leaders of the armed groups Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) affirmed their commitment for a united Sudan and called for a national dialog in a meeting facilitated by the African Union (AU). On October 4, the governor of Central Darfur, Ga'afar Abdel-Hakam, revealed ongoing peace negotiations with four armed movements in Jebel Marra, North Darfur. However, no progress in the peace process was observed.

On June 25, a former faction of the SLM led by Abdel-Wahid Al-Nur (SLM-AW) announced the formation of a new movement under the name of Sudan Liberation Movement – Second Revolution (SLM-SR). On April 11, Sudanese Minister of Defense Abdel-Rahim Mohamed Hussein urged armed movements in Darfur to seek peace negotiations or prepare to be defeated during the planned military campaign in summer. The military campaign involved the deployment of several militias and paramilitary troops, such as the Khartoum-controlled RSF, which had been founded in 2013 and mainly consisted of former members of Arab Janjaweed militias.

On January 3, the SLM-AW, under the banner of the SRF, attacked an SAF battalion north of Kutum in North Darfur, which left 41 troops and two SRF members dead. On January 22, the LJM announced they had seized Kalaimendo garrison in North Darfur near El Fasher. LJM claimed that 20 government troops, consisting of paramilitary Popular Defence Forces (PDF), Central Reserve Forces (Abu Tira), and National Security Forces, were killed in the attack. On March 5, Darfur Joint Resistance Forces (DJRF) claimed control of three localities in North Darfur, namely Alliet, El Taweisha, and Kalaimendo. The Darfur Joint Resistance Forces consisted of troops from the SLM-AW, the SLM-MM (both also part of the SRF), and a faction of the LJM led by Taher Hajar (LJM-TH). On March 15, DJRF killed 83 SAF soldiers in the area of Kulkul, north of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. The Sudanese Air Force subsequently bombed the area. The following day, the DJRF repelled an attack by the RSF in East Jebel Marra, killing 44 RSF and SAF troops. On March 24, RSF destroyed an SLM-MM camp near Kutum in North Darfur, allegedly killing 151 militants, including ten top SLM-MM leaders. On the same day, more than 60 RSF troops were killed in a battle between the DJRF and an RSF convoy. On April 28, the SLM-AW attacked the military garrison of Rokoro in Central Darfur and killed 27 SAF troops and militia fighters.

On June 27, government troops fighting alongside paramilitary border guards killed Ali Karbino and twelve other high-ranking members of the LJM-TH in a battle near Kutum, North Darfur. According to the militants, 140 soldiers were killed. Karbino had led the LJM-TH, which was then known as the

Liberation and Justice Movement - Karbino (LJM-K), until his replacement by Taher Hajar. Karbino had defected earlier from the LJM led by Tijani Sese after the latter had signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in 2011.

On September 11, LJM-TH and SLM-MM militants killed 23 government soldiers in an attack on a military convoy near Jebel Hireiz, North Darfur. On October 16, a battle between forces of the SAF and the SLM-AW left 21 government troops and one militant dead according to a SLM-AW spokesman. He further stated that SAF had launched an air raid on rebel-held localities in the area. SLM-AW announced to have seized control of Moro military base on October 31 and to have killed 37 government and militia forces. The same day, the army allegedly shelled Deribat, North Darfur, using heavy artillery. On November 23, clashes between SLM-TH and the SAF left up to 20 people dead.

Attacks on civilians by government-controlled groups left up to 300,000 people displaced, according to US Ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power. On June 12, Power accused the government of Sudan of intensifying attacks on civilians and of deliberately bombing schools and hospitals. On February 27 and 28, RSF looted and burned more than 35 villages in South Darfur over a period of two days. About 31 villagers were killed, 23 wounded, and more than 20 women were raped. While about 5,000 villagers fled to Kalma camp, another 11,000 were trapped in the desert by RSF. In the second week of March, RSF killed at least 200 people in attacks on villages in South Darfur. On March 16, RSF reportedly plundered then burned down 25 villages in North Darfur. While an unidentified number of citizens were killed, the attacks displaced more than 30,000 people. On April 1, the RSF, assisted by Abbala tribesmen, set ablaze more than 127 villages in South Darfur.

Airstrikes targeted at civilians were conducted frequently throughout the year. For instance on November 18, using Antonov aircraft, the SAF destroyed schools, wells, farmland and killed cattle in several villages in North Darfur.

In April, several UN institutions warned of a severe malnutrition crisis in Darfur. From October 31 to November 1, SAF troops reportedly gang-raped more than 200 women and girls in the village of Tabit, North Darfur. In the course of the year, thousands of civilians were killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. jub

SUDAN (INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Al-Rezeigat Abballa vs. Beni Hussein vs. Misseriya vs. Salamat vs. Al-Gimir vs. Bani Halba vs. Ma'alia vs. Hamar vs. Taisha et al.

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The conflict over resources and subnational predominance between several tribes, such as the government-supported Al-Rezeigat Abballa tribe, Beni Hussein, Misseriya, Salamat, Taisha, Al-Gimir, Bani Halba, Maaliya, and Hamar, continued at the level of a war. Following the loss of resources after South Sudan's independence in 2011, tribal fighting intensified. Violence was mainly related to the control over oil, land, water, and gold, and thus mostly affected resource-rich regions such as Darfur and Kordofan.

In West Kordofan, members of the Misseriya tribe fought over

land and oil. On July 4, 150 people were reportedly killed and a further 100 injured in clashes between two Misseriya factions in Al-Dibab, West Kordofan. On July 18, a Rezeigat delegation launched a mediation initiative in order to reconcile the Misseriya. Between November 23 and 27, renewed clashes left more than 150 people dead in the Kwak area of West Kordofan. The conflict parties allegedly used guns and heavy weapons.

In Darfur, tribes and sub-tribes fought over land and mining rights. On February 18, members of Misseriya sub-tribe Salamat and other ethnic Misseriya clashed in Um Dukhun, central Darfur, killing dozens in what started as a blood feud. This incident took place one month after 5,000 people, who had previously fled inter-tribal fighting in 2013, returned to Um Dukhun.

After a series of tit-for-tat cattle looting, on June 16 the Central Darfur governor dismissed leaders of the Salamat and Misseriya tribes from their administrative positions for their insufficient effort in mediating the violent conflict. Between June 19 and 20, Misseriya and Salamat members clashed again following cattle looting allegations. The local government confirmed nine deaths. One day later, Misseriya gunmen raided a Salamat cattle camp, leaving dozens on both sides dead. Government reports alleged that the latest series of attacks over cattle looting between the two tribes had resulted in over 1,000 fatalities and 500 people wounded. Another attack by Salamat tribesmen on members of Misseriya in Um Dukhun resulted in approx. 100 fatalities on both sides on November 14. The attacks led to a major displacement of the local population. On November 15, Salamat tribesmen fleeing into neighboring Chad clashed with the Chadian army as well as joint Sudanese-Chadian forces. Nine soldiers and several tribesmen were killed. A reconciliation conference between Salamat and another Arab tribe, the Taisha, originally scheduled for August, started on October 16.

On June 26, Al-Rezeigat Abballa tribesmen killed ten Beni Hussein members in two separate attacks. Three days later, Beni Hussein tribesmen protested in front of the National Assembly in the capital Khartoum against violent attacks committed by its rival Rezeigat in El Sereif, North Darfur. According to Beni Hussein, the fighting between the two groups, which had erupted over control of gold mines in 2013, had left over 1,000 people dead and 15,000 families displaced. Between August 26 and 28, Rezeigat and Beni Hussein clashed several times, leaving a total of 38 tribesmen dead.


In addition, fighting between Rezeigat and Ma'alia tribes in East Darfur turned highly violent in August, resulting in more than 300 fatalities according to a UN report. For instance, on August 16, at least 47 members of both tribes were killed. In response, government troops were deployed to prevent renewed fighting. However, another attack on August 19 allegedly resulted in 100 fatalities. Between October 7 and 9, alleged Rezeigat members attacked the Labado camp for displaced people in Yassin locality, East Darfur. They attempted to loot large numbers of the camp's cattle. The residents of the camp, mostly ethnic Ma'alia, fought back and killed two of the attackers. In fear of revenge, more than 13,000 residents of the camp fled to the shelter of a nearby UNAMID base. Two days later, police forces were deployed to prevent an escalation, since large numbers of fighters from both tribes had gathered nearby the camp. On October 10, members of Rezeigat stopped a train they believed was loaded with weapons for Ma'alia and held it for eleven hours. Two days later, Rezeigat attacked Abu Dungul, East Dafur, killing one Ma'alia tribesman. They looted and later torched the village,

forcing hundreds to flee. On November 23, leaders of the two tribes agreed to hold a peace forum scheduled for December 5.

Ma'alia, dwelling in West Kordofan, were also involved in fighting over control of land and oil fields with ethnic Hamar, originating from East Darfur. Violence first erupted on February 4, after Hamar had reportedly killed a Ma'alia tribesman. In response, Ma'alia abducted three Hamar and stole 80 camels and 600 sheep. Continued fighting in the following five months left 75 people dead. Subsequently, on July 2, the authorities of West Kordofan and East Darfur announced they would deploy troops to end the violence. On July 11, the tribes' leaders signed a peace agreement in Khartoum. Between December 4 and 6, renewed fighting left 20 people dead.

The intensified fighting in Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile between tribes as well as between rebel groups and the government led to an increasing scarcity of food supplies and a severe risk of famine [→ Sudan (Darfur); Sudan (SPLM/A-North / Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile)]. nab

SUDAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Alliance of the Sudanese Civil Society Organizations, NCF, student-led groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between various opposition groups and the government de-escalated to a violent crisis. The opposition was comprised of student-led groups, the Alliance of the Sudanese Civil Society Organizations, and members of the National Consensus Forces (NCF), a coalition of opposition parties including the National Umma Party (NUP), the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), and the Popular Congress Party (PCP). The NCF was founded to form an effective opposition to President Omar al-Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP) in preparation for the 2010 General Elections. Armed groups operating under the banner of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) partially supported the opposition's political agenda [→ Sudan (Darfur); Sudan (SPLM/A-North / South Kordofan, Blue Nile)].

The conflict erupted in 2011 in the context of the so-called Arab Spring and the secession of South Sudan. The latter's independence triggered an economic crisis due to lower oil revenues. The government led by al-Bashir, in office since 1989, cracked down on student protesters, killing several people and arresting large numbers of activists in the course of 2011. Demonstrations concerned rising food and gas prices. The imposition of austerity policies in 2012 and the further rise of gas prices in October 2013 exacerbated the tensions. The government and police forces killed more than 200 people during protests in September and October 2013. In 2014, the government continued to take violent action against protesters, students, and journalists and suppressed the political opposition. According to human rights organizations, the government's means of suppression were increasingly violent with members of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) making use of truncheons, teargas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition. On January 1, Sudan's Independence Day, NUP leader Sadiq al-Mahdi and several other opposition leaders criticized the government and ex-

pressed their hopes for free and fair elections in 2015. On March 11, NISS agents shot a student dead and arrested approx. 100 during protests at Khartoum University in the capital. Throughout the year, the government repeatedly arrested students taking part in protests against tuition fees. A large number of the detainees were of Darfuri origin.

Following al-Bashir's announcement in late 2013 to hold peace negotiations with the opposition, the NCF decided to boycott the talks in May, stating that its preconditions had not been fulfilled by the government. On June 2, hundreds protested in Khartoum against the arrest of al-Mahdi, who had been detained by the government two weeks earlier. General prosecutor Yasser Mohammed prohibited the media from reporting on al-Mahdi's case on May 27.

Between August 6 and 8, militant groups SRF and NUP signed the Paris Declaration in the capital of France, agreeing to unite the opposition with a common agenda.

On October 22, representatives from the Sudanese Congress Party and SCP criticized al-Bashir for his announcement to run for president once more in the 2015 elections, stating that it would violate the 2005 peace agreement that had restricted presidency to two terms. One day later, several opposition parties signed the so-called Teiba Charter, which was created to unite the opposition in order to achieve regime change. On November 3, NCF announced it would boycott a national dialog meeting and the 2015 elections, calling for the overthrow of al-Bashir's administration, and stating that the restrictive treatment of the opposition would not allow for fair polls to take place. On November 18, NISS attacked a group of students at the University of Bahri in Khartoum with sticks and metal bars, leaving several injured and more than 100 people arrested. On December 3, civil society representatives alongside members of the armed and unarmed opposition signed the "Sudan Call" agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The agreement united a large number of opposition parties for the first time since al-Bashir had come into power in 1989. Two days later, the NISS arrested the NCF leader Farouk Abu Issa and the Alliance of Sudanese Civil Society Organization's leader Amin Maki Madani. On December 21, NISS raided the Sudanese Observatory for Human Rights, a local human rights NGO. On December 28, al-Bashir called the opposition coalition traitors who were supported by foreign secret services, such as Mossad from Israel and the US Central Intelligence Agency. nab

SUDAN (SPLM/A-NORTH / SOUTH KORDOFAN, BLUE NILE)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: SPLM/A-North vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy

The war between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-North) and the government over autonomy in the two states bordering South Sudan, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan continued [→ Sudan – South Sudan]. The war began as a dispute over the oil-rich region Abyei after South Sudan gained its independence in 2011. Furthermore, the group partially operated under the banner of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), a coalition uniting armed groups from Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan [→ Sudan (Darfur)].

Throughout the year, violence reportedly included extra-

judicial killings, indiscriminate bombings, illegal detention, attacks against civilians, looting of civilian homes, and destruction of property, all of which led to massive displacements.

On January 17, SPLM/A-North under the lead of SRF attacked Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and militant troops in the Malkan area, Blue Nile, killing 74 soldiers. According to SPLM/A-North, the rebels seized several heavy weapons, including tanks, over a dozen vehicles, some of which were loaded with machine guns, and three rocket launchers. On January 26, government forces launched airstrikes against the SPLM/A-North controlled town Kauda in South Kordofan. In a two-day attack starting on February 12, SAF fired air-to-surface missiles at Thorlatiso village and neighboring Umserndiba, South Kordofan, killing at least 13 civilians and injuring 16. Between February 13 and March 2, peace talks between the government and SPLM/A-North took place in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. However, government airstrikes continued throughout February, resulting in many fatalities. On February 19, after the government had declared it would send approx. 5,000 additional soldiers to the two border states, SPLM/A-North fighters shelled Kadulgi, capital of South Kordofan, with rockets. On March 14, the Special Court of Sinja sentenced seventeen SPLM/A-North fighters to death in absentia, among them chairman Malik Agar and Secretary General Yassar Aman, over events dating back to the group's formation in 2011. In mid-April, SAF regrouped its troops in the Nuba Mountains, South Kordofan. On April 29, government troops recaptured the SPLM/A-North base in Arbi, and the village of Sarafaya, South Kordofan, resulting in the deaths of many rebels and several soldiers. Between April 12 and 27, SAF employed massive shelling in civilian areas in Delami County, South Kordofan, killing at least four and leaving 15 wounded.

On April 14, the government launched a decisive military operation to set an end to the rebellion in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Darfur. The so-called "Decisive Summer" operation aimed at ending the rebellions in Sudan's peripheries prior to the presidential elections in 2015. Throughout the second half of the year, a high number of airstrikes led to major destruction of property and crops as well as a rise in human displacement. As in Darfur, the local population of Blue Nile and South Kordofan was under increasing risk of a severe famine. Meanwhile, the government reportedly obstructed humanitarian access to both areas.

Between May 1 and 14, SAF carried out several bombardments in South Kordofan, including the counties Um Dorein and Delami, damaging several buildings, among them a church and a hospital. Between May 15 and 23, SAF dropped over 200 bombs on Tangal, Um Dorein county. On May 20, government forces recaptured the strategically important Daldako area in South Kordofan from which SPLM/A-North had launched their rocket attacks. Starting on May 27, Sudanese government forces intensified their attacks in Kauda by dropping more than 100 bombs over a three day period. 110 SPLM/A-North fighters died in a SAF operation around al-Atmoor area, South Kordofan on June 9. In mid-June, Sudanese government aircraft bombed a hospital in Farandalla, South Kordofan. On June 18, government troops detained ten civilians from Lagori village, South Kordofan. According to its spokesman Arnu Ngutulu Lodi, SPLM/A-North fighters killed 15 army and militia members and wounded many during an attack on El Atmor, South Kordofan, on June 28, while three of the attackers died. However, an SAF spokesman reported 50 dead attackers. On July 2, SPLM/A-North claimed to have shot down an SAF helicopter gunship in an alleged attack in

Kadulgi.

On August 1, SAF killed two SPLM/A-North rebels while losing one soldier in an attack in the town of Agadi, Blue Nile. On August 26, SPLM/A-North alleged that the SAF recruited more than 3,000 children. On November 13, the Sudanese government and SPLM/A-North met under the auspices of the African Union's High-level Implementation Panel for Sudan in Addis Ababa to discuss a comprehensive ceasefire agreement involving humanitarian aid and national dialog. Starting on November 17, six days of aerial bombing and ground fighting between SAF and SPLM/A-North in the provinces of South Kordofan and Blue Nile resulted in the death of eight. On November 23, government troops allegedly bombed the towns of Yabous and Shali, Blue Nile, killing one and injuring three. Peace talks between the government and SPLM/A-North rebels resumed on November 26. On December 2, SAF repelled an SPLM/A-North attack on the villages of Balanja and al-Atmour, South Kordofan, which killed 50 rebels. According to SAF troops no one was killed when SPLM/A-North shelled the outskirts of Kadugli using Katyusha rockets on December 8. In a statement the next day, Hussein Karshoum, member of the government delegation, announced the failure of the latest round of peace negotiations. According to SPLM/A-North spokesperson Arnu Ngutulu Lodi, SPLM/A-North rebels recaptured al-Daldako and Ruseiris areas and Jabal Nimir in South Kordofan, inflicting heavy losses on SAF troops. Throughout the year, hundreds of thousands were displaced. Imp

SUDAN – SOUTH SUDAN

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Sudan vs. South Sudan
 Conflict items: territory, resources, other

In the conflict over the border region Abyei and oil revenues between Sudan and South Sudan, diplomatic tensions eased significantly, although it remained sporadically violent. Against the backdrop of the intrastate conflict in South Sudan in December 2013, Sudan signaled its support for South Sudan's government led by Salva Kiir Mayardit [→ South Sudan (SPLM/A-in-Opposition)]. On January 6, Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir visited South Sudan's capital Juba. Al-Bashir assured South Sudan that he had no intention of supporting the militants. In the same month, Sudan's Minister of Information, Ahmed Bilal, suggested President al-Bashir as mediator in South Sudan's domestic conflict. At the end of January, al-Bashir held talks with South Sudan's Vice President James Wani Igga on the current state of the conflict with the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) led by Riek Machar. They also discussed both states' economic and political relations. In late February, al-Bashir reaffirmed his commitment to the implementation of the cooperation agreements signed earlier with South Sudan. Despite trading accusations that the other side had perpetrated violence in the contested border region of Abyei in February and May, consultation about rebel activity in the border region and demarcation issues continued [→ Sudan (SPLM/A-North / Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile)]. In May and October, the UN Security Council extended UNISFA's mandate twice, ensuring that the mandate last until 02/28/15. On April 5, both presidents met to discuss the security situation. However, in the same month, South Sudan accused Sudan of tolerating cross-border activity by SPLM/A-IO and

Arab militias [→ Sudan (Darfur)]. With South Sudan's consent, Machar met al-Bashir in August. On November 4, Kiir and al-Bashir agreed on naming a chief administrator for Abyei and on moving forward in the border demarcation process. Only two days before, South Sudan had blamed Sudan for conducting an air raid in Western Bahr el-Ghazal state, which left 35 people dead. On November 12, South Sudan accused the Sudanese air force of having conducted another bombardment on Khur Tanbak, Upper Nile Province with an Antonov aircraft. Sudan denied both charges. On November 19, the South Sudanese Army reported a military build-up of Sudanese forces in the area bordering South Sudan's Sirmalaka, Western Bahr El Ghazal state.

Throughout the year, the two parties repeatedly accused each other of supporting rebel groups on their respective territories. Sudan claimed that South Sudan supported groups in Blue Nile and Darfur [→ Sudan (SPLM/A-North / Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile)]. By the end of December, Sudan stated that it intended to pursue Sudanese militant groups on South Sudanese territory, and demanded that their neighboring country put an immediate stop to any support of rebel groups. South Sudan called this statement a declaration of war and denied any cooperation with militant groups in Sudan.

bkm

SWAZILAND (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ▼ | Start: **1998**

Conflict parties: COSATU, PUDEMO, SFTU, SNUS, SWACOPA, SWAYOCO, TUCOSWA vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over the orientation of the political system and national power between opposition groups and King Mswati III de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. Throughout the year, opposition groups, among them the pro-democratic party People's United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO), its youth wing Swaziland Youth Congress (SWAYOCO), and the Trade Union Congress of Swaziland (TUCOSWA), staged protests against the government in response to the detainment of several opposition activists and journalists. On March 18, police arrested two journalists for articles criticizing the lack of judicial independence and integrity. They were sentenced to two years in prison on July 25. Police detained 16 opposition activists protesting the trial of the journalists outside the High Court in the capital Mbabane on April 23. Seven of the journalists were released two weeks later. On May 1, trade unions organized a pro-democratic rally in Manzini where PUDEMO's president Mario Masuku and SWAYOCO Secretary General Maxwell Dlamini spoke in front of approx. 7,000 participants. Masuku and Dlamini were arrested shortly after their speech, imprisoned, and charged with terrorism. In response to continuing violations of human as well as labor rights, the US government excluded Swaziland from the trade agreement African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in May. On August 6, while in parliament, Prime Minister Barnabas Sibusiso Dlamini called for the strangulation of two TUCOSWA representatives. The representatives had attended the White House US-Africa Leaders Summit, discussing Swaziland's removal from AGOA and expressing concerns with regard to labor rights. The government, with immediate effect, closed all labor federations on October 12.

TANZANIA (CHADEMA, CUF – CCM)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1993**

Conflict parties: Chadema, CUF vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over the structure of the political system and national power between the opposition parties Civic United Front (CUF) and Party for Democracy and Progress (Chadema), on the one hand, and the ruling Party of the Revolution (CCM), on the other, continued at a violent level. The main controversial issue the three parties faced was related to the question of the union structure defined in the draft constitution. While members of CUF and Chadema backed a three-government structure in which Zanzibar would gain a more autonomous status, most members of the CCM favored the continuation of a two-government system. Throughout the year, CUF and the leading opposition party Chadema converged in their actions concerning the draft constitution. However, in the long run, Chadema aspired for national power and the Zanzibar-based CUF mainly struggled for further autonomy of the archipelago.

On February 18, the Constituent Assembly (CA) started its sittings in the capital Dodoma to debate the new Draft Constitution which had been elaborated by the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) since 2011. Claiming that CCM didn't follow public interests, opponents mainly consisting of members of CUF, Chadema, and the National Convention for Construction and Reform – Mageuzi (NCCR-Mageuzi), announced that they had formed the Coalition of Defenders of the People's Constitution, called Ukawa, on February 28. Ukawa accused CCM members of the CA of discrimination and imputations. For instance, CCM accused CUF of having links to the Zanzibari secessionist religious group called Uamsho [→ Tanzania (Uamsho / Zanzibar)]. Initiated by Ibrahim Lipumba, chairman of the CUF and one of the leaders of Ukawa, 190 members of CA who belonged to Ukawa walked out of an assembly meeting on April 16.

On September 15, the chairman of Chadema and Ukawa, Freeman Mbowe, was summoned by the police. He had organized countrywide mass protests against the constitution-making process without permission by authorities. Following his arrest, hundreds of Chadema supporters protesting in Dar es Salaam were dispersed by policemen. The police reportedly used teargas and batons, injuring several people. On September 29, police again used teargas to disperse a protest by Chadema against the CA in Dar es Salaam. Demonstrations were accompanied by a heavy presence of security personnel. On October 2, the CA passed the proposed constitution which would be submitted to a referendum in 2015. On October 4, ignoring police warnings not to demonstrate without permit, the leader of the women's wing of Chadema, Halima Mdee, led protesters to the State House in Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam. Police used water cannon to disperse the demonstrators. Subsequently, Mdee and eight other members were arrested and charged on October 7 with unlawful assembly and disobedience.

On October 26, CUF, Chadema, NCCR-Mageuzi, and the National League for Democracy signed a Memorandum of Understanding during a rally in Dar es Salaam, forming a coalition to challenge the ruling CCM in next year's fifth multi-party General Election. jsp, she

TOGO (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1963**

Conflict parties: ANC, CST vs. government
 Conflict items: national power

The conflict over national power between the National Alliance for Change (ANC) under Jean-Pierre Fabre, Safe Togo Collective (CST), as well as several other opposition groups, on the one hand, and the government's and President Faure Gnassingbé's party, Union for the Republic (UNIR), on the other, continued. On January 4, supporters of ANC staged a demonstration to ask the government to release opposition members suspected of burning down two market places in the city Kara, Kara region, and the capital Lomé in January 2013, and to implement measures in favor of the rule of law. During a meeting on May 3, opposition leader Fabre handed over a memorandum containing proposals for constitutional and institutional reform to President Gnassingbé. On April 2, ANC sent a letter to Prime Minister Kwesi Ahoomey-Zunu, urging him to rapidly organize a dialog on constitutional reforms. On May 19, the government started negotiations with opposition parties on institutional and constitutional reforms. However, on June 3, ANC, the Rainbow Coalition, and the Alliance of Democrats for Integral Development left the negotiating table. The same day, the government drafted a bill on institutional and constitutional reforms. When it was considered by the National Assembly on June 30, 63 members of Parliament from the majority, composed of the UNIR and the Union of Forces for Change (UFC), voted against the bill, and it was rejected. On July 10, CST called on the international community to put pressure on the government to undertake the promised reforms. On November 21, police dispersed thousands of opposition protesters with teargas near Parliament, injuring two people. One week later, on November 28, thousands protested in Lomé to call for constitutional change that would prevent President Gnassingbe from running for a third term in the 2015 presidential elections. es

UGANDA (KINGDOM OF RWENZURURU / RWENZURURU)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: Kingdom of Rwenzururu vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy, resources

A violent crisis over autonomy and resources between the Kingdom of Rwenzururu and the government emerged. In 2008, the government had granted the Bakonzo tribe the cultural status of a kingdom, comprising the western districts Kasese, Bundibogyo, and Ntoroko. This area was also inhabited by several minority groups, such as the Bamba, Basongora, and Banyawindi. The government's gesture had ended a decade-old demand of the Bakonzo and Bamba for cultural independence from the Kingdom of Toro. Since then, rivalries emerged between Rwenzururu's ethnic groups over the region's scarce land and recently discovered oil resources [→ Uganda (inter-ethnic rivalries / Rwenzururu)].

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Throughout the year, the government granted some of the ethnic minorities in the region the status of kingdoms as well. Subsequently, violence between Bakonzo and the government erupted.

In June, President Yoweri Museveni attended the coronation ceremony of the Bamba king Martin Ayongi Kamyia in Bundibugyo district and urged Rwenzururu leaders not to visit a shrine in that area. On July 5, around 300 alleged Bakonzo attacked government institutions in Kasese, Bundibugyo, and Ntoroko, with spears, machetes, and guns. In more than ten separate attacks on police stations, military barracks, and villages, around 75 attackers, ten civilians, five policemen, and five soldiers died. In the following days, the government deployed the Alpine Brigade to the mountainous region and allegedly instigated retaliation attacks of minority groups against Bakonzo civilians, causing at least nine fatalities. On July 9, the Rwenzururu kingdom denied any involvement in the attacks. Between July 5 and 10, police arrested five members of the kingdom's government, including Prime Minister Nzaghale and Deputy Prime Minister Yeremiya Mutooro. After the government had granted amnesty, over 150 alleged perpetrators surrendered in mid-July. They were brought before military courts, but the government released them shortly afterwards. On July 28, a Bakonzo youth group claimed responsibility for the July attacks. They cited land conflicts, the refusal of the president to meet Bakonzo cultural elders, and high unemployment rates among Bakonzo people as their motivation.

On October 15, the Kasese district commissioner and the army stated that a new rebel group aiming to attack Uganda had been created in the neighboring DR Congo. They stated that the group, called Sikilyamuba, was comprised of the remnants of the previously pardoned attackers. Furthermore, Sikilyamuba had allegedly formed an alliance with Esyomango, the youth military wing of the Rwenzururu kingdom. [jli](#)

formed in 2009, ended with the 2013 elections. The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), led by President Robert Mugabe, has ruled solely since. Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the main opposition party Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T), repeatedly called for new elections and a coalition government at the beginning of the year. ZANU-PF rejected the idea. On April 13, MDC-T announced nationwide protests against Mugabe, claiming that the country's economic crisis persisted due to a government crisis. Throughout the year, the government and MDC-T repeatedly clashed. On May 4, MDC-T and ZANU-PF members clashed during an MDC-T rally in Epworth, Harare province, leaving 18 people injured. On August 27, police cracked down on MDC-T youths protesting for jobs in the capital Harare, injuring at least 18 MDC-T members. On September 26, police destroyed around 100 houses belonging to MDC-T members in Epworth. ZANU-PF members supported the police and clashes erupted with residents who used axes and bricks and dozens of people were injured. Violence was also reported within MDC-T as well as ZANU-PF over leadership questions. The splinter party MDC-Renewal was launched. Within ZANU-PF, fighting over the succession of Mugabe increased. However, on December 6, the ZANU-PF congress reinforced Mugabe's position as ZANU-PF's presidential candidate for the 2018 elections. Domestic actors, including a coalition of churches and the Zimbabwe Peace Project, but also international actors, such as the United States and Australia, condemned the increase in violence due to intra-party conflicts. On January 5, the opposition party National Constitutional Assembly accused ZANU-PF of attacking its members during campaigns for the January 25 by-elections in Harare. On July 12, opposition party Transform Zimbabwe (TZ) leader Jacob Ngarivhume and 13 other TZ members were arrested in Gweru, Midlands province. Ngarivhume was accused of having held an illegal gathering. On July 18, the TZ leader accused the government of restricting freedom of assembly. Furthermore, several opposition movements and organizations clashed with the government. On February 13, police broke up a protest against corruption by the organization Women of Zimbabwe Arise in Harare, injuring several activists. On October 17, journalist Itai Dzamara was arrested in Harare after he had sent a petition to Mugabe saying he should step down. Dzamara started the movement Occupy Africa Unity Square (OAUS) this year. On November 6 and December 2, OAUS held sit-ins in Harare. In response, anti-riot police severely beat the protesters. Throughout the year, international human rights organizations repeatedly condemned Mugabe's crackdown on opposition groups. [las](#)

ZIMBABWE (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2000**

Conflict parties: MDC-T, MDC-Renewal, NCA, OAUS, TZ, WOZA et al. vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis between opposition groups and the government over national power and political, economic, and social matters continued. The government of national unity,

THE AMERICAS

VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN THE AMERICAS IN 2014



INTENSITY
WAR
LIMITED WAR
VIOLENT CRISIS
NO VIOLENT CONFLICT

REGIONAL PANORAMA

The number of conflicts in the Americas increased by one to 52. While one conflict had ended in 2013, two intrastate conflicts erupted in 2014.

In Mexico, a violent conflict erupted between various social groups among them teacher trainees, i.e. normalistas, and the government under President Enrique Peña Nieto over the political system and the handling of public security. The conflict received widespread media attention due to the killing of six people and the abduction of 43 students in late September in Iguala. The remains of the kidnapped students were not found despite the discovery of numerous mass graves, leading to a further increase in demonstrations against the government's handling of the case and public security [→ Mexico (public security)]. Various anarchist groups in Chile were responsible for a series of bomb attacks on the public transport system and official buildings, killing one and injuring several people. The government under President Michelle Bachelet reacted with a harsher implementation of anti-terrorism laws [→ Chile (anarchist groups)].

In Panama, the conflict between opposition groups and the government over the political system and resources ended after the opposition accepted their defeat in the presidential elections. New president Juan Carlos Varela took office in July and announced inclusive policies for unions and indigenous groups. However, the indigenous Ngöbe-Bugle, which in the past years had often protested in solidarity with the opposition parties, continuously protested against the construction of the hydropower station Barro Blanco in the Chiriquí province [→ Panama (opposition)].

The autonomy and system conflict between the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) and the government in Mexico ended. In the wake of the newly erupted conflict concerning public security, the group joined the protests against the government's handling of internal security. It did not, however, resume its violent activity which had ceased already before 2014.



Similar to previous years, the sole war in the Americas, i.e. the conflict between drug cartels, self-defense groups, and the Mexican government, was most intensely fought out in the states of Michoacán, Guerrero, and Tamaulipas [→ Mexico (drug cartels)]. The level of violence shifted regionally rather than decreased, leading to a military intervention in Tamaulipas state and troop buildup in Michoacán. Despite numerous arrests and killings of drug cartel kingpins, such as the capture of Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán Loera of the Sinaloa Federation, the latter as well as Los Zetas, the Gulf Cartel, and Los Caballeros Templarios remained the predominant drug cartels in the limited war over the control of turf [→ Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups)]. The country's high level of violence, devolution, and fragmentation of cartels entailed a doubling of disappearances compared to 2012 figures, amounting to an average of 13 cases per day.

As in previous years, three conflicts in Colombia remained highly violent. Despite ongoing peace talks in Havana, Cuba, the conflict between the rebel group FARC and the government claimed the lives of at least 400 combatants and civilians [→ Colombia (FARC)]. In addition, the conflict between neo-paramilitary groups and the government as well as in-fighting between the various armed groups continued on a highly violent level [→ Colombia (neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels); Colombia (inter-cartel violence, neo-paramilitary groups, left-wing militants)]. These limited wars accounted for the majority of the 100,000 people displaced throughout the year. However, the number of newly displaced people decreased by more than 50 per cent compared to 2013. Increasingly common were inner-city displacements, such as in the port city Buenaventura.

Although Brazil witnessed an increase of police violence, the conflict between drug trafficking organizations and the government de-escalated to a violent crisis [→ Brazil (drug trafficking organizations)]. In Venezuela, the violent conflict over system and national power between opposition and government supporters left more than 40 people dead and approx. 675 injured. Mass protests paralyzed most of the country in February, affecting 16 of the 23 states [→ Venezuela (opposition)].

Interstate conflicts throughout the Americas prevailed with mixed developments regarding intensity. The territorial conflict between Honduras and El Salvador about possessions in the Gulf of Fonseca, especially Isla Conejo, escalated to a violent crisis when navy and fishing vessels from both sides encountered in April and May, leaving one civilian dead and several others injured [→ Honduras – El Salvador (Isla Conejo)].

The territorial dispute between Peru and Chile about the exact maritime border was highlighted by a final decision of the ICJ in January, granting Peru 28,000 of the disputed 38,000 square kilometers. While both parties abided by the decision and set up a bilateral technical delegation, tensions rose again when Peru published maps that showed the starting point of the terrestrial border 265m further north than Chile had assumed before [→ Peru – Chile (border)]. The conflict between the US and Cuba which was mediated by the Vatican was marked by the reestablishment of diplomatic relations for the first time since 1961 [→ USA – Cuba (system)]. During the fiscal year 2014, October 2013 to August 2014, 68,541 unaccompanied alien children, an increase of 77 percent compared to the previous fiscal year, crossed the southwest border between the USA and Mexico illegally. Most of the immigrants fled from the Northern Triangle, i.e. Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, due to poverty and violence [→ USA – Mexico (border security)]. (peh, jok, kgr, swa)



THE AMERICAS

Overview: Conflicts in the Americas in 2014

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Argentina – United Kingdom (Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas)	Argentina vs. United Kingdom	territory, resources	1833	•	2
Bolivia (socioeconomic protests)	coca farmers, FENCOMIN, police officers vs. government	system/ideology, resources	1983	•	3
Bolivia – Chile (access to sea)*	Bolivia vs. Chile	territory, resources	1883	•	1
Brazil (drug trafficking organizations)	drug trafficking organizations, militias vs. government	subnational predominance	2010	↘	3
Brazil (indigenous groups)*	indigenous groups vs. government	autonomy, resources	1985	•	3
Brazil (MST, MTST)*	MST, MTST vs. government	resources	1996	•	3
Brazil (social protests)	MPL et al. vs. government	system/ideology	2013	•	3
Chile (anarchist groups)	Conspiracy of Cells of Fire, other anarchist groups vs. government	system/ideology	2014	NEW	3
Chile (Mapuche / Araucanía)	Mapuche vs. government	autonomy, resources	2008	•	3
Chile (Rapa Nui / Easter Island)*	Rapa Nui vs. government	secession	2010	•	1
Chile (social movements)	ACES, CONES, CONFECU vs. government	system/ideology	2006	•	3
Colombia (ASCAMCAT / Catatumbo)*	ASCAMCAT, farmers in Catatumbo vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources	2013	↓	1
Colombia (ELN)	ELN vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	1964	•	3
Colombia (FARC)	FARC vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	1964	•	4
Colombia (indigenous groups)*	various indigenous groups vs. government	resources	2005	•	3
Colombia (inter-cartel violence, neo-paramilitary groups, left-wing militants)	Los Urabeños vs. Los Rastrojos vs. ELN vs. La Empresa vs. Libertadores del Vichada vs. Bloque Meta vs. Águilas Negras vs. Los Paisas	subnational predominance, resources	2013	•	4
Colombia (neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels)	drug cartels, neo-paramilitary groups vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	1983	•	4
Dominican Republic – Haiti*	Dominican Republic vs. Haiti	other	2009	•	1
Ecuador (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, resources	1980	•	3
El Salvador (Maras)	Barrio 18, Mara Salvatrucha vs. government	subnational predominance	2012	•	3
Guatemala (drug cartels)	drug cartels vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2009	•	3
Guatemala (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	resources	1985	•	3
Guatemala – Belize (territory)*	Guatemala vs. Belize	territory	1981	•	3
Haiti (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	national power	1986	•	3
Honduras (drug trafficking organizations, organized crime)*	drug trafficking organizations, organized crime vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2012	•	3
Honduras (MUCA, MARCA, PARCA, farmers of Bajo Aguán – landowners)*	farmers of Bajo Aguán, MARCA, MUCA vs. landowners	resources	2009	•	3
Honduras (opposition)	anti-government activists, FNRP, LIBRE, PAC, PL vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2009	•	3
Honduras – El Salvador (Isla Conejo)	Honduras vs. El Salvador	territory	2013	↗	3
Jamaica (drug gangs)	drug gangs vs. government	subnational predominance	2010	•	3
Mexico (CNTE et al.)*	CNTE et al. vs. government	system/ideology	2006	•	3
Mexico (drug cartels)	drug cartels vs. vigilante groups vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2006	•	5
Mexico (EPR / Guerrero)*	EPR vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1995	END	1
Mexico (EZLN / Chiapas)	EZLN vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources, other	1994	•	3
Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups)	Sinaloa et al. vs. Los Zetas et al. vs. CDG et al. vs. LCT et al. vs. CJNG et al. vs. LFM et al.	subnational predominance, resources	2005	•	4
Mexico (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	national power	2006	↘	2
Mexico (public security)	ANP et al., normalistas vs. government	system/ideology	2014	NEW	3

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Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Nicaragua (militant groups)	Armed Forces for National Salvation - Army of the People (FASN-EP), Coordinated Nicaraguan Guerrilla (CGN), Democratic Front of Commando 3-80 (FDC 3-80) vs. government	system/ideology	2012	•	3
Nicaragua (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2008	•	3
Nicaragua – Colombia (sea border)	Nicaragua vs. Colombia	territory, resources	1825	•	2
Nicaragua – Costa Rica (Rio San Juan)*	Nicaragua vs. Costa Rica	territory	1858	•	1
Panama (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, resources	2008	END	1
Paraguay (EPP, agrarian movements)	EPP, ACA, agrarian movements vs. government	system/ideology, resources	1989	•	3
Peru (opposition movements)*	opposition movements vs. government	system/ideology, resources	2008	•	3
Peru (Shining Path)	SL vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	1980	•	3
Peru – Chile (border)	Peru vs. Chile	territory	1883	•	1
United Kingdom – Chile (Antarctica)*	United Kingdom vs. Chile	territory	2007	•	1
USA – Cuba (Guantanamo)*	USA vs. Cuba	territory	1959	•	1
USA – Cuba (system)	USA vs. Cuba	system/ideology, international power	1960	•	2
USA – Mexico (border security)	USA vs. Mexico	other	2005	↗	3
USA – Venezuela*	USA vs. Venezuela	system/ideology, international power	2001	•	2
Venezuela (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1992	•	3
Venezuela – Colombia (Monjes Islands)*	Venezuela vs. Colombia	territory, resources	1871	•	1

^{1 2 3 4} cf. overview table for Europe

Please note: The intensity of each conflict as shown in the tables is the highest intensity reached in the course of the year. Therefore, conflicts may, for instance, be classified as limited wars although there may have been no more fighting in the second half of the year.

If a conflict revolves around a territory whose name is disputed by the conflict parties, both variations will be named, separated by an "/" [e.g. Japan – China (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands); Argentina – UK (Falkland Islands/Islands Malvinas)]. If, in contrast, the conflict actors strive for subnational predominance, secession, or autonomy of or in a certain region, the region is separated from the actors by " / " [e.g. France (FLNC / Corsica); Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)].

SELECTED CONFLICT DESCRIPTIONS

ARGENTINA – UNITED KINGDOM (FALKLAND ISLANDS/ISLAS MALVINAS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1833**Conflict parties: Argentina vs. United Kingdom
Conflict items: territory, resources

The non-violent crisis between Argentina and the United Kingdom (UK) over the territory of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas and resources continued.

Throughout the year, the Argentine government repeatedly declared its peaceful intentions and demanded a greater willingness for dialog from the UK. On January 3, the 181st anniversary of British rule over the disputed islands, Argentina installed a special Malvinas secretariat, headed by former senator Daniel Filmus. In his first official statement on January 12, Filmus announced that any company exploiting oil deposits in the islands' surrounding maritime territory without Argentina's consent would face consequences ranging from fines to prison sentences.

On April 2, the 32nd anniversary of the Argentine invasion of the islands, Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner claimed the British government's true interests were not the exploitation of resources but the installation of a NATO military base in the South Atlantic. British officials repudiated this and reaffirmed the UK's compliance with the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty as well as UN Resolution 49/84 of 1997, characterizing its military presence on the islands as purely defensive.

Fernández de Kirchner also criticized the scheduling of a British missile test. On April 11, the UK foreign ministry asserted that the missile test was a biannual routine exercise that had been carried out for many years, starting prior to 2007. The same day, Argentine Foreign Minister Héctor Timerman also rejected the scheduled test and summoned the British ambassador. Filmus stated that he had filed a formal complaint to the British government about the issue, calling the military exercise a threat to the region. In the course of the remaining year, Argentina repeatedly accused the UK of militarizing the South Atlantic. lme

BOLIVIA (SOCIOECONOMIC PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1983**Conflict parties: coca farmers, FENCOMIN, police officers vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, resources

The conflict between societal groups and organizations and the government over resources and the orientation of the political system continued at the level of a violent crisis. Involved parties consisted of unions, such as the National Mining Cooperatives Federation (FENCOMIN), the national police officers' association (ANSSCLAPOL), and coca farmers. The government continued to fight illegal coca cultivation and drug trafficking. On March 25, up to 3,000 residents of Yapaquí, Santa Cruz department, clashed with police at the groundbreaking ceremony for a new Special Coun-

ternarcotics Force military base. Protesters hurled stones at the police, leaving one policeman injured, while police responded with tear gas. Protesters also installed blockades on the Santa Cruz-Cochabamba route, which were later cleared by police. Despite the protests, on March 28 the government announced that the construction of the military base would continue.

A new mining bill forbidding contracts between private investors and mining cooperatives increased tensions between FENCOMIN and the government. On March 31, police cleared a road blockade set up by protesting miners in Sayari, Cochabamba, leaving two miners dead and 130 injured. The following day, the government withdrew the bill. A week later, President Evo Morales appointed César Navarro as new mining minister. Amidst ongoing protests, representatives of FENCOMIN and the government reached an agreement on April 25, leaving the bill's controversial paragraph unaltered. Morales stressed that signing contracts between mining cooperatives and private investors was unconstitutional and any contravention would be persecuted. On May 19, the Chamber of Deputies approved the proposal and later passed the bill on May 28.

Tensions between ANSSCLAPOL and the government rose again in June, renewing the conflict of 2012 concerning demands related to salary. The dispute culminated on July 3 when hundreds of policemen with balaclavas and tear gas stormed the headquarters of the Police Operations and Tactics Unit (UTOP) in La Paz. Five days later, the parties were able to settle the dispute and a salary reform was announced for 2015. On October 12, Morales was re-elected with a majority of two thirds in the Senate, leaving his closest rival, Samuel Medina Auza of Democratic Unity (Unidad Demócrata), more than 40 percent behind. Campaigning remained peaceful and neither side contested the election results. lme

BRAZIL (DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ▼ | Start: **2010**Conflict parties: drug trafficking organizations, militias vs. government
Conflict items: subnational predominance

The conflict over subnational predominance between the main drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) Comando Vermelho (CV), Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP), Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), and Amigos dos Amigos (ADA), as well as various militias on the one hand, and the government on the other, de-escalated to a violent crisis. The states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo remained hotspots for confrontations between DTOs and security forces.

On January 8, police arrested ten PCC members in São Paulo who had tortured an alleged police informant. Between February and March, CV members attacked Pacifying Police Unit (UPP) stations in the favelas Parque Proletário, Mangueira, and Complexo do Alemão, in Rio de Janeiro. They killed one policeman, injured five others, and torched five police stations. During the firefights, UPP agents killed twelve alleged DTO members. On March 30, 1,180 military police (PM) forces and Federal Forces (FF) occupied the favela Complexo da Maré, Rio de Janeiro. In August, police arrested 21 members of the Justice League militia, among them one of

its leaders, in Rio de Janeiro. Afterwards, gang members set several buses on fire. By October, militias controlled at least ten percent of Rio de Janeiro's favelas. In the second half of the year, security forces arrested more than 50 suspected DTO members. The government continued widespread operations to combat DTO activities.

In April, Brazil and Peru intensified joint anti-drug trafficking operations in the border region at the Yavarí River, Amazonas. The following month, Brazil's military launched "Operation Ágata VIII" against drug and arms trafficking at its borders with around 30,000 troops, seizing 40 tons of drugs, 206 boats, and 126 vehicles. On November 4, the FF, supported by Honduras, the USA, and Colombia dismantled a drug trafficking and money laundering ring based in Sinop, Mato Grosso and arrested more than 24 suspects. Authorities also seized USD 5.3 million and nine aircrafts in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Amazonas.

According to the Department of Homeland Security, 55 PM members died between January and November while combating DTOs, while Brazil's Forum of Public Security stated that security forces had killed 478 people by the end of September. cpn

BRAZIL (SOCIAL PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: MPL et al. vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over system and ideology between different protest groups such the Free Fare Movement (MPL), truckers, and teachers, on the one hand, and the government led by President Dilma Rousseff on the other, continued.

During a demonstration on February 2 in Rio de Janeiro in the eponymous state, 2,000 people protested increasing public transport fares and threw stones at security forces. Police used tear gas and arrested at least 20 people and injured seven. On February 22, 1,000 people protested in São Paulo, São Paulo state. 2,300 policemen were present and arrested more than 260 demonstrators. On May 27, in Brasília, Federal District, 2,500 people including indigenous groups, Homeless Workers' Movement (MTST) members, and anti-World Cup groups protested the sports event [→ Brazil (indigenous groups); Brazil (MST, MTST)]. On the day of the FIFA World Cup opening on June 12, thousands of people protested in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Fortaleza, Manaus, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Taguatinga, and Salvador. In São Paulo, confrontations between police and protesters left 15 people injured while 31 were arrested. On June 15, around 300 people protested near the Maracanã stadium in Rio de Janeiro. A group of protesters threw Molotov cocktails at the military police (PM) who used tear gas. At least three people were injured. Afterwards, authorities suspended two policemen who had threatened protesters by firing shots in the air while off duty. Two days later, PM agents made use of tear gas to disperse a 300-person demonstration in Fortaleza, Ceará state. The same day, police arrested 17 MPL members during protests in Rio de Janeiro. On June 28, 300 people demonstrated near the Maracanã stadium, Rio de Janeiro. Police used tear gas and batons and arrested fifteen protesters. Between June 15 and 28, PM attacked at least 14 photographers who were covering the protests.

Bus and tram drivers protested throughout the year, demanding higher salaries. At the beginning of May, both groups went

on strike in Florianópolis, Santa Catarina, leaving 300,000 commuters without transportation. During the first week of June, similar strikes by metro drivers took place in São Paulo. On November 5, bus drivers protested against the torching of their vehicles, including some 119 buses in the previous month, and blocked 29 bus stations.

About three weeks after Rousseff's re-election on October 5, up to 100,000 people took to the streets in nationwide protests calling for political reforms. On December 6, protests continued in São Paulo with between 2,000 and 4,000 people, some of whom blocked part of Avenida Paulista. cpn

CHILE (ANARCHIST GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: Conspiracy of Cells of Fire, other anarchist groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

A violent crisis over the political system erupted between various anarchist groups and the government. While several minor bomb attacks in previous years resulted in material damage only, this year a series of attacks on the public transport system and official buildings injured and killed several people in the capital Santiago de Chile. The government reacted by instating the application of the anti-terrorist law, allowing for harsher prosecutions, and made several arrests within the anarchist scene.

Throughout the year, more than 30 explosives were planted in Santiago, mostly not exploding or causing only minor damage. A variety of anarchist groups, such as the Conspiracy of the Cells of Fire (CCF), claimed responsibility for these actions which primarily targeted banks, police stations, and the public transport system.

On September 8, an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in the Escuela Militar metro station in central Santiago, injuring 14 bystanders and causing substantial damage. Police later stated that the attackers had used a fire extinguisher filled with gunpowder, which was then set off with a timer.

On September 18, three suspects were arrested in connection with the attack. The same day, CCF claimed responsibility for several attacks, including the September 8 bombing in a communiqué, blaming police for allegedly not reacting to a prior warning call. The group also stated that it had attacked the metro station and other targets as symbols of the state and capitalism. On September 25, a man died in the Santiago neighborhood of Yungay when he opened a backpack carrying an IED. Police later stated that the IED was supposed to explode next to a building of the gendarmerie when the victim picked it up and carried it away. No suspects were identified.

In reaction to the September 8 bomb attack, President Michele Bachelet instated the anti-terrorist law, stemming from the Pinochet era and allowing for aggravated measures and prosecutions against suspects. The step received harsh criticism by civil society activists and NGOs such as Human Rights Watch. peh

CHILE (MAPUCHE / ARAUCANÍA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: Mapuche vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy, resources

The violent conflict over autonomy and resources in the La Araucanía region between members and organizations of the indigenous Mapuche and the government continued.

On February 20, Mapuche Celestino Córdova was found guilty of an arson attack on the home of two landowners on 01/04/13. Despite the request of President Sebastián Piñera's government, Córdova was not subjected to the anti-terrorism law. The new government under President Michelle Bachelet, who took office in March, sought a new approach to the conflict. Bachelet appointed Francisco Huenchumilla governor of La Araucanía and Domingo Namuncura ambassador to Guatemala, both of Mapuche origin. On March 12, Huenchumilla apologized to the Mapuche on behalf of the government for the past seizing of Mapuche land.

Despite these changes, the issue of returning lands to the Mapuche remained a point of contention. Throughout the year, activists occupied estates in La Araucanía, at times leading to violent confrontations with the police. For example, on March 3, about 30 activists entered a forestry estate where they installed barricades and set fires. The following day, police and firefighters clashed with the activists. Seven police officers were wounded by pellets. On October 1, Mapuche José Mauricio Quintriqueo died after being hit by a tractor during the occupation of a forestry estate in Galvarino, La Araucanía. His death sparked several protests and demonstrations. For example, on October 4, Mapuche activists set up a road block in Arauco, Bío Bío. When police tried to clear the road block, clashes ensued, leaving at least 13 policemen injured.

On April 7, three Mapuche prisoners in Angol, La Araucanía, began a 39-day hunger strike to pressure the government. The strike created new tensions in the region. For instance on April 29, more than 300 Mapuche demonstrated in Temuco, La Araucanía, in support of the prisoners. In subsequent clashes, police dispersed the crowd using water cannon and tear gas and detained at least four people. On June 19, the government announced it would no longer apply the anti-terrorism law in the context of the Mapuche conflict, after which the prisoners ended their strike. In addition, on July 29, the International Court of Human Rights ruled in favor of Mapuche convicts in the case "Norín Catrimán et al. vs. Chile", strongly criticizing the application of the law in the past.

In addition to violent clashes, the region experienced a number of peaceful demonstrations. For example, on March 11, 30 to 40 people marched peacefully in Puerto Montt, Los Lagos, to demand the inclusion of the Mapuche language in education curricula. Furthermore, the Mapuche organization Consejo de Todas Las Tierras took part in the "March of Marches" in Santiago de Chile on March 22, which drew 25,000 to 100,000 people to the streets of the capital, where various civil society groups gave their demands to the new government. kgr

CHILE (SOCIAL MOVEMENTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: ACES, CONES, CONFECH vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over system and ideology between social movement organizations such as the Confederation of Chilean Students (CONFECH) and the government continued. Education system reforms were among the main demands of the social movement groups.

On January 31, after student leaders had strongly criticized the designated Minister of Education Claudia Peirano, President Michelle Bachelet appointed Nicolás Eyzaguirre. Bachelet made the education reform a central part of her presidential term and announced the investment of USD 8.2 billion in the education sector by 2020. The Coordinating Assembly of High School Students (ACES), Committee of Chilean Secondary School Students (CONES), and CONFECH postponed a protest march scheduled for April 24 as a consequence of negotiations between CONFECH and Eyzaguirre at the April 12 round table on education reform. On May 5, Bachelet signed a law ensuring financial support of bankrupt private universities. However, the student movement rejected the initiative as insufficient and resumed their protests. On May 9, between 40,000 and 100,000 students took to the streets in the capital Santiago de Chile to demand participation in drafting the new education reform and the provision of free quality education. In subsequent clashes, protesters injured 20 policemen while the latter arrested approx. 100 demonstrators and used water cannon and tear gas. Ten days later, Bachelet presented the first part of the education program containing reforms to build new universities and to lower the costs of education. However, student representatives rejected the plans, claiming they were insufficient and unsubstantial. Accused of having thrown Molotov cocktails, CONFECH, CONES, and ACES canceled further negotiations with the government.

The second protest march on June 10, organized by CONFECH, ACES, CONES, and a teachers' union took place in various cities. Between 20,000 and 100,000 protesters took part, demanding more influence on the education reform. On June 25, 50,000 to 150,000 teachers marched on the streets of Santiago. When a group of hooded persons attempted to destroy traffic lights, special police forces intervened with water cannon. On October 9, up to 100,000 participants of different organizations marched in over 20 cities against the planned education reform, while another demonstration on October 25 drew 50,000 to 200,000 people to the streets of Santiago.

pha

COLOMBIA (ELN)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1964**

Conflict parties: ELN vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources

The violent conflict over the orientation of the political sys-

tem, subnational predominance, and resources between the 1,500 members-strong National Liberation Army (ELN) and the government continued. Departments most affected by violence were Arauca, Bolívar, Cauca, Norte de Santander, Chocó, and the capital Bogotá.

ELN continued to attack state security forces. For example, on June 3, ELN lured a police convoy to a road where they had planted explosives in Saravena, Arauca. After the bombs went off, ELN opened gunfire, killing four policemen and injuring one. ELN also targeted the capital Bogotá. On June 20, an ELN bomb exploded at a police station in the Chapinero neighborhood, injuring two police officers and one civilian and damaging nearby buildings. On July 29, two additional bombs went off on Calle 26 and in the Kennedy neighborhood, leaving no casualties.

Furthermore, ELN carried out numerous attacks on the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline owned by Ecopetrol. Such attacks, which usually consisted of bomb attacks to damage the pipeline infrastructure, took place in Arauca, Boyacá, and Norte de Santander. By August 21, almost 100 attacks on the pipeline had been registered, according to the Colombian Petrol Association, costing a total of USD 531 million in repairs and profit losses. On June 29, two bombs went off at an oil workers' camp along the pipeline, injuring 13 to 15 people. ELN later claimed the bombs had been meant to target a US military bunker and had not been intended to hurt civilians.

Throughout the year, state forces conducted several operations against ELN. For example, on July 23, the Army and Air Force killed eight ELN members and captured five in Saravena and Fortul, Arauca. In the department Bolívar in October and November, three operations by the Army, Air Force, and police led to the death of five ELN members and the capture of seven.

Despite the violence, peace negotiations between ELN and the government became more feasible in the course of the year. Exploratory talks began in January. On June 10, a joint statement by the government and ELN marked the official start of confidential preliminary talks, which included subjects such as civil society participation. The UN called this a historic act. However, on October 15, ELN commander Gustavo Giraldo Quinchia alias Pablo expressed his frustration with the peace talks' slow progress. On October 21, ELN announced it had reached an agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to converge the two peace processes [→ Colombia (FARC)]. Furthermore, from May 20 to 28, both ELN and FARC upheld a joint unilateral ceasefire due to the presidential elections. qk

COLOMBIA (FARC)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1964**

Conflict parties: FARC vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources

The conflict over system and ideology, subnational predominance, and resources between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), accounting for 7,000 to 8,000 members, and the government of President Juan Manuel Santos remained highly violent. The marxist-leninist FARC was active mainly in the departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Caquetá, Chocó, Cauca, Guaviare, La Guajira, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, Tolima, and Valle del Cauca,

and was financed by drug trafficking, extortion, and illegal mining.

The peace negotiations in Havana, Cuba, that had been initiated in 2012 continued. In May, the FARC agreed to cease all drug trafficking activities should a peace agreement come into force. In August, for the first time, victim representatives participated in the peace talks. The negotiations were also a major campaign issue during the presidential elections, as Santos main opponent, Óscar Iván Zuluaga, announced that he would suspend the peace talks if he became president. In the June 15 election, which was accompanied by a three-week unilateral ceasefire by the FARC, Santos was re-elected. On November 17, the government temporarily suspended the peace talks following the kidnapping of General Rubén Darío Alzate one day earlier. The FARC had captured him along with two other people in Las Mercedes, Chocó. On November 30, all three hostages were released, allowing for the resumption of negotiations on December 10.

Despite the peace talks, violence continued throughout the year.

State forces conducted various operations against the FARC, many of them leading to the killing or arrest of alleged FARC members. For example, during an operation by air force and army on January 18 in Tame, Arauca, 14 FARC fighters were killed. Three days later, in a joint police, air force, and army operation in Planadas, Tolima, seven rebels were killed and five captured. Initial air strikes were followed by a ground attack. On July 13, a similar joint operation claimed the lives of 13 FARC members in Vigía del Fuerte, Antioquia. According to the Ministry of Defense, by November, 235 guerrilla fighters had died in confrontations with state forces and more than 1,000 had demobilized.












The FARC carried out various attacks, often killing or injuring state troops and civilians. On January 16, FARC detonated a bomb in Pradera, Valle del Cauca, killing one and injuring 56. On March 10, alleged FARC members opened fire on a group of soldiers and construction workers in La Montañita, Caquetá, killing four soldiers and injuring four civilians. Many FARC attacks targeted members of the police. For example on March 24, a bomb explosion in Guapi, Cauca, left one policeman dead and eleven people injured, among them two police officers. On September 16, seven policemen were killed and five were injured by grenades and explosives in Tierradentro, Córdoba. The government accused the FARC of having conducted the attack together with the criminal group Los Urabeños, which the rebel group denied [→ Colombia (neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels)]. On December 19, in Santander de Quilichao, Cauca, five soldiers were killed and up to seven were injured in the last violent clash with the FARC before the FARC's unilateral, indefinite ceasefire took effect one day later.

FARC guerrilla fighters also carried out several attacks on the country's infrastructure. For example, on March 31, the FARC used 100kg of explosives to damage a section of the Pan-American Highway near Santander de Quilichao, impeding traffic for several days.

Violent encounters between the FARC and government forces caused displacement among the civilian population. For instance, in March and April, nearly 700 inhabitants of Guapi were displaced by continuous fighting between the conflict parties. According to the National Victim's Unit, armed conflicts in the country, among them the conflict with the FARC, led to the displacement of nearly 100,000 people this year.

kgr

COLOMBIA (FARC)



NO VIOLENT CONFLICT MEASURES VIOLENT CRISIS LIMITED WAR WAR

COLOMBIA (INTER-CARTEL VIOLENCE, NEO-PARAMILITARY GROUPS, LEFT-WING MILITANTS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: Los Urabeños vs. Los Rastrojos vs. ELN vs. La Empresa vs. Libertadores del Vichada vs. Bloque Meta vs. Águilas Negras vs. Los Paisas

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The limited war between neo-paramilitary groups, drug trafficking organizations, and left-wing militants over subnational predominance and resources continued. This year, the left-wing National Liberation Army (ELN) entered competition with these groups [→ Colombia (ELN)].

The neo-paramilitary groups, labeled Criminal Gangs (BACRIM) by the government, were formed by ex-members of the paramilitary organization United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), which had demobilized in 2006, as well as by members of drug cartels. Their activities consisted of local and international drug trade, extortion, illegal mining, and human trafficking. In total, the gangs were estimated to count more than 3,400 members. Los Urabeños, called Clan Úsuga by the government, continued to be the largest and most dominant of the gangs with 2,650 members. Other gangs involved were Los Rastrojos, Libertadores del Vichada, La Empresa, Los Paisas, Bloque Meta, and Águilas Negras [→ Colombia (neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels)]. The criminal gangs were present in 27 of the country's 32 departments, as well as the Venezuelan states Apure, Tachira, and Zulia. The turf war was particularly violent in Valle del Cauca and Chocó departments. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), neo-paramilitary groups were responsible for about one quarter of the country's IDPs, which totaled nearly 100,000 this year. Los Urabeños and the Los Rastrojos-affiliated La Empresa continued to fight over control of the port city Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca. Neighborhoods dominated by the competing gangs were marked by "invisible borders", which inhibited free passage for residents and caused the displacement of 95 families in January. By May, the gang war had displaced at least 1,200 people. In the first three months of the year alone, Buenaventura counted 87 homicides, several of which included dismembering bodies in alleged "chop-up houses". In November, 30 members of Los Paisas reportedly joined the gang war. To protest the high levels of violence, at least 15,000 citizens demonstrated in Buenaventura on February 19. In March, the government announced the deployment of additional troops to the city to improve security.

Cali, Valle del Cauca, was affected by the rivalry between Los Urabeños and Los Rastrojos as well. Fighting between the two gangs and their local affiliates accounted for at least 565 homicides, however the overall homicide rate in the city went down compared to 2013. In February, the Ombudsman declared 250,000 residents at high risk of violence due to the turf war.

In Alto Baudó, Chocó, strategically important for drug trafficking, coca cultivation, and illegal mining, Los Urabeños clashed with the ELN. On May 10 and 11, more than 2,500 people from indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities fled the clashes, while another 538 were displaced between June 13

and 19.

Villavicencio, Meta, saw continued rivalry between Libertadores del Vichada and Bloque Meta due to the city's location on the drug trafficking route to Bogotá and the Caribbean. Police attributed the majority of the homicides in the city to the gang war, with more than 100 victims counted by October.

Violence also spilled over into Venezuela. For example, on November 10, Los Urabeños allegedly killed eight Colombian gang members affiliated with either Los Rastrojos or Águilas Negras in Zulia, Venezuela. qk, kgr

ECUADOR (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1980**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, resources

The crisis over system and ideology as well as resources between various opposition groups and the government of President Rafael Correa remained violent. The government's planned election reform and the newly-approved water and labor laws led to anti-government protests in the second half of the year.

On March 19, Ecuador's ruling party, Alianza PAÍS (AP), proposed a reform to allow indefinite re-election of the president and other government officials starting in 2017. The right-wing opposition immediately labeled the planned constitutional amendment undemocratic. Additionally, a Human Rights Watch report issued on July 14 criticized the reform's limitations of citizens' rights and the proposed power increase of the armed forces. On October 31, the Constitutional Court ruled that the National Assembly (AN) could proceed with the reform's constitutional amendments. On November 26, the National Electoral Council (CNE) rejected the Patriotic Society Party's request for a referendum on the constitutional amendments.

On April 12, two environmental groups, Yasunidos and Amazon Defense Coalition (FDA), submitted a list of about 70,000 signatures to the CNE for a referendum to vote on further oil exploitation in the Yasuní National Park. The CNE rejected their petition on May 6, declaring 40,000 signatures invalid. Two weeks later, the government issued a permit for oil drilling in the Yasuní reserve allowing the construction of camps and access roads. On October 28, Yasunidos announced it would sue the government for violation of its political rights before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

On June 24, AN approved a new water law prohibiting all forms of water privatization. On the same day, 1,000 people commenced a twelve-day protest march to the capital Quito, Pichincha province, to demonstrate against the new law and their possible loss of access to natural resources. Police set up blockades to stop the demonstration and dispersed the crowd with tear gas.

On September 17, about 9,000 demonstrators participated in pro- and anti-government protest marches against a proposed reform of the labor code mainly in Quito and in Guayaquil, Guayas province. Leading conservative opposition mayors, the country's largest trade union, United Workers Front (FUT), and members of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador supported the anti-government protests. The demonstrators threw rocks and Molotov cocktails at the police, injuring 15 policemen. Police arrested

approx. 74 protesters. At a rally in Guayaquil on November 15, Correa announced that a revised labor reform package had been sent to the AN for approval. Four days later, FUT organized another nationwide anti-labor reform protest and about 45,000 demonstrators participated in major cities. sen

EL SALVADOR (MARAS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: Barrio 18, Mara Salvatrucha vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The conflict over subnational predominance between the country's main criminal gangs, also known as Maras, and the government remained violent. In the wake of more sophisticated gang activities and a rising homicide rate, the new government under President Salvador Sánchez Cerén launched new security strategies in the second half of the year. Compared to the previous year, gang-related homicides and attacks against policemen rose significantly.

On April 4, gang members overpowered a police patrol in San Matías and a police delegation in Quezaltepeque, both in La Libertad, in separate attacks that left one officer dead and three injured. Between October 5 and 15, gang members killed six policemen in Acajutla, Sonsonate, and in Aguilares, San Salvador. In November, police officials stated that gang members had killed 33 policemen since January. Figures from the national police and the National Forensic Institute showed an increase of about 60 percent in murders compared to 2013, marking more than 3,900 killings nationwide. The most affected departments were San Salvador, San Miguel, Usulután, and La Libertad.

On June 10, newly-appointed President Salvador Sánchez Cerén of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) declared he would implement new security policies while principally maintaining the gang truce. The strategy aimed at reducing gang violence. One week earlier, spokesmen of the Mara Salvatrucha (MS) and the Barrio 18 had confirmed their intention to cooperate with the new government. On August 11, Sánchez Cerén launched a new community police force in the capital San Salvador and introduced the National Council for Citizen Security (CNSCC) on September 29. Both initiatives included governmental and social representatives of the state and were designed to combat security problems and gang violence more effectively. On November 3, Attorney General Luis Martínez declared that the CNSCC would not resume talks with MS and Barrio 18. On March 16, a police report stated evidence that about 60 MS members had received military training by former civil war combatants in San Alejo, La Unión, and in Quezaltepeque, La Libertad, in February. The report also identified links between three high-ranking MS leaders and a Mexican cartel concerning transnational drug smuggling. sen

GUATEMALA (DRUG CARTELS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: drug cartels vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis between various drug cartels and the government of President Otto Pérez Molina over subnational predominance and resources continued.

In April, Molina deployed a special unit comprising 200 National Civil Police (PNC) agents and 195 troops to the north-eastern departments between Petén and Chiquimula to combat organized crime. In August, the Ministry of the Interior deployed police and military forces in Alta Verapaz and Baja Verapaz, both affected by the incursion of the Mexican cartel Los Zetas [→ Mexico (drug cartels)].

Actions taken against anti-drug police were frequently reported throughout the year.

In La Esperanza, Quetzaltenango, on March 24, anti-drug police seized eleven assault rifles, ammunition, and explosives while apprehending a suspect allegedly connected to the Gulf Cartel. On May 25, in the capital Guatemala City, a shootout between two anti-drug police agents and one perpetrator left all three dead and another two injured in the crossfire.

On August 12, during an operation near Playitas, Izabal, security forces injured one person linked to the Gulf Cartel. On August 24 and 25, police found a drug laboratory and seized small weaponry in San Andrés Itzapa during an operation in Chimaltenango department. In a subsequent shootout, one Mexican civilian was killed while several others were able to flee.

Authorities arrested several suspects throughout the year. On April 7, in San Pedro Carchá, Alta Verapaz, security forces captured Wilver Arnulfo Cabrera France, a local Zetas leader accused, inter alia, of drug trafficking. Security forces apprehended Jairo Estuardo Orellana Morales, wanted for his affiliation with the Lorenzanas, in Gualán, Zacapa on May 15. On November 21, a joint team of national security forces and agents of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala captured formerly Zetas-affiliated Cheguén Sagastume and five other Zetas in different towns in Chiquimula. On October 20, authorities arrested four persons connected to Sagastume and confiscated cocaine. On November 8, security forces captured Efraín Cifuentes González, allegedly affiliated with Los Zetas and Los Caballeros Templarios in Mexico, in La Libertad, Petén. Haroldo Mendoza Matta and ten other members of the Mendoza Cartel were arrested on November 21 in Guatemala, Petén, and Izabal in connection to the murder of four persons. On November 12, Waldemar Lorenzana Cordón, son of the head of the Lorenzana's cartel, was extradited to the USA.

According to the Guatemalan News Agency, throughout the year, authorities seized more than five tons of cocaine, surpassing the previous year's amount by 1.7 tons. The National Institute for Forensic Science registered 5,924 homicides in total, an increase of 610 compared to 2013. tk

HAITI (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1986**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The violent conflict between several opposition groups and the government over national power continued. Protests concentrated in the capital Port-au-Prince and in Petit-Goâve, Ouest department. Demonstrators demanded the resignation of President Michel Martelly and Prime Minister Laurent

Lamothe due to alleged corruption and the government's inability to organize legislative elections, which were two years overdue.

In Port-au-Prince, opposition parties Fanmi Lavalas, the Patriotic Force for the Respect of the Constitution (FOPARK), and the Patriotic Movement of the Democratic Opposition (MOPOD) held general protests throughout the year, which turned violent on several occasions. While activists burned tires and threw rocks at security forces, the latter responded with tear gas to disperse the crowds. The largest demonstration took place on June 6, with approx. 5,000 activists. On December 13, clashes between UN peacekeepers of the MINUSTAH mission and police officers, on the one hand, and protesters, on the other, left one activist dead and several injured. In Petit-Goâve, a mass panic broke out during religious festivities on August 17, when special police forces used tear gas and fired shots in the air, leaving 43 injured. Following this event, local opposition movements held at least 36 demonstrations, most of which turned violent, demanding the resignation of Mayor Sandra Jules and of Martelly. The interior ministry placed Petit-Goâve under tutelage of the state on October 25 to guarantee the population's basic needs until a new Municipal Commission was elected. After several rounds of talks, Martelly met with representatives of the opposition to sign the El Rancho Accords on March 14, which established elections for 2/3 of the Senate. Martelly announced legislative elections would be held on October 26. However, the Electoral Law was not amended due to an impasse in the Senate between opposition and government supporters, and elections could not be held on the said date. To overcome the political deadlock, Martelly created the Presidential Consultative Commission on November 28, which recommended Lamothe's resignation and the establishment of a consensus government with ministers elected jointly by the administration and the opposition. Lamothe followed suit and submitted his resignation on December 14. Evans Paul was appointed prime minister on December 25. The two heads of parliament and Martelly signed an accord on December 29 to find a way out of the political impasse.

HONDURAS (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: anti-government activists, FNRP, LIBRE, PAC, PL vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The system and national power conflict between non-party opposition groups and oppositional parties such as LIBRE, on the one hand, and the government of the National Party (PN), on the other, remained violent. On May 12, gunmen shot a representative of the LIBRE party in the city hall of the capital Tegucigalpa. The following day, in a speech before Congress, former president and current member of Congress José Manuel Zelaya (LIBRE) accused the government of failing to provide security for its citizens. Several thousand LIBRE supporters protested outside the building. LIBRE deputies later gave some protesters access to the building, which led to turmoil and clashes inside. Subsequently, at the order of President of Congress Mauricio Oliva, over 200 members of the military police forcefully evicted the demonstrators and the resisting LIBRE deputies from Congress using tear gas, pepper spray, and batons. LIBRE party members and security

forces clashed on the streets. Several LIBRE deputies and supporters were injured. On May 14, LIBRE called for protests against their removal from Congress. On May 15 and 16, about 400 members of various indigenous and peasant organizations rallied in Tegucigalpa. The protesters demanded land reforms, a stop to the "neoliberal sale of the country," and the liberation of imprisoned activist José Isabel Chabelo Morales.

Repressive measures and targeted killings against opposition activists also continued. On January 21, perpetrators shot dead the indigenous activist Justo Sorto in Yance, Intibúca department. On March 5, seven supporters of the Agua Zarca dam project attacked the opposition activist María Santos Domínguez, her husband, and her son with machetes, sticks, and stones in Intibucá, heavily injuring them. On April 6, two members of the indigenous organization COPINH opposing Agua Zarca killed two supporters of the dam project who had allegedly attacked them near La Unión, Intibúca. The COPINH members were heavily injured. On May 9, military officers arrested and beat the chair of the NGO Casa Alianza, José Guadalupe Ruelas. On May 17, police forces arrested the human rights activist Cristian Castro without a warrant in La Esperanza, Intibúca. On August 27, heavily armed assailants killed Margarita Murillo, a highly popular figure in the peasant movement, in Villa Nueva, near San Pedro Sula, Cortés department. She had been involved in the movement National Front of Popular Resistance (FRNP) and later on in the left-wing party LIBRE. Prior to her death, the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (CIDH) had called without success for the government to provide for her safety.

HONDURAS – EL SALVADOR (ISLA CONEJO)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: Honduras vs. El Salvador

Conflict items: territory

The territorial conflict between Honduras and El Salvador over the island Isla Conejo and adjacent waters in the Gulf of Fonseca turned violent. In several incidents throughout the year, naval forces of both nations clashed with civilian fishing boats in the Gulf, resulting in one Honduran civilian's death and several injuries on both sides. El Salvador was supported by Nicaragua in its claim for the island.

On April 3, soldiers of the Honduran navy opened fire on several fishing vessels southeast of Isla del Tigre, injuring a Salvadoran fisherman. According to Honduran naval sources, they had been rammed during the persecution. In a statement, the Honduran government offered an apology and expressed its hope that similar situations would not occur in the future, stressing that relations between both countries were characterized by "friendship and cooperation". Several fishermen that had been arrested after the incident were later turned over to Salvadoran authorities. On May 16, soldiers of the Salvadoran navy killed a Honduran fisherman and injured another after a pursuit in the same area.

Salvadoran President Mauricio Funes deemed the March 24 inauguration of a heliport on Isla Conejo "a provocation" and repeated his government's claim that the islet was Salvadoran territory. In October, Salvadoran President of Parliament Sigfrido Reyes called the Honduran presence on the disputed island "illegal" and reiterated Salvadoran claims to the island. The re-hoisting of the Honduran flag by military personnel

on September 1 further increased diplomatic tensions. However, both sides later expressed their intention to cooperate on several development projects in the gulf region. Hugo Martínez, Secretary General of the Central American Integration System (SICA) in mid-September also expressed his hopes for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. peh

JAMAICA (DRUG GANGS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2010**

Conflict parties: drug gangs vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The conflict between various drug gangs and the government over subnational predominance remained violent. Clashes mainly concentrated on the parishes of West Kingston, Clarendon, and Westmoreland. On January 4, police announced the intensification of "Operation Resilience", which had been initiated on 10/02/13 as a way to reduce gang-related violence. Police forces arrested high-ranking members of the Alma gang, killing at least one and seizing 13 rifles during various raids in Westmoreland on January 8. Furthermore, police seized about 180 kg of marijuana worth USD 50 million in Lakes Pen, St. Catherine, on February 11. On June 5, during the third round of the operation, police and the Jamaica Defense Force arrested 71 persons and seized about 30 kg of marijuana and one stolen vehicle. With a two-year delay, the anti-gang bill, the Criminal Justice Act 2014, came into effect on April 4. By July 19, 18 members of the Scare Dem Crew, Savannah, and Tony Reid gangs had been arrested in the parishes of Kingston, St. Andrews, Clarendon, St. James, and Westmoreland under the previously enacted bill. Despite peace talks, the turf war for subnational predominance remained most violent in West Kingston. On February 26 and 27, approx. 30 alleged gang members from eight West Kingston communities assembled, with the mediation of the police, to reach a peaceful solution to their two-year feud. The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) registered the death of 35 people in gang-related killings in the capital between January and May, amounting to a 40 percent increase compared to the same period last year. The JCF also reported a nationwide reduction in gang-related murders in July. Statistics revealed 307 gang-related murders during the first seven months of the year, in comparison with 472 victims during the same time frame in 2013. Authorities registered about 100 killings by security forces, compared to 258 in 2013. osv

MEXICO (DRUG CARTELS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: drug cartels vs. vigilante groups vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources

The war between various drug cartels, vigilante groups known as autodefensas, and the government under President Enrique Peña Nieto over subnational predominance and resources continued. The most active drug cartels were the Sinaloa Cartel, Los Zetas, the Gulf Cartel (CDG), Los Caballeros Templarios (LCT), and the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación

(CJNG). Tamaulipas, Michoacán, and Guerrero were the most affected states. Clashes between government forces and armed groups took place almost daily. Additionally, the inter-cartel conflict remained highly violent [→ Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups)].

Violence in the northeastern border state of Tamaulipas increased sharply in early April. Sparked by the government's arrest of CDG leader Jesús Alejandro "El Simple" Leal Flores on April 1, confrontations between the military and CDG in Reynosa left six people dead the same day. On May 5, following separate firefights in Matamoros, Reynosa, and Ciudad Victoria, eight people died in clashes between Federal Police (PF), Los Zetas, and CDG. In an encounter involving the use of grenades and high-caliber weapons, PF killed Los Zetas founder Galindo "Z-9" Mellado Cruz in Reynosa on May 9. Four other gunmen and one soldier died. On October 21, police killed 19 suspected CDG gunmen in Matamoros and Río Bravo. After Michoacán, Tamaulipas became the second state to undergo a federal intervention mobilizing 2,500 security forces on May 12.

Despite intensified troop deployment, Michoacán remained a hotspot. PF detained several politicians accused of maintaining relations with LCT in the first semester of the year, including former Interim Governor Jesús Reyna García. Furthermore, clashes were on the rise in Guerrero state. PF killed eight gunmen in separate shootouts in the towns of Zumpango del Río and Pantla on February 15. Accusations of occasional collusion between both conflict actors were raised when, on September 26, municipal police in Iguala fired at student protesters and later handed them over to the local cartel offshoot Guerreros Unidos, leaving six people dead and 17 injured. 43 were abducted [→ Mexico (public security)].

Vigilante groups in the two Pacific states of Michoacán and Guerrero repeatedly clashed with both drug cartels and state authorities. In January, more than 400 armed vigilantes seized various municipalities in Michoacán, subsequently controlling 33 out of 113. Hundreds of vigilantes from La Ruana and Buenavista accused of collusion with LCT and CJNG, respectively, faced off on March 11. On April 14, 20 vigilante leaders within the General Council of the Michoacán Self-Defense Forces and Michoacán security commissioner Alfredo Castillo negotiated eleven agreements, including the vigilantes' integration into the Rural Defense Corps (FRE), which was officially launched on May 10. On December 14, however, hundreds of vigilantes announced the reactivation of their organization. Two days later, eleven people died in La Ruana in a clash between former vigilantes linked to Hipólito Mora and others linked to Luis Antonio "El Americano" Torres. Many violent encounters took place in Estado de México. Secretary of the Interior Miguel Osorio Chong announced on March 31 to send the armed forces to Estado de México and to double the presence of PF. On June 30, elements of the Department of Defense killed 22 alleged LFM gunmen in Tlatlaxala.

On May 12 in Guachinango, Jalisco, an ambush by more than 30 CJNG assailants left four soldiers burned to death. On March 28 in a shootout in Novolato, Sinaloa, marines, soldiers, and state police killed four gunmen, while four marines were wounded.

In Perote, Veracruz, a skirmish between security forces and Los Zetas left ten persons dead on March 27. Military killed 23 Los Zetas members in separate shootouts in the municipalities of Alto Lucero and Banderilla from May 15 to 17. Security forces shot dead nine suspected Los Zetas gunmen in separate incidents in Veracruz City and Orizaba on July 5.

In the course of the year, security forces arrested and killed several cartel leaders in crackdowns especially targeting LCT. In January and February, PF arrested 675 people in Michoacán seizing more than 250 guns, 30 grenades, and a rocket launcher. On January 19, federal forces detained LCT second-in-command Dionisio Loya "El Tío" Plancarte. Marines killed LFM founder and LCT leader, Nazario "El Chayo" Moreno González, in a gunfight in Tumbiscatio, Michoacán, on March 9. On March 31, the Mexican Navy killed Enrique "El Kike" Plancarte, another LCT head, in Colón, Querétaro. On February 22, marines and US Drug Enforcement Administration officers arrested Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán Loera, head of the Sinaloa Cartel and the world's most wanted drug lord, in Mazatlán, Sinaloa.

Drug cartels showed a strong presence in illegal businesses outside of drug-trafficking. Authorities seized more than 200,000 tons of illegal iron ore during the first half of the year. Cartels also engaged in human and organ trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. Journalists were repeatedly threatened, intimidated, and abducted by drug cartels, stimulating self-censorship. asc

MEXICO (EZLN / CHIAPAS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1994**

Conflict parties: EZLN vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy, system/ideology, resources, other

The violent crisis concerning ideology, autonomy, and resources between the indigenous Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in Chiapas and the government of President Enrique Peña Nieto continued. In January, Commissioner for the Dialog with the Indigenous People Martín Veloz announced that 2014 would be a decisive year for once more taking up the dialog with the Zapatistas. By February, he estimated, a legal initiative to harmonize international treaties and national law concerning indigenous rights would be promulgated.

Throughout the year, peasant organizations conducted several attacks on EZLN bases. The Zapatistas repeatedly claimed those organizations were linked to the government, however official accounts did not confirm such claims. On January 30, 300 members of the Independent Center of Agricultural Workers and Campesinos (CIOAC) and the Regional Organization of Coffee Growers of Ocosingo (ORCAO) attacked a Zapatista community in Altamirano, Chiapas. They used clubs, stones, and machetes, leaving six people injured. EZLN claimed the aggressors were part of the government's broader strategy to suppress the autonomy of EZLN. On March 21, an EZLN member and municipal leader was ambushed and shot in Chilón, Chiapas. The incident remained unresolved, though EZLN blamed the government. According to the human rights center Fray Bartolomé de las Casas (Frayba), around 140 CIOAC members as well as members of the Green Ecologist Party of Mexico (PVEM) and the National Action Party (PAN) attacked 68 EZLN members with stones, clubs, and machetes in the municipality of La Realidad, Chiapas, on May 2. The ambush left one Zapatista dead and 15 injured. According to Frayba, on August 14, 18 ORCAO members intruded a new EZLN settlement near Ocosingo, Chiapas and threatened the community members by firing shots and claiming it was not the Zapatistas' land. On September 16, a municipal policeman was injured by gunshots in Chilón, with the perpetrators

remaining unknown. Subsequently, 40 policemen detained three pro-Zapatistas and tortured them, compelling them to self-indictment.

After five years of absence from public life, EZLN spokesman Subcomandante Marcos reappeared in Las Margaritas, Chiapas on May 24, affirming that the figure of Subcomandante Marcos had been a "mere hologram that ceased to exist". Subcomandante Moisés became the new spokesman. From October on, EZLN continuously expressed solidarity with those affected by the abduction and presumed killing of 43 students in Iguala [→ Mexico (public security)]. On October 8, about 20,000 Zapatistas took to the streets in San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, silently expressing their support. jok

MEXICO (INTER-CARTEL VIOLENCE, PARAMILITARY GROUPS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: Sinaloa et al. vs. Los Zetas et al. vs. CDG et al. vs. LCT et al. vs. CJNG et al. vs. LFM et al.
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The subnational predominance and resources conflict between various drug cartels remained highly violent. The most violent combat groups were those of the Sinaloa Cartel, Los Zetas, the Gulf Cartel (CDG), Los Caballeros Templarios (LCT), and the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Los Zetas, CDG, and LCT stayed the most powerful, though they were challenged by a wave of arrests and vigilante groups [→ Mexico (drug cartels)]. Guerrero and Tamaulipas were the most contested states.

The third year of fights between CDG and its longtime rival Los Zetas as well as CDG infighting caused a wave of violence in Tamaulipas state, leaving 70 persons dead in April and another 25 in May. On April 3, three people died during fights between CDG members leading to a shootout at the funeral of Aarón "El Wuasa" Rogelio García in Matamoros. His killing was ostensibly ordered by detained CDG head Javier Garza Medrano. Further clashes between rivaling CDG members in Tampico and Ciudad Victoria left 28 persons dead on April 5 and 6. On April 22, confrontations between CDG, Los Zetas, and marines cost the lives of seven people. 21 people died in clashes in San Ignacio, Sinaloa, on June 9 and 10. The bodies' black uniforms suggested that they were Los Zetas members. In Guerrero state, power struggles between CJNG, Guerreros Unidos, LFM, and Los Rojos for the control of drug trafficking routes connecting the states of Guerrero, Estado de México, and Morelos, remained violent. On February 21, 20 people died in an inter-cartel shootout involving at least 70 people in San Miguel Totolapan. On March 29, five corpses were found in the municipality of Ajuchitlán del Progreso with a threatening message signed by LFM. On May 28, nine people were killed including three men who were found decapitated, with a message warning of an impending upsurge of violence in the capital Chilpancingo. Rivaling drug gangs Los Rojos and Los Ardillos killed 14 people in shootouts in Chilapa on July 9 and 10.

Following four shootouts between Los Rojos and Los Ardillos near Chilapa de Álvarez on November 26, authorities discovered eleven beheaded corpses of presumably Los Ardillos members, next to a message signed by Los Rojos.

CJNG, LFM, LCT, and Los Zetas vied for control of Estado de México, also affecting the capital. Violence in the state escalated with around 100 executions in the first two months of 2014. On February 23, CDG revealed a banner in Cuautiltán Izcalli announcing the cleansing of the region from crime. Between March 7 and 9, six people died in a wave of shootouts in two bars. Outside a bar, a banner was left with a message signed by LFM. Michoacán was contested by vigilante groups, Los Zetas, LFM, CDG, and the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) while LCT's presence was diminished [→ Mexico (drug cartels)]. On February 11, two LCT members died in a clash with a local cartel in Sahuayo. Additionally, in January authorities uncovered evidence of an alliance between LCT and the BLO to retain LCT's control of Michoacán.

Violence was on the rise in the northern states of Baja California and Chihuahua. In August, clashes between the Sinaloa Cartel and a new alliance between Los Zetas and BLO cost the lives of ten persons in Los Barriles, Baja California. On September 26 and October 26, shootouts in Guachochi, Chihuahua between members of the Sinaloa Cartel and a rival cartel left 22 people dead. asc

MEXICO (PUBLIC SECURITY)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: ANP et al., normalistas vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

A violent crisis concerning the political system and the handling of public security erupted between a large variety of social groups and the government under President Enrique Peña Nieto. The former comprised, inter alia, teacher trainees also known as normalistas, the Popular National Assembly (ANP), and teachers' unions.

On September 26, some 300 municipal policemen intercepted around 60 normalistas who had seized three buses to head from Ayotzinapa to Iguala, both Guerrero. Police opened fire, killing six and injuring 25. According to official accounts, authorities had anticipated that they would protest and interrupt a ceremony held by Iguala's mayor's wife that day. As revealed in ensuing investigations, police had then abducted as many as 43 students and handed them over to a local cartel offshoot, Guerreros Unidos, who allegedly killed them and burned the corpses on a nearby dump site in Cocula, Guerrero.

Protests demanding the investigation of 57 missing colleagues and the demission of Governor Angel Aguirre arose when 3,000 demonstrators, mainly normalistas, took to the streets in Chilpancingo, Guerrero, on September 29. Some threw rocks at the state congress. On October 4, at least six mass graves containing 28 bodies in total were found near Iguala. Neither of those nor of the additional corpses found in the following weeks belonged to the students, which further fueled protests. Throughout the rest of the year, 80 suspects were arrested including 44 municipal policemen (the masterminds), Iguala's mayor and his wife (accused of collusion with Guerreros Unidos), and the leader of Guerreros Unidos. Aguirre resigned on October 23. One normalista's remains were identified in Cocula on December 6 while 42 remained missing by the end of the year.

The initial protests were followed by a surge of broader demonstrations and riots primarily addressing public security. They took place almost daily and throughout the whole

country, though they turned violent mostly in Guerrero and the Federal District. For instance during protests on October 13, up to 500 normalistas and members of the Guerrero State Education Workers' Union (CETEG) ransacked and set governmental buildings ablaze in Chilpancingo, Guerrero. Five teachers and two policemen were injured when 200 policemen dispersed the crowd. On October 15, the ANP was founded, encompassing around 100 civil society groups demanding a thorough investigation of the Iguala incident. Later, on November 8, Attorney General Jesús Murillo Karam revealed how the normalistas had allegedly been killed. Two days later, protests that attracted around 30,000 participants were staged in the capital Mexico City, Federal District. Six demonstrators were injured as protesters hurled Molotov cocktails, stones, and fireworks, and police responded with tear gas. During a subsequent riot, a hooded demonstrator set fire to the door of the National Palace. On November 18, Peña Nieto called the protests an attempt to "produce instability" and "attack the national project". Marches in 30 cities took place on November 20, with between 30,000 and 100,000 protesters in Mexico City alone. Eleven were arrested and around a dozen injured. On December 1, Nieto's second anniversary in office, up to 4,000 protesters took to the streets of Mexico City, calling for his resignation. CETEG and federal police again clashed on December 14 in Chilpancingo, leaving 21 persons injured. Apart from marches, teachers' unions [→ Mexico (CNTE et al.)] and normalistas blocked highways, airports, toll booths, and shopping malls for weeks, mostly in the states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, Michoacán, and Guerrero. Two months after the shooting and students' disappearance, Peña Nieto announced ten anti-crime measures, among them a subsumption of the 1,800 municipal police forces by state police and the implementation of a missing persons register. Since the government's start of the so-called war on drugs in 2006 [→ Mexico (drug cartels)], well over 20,000 people had been registered missing. jok

NICARAGUA (MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: Armed Forces for National Salvation - Army of the People (FASN-EP), Coordinated Nicaraguan Guerrilla (CGN), Democratic Front of Commando 3-80 (FDC 3-80) vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The system conflict between various armed groups and the government of President Daniel Ortega's Sandinista National Liberation Front continued as a violent crisis. On February 10, after Marvin "Comandante Nicaragua" Figueroa, an influential militant, had been captured by Honduran police in October 2013, the umbrella group Coordinated Nicaraguan Guerrillera (CGN) accused the Nicaraguan Intelligence Service of having planned the assassination of Figueroa.

On April 21, a shootout between the army and militant forces took place in Las Lajas, department of Estelí. According to CGN, two clashes took place between militants and security forces in June. During the first clash on June 14, in Las Delicias in the Autonomous Region of the Southern Atlantic (RAAS), one militant and two soldiers were killed and several injured. The following day, the second combat took place in La Cruz de Río Grande, RAAS, leaving one militant and one soldier dead, while several others were wounded. On July

19, at least five gunmen attacked two buses of Sandinista supporters. The attackers killed five people and injured another 28. One bus was attacked in Ciudad Darío, the other in San Ramón, both Matagalpa department. The following day, a formerly unknown group called Armed Forces for National Salvation - Army of the People (FASN-EP) took responsibility for the attacks. However, the police denied the existence of politically motivated armed groups and blamed criminal gangs. The following weeks, police detained several suspects. CGN, the oppositional Independent Liberal Party, the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights, and the Episcopal Conference of Nicaragua accused the security forces of torture, especially against liberal opposition members [→ Nicaragua (opposition groups)].

On August 30, a group of militants attacked a police station in San Pedro del Norte, RAAS and killed at least one soldier, according to CGN. The following day, CGN members attacked two military bases, one in San Pedro del Norte, RAAS, the other in La Estrellita, Autonomous Region of the Northern Atlantic, killing two soldiers and wounding another five. Three militants were wounded in the attacks, for which FASN-EP took responsibility. According to Carlos Blandón, a catholic priest, in the beginning of October two clashes between members of militant groups and soldiers took place in Ayapal, Jinotega. Eight soldiers and one militant were killed. Police confirmed combats, but declared they were fighting drug gangs. hzi

NICARAGUA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The system and national power conflict between various opposition groups and the government of President Daniel Ortega's Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) continued on a violent level. After parliament voted on 12/11/13 in favor of the constitutional reform in the first reading, it was adopted on January 28. The reform strengthened the president's executive power and granted him reelection for more than one term. In reaction, the oppositional Independent Liberal Party (PLI) called for protests against the government. On March 2, the ruling FSLN won the regional elections in the Autonomous Region of the Northern Atlantic (RAAN) and the Autonomous Region of the Southern Atlantic (RAAS). One day later, the PLI and the indigenous YATAMA party deemed the elections to be full of fraud, manipulation, and irregularities. Days later, after YATAMA had called their supporters to protest, YATAMA supporters demonstrated against the results. At the end of May, the government proposed a bill on police legislation. The Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights (CENIDH) and various opposition groups claimed that the proposed law violated the independence of police, freedom of expression, and free media. Nevertheless, on June 11, the law was adopted by the National Assembly. On July 4, the PLI and the Constitutionalist Liberal Party started negotiations about the formation of a united liberal party. On July 17, during a commemoration march in the capital Managua, a mob of Sandinista Youth members on motorbikes attacked opposition activists with baseball bats and injured two of them. They also attacked journalists, injuring three. According to the journalists, police were present but did not interfere and allegedly helped the attackers. Afterwards, on July 19, gunmen attacked two buses of Sandinista supporters, killing five

and injuring another 28 [→ Nicaragua (militant groups)], the militant umbrella group Coordinated Nicaraguan Guerrillera, CENIDH, the PLI, and the Episcopal Conference of Nicaragua accused the security forces of acting brutally and unreasonably harshly during their investigation, especially against liberal opposition members. The Permanent Commission on Human Rights and the PLI reported that some of the suspects had been detained without arrest warrants and disappeared for several days without contact to their families or lawyers. On October 24, Sandinista Youth members threw stones at students who were protesting in Ciudad de Rivas, department of Rivas, against the planned interoceanic canal. On December 24, about 300 security forces attacked a blockade of thousands of farmers who protested against the interoceanic canal in El Tule, department of Río San Juan. Security forces used rubber projectiles and tear gas. 15 policemen and between five and over 70 protesters were wounded. Security forces detained an additional 33 protesters. As of December 31, all detainees were set free, but according to their families, they had been tortured during their detention. hzi

NICARAGUA – COLOMBIA (SEA BORDER)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1825**

Conflict parties: Nicaragua vs. Colombia
 Conflict items: territory, resources

The non-violent crisis between Nicaragua and Colombia over the maritime border surrounding the archipelagos of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina continued. Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, who had previously declared that his country would not abide by the 2013 ICJ ruling that clarified the maritime borders between the two countries, continued to insist on a bilateral treaty. On May 3, the Colombian Constitutional Court deemed the ICJ ruling incompatible with the Colombian constitution. Three days later, Santos announced that in the case of his re-election, he would negotiate a bilateral border treaty with Nicaragua. On June 15, he was reelected as president. On August 14, he officially asked the ICJ not to accept the lawsuit Nicaragua had filed on 09/17/13, in which Nicaragua had demanded additional maritime territory. On March 17, the Colombian Navy stationed a second destroyer in the maritime border area. Nevertheless, the same day, Nicaraguan General Julio Avilés emphasized that the two countries' maritime forces would communicate and cooperate. hzi

PANAMA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **END** | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, resources

The system conflict between opposition groups, particularly the umbrella social movement National Movement for the Defense of Economic and Social Rights (FRENADES), its labor union National Union of Workers of Construction and Similar Industries (SUNTRACS), as well as the associated political party Broad Front for Democracy (FAD) on the one hand, and the government on the other, ended after uncontested presidential elections in May. In April and May, several worker

unions and associations held peaceful protests and strikes. Among their demands were wage increases. SUNTRACS, which had initiated violent strikes throughout previous years, called for a national strike on April 23. The strike interrupted almost all construction work in the country including the Panama Canal expansion project. Teachers' unions and the education ministry of President Ricardo Martinelly as well as President-elect Juan Carlos Varela reached a deal on May 23 ending the strikes.

Presidential elections were held on May 4 and Varela emerged victorious, taking office on July 1. Former SUNTRACS General Secretary Genaro López, who ran for the FAD, a recently formed party representing union sectors, indigenous groups, farmers, and young people, received less than one percent of the votes. The elections were conducted in a peaceful manner and without any violent aftermath. thg

PARAGUAY (EPP, AGRARIAN MOVEMENTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: EPP, ACA, agrarian movements vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, resources

The violent crisis over land reform between several farmers' organizations, the left-leaning People's Army of Paraguay (EPP), indigenous groups, and landless people, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. These groups continued to express their demands for integral agrarian, social, and political reform.

EPP continued its violent campaign against the state. The most severe assault was staged on April 2, when around 15 EPP members attacked a Brazilian landowner's farm near Azotey, Concepción department. Two EPP members and one member of the armed forces were killed in a subsequent shootout. The attackers, who stole money and other items, also kidnapped Arlan Fick Bremm, the farm owner's son. A civilian bystander was killed in close proximity to the farm. In the following weeks, several demonstrations in support of the hostage took place. For example, on April 25, nearly 500 people marched to Yby Yaú, Concepción, demanding Fick's release. In a separate incident on February 27, two workers were killed by suspected EPP members on a farm near Yby Yaú.

Also in Concepción, EPP kidnapped police officer Edelio Morínigo Florenciano on July 8. Both Fick and Morínigo were alive and seemingly in good health in a video released by EPP on October 22. On December 25, EPP released Fick.

EPP also conducted attacks on the country's infrastructure. For instance, in July, EPP blew up two high-tension transmission towers in Concepción, cutting off the electricity supply to parts of six departments.

Several former EPP members set up a breakaway faction called Armed Farmers Group (ACA). Security forces killed four suspected ACA members in clashes on September 19 and 21 in Arroyito, Concepción.

In June, Congress approved the creation of the new Paraguayan Secret Service, which was designed to support the armed forces and the police in combating EPP. ank

PERU (SHINING PATH)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1980**

Conflict parties: SL vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance, resources

The subnational predominance and ideology conflict between the left-wing Maoist rebel group Shining Path (SL) and the government remained violent. SL split up into the Huallaga Regional Committee (CRH) and the Center Regional Committee (CRC). Only CRC remained active, with an estimated 300 to 500 fighters in southern Peru, primarily in the Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro River Valley (VRAEM) covering parts of the regions Ayacucho, Cusco, and Junin. The government accused SL of being involved in drug trafficking and providing drug cartels with gunmen.

Throughout the year, six people were killed and about 15 injured in attacks. On February 16, alleged SL fighters attacked a workers' camp for natural gas and injured a worker during a shootout in the Cusco region. On June 18, army troops killed three SL members in a clash in the Cusco region. In August, more than 100 soldiers rescued nine captives from SL in Junin. On October 3, SL attacked a military convoy near Machente in Ayacucho region, killing two servicemen. Ten days later, SL members killed one soldier and injured four others when they attacked a military outpost in the same region.

Throughout the year, military and police forces destroyed dozens of clandestine airstrips, which served cocaine smugglers in VRAEM. On March 13, police detained 15 SL members, including the alleged leader Jairo Santiago Díaz Vega alias "Comrade Freddy" or "Percy" in Huánuco region. The government blamed them for restructuring the debilitated HRC. On April 10, more than 300 police and army forces arrested 24 members of the Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights (Movadef) in a nationwide operation. The government accused them of being linked to CRH, legitimizing and reviving SL as well as infiltrating democratic life ahead of the impending regional elections in fall and the 2016 presidential elections. On November 13, police captured two SL fighters after a shootout in Ayacucho region. mgm

PERU – CHILE (BORDER)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1883**

Conflict parties: Peru vs. Chile

Conflict items: territory

The territorial dispute between Peru and Chile continued. While the ICJ's decision on the maritime border was accepted by both parties, tensions continued after a controversy over the terrestrial border in the coastal area. On January 27, in its final ruling on the maritime border between the two states, the ICJ awarded 28,000 of the disputed 38,000 square kilometers to Peru while granting Chile sovereignty over an area harboring some of the world's richest fishing grounds. The court also decided that the maritime border should start at the current area of coastline. Peruvian President Ollanta Humala welcomed the court's decision, while Chilean President-elect Michelle Bachelet initially called the ruling "a loss" for Chile

but expressed her intention to gradually implement it. Technical delegates from the two countries later met to discuss the implementation.

On February 10 and August 19, Peru published maps showing the terrestrial border as an extension of the maritime border, which added an additional 3.7 hectares to Peruvian territory. According to the Peruvian version of the map, its border with Chile would begin south of the Punto de la Concordia or 265m further south than assumed by Chile. Chile protested this with a formal note, accusing Peru of deliberately raising tensions, stating that the terrestrial border had not been part of the ICJ's decision. [peh](#)

USA – CUBA (SYSTEM)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **1960**

Conflict parties: USA vs. Cuba
 Conflict items: system/ideology, international power

The conflict between the USA and Cuba over ideology and international power continued on a non-violent level. The US continued to uphold sanctions against Cuba and repeatedly accused Cuba of violating human rights. In December, US President Barack Obama took executive actions to normalize relations between the countries which had not maintained diplomatic relations since 1961.

On January 9, officials from both countries met in the Cuban capital Havana to discuss migration issues. The Cuban foreign ministry emphasized that migration would continue to be a problem until the US abandoned the so-called "wet foot, dry foot policy", the practice of sending immigrants detained at sea back while letting those detained on soil stay. Furthermore Cuba demanded that the US repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1996, claiming it was discriminatory. On April 30, for the 32nd consecutive year, the US Department of State classified Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism in its annual report. Cuba and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States repudiated the classification. After 18 months of secret talks mediated by Canada and the Vatican, US-Cuban relations improved significantly. On December 16, Cuba released, among others, Alan Gross, a US Agency for International Development government worker who had been imprisoned for smuggling satellite equipment in 2009, in exchange for the remaining three of the Cuban Five incarcerated for espionage in 1998. The next day, Obama announced that the US would reestablish diplomatic relations with Cuba and reopen an embassy in Havana. Furthermore, he promised to normalize commerce, travel, and communication. Only Congress, however, could lift the trade embargo and the Republicans, the majority party, said they would uphold it. [cn](#), [swa](#)

USA – MEXICO (BORDER SECURITY)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: USA vs. Mexico
 Conflict items: other

The conflict between the USA and Mexico over border security escalated to a violent crisis. Strategies to end illegal

immigration and cross-border drug and weapon trafficking as well as the use of lethal force by the US Border Patrol (USBP) remained disputed.

Throughout the year, Mexico condemned the practice of the USBP's use of lethal force against unarmed Mexicans and demanded investigations.

On January 16, a USBP agent fatally shot a Mexican in Cochise County, outside of Douglas, Arizona in the border region. A USBP agent shot a Mexican twice after he had allegedly thrown rocks at him in Otay Mountain, 6 km east of the Otay Mesa border crossing, California on February 18. Reportedly, after an armed US Marine had crossed the border, he was detained and charged with the possession of weapons intended for military use on March 31. Tensions between the US and Mexico intensified. In response, the Department of Homeland Security released statistics indicating that approx. 320 armed Mexican authorities had crossed the border since 2004. Another incident, on June 26, further exacerbated relations when a Mexican law enforcement helicopter allegedly fired two shots at USBP in Arizona, approx. 100 m away from the border. Mexican officials stated that the helicopter was on a mission to detain criminals and blamed them for firing the shots. The Federal Bureau of Investigation launched an investigation. According to US Customs and Border Protection, between 10/01/13 and August, 68,541 unaccompanied alien children, an increase of 77 percent compared to the previous fiscal year, crossed the southwest border illegally. Most of them came from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. In reaction to the so-called "urgent humanitarian situation", US President Barack Obama established an inter-agency group on June 2. The presidents of the US, Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador published a joint statement on July 25, acknowledging their shared responsibility and promising to work together to handle the immigration crisis. US Republicans accused the Obama administration of causing the crisis, arguing that Obama's executive order had enabled a delayed deportation of illegally immigrated children under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. In response, the Obama administration blamed the influx of immigrants on gang violence in Central America and promised relief programs worth USD 93 million to reduce poverty and violence in Central America. On November 20, Obama announced a series of executive orders extending DACA's scope and range to include illegal immigrants who had arrived prior to 10/01/01.

[swa](#)

VENEZUELA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent conflict over system and national power between the opposition, primarily composed of student organizations and a number of political parties, and the government led by President Nicolás Maduro continued.

In the course of the year, violence between opposition and pro-government supporters left more than 40 people dead and approx. 675 injured. Tensions began to rise in January in Mérida state and triggered demonstrations in San Cristóbal, capital of Táchira state. Protests subsequently spread nationwide affecting 16 of the 23 states. National Police (GNB) and government-endorsed left-wing paramilitaries, so-called

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colectivos, intervened in the protests.

In February, small groups of students blocked roads and burned tires in the states of Táchira and Mérida to protest the high levels of violence, inflation, food shortages, and the release of detained protesters.

On February 6, approx. 70 pro-opposition students attacked the governor's house in Táchira with Molotov cocktails, stones, and bottles, damaging the house and injuring twelve policemen. Mass protests paralyzed most of the country from February 12 to 14. On February 12, approx. 50,000 demonstrators, mostly students, participated in a march organized by Leopoldo López, a right-wing opposition leader, during the 200th "Day of the Youth" celebration in the capital Caracas. Clashes between pro- and anti-government protesters left three people (two opposition and one pro-government demonstrator) dead and more than 20 injured.

A colectivo member reportedly fatally shot one of the pro-opposition protesters. Similar events took place in the states of Mérida, Carabobo, and Aragua. Hundreds of riot police fired tear gas and used water cannon to disperse the protests. Maduro banned street demonstrations and accused the opposition and the USA of plotting a coup against him as well as of having initiated the protests [→ USA – Venezuela]. A month later, rival demonstrators protested in Valencia, Carabobo, and in eastern Caracas. Colectivos shot dead two people. Clashes between police using tear gas and stone and petrol bomb throwing protesters left several people injured.


On October 1, Robert Serra, member of the National Assembly for the ruling Socialist Party (PSUV), and his partner were assassinated in their home in Caracas. Maduro accused the right-wing opposition and Colombian paramilitaries of the murder. A week later, when special police force, CICPC, raided the headquarters of the colectivo Shield of the Revolution in Caracas, they clashed with pro-government colectivo paramilitaries. In the shootout, five people died and four were injured. Among the dead was José Odreman, affiliated with Serra and leader of the colectivo coalition 5th of March. On October 24, Maduro announced Interior Minister Miguel Rodríguez Torres's resignation, reportedly due to 5th of March's pressure.

On February 18, López, accused of instigating the opposition protests, turned himself over to the national guard at a large opposition march in Caracas. He was formally charged with arson, criminal incitement, and conspiracy two months later. López's release was part of the opposition's demands for resuming peace negotiations. Beginning in April, the moderate opposition coalition Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD) held several rounds of unsuccessful talks with the government under the mediation of UNASUR and a papal representative. MUD's demands to resume peace talks included the participation of student representatives, the passing of an amnesty law for political prisoners, and the formation of a national truth commission.

jca, swa

ASIA AND OCEANIA

VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2014



REGIONAL PANORAMA

As in previous years, Asia accounted for the most conflicts among the five regions with a total of 127, thus covering almost 30 percent of all conflicts in 2014. Six highly violent conflicts were observed, among them the intrastate war in Pakistan, which remained for the eighth consecutive year on a highly violent level [→ Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)]. Both the number of limited wars and the number of wars decreased by one compared to 2013. The 2013 war over secession between the MNLF and the Philippine government de-escalated by three levels [→ Philippines (MNLF)]. The conflict between Pakistan and India escalated to a limited war for the first time since 2004. The heaviest clashes erupted in October along the Line of Control, displacing around 20,000 residents in the border area. In China, the conflict with the Uyghur minority spread further into the Eastern provinces and escalated to a limited war [→ China (Uyghurs / Xinjiang)].

In 2014, two violent conflicts erupted, one of them between Naga and Assamese Adivasi communities along the border of the Indian states Assam and Nagaland, and the other between opposition groups and the government of the Republic of China (ROC) [→ India (Nagas – Assamese Adivasis); China (Taiwan – opposition groups)]. In Papua New Guinea, the conflict over the status and resources of the island Bougainville resumed on the level of a Dispute. The parties conflicted over advancing negotiations for the reopening of the controversial Panguna copper mine [→ Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)]. In Sri Lanka, the dispute between Eelam Tamils and Muslims ended with the former adversaries aligning in their pursuit of equal rights [→ Sri Lanka (Tamils – Muslims)].

East Asia remained the subregion with the highest quantity of interstate conflicts. As in 2013, maritime territorial conflicts were a source of tensions. Between Japan and its Chinese and Korean neighbors, territorial claims became increasingly part of a broader conflict over conceptions of national history. Despite this, Japan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) resumed dialog in November. Crises over territory and international power continued also between the PRC and its neighbors India, Philippines, and Vietnam, who enhanced cooperation among each other as well as with the USA and Japan. In September, China and India engaged in the largest border standoff since 1964, involving more than 1,000 troops on each side. In the South China Sea, the stationing of a Chinese oil platform was followed by fatal riots in Vietnam, which prompted the evacuation of several thousand Chinese citizens. Interstate conflicts over regional power converged in the Sino-American relationship, which continued to experience tensions over cybertheft, Chinese actions in the East and South China Sea, and US weapon sales to the ROC [→ China (Taiwan)]. However, the US and the PRC increased cooperation with regard to economic exchange and emission reductions. On the Korean peninsula, the situation remained tense with exchange of warning fire across the border and North Korean missile launches. In Central Asia, the interstate conflict over street construction plans in the Fergana Valley between border guards turned violent, frequently involving civilians [→ Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan – Tajikistan (border communities / Fergana Valley)].

Conflicts between governments and civilian opposition groups over both system and national power were observed in 16 countries. Six of them reached the level of a violent crisis. In Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Pakistan, various opposition groups united in broad coalitions against their governments and faced crackdowns with lethal consequences. In India, during the Lok Sabha elections as well as during the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly elections, militants attacked several polling stations and security personnel [→ India (JeM et al. / Kashmir)]. In Bangladesh, the Awami League was re-elected despite opposition boycott [→ Bangladesh (opposition)]. In Pakistan, Tahirul Qadri aligned his anti-corruption movement with the opposition party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf. The two groups organized parallel protest marches to the capital [→ Pakistan (opposition)]. In Thailand, clashes between so-called Yellow Shirts and Red Shirts further intensified until May 20, when the military imposed martial law and staged a coup d'État two days later [→ Thailand (opposition)]. In Kyrgyzstan and in Taiwan, opposition groups protested against extensive trade agreements with Russia and the PRC, respectively. While no threats of violence were observed in the ongoing conflicts in Fiji, Kazakhstan, the Maldives, Myanmar, and Nepal, they remained tense in the cases of PRC, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In the PRC, leader Xi Jinping extended his anti-corruption campaign into the highest levels of the party and the military, culminating in the expulsion of former general Xu Caihou and former security chief Zhou Yongkang from the party.

Conflicts over secession or autonomy persisted most prominently in the PRC, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines. In northeast India, militant secessionist groups remained active in Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Nagaland. Particularly in Assam, the government responded with additional deployment of security forces. In southern central India, Telangana split from Andhra Pradesh to be established as India's 29th state [→ India (TJAC / Telangana)]. Demands for increased autonomy were voiced in Hong Kong, Siberia, and in Tajik Gorno-Badakhshan. In Nepal, negotiations between the government and autonomy-seeking groups were affected by the unresolved issue of federalism in the constitution-making process [→ Nepal (Kiratis / Kosi, Mechi, Sagarmatha); Nepal (Madheshis / Terai)]. The secession conflict in Thailand's southern border provinces remained violent with Thai military allegedly distributing weapons to militias.

Violent conflicts between ethnic or tribal groups were observed in several parts of Asia and Oceania. In Papua New Guinea, several highland tribes engaged in fighting, while violence in Pakistan between various ethnic groups and affiliated gangs concentrated on the country's biggest city, Karachi [→ Pakistan (inter-ethnic violence / Sindh)]. Northeast India saw an increase of attacks along ethnic lines especially due to activities of the Bodo militant faction led by I.K. Songbjit, which heavily assailed Bengalis and Santhals [→ India (Bodos, Assamese – Biharis, Bengalis); India (NDFB-S – Santhals / Assam)].

Ideological conflicts were mostly fought along religious lines, with ongoing attacks by Maoist militants in India being one of the few exceptions [→ India (Naxalites)]. In the PRC, government campaigns against Christians and religious sects turned violent [→ China (Christians); China (Falun Gong et al.)]. Bangladesh saw religious tensions increase with Jamaat-e-Islami party supporters attacking hundreds of Hindus shortly after the national elections [→ Bangladesh (opposition)]. Post-election violence along religious lines was also observed in India [→ India (Hindus – Muslims); India (Hindus – Christians)]. In Myanmar and Sri Lanka, Buddhist groups continued their attacks on Muslim and Christian minorities.


Conflicts with Islamists in Asia were affected by developments around the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq [→ Syria (opposition groups); Iraq (IS et al.)]. Several groups pledged allegiance to IS, such as Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and IMU in

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
Tajikistan. After an attack on the Karachi airport in Pakistan, the government commenced the military operation “Zarb-e-Azb”, focussing on the FATA region. Reportedly, Uyghur militants from the PRC were killed in the operation as well. Air strikes were further increased after Taliban killed 145 civilians in a school attack in Peshawar on December 16.

Socioeconomic conflicts were observed in all Asian subregions. While protests in Bangladesh and Cambodia mainly revolved around minimum wages and working conditions in the textile industry, other crises were fueled by intense resource extraction and pollution [→ China (Inner Mongolia); China (Tibet); Indonesia (Papua); Kyrgyzstan (Kumtor Gold Mine); Myanmar (farmers et al. / Sagaing Region); Papua New Guinea (socioeconomic protests)]. In PRC, Papua New Guinea, and Samoa, land rights conflicts figured prominently. Water conflicts were observed on both intra- and interstate level, with hydrodam projects causing tensions between the states around the Tibetan plateau [→ China – India; Pakistan – India; Uzbekistan – Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan). (ska, jfr, iro, ste, cwl)

CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2014 COMPARED TO 2013



FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT ITEMS IN 2014 IN ASIA AND OCEANIA BY INTENSITY GROUPS



ASIA AND OCEANIA

Overview: Conflicts in Asia and Oceania in 2014

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts)*	PCJSS-MN Larma, PCJSS-Santu Larma, UPDF vs. government	autonomy	1971	•	1
Bangladesh (inter-militant violence / Chittagong Hill Tracts)*	PCJSS-Santu Larma vs. PCJSS-MN Larma vs. UPDF	subnational predominance	1997	•	3
Bangladesh (Islamist groups)*	JMB, HuJI-B, Hel vs. government	system/ideology	2004	•	3
Bangladesh (opposition)	BNP, Jel vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1991	•	3
Bangladesh (RMG workers)	RMG workers vs. government	other	2006	•	3
Cambodia (opposition movement)	civil society groups, CNRP vs. CPP	system/ideology, national power, resources	1997	•	3
Cambodia – Vietnam*	Cambodia vs. Vietnam	territory	1969	•	1
China (Christians)	Christians, house churches vs. government	system/ideology	1949	↗	3
China (Falun Gong et al.)	Church of Almighty God, Falun Gong vs. government	system/ideology	1999	↗	3
China (Han – Hui – Tibetans)*	Tibetans vs. Hui vs. Han	subnational predominance	1949	↘	2
China (Hong Kong pro-democracy groups)	ATD, HKFS, OCLP et al. vs. government, SAR government	autonomy, system/ideology	1997	↗	3
China (Inner Mongolia)	Mongolian Ethnic minorities vs. government, Han Chinese	autonomy, subnational predominance, resources	1981	•	3
China (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology	1978	↗	2
China (socioeconomic protests)	environmentalists, migrant workers, peasants et al. vs. government	resources, other	1978	•	3
China (Taiwan – opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. ROC	system/ideology, other	2014	NEW	3
China (Taiwan)	ROC vs. pro-Taiwan independence groups vs. PRC	secession, system/ideology	1949	•	2
China (Tibet)	CTA, Tibetans, TYC vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources	1950	•	3
China (Uyghurs / Xinjiang)	ETIM, TIP, Uyghurs, WUC vs. government, Han	secession, system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	1949	↗	4
China – India	China vs. India	territory, international power, resources	1954	•	2
China – USA	PRC vs. USA	system/ideology, international power	1949	↘	1
China – Vietnam et al. (South China Sea)	Brunei vs. PRC vs. ROC vs. Malaysia vs. Vietnam vs. Philippines	territory, international power, resources	1949	•	3
Fiji (Indo-Fijians – indigenous Fijian ethnonationalists)*	Indo-Fijians vs. indigenous Fijians	subnational predominance	1970	•	1
Fiji (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1987	•	1
Fiji – Tonga (Minerva Reefs)*	Fiji vs. Tonga	territory	2005	•	1
India (Bodos, Assamese – Biharis, Bengalis)*	Bodos, NDFB-S, Assamese, ULFA-I vs. Bengalis, Biharis, AAMSU, ABMSU	subnational predominance	1981	•	3
India (GJM et al. / West Bengal)	GJM, UGPO, GNLF, AIGL vs. government	autonomy	1907	•	2
India (GNLA et al. / Meghalaya)*	GNLA, ANVC, ANVC-B, HNLC, UALA, LAEF, AMEF, ATF, ASAK, ANLA et al. vs. government	secession	1988	•	3
India (Hindus – Christians)*	Hindus, Shiv Sena, VHP, Bajrang Dal vs. Christians	subnational predominance	1999	•	3
India (Hindus – Muslims)	Hindus vs. Muslims	subnational predominance	1947	•	3
India (HPC-D / Mizoram, Manipur, Assam)	HPC-D vs. government	secession	1986	•	2
India (inter-factional violence / Nagaland)	NCSN-K, ZUV vs. NSCN-IM vs. NSCN-KK	subnational predominance	1988	•	3
India (inter-militant violence / Meghalaya)*	GNLA vs. AMEF, ANVC, ANVC-B, UALA vs. LAEF vs. ANLA	subnational predominance	1992	↗	3
India (Islamist militant groups)*	JeM, LeT, HM, SIMI vs. government	system/ideology	2000	•	3
India (JeM et al. / Kashmir)	LeT, HM, JeM, HuM vs. government	secession	1947	↘	3

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Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
India (Manipur)*	KCP-factions, UPPK et al., UNLF, RPF/PLA, PREPAK-pro, PREPAK, MPLF, KYKL, KNLF vs. government	secession	1964	•	3
India (Nagas – Assamese Adivasis)	Nagas, NSCN-IM, NSCN-KK vs. AANLA, AASAA, AASU, AJYCP, Assamese Adivasis, ATASU	subnational predominance	2014	NEW	3
India (Nagas – Kukis)*	NSCN, UNPC vs. KLA, KNA, KNF	subnational predominance	1947	↘	1
India (Naxalites)	CPI-M vs. government	system/ideology	1997	•	3
India (NDFB-S – Santhals / Assam)	Bodos, NDFB-S vs. NSLA, Santhals, STF	subnational predominance	1994	↑	4
India (NLFT, ATTF / Tripura)*	ATTF, NLFT vs. government	secession	1978	•	3
India (NSCN et al. / Nagaland)*	NNC, NNC-NA, NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, NSCN-KK, UNC, ZUF vs. government	secession	1947	•	3
India (PULF)*	PULF vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1993	•	2
India (Sikhs – DSS)*	Sikhs vs. DSS	system/ideology	2007	•	3
India (Sikhs)	BKI, Dal Khalsa, KLF, KTF, KZF, Shiromani Akali Dal vs. government	autonomy	1947	↗	2
India (TJAC / Telangana)	TJAC vs. government	autonomy	1969	•	3
India (ULFA et al. / Assam)	DJNA, KPLT, NDFB-S, RNLF, RNSF, ULFA-I, UPLA, KLO vs. government	secession	1979	•	3
Indonesia (Ahmadiyya)	Ahmadiyya vs. government, Sunni radicals	system/ideology	1980	↘	2
Indonesia (Islamist militant groups)	JAT, JI, Lintas Tanzim vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1981	•	3
Indonesia (KPA, Partai Aceh / Aceh)*	KPA, Partai Aceh vs. government	autonomy, resources	1953	•	1
Indonesia (KPA, Partai Aceh – Irwandi camp / Aceh)*	Irwandi Camp, PNA vs. KPA, Partai Aceh	subnational predominance, resources	2006	↑	3
Indonesia (Muslims – Christians / Moluccas)*	Muslims vs. Christians	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1998	↑	3
Indonesia (Muslims – Christians / Sulawesi)*	Muslims vs. Christians	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1998	↘	2
Indonesia (Papua)	KNPB, OPM vs. government	secession, resources	1961	•	3
Indonesia – Timor-Leste*	Indonesia vs. Timor-Leste	territory, other	2002	•	1
Japan – China	PRC vs. ROC vs. Japan	territory, international power, resources, other	1971	•	2
Japan – Russia	Japan vs. Russia	territory, international power	1945	↗	2
Japan – South Korea	Japan vs. ROK	territory, other	1951	•	2
Kazakhstan (Islamist militant groups)*	Djund al-Khalifat, Islamist militant groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	↘	1
Kazakhstan (opposition groups)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2004	↘	1
Kyrgyzstan (Kumtor Gold Mine)*	mine workers vs. government	system/ideology, resources	2009	↓	1
Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz – Uzbeks)*	ethnic Kyrgyz vs. ethnic Uzbeks	subnational predominance, resources	1990	↓	1
Kyrgyzstan (opposition)	opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2005	↗	3
Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan – Tajikistan (border communities / Fergana Valley)	Tajikistan vs. Kyrgyzstan vs. Uzbekistan	territory, international power	2000	•	3
Laos (Christians)*	Christians vs. government	system/ideology	1975	•	2
Laos (Hmong, royalists)*	Hmong, royalists vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1975	•	2
Malaysia (Malay – Chinese, Indian and indigenous Malaysians)*	Malay Malaysians vs. Chinese Malaysians, Indian Malaysian, indigenous Malaysians	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1946	•	2
Malaysia (opposition movement)*	Berish, Pakatan Rakyat vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1969	↘	2
Malaysia (Sulu Sultanate supporters / Lahad Datu district)	Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo vs. government	secession	2013	•	3
Malaysia – Indonesia, Philippines (immigrants)*	Malaysia vs. Indonesia vs. Philippines	other	1998	•	2
Maldives (opposition)*	MDP vs. government	national power	2011	↓	1

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Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Myanmar (Arakan Liberation Army, NUFA / Rakhine State)*	Arakan Liberation Army, NUFA vs. government	secession	1948	•	1
Myanmar (Buddhists – Rohingyas / Rakhine State)*	Buddhists vs. Rohingyas	subnational predominance, other	2012	•	3
Myanmar (CNA, CNF / Chin State)*	CNA, CNF vs. government	secession	1988	•	1
Myanmar (farmers et al. / Sagaing Region)*	farmers, students et al. vs. government	resources, other	2012	•	3
Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)	KIA, KIO vs. government	autonomy, resources	1961	•	4
Myanmar (KNPP, KnA, KNLP / Kayah State)*	KnA, KNLP, KNPP vs. government	autonomy	1948	•	2
Myanmar (KNU, KNLA, DKBA / Kayin State, Kayah State)	DKBA, KNLA, KNU vs. government	autonomy	1948	•	3
Myanmar (MNLA, NMSP / Mon State, Kayin State)*	MNLA, NMSP vs. government	secession	1948	•	1
Myanmar (opposition movement)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1962	↘	1
Myanmar (Rohingyas, ARNO / Rakhine State)*	ARNO, Rohingyas vs. government	other	1948	•	1
Myanmar (SSA / Shan State)*	SSA-N, SSA-S vs. government	autonomy	1952	•	3
Myanmar (UWSA, NDAA / Shan State)	NDAA, UWSA vs. government	autonomy	1988	•	2
Nepal (former PLA members)*	former PLA members vs. government	other	2008	•	1
Nepal (Kiratis / Kosi, Mechi, Sagarmatha)*	FLSC, KMMS, KNF, LNFL, SLRP vs. government	autonomy	1992	↘	2
Nepal (Madheshis / Terai)	ATTM, JTMM, JTMM factions, MJF, MRJP, TSJP vs. government	autonomy	2004	↘	2
Nepal (opposition)*	government vs. opposition	system/ideology, national power	2008	↘	1
Nepal (right-wing Hindu groups)*	BHYF, NDA, RPPN vs. government	system/ideology	2006	↘	1
Nepal – Bhutan*	Nepal vs. Bhutan	other	1985	•	1
North Korea – South Korea	DPRK vs. ROK	territory, system/ideology, international power	1948	•	2
North Korea – USA, South Korea, Japan	DPRK vs. Japan, ROK, USA	system/ideology, international power, other	1990	•	2
Pakistan (BLA et al. / Balochistan)*	BLA, BLF, BNM, BNP, BRA, BRP, UBA vs. government	secession, resources	1948	•	3
Pakistan (inter-ethnic violence / Sindh)	Mohajirs, MQM vs. Pakhtuns, ANP vs. Balochs, Sindhis, PPP	subnational predominance	1947	↘	3
Pakistan (inter-Islamist violence)*	TTP vs. AI vs. LI vs. TNSM vs. AMNAM	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2010	↘	3
Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)	al-Qaeda, TTP, Haqqani Network, LI, IMU vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2001	•	5
Pakistan (opposition)	PAT, PTI vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1998	•	3
Pakistan (Sunni militants – religious groups)	TTP, LeJ, Jundullah, Jal vs. Ahmadiyya, Christians, Hindus, Shiites	subnational predominance	1985	↘	3
Pakistan (Taliban – tribes)	TTP, LI vs. various tribes, tribal militias	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2001	•	3
Pakistan – India	Pakistan vs. India	territory, international power, resources	1947	↗	4
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	customary landowners, MDF, veterans, women groups vs. Meekamui Tribal Government, MGU vs. ABG, BCL, government	autonomy, resources, other	1964	•	1
Papua New Guinea (highlanders – lowlanders)*	highlanders vs. lowlanders	subnational predominance	1975	↓	1
Papua New Guinea (opposition)	opposition vs. government	national power, other	2011	↗	2
Papua New Guinea (socioeconomic protests)	customary landowners, women groups vs. government, resource companies	resources, other	1995	•	3
Papua New Guinea (tribal violence)	Alia, Homaria, Linabini, Mapulu, Paibali, Pokoli	subnational predominance, resources	1975	•	3

ASIA AND OCEANIA

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Philippines (Abu Sayyaf)	Abu Sayyaf Group vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1991	•	3
Philippines (BIFM, BIFF – MILF, government)	BIFF, BIFM vs. government, MILF	secession, subnational predominance	2008	•	4
Philippines (CPP, NPA)*	CPP, NPA vs. government	system/ideology	1968	•	3
Philippines (MILF – MNLF)*	MILF vs. MNLF	subnational predominance	2009	•	3
Philippines (MILF)	MILF vs. government	secession, system/ideology, resources	1977	↗	3
Philippines (MNLF)	MNLF vs. government	secession, system/ideology, resources	1969	↓	2
Samoa (landowner protests)*	customary landowners vs. government	other	1946	•	2
Singapore – Malaysia*	Singapore vs. Malaysia	territory	1963	•	1
Sri Lanka (Buddhists – Muslims, Christians)	BBS, JHU, JVP, Sinhalese Buddhists vs. Christians, Muslims, SLMC	system/ideology	1948	•	3
Sri Lanka (Muslims)*	Muslims, SMLC vs. government	other	1948	•	1
Sri Lanka (Upcountry Tamils)*	CWC, Upcountry Tamils vs. government	other	1948	•	1
Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakhshan)	drug traffickers, Pamiri people vs. government	autonomy, subnational predominance	2012	•	3
Tajikistan (Islamist militant groups)*	Hizb-ut-Tahrir, IMU, Jamaat Ansarullah, Jundullah, Tablig-i-Jamaat vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1997	↘	2
Tajikistan (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1997	•	2
Thailand (Islamist Separatists / Southern Border Provinces)	various Islamist separatists vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1902	•	3
Thailand (opposition)	PTP, UDD vs. PAD vs. RTAF	system/ideology, national power	2006	•	3
Thailand – Cambodia (border)*	Thailand vs. Cambodia	territory, international power	1954	•	2
Thailand – Myanmar	Myanmar vs. Thailand	territory, other	1948	•	1
Timor-Leste (FRETILIN – CNRT)*	FRETILIN vs. CNRT	national power	2006	•	1
Timor-Leste – Australia*	Timor-Leste vs. Australia	resources	2002	•	1
USA – Pakistan*	USA vs. Pakistan	other	2003	•	1
Uzbekistan (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1991	•	2
Uzbekistan – Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan vs. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan	international power, resources	2010	•	1
Vietnam (Montagnards)*	Montagnards vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1958	•	2

¹ ² ³ ⁴ cf. overview table for Europe

Please note: The intensity of each conflict as shown in the tables is the highest intensity reached in the course of the year. Therefore, conflicts may, for instance, be classified as limited wars although there may have been no more fighting in the second half of the year.

If a conflict revolves around a territory whose name is disputed by the conflict parties, both variations will be named, separated by an "/" [e.g. Japan – China (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands); Argentina – UK (Falkland Islands/Islands Malvinas)]. If, in contrast, the conflict actors strive for subnational predominance, secession, or autonomy of or in a certain region, the region is separated from the actors by " / " [e.g. France (FLNC / Corsica); Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)].

SELECTED CONFLICT DESCRIPTIONS

BANGLADESH (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1991**Conflict parties: BNP, Jel vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power, ideology and system between the opposition parties Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami (Jel) and the government continued as a violent crisis. BNP and Jel were supported by their student wings Bangladesh Jatiyotabadi Chhatradal (BJC) and Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS) respectively, while the ruling Awami League (AL) fought along with its student organization Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL).

BNP boycotted the 2014 general elections, while the Jel had already been banned from it by the authorities last year. Supporters of Jel and BNP clashed with followers of AL throughout the country during election day on January 5, resulting in the death of at least 19 people. More than 100 polling stations were attacked, some of them torched.

Shortly after the election, Jel activists destroyed Hindu temples and houses in Khulana, Chittagong, and Rajshahi divisions accusing the people that worshiped and lived there of supporting the government.

From March 19 to May 20, Jel and BNP took part in the sub-national Upazila elections. Government as well as opposition supporters attacked polling centers, leaving at least four people dead and over 100 injured. One Jel supporter died in a gun battle with the police in Noakhali, Chittagong. On May 4, BNP organized a hunger strike, claiming that over 300 of its members had been killed or vanished over the last year.

From January to May, Jel and the police clashed several times in Khulana, leaving six activists dead and 68 injured.

Throughout the year, ICS and BCL fought over supremacy at several universities. For instance, during clashes in January at Chittagong and Shahjalal University, Chittagong and Sylhet divisions, one opposition activist was killed, 32 people were injured, and cars and buildings were vandalized. On June 27, ICS members set a university bus on fire at Rajshahi University, Rajshahi. Throughout the year, ICS clashed with police forces in Khulana, Sylhet and Chittagong, resulting in the death of four ICS activists. 29 persons, including at least six policemen, were injured.

In 2014, Jel leaders Motiur Rahman Nizami, Khokon Razakar, Syed Mohammed Kaiser and Azharul Islam were sentenced to death for crimes during the 1971 liberation war. On September 17, the appellate division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court commuted the death sentence against Jel Vice-President Delwar Hossain Sayedee to life-long imprisonment. On September 18 and 21, Jel called for countrywide general strikes. Clashes between Jel and AL supporters followed after the verdicts all over the country, leaving around 30 persons injured.

On September 22, BNP and its aligned parties staged a countrywide general strike against the newly adopted 16th Amendment of the constitution, which allowed the parliament to remove Supreme Court judges from office. [maw](#)

BANGLADESH (RMG WORKERS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**Conflict parties: RMG workers vs. government
Conflict items: other

The conflict over working-conditions and payment of wages between ready-made garment workers (RMG) and the government continued as a violent crisis.

RMG workers staged several protests in Gazipur, eponymous district, a town in the industrial belt around the capital Dhaka, as well as in the Chittagong division. As in previous years, security breaches in factory buildings led to several lethal accidents, mainly due to fire outbreaks.

On January 4 and 8, 45 workers and 13 policemen were injured in clashes between over 8,000 protesting garment workers and the police at the Chittagong Export Processing Zone. After a worker had died, protesters vandalized factories and damaged machines. They demanded to be paid according to the new minimum wage introduced in December 2013. On January 14, 2,000 workers protested for the same reason in Dhaka.

In the course of the year, RMG workers vandalized factories on similar occasions in Chittagong and Gazipur, claiming that they had not been paid for months.

On May 29, RMG workers blocked the Dhaka-Mymensingh Highway and damaged a factory building after one worker's suicide. Police dispersed the protesters, injuring five of them.

On August 8, police used water cannon and tear gas to clear a factory in Dhaka, where 1,500 workers were staging an eleven day hunger strike to claim overdue wages.

Meanwhile, legal proceedings continued against the factory owners, who were held responsible for the industrial accidents of the Tazreen Fashion factory fire in Ashulia on 12/24/12 and the Rana Plaza collapse in Savar on 04/24/2013. In February, the bail applications of the Tazreen Fashion owners, Delwar Hossain and Mahmuda Akter, were rejected. However, the high court granted bail to Rana Plaza owner Sohel Rana in one of several pending cases against him. Consequently, several hundreds of workers protested against the court's decision. On the anniversary of the Rana Plaza collapse, thousands of survivors and victims' family members demonstrated in front of the ruins, demanding both compensation and punishment of Rana. [maw](#)

CAMBODIA (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1997**Conflict parties: civil society groups, CNRP vs. CPP
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power, resources

The violent conflict between the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) as well as unions and civil society groups, on the one hand, and the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP), on the other, continued.

On January 2, special forces violently ended a nationwide strike by tens of thousands of garment workers over higher

minimum wages, killing five and injuring dozens. Small-scale strikes continued throughout the year. The minimum wage for garment workers was set to USD 128 per month in November, but remained twelve dollars below the minimum wage demanded by unions. In connection with the January strikes, security forces also cleared Phnom Penh Freedom Park, where protesters had occupied the square for several days. On January 4, authorities imposed a one-month ban on demonstrations. On July 15, opposition activists protested against the district security guards' continuous blockade of the park, resulting in violent clashes.

Several opposition members, including elected MPs, were arrested on charges of holding illegal demonstrations and insurrectionary activities. One week later, the most prominent were released on bail as part of a political deal between CNRP leader Sam Rainsy and CPP leader and Prime Minister Hun Sen. On July 22, after ten months of political deadlock in the aftermath of the 2013 national elections, the two leaders reached an agreement. It included the establishment of an opposition television station, the reorganization of the National Election Commission, the creation of a parliamentary minority leader position for Rainsy, and the transfer of control over half of the parliamentary commissions to CNRP. As a result, the 55 CNRP lawmakers took up their seats in Parliament in early August. However, no final agreement was reached with regards to the reorganization of the National Election Commission. In December, the National Assembly amended its internal rules to recognize the opposition leader as minority leader. Royalist party FUNCINPEC announced its return to political stage with former PM Prince Norodom Ranariddh resuming his post as chairman. On December 31, the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training reported that 276 strikes took place throughout the year, compared to 418 in 2013. som

CHINA (CHRISTIANS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: Christians, house churches vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The conflict over religious freedom between Christian groups and the government escalated to the level of a violent crisis. Throughout the year, local authorities raided house church meetings and summer camps. Contrary to previous years, authorities increasingly targeted members of the officially sanctioned Protestant and Catholic church organizations. Accompanying the government's increase of anti-Foreign and anti-Christian rhetoric, local authorities demolished hundreds of Protestant and Catholic churches, mainly in the provinces of Zhejiang, Shandong, Guangzhou, and Anhui. Reportedly, authorities in Zhejiang ordered the demolition of more than hundred churches. Police seized bibles and ordered churches to remove their crosses.

On January 1, local police raided the meeting of a house church and detained nine members in Urumqi, capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. At the end of January, police arrested at least 15 members of the Holy Love Fellowship house church in the capital Beijing. Two months later, the house church supported a petitioner from Anhui and was harassed by "black guards", people hired by local authorities to intercept petitioners on their way to the State Bureau for Letters and Visits [→ China (socioeconomic protests)]. On

March 1, local officials assaulted a Christian and confiscated his bible in Qu County, Sichuan. At the end of April, 1,000 police officers demolished the Sanjiang Church in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province, after church members had refused to remove its cross. About 5,000 Christians gathered in defense of the church. On July 20, authorities interrupted a meeting of 40 Orchard Garden house church members in Beijing, taking participants to the police station and confiscating and destroying church property. On June 25, 30 police officers detained 22 house church members, who had gathered in a factory in Cao County, Shandong. On the same day, a 4,000-strong police force ensured the removal of two crosses from a church in Taizhou, Zhejiang. On August 4, government officials shut down a house church's summer camp in Jianzai, Anhui. On September 21, at least 200 police officers raided a house church and arrested more than 100 Christians in Foshan, Guangdong. The same month, authorities detained 36 Christians in Liangshan, Sichuan province. As in previous years, authorities rounded up several Christians during Christmas. In many places, bans were imposed on the celebration of foreign festivals. On Christmas Eve, local police in Liangzhong, Sichuan, raided a house church, detaining three people for five to twelve days. asc

CHINA (FALUN GONG ET AL.)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1999**

Conflict parties: Church of Almighty God, Falun Gong vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The conflict over ideology between religious groups, such as Falun Gong and the Church of Almighty God, and the government escalated to the level of a violent crisis. Following large scale protests by Falun Gong members in the government district in the capital Beijing in April 1999, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued legislation banning "heretic cult organizations" in October the same year.

On March 20, four human rights lawyers and 38 Falun Gong supporters gathered in front of a center for "legal education" in the city of Jiansanjiang, Heilongjiang province, shouting Falun Gong slogans and protesting against the detention of group members. Police arrested eleven persons and sentenced them to administrative detention between five and 15 days. As in previous years, Falun Gong continued to accuse the government of harvesting the organs of its members.

The Church of Almighty God, also known as Eastern Lightning, was founded in the early 1990s by Zhao Weishan. Having already banned the group in 1995, the Ministry of Public Security named the Church of Almighty God as one of 14 "evil cults" on a list that was released to the media in June. The group first received widespread media attention in 2012 when it prophesied an apocalypse to occur on 12/21/12. On 12/18/12 the police detained over 500 members nationwide for spreading rumors about the impending end of the world. On May 28, members of the group beat a woman to death in Zhaoyuan, Shandong province after failing to proselytize her. During a two-month nationwide campaign against the group, which started in June, the Chinese public security organs arrested close to 1,000 suspected members. On November 28, the Shandong Higher People's Court sentenced two of the five assailants of the May 28 attack to death and three to prison terms. edit

CHINA (HONG KONG PRO-DEMOCRACY GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: ATD, HKFS, OCLP et al. vs. government, SAR government

Conflict items: autonomy, system/ideology

The conflict over system and autonomy between Hong Kong's pro-democracy groups and the governments of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Hong Kong (HK) Special Administrative Region (SAR) escalated to a violent crisis. The pro-democracy activists assembled in various organizations, such as the Alliance for True Democracy (ATD), Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP), and the HK Federation of Students. They demanded universal suffrage for the election of the Chief Executive and freedom of press on the basis of the HK Basic Law. The pro-democracy groups faced opposition by pro-Beijing groups such as the Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD).

The ATD frequently organized protests, involving over 6,000 people on January 1 and 154,000 on July 1. On January 1 and June 20, OCLP initiated an official and unofficial referendum on constitutional reform, culminating in 62,000 and 787,000 votes, respectively. Chief Secretary for Administration Carrie Lam dismissed both referendums.

On February 23, 4,000 journalists pressed for freedom of the media in HK. Three days later, assailants stabbed journalist and PRC-critic Kevin Lau in Eastern District. Thousands took to the streets in protest over the attack. In early March, PRC Premier Li Keqiang reiterated the so-called "one country, two systems" principle. On April 6, while Beijing warned the USA not to interfere with HK's affairs, US Vice President Joe Biden met with the founder of HK's Democratic Party Martin Lee. In May, Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying stated that the HK riot police, 10,000 strong, would intervene if an occupation of the central district on July 1 were to take place. On June 4, 180,000 people attended the 25th annual Tiananmen Square commemoration in HK. Six days later, the PRC's White Paper reiterated that Beijing would maintain full authority over HK. On July 1, riot police attempted to break up peaceful pro-democratic sit-ins at the central business district, arresting 511 protesters. On July 17, Leung formally asked Beijing to permit democratic reforms but offered no clear proposals. By July 28, APD's signature campaign against OCLP reportedly gathered a million signatures. In August, the APD organized protests against OCLP, reportedly mobilizing 111,800 people. On August 31, after the PRC's National People's Congress Standing Committee decided that the HK chief executive should be selected by an unelected nominating committee, OCLP stepped up its protests and students boycotted their classes. On September 26, riot police arrested 70 students who had entered the closed-off Civic Square. Two days later, clashes left dozens of protesters and six officers injured, with the police using tear gas, batons, and pepper spray. Four days later, protest leaders announced October 1 was the deadline for electoral reforms and Leung's resignation. Leung rejected the demands, but offered talks between the protesters and the SAR government. However, he later canceled the offer, which led to renewed protests and clashes with riot police throughout October and November. On November 26, seven police officers were arrested for having beaten a protester. On December 11, thousands of police forces dismantled

the last pro-democracy protest camps, arresting about 250 protesters. However, they returned on December 24, and riot police arrested 37 protesters. On December 31, OCLP supporters released yellow balloons symbolizing the call for universal suffrage. kol

CHINA (INNER MONGOLIA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1981**

Conflict parties: Mongolian Ethnic minorities vs. government, Han Chinese

Conflict items: autonomy, subnational predominance, resources

The conflict in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) over resources, subnational predominance, and autonomy between Mongolian ethnic minorities, on the one side, and Han Chinese and the government, on the other, remained violent. Mongolian herders staged several protests and sit-ins against land expropriation, forced relocations, mining projects, and the extension of military bases.

On January 9, herders from different parts of Urad Middle Banner protested in front of a local government building in Haliut Town, demanding the return of their grazing lands. Two days later, police raided the homes of several herders from the banner, arresting five people. From March 22 to 23, Premier Li Keqiang visited the IMAR, stating his commitment to sustainable development and the improvement of local infrastructure. A few days later, about a hundred herders protested in front of the government building in the IMAR capital Hohhot and hundreds of police officers forcefully dispersed them. On March 31, after more than 100 herders from Urad Front Banner and Urad Rare Banner staged a protest, the police arrested 39 and beat up several in the city of Bayannuur. On April 12, police forcefully arrested 40 herders protesting against a coal transportation company. Four days later, about 150 herders from Heshigten Banner staged a sit-in-protest in front of a mining company. More than 200 riot police forces arrested eight protesters in the ensuing crackdown. On April 21, 130 herders went to Beijing to complain about their forced relocation. On May 4, about hundred Mongolian herders from Ezenee Banner demonstrated in the banner's capital against the Lanzhou military base expansion and immigration from the neighboring province Gansu. On August 21, herders protested the Zhurihe Combined Tactics Training Base. Authorities detained one of them. On September 29, police forcefully detained a herder in West Ujimqin Banner. After 400 herders had protested in Huvuut-shar Banner on October 8, local authorities promised the herders a subsidy for livestock hay and fodder, as well as the payment of outstanding compensation. On November 8, a Chinese mining truck reportedly killed a herder in Abag Banner by running over him and his horse. On December 9, the government released prominent Mongolian activist Hadda after almost 20 years of prison. asc

CHINA (SOCIOECONOMIC PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1978**

Conflict parties: environmentalists, migrant workers, peasants et al. vs. government

Conflict items: resources, other

The violent crisis over social and economic resources between peasants, migrant workers, environmentalists, microbloggers, and other civilians, on the one hand, and government authorities, on the other, continued. People engaged in illegal protests against pollution, corruption, land grabs, substandard working conditions, and restrictive urban management, thereby contesting the government's economic growth and social stability maintenance policies. Although the Chinese Communist Party proclaimed there would be better compensation for evicted farmers in documents like the No.1 Central Document released on January 19, clashes between the evicted, the police, and firm representatives remained frequent. In some cases, evicted residents resorted to squatting in order to achieve compensation. Successful high-profile strikes and demonstrations served as models for subsequent protests.

Protesters actively obstructed industrial projects such as PX chemical plants and waste incinerators. For instance on March 30, about 1,000 protesters clashed with a few hundred policemen over the construction of a PX plant in Maoming City, Guangdong province, setting a vehicle on fire and smashing a police station. Police injured 15 people with batons and tear gas and detained eight. Protests against waste incinerators turned violent on two occasions, one in early May in Zhongtai Subdistrict, Zhejiang province and another in mid-September in Boluo County, Guangdong, leaving over 40 people injured, while 77 were arrested.

While the frequency of strikes for higher wages decreased, strikes over social insurance, pensions, and bonuses figured prominently. For instance, approx. 30,000 shoe factory workers of Yue Yuen Industrial Holdings went on strike in Guangdong from April 5 to 26 after having found out about the firm's low pension and insurance payments. Protesters clashed with a few hundred policemen and riot police, resulting in dozens of injuries and the detainment of ten people. From April 8 to 9 and September 18 to 22, in Daqing, Heilongjiang province, workers and their adult children of the SOE China National Petroleum protested the revocation of the firm's policy to employ the workers' children after university graduation. Up to 10,000 teachers went on strike in several villages east of Harbin City, Heilongjiang, over mandatory pilot pension fund payments from November 17 to 26 until salaries were raised.

On July 30, the State Council announced a reform of the hukou household registration system, which would allow rural residents to apply for urban resident permits in townships and smaller cities. In November, the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee decided to give farmers the right to transfer and mortgage their land-use rights and turn their rights into shares of evolving large-scale industrial projects. los

CHINA (TAIWAN – OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. ROC

Conflict items: system/ideology, other

A violent conflict over the political system erupted between opposition groups and the government of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. On 06/21/13, representatives of the ROC's Straits Exchange Foundation and the People's Republic of China's (PRC) Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits signed the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA). The signing sparked widespread concerns in Taiwan over the economic and political consequences of the agreement and dissatisfaction with what civic groups and students perceived to be a non-transparent negotiation process. Following public pressure, the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) and the opposing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) agreed on a clause-by-clause review in the Legislative Yuan and later on a series of public hearings on the CSSTA. On March 17, after the hearings' completion, KMT legislator Chang Ching-chung declared the end of the review process and announced the second reading of the agreement in the plenary session for March 21.

On March 18, protesters forcefully entered the building of the Legislative Yuan in the capital Taipei. Up to 400 protesters occupied the building until April 10 with several thousand supporters demonstrating in the vicinity. On March 23, a group of protesters attempted to occupy the Executive Yuan. Riot police forcefully removed them and used water cannon and batons against the demonstrators in front of the government buildings. In the process, at least 137 people were injured and 24 hospitalized. On March 30, following calls by the protesters for nation-wide participation, at least 100,000 people took to the streets in support of the occupation. The so-called "Sunflower Movement", made up of several student and civil society groups such as the pro-Taiwan independence Black Island Nation Youth Front, and the Democratic Front against Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement emerged from the occupation. Some of the prominent student leaders of the movement had been involved in activism on diverse issues such as land acquisition and the independence of the media over the previous years. Large scale protests in Taipei continued on April 26 and 27, when as many as 50,000 protesters demonstrated against the construction of a nuclear power plant on Taiwan.

In late June, protests by pro-independence opposition groups interrupted the visit of PRC Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun, who had to cancel three of his public appearances [→ China (Taiwan)]. Two students were injured in ensuing clashes with police.

Public discontent was reflected in the local elections held on November 29, causing KMT member and Prime Minister Jiang Yi-huah and his entire cabinet to resign on December 1. Two days later, the Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou resigned as chairman of the KMT. abr

CHINA (TAIWAN)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: ROC vs. pro-Taiwan independence groups vs. PRC

Conflict items: secession, system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over the political status of Taiwan between the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC), and pro-Taiwan independence groups continued. ROC's ruling party Kuomintang (KMT) promoted the political and economic advancement of cross-strait relations. The opposing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) reiterated its support for independence, but announced in January that it would reduce its opposition to a number of Taiwan's exchanges with Beijing. After some members proposed to shelve the Taiwan Independence Clause, a debate erupted within the DPP over the clause's benefits for the next presidential elections. Meanwhile, large-scale protests erupted over the 06/21/13 signing of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement, culminating in the occupation of the Legislative Yuan [→ China (Taiwan – opposition groups)]. Throughout the year, the ROC repeatedly accused the PRC of cyber attacks on its official websites as well as military espionage. It arrested several officials for spying, including retired Vice Admiral Ko Cheng-sheng.

On January 10, the PRC protested the DPP's pro-independence stance. On February 11, ROC Mainland Affairs Minister Wang Yu-chi and PRC's Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Zhang Zhijun met in Nanjing for the first official talks since 1949. They agreed to establish representative offices and strengthen economic ties. On May 5, PRC President Xi Jinping reiterated their rejection of Taiwan's independence to People First Party Chairman James Soong. On May 27, a bipartisan assembly, including former DPP chairman Shih Ming-teh, suggested the concept of Greater One China, urging the PRC and the ROC to form a "limited international entity". TAO stated that the PRC would not comment on it. On the other hand, DPP spokesperson Lin Chun-hsien stated that Taiwan's future lay solely with the people of Taiwan. On June 6, the DPP mayor of the special municipality Tainan Lai Ching-te visited the PRC for the first time to promote Tainan's culture and demonstrate the DPP's readiness for talks. On June 12, TAO stated that the sovereignty issue ought to be decided by all Chinese. The statement sparked popular protests and led Ma to reiterate that the issue could only be decided by the Taiwanese. From June 25 to 28, TAO Director Zhang paid an official visit to Taiwan. Pro-independence groups protested against the visit. Police injured two students in ensuing clashes. On September 26, President Xi advised ROC to accept the "one country, two systems" principle. Both the ROC government and the pro-independence groups rejected this. President Ma commented also on the pro-democracy protests in PRC's Special Administrative Region Hong Kong, which is subject to the principle [→ China (Hong Kong pro-democracy groups)]. He warned that Beijing's response to the protests could damage cross-strait relations and alienate the Taiwanese public. On December 9, PRC's President of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, Chen Deming, and his counterpart Lin Join-sane visited Taiwan to speak about economic cooperation. The pro-independence group Taiwan Solidarity Union protested Chen's stay. Throughout the year PRC and ROC updated their military in-

frastructure. The ROC introduced new surface-to-air-missiles, upgraded its fighter jet radar, discussed the purchase of F-35 stealth fighters, and asked the US for help in building submarines. The PRC on the other hand built new troop transports, developed the fighter jet Chengdu J-20, and introduced long range anti-ship cruise missiles to its arsenal. On December 11, the PRC protested the US sale of Perry-class frigates to Taiwan [→ China - USA]. kol

CHINA (TIBET)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1950**

Conflict parties: CTA, Tibetans, TYC vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy, system/ideology, resources

The violent crisis between Tibetans and the government over the status of the greater region of Tibet, its system, and resources continued. Throughout the year, twelve Tibetans set themselves on fire to protest Chinese rule in Tibetan populated areas. Tibetans demonstrated against forced land expropriation, labor market discrimination, and environmental degradation caused by mining activities and dam construction.

The government published 16 new rules to prevent self-immolations, establishing collective penalties for families and supporters of self-immolators. At the end of May, Chinese security services in Kardze/Ganzi County, Sichuan Province, forced area residents to participate in fire service drills, instructing them on how to stop self-immolation protests. On January 22, the official Tibet TV website announced that 2.3 million people in the TAR had been relocated in the course of the New Socialist Countryside project, which started in 2006. In January, Chinese authorities detained 20 Tibetans for their involvement in protests against a road project in Pondha Town, Sichuan. In March and April, several hundred Tibetans protested against the seizure of farmland for highway projects in Sangchu/Xiahe County, Gansu Province. On August 12, in Sershu/Shiqu County, Sichuan, police used tear gas and shot at Tibetan protesters demonstrating for the release of a village leader. Police killed five Tibetans and wounded twelve.

Authorities imposed severe restrictions on Tibetan religion and culture. Monasteries were forced to pledge loyalty to the ruling Chinese Communist Party. On January 2, authorities closed Dorgna, Tarmoe, and Rabten monastery in Driru/Biru County, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). On April 10, a private school for Tibetan monks in Dunda village, Pema/Banma County, Qinghai, was closed by authorities after being accused of encouraging separatist activities. Tibetan government officials were forbidden to attend the Kalachakra ceremony in June, a strongly monitored Buddhist ritual which was held at the Genden Choeling monastery in Tsoe/Hezuo City, Gansu province. In September, public officials launched a "rectification and cleansing" campaign against Tibetan Buddhist monasteries in Driru/Biru, destroying religious meeting places and expelling underage monks.

The Tibetan exile community remained split between autonomy and secession advocates. While the Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) in Dharamsala, India, adhered to their goal of genuine Tibetan autonomy and pursued the "Umaylam" / "Middle Way Approach", the Tibetan Youth Congress demanded full independence. As in previous years, the Chinese central government dismissed the possibility

of the Dalai Lama returning to China. Within the scope of a newly-launched counterterrorism campaign, it tightened border controls around TAR. Nevertheless, around 100 Tibetan refugees arrived in Dharamsala this year. In 2013, the CTA had given its consent to Tibetan applications for Indian citizenship. Since February, Tibetans with Indian citizenship also had the right to register as voters. In Nepal, the government further increased restrictions on Tibetan refugees, limiting their freedom of speech and public activities. ffa

CHINA (UYGHURS / XINJIANG)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: ETIM, TIP, Uyghurs, WUC vs. government, Han

Conflict items: secession, system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources

The conflict over ideology and the status of the resource-rich Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) between Uyghurs and the government escalated to a limited war. While Uyghurs are members of a Turkic Muslim minority mainly living in the XUAR, local and central authorities are dominated by ethnic Han Chinese. In the course of the year, more than 250 people were killed. Militant Uyghurs attacked police patrols and stations but increasingly targeted train stations and other public places, on some occasions outside the XUAR. Militants also assassinated several Uyghur government employees. The government launched anti-terror and strike hard campaigns, and passed several new regulations to restrict public religious practice, religious education, group activities, and online communication. Throughout the year, police forces staged numerous public anti-terror drills and raided the homes of Uyghurs, arresting hundreds of suspects and reportedly taking down 115 militant groups. Courts sentenced dozens of people to death. Following unrest, authorities occasionally resorted to curfews and temporary shutdowns of telecommunication and electricity.

As in previous years, tensions between Uyghurs and Han Chinese were fuelled by socioeconomic and environmental discrimination. Several Uyghur communities complained over pollution and water exploitation of mines and coal-to-gas plants moved to the XUAR. The government required companies to hire more Uyghurs and encouraged ethnic mingling through mixed marriages and interregional migration.

On January 24 and February 14, attacks on police stations and patrols in the counties of Xinhe and Wushi, XUAR, left 17 militants and at least three policemen injured. Also in February, the government announced it would more than double the XUAR's public security budget and dispatch 200,000 party cadres to improve responsiveness and grassroots surveillance. On March 1, eight Uyghurs armed with knives stabbed 29 civilians to death and injured 143, including policemen, in an attack at Kunming train station, Yunnan province. Police shot four of them dead at the scene. In the following months, the government stepped up security checks and equipped police patrols with guns in several major cities to counter attacks and social unrest [→ China (socioeconomic protests)]. On March 14, a knife fight between two reported Uyghur vendors in Changsha, the capital of Hunan province, resulted in a killing spree that left the attacker and five civilians dead. On March 22, an Uyghur injured three people with a knife in a train station in Huaihua, Hunan. On April 30, during an attack at the train station of Urumqi, capital of XUAR, two attackers

armed with knives and explosives injured 79 and killed one by blowing themselves up. Six days later, another train station attack in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, with an assailant wounding at least six people with a knife. On May 21, Uyghur suicide attackers killed 31 people and injured 94 by driving a car into a shopping market in Urumqi and throwing explosives. Subsequently, the central government announced a strike hard campaign. Eight days later, the operative head of the campaign was stabbed to death by Uyghurs in Misha Township, XUAR. On July 28, Uyghur rioters armed with knives and axes reportedly attacked police stations and government offices in Elixku Township, Yarkant/Shache county. While the government reported 37 civilians and 59 attackers had been killed and 13 injured, the World Uyghur Congress put the number of casualties much higher. Authorities arrested 215 people and sentenced twelve of them to death. On July 30, three Uyghur youths assassinated Juma Tahir, the government-appointed imam of the Id Kah Mosque in Kashgar, XUAR. On September 21, attacks on a farmer's market, a police station, and a shop in Bugur/Luntai County, XUAR, reportedly left about 100 injured and 50 dead, including civilians, policemen, and 40 attackers. Four days later, the Urumqi city court sentenced the Uyghur scholar and moderate dissident Ilham Tohti to life in prison for separatism.

Authorities repeatedly linked attacks to the militant outfit East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which is often equated with the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), reportedly operating in the tribal areas of Pakistan. In March, TIP leader Abdullah Mansour announced the party would take revenge on China. The Chinese government urged both the Pakistani prime minister and the army chief to take actions against the group, of whom many were reported to have been killed in the Zarb-e-Azb military operation in North Waziristan agency [→ Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)].

Throughout the year, hundreds of Uyghurs fled the country by crossing the border to Central and Southeast Asian countries. Several were killed in encounters with Chinese and Kyrgyz border guards. In March, after Thai authorities rescued more than 200 Uyghurs from human traffickers and detained them in an immigration camp in Thailand, China demanded their repatriation. China rebuked Turkey for interfering when it offered shelter to the detainees in November. los, jfr, ayc

CHINA – INDIA

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **1954**

Conflict parties: China vs. India

Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The non-violent crisis between China and India over territory, resources, and international power continued. Between January and August, India reported 300 incursions by Chinese troops on what it perceived to be the course of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which is not demarcated. On February 10, the Fifth Meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs reviewed recent developments in the areas around the LAC, especially in the Ladakh region. Issues discussed included implementation of the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA), additional confidence building measures, and further steps to maintain peace. On March 31, Indian border patrols detained two suspected Chinese nationals near the border in the Indian village of Namgia, Himachal Pradesh. In April, senior Indian

Army officers met with the responsible Chinese general to discuss the implementation of the BDCA for the first time. In July, the Indian government announced plans to provide military training for people living in areas close to the LAC in India's northeast and in Jammu and Kashmir. In September, it lowered restrictions for the buildup of infrastructure along the LAC, where an advanced road and rail network already existed on the Chinese side. On September 14, shortly before the first summit talks between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Indian and Chinese troops engaged in a standoff along the border. Reportedly, Indian security forces had discovered Chinese soldiers using heavy earth-moving equipment to build a dirt road into disputed territory. Chinese soldiers also seized positions at a high ground near Chumar, Ladakh. According to Indian officials, more than 1,000 troops were involved on each side, making it the largest standoff between the two countries in decades. From September 17 to 19, Xi met with Modi during his birthday in Gujarat and later in Delhi to discuss Chinese investments and common development. During a joint press conference, Modi urged for clarification of the LAC. Rather than the announced USD 100 billion, Xi stated that China would invest USD 20 billion in railways, industrial parks and, potentially, nuclear power in India within the next five years. Xi also met with Indian President Pranab Mukherjee, who had returned from talks with his Vietnamese counterpart on defense and energy cooperation [→ China – Vietnam et al. (South China Sea)]. On September 26, both sides foreign ministers resolved the prolonging border standoff. In October, the Indian government gave its approval for 12,000 troops to be recruited into the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, which guards the LAC. Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh also announced USD 28.5 million infrastructure investment and that 54 new outposts would be built along the LAC. India also announced plans to build a 1,800 km mountain road along the LAC from Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh to the Burmese border. Chinese foreign office spokesperson Hong Lei stated that the project could complicate the border dispute. On November 23, China put the first of its dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra river in Tibet into service. A number of protests took place in Assam calling for the immediate decommissioning of the dam on ecological grounds. als

CHINA – USA

Intensity: **1** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: PRC vs. USA
 Conflict items: system/ideology, international power

The conflict over international power between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the USA continued. On February 21, US President Barack Obama met with the Dalai Lama, which was criticized by PRC [→ China (Tibet)]. In May, the US charged five officers of the People's Liberation Army with industrial cyber-espionage. This was followed by accusations of hacking by China and US counterclaims. The US repeatedly voiced concerns over PRC's actions regarding the territorial disputes in the South and East China Sea [→ China – Vietnam et al. (South China Sea); → Japan – China]. On May 13, both countries' foreign ministers discussed the differences over the South China Sea in a phone call, but also reaffirmed the common goal of North Korean denucleariza-

tion [→ North Korea – USA, South Korea, Japan]. On May 31, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel accused the PRC of using threats of force to advance its territorial claims. The comment was met by strong opposition from the PRC, which accused the US of supporting neighboring countries such as Vietnam, Japan, and the Philippines in maritime disputes. During his Tokyo visit in April, Obama reiterated that the Senkaku Islands were covered by the US-Japan Security Treaty. From July 9 to 10, Secretary of State John Kerry and State Councilor Yang Jiechi chaired the sixth round of the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing. Five days later, both sides' navy chiefs met in the city. On August 11, the US stated that it would monitor Chinese actions in the South China Sea. Eight days later, a PRC Su-27 fighter jet flew within ten meters from a US Navy P-8 Poseidon reconnaissance aircraft 135 miles from Hainan Island. The US voiced strong concerns over the incident.

During the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing on November 11, Obama stated that he wanted to take the US relationship with the PRC to a new level. However, he did not mention the "new type of major power relation" framework promoted by Chinese leader Xi Jinping since February 2012. During the summit, both countries reached an understanding over trade tariffs on high-tech products and a new, reciprocal ten-year visa policy for tourists and businessmen. They also agreed to expand military exchanges and joint drills, to establish a mutual reporting mechanism for major military operations, and to continue work on a code of safe conduct for aerial and naval military encounters. On November 12, both sides released the US-China Joint Agreement on Climate Change, announcing unilateral measures to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. They also agreed to cooperate on clean energy and environmental protection.

In December, the US Congress authorized the sale of four warships to ROC [→ China (Taiwan)]. The PRC opposed this as an interference in its internal affairs. als

CHINA – VIETNAM ET AL. (SOUTH CHINA SEA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: Brunei vs. PRC vs. ROC vs. Malaysia vs. Vietnam vs. Philippines
 Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The conflict over territory, resources, and international power in the South China Sea between Brunei, the governments of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC), Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam continued.

In January, PRC's Hainan Province revised rules for fishing vessels in the disputed waters despite protests from the other parties. The new regulations required foreign fishermen to seek Chinese approval. In March, the Philippines submitted evidence to the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), hearing its case against Beijing's territorial claims in the South China Sea. It asked the court to uphold its right to exploit waters within its 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). On December 5, Vietnam submitted a statement to the PCA, recognizing the court's jurisdiction over the case and requested the court to give "due regard" to its own rights. The PRC issued a position paper on December 7, explaining that it had the right to and would not participate in or accept the

results of the tribunal as it wished to resolve the conflict bilaterally. In April, the PRC accused the Philippines of illegally occupying Chinese territory after a Philippine vessel had outmaneuvered its coast guard and resupplied a ship that had been stranded for 15 years on Second Thomas Shoal. In May, the PRC's China National Offshore Oil Corporation stationed its Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig about 17 miles off Triton Island, also claimed by Vietnam. Vietnam demanded the PRC to withdraw the rig. Its continued presence was followed by multiple collisions between Vietnamese and Chinese ships, reportedly leaving six Vietnamese injured. Both sides acknowledged that they had used water cannons. The same month, anti-Chinese riots left at least four people dead and more than 100 injured in Vietnam. Several Chinese and Taiwanese-owned businesses and factories were destroyed. The PRC and the ROC evacuated several thousand workers and called on Vietnam to protect their citizens.

Vietnamese officials stated that violence over the conflict would not be tolerated and announced the persecution of more than 300 people involved in the attacks. Also in May, Philippine National Police arrested eleven Chinese fishermen, fishing sea turtles in disputed waters. In November, a court in the Philippines found the fishermen guilty of poaching and catching an endangered species. In June, China reportedly added several new features to the Spratly archipelago by moving sand onto reefs and shoals. In the same month, PRC State Councilor Yang Jiechi held talks with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh about the controversial oil rig. These were the first high-level discussions between the two countries since early May. On July 15, PRC patrol ships detained six Vietnamese fishermen in disputed waters. Shortly after the incident, the PRC began moving its oil rig north towards the Chinese island of Hainan and out of disputed waters. In August and September, Vietnam sent a special envoy and a high-level military delegation to Beijing. Shortly after, both sides agreed to reset their relations on the seventh Joint Steering Committee on Bilateral Cooperation in Hanoi. In October, the PRC completed the extension of a runway on Woody Island, one of the Paracel islands also claimed by Vietnam and the ROC. In November, PRC Defence Minister Chang Wanquan said he wanted to enhance dialog to manage disputes with neighboring countries.

In the course of the year, external supporters increased their activities in the conflict, most importantly the USA, India, and Japan. On August 10, during the ASEAN summit in Naypyitaw, the US urged all claimants to establish a code of conduct and reduce tensions. The PRC repeatedly warned the US to stay out of the dispute [→ China – USA]. On September 29, joint military exercises between the US and Philippine navies began in Palawan, the Philippine island closest to contested areas of the South China Sea. On October 2, the US partly lifted its 1975 arms embargo on Vietnam. The same month, India announced to supply Vietnam with naval ships [→ China – India]. Both countries enhanced cooperation on defense matters and oil exploration. Vietnam and the Philippines were also assisted by Japan in building up their maritime security capacities [→ Japan – China]. als

INDIA (GJM ET AL. / WEST BENGAL)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1907**

Conflict parties: GJM, UGPO, GNL, AIGL vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy

The conflict over the creation of an autonomous Gorkha federal state between different ethnic Gorkha groups, among them the parties Gorkha National Liberation Front and Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) as well as militant United Gorkha People's Organization (UGPO), and the government, continued at a non-violent level. The disputed territory encompassed areas in Dooars region in northern West Bengal state.

The federal government of West Bengal delayed the process of transferring parts of the administration to the Gorkhland Territorial Administration (GTA) throughout the year. To put pressure on the central government, GJM held a rally in New Delhi on February 21 and a delegation of the party met with central state ministers.

On September 13, the army along with the police arrested five militants of the newly founded UGPO and confiscated five pistols and ammunition. The UGPO was allegedly supported by the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak and Muivah [→ India (NSCN et al./ Nagaland)].

On November 10, Indian security forces confiscated sophisticated small arms, like a M-16 rifle and Beretta pistols, and ammunition from a car on its way to UGPO in Darjeeling.

Two weeks later, Home Minister Rajnath Singh agreed during a meeting with GJM leaders to establish a committee for the Gorkhland issue.

lst

INDIA (HINDUS – MUSLIMS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: Hindus vs. Muslims

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The conflict over subnational predominance between Hindus and Muslims continued as a violent crisis. On January 14, Hindu and Muslim communities clashed in the village of Kotadi, Rajasthan state, during the Hindu celebrations of Makar Sankranti. Three people were killed and at least six others were injured in a shootout. In the course of the clashes, Hindus set several Muslim businesses and houses on fire.

In May, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won the national general elections, making Narendra Modi the new prime minister. Criticism of BJP's close ties to the right-wing Hindu nationalist organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Modi's alleged involvement in the 2002 Gujarat riots contributed to inter-communal tensions. On May 25, during Modi's inauguration, Muslim protesters clashed with Hindus in the city of Ahmedabad, Gujarat state, damaging several shops and vehicles. Police forces injured at least four people when firing tear gas.

On October 25, police in Trilokpuri, East-Delhi district, arrested more than 80 people and imposed a curfew after communal clashes in the days before, in which more than 45 people, among them 25 policemen, had been injured. On November 3, Hindu and Muslim rioters threw stones at

each other and damaged several shops and motor vehicles in Barwani, Madhya Pradesh state. Police used tear gas to dissolve the clash. The incidents left seven people injured. On December 8, RSS held a ceremony in Agra, Uttar Pradesh state, in which over 200 Muslims were converted to Hinduism. Various Muslim groups and opposition parties called the procedure illegal and demanded the arrest of those responsible. Leaders of the Muslim AMP party in Agra uttered threats of future violence if the conversions continued. abo

INDIA (HPC-D / MIZORAM, MANIPUR, ASSAM)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1986**

Conflict parties: HPC-D vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The conflict over secession between Hmar People's Convention-Democracy (HPC-D) and the government continued as a non-violent crisis. The HPC-D demanded an independent state created from the Hmar inhabited areas in the states of Mizoram, Manipur, and Assam. During the year, the HPC-D carried out several bomb attacks in Mizoram but none of them led to death or injuries.

Suspected HPC-D cadres blasted a bomb near the Mizoram state assembly building on January 11 and near another building on January 30 in Aizawl district, Mizoram state. No casualties were reported.

On February 20, Mizoram police forces and 35 paramilitary Assam Rifles arrested five cadres of HPC-D in Churachandpur district, Manipur state. Mizoram Police transferred the suspects to Manipur police forces. Security forces confiscated 480 rounds of rifle ammunition and hand grenades. The same day militants blasted a bomb on New Market in Aizawl, damaging an adjacent building. One day later, Mizoram Chief Minister Lal Thanhawla claimed HPC-D responsible for the blasts on January 30 and February 20 in Aizawl.

Manipur army forces of Red Shield Division arrested two HPC-D cadres, Laldikshak and Didi Vanlalhrate, in Tuibong village, Churachandpur on March 19. Army forces seized two pistols and six rounds of ammunition.

On April 18, another alleged HPC-D bomb exploded near the state assembly building in Aizawl. No casualties were reported. On July 12, Mizoram police constable Sakawrdai Malsawm Kima joined HPC-D. Ten days later, militants blasted a bomb near the residence of Hmar leader and Sinlung hills development council (SHDC) chairman Hmingchungnunga in Aizawl. Three days later HPC-D claimed responsibility for the bomb attack. The SHDC was established after the peace accord between the HPC and the government in 1994. The HPC-D blamed the SHDC for cooperating with the government although the government had never fulfilled its commitments of the peace accord.

Police forces arrested two suspected HPC-D militants in Aizawl on August 2. One of the arrested claimed responsibility for the bombing near the residence of the Mizoram parliamentary secretary for Home Affairs the same night and the blast on July 22. The following day, Mizoram Police arrested another man in connection with the blasts.

On November 17, the Mizoram state government asked the central Ministry of Home Affairs to declare HPC-D an unlawful organization. On December 6 and 8, Troops of the Red Shield Division of paramilitary Assam Rifles seized several small pistols and ammunition, and arrested one HPC-D cadre at Thingchom in Churachandpur.

mw

INDIA (INTER-FACTIONAL VIOLENCE / NAGALAND)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1988**

Conflict parties: NSCN-K, ZUV vs. NSCN-IM vs. NSCN-KK

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis between Nagaland militant groups vying for subnational predominance in Nagaland state continued. The involved National Socialist Council of Nagaland factions included the unit led by Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), the Khole Kitovi group (NSCN-KK), and the Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) aligned with the Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF). Each of the groups participated to varying extents in criminal activities such as extortion and kidnapping.

Throughout the year, the peace talks between NSCN-IM, NSCN-KK, and the Nagaland National Council/ Federal Government of Nagaland (NNC/FGN) proceeded and no encounters between these groups were reported.

On February 27, the groups attended a meeting organized by the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR) in Dimapur, Nagaland, to discuss the ongoing reconciliation process. At another FNR meeting one month later, they signed the Lenten Agreement in which they agreed to form the Naga National Government and unify the different factions. The implementation of the Lenten Agreement was discussed from April 29 to May 3 in Kolkata, West Bengal state.

However, NSCN-K did not participate in the talks and occasionally clashed with the other factions. During the peace talks between NSCN-IM and the government in July [→ India (NSCN et al. / Nagaland)], they also stated that they would not accept any results of the talks as NSCN-IM were not representative for the Nagas. On October 11, NSCN-K militants killed at least one NSCN-KK member in a gunfight in Phongkhuri village, Phek district, Nagaland. Afterwards both factions claimed they had been ambushed by the other group and acted in retaliation. On October 24, attackers threw a grenade into the house of NSCN-KK finance secretary Kideon Zhimomi, leaving six people injured. The NSCN-KK blamed the NSCN-K for the attack.

Throughout the year, the groups announced various defections. On April 11 ZUF claimed that two NSCN-IM cadres had joined their group, while on May 28 twelve members of the NSCN-K deviated to the NSCN-KK. ksh

INDIA (JEM ET AL. / KASHMIR)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↘ | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: LeT, HM, JeM, HuM vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The secession conflict in the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) between Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), on the one hand, and the government, on the other hand, de-escalated to a violent crisis. In 2014, at least 164 people died in the course of the conflict. Militants killed 15 policemen, 29 army soldiers, 15 civilians,

and five sarpanches, who were the elected heads of a panchayat, a local government at village level. Army and security forces killed 95 militants, two protestors and three civilians. Militant groups from Pakistan repeatedly attempted to cross the Line of Control (LoC) and enter Indian territory. Indian soldiers prevented several of these attempts. On May 9, the Indian Army stopped an infiltration attempt in Poonch District, nearby the LoC and killed two militants in a gun battle. Militants executed several attacks on Indian police and army. On March 3, militants killed two policemen with two AK-47 rifles outside the District Court Complex of Pulwama, Pulwama district. On December 5, during the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly elections, members of LeT simultaneously conducted four attacks on Indian security personnel. In the heaviest one, six militants attacked an army camp in Uri, Baramula district, killing eight soldiers and three policemen. The militants also killed two civilians in Tral, Pulwama. On the same day, security personnel killed eight militants. Throughout the year, militants also attempted to assassinate several sarpanches and panches, members of panchayats. Already in 2012, LeT and JeM had issued death threats and carried out assassinations of sarpanches. For instance on April 17, militants killed a sarpanch at Gulzarpora village in Awantipore, Pulwama. Indian army and security forces for their part led a series of single combat operations against militants on Indian territory. Army forces killed seven militants in a search operation on February 24. In a joint operation, police and army forces killed two LeT militants at Zunarishi, Kupwara District, on April 8. In the gunfight, the militants killed two policemen, one soldier and injured four more policemen, two soldiers, and one civilian. sgs

INDIA (NAGAS – ASSAMESE ADIVASIS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: Nagas, NSCN-IM, NSCN-KK vs. AANLA, AASAA, AASU, AJYCP, Assamese Adivasis, ATASU
 Conflict items: subnational predominance

A violent crisis over subnational predominance erupted between Naga and Assamese Adivasi communities in the Disputed Area Belt (DAB) between the states of Assam and Nagaland. The communities were supported by militant groups, such as the Isak Muivah and Khaplang Kitovi factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM, NSCN-KK). The conflict broke out when the groups interfered in a land dispute between a Naga and an Adivasi in the DAB. After Nagas had allegedly kidnapped two Adivasi boys on July 24, the All Adivasi National Liberation Army forced the Naga off the disputed land on August 2. In response, Nagas abducted three Adivasis from Chandalashung, Wokha district, Nagaland, with the help of NSCN-KK. On August 12, about 20,000 Assamese protested the abduction of the two Adivasi boys in Chetiagaon village, Golaghat district, Assam. Central Reserve Police Forces tried to disperse the protesters with batons when attackers from across the state border opened fire at the crowd, killing one person. Reportedly, the Adivasis burnt down a Naga house in response. Nagas in turn killed at least nine Adivasis and burnt down at least 200 of their houses in the B sector of the DAB, causing about 10,000 Adivasis to flee. The Nagas accused the Adivasis of starting the riots and burning down 300 of

their houses, forcing around 1,000 Nagas to flee. Up to 18 people died in the clashes between August 12 and 15. On August 13, All Adivasi Students' Association of Assam members blocked the National Highway 39 (NH 39) connecting Assam and Nagaland in Golaghat for more than a week. The goods supply to Upper Assam, Nagaland and Manipur was interrupted as hundreds of tankers and trucks could not pass and were lined up along the NH 39 and 37. On August 15, the protesters prevented a Nagaland state official from using the NH 39 and kept him and eight of his staff members as hostages for four days. On August 18, Adivasi protesters, demanding an immediate punishment of the Naga attackers, stalled the convoy of Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi on its way to a refugee camp in Urmianghat, Assam. Two days later, about 1,000 Adivasi protesters attacked a police station in Golaghat. In reaction, police opened fire, killing at least three protesters. They also injured 20 to 30 people using tear gas and enforced a curfew in the affected area. On August 21, the Assam and Nagaland state governments agreed to establish a joint mechanism to prevent the resumption of violence. Assam State Government blamed the NSCN-IM for the riots, but the role of the militant group remained unclear. According to the office of the Assamese chief minister, around 5,700 IDPs could return home by September. On November 13, assailants killed an Adivasi in Chandalashung over another land dispute. The government deployed additional security forces. msc

INDIA (NAXALITES)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: CPI-M vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent conflict between the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M), also known as Naxalites, and the government over system and ideology continued. The Naxalites operated in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Kerala, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. In the course of the year, 49 encounters between police forces and militants took place in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, and Maharashtra. While police forces killed 61 militants, Naxalites killed 33 members of the paramilitary Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and 20 policemen. Gun battles such as the one on March 11 between 200 militants and security forces in Sukma district, Chhattisgarh left 16 people dead, among them eleven CRPF members, four policemen, and one civilian. Similarly, on December 1, about 100 militants killed 14 CRPF personnel and injured 15 in Chintagufa area, Sukma district, Chhattisgarh. In ensuing clashes, security forces gunned down 15 militants. Naxalites were particularly active during the general elections from February to May and carried out several attacks on polling officials. For instance on April 12, militants blew up the bus of a polling team with a landmine, killing six polling officials in Chhattisgarh. The same day, also in Chhattisgarh, militants detonated a landmine killing five members of an election safety operation team and one civilian. On April 24, another landmine killed five policemen and three polling

officials after a shootout between Naxalites and police forces in Dumka district, Jharkhand.

On June 4, militants killed three suspected anti-Maoist villagers in Jojo village in Khunti district, Jharkhand. In the course of the year, in 16 similar incidents in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Odisha, and West Bengal states, Naxalites killed 25 villagers accusing them of being police informers. On October 19, approx. 40 armed militants killed a defector in Veeravaram village in Visakhapatnam district, Andhra Pradesh. They also threatened to kill a priest, accusing both defector and priest of being police informers. Subsequently, about 400 villagers attacked the militants with bamboo sticks and stones, killing three. On August 8, 200 Naxalites killed 16 Triptiya Prastuti Committee (TPC) members, a splinter-group of CPI-M, near Kauriya village in Palamu district, Jharkhand.

In two incidents Naxalites attacked government officials. On August 29, militants shot dead District Congress Leader Kishan Saw in Ghatsila town in East Singhbhum district, Jharkhand. On September 25, seven Naxalites gunned down local Indian National Congress party leader Jeevan Patnaik in Sunki village in Koraput district, Odisha.

On December 2, intelligence reports stated that Naxalites were recruiting children in Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, and Odisha. After the new government under Narendra Modi had introduced a new policy offering higher financial incentives for surrendered militants on August 20, the number of surrendered Naxalites increased steadily in the second half of the year. ans

INDIA (NDFB-S – SANTHALS / ASSAM)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↑** | Start: **1994**

Conflict parties: Bodos, NDFB-S vs. NSLA, Santhals, STF

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The conflict over subnational predominance in the Western parts of Assam state between Bodos and Santhals escalated to a limited war. I.K. Songbijit's faction of the Bodo militant group National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-S) dominated the conflict. The Santhals were organized in groups such as the Santhali Tiger Force (STF) and the umbrella organization National Santhal Liberation Army (NSLA). NDBF-S, STF, and NSLA continued to attack civilians and extort money from local businessmen.

By December, the conflict between the indigenous groups remained non-violent as in previous years. However, security forces arrested several NSLA members and frequently clashed with NDFB-S, which demanded an independent Bodoland [→ India (ULFA et al. / Assam)]. Unlike other NDFB-factions, NDFB-S did not participate in the peace talks with the government and had warned against attacks in retaliation for the security forces' operation in the area. On December 23, NDFB-S members killed at least 37 people in Sonitpur district and at least 27 people in Kokrajhar district, Assam. Most of the victims belonged to the Santhal community.

On December 24, violent protests against the killings erupted in the area. When a large crowd attacked a local police station in Sonitpur during the course of these protests, the police shot dead three Adivasis. Santhals also attacked a village mainly inhabited by the Bodo community in Chirang district the same day and killed two people. In Kokrajhar district, As-

am, protesters burned down a Bodo village. In total, around five members of the Bodo community died in the unrest. In the following days, student organizations affiliated to both communities, like the All Adivasi Students' Association and the All Bodo Students' Union, held protests in different parts of Assam and demanded state-wide bandhs.

The government imposed a curfew in the affected areas and deployed up to 9,000 security personnel. Overall, more than 80 people died in the clashes and more than 100,000 people temporarily fled their homes, but began to return by the end of the year. hru

INDIA (SIKHS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: BKi, Dal Khalsa, KLF, KTF, KZF, Shiromani Akali Dal vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy

The dispute over autonomy and the reappraisal of the 1984 anti-Sikh riots between the political party Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) and Sikh groups on one side, and the government on the other, rose to the level of a non-violent crisis. On occasion of the 30th anniversary of the 1984 anti-Sikh riots from 10/31/1984 to 11/03/1984, Sikhs took to the streets, demanding accountability of those involved in the incidents. No calls for autonomy were reported.

On January 13, British Government declassified documents proving Margaret Thatcher's government involvement in the riots. Four days later, All India Sikh Students Federation held a protest march in front of the British High Commission in New Delhi, asking for an official condemnation of British involvement. On January 30, around 200 members of the Sikh community protested outside the New Delhi residence of Indian National Congress party's (INC) vice-president Rahul Gandhi. They demanded accountability and the names of the allegedly involved INC leaders in the riots. Police dispersed the gathering with water cannons and arrested 120 protesters. Uttering the same demand, hundreds of Sikhs walked to the residence of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Delhi on February 10. On November 1, Sikh protesters blocked the railway traffic in Ludhiana, Punjab, to draw attention to the 1984 riots.

On July 11, Congress-led Haryana Assembly confirmed the formation of a separate management body for gurdwaras, places of worship for Sikhs, in the state of Haryana, thereby giving it independence from the SAD-controlled Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC). On June 28, a SAD member accused the government of dividing the Sikh community by supporting this move. On July 19, Sikhs alongside leaders and workers of the Delhi unit of SAD, gathered around the residence of Congress president Sonia Gandhi in New Delhi, protesting the management body's formation. Police stopped their march with water cannons.

On several occasions, Sikh groups pressed for the release of former militants. On November 14, Sikh activist Gurbaksh Singh Khalsa started a hunger strike in Ambala Gurdwara, Haryana, demanding the release of at least six Sikh prisoners who had completed their jail terms. On December 2, Haryana SAD joined this demand and SGPC followed shortly afterwards. On December 24, Punjab Chief Minister Parkash Singh Badal asked several state governments to release the Sikh convicts early.

Over the course of the year, police arrested several members

of pro-Khalistan groups. For instance, police arrested six known members in the states of Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, and Tamil Nadu. Among them were the chief of Tiger Force of Khalistan Rattandeep Singh, militant Ramandeep Singh Goldy, and Khalistan Liberation Force chief Harminder Singh Minto. ser, iro

INDIA (TJAC / TELANGANA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1969**

Conflict parties: TJAC vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy

The conflict over autonomy of the Telangana region between the Telangana Joint Action Committee (TJAC) and the government continued at a violent level. The government met TJAC's demand by creating Telangana state out of Andhra Pradesh state in February. However, negotiations between both sides continued.

On January 6, Osmania University students staged a march towards the Andhra Pradesh state assembly building, demanding an autonomous Telangana state. They clashed with police personnel, which used tear gas to stop the procession. One student and one policeman were injured. During the day, police took 40 people into preventive custody.

The lower house approved the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Bill on February 18, and the upper house did the same two days later. On both occasions anti-bifurcation MPs protested by ripping pages of the draft. One MP used pepper spray. Before and after the approval of the act, different anti-bifurcation organizations like the Yuvajana Shramika Rythu Congress Party held general strikes in the Seemandhra region, Andhra Pradesh. Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister N. Kiran Kumar Reddy held a silent sit-in in the capital New Delhi to protest the bifurcation. After the bill was approved by the lower house, Reddy immediately resigned.

On March 1, TJAC chairman M. Kodandaram stated the organization would perform the "watchdog" role in the state. Throughout the year, TJAC discussed internal problems such as the electric power crisis with the Telangana government.

On April 30, the Telangana Rashtra Samithi Party won the majority of seats in the Telangana Legislative Assembly elections. Its president, Kalvakuntla Chandrashekar Rao, was named the state's first chief minister on June 2.

On July 11, the lower house passed an amendment to the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Bill which allocated seven administrative divisions in Khammam district from Telangana to Andhra Pradesh. The TJAC called for a bandh in Telangana the following day.

Another contentious issue between the central and the Telangana government was the city of Hyderabad, designated as the shared capital of both states for a maximum of ten years. For instance, the central government called for entrusting joint governor E.S.L. Narasimhan with law and order as well as security issues in the states' capital. While the Andhra Pradesh government welcomed the suggestion, the Telangana government refused it as an interference in its affairs. twe

INDIA (ULFA ET AL. / ASSAM)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: DJNA, KPLT, NDFB-S, RNLF, RNSF, ULFA-I, UPLA, KLO vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The conflict between different Karbi, Assamese, and Bodo groups and their political factions demanding the secession for different parts of Assam state, on one side, and the government on the other, continued as a violent crisis. The most active groups were the Karbi People's Liberation Tigers (KPLT), the United Liberation Front of Assam Independent (ULFA-I), and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland Songbijit (NDFB-S).

Throughout the year, the government heavily reinforced its military actions against the armed groups. Besides additional deployment of troops, paramilitary forces, like the Armed Border Force (SSB), and special forces, the government established 60 police stations. Security forces killed around 60 militants, among them over 40 of NDFB-S and twelve KPLT, and arrested at least 115.


On May 1 and 2, NDFB-S militants killed at least 41 Muslim villagers in Baska and Kokrajhar districts, Assam [→ India (Bodos, Assamese – Biharis, Bengalis)]. Subsequently, the government imposed a curfew for several days in the districts of Chirang, Kokrajhar, Baksa and parts of Dhubri. It also staged army flag marches and deployed ten additional companies of central police forces.

On June 5, militants killed Hamren police district's Superintendent Nityananda Goswami and his personal security officer during a search operation in Karbi Anglong district, Assam. The newly founded United Peoples Liberation Army (UPLA) claimed responsibility for the attack. UPLA demanded an independent Karbi state. Five days later, police forces arrested ten UPLA militants in Nagaland state, close to Assamese frontier. In a similar incident on January 28, NDFB-S militants killed Additional Superintendent Gulzar Hussain in Sonitpur district, Assam.

On August 20, army and Assam police killed five NDFB-S militants in Chirang. Later the same day, NDFB-S militants shot dead an alleged police informer in the same district. The militants released a video of the killing and declared it a warning to future police informers.

In another mass killing on December 23, NDFB-S militants killed at least 67 Adivasis in Sonitpur and Kokrajhar [→ India (NDFB – ACF, BCF)]. The government imposed a curfew and transferred up to 9,000 security personnel to the affected area. By the end of the year, security forces arrested up to eight suspects in connection with the killings, including three NDFB-S militants. The government stated that it excluded any political solution. On October 23, Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi offered amnesty to ULFA-I commander Paresh Baruah should he surrender and engage himself in politics. Baruah had stated two days before that he would peacefully accept the result of a plebiscite over the independence of Assam. Throughout the year, around 45 militants of various groups surrendered to the police. pak

INDONESIA (AHMADIYYA)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **1980**


Conflict parties: Ahmadiyya vs. government, Sunni radicals

Conflict items: system/ideology

The ideology conflict between the Indonesian branch of the Ahmadiyya religious community and government along with radical Sunni Muslims decreased to a non-violent level. The Ahmadiyya is a worldwide represented religious community, calling themselves Muslims, although they are not recognized by other Muslim groups.

On April 8 and 9, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), the government's religious authority, issued Ahmadi in West Java to cease worshiping before the legislative election later in April. The MUI expected riots during and after the election period. Despite the MUI's effort, local Ahmadi did not stop their services and the election passed without any incidents. On September 24, Sunni radical Islam Defenders Front (FPI) launched threats against religious minorities, including the Ahmadiyya religious community. The FPI opposed Governor of Jakarta Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, an ethnic Chinese man with Christian faith, fearing his influence on the MUI. Inu

INDONESIA (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1981**

Conflict parties: JAT, Jl, Lintas Tanzim vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over ideology and national power between Islamist militant groups fighting for an Islamic state in Indonesia and the government continued at a violent level.


In the first week of January, a court in Jakarta sentenced Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) member Achmad Taufik to seven years and six month in prison for his involvement in a bomb attack on the embassy of Myanmar in 2013.

On January 10, the former national police president condemned the police's practice of killing terror suspects, as during raids such as the anti-terror unit Densus 88 had made on New Year's Eve, shooting six suspected terrorists in South Tangerang, Jakarta.

On January 20, the police arrested two members of the Santoso group in Surabaya, East Java, blaming them for planning attacks on local police stations. On February 6, during a gunfight in Poso district, Central Sulawesi, one police officer and one suspected terrorist were killed and one militant arrested. In March Densus 88 detained five suspected Islamist terrorists and seized several home-made bombs in Jakarta. On June 24, Densus 88 conducted raids in Cipayung, East Jakarta, detaining one man and seizing small weapons. In mid-July JI co-founder and leader of Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) Abu Bakar Bashir expressed his and the organization's support for the Islamic State (IS) and its fight in Syria and Iraq [→ Iraq (IS et al.); Syria (inter-opposition violence)]. At the beginning of August the police arrested one JAT member in Jatiasih, Bekasi, accusing him of founding a terrorist training camp in Aceh. In the same month the government intensified cooperation with Indonesian and Australian intelligence services in fighting terrorism by signing a Security Cooperation

Act. On September 11, the government froze the assets of three men mentioned in a UNSC Resolution for supporting al-Qaeda. On the following day, Densus 88 detained eight men in Kota Palu, Central Sulawesi, accusing them of communicating with IS and JI. Police arrested another suspected terrorist in the following days in Purworejo, Central Java. At the end of September the United States issued financial sanctions on JI for supporting the IS. On December 16, the Indonesian government stated that it suspected about 110 foreigners living in Indonesia were IS fighters. On December 21, Densus 88 arrested a man in Lamongan, East Java, accusing him of organizing training camps for JI. Iwe

INDONESIA (PAPUA)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1961**

Conflict parties: KNPB, OPM vs. government

Conflict items: secession, resources

The conflict between the Free Papua Movement (OPM) and the National Committee for West Papua (KNPB), on the one hand, and the Indonesian government, on the other hand, over resources and the secession of Papua and West Papua provinces remained violent.

While OPM used violence as a strategy to accomplish its aims, KNPB used peaceful means to achieve an independent West Papua. Over the year, at least 20 people were killed in shootings between OPM and the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). Clashes erupted primarily in Papua's Puncak Jaya regency, location of the world's biggest goldmine, the Grasberg mine. In January, six men received sentences between 15 to 18 years in prison for raising the morning star flag in 2013, which symbolizes an independent West Papua.

On January 24, OPM members clashed with 25 soldiers and police officers. Three OPM members and one soldier were killed near Grasberg mine. On February 1, police officers and soldiers jointly raided an OPM meeting in Yapen, Papua. In the following shootout one OPM member died, and eleven OPM members were arrested, while police seized firearms and morning star flags. The next day, the military and OPM members clashed again, leaving five separatists dead in Lanny Jaya, Papua. On April 4, OPM members lowered an Indonesian flag, burned a Papua New Guinean government border administration facility and raised the West Papuan and UN flag near the border of Papua New Guinea. On April 5, OPM wearing UN's blue berets fired around 60 rounds of ammunition into the Indonesian Batas area. The same day, around 40 OPM members fired on a watchtower at a military post, set a billboard on fire, took the Indonesian flag down, and raised the morning star flag. During the attack one soldier was injured in Wutung, Jayapura regency, Papua. Between January and April military seized 28 rifles from OPM through search operations in West Papua. On June 30, the police arrested three people who were trying to supply OPM members with firearms and ammunition in Sorong Port, West Papua.

On July 28, OPM intercepted a police patrol in Lanny Jaya, leaving two police officers dead. On August 1, TNI shot and killed five OPM members during a patrol in Lanny Jaya. On August 10, police officers arrested 21 civilians for being involved with OPM in Jayapura, Papua. In Manokwari area on August 16, 700 OPM supporters surrendered and declared their support for Indonesia, and some of them handed over their weapons. On September 18, TNI and OPM had a gun battle at Pirime airfield, Lanny Jaya, where one OPM member was

killed and another injured. On September 25, an Indonesian soldier was killed by a gunman on a market in Puncak Jaya. One police officer and three soldiers suspected of supplying OPM with ammunition were arrested in Wamena, Papua, on October 28.

Throughout the year, the KNPB mobilized hundreds of people to demonstrate for holding a referendum regarding the independence of West Papua, as they did, for example, on December 1. asc

JAPAN – CHINA

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **1971**

Conflict parties: PRC vs. ROC vs. Japan
 Conflict items: territory, international power, resources, other

The non-violent crisis over international power as well as territory and resources of the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands between Japan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the Republic of China (ROC) continued with all parties reiterating their sovereignty claims. Dialog between Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and PRC President Xi Jinping remained frozen for another ten months before finally resuming in November. Abe refrained from further visits to the Yasukuni shrine, after history controversies had flared up over his 12/26/2013 visit. However, differing conceptions of national history remained a source of tension with the PRC introducing new holidays for commemorating the war with Japan and continuing shrine visits by Japanese lawmakers. Furthermore, the PRC joined the Republic of Korea in raising the issue of war-time sex slaves [→ Japan – South Korea].

With regards to the disputed islands, ROC President Ma Ying-jeou repeatedly urged the parties to solve the conflict peacefully, referring to his East China Sea (ECS) Peace Initiative. Throughout the year, PRC coast guard vessels and destroyers sailed into the disputed waters, followed by Japanese protest. On January 8, the PRC announced it would increase coast guard patrols in the ECS and requested foreign fishermen to ask for permission to fish in the region. In February, Japan publicly assured the US that it would react calmly to the PRC’s actions. On April 8, the PRC urged visiting US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel to restrain Japan [→ China – USA]. In April, Hu Deping, the son of PRC’s former General Secretary of the Communist Party Hu Yaobang, who improved Sino-Japanese ties in the 1980s, met with Japan’s Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio. The same month, Mayor of Beijing Wang Anshun met with Tokyo governor Masuzoe Yichi.

In mid-April, Japan sent 100 soldiers and commenced the building of a radar site on Yonaguni Island, close to the disputed territory. Furthermore, it sent an early warning unit to Okinawa Island to improve surveillance. On April 24, US President Barack Obama reiterated that the USA would defend all territories administered by Japan, including the disputed islands. On May 24 and June 11, PRC fighter jets flew within 50 meters of Japanese surveillance and intelligence aircrafts near the islands. Both sides blamed each other for the incidents, which took place in overlapping airspace of their Air Defense Identification Zones. On July 1, the Abe cabinet authorized the reinterpretation of Article 9 of the constitution for legislative approval, which would grant Japan the right to exert collective self defense. While the US welcomed the decision, the PRC expressed concerns. On July 14, Abe emphasized that the possibilities for the Self-Defense Forces to

help an ally under attack by means of force would be limited. On July 19, Japan’s Defense Ministry considered positioning SDF aircraft at the commercial airfield of Saga, Okinawa. On August 18, former Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo and National Security Advisor Yachi Shotaro met with Vice President Li Yuanchao in Beijing to discuss the Sino-Japanese impasse. In late September, Japan dispatched two new 1,500 ton patrol vessels and helicopter carrier Izumo for sea trials. On October 8, Japan and the US released an interim report on the revision of their defense cooperation guidelines. The PRC urged both countries not to undermine the interests of third parties.

On November 7, Japan and the PRC parallelly issued four-point statements on improving ties, pledging that they shared some recognition on overcoming their political difficulties and would resume dialog to avoid further conflict. Three days later, Xi and Abe met at the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit to discuss relations. The next day, Japan urged the PRC to discuss the establishment of an emergency hotline to avoid escalation of accidental clashes. On December 3, the New Japan-China Friendship Committee for the 21st-Century, consisting of intellectuals from both countries, met in Beijing. On December 24, the Japanese government requested authorities from Ishigaki island to cancel a planned aerial survey of the disputed islands. kol

JAPAN – RUSSIA

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1945**

Conflict parties: Japan vs. Russia
 Conflict items: territory, international power

The conflict over international power and territory of the southern Kuril Islands between Japan and Russia escalated to a non-violent crisis.

On February 8, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo agreed to talk about the Kuril dispute in fall 2014. However, the envisaged summit did not materialize after Japan joined the three rounds of Western sanctions on Russia in April, August, and September [→ USA, EU et al. – Russia]. Russia stated its disappointment and announced it would react accordingly. On April 18, Colonel General Sergey Suvorkin, head of Russian Eastern Military District, announced the government’s approval for the military modernization plans in the Russian Far East and the building of over 150 military facilities on the southern Kuril Islands of Iturup and Kunashir, Sakhalin oblast. The same day, Japan scrambled fighter jets after it had spotted Russian bombers around the southern Japanese island of Okinawa. Japan’s Defense Ministry reported a significant increase of scrambles to intercept Russian aircrafts since April. On August 12, Russian Armed Forces Colonel Alexander Gordeev announced there would be military drills near the disputed islands. They took place the following day and involved over 1,000 soldiers and five Mi-8AMTSh attack helicopters. Japan’s Foreign Ministry stated the drills were absolutely unacceptable.

On November 9, Abe and Putin met at the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing, confirming positive relations and preparations for Putin’s visit to Japan in 2015. On December 1, Abe pledged to negotiate with Russia over a formal peace treaty. nro

JAPAN – SOUTH KOREA

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1951**

Conflict parties: Japan vs. ROK
Conflict items: territory, other

The non-violent crisis over conceptions of national history and the territory of the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) continued.

In January, the Japanese Ministry of Education introduced new teaching manuals emphasizing that the islands were Japan's integral territory. On February 22, several Japanese officials attended the Takeshima Day in Matsue, Shimane Prefecture, celebrated since 2006 to mark the 1905 Japanese takeover of the islets. The ROK and Japan carried out naval drills near the disputed islets, describing them as exercises to protect the islets from an external attack. While Korean drills took place in June and November, Japan carried out exercises in August. In mid-August, Japan reiterated its territorial claims in its Annual White Defense Paper. On October 20, ROK called on firms to build tourist facilities on the disputed islands, but revoked the bidding twelve days later.

Besides the islets, conceptions of national history remained a continuous source of tension, especially those relating to the wartime prostitution of Korean "comfort women" in Japanese military brothels. On 8/4/1993, former chief cabinet secretary Kono Yohei had officially apologized in the name of the government of Japan for the recruitment of comfort women and acknowledged the role of the Imperial Japanese Army in it. On February 20, following right-wing criticism that the Kono statement was solely based on witness reports, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide formed a five-person panel to re-examine the statement. The ROK and the Chinese governments criticized the move [→ Japan – China]. In April and October, Japanese parliament members visited the Yasukuni Shrine that included also war criminals. On June 20, the investigation panel released its findings, confirming the Kono statement's accuracy but also claiming that its wording had been coordinated with the ROK government. Two months later, Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun retracted 16 articles dating from 1982 and on, admitting that they were based on the invented memories of former soldier and key witness Yoshida Seiji. The retraction prompted Japan's largest newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun to revoke statements of concession on the issue, further fueling the revisionist debate. The ROK government led by President Park Geun-hye repeatedly demanded Japanese concessions on historical issues as a prerequisite for a bilateral summit. In November, Park proposed to resume the annual trilateral summit meeting with the People's Republic of China after the three countries' foreign ministers had held talks on September 11.

The USA repeatedly urged both countries to resolve tensions. In March, the US, ROK, and Japan met at the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, Netherlands, to discuss regional security. On December 29, the three countries agreed to share military intelligence on the North Korean missile and nuclear weapon programs [→ North Korea – USA, South Korea, Japan]. jfr, nro

KYRGYZSTAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: opposition parties vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over the orientation of the political system and national power between the Kyrgyz government and opposition groups turned violent.

On February 12, Ata-Jurt and Uluttar Birimdigi parties, together with former government leaders, formed the United Opposition Coalition (UOC) which organized a number of non-violent protests in Kyrgyzstan, predominantly in the capital Bishkek and the cities Osh, Jalalabad, and Karakol. Demonstrators mainly opposed the assignation of the majority of Manas International Airport's shares to the Russian state oil holding Rosneft in exchange for further investments, the acquisition of Kyrgyzgas by Russian Gazprom, the entry of Kyrgyzstan to the Eurasian Economic Union, and corruption. On April 10, the UOC organized a protest with more than 1,000 people against decisions made by President Almazbek Atambaev's administration. Relatives of parliamentary deputy and member of Ata-Jurt Akhmadbek Keldibekov, who had been arrested last November due to accusations of corruption and abuse of duties, organized protests in Bishkek and Alay regions. On May 27, after the court's announcement to detain Keldibekov in an investigative isolation ward for one month, supporters of the inductee blocked the route to Irkeshtam, Osh province, as well as the highway. Some activists on horses attacked policemen with cudgels, injuring one policeman. Hundreds of food trucks were unable to deliver products to local villages. After official negotiations, demonstrators agreed to reopen the route on June 22. On September 26, during a meeting in Osh, several people attacked opposition leaders and parliamentary deputies, Ravshan Jeenbekov and Omurbek Abdyrakhmanov, with eggs and demanded everyone to leave the place.

On October 7, a bill against "propaganda of nontraditional sexual relations", suggesting legal prosecution for "gay propaganda", passed at first hearing in parliament. On November 24, a parliament hearing of a bill labeling foreign funded NGOs as foreign agents took place. The law, initiated by deputies of the political faction Ar-Namys, would grant more control to the state over the activities of the NGOs. Both bills were pending further consideration in the parliament and later by the president. The US Embassy in Bishkek and several NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Kyrgyz LGBTIQ-organization Labrys criticized the bills, claiming they were harmful and repressive towards the opposition. smu

**KYRGYZSTAN – UZBEKISTAN – TAJIKISTAN
(BORDER COMMUNITIES / FERGANA VALLEY)**

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2000**

Conflict parties: Tajikistan vs. Kyrgyzstan vs. Uzbekistan
Conflict items: territory, international power

The conflict over territory and international power between inhabitants of enclaves/exclaves as well as the respective governments of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan con-

tinued at a violent level.

Planned road construction in Tajikistan's Vorukh exclave, Sughd province, engulfed by Kyrgyzstan's Batken province, resulted in several blocked roads throughout the year.

Over the year, border guards shot dead at least five citizens of the three countries' exclaves as they attempted to cross the border. On January 11, fire exchanges between Tajik and Kyrgyz border guards over planned road construction near Vorukh left eight wounded. The construction would prevent Kyrgyz from crossing Tajik controlled territory. Subsequently, the border was closed for a two-month period. On May 7, the planned construction led to clashes with 1,500 people involved, located between the city of Isfara, Sughd and Batken province. The same day, Kyrgyz citizens blocked the road connecting Vorukh with Tajik mainland. Both actions left around 60 people injured. In response, Tajiks blocked a road which connected Batken to the Kyrgyz exclave and demanded that their government resolve the border dispute. The planned construction of Kok Tash-Ak Sai-Tamdyk road caused a shootout between Tajik and Kyrgyz border guards in Tamdyk, Batken, on July 10, leaving one dead and seven injured. On July 12, Uzbek and Kyrgyz border guards and military officials held talks on an agreement on the demarcation of territories in the city Fergana, Fergana province, Uzbekistan. On July 21, Deputy Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan Abdyrakhman Mamataliev stated that demarcation issues with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan would continue. On August 11, Kyrgyz and Tajik officials met in Osh, Osh province, Kyrgyzstan, in order to discuss a shooting between Tajik border guards and three Kyrgyz citizens in Jirgatol, Jirgatol province, Tajikistan on August 9, which had left one Kyrgyz dead. On August 19, Kyrgyz border guards shot dead an Uzbek citizen crossing the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border in Kadamjai district, Batken, with a group of more than 20 people, who consequently fled back to Uzbekistan.

In the last week of August, three meetings between Tajik and Kyrgyz officials concerning the border issues took place in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek. One meeting included talks between Kyrgyzstan's Prime Minister Joomart Otorbayev and Tajikistan's Deputy Prime Minister Azim Ibrohim. The delegations agreed on the construction of a road and two bridges connecting Vorukh with Tajik mainland and on intensifying the demarcation process.

On November 13, Uzbek border guards and two Kyrgyz citizens were involved in a shooting, leaving one Kyrgyz dead in Yangikurgan district, Namangan province, at the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. Two days earlier, Uzbek border guards injured one Kyrgyz citizen in Batken, whom they accused of smuggling. kwu

MALAYSIA (SULU SULTANATE SUPPORTERS / LAHAD DATU DISTRICT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The conflict between the Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo and the government over the secession of Lahad Datu district in Sabah state remained at a violent level.

The disputed region had belonged to the former Sulu Sultanate until it became a British colony in 1878. In 1963, the colony North Borneo, to which Sabah belonged, was integrated into the Federation of Malaya, later Malaysia, while the rest of the former Sulu Sultanate went to the Philippines. This caused a decades-long conflict over the region between Malaysia and the Philippines which phased out in the 1990s. More recently, the supporters of the Sulu Sultanate wanted Lahad Datu district to be included in the Philippines and forcibly occupied villages in Sabah in February 2013. However, after several weeks of negotiations, security forces moved in and repelled the Sulu militants.

On January 6, the trial against 30 members of the Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo began at Kota Kinabalu Central Prison, in the state capital of Sabah Kota Kinabalu. Among those on trial was Datu Amirbahar Hushin Kiram, a nephew of the late descendant of the Sulu Sultan, Jamalul Kiram III, who died of natural causes in October 2013. The militants faced charges of waging war against the King, harboring and recruiting terrorists, as well as being members of a terrorist group. The trial was still ongoing at the end of the year.

On June 25, six armed suspected Sulu militants were arrested in the city Kunak, Tawau region. The suspects had allegedly planned to revive and reform a new army and planned to conduct new attacks in Sabah. In the same city on July 22, three men were detained under the Prevention of Crime Act 1959 which allows the detention without trial for up to two years. According to government officials, the suspects recruited new members for the Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo. On October 30, police forces killed two Filipino gunmen in Penampang, West Coast division. According to government officials, the two militants were members of the Sulu group and committed robberies to raise funds for their activities.

Throughout the year, the security situation on the island of Borneo remained tense with several kidnappings conducted by Filipino militants [→ Philippines (Abu Sayyaf)]. sg

MYANMAR (KIA, KIO / KACHIN STATE)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1961**

Conflict parties: KIA, KIO vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy, resources

The conflict concerning autonomy and resources between the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and its military wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued as a limited war. In total, an estimated number of 120,000 IDP were still living in about 100 temporary camps in both government and rebel-held areas after fleeing their homes due to clashes in the Kachin State since the breakdown of the ceasefire in June 2011.

After the Myanmar Armed Forces, officially known as Tatmadaw, had retreated from the Nam Lim Pa area on 12/28/2013, tension remained high as some low-scale clashes continued in Kachin State's Bhamo District in January. On February 12, after a two day gun battle, Tatmadaw seized a KIA outpost stationed in northern Bhamo Township, located about 100 km from the KIA headquarter in Laiza. Fighting left two KIA fighters dead. While on March 30, Myanmar's first census-taking process since 1983 was launched, KIA did not allow government enumerators to collect data

within its territory. On April 4, KIA ambushed an army truck in the Man Wein Gyi region, killing an officer who was reportedly providing security for census enumerators in KIA-held areas.

On April 10, Tatmadaw attacked KIA Third Brigade positions close to Mai Ja Yang town, firing heavy artillery. The Tatmadaw operation resulted in the capture of a KIA camp and left at least 14 soldiers and eight rebels dead. On April 13, the KIA destroyed several military vehicles with supplies traveling from Bhamo to Seinlon, killing two soldiers and injuring nine. Three days later, the army took two KIA outposts and reoccupied two roads after forcing KIA troops to withdraw. By April 21, the heavy fighting displaced about 5,000 people, while road closures by Tatmadaw made it difficult for aid groups to send relief.

In June, the conflict between KIA and Tatmadaw started to spill over to neighboring northern Shan state, where the Shan State Army-North (SSA-North) [→ Myanmar (SSA / Shan State)] and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) operate. KIA and allied TNLA had not yet signed the ceasefire agreement with the government. On June 4, a battalion commander and two soldiers were killed during an ambush on a vehicle in Kut Khaing Township, northern Shan state. TNLA claimed responsibility for the ambush while an army officer, confirming the major's death, stated that KIA and TNLA had collaborated during the attack. On June 5, the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) issued a statement describing the consequences for civilians in Shan state caused by the military operations against KIA. According to SHRF, Tatmadaw deployed an additional 1,000 troops into the northern Shan state and southeastern Kachin state and fired hundreds of shells in the populated Shan farming area of Tung Loi Ho Hsur west of Namkham. The SHRF accused the Tatmadaw of looting and destroying several villages, killing at least one civilian, injuring five, and displacing 1,000. Fighting continued between the army and TNLA in Shan state from June 11 to June 15. In Kutkai Township on June 15, KIA was reportedly involved in a clash between Tatmadaw and a coalition of ethnic rebel groups, consisting of the KIA, the TNLA and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). In the following days, the army reportedly set up helicopter landing pads, stockpiling rocket launchers and artillery shells in the states of Kachin and Shan, while ethnic armed groups stepped up cooperation and forced recruitment. Fighting between KIA and Tatmadaw intensified again on June 24 and 25 in northern Shan state, leaving at least four soldiers dead. On August 8 and 10, soldiers and militants clashed at Sabaw Maw, a KIA-controlled ruby mine area. At least four army soldiers were killed and the troops burned down a nearby KIA base. About 200 civilians from Hpakant Township were displaced. On October 1, Tatmadaw and a combined force of TNLA, KIA, and MNDAA clashed in Kutkhai, leaving 17 soldiers dead and four injured. On October 15, the Tatmadaw demanded the KIA to withdraw from a base close to the Kachin jade mining town of Hpakant and deployed soldiers, while KIA fighters prepared to defend the area. More than 1,000 Kachin villagers left the area. From October 15 to 16, Tatmadaw divisions invaded territories of Loi Kang village, Kutkhai, clashing with the allied forces of TNLA, KIA, and MNDAA. On November 19, Tatmadaw attacked a KIA military training academy in Laiza, reportedly using M102 howitzers. The 23 cadets killed in the attack were trainees from the non-state armed groups All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF), Arakan Army (AA), Chin National Front (CNF), and TNLA. 20 people, among them four KIA commanders, were injured. On November 22, the Tatmadaw reportedly fired six mortar shells at

KIA positions located on the border of Bhamo and Momauk townships. The following day, Tatmadaw reportedly shelled KIA defense posts around Laiza. On December 10 in eastern Shan state, seven soldiers died and at least 20 were injured in clashes with the Kokang militant group, reportedly supported by TNLA and KIA.

The peacemaking process continued throughout the year. Despite several attempts since 2013, a formal nationwide ceasefire agreement was not realized and peace meetings were postponed several times. During the signing conference in January, KIO announced that it would sign the nationwide ceasefire agreement as long as political dialog started immediately, while the government's negotiation team prioritized the signing over political dialog. On May 13 and 14, the first bilateral talks since 10/10/13 took place. KIO and the government agreed on the formation of a peace monitoring commission, observing both sides' troop movements. From August 15 to 17, the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) held talks with the government's Union Peacemaking Working Committee (UPWC) in Rangoon, where the government's negotiators confirmed the inclusion of federalism in the nationwide ceasefire deal. The following day, ethnic armed groups' leaders met with Aung San Suu Kyi, chairperson of main opposition party National League for Democracy (NLD), asking her to observe the ongoing peace process [→ Myanmar (opposition movement)]. During the next informal round of peace talks from September 22 to 24, government negotiators rejected the proposed formation of a "federal army", consisting of ethnically constituted armed units. After the attack on the Kachin military academy in Laiza on November 19, the NCCT held a meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand, stating that the peace process should go on despite the incident. On December 9, the KIA joined the announcement by twelve ethnic armed groups to form a "Federal Union Army". On December 10, the KIA decided to cancel its monthly meetings with local Tatmadaw commanders in the Kachin state capital Myitkyina, which were held to prevent further escalation after the November 19 attack. Senior representatives of both Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups remained absent from another round of NCCT ceasefire talks that took place in Rangoon on December 21 and 22. nwu

MYANMAR (KNU, KNLA, DKBA / KAYIN STATE, KAYAH STATE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: DKBA, KNLA, KNU vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy

The autonomy conflict between the Karen National Union (KNU), its military wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), on the one hand, and the government, on the other hand, continued as a violent crisis.


Following the 11/02/13 meeting of 17 ethnic groups including the KNU in Laiza, the discussions concerning a nationwide ceasefire agreement continued. On January 5 and at the beginning of June, the KNU leadership met President Thein Sein, Parliamentary Speaker Shwe Mann and Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces, officially known as Tatmadaw. The KNU also joined meetings between the government and numerous ethnic groups on January 29 as well as March 9 and 10. At the

beginning of September, the KNU left the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) due to a power struggle in its leadership and the slow advancement of the peace negotiations, but remained a member of the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) [→ Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)]. On October 14, DKBA, KNLA Brigade 2 and 5, Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO), and the KNU/KNLA Peace Council announced the formation of a re-unified Karen army, Kawthoolei Armed Forces (KAF). After an apparent standstill in the peace negotiations, on December 22, members of the NCCT, including the KNU, met with the Union Peacemaking Work Committee in the capital Rangoon and agreed on the remaining aspects of the draft. The delegates expressed hope to sign the nationwide ceasefire on 02/12/15.

On June 13 and 14, military conflict erupted again in an incident where Tatmadaw shot one KNLA fighter dead and injured another in an attack in Tanintharyi Township, Huaypha area. On June 14, 80 army soldiers attacked more than ten KNLA Brigade 4 members in Dawei Township, Tanintharyi Region, using guns and killing one KNLA militant. On July 7, the DKBA and army clashed in Kawkareik Township, Kayin State, using artillery. No casualties were reported.

One army soldier was killed in a fight between KNLA and Tatmadaw on September 9 in Papun district, Kayin State. On September 18, DKBA and army troops fought in Myawaddy, Kayin State, killing one and injuring another DKBA fighter. Two days later, Burmese Border Guard Forces (BGF) killed a KNU militant in the same town. During a scheduled meeting on September 26 in Kyaikmayaw, Mon State, DKBA detained eight army soldiers and injured two in a following clash which involved the use of mortars. The following day, heavy fighting with rocket propelled grenades (RPG) broke out between both sides and displaced about 100 people. Meanwhile, one KNU fighter was killed in a fight with army soldiers in Kyaukgyi Township, Bago Region. From October 3 to 11, heavy fighting between both groups took place in Kawkareik and Hlaingbwe Township in Kayin state and Kyaikmayaw. It involved the use of heavy artillery, mortars, and RPGs and displaced 200 people. DKBA detained 20 soldiers and injured two. Tatmadaw deployed 1,000 soldiers in the area and killed five DKBA fighters. On October 11, clashes between both sides in Myawaddy and Kawkareik killed four civilians, injured at least five, and forced several hundreds to leave their homes. kv, prü

MYANMAR (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)


Intensity: **1** | Change:  | Start: **1962**

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over the orientation of the political system and national power between various opposition groups and the government de-escalated to a dispute. On February 10, the main opposition party, National League for Democracy (NLD), and The 88 Generation Peace and Open Society (88 Generation), a political organization that emerged after the student-led uprising of 1988, announced their formal cooperation to push for a constitutional reform before the 2015 general election. The 2008 adopted Constitution guaranteed the military 25 percent of parliamentary seats thereby giving them a veto power over constitutional amendments, barred NLD chairperson Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming president,

and was opposed by ethnic groups who demanded a federal system [→ Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)]. In May, NLD and 88 Generation activists held large rallies in the capital Rangoon and Mandalay, starting a nationwide public campaign to put pressure on the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the military to accept the amendments to the Constitution. On May 27, a USDP member accused the opposition's campaign of purposely provoking public disorder. On June 30, NLD announced that more than 3.3 million people had signed the petition to change Article 436 of the Constitution that granted the military veto power. On August 13, NLD and 88 Generation presented the petition to the parliament, stressing the political importance of the call of nearly five million citizens for constitutional reforms. On November 8, more than 10,000 people attended a speech by Suu Kyi in the Karen State capital Loikaw where she addressed the need for constitutional reforms. Military representatives in the parliament signaled their refusal of the amendments on November 17. The following day, the speaker of the Lower House stated that changes to the constitution could only be enacted after the general election in 2015. On December 30, Suu Kyi conditioned the NLD's participation in the general election on the rules and regulations given. nwu

MYANMAR (UWSA, NDAA / SHAN STATE)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **1988**

Conflict parties: NDAA, UWSA vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy


The autonomy conflict between the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the military wing of the United Wa State Party, and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), on the one hand, and the government, on the other hand, continued as a non-violent crisis.

The UWSA, consisting of former members of the Communist Party of Burma (BCP) and the Chinese Kuomintang, named their territory Wa State Special Administrative District in 2009, which the government still had not recognized in 2014. While the government in 1989 promised the NDAA, which also comprised former BCP members, autonomy of the Mong La region, NDAA only governed Special Region 4 of Shan state.

In 2014, neither of the groups attended any of the meetings or discussions about the nationwide ceasefire agreement. On March 3, a delegation of the UWSA in Naypyidaw demanded the government for its own state. On May 12, the UWSA clarified that they did not want secession but rather autonomy of the Wa region. However, the government reacted with occasional threats of violence. A military leader threatened to fight and drive the UWSA out of Myanmar. On June 5, military units moved from Taunggyi closer to the UWSA bases in Mongsu and continued to observe them. From July 30 to 31, a meeting of 18 ethnic armed groups that were not part of the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) took place, yet UWSA and NDAA did not attend. They did not participate in any talks with President Thein Sein, Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, or the military leaders of the ethnic groups of Shan, Wa, and Mong La on August 27. However, UWSA and NDAA stated that they were interested in signing the ceasefire accord once it was ready. After a standstill at the end of the year, the NCCT and the Union Peacemaking Work Committee agreed on the last open issues

of the ceasefire draft on December 22. kv

NEPAL (MADHESHIS / TERAI)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **2004**

Conflict parties: ATMM, JTMM, JTMM factions, MJF, MRJP, TSJP vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy

The autonomy conflict in the Terai region between various Madheshi parties and militant groups and the government de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.


While no militant attacks were reported this year, authorities arrested four people for being involved in attacks in previous years. Several parties and armed groups participated in talks with the government. At one meeting with the government in Dhanusa, Janakpur zone, Central region, on August 10 and 11, five Terai-based militant outfits, among them the Akil Tarai Mukti Morcha (ATMM), declared that they would take part in the constitution-making process and would cease using violent methods. The government also signed a five-point peace agreement with the Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha (JTMM). On November 2, the ATMM reiterated their willingness to hold talks with the government under the mediation of a third party. On December 7, the militant groups Terai Samyukta Jankranti Party and Madhes Rastra Janatantrik Party surrendered their arms to the government in Sapatari, Sagarmatha zone, East region.

In the ongoing constitution-making process, Madheshi groups advocated a system of ethnic-based federalism. Thus, on July 10, the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), the Federal Socialist Party-Nepal, and five Madheshi parties announced the formation of the Federal Republican Alliance. On October 10, an alliance of 22 parties including Madheshi groups launched a rally in the capital Kathmandu, demanding the integration of federalism in the new constitution.

On November 21 and 22, various Madheshi parties protested in Janakpur over the spontaneous cancellation of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to holy sites in Terai. They also burned an effigy of Nepali Prime Minister Sushil Koirala, accusing him of not ensuring Modi's visit, which they believed would have been a morale boost for the Terai people. A general strike was held the same day.

On September 13, police detained activist Chandra Kant Raut for questioning Nepal's territorial integrity while he was delivering a speech demanding Terai's right to secede within a democratic process. The arrest received international attention. Over the next months, Madheshi groups staged several protests demanding Raut's release. After he was released on bail in November, police arrested him again on December 28. After the second arrest, Raut's supporters protested in Jaleswor town, Janakpur. krk

NORTH KOREA – SOUTH KOREA

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: DPRK vs. ROK

Conflict items: territory, system/ideology, international power

The non-violent crisis over ideology, international power, and territory between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

(DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) continued. In his New Year's address on January 1, DPRK leader Kim Jong-un called for improving ties with the South while also vowing to strengthen the military. On January 6, ROK President Park Geun-hye stated her commitment to an era of unification, but named the nuclear threats from the North as the primary barrier [→ North Korea - USA, South Korea, Japan]. In early February, the ROK's military confirmed that the North had apparently stopped broadcasts and leaflet drops targeted at the South since December 2013. From February 20 to 25, separated family members from both sides met in the DPRK's Mount Kumgang tourist region. On March 9, the ROK's Ministry of Unification announced that operations at the jointly run Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) recovered to levels before the 2013 shutdown.

On March 26, the DPRK fired two mid-range Nodong ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan/East Sea. The ROK's defense ministry condemned the launch as a clear breach of UN Security Council resolutions. Five days later, the ROK Armed Forces fired hundreds of artillery rounds north of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) into the Yellow Sea, after the Korean People's Army shelled the area south of the NLL in a previously announced drill. On April 11, ROK's defense ministry claimed that three drones, having crashed on ROK territory in late March, were proved to be from the DPRK.

On June 26, a general meeting of an inter-Korean committee, established to oversee the development of the KIC, ended without an agreement. Three days later, prior to the visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Seoul, the DPRK fired again two short-range missiles into the Sea of Japan/East Sea. On August 18, the ROK's Ministry of Unification announced its 2014 Inter-Korean Development Program, including an expansion of economic collaboration and improvement of human rights in the North. On September 24, Park declared in her speech at the UN General Assembly that the North should follow the recommendations of the 2013 established UNHCR Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK, and urged third countries to support and protect North Korean defectors.

In September and October, the DPRK dispatched 273 athletes to the Asian Games and nine to the Asian Para Games, both hosted by the ROK in Incheon. On October 4, the DPRK sent a high-ranking delegation to the closing ceremony. Three days later, a patrol boat from the North crossed the NLL, leading to an exchange of warning fires. On October 10, the 69th anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea, South Korean activist group Fighters for a Free North Korea (FFNK) launched ten balloons with approx. 200,000 regime-critical leaflets. When the North tried to shoot down the balloons, some of the bullets landed south of the border and led to an exchange of warning fire with the South. Five days later, both sides met for high-level military talks in the village of Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

On October 19, approx. ten Korean People's Army soldiers approached the Military Demarcation Line inside the DMZ near Paju city, Gyeonggi province. The soldiers retreated immediately after the South fired warning shots. Five days later, South Korean activists, mostly defectors from the North, started another leaflet balloon launch in Gyeonggi and clashed with local people, who condemned the activity as a threat to peace. On November 3, the DPRK ruled out talks as long as the spread of leaflets continued. On December 19, ROK's constitutional court banned the pro-North Unified Progressive Party. The government deployed busloads of riot police to the court, where supporters and opponents of the move held demonstrations. On December 29, the ROK

officially proposed talks with the DPRK in January 2015 to discuss pending inter-Korean issues. lxl

NORTH KOREA – USA, SOUTH KOREA, JAPAN

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1990**

Conflict parties: DPRK vs. Japan, ROK, USA
 Conflict items: system/ideology, international power, other

The non-violent crisis over ideology and international power between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), on the one hand, and the USA, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan, on the other, continued. On February 24, the US and ROK commenced their joint military exercises Foal Eagle and Key Resolve. Two days later, the DPRK launched four short-range missiles from its Gitdaeryeong base in Gangwon province into the Sea of Japan/East Sea. On July 2, during their joint RIMPAC military exercise, the US, the ROK, and Japan agreed to work closer militarily to answer the DPRK’s nuclear threat. Two days later, Japan released some of its unilateral sanctions on the DPRK, which announced a special investigation on the case of the Japanese nationals the DPRK had abducted in the late 1970s. On June 3, commander of US Forces Korea Curtis Scaparrotti publicly recommended the deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system to the ROK. In late August, the US and the ROK commenced their annual joint Ulchi Freedom Guardian military exercise. Close to its end on September 1, the DPRK launched a ballistic missile into the East Sea. On October 24, the DPRK insisted on its nuclear development and called on the US to abandon its hostile policy. In mid-November, DPRK special envoy Choe Ryong-hae paid a one-week visit to Russia, reportedly reaching agreement over improving political, economic, and military ties and increasing efforts to resume the six-party talks. On November 23, the DPRK’s defense minister announced that his country would fight back “super strongly” against the US, Japan, and the ROK. On December 19, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation accused the DPRK of a cyber-attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment. US President Barack Obama stated that the US would respond proportionately. On December 29, the US, the ROK, and Japan concluded an agreement on sharing intelligence regarding the DPRK’s nuclear weapon and missile development.

On February 17, the 2013 established UNHCR Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Human Rights in the DPRK released its final report, stating that human rights violations were systematic and widespread. On March 25 during the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, Netherlands, ROK President Park Geun-hye stated that China should not veto the report of COI. During the summit, the US and China reached consensus on their opposition to nuclear weapons in the DPRK but disagreed over a restart of the six-party talks. On October 15, a DPRK representative to the UN circulated a resolution opposing the COI human rights report. On October 26, over 100,000 people demonstrated in the capital Pyongyang, DPRK, against the UN vote condemning the country’s human rights record. On November 19, the UN General Assembly adopted a draft resolution on human rights issues in the DPRK, endorsing the COI’s report and recommending the UN Security Council discuss the issue. On December 22, the UNSC passed a vote adding the issue of human rights in the DPRK to its agenda and debated on referring it to the ICJ. lxl

PAKISTAN (INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE / SINDH)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↘ | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: Mohajirs, MQM vs. Pakhtuns, ANP vs. Balochs, Sindhis, PPP

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The conflict over subnational predominance in the province of Sindh between different ethnic groups and their affiliated political parties de-escalated to a violent crisis. The affiliated parties included the Mohajir people and their political organization the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), the Pakhtuns, backed by the Awami National Party (ANP), and the Balochs and Sindhis, both of which are supported by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Most of the violence occurred in Sindh’s capital Karachi, where Mohajirs constitute the majority. According to official sources, 2,909 people were killed in Karachi during 2014, including 134 political activists. At least 120 people died due to sectarian violence, many of them falling victim to targeted killings.

On January 3, exiled MQM leader Altaf Hussain threatened the ruling PPP with partitioning Sindh if his party’s political demands were ignored. The statement caused strong reactions among Sindhi nationalist parties resulting in protests and strikes throughout the province. On October 19, MQM announced its separation from the PPP-led provincial government, accusing it of fostering ethnic division.

On February 28, two MQM workers were shot dead when leaving a mosque in the provincial capital Karachi. On April 30, four disfigured bodies of MQM members were found in Gadap Town, Karachi. In reaction, a large number of party members gathered in Karachi and Hyderabad, Sindh, firing in the air and closing down shops. On May 2, MQM organized a day of mourning and peaceful protest with a complete shutdown of businesses and markets in Karachi. On September 5 and November 28, militants killed four MQM activists in separate incidents in the city. During September, MQM carried out several sit-ins in Karachi, protesting the torture and abduction of 41 party members. The paramilitary force Sindh Rangers had arrested the 41 members in the course of a 2013 targeted operation.

On January 29, a series of three explosions targeting a local ANP leader in SITE Town, Karachi, injured at least 16 people. On February 20, militants opened fire on a car, killing all five passengers including three ANP workers in Orangi Town, Karachi. On November 5, the PPP stated that three of its members had been killed in Karachi.

In Lyari Town, Karachi, 87 people died throughout the year due to clashes between rival gangs allegedly affiliated with ethnic groups and political parties. In the course of a two-day clash between heavily armed groups starting on March 10, 19 civilians died in Lyari Town, Karachi. On the same day, locals took to the streets demanding demilitarization and politicization of the police. Paramilitary forces killed eleven militants affiliated with the Baba Ladla group.

On May 13, Iranian border guards reportedly shot and killed Noor Mohammad alias Baba Ladla when he crossed the Pakistan-Iran border. He was wanted in 120 registered cases of murder, attempted murder, kidnapping, as well as drug peddling and extortion.

On September 29, an official of the Sindh Rangers stated that since September 2013 more than 2,250 criminals had been arrested in Karachi. According to them, over 400 raids were

carried out and 560 MQM and 40 ANP suspects arrested. According to MQM, at least 700 of its party's workers had been jailed and thousands detained. In October, Karachi police stated that they had killed 572 and arrested 16,986 people from 09/05/2013 to October 29, while 170 police personnel had been killed in Karachi. nwu

PAKISTAN (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: al-Qaeda, TTP, Haqqani Network, LI, IMU vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The war over national power and the orientation of the political system between Islamist militant groups such as al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Islam (LI), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Haqqani Network, and, most prominently, the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) and its newly emerged splitter groups on the one side, and the government, supported by the USA, on the other, continued.

Throughout the course of the year, several groups split off the umbrella organization TTP because of internal disagreements over peace negotiations with the government. On May 28, a leading faction led by Khalid Mehsud seceded in South Waziristan agency, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). In August, Ahrar-ul-Hind (AuH) and other dissident groups merged into the new group Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), led by Omar Khalid Khorasani.

The conflict claimed the lives of more than 3,600 people, despite an ongoing peace dialog between the government and the TTP leadership. Heavy clashes between militants and security forces mainly occurred in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KP), while militants increasingly launched attacks in the capitals of the other provinces, targeting key army and police installations.

On January 19, TTP attacked a military convoy in Bannu, KP, killing 20 soldiers and leaving 30 injured. The next day, a suicide bomber belonging to the same group killed 14 people, including seven soldiers, in Rawalpindi, Punjab. On February 13, the group targeted a police bus in Karachi, Sindh, using a car with approx. 30 kg of explosives and killing 13 policemen and 47 civilians. On February 17, the Mohmand-group of TTP killed 23 soldiers in Mohmand Agency, FATA. The peace talks between the government and TTP reached an impasse. In March, TTP announced a one-month unilateral ceasefire which was rescinded in April. Despite that, three militants of AuH, a group which had split from TTP in early February, conducted a suicide attack on a district court in the capital Islamabad on March 3, killing eleven and injuring 25 civilians. On March 14, AuH attacked a police station in Peshawar, KP, killing ten policemen and injuring 30 civilians. On the same day, the group killed ten soldiers and injured 31 in a bomb attack on a vehicle of security forces in Quetta, Balochistan province.

On June 8, TTP and IMU, armed with automatic weapons, a rocket launcher, suicide vests, and grenades, jointly attacked the cargo terminal of Jinnah International Airport in Karachi. 29 people were killed, including the ten militants. One week later, the government started the military operation "Zarb-e-Azb", mainly covering North Waziristan agency and Khyber agency, FATA. According to official sources, around 30,000 personnel took part in the operation, involving all branches of the armed forces as well as other paramilitary personnel.

In the course of the following months, the army's air force destroyed many hideouts of TTP and IMU whereby over 2,000 militants and 190 security personnel were killed. More than a million IDPs fled to nearby districts where the government had arranged refugee camps which were in turn attacked by militants on several occasions.

On August 15, security forces foiled two attacks by 13 militants of TTP's splinter groups on two military airbases in Quetta. The fighting resulted in the death of twelve militants, eleven injured soldiers, and one arrest. On September 6, about six al-Qaida militants attempted to attack Karachi's naval dockyard with rocket launchers, assault rifles, and grenades. Navy security forces killed two militants and arrested four.

In October, the government launched the air and ground operation "Khyber 1" against LI, JuA, and TTP, mainly covering Khyber. The US-supported air strikes in the areas of Bara, Jamrud, Sepah, and Akakhel killed more than 130 militants and destroyed several ammunition depots. The number of IDPs rose to more than 30,000.

On November 2, a militant carried out a suicide attack at a border checkpoint during the daily border closing ceremony in Wagah village, Punjab, using 25 kg of explosives. 60 civilians died and at least 100 were injured. JuA, TTP as well as Jundullah [→ Pakistan (Sunni militants – religious groups)] claimed responsibility.

On December 16, seven TTP militants stormed the Army Public School in Peshawar, KP, killing 145 civilians, mostly children. Special forces killed all militants and rescued the remaining 900 civilians. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif called the attack a national tragedy. On December 22, he announced a second "Zarb-e-Azb" operation that would focus on urban areas and villages. Consequently, the number of air strikes in FATA and KP increased. On December 17, the prime minister's office announced the moratorium on the death penalty, imposed in 2008, to be lifted for terror-related cases. Two days later, the first two convicted militants, who were unrelated to the attack in Peshawar, were executed in Faisalabad, Punjab. On December 25, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged Sharif to end the executions. sak

PAKISTAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1998**













Conflict parties: PAT, PTI vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between the opposition parties and the government continued on the level of a violent crisis. Supporters of Islamic preacher Tahirul Qadri, leader of Pakistan Awami Tehrik (PAT) Party, which formerly campaigned solely against corruption, and supporters of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) Party staged several protests throughout the year. Qadri and PTI party leader Imran Khan jointly demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, accusing him of failing to investigate the 2013 polls and mishandling of economic, military, and infrastructural issues. On October 2, Qadri announced to contest the next elections with his party.

On June 16, eight supporters of Qadri were killed, up to 80 were wounded, and several were arrested in Lahore, Punjab province, when police and protesters clashed in front of the office of Qadri. Police used tear gas and firearms while the protesters threw stones. One week later, when Qadri tried to

PAKISTAN (ISLAMIST MILITANTS)




NO VIOLENT CONFLICT MEASURES VIOLENT CRISIS LIMITED WAR WAR

return to the capital Islamabad from his exile in Canada, the government denied him landing permission and redirected his flight to Lahore. One day before a planned demonstration on August 10, clashes erupted between Qadri supporters and police forces in Lahore. Four Qadri supporters and two policemen died.

On August 14, the Pakistani independence day, Khan headed a large-scale march from Lahore to Islamabad. A parallel march was led by Qadri. They led up to 17,000 people to Islamabad. Meanwhile, police forces in Islamabad tried to secure governmental buildings with road blockades and thousands of policemen. On August 15, alleged supporters of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League attacked Khan's convoy with stones in Gujranwala, Punjab. On August 21, parliament passed a resolution against a possible resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The government accused the protesters of undermining democracy. On August 30, the marching protesters arrived in the capital, breaking barriers with wire cutters and cranes and blocking the parliament and other state buildings with a sit-in. Several hundred PTI and PAT protesters clashed with police forces from August 30 to September 1, following the protest leaders' order to move towards Sharif's house. Three people died, up to 264 people were injured, and police forces arrested 100 PTI and PAT supporters. Police personnel used tear gas and rubber bullets, and the protesters used sticks, hand tools, and stones. Protesters gained temporary control of Pakistan's broadcast station PTV. On October 20, Pakistani authorities suspended pro-PTI broadcaster ARY News TV for 15 days, accusing it of defaming the judiciary. On October 22, Qadri ended the sit-in of his supporters. Talks between government and Khan about the investigation of alleged ballot rigging in 2013 and electoral reforms failed in August, but were resumed on December 13. One day after an attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, on December 16, [→ Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)] Imran Khan ended his supporters' blockade. According to police sources, 60,000 people had taken part in the march. mw, iro

PAKISTAN (SUNNI MILITANTS – RELIGIOUS GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1985**

Conflict parties: TTP, LeJ, Jundullah, Jal vs. Ahmadiyya, Christians, Hindus, Shiites

Conflict items: subnational predominance


The conflict over subnational predominance between militant Sunni groups, among them Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and Shiites and other religious minorities de-escalated to a violent crisis. Despite accusations, TTP did not claim responsibility for any attacks while a new group called Jaysh-al-Islam (Jal) entered the conflict [→ Syria (inter-opposition violence)].

On January 1, a Jal suicide bomber killed at least three Shiite pilgrims in the town of Akhtarabad, Balochistan province. Five days later, a LeJ suicide bomber killed a Shiite teenager, who had foiled his attack on a school in Hangu, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. On January 21, LeJ bombed a bus carrying Shiite pilgrims, killing 22 in Kanak, Mastung district of Balochistan. On February 9, assailants killed at least eight civilians in a targeted attack aimed at a Sufi shrine in Karachi, the capital of Sindh province. On April 25, an im-

provised explosive device killed at least four Shiite civilians in Karachi, Sindh province. On May 13, militants blew up an Imambargah, a congregation hall for Shiite commemoration ceremonies, in Mansehra, KP. On June 8, a Jal suicide bomber killed 30 Shiite pilgrims in an attack on two buses parked in front of a hotel in Taftan, Chaghai district, Balochistan. On August 29, assailants targeted and killed six Zikri worshippers at a Zikri shrine in Awaran district, Balochistan. On October 23, five assailants entered a bus and selectively shot dead eight Shiite passengers in Quetta, Balochistan.

In attacks on notable public religious figures, 17 people died. These included Syed Asghar Ali Shah, the KP provincial president of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria, a Shiite Muslim religious organization, and Azhar Hussain, president of Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen Pakistan, a Shiite religious and political organization based in Rajanpur district. On May 26, militants shot dead Ahmadi Mehdi Ali Qamar, a US citizen, in Chenab Nagar, Punjab. Throughout the year, at least 45 people died in smaller attacks. mhu

PAKISTAN (TALIBAN – TRIBES)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: TTP, LI vs. various tribes, tribal militias

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational predominance

The conflict over ideology and subnational predominance between Sunni militant groups, such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) on the one hand, and various tribes with their respective militias supported by the government, on the other, continued as a violent crisis.

The conflict mainly took place in Pakistan's semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan, but it also spread to the neighboring province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Throughout the year, at least 80 people were killed in assassinations and bombings targeted at tribal elders and militia fighters as well as in smaller clashes between Islamist and tribal militia fighters. Tribal militias, also called Lashkar, closely cooperated with the army. Moreover, militants attacked camps of people displaced by the ongoing army offensive [→ Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)].

In early January, additional tribal militias were sent to the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan in FATA to support the border security forces in combating cross-border intrusion. In one of many similar incidents throughout the year, a remotely triggered bomb blast killed two fighters of the Zakhakhel tribal militia in Khyber agency, FATA, on January 15. On February 1, one militant, one policeman, and at least three Lashkar fighters were killed in a shootout after the Lashkar members apprehended militants planting explosives next to a road on the outskirts of Peshawar, KP. On February 12, several militants attacked the house of a tribal militia's leader, killing him and eight of his relatives in Peshawar, KP. On April 7, militants attacked a tribal Lashkar's premises in Khyber agency, killing two. On April 12, TTP abducted more than a hundred civilians from a market fair in Orakzai agency, FATA. After a few days of negotiations with local elders, TTP released most of them.

The LI issued an ultimatum forcing the civilians of Bara subdivision, Khyber agency, to either support the militants or flee by April 27. Subsequently, hundreds left the area. On May 1, a tribal elder and two civilians were killed in a drive-by shooting close to Miranshah, North Waziristan agency, FATA.

In several incidents in the first half of May, a tribal militia in Khyber agency shot dead at least six people allegedly spying for Islamist groups. On May 18, a suicide bomber killed at least four people and injured several others in a registration camp for refugees in Tirah Valley, Khyber agency. Alleged TTP militants fired rockets and grenades on a camp of refugees on June 10, forcing hundreds to flee the area in Orakzai agency. In mid-July, tribal elders from Bajaur agency, FATA, announced the founding of a new tribal militia comprising of thousands of fighters to stop illegal border crossings from Afghanistan [→ Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)]. Subsequently, the military agreed to postpone its planned offensive in the area. Fighting between Islamist militants and tribal fighters continued throughout the rest of the year. For example on August 13, militants fired a rocket on the house of a local militia leader in Khyber agency, injuring nine people. On September 28, TTP shot dead a prominent Lashkar leader in Bajaur agency. On October 11, a roadside bomb killed another militia leader in Kohat district, KP. On December 10, tribal militia fighters attacked a camp of TTP and LI in Khyber agency with heavy weapons, killing two LI militants. hru

PAKISTAN – INDIA

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: Pakistan vs. India
 Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The conflict over international power, resources, and the status of the Kashmir region between Pakistan and India escalated to a limited war. Over the course of the year, Pakistani and Indian soldiers clashed at least 81 times on the contested Line of Control (LoC), leaving a total of 25 Pakistanis and 16 Indians dead and at least 130 injured.

On April 25, Pakistani and Indian troops violated the 2003 ceasefire agreement for the first time in 2014 along the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir state (J&K), using small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars. Another four violent skirmishes between both parties followed until May 11, without casualties or material damage.

On June 13, Pakistani and Indian troops clashed, firing across the LoC in Poonch district, J&K, using mortar shells and automatic weapons. Two Pakistani civilians were injured. In 17 similar skirmishes between June 13 and August 23, one Indian soldier, two Indian civilians and seven Pakistani civilians died, while another 30 people were injured.

After heavy floods in September had damaged over 50 km of border fencing along the LoC and International Border in Jammu and Kashmir, India deployed a system to prevent cross-border infiltration.

Between October 2 and 24, cross-border firing erupted along the LoC and the international border in seven different areas. In at least 50 skirmishes, heavy firing with automatic weapons, mortar shells and 81 mm rockets from both sides killed twelve Pakistanis, nine Indians, and injured more than 100 people in total. Due to the heavy firing, around 20,000 refugees left the border area. Between November 8 and December 8, shortly before and during the Assembly Elections in Indian-administered state of J&K, five border skirmishes along the LoC in J&K killed one Indian soldier and one Indian civilian.

On May 26, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif took part in the swearing-in ceremony of India's newly elected Prime Min-

ister Narendra Modi in the capital New Delhi. In a meeting on the sidelines of the ceremony, Sharif expressed his desire to overcome the mutual distrust of both countries by fostering peace and development. On August 18, India called off foreign secretary-level talks with Pakistan due to Pakistan's High Commissioner Abdul Basit's meeting with Kashmiri separatist leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani in New Delhi [→ India (JeM et al./ Kashmir)]. At a meeting with National Security Advisor Ajit Doval on October 9, Modi announced India would maintain a hard stand towards ceasefire violations by Pakistan. On October 10, Pakistan's Foreign Office urged India to allow the UN military observer group UNMOGIP to visit their side of the LoC, which India refused.

From August 25 to 28, Indian and Pakistani delegations of the Indian Indus Water Commission met in Lahore, Punjab state. Pakistan objected to the building of the Kishanganga dam and four other proposed dams at the Jhelum and the Chenab rivers in Jammu and Kashmir state. Pakistan's Indus Water Commissioner Mirza Asif Baig announced Pakistan would appeal to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) if no settlement was found. On 02/18/2013, the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague, Netherlands, had rejected its claim that India's Kishanganga dam project was a violation of the Indus Water Treaty. jam

PAPUA NEW GUINEA (BOUGAINVILLE)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **•** | Start: **1964**

Conflict parties: customary landowners, MDF, veterans, women groups vs. Meekamui Tribal Government, MGU vs. ABG, BCL, government

Conflict items: autonomy, resources, other

The dispute over autonomy and resources on the Papua New Guinean (PNG) island of Bougainville resumed with negotiations over the reopening of the Panguna copper mine. In 1988, quarrels over the mine led to its closure in the ensuing civil war between the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and the government, which lasted until January 1998 and caused at least 10,000 deaths. In August 2002, the Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA) granted Bougainville autonomous control over its resources and the right for a referendum on independence between 2015 and 2020. The BPA also included a weapons disposal program, whose completion was declared by the UN Observer Mission on Bougainville in 2005.

In 2013, plans on the mine's reopening were increasingly put forward. While customary landowners, veterans, and women's groups opposed them, the plans were endorsed by the government and the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG), landowner associations, and the mine's former operator Bougainville Copper Ltd. (BCL), a subsidiary of the Rio Tinto Group.

Former BRA members, who referred to themselves as Meekamui and retained de facto control over the Panguna area since the civil war, remained split over the mine's reopening. While the Meekamui Government of Unity (MGU), led by Moses Pipiro, and the Meekamui Tribal Government, led by Philip Miriori, were willing to negotiate, the Meekamui Defence Forces (MDF), led by Chris Uma, opposed the mine's reopening. MDF reportedly refused to dispose all of their weapons and established a "no go zone" around the mine. In January, Peter O'Neill resumed relations with Bougainville

by being the first prime minister to visit Panguna since the end of the war. Together with ABG President John Momis, he attended a reconciliation ceremony at the mine site, accompanied by police and Meekamui fighters. The visit was received ambiguously, and Bougainvilleans continued to hold reconciliation ceremonies throughout the island. While the factions of Miriori and Pipiro supported the visit, MDF held strong objections. In February and March, chiefs from Central Bougainville District and women's groups rejected the re-opening at the current point of time. Women's groups named complete ownership of the mine by Bougainville people, compensation payments by Rio Tinto, and the restoration of the environment as conditions. On August 8, the ABG passed the third draft of the Bougainville Mining Bill 2014 as a transitional agreement, cancelling BCL's exploration and mining licenses. People demonstrating in front of the parliament in Buka had delayed the adoption by three days. On September 9, due to outstanding compensation from the National Lands Department, landowners blocked the re-opening of the Aropa Airport in Buka, which was shut during the war in 1991. The airport was finally reopened by O'Neill on December 12. In September, NGO Jubilee Australia published a report containing interviews conducted with villagers around the mine at the end of 2013 who felt uninformed and insufficiently consulted with regard to the mining plans and stated their objections to the re-opening. Momis and landowner associations criticized the report for not representing the majority opinion. However, MP for Central Bougainville Jimmy Miringtoro stated that the report reflected the affected communities' attitude. In October, Miriori met with O'Neill in Port Moresby. Uma criticized him for not consulting other Meekamui leaders. On December 2, Momis wrote a public letter to O'Neill, referring to a meeting between O'Neill and the MGU on October 9 in which he had reportedly denoted the mining bill as invalid. According to the letter, O'Neill had further stated that Bougainville's share would not exceed 35 percent and that he intended to control mining operations in Panguna in a similar fashion to the Ok Tedi mine in Western Province [→ Papua New Guinea (socioeconomic protests)]. In addition, Momis objected that O'Neill had not made these statements in their meetings on October 3 and November 18, warning that they could potentially undermine the PNG-ABG relationship and the people's trust in the BPA. On December 12, Bougainville leaders criticized the final draft of the mining bill for significantly deviating from the transitional agreement adopted in August, stating that it would enable BCL to regain its mining licenses. mrl, jfr

PAPUA NEW GUINEA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: 2 | Change: ↗ | Start: 2011

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government
 Conflict items: national power, other

The national power conflict between the opposition, headed by Belden Namah and later by Don Polye, and the government, headed by Prime Minister Peter O'Neill, escalated to a non-violent crisis. Throughout the year, news about the two corruption trials launched by Namah against O'Neill were ubiquitous. The first started in 2013 and concerned O'Neill's alleged payments of Kina 28 Million to the Paraka law firm for a controversial legal trial. The second was launched in April over untaxed payments of Kina 50 Million to Israeli enterprise LR group for two turbine generators.

On June 16, Sam Koim, chairman of anti-corruption agency Task-Force Sweep, issued an arrest warrant for O'Neill due to the forensic confirmation of his signature on a payment letter to the Paraka lawyers. Two days later, O'Neill disbanded the Task Force Sweep and fired the police commissioner.

On June 24, more than 1,000 students and other city residents protested against corruption and demanded O'Neill's resignation at Unagi Oval place in the capital Port Moresby. Protests also occurred in the provinces of Chimbu and Eastern Highlands. Protesters in Chimbu threatened to shut down the national highway if O'Neill did not resign. On June 25, authorities announced a protest ban. The following day, O'Neill appointed Geoffrey Vaki as new Acting Police Commissioner, who withdrew the warrant against him. On July 1, supporters of O'Neill's electorate in Southern Highlands province threatened to close down the USD 19 billion ExxonMobil Liquefied Natural Gas plant, if O'Neill resigned [→ Papua New Guinea (socioeconomic protests)].

On October 3, the Supreme Court ruled that Vaki was not authorized to stop the warrant against O'Neill. Parliamentary opposition leader Namah was replaced by MP Don Polye on December 3. On December 15, the chief justice of the Supreme Court announced Vaki would go to trial for contempt of court. nro

PAPUA NEW GUINEA (SOCIOECONOMIC PROTESTS)

Intensity: 3 | Change: • | Start: 1995

Conflict parties: customary landowners, women groups vs. government, resource companies
 Conflict items: resources, other

The resource conflict between customary landowners and women's groups on one side, and the government and mining companies on the other, continued at a violent level. Landowners and women's groups protested mining projects, demanded compensation payments, and recognition of usufructuary rights and land ownership. Protests mainly revolved around resource projects in the provinces of Enga, Hela, Madang, New Ireland, and Western Province.

On June 18, Prime Minister Peter O'Neill announced the cancellation of all illegally obtained Special Agriculture and Business Leases (SABLs) and the repeal of certain provisions in the 1996 Land Act. The National Court canceled two leases of 38,350 hectares in Oro province of plantation company Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad. The Lands Department delayed the cancellation of 25 other land leases, referring to outstanding summons. On March 19, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative acknowledged Papua New Guinea (PNG) as a candidate. At the end of July, twelve women's groups affected by mining projects were chosen to receive government grants over USD 378,341 within the frame of the World Bank funded "Small Grants Project". In the end of August, two women's groups from Winima and Kwemba signed an agreement with the Mineral Resources Authority to receive support for community projects. In March, 30 mobile squad officers were deployed after a gunfight over the distribution of compensation payments erupted between Alia and Mapulu people near the LNG project in Hela [→ Papua New Guinea (tribal violence)].

On Lihir Island, New Ireland, the dispute over compensation packages, provided by gold mine operator Newcrest and ad-

ministered by the Lihir Mine Area Landowners Association, continued. On March 21, the mine closed its operations for several days after customary landowners placed ginger plants, traditionally used to settle disputes, at its facilities. The regional government deployed additional police forces to the site.

In Porgera, Enga, several measures took place concerning the dispute over Barrick's gold mine. At the end of April, the national government declared a state of emergency following an increase of unauthorized artisanal mining. The government sent 40 PNG Defence Force soldiers and 100 Royal PNG Constabulary policemen to the region. On June 6, security forces reportedly burned down 200 houses belonging to Tiene people in Wingima village. Thousands were left homeless and two people were arrested, while most of the artisanal miners fled. On October 28, following earlier compensation demands, hundreds of residents demonstrated at the Porgera mine, demanding compensation. On December 19, they announced they would block the mine.

On August 4, approx. 200 armed landowners stormed the Ramu NiCo's Kurumbukari Mine in Madang Province, injuring five Chinese employees and sabotaging facilities and equipment. On October 9, landowners from New Ireland gave an ultimatum; either they would be recognized as a signing party in the Memorandum Agreement between the Nautilus Minerals Company and the national and provincial governments or they would prevent the realization of the deep sea mining project Solwara I, scheduled to start in 2018. mrl

PAPUA NEW GUINEA (TRIBAL VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: Alia, Homaria, Linabini, Mapulu, Paibali, Pokoli

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The conflict between various tribes over subnational predominance and resources remained violent. Authorities intervened in tribal fights by deploying police forces and highland squads.

On March 7, four persons were killed near the PNG Liquefied Natural Gas (PNG LNG) project in Hela province in a gunfight between the Alia and Mapulu clans of the Wabe tribe, which arose over the distribution of compensation payments [→ Papua New Guinea (socioeconomic protests)]. The provincial police commander Mark Yangen deployed a mobile squad of 30 officers. On March 10, one man was killed in a gunfight between Homaria and Pokoli tribes near Tari, provincial capital of Hela.

On November 4, Linabini tribesmen shot dead three Paibali tribe members in Tari. Six days later, Linabini killed two more Paibalies during the funeral of the killed. The same day, Linabini killed another Paibali. The fight between both tribes dates back to the establishment of the province in 2012, which led to disagreements over land. Yangen stated that the police were unable to intervene appropriately due to their lack of manpower and the tribesmen's high-powered rifles and guerilla tactics. He said that the Angore tribe provided the Linabini with guns and logistical support in retaliation of a murder of an Angore tribe member by Paibalies. On November 11, Hela's executive council declared the Tari-Pori electorate and parts of Komo-Margarima electorate as a fighting zone, vesting security forces with extended authority. Two days

later, Hela's provincial assembly allocated USD 763,000 to finance a 30-day mission of 100 police officers and soldiers to end the fighting. They searched, arrested and charged firearm owners, especially those involved in the clash. A few days later, the provinces of Chimbu, Southern Highlands, and Western Highlands deployed 250 military and police units to protect state assets such as the nearby PNG LNG Project and to stop the fighting, leaving around 30 dead, many more injured and 145 people arrested. The operation ended on December 4 due to lack of funding. nro

PHILIPPINES (ABU SAYYAF)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: Abu Sayyaf Group vs. government

Conflict items: secession, system/ideology

The secession and ideology conflict between militant Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the government in the southern regions of the country continued at a violent level. Throughout the year, ASG kidnapped several people in Malaysia and the Philippines and conducted bomb attacks in the latter. The group was linked to al-Qaeda and also pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in September [→ Iraq (IS et al.); Syria (inter-opposition violence)].

On January 1, alleged ASG fighters launched a bomb attack, leaving seven people dead and at least six injured in Sumisip, Basilan province. In a military operation against ASG on January 7, the army deployed a helicopter gunship and injured two civilians in Al-Barka, Basilan province, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In February, clashes between government troops and ASG in Sulu province, ARMM, left six ASG militants and one soldier dead. At the end of March, ASG attacked a community in Patikul, Sulu province, and injured three civilians. On April 11, seven to twelve people were killed and 29 were injured in a clash between ASG militants and soldiers in the town of Tipo-Tipo in Basilan. Three days later, two suspected ASG militants were killed by Philippine police in a firefight in Sulu. In May, the army launched an air and ground offensive in Jolo, Sulu, leaving 14 Abu Sayyaf militants and one soldier dead. In June, seven Philippine marines were killed and 13 others injured in fighting in Patikul. Eight days later, the Pentagon's Pacific Command reported that the American military counterterrorism operation in the southern regions would come to an end after more than ten years. In July, military-launched operations and the explosion of a landmine in Sungkayot village in Ungkya Pukayaan town, Basilan, killed several ASG militants and civilians. The number of casualties ranged from 25 to 27. In August, an ASG ambush in Basilan and the explosion of a landmine as well as a clash between the army and ASG left eleven to 19 soldiers injured. On September 6, ASG beheaded a private security guard in Basilan. In October, authorities arrested an ASG leader in Basilan. On November 2, ASG militants launched an ambush on the army in Basilan, killing six soldiers. Throughout the month, government launched operations against ASG, killing six militants in Sulu. Furthermore, they sent an artillery battalion to the ARMM to help support the fight against ASG. On November 15, clashes between government troops and ASG members in Sulu province, ARMM left five soldiers and 15 militants dead and 56 injured, among them 30 alleged ASG members. In November, Philippine troops captured 15 suspected ASG fighters in Sulu province and Zamboanga City, Zamboanga

Peninsula. In December, a clash between Philippine soldiers and ASG in Al-Barka caused the death of three ASG militants and injured seven to 15 others.

Throughout the year, ASG took several hostages from Malaysia's Tawau division in Sabah state, including the disputed Lahad Datu district [→ Malaysia (Sulu Sultanate supporters / Lahad Datu district)]. In most cases the hostages were fishermen or tourists. aas

PHILIPPINES (BIFM, BIFF – MILF, GOVERNMENT)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: BIFF, BIFM vs. government, MILF
 Conflict items: secession, subnational predominance

The conflict over secession and subnational predominance in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and SOCCSKSARGEN region between the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM) and its armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on one side and the government on the other continued at the level of a limited war. On January 25, BIFM rejected the signing of the annex on normalization between the government and the MILF. The group announced that it would continue its fight for a separate Islamic State.

Fighting was reported throughout the year, resulting in a high number of casualties.

From 12/31/2013 to January 5, BIFF and government soldiers clashed in Paidu Pulangi, Cotabato province, SOCCSKSARGEN. Ten people were killed.

On January 26, the Philippine Army's Joint Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), supported by the MILF, launched a massive offensive against BIFF which lasted until February 1. In the course of this offensive, the army seized two BIFF strongholds in Shariff Saydona Mustapha and Datu Piang, Maguindanao province, ARMM. 53 BIFF fighters and one government soldier were killed, nine BIFF militants, 20 government soldiers, and eight civilians injured and 35,000 inhabitants were displaced. Both sides used heavy artillery and explosive devices. The army had close air support by helicopter gunships.

On February 4, BIFF detonated a bomb near Raja Buayan town, Maguindanao but failed to hit an army convoy. No casualties were reported. While clashing on February 20 in Shariff Saydona, Mustapha soldiers injured three BIFF militants. On February 28, BIFF attacked an army camp in Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Maguindanao using M-79 grenades, killing three BIFF members and injuring three soldiers. Both sides clashed again on May 9 in Datu Unsay, Maguindanao, leaving one militant dead. On May 12, BIFF ambushed an army patrol with an improvised explosive device (IED) in Datu Unsay, resulting in heavy gunfire and the death of three soldiers. In the same municipality on June 5, a BIFF bomb killed one soldier and injured three. Four days later, 30 BIFF members attacked an army camp in Shariff Saydona. Three militants were killed and one soldier injured. On June 10, BIFF killed two army soldiers in Libutan, Maguindanao. Following a clash on June 22 in Al-Barka, Basilan province, ARMM, a militant was killed and another injured. BIFF also frequently raided banana plantations, leading to clashes with its security guards. For instance on July 13, 30 BIFF members attacked a banana plantation with rocket propelled grenades near Barangay Dungos, Cotabato, SOCCSKSARGEN. One militant was killed in ensuing clashes with plantation security.

During a fight with 50 heavily armed BIFF militants on July 21 in Datu Piang and Shariff Saydona Mustapha, 17 BIFF militants and one soldier were killed and eleven people injured. The army used helicopter gunships in the fight, which led 1,000 inhabitants to flee.

On August 8 and 12, two clashes with over 100 BIFF members in Datu Piang left four BIFF members dead. On September 11, ten BIFF members and two soldiers were killed and another six soldiers injured in Midsayap, Cotabato. On September 30, BIFF militants killed two soldiers in Datu Piang. In two separate clashes on October 22 and 23 in Datu Hoffer, Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat province, SOCCSKSARGEN, seven BIFF members, two soldiers and one civilian were killed. On November 14, another clash left one militant and two civilians dead, another three civilians were injured, and 1,200 inhabitants were displaced in Pikit, Cotabato, when 50 BIFF members used mortars. Two days later, four militants were killed in a clash of 50 BIFF members with the army in Maguindanao. On November 18, BIFF fighters killed three soldiers in Datu Saudi. 60 army soldiers and 30 BIFF militants clashed in Sahrif Saydona, on December 1. Three BIFF members were killed and two army soldiers injured.

On August 13, BIFF pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) as well as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) [→ Philippines (Abu Sayyaf)]. prü

PHILIPPINES (MILF)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1977**

Conflict parties: MILF vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, system/ideology, resources

The conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the government over secession, ideology, and resources escalated to a violent crisis.

Both parties achieved an agreement on the solution of the conflict. From January 20 to 25, the 43rd round of peace talks took place in the capital of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. By the end of the meetings, the parties signed the final annex on normalization and the addendum on the Bangsamoro Waters. On February 8, the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) was inaugurated and tasked to draft the Bangsamoro law. The final Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro was signed on March 27.

Between July 8 and 11, after the government made amendments to the first draft version, the MILF and the government discussed the draft law in Kuala Lumpur. They met again on July 18 for a five-day meeting in the capital of Manila, Philippines, as the MILF threatened to reject the law. On July 25, Philippine President Aquino met with the BTC. From August 1 to 10, the BTC and the MILF met in Davao City, Davao Region, Philippines, to develop the final draft law. The talks were concluded on August 15. Five days later, the new draft law was submitted to Aquino. He submitted the Bangsamoro basic law to the House of Representatives on September 10. Despite this progress, minor fighting occurred. On April 11, four MILF fighters and two soldiers were killed when the army attacked the Abu Sayyaf Group in Basilan [→ Philippines (Abu Sayyaf)]. Government soldiers and MILF factions clashed on July 10 and 11 in Lanao del Sur province, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. One soldier was killed on each side. prü

PHILIPPINES (MNLF)

 Intensity: **2** | Change: **↓** | Start: **1969**

 Conflict parties: MNLF vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, system/ideology, resources

The conflict between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the government over the orientation of the political system, resources, and the secession of the islands of Mindanao, Palawan, and Sulu de-escalated by three intensities from a war to a non-violent crisis. No clashes were reported for the year 2014.

The MNLF criticized the signing of the annex on normalization between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) [→ Philippines (MILF)] in January and the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in March as a violation of the 1996 peace agreement between the MNLF and the government. The MNLF wanted this agreement to be incorporated into the CAB and demanded more participation in the negotiations. In a meeting on June 11 and 12, three factions of the MNLF, namely the Islamic Command Council, the Executive Committee, and Nur Misuari's group, agreed to reunite and accepted Misuari as leader. Misuari was responsible for the 2013 standoff in Zamboanga City, Zamboanga Peninsula, which was condemned by the other factions as a breaking of the 1996 peace agreement. On August 24, Misuari reiterated his call for independence. prü

SRI LANKA (BUDDHISTS – MUSLIMS, CHRISTIANS)

 Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1948**

 Conflict parties: BBS, JHU, JVP, Sinhalese Buddhists vs. Christians, Muslims, SLMC
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over system and ideology between the Sinhalese Buddhists along with the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), the monk-led National Heritage Party (JHU), as well as People's Liberation Front (JVP), on the one hand, and the Muslims represented by the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the Christians, on the other, continued.

On January 12, up to 250 people accompanied by Buddhist monks vandalized two Christian churches in Hikkaduwa, Western Province, demolishing windows, doors, and musical instruments. Another church attack close to the capital Colombo was reported the same day.

On March 9, BBS General Secretary Galagoda Atthe Gnanasara followed by about 20 monks stormed a media conference of a group of Muslims and Buddhist clergy, blaming the attending Buddhists of betraying their religion. The JVP directly distanced itself from the BBS in a press statement reiterating the freedom of expression.

A new wave of violence erupted on June 12, when a small group of Muslims assaulted a Buddhist monk on his way to a temple ceremony in Dharga Town, Western Province. Subsequently, Buddhists stormed the Aluthgama police station, Western Province, to demand immediate action against the suspects. Three days later, the BBS organized a protest march in Aluthgama and Beruwela, Western Province. Clashes broke

out after a speech of Gnanasara, leaving four Muslims dead and at least 75 injured. Up to 100 primarily Muslim-owned shops and homes were looted. Some attackers used petrol bombs. Police were backed up with 1,000 additional personnel and fired tear gas and enforced a curfew in the two towns. Victims of the riots and rights activists denounced police inaction. On June 19, Wataraaka Vijitha Thero, a Buddhist monk known for criticizing the BBS, was found undressed, bound, and injured in Panadura, Western District. However, the BBS denied involvement. Two days later, a Muslim-owned apparel store burned down in the same town. The police found an electric short-circuit responsible but eyewitnesses said that alleged Buddhist attackers threw petrol bombs at the building.

On July 2, the BBS threatened the government to stay from any penalization for clashes in June and blamed Muslim organizations for the outburst of violence. The following day, the police stated that they had arrested 95 Sinhalese and 24 Muslims in connection with the unrest.

On July 8, the BBS called on the government to inquire the at the beginning of 2014 established National Shooru Council, an alliance of several national Muslim organizations. The BBS believed it to be part of a conspiracy to turn Sri Lanka into a Muslim country. They also urged to place all Muslim ministers in the cabinet under intelligence surveillance on September 17.

Ashin Wirathu, a known Buddhist extremist from Myanmar, visited Colombo on September 28 and announced the building of an alliance with the BBS to defend Buddhism, especially against Islamism.

Eight days later, the BBS introduced a constitutional draft comprising the recognition of Sinhalese Buddhists as the national race of the country, and the prohibition of all religious propagation other than Buddhism. mwu

TAJIKISTAN (GORNO-BADAKHSHAN)

 Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2012**

 Conflict parties: drug traffickers, Pamiri people vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy, subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province between the local Pamiri people and drug traffickers and the central government continued.

On May 21, according to Tajik authorities, a small group of drug traffickers arrived at the local police station in Khorugh, capital of Gorno-Badakhshan, to free an accused drug smuggler. A gunfight erupted, killing a police officer, two alleged drug traffickers, and a bystander, and injuring several others. Starting on May 23, several hundred local residents protested the police's handling of the incident for two days, torching several buildings, including the provincial police headquarters. Witnesses reported that one of the protesters threw a grenade and some protesters opened gunfire at the building. In total, two people were killed and seven injured during the violent demonstrations. Protesters demanded a fair investigation into the events, calling on the authorities to dismiss the heads of regional law enforcement agencies. The Pamiri protesters also demanded more autonomy in electing provincial and district governors in Gorno-Badakhshan as well as the appointment of Gorno-Badakhshan officials

to central government positions. Officials initially rejected these demands, but on May 28, Tajik chief public prosecutor Sherkhon Salimzoda met with representatives of the regional administration to discuss the incidents in Khorugh. On July 12, President Emomali Rahmon nominated Murtazo Haidarzoda as new head of the Drug Enforcement Administration in Gorno-Badakhshan and on September 2, Nusrat Mirzoyev was nominated head of the State Committee for National Security in the same province. fsc

THAILAND (ISLAMIST SEPARATISTS / SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1902**

Conflict parties: various Islamist separatists vs. gov-ernment

Conflict items: secession, system/ideology

The conflict over secession and ideology between various Islam-ist separatists, including Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), and the government continued at a violent level. The Islamist militants sought the separation of the predominantly Muslim southern provinces Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, and Sonkhla.

The government deployed about 150,000 soldiers in the southern provinces, fighting approx. 11,000 militants. Throughout the year, militants carried out numerous attacks, primarily on Buddhist monks, public school teachers, and government officials. The conflict resulted in a total of 212 people killed, including 68 security forces and eight militants, in 2014.

For instance, on January 14, militant separatists shot a teacher in Kabang district, Yaa, and on February 3, gunmen killed three and injured two in Bacho district, Narathiwat. On February 9, insurgents shot and killed a policeman's wife and burned her body in front of a crowd in Tambon Ratapanyang, Pattani. Four militants on motorcycles fired into a crowd who were giving alms to Buddhist monks in Mae Lan district, Pattani, killing four and injuring seven on February 13.

On March 14, gunmen killed a teacher and burned her corpse in Mayo district, Pattani. Six days later, another teacher was killed in Tak Pai district, Narathiwat. On April 6 and 7, eight bombs exploded in Yala, killing one and injuring at least 28. On May 12, separatists conducted approx. 30 attacks at different locations in Narathiwat and Yala, killing one Muslim woman and injuring more than ten people. Another nine bomb attacks killed two and injured dozens in Pattani, on May 24. On June 4, militants detonated roadside bombs, targeting patrolling soldiers in Yarang, Pattani. One week later, the military junta announced new security measures, such as curfews, to restore order in the southern provinces.

Starting in September, the government distributed about 2,700 assault rifles to local civilian volunteers for self-defense in southern provinces. Suspected militants entered a government office, opened fire, and detonated two bombs in Khok Pho district, Pattani, on September 11. Four people were killed and several injured. On October 12, separatists set six state schools on fire in Pattani province. No casualties were reported. On October 31, suspected militants bombed four bars and restaurants in Muang district, Pattani, killing one person and injuring two. Suspected militants detonated a roadside bomb, injuring four paramilitary rangers in Yaring district, Pattani, on November 10. Four days later, combined

security forces surrounded a hideout of the militants, and in the subsequent shootout two militants were killed and five surrendered in Nong Chik district, Pattani. On December 4, militants killed one civilian in Ra-ngae district, Narathiwat. iga

THAILAND (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: PTP, UDD vs. PAD vs. RTAF

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), on the one hand, and the Pheu Thai Party (PTP) and the affiliated movement United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), on the other, continued as a violent crisis. The PTP government led by Yingluck Shinawatra stayed in power until May 7. Following the coup on May 22, the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) became a direct party to the conflict. As in the previous year, supporters of the then-incumbent PTP and the opposing PAD, also known as Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts, continued to clash in the capital Bangkok.

A grenade attack on Red Shirts near Chulalongkorn University left one person dead and 35 injured on New Year's day.

On January 13, tens of thousands of Yellow Shirts shut down main intersections in Bangkok for several weeks and blocked the snap election on February 2 in almost 70 of the 375 constituencies. On January 26 and February 1, clashes between both sides left one person dead and 18 people injured. On January 30 the Anti-Corruption Commission launched an impeachment investigation against Yingluck for her involvement in the rice-pledging scheme.

On February 18, clashes escalated between police forces and Yellow Shirts in Bangkok's Phan Fa Bridge area, leaving six people dead and 64 injured. According to the police, the protesters attacked them with guns and M-79 grenades. Subsequently, the PTP government imposed a state of emergency on Bangkok and neighboring provinces. On May 7, the Constitutional Court declared Prime Minister Yingluck guilty for abuse of power and ordered her to step down. Deputy Prime Minister Niwatthamrong Boonsongpaisan replaced her. On May 9, police dispersed thousands of Yellow Shirts who had taken to the streets. Later that day, anti-government protest leader Suthep Thaugsuban called on his supporters to protest in front of the parliament, the prime minister's offices, and five television stations. At the end of May, the RTAF under General Prayuth Chan-ocha undertook a series of interventions into Thai politics that culminated in a coup d'état. On May 20, without the government's approval, RTAF declared nationwide martial law. Two days later, the RTAF declared a curfew, suspended the Constitution, censored the media, detained key politicians of both sides, and prohibited gatherings of more than five people. RTAF thereby seized control of the government and Prayuth announced himself as head of a temporary government replacing Niwatthamrong. These actions sparked protests of 1,000 people in Bangkok and Chiang Mai, resulting in several arrests. On July 22, King Bhumibol Adulyadej endorsed the interim constitution, giving the military's National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) the power to intervene in issues "destructive to the peace and safety of the country" without approval of a civilian government.

On August 21, the National Legislative Assembly appointed

General Prayuth as prime minister. On August 31, Prayuth formed an interim cabinet, dominated by military generals. The military stated that it would rule until the next elections in 2016. Due to the NCPO's measures to monitor illegal labor, reportedly around 170,000 Cambodians and a high number of Burmese migrant workers were forced to leave the country [→ Thailand – Myanmar]. sar

THAILAND – MYANMAR

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: Myanmar vs. Thailand

Conflict items: territory, other

The conflict over territory and the status of Burmese migrants and refugees between Thailand and Myanmar continued as a dispute.

On May 22, the military coup in Thailand led to constraints at the Thailand-Myanmar border crossings, resulting in restrictions for refugees and traders at the border checkpoint of Mae Sot, Tak Province, Thailand. On June 3, the Three Pagodas Pass was temporarily closed. On June 20, migrant workers from Myanmar were forced to leave Thailand and to return to Myanmar, despite owning proper documents.

On July 2, Thai government ordered all 120,000 Burmese refugees to stay in their camps. Reportedly, some hundred Burmese refugees were sent back to Myanmar. Thai government opened a one-stop service center in Samut Sakhon Province, Thailand, on July 11. Migrants could apply there for a national registration card, health insurance, and work permission. While the demand to register was high, it was not affordable for many. On July 16, Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed it would enable the repatriation of the refugees with respect to human rights and in cooperation with the government of Myanmar and UN principles. On September 26, the Myanmar Ministry of Labour announced it had to wait until the signing of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers before problems at the Thailand-Myanmar border could be solved properly. kv

UZBEKISTAN – TAJIKISTAN, KYRGYZSTAN

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **2010**

Conflict parties: Uzbekistan vs. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan

Conflict items: international power, resources

The dispute over water resources and international power between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan continued.

The conflict revolved around the controversial Rogun Dam hydropower plant (HPP) project on the Vakhsh River in southern Tajikistan, and the Kambarata-1 project with Narynski HPP cascade on the Naryn River in Jalal-Abad province, southwestern Kyrgyzstan. The Tajik and Kyrgyz governments claimed that hydropower projects were essential for their countries to overcome energy shortages, while the Uzbek government was concerned that dam projects would reduce flows from the two major transnational rivers in the region, threatening its water supply and cotton industry. In addition, Uzbekistan stated that the area showed high seismic activity which posed a threat to the stability of the dams and thereby to the country.

In 2013, both the Russian and the Kyrgyz parliaments passed a bill committed to building Kambarata-1. As of December, Russia had yet to decide on the funding of the hydropower plant. Inter RAO, the Russian state-run company that was supposed to oversee Kambarata-1's construction, stated that it was still carrying out a feasibility study. Consequently, construction had not started. On April 1, Russian Gazprom acquired KyrgyzGas. In response, on April 14, Uzbekistan's gas supplier Uztransgaz cut off gas supply in southern Kyrgyzstan in the region of Osh, affecting about 60,000 households.


The Techno-Economic Assessment Study (TEAS II) of the existing Rogun HPP works by the World Bank confirmed the feasibility of the project. However, financing of construction would require additional stabilization measures such as the reinforcement of the powerhouse cavern. The findings were discussed on the fifth and final information-sharing and consultation meetings with riparian countries in Almaty, Kazakhstan, from July 14 to 18. According to a Human Rights Watch report published in June, the Tajik government had resettled approx. 1,500 families out of the reservoir zone since 2009, allegedly committing human rights violations in the process. fb

MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB

VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB IN 2014

INTENSITY

- WAR
- LIMITED WAR
- VIOLENT CRISIS
- NO VIOLENT CONFLICT



REGIONAL PANORAMA

With a total of 74, the overall number of conflicts in the Middle East and Maghreb remained constant. The region's 14 highly violent conflicts accounted for nearly a third of all highly violent conflicts in the world. With nine wars, nearly half of all wars were observed in the region. As in previous years, the most frequent conflict item pursued by the conflict parties was system/ideology, with two out of three conflicts revolving around this item, followed by national power. While these items constituted the predominant conflict items in the region's highly violent conflicts, contestations over territory tended to be less violent.

The conflict dynamics in Syria and Iraq were particularly marked by territorial advances and increasing combat action of the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS) [→ Syria (opposition groups); Iraq (IS et al.)]. In Syria, various Islamist groups continued to fight both against each other and the government [→ Syria (inter-opposition violence)]. In Iraq, IS and other Sunni militant groups fought the government, which was supported by Shiite militias, Kurdish Peshmerga, pro-government Sunni tribal fighters, Iran, and a US-led coalition. As of February, al-Qaeda's general command formally disassociated itself from ISIS, further increasing combat action between the al-Nusra Front and ISIS. In June, ISIS launched a large-scale operation in northern Iraq, resulting in considerable territorial gains. The same month, ISIS announced to have established an Islamic caliphate, i.e. Islamic State (IS), covering parts of Syria and Iraq, with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaiming himself as caliph. Following IS' territorial expansion in Syria and Iraq, the international coalition conducted hundreds of airstrikes against major Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, the Egyptian Islamist group ABM, operating in Sinai peninsula, pledged allegiance to IS [→ Egypt (Islamist groups / Sinai Peninsula)]. IS' influence spread further in the Maghreb following the seizure of the Libyan city Derna by an affiliated group in November [→ Libya (opposition groups)]. Throughout the year, fighting between various militias reached the level of a war, experiencing a steep escalation in July with the attack on and subsequent conquering of the capital Tripoli by Islamist militias. Officials in Tobruk and Tripoli claimed national power, each with a network of militias on its side. Towards the end of the year, the UN tried to initiate a dialog to end the conflict. However, no agreement was reached.


Another war took place in the Gaza Strip, with Israel launching "Operation Protective Edge" in response to the kidnapping of two Israeli youths and the continuation of rocket fire from Gaza [→ Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territories)].

Combat between the Israeli army and Hamas lasted until the end of August and caused over 2,000 Palestinian casualties and about 70 on the Israeli side. Opposition conflicts continued in all North African states [→ Algeria (opposition groups); Morocco (opposition movement), Tunisia (opposition groups)]. In the course of the conflict between the Egyptian government and several opposition groups, hundreds of death sentences and life imprisonments were imposed on members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood [→ Egypt (opposition groups)]. The opposition conflicts in Tunisia and Algeria were marked by violence in the course of the respective elections. In Tunisia, the ruling Ennahda party was superseded by the Nidaa Tounis party, while in Algeria, President Bouteflika was reelected for the fourth time. In both countries, police forces dispersed demonstrators protesting against the election results. Fighting between AQIM as well as affiliated militants and the Tunisian government de-escalated from a limited war to a violent crisis [→ Tunisia (AQIM et al.)]. However, in April and July, the military conducted large-scale operations with Algerian forces to combat AQIM in the border region. The conflict between the Algerian government, which mobilized more than 50,000 troops in January alone, and AQIM remained on the level of a limited war [→ Algeria (AQIM et al.)]. In September, AQIM faction Jund al-Khalifa defected and pledged allegiance to IS.


With a total of seven violent internal conflicts, Yemen remained one of the most conflict-ridden countries in the region. The conflict between al-Houthi rebels and the government escalated from a violent crisis to a war with al-Houthis consolidating their control over the northern governorates and expanding further south [→ Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)]. On September 21, they seized the capital Sanaa. Al-Houthis' advance met increased resistance from Sunni tribal forces in the north and from AQAP in the south, with both conflicts constituting limited wars [→ Yemen (al-Houthi rebels – Sunni tribal forces); Yemen (AQAP – al-Houthi rebels)]. In addition, the conflict between AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia, on the one hand, and the government, supported by the US and the Popular Resistance Committee forces, on the other, remained at war level [→ Yemen (AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia)]. Although the National Dialog Conference agreed on a number of common recommendations in January, the conflicts between opposition groups and the government as well as between southern secessionists and the government remained on a violent level throughout the year [→ Yemen (opposition groups); Yemen (SMM / South Yemen)].

The conflict in Afghanistan between the Taliban and various other militant groups on the one hand, and the government supported by the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and US forces, on the other, remained on the level of a war. More than 2,500 civilians were killed throughout the year. On December 28, the ISAF mission ended after 13 years. However, NATO member states had previously agreed on a non-combat follow-up mission, coming into force in January 2015. Moreover, the US and Afghanistan signed a bilateral security agreement, enabling a contingent of US troops to remain deployed. (yal, et, ema, sep, jri)

CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB IN 2014 COMPARED TO 2013



FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT ITEMS IN 2014 IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB BY INTENSITY GROUPS



MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB

Overview: Conflicts in the Middle East and Maghreb in 2014

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Afghanistan (Kuchi Nomads – Hazara)	Kuchi nomads vs. Hazara	subnational predominance, resources	2007	•	2
Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)	Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hezb-e Islami, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, militant groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1994	•	5
Afghanistan – Pakistan*	Afghanistan vs. Pakistan	territory, other	1947	↘	2
Algeria (AQIM et al.)	AQIM, Blood Signatories, Jund al-Khalifa, MUJAO vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1989	•	4
Algeria (Berbers / Kabylia)*	Berbers vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1963	↗	3
Algeria (Malekites – Mozabites / Ghardaia)*	Malekites vs. Mozabites	subnational predominance, resources	2013	•	3
Algeria (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	3
Bahrain (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1975	•	3
Egypt (Bedouin activists)*	Bedouin activists vs. government	other	2004	•	1
Egypt (Islamist groups / Sinai Peninsula)	ABM, AM vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1992	•	4
Egypt (Muslims – Christians)	Muslims vs. Christians	subnational predominance	1952	•	3
Egypt (opposition groups)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1954	↓	3
Egypt – Sudan*	Egypt vs. Sudan	territory	1958	•	1
Iran (Jundallah et al. / Sistan-Balochistan)*	Jundallah, Jaish al-Adl, Harakat Ansar Iran, Sunni militant groups vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1979	•	3
Iran (opposition groups)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1993	•	2
Iran (People's Mujahideen)*	People's Mujahideen of Iran vs. government	system/ideology	1965	↑	3
Iran (PJAK / Kurdish areas)*	PJAK vs. government	autonomy	1979	↘	2
Iran – Israel*	Iran vs. Israel	system/ideology, international power	1979	•	2
Iran – UAE*	Iran vs. UAE	territory	1970	•	1
Iran – USA, EU (nuclear program)	Iran vs. USA, EU	international power	1979	•	2
Iraq (IS et al.)	IS, Sunni militant groups, anti-government Sunni tribesmen vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2003	•	5
Iraq (Kurdistan Regional Government)	KRG vs. government	secession, resources	1971	•	1
Iraq (opposition movement)*	opposition movement vs. government	system/ideology	2011	↓	1
Iraq (Shiite militant groups)*	al-Mukhtar army, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Mahdi army, Shiite militias vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2004	•	3
Iraq (Sunni opposition)*	sunni opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2012	↓	1
Iraq – Iran	Iraq vs. Iran	territory	1969	END	1
Iraq – Kuwait*	Iraq vs. Kuwait	territory, resources	1961	•	1
Israel (al Fatah - Hamas)*	al-Fatah vs. Hamas	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1994	•	1
Israel (Hamas - Salafist groups)*	Hamas vs. Salafist groups	system/ideology	2007	•	2
Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territories)	Hamas, PIJ, PRC vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1988	↑	5
Israel (Hezbollah)	Hezbollah vs. Israel	system/ideology	1982	•	3
Israel (PNA / Palestinian Territories)	PNA vs. government	secession, system/ideology, resources	1948	•	3
Israel – Lebanon*	Israel vs. Lebanon	territory, international power	1948	•	2
Jordan (Hamas)*	Hamas vs. government	system/ideology	1994	•	1
Jordan (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology	2011	•	3
Kuwait (Bedouns)*	government vs. Bedouns	other	1960	•	3
Kuwait (opposition movement)	opposition movement vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2012	•	3

MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Lebanon (Fatah al-Islam et al. - Fatah)*	Fatah al-Islam, Jund al-Sham et al. vs. Fatah	subnational predominance	2007	•	3
Lebanon (Fatah al-Islam et al.)*	Fatah al-Islam, Palestinian Islamist groups vs. government	system/ideology	2006	•	3
Lebanon (March 14 Alliance – March 8 Alliance)*	March 14 Alliance vs. March 8 Alliance	system/ideology, national power	2005	•	1
Lebanon (Sunni - Alawite)*	Sunnis vs. Alawites	subnational predominance	1975	•	3
Lebanon (Sunni militant groups)	Abdullah Azzam Brigades, al-Nusra Front, ISIS et al. vs. government, Hezbollah	subnational predominance	2014	NEW	4
Libya (Federalists / Cyrenaica)	Congress of the People of Cyrenaica, Council of Cyrenaica in Libya, Cyrenaica Federalists, Cyrenaica Transitional Council, Political Bureau of Cyrenaica vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	2012	•	2
Libya (inter-tribal violence)*	Qaddafi tribe vs. Awlad Suleiman tribe vs. Tibu tribe	subnational predominance, resources	2012	•	3
Libya (opposition groups)	Operation Dignity, Zintan brigades vs. Libya Dawn, Misrata brigades, Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries	system/ideology, national power	2011	↗	5
Mauritania (AQIM)*	AQIM vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2007	•	2
Morocco (AQIM)*	AQIM vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2003	•	2
Morocco (opposition movement)*	February 20 Movement vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	2
Morocco (POLISARIO / Western Sahara)	POLISARIO vs. government	secession	1975	•	3
Oman (opposition groups)*	opposition movement vs. government	system/ideology	2011	•	1
Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi rebels)*	al-Houthi rebels vs. government	subnational predominance	2009	•	1
Saudi Arabia (AQAP)*	AQAP vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1990	↗	3
Saudi Arabia (opposition movement)*	opposition movement vs. government	system/ideology	1990	•	1
Saudi Arabia (Shiites)	Shiites vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1979	•	3
Syria (inter-opposition violence)	ISIS vs. al-Nusra Front vs. Islamic Front vs. Islamist groups vs. NC	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	2013	↑	5
Syria (Kurdish groups)*	KDPS, PYD vs. government	autonomy, subnational predominance	1962	•	3
Syria (NC, Islamist Groups - KSC / Kurdish Regions)	NC, Islamist groups vs. KSC	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	2012	•	5
Syria (opposition groups)	NC, FSA, IS, Islamic Front, al-Nusra vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	5
Syria – Israel*	Syria vs. Israel	territory, international power, resources	1948	•	3
Syria – Turkey	Syria vs. Turkey	territory, international power	1946	•	3
Syria – USA	Syria vs. USA	system/ideology, international power	2003	•	2
Tunisia (AQIM et al.)	AQIM, various militant groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	↘	3
Tunisia (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2010	•	3
Turkey (Huda Par - PKK/Kurdish regions)*	Kurdish Nationalists vs. PKK	system/ideology	1992	↑	3
Turkey (opposition movement)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology	2013	•	3
Turkey (PKK)	PKK vs. government	autonomy	1974	↘	3
Turkey – Iraq*	Turkey vs. Iraq	international power	1979	•	2
Yemen (al-Houthi rebels - Sunni tribal forces)	al-Houthi rebels vs. Sunni tribal forces	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2011	•	4
Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)	al-Houthi rebels vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2004	↑	5
Yemen (AQAP – al-Houthi rebels)	AQAP vs. al-Houthi rebels	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2010	↗	4
Yemen (AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia)	Ansar al-Sharia, AQAP vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1992	•	5

MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Yemen (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	3
Yemen (SMM / South Yemen)	SMM vs. government	secession	2009	•	3
Yemen (tribes / Marib)*	militant tribesmen vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	2012	•	3

^{1 2 3 4} cf. overview table for Europe

Please note: The intensity of each conflict as shown in the tables is the highest intensity reached in the course of the year. Therefore, conflicts may, for instance, be classified as limited wars although there may have been no more fighting in the second half of the year.

If a conflict revolves around a territory whose name is disputed by the conflict parties, both variations will be named, separated by an "/" [e.g. Japan – China (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands); Argentina – UK (Falkland Islands/Islands Malvinas)]. If, in contrast, the conflict actors strive for subnational predominance, secession, or autonomy of or in a certain region, the region is separated from the actors by " / " [e.g. France (FLNC / Corsica); Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)].

SELECTED CONFLICT DESCRIPTIONS

AFGHANISTAN (KUCHI NOMADS – HAZARA)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2007**Conflict parties: Kuchi nomads vs. Hazara
Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The conflict between Kuchi nomads and Hazara concerning subnational predominance and resources continued. The mainly Pashtun and Sunni Kuchi nomads claimed access to pastures in the Hazarajat area where Shiite Hazara had settled.

According to a local news agency, on April 9, the Military Council of Wardak province arranged security measures in Daimirdad district in order to prevent a feared outbreak of clashes between the two groups. The council called on the defense and interior ministries to send security forces to the district. However, no direct confrontations were reported throughout the year.

In early December, a radio station reported the arrival of a presidential adviser who was sent to Wardak in order to negotiate with representatives of both groups and local officials.

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AFGHANISTAN (TALIBAN ET AL.)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **1994**Conflict parties: Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hezb-e Islami, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, militant groups vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The war over national power and the orientation of the political system between the Taliban, the Haqqani network, the Hezb-e-Islami, and various other militant groups on one side, and the government supported by the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and US forces on the other, continued.

During the period of observation, at least 2,500 civilians were killed. According to UN figures, 1,564 civilians died in the first six months of the year, marking an increase of 24 percent compared to the same time span in 2013. Nearly three quarters of the civilians were killed in militant activities, mainly in assaults with explosives, as well as in attacks involving small arms, mortars, and rockets. For example, on March 18, a suicide bomber killed 15 people and wounded another 27 in the provincial capital Maimana, Faryab province. Two days later, coordinated bomb attacks and ensuing gun battles between militants and security forces left 18 people dead and another 22 injured in the city of Jalalabad, Nangarhar province. On September 4, Taliban militants attacked the provincial headquarters of the intelligence service National Directorate of Security in Ghazni province, using bombs and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). According to Afghan media, 30 people were killed as well as 150 wounded in the attack, including Taliban, security forces, and civilians. Additionally, the provincial governor stated that 50 buildings

were damaged. On November 23, a suicide bomber targeted a volleyball match in Yahva Khel district of eastern Paktika province. The bomber killed at least 61 people and wounded about 60 others in the attack. Afghanistan saw the first transition to a new head of state since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. On April 5, the first round of the presidential election was held. The Taliban announced it would carry out attacks during this period. On March 25, ten people were killed when militants attacked an office of the Independent Election Commission in the capital Kabul. Security personnel fatally shot the attackers in ensuing clashes. On June 6, suicide bombers targeted the campaign convoy of presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah, killing a dozen people and wounding another 14. According to officials, on June 14, the day of the second round, 254 people were killed, including 176 militants, 49 civilians, and 29 security forces in attacks all over the country. Due to irregularities throughout the vote counting process, the final inauguration of the new President Ashraf Ghani was delayed until the end of September.

Since combat lead had been transferred from NATO into the responsibility of Afghan forces in 2013, government forces conducted operations on their own. NATO, among others, provided air support. For instance, in April, security forces conducted a two-week military operation in Qaisar district, Faryab, killing 57 militants and wounding 43, and a NATO airstrike allegedly killed 50 militants and wounded 20 more on August 1, after hundreds of militants had stormed the Hesarak district, Nangarhar province. At the end of August, security forces launched a week-long operation in Garamsir and Khanshin districts in Helmand province, killing an alleged 81 militants and destroying 35 of their posts. At the end of September, the army, security forces and police as well as ISAF forces conducted a joint two-day operation in Sangin and Kajaki districts of Helmand province, allegedly killing 45 militants. Whereas Afghan forces attacked militants on the ground, ISAF conducted airstrikes on militant hideouts. Also in late September, security forces carried out a six-day operation in the Durbaba district, Nangarhar, killing 158 militants and wounding another 32, while militants killed six policemen. Officials stated that hundreds of militants overran and besieged Dangan district, Kunar province, in mid-December. The army carried out an offensive supported by airstrikes of foreign forces, reportedly killing 136 militants and leaving another 138 wounded in return.

NATO members gradually reduced their troop numbers and ended their combat missions. German forces, for example, ended their combat mission in northern Afghanistan by the end of August.

During the period of observation, militants launched attacks in Kabul. For instance, on March 20, militants assaulted a hotel, killing nine. Four of the assailants were killed in a shootout with security forces. On November 16, a suicide bomber attempted to assassinate a prominent female member of Afghanistan's parliament, killing three people. On November 27, the Taliban carried out a suicide attack on a British embassy vehicle, leaving five people dead, including a British national, and injuring 20. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it targeted foreign invading forces.

As in previous years, international troops as well as domestic and foreign officials were targeted in attacks and assassinations carried out by militants. For example, on May 23, militants attacked the Indian consulate in Herat province with

RPGs and machine guns. Taliban militants abducted five International Committee of the Red Cross workers in Adraskan district in Herat province on August 14. The Taliban decided to release the workers a week later. In late August, the chief of a peace committee in Nuristan province was fatally shot in Kabul.

Southern and eastern provinces, close to the Pakistan border, were especially affected by insurgent activities and fighting between militants and security forces. For example, at the beginning of May, officials stated that a week-long battle between militants and security forces in the Gilan district of Ghazni province left approx. 86 militants dead and dozens injured, and around 200 families fled the district. In mid-June, an alleged 800 militants attacked security posts across Sangin district, Helmand. Officials claimed that around 3,000 families were displaced within the first days of the clashes and fighting spilled over to neighboring districts. On August 18, officials stated that around 900 had been killed in Sangin since June, including approx. 400 militants, 270 security forces, and 230 civilians.

Officials frequently stated that Pakistani nationals were among the militants operating in Afghanistan and repeatedly blamed Pakistan for supporting militants in order to destabilize Afghanistan [→ Afghanistan – Pakistan; Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)].

After 13 years, the ISAF mission ended on December 28. However, NATO member states agreed on a non-combat follow-on mission, called Resolute Support, comprising of 2,000 forces and starting on 01/01/2015. The mission was based on a Status of Forces Agreement which was signed in Kabul on September 30 and later ratified by the Afghan parliament. The same day, the USA and Afghanistan signed a Bilateral Security Agreement, enabling an additional contingent of 9,800 US troops to remain deployed.

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ALGERIA (AQIM ET AL.)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: AQIM, Blood Signatories, Jund al-Khalifa, MUJAO vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), the Blood Signatories, and Jund al-Khalifa on one side and the government on the other continued at a highly violent level.

On July 14, AQIM declared that they would reject the Islamic State's (IS) self-declared caliphate in the Levant [→ Iraq (Sunni militant groups); Syria (Inter-opposition violence)]. However, internal divisions among AQIM remained and newly formed splinter group Jund al-Khalifa pledged allegiance to IS on September 14. Over the course of the year, the conflict claimed approx. 120 lives, including those of militants and security forces as well as civilians. Overall, Islamist forces attacks diminished in comparison to last year. The regional axis of Boumerdès, Tizi Ouzou, and Bouira was the main venue of confrontations between government forces and Islamist militants.

On January 15, the government mobilized more than 50,000 troops in eight southern provinces including those bordering Libya, Mali, and Niger. During operations in January, mem-

bers of the Algerian People's National Army (APNA) killed 13 Islamist militants in the provinces of Bouira, Médéa, and El-Oued. On February 3, a roadside bomb planted next to a police checkpoint in the town of Bordj Ménaïel, Boumerdès province killed one civilian and wounded three others. In March, the military conducted several operations in the region of Tizi Ouzou which left another 13 militants dead. In addition, border guards and other security forces shot dead seven insurgents when they tried to enter Algerian soil 40 km south of Tébessa, Tébessa province, in proximity to the Tunisian border on March 14. On April 19, AQIM militants attacked a military detachment, killing eleven soldiers and wounding five in Tizi Ouzou. During May and June, security forces killed 16 militants in several operations in the provinces of Tamanrasset, Boumerdès, and Defla. On July 12, three soldiers and four communal guards were killed by an improvised explosive device near Ain Aïcha in Sidi Bel Abbès province. After Islamist militants killed 15 Tunisian soldiers on July 17 in Mount Chaambi, the Algerian and Tunisian military started a joint large-scale military operation in the border region on July 20 [→ Tunisia (AQIM et al.)]. Subsequently, 8,000 Algerian soldiers were deployed in the area. During the rest of July and August, six militants and one soldier died during ambushes and smaller clashes in the provinces of Tipaza, Tizi Ouzou, and Tlemcen. On December 21, the ANP deployed 4,000 soldiers to conduct a two-week operation to track down insurgents along the border with Libya and Niger [→ Libya (inter-tribal violence)]. On the same day, Jund al-Khalifa kidnapped French national Herve Gourdel while he was hiking in Djurdjura National Park in Tizi Ouzou. Three days later, members of the group beheaded the hostage after France did not meet their demands to halt its airstrikes on IS. After this incident, the Algerian military intensified its operations and killed 23 militants in the provinces of Bouira, Tizi Ouzou, Jijel, and Boumerdès.

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ALGERIA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between various opposition groups and the government remained on a violent level. The year was marked by presidential elections in April, which caused several demonstrations, calls for boycott, and violent clashes, notably in the first half of the year.

In January, the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), the country's main Islamist political party, and the liberal party Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) announced not to take part in the upcoming presidential elections scheduled for April, citing fears of fraud. Islamist parties Ennahda and Front for Justice and Development (FJD) pursued the same path by February 15. On February 22, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal officially announced that President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) party would run for a fourth term. Two days later, the party leaders of RCD, MSP, and Ennahda called for a public boycott of the presidential elections, claiming they will not be free and fair. The opposition party Socialist Forces Front (FFS) joined the boycott on March 7.

On March 1, the newly formed secular Barakat movement

held a demonstration in front of the central university in Algiers, protesting an expected fourth term of Bouteflika. Police forces dispersed the protesters using clubs and arrested around 40 protesters in another Barakat demonstration five days later. On March 12, police stopped around 300 RCD, MSP, and FJD members and supporters from assembling in the capital. On March 20, 1,000 to 2,000 people took to the streets in the city of Batna in the eponymous province, chanting slogans against a fourth term. The next day, between 5,000 and 7,000 protesters assembled in a sports stadium in Algiers where various opposition leaders publicly denounced the president's re-election bid.

On April 17, Bouteflika won the election with 81.49 percent of the vote. The voter turnout was at 50.70 percent. Ali Benflis, the main opposition candidate, immediately rejected the announced results, alleging that there had been massive fraud in the election process. Earlier that day, protesters clashed with anti-riot police in several cities around the country after attempting to destroy polling stations. The gravest clash took place in Machdallah, Bouira province, leaving 44 policemen and numerous demonstrators injured.

On September 11, Benflis and other opposition leaders published a statement calling Bouteflika to step down.

On November 29, clashes erupted between around 700 young protesters demanding better living conditions and police forces near Touggourt, Ouargla province. Anti-riot police arrested 14 and shot dead two demonstrators after they had blocked a highway and attacked a police station with Molotov cocktails. 35 protesters and 20 policemen were injured during the clashes. ala, jri

BAHRAIN (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the political system and national power between the mainly Shiite opposition groups and the Sunni government continued. Throughout the year, opposition groups and the government held several talks which were repeatedly broken off and recommenced. Meanwhile, protesters took to the streets all over the country, demanding political reforms and a more democratic constitution and voiced their solidarity with prisoners. During these demonstrations, security forces killed a total of six protesters and injured around 46, employing tear gas as well as birdshot. Protesters killed approx. seven police officers and injured another 17 in attacks with self-made bombs. The government arrested demonstrators and handed out jail terms ranging from one year to life-long imprisonment to approx. 270 protesters and activists.

On January 26, police forces clashed with protesters attending the funeral of a young man who died while in custody. Police fired tear gas and birdshot, while protesters responded by throwing stones and setting fires. Three days later, a court dissolved a Shiite clerics' council under the charge of politicization and illegal doings. Youth groups hurled firebombs at a police vehicle on January 30, leaving two police men wounded.

Marking the three-year anniversary of the uprising on February 14, protesters took to the streets from February 13 to 15, resulting in clashes with heavily employed security forces. Police fired tear gas and arrested 29 demonstrators, while

the latter set up road blocks, burned tires and tried to reach symbolic Pearl Square in the capital Manama. On March 3, protesters planted a bomb and the explosion killed three policemen in a Shiite village near Manama. On April 29, a court sentenced nine members of the Tamarod opposition movement to prison sentences of five years for attempting to overthrow the government by having called for protests and strikes last year.

On October 1, leading activist Nabil Rajab was detained over Twitter posts that were deemed offensive to the king and government. Throughout the following week, protesters staged widespread demonstrations against the measures taken by the government against critics. On October 11, the four leading opposition parties, among them al-Wefaq, announced their boycott of the upcoming general elections on November 22. They claimed the elections were unjust and controlled by the government and they called for popular support of the boycott. Two weeks later, the government banned al-Wefaq for three months. The elections, held on November 22 and November 29, were overshadowed by protests of the Shiite opposition. On November 25, police forces raided the house of a leading Shiite cleric in Diraz village, Northern governorate.

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EGYPT (ISLAMIST GROUPS / SINAI PENINSULA)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: ABM, AM vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, system/ideology

The limited war over secession and ideology between Islamist groups in the Sinai Peninsula and the government, supported by Israel, continued.

Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) and Aynad Misr (AM) frequently carried out attacks on policemen and soldiers in North Sinai. Sinai-based militants increased bomb attacks on the capital Cairo. The Cairo Urgent Matters Court declared ABM and AM terrorist organizations in April and May, respectively. Throughout the year, special security forces conducted several raids in North Sinai. In total, they killed at least 200 suspected militants, wounded 50 and arrested over 325. In addition, two soldiers were killed during the raids. The special forces destroyed more than 150 houses and hideouts, around 35 vehicles, and ten tunnels leading to Gaza.

On January 24, ABM members detonated one bomb in front of the police headquarters in central Cairo and three in Dokki district, leaving six dead and at least 100 injured. The next day, ABM killed five soldiers when they shot down a military helicopter with a shoulder-fired missile near the town Sheikh Zuweid, North Sinai. On February 16, an ABM suicide bomber blew himself up in a tourist bus, killing four people and leaving twelve injured in Taba, North Sinai. Two days later, ABM released a statement on Twitter announcing an attack on all tourists who chose to remain in Egypt after February 20. AM members set off two bombs in front of Cairo University, killing one officer and wounding five others on April 2. Between July 13 and 28, militants killed 16 people and injured 34 in attacks on supermarkets, gas pipelines, and military personnel in North Sinai. Between August and October, ABM executed ten people whom they accused of being Israeli spies in North Sinai. In the same period, various ABM attacks in the region left 17 dead and dozens wounded. On October 24, ABM affiliates carried out an attack involving

a car-bomb and a grenade on a checkpoint near the city al-Arish, North Sinai, causing the death of 31 security personnel. Meanwhile, Islamists opened fire at and killed three policemen in al-Arish. The following day, the government declared a three-month state of emergency and a curfew over parts of Sinai and started a large-scale military combat operation with helicopters and special troops. The government simultaneously shut down phone lines and Internet services in North Sinai and closed border crossings to the Gaza strip [→ Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territories)]. On October 29, authorities announced the establishment of a 500 meters buffer zone to the Gaza strip, resulting in the displacement of around 1,100 families.

After the Islamic State's (IS) spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani expressed his appreciation of acts committed by Islamist militants in the Sinai Peninsula, ABM issued a declaration pledging allegiance to the IS on November 3 [→ Syria (inter-opposition violence); Iraq (IS et al.)]. The group later denied the declaration via Twitter. On November 7, with Israeli approval, the government sent two additional infantry battalions and a fleet of attack helicopters to demilitarize Sinai. On November 18, during clashes with the army, militants fired two mortar shells, striking a house and leaving ten civilians dead. Three days later, the government shut down schools in Sheikh Zuweid and Rafah. ABM claimed responsibility for bomb attacks carried out during opposition protests in Cairo at the end of November, in which five people were killed. On December 6, the Cairo Criminal Court sentenced seven militants to death over the killing of 25 policemen on 08/19/2013. On December 22, security forces stormed an ABM shelter in Sharqiya province, killing five militants. The following day, ABM attacked a police compound in the Nile Delta, leaving 16 people dead and 140 wounded. The same day, ABM members blew up a gas pipeline near al-Arish. On December 23, ABM released a video showing the execution of two men whom they had accused of being military informants. In an attack on a checkpoint east of Cairo three days later, five people were injured and two militants were killed.

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EGYPT (MUSLIMS – CHRISTIANS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1952**

Conflict parties: Muslims vs. Christians
 Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance between Muslims and Coptic Christians continued. Coptic Christians, the largest non-Muslim minority, repeatedly claimed they were victims of discriminatory government policies as well as political and economic marginalization.

Rural areas, such as Minya province, were primarily affected by acts of violence against the Christian minority. Police forces intervened several times, arresting scores of involved persons, while at other times reportedly remaining idle. Copts blamed the government for not providing them with enough security. On June 2, Muslim protesters attacked and burned shops owned by Coptic Christians with petrol bombs in the village of el-Mahameed in Luxor governorate. The incident occurred just hours before the trial of a Copt who faced accusations of blasphemy. On August 5, after hearing about Coptic residents' plans to build a church, local Muslims gathered in the streets and reportedly attacked Christian houses with Molotov cocktails near Yaacoub village, Minya. Officials

said that around a dozen people were arrested. has

EGYPT (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↓ | Start: **1954**

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between several opposition groups, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and supporters of former president Muhammad Mursi, and the government de-escalated from a war to a violent crisis. Since the ousting of Mursi in July 2013, bombings and attacks by Islamist militants increased in Cairo, but were often blamed on the MB by the government [→ Egypt (Islamist groups / Sinai Peninsula)].

In the course of the year, members and supporters of the prohibited MB and the affiliated former ruling Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) clashed repeatedly with security forces and supporters of President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi. Nationwide clashes and demonstrations left at least 150 people dead and resulted in tens of thousands arrests of MB supporters. Throughout the year, secular opposition groups staged several demonstrations, accusing the government of human rights infringements. In addition, several hundred MB members and supporters were sentenced to death and life in prison over their participation in the 2013 protests and alleged acts of violence.

In a referendum on January 14 and 15, 98 percent voted in favour of the new constitution with an electoral turnout of about 39 percent. The MB called to boycott the referendum. Violent clashes between MB supporters and security forces in several provinces left twelve people dead. On the third anniversary of the revolution on January 25, MB-supporting protesters gathered in various governorates, amongst them Minya, Giza, Cairo, and Alexandria as well as the cities of Fayoum, Ismailia, Assiut, and Beni Sweif. Police forces fired tear gas and birdshot to disperse the crowd, resulting in at least 49 casualties, hundreds of injured, and thousands of arrests. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of supporters of al-Sisi celebrated in Cairo's Tahrir Square.

After UNHRC had released a report stating concern about the use of violence of the Egyptian government on March 7, clashes erupted between security forces and pro-Mursi protesters and resulted in seven fatalities in al-Alf Maskan district, Cairo governorate and one in al-Sharqiya governorate.

In March and April, two mass trials condemned a total of 1,212 people, including MB leader Muhammad Badie, to death for their role in the 2013 riots. Many of the verdicts were later converted by court into life imprisonment, including Badie's on August 30.

Leading up to the elections in May, al-Sisi resigned as defense minister on March 26 to run for presidency. The announcement led to protests in Alexandria and Cairo, leaving five people dead. The presidential elections, extended by one day to raise the voter turnout, were held between May 26 and 28. Al-Sisi won 96 percent of the votes, with a voter turnout of 44 percent. The electoral result caused nationwide demonstrations. On August 9, the government dissolved the FJP, the remaining political arm of the MB, prior to the upcoming parliamentary elections in May 2015. Demonstrations in several cities, including Cairo, Alexandria, Assiut, and Fayoum, on the anniversary of the ousting of former president Mursi

on July 4, caused one fatality and led to the arrests of about 200 people. Pro-Mursi protesters hurling Molotov cocktails clashed with riot police in Giza, Cairo, and Alexandria on the first anniversary of the raids in Cairo's Nahda and Rabaa al-Adawiya squares protest camps on August 14 and 15, resulting in ten casualties. Security forces used live ammunition and birdshot to disperse the crowd. With regard to the 2015 parliamentary elections, Salafi al-Watan party withdrew from MB-led Alliance to Support Legitimacy (ASL) on September 17. In September, about 150 opposition detainees went on hunger strike against their detentions under the 2013 Protest Law. During several clashes with riot police at the campus of Alexandria University in the beginning of October, at least 150 students were arrested and one died. President Sisi issued a decree on October 27, allowing military trials for civilians. On November 29, the criminal charges against former president Hosni Mubarak were dropped. A court declared him not responsible for the killing of protesters in 2011. The verdict led to protests all over the country, leaving two protesters in Cairo dead. Police dispersed about 1,000 protesters by firing tear gas and birdshot. Another 185 MB supporters were sentenced to death on December 2 for allegedly attacking a police station near Cairo in August 2013. hsp

IRAN (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1993**

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The dispute between opposition groups and the government over the orientation of the political system and national power continued.

As in previous years, opposition activists as well as journalists faced arrest and imprisonment. For instance, according to an opposition website, between May 19 and May 23, eight oppositionists were sentenced to 20 years in prison after having posted critical comments against the regime on a social media network. On May 28, journalist Saba Azarpeyk was detained because of alleged propaganda against the regime but was released on bail of USD 65,000 three months later. The two top opposition leaders, Mir Husseini Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi, both candidates in the presidential elections of 2009, remained under house arrest for the third year without criminal charges. On October 25, Nasrin Sotoudeh, a human rights lawyer, as well as several demonstrators were arrested by security forces after protesting her disbarment in Tehran. On December 12, Telecommunications Minister Mahmoud Vaezi said that the authorities were developing a new technology to monitor the Internet more efficiently.

The human rights situation raised domestic as well as international criticism. For instance, on March 11, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon criticized the human rights situation in Iran, especially concerning freedom of speech and the rise in executions under President Hassan Rouhani. On April 20, families of political detainees protested in front of the parliament against their imprisonment conditions. According to an opposition website, these prisoners were wounded in clashes with security guards in Evin prison three days earlier. Amnesty International stated that 32 prisoners were put into solitary confinement following the incident. Several members of parliament pushed for an inquiry into the incidents. nde

IRAN – USA, EU (NUCLEAR PROGRAM)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: Iran vs. USA, EU
Conflict items: international power

The non-violent crisis between Iran and the USA and the EU over Iran's nuclear program continued.


As in previous years, Iran declared that its nuclear program served peaceful purposes, while the US, the EU, and especially Israel suspected Iran of covering a possible military dimension of the program [→ Iran – Israel]. Following the inauguration of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in 2013, diplomatic efforts to solve the conflict increased. Although several sanctions were lifted, others posed by the US and the EU remained in place. A final agreement on Iran's nuclear program was not reached within the period of observation. On January 9 and 10, representatives of Iran and the P5+1/EU3+3 group met in Geneva, Switzerland to further discuss implementation details of the Joint Action Plan (JPA) which had been signed on 11/24/2013.

The P5+1/EU3+3 group, headed by the Vice President of the European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP-HR) Catherine Ashton, comprised the US, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany. The parties finally agreed on the implementation of the JPA and put it into effect on January 20. That month, the IAEA confirmed that Iran had acted in concordance with the JPA and had stopped uranium enrichment above the 5%-level and reduced its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium. Additionally, the construction at the heavy water reactor in Arak, Markazi province, was halted as were increasing enrichment capacities. Subsequently, the US and EU announced the relief of specific sanctions, giving Iran access to approx. \$4.2 billion of its blocked assets within the first half of the year. Following an invitation by Iran, VP-HR Ashton visited the Iranian capital Tehran from March 8 to 9 for the first time. However, Ashton also met human rights activists, sparking criticism by the Iranian government. Official talks between Iran and the P5+1/EU3+3 group continued from March 17 to 19 in the Austrian capital Vienna. On April 11, the US stated that it would refuse to grant Iran's nominated ambassador to the UN Hamid Abutalebi a visa, announcing that he had been involved in the 1979 hostage crisis in the US embassy in Tehran. During the first half of the year, meetings in Vienna took place from April 7 to 9, May 14 to 16, and June 16 to 21. As in previous years, high-level talks were framed by technical meetings, as well as talks between IAEA officials and Iranian diplomats. Additionally, several bilateral meetings sided official talks, as for example from June 9 to 10 and September 4 to 5, between the US and Iran.

Reaching an agreement in order to meet the JPA deadline failed on July 20. Subsequently, talks between P5+1/EU3+3 and Iran were extended until November 24. Although most sanctions remained in place, the US and EU gave Iran access to another \$2.8 billion of its assets between July and November.


However, the second half of the year was marked by tensions and a decrease in diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict. On August 29, the US Treasury Department and the Department of State imposed new sanctions. A week later, an IAEA report issued that Iran had not provided enough information about a possible military research dimension of its nuclear

IRAQ (IS et al.)



NO VIOLENT CONFLICT MEASURES VIOLENT CRISIS LIMITED WAR WAR

SYRIA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)



NO VIOLENT CONFLICT MEASURES VIOLENT CRISIS LIMITED WAR WAR

program, causing tensions between the two sides. Bridging differences failed again and the JPA was extended until 06/30/2015 in order to reach an agreement on Iran's nuclear program.

On October 5, an explosion and a fire at the Parchin military complex about 30 km southeast of Tehran destroyed at least two buildings and stirred rumors about a possible US or Israeli covert action in Iran. In late October, Iran announced to have prevented a cyber attack against its uranium enrichment facilities in Natanz, Isfahan province. Earlier this year, Iran's Foreign Minister Muhammad Javad Zarif had accused western states of sabotaging elements of the reactor in Arak. In mid-2014, the advances of IS in Iraq seemed to influence the relations between Iran and the US [→ Iraq (IS et al.)]. On June 16, US Secretary of State John Kerry announced to be open for discussion after Iran had suggested a possible cooperation to fight IS. However, in late 2014, Iran criticized the US military presence in Iraq and denied that they would coordinate with the US-led coalition to fight IS. flr

IRAQ (IS ET AL.)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: IS, Sunni militant groups, anti-government Sunni tribesmen vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The war over national power and the orientation of the political system between Sunni militant groups, mainly the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as well as, for example, the Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order, the Islamic Army of Iraq, Ansar al-Islam, and several militant Sunni tribal fighters on the one hand, and the government on the other continued. The latter was supported by Shiite militias, Kurdish Peshmerga, pro-government Sunni tribesmen, Iran, as well as an US-led coalition.

ISIS made considerable territorial gains in western and northern Iraq, namely in the provinces of al Anbar, Babil, Ninawa, and Salah ad-Din. According to the UN, 12,282 civilians were killed and 23,126 injured, making 2014 the most fatal year for civilians since 2008. In addition, the UN estimated that more than 2.75 million people were internally displaced. On June 29, ISIS declared the founding of a caliphate, currently comprising territory in Syria and Iraq, and renamed itself the Islamic State (IS) [→ Syria (opposition groups); Syria (inter-opposition violence); Syria (NC, Islamist Groups - KSC / Kurdish Regions)]. Its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed himself Caliph. Following rapid IS advances in June, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari asked the USA to assist the security forces in fighting against IS by providing air support. Since early August hundreds of air strikes were conducted by the US-led coalition. On August 11, the US started supplying weapons to Peshmerga fighters. Several western countries also armed Kurdish security forces in coordination with the Iraqi government. IS militants beheaded US and UK nationals in retaliation for airstrikes and the arming of Kurds by the US-led international coalition. As requested by the government, Iran supported Iraq by training security forces, providing strategic and operational assistance, and conducting airstrikes on IS positions.

The period of observation started with militants' seizure of the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi in the Sunni-dominated governorate of al Anbar. Sunni militants overran Ramadi, using

vehicles mounted with machine guns and anti-aircraft guns and set police vehicles on fire. Militants used loudspeakers to call on the inhabitants to join them. Sunni tribesmen supported the army in fighting the militants in Ramadi. Between January 1 and 3 alone, at least 40 militants were killed during combat. In Fallujah, anti-government Sunni tribesmen supported Sunni militants in fighting the army, which tried to regain the city. Government forces conducted airstrikes on both cities in January and deployed heavy weaponry, especially around Fallujah. Due to ongoing clashes, more than 11,000 families fled their homes by the end of the month. Throughout the year, both cities remained heavily contested between militants and security forces. Whereas security forces repeatedly claimed to have retaken Ramadi, Fallujah stayed in the hands of militants. In mid-May, the military started an operation targeting Fallujah, which involved airstrikes and artillery, causing at least 6,000 people to flee the city. The operation allegedly comprised 42,000 security personnel. Within the first six months of the year, more than 400,000 inhabitants fled Ramadi and Fallujah. Until the end of the observation period, IS remained in control of vast territories in al Anbar and made further territorial gains, including, among others, the cities of al Qaim, Kubaisa, al Wafa, and Hit. IS continued attacks on government-held areas and government allies. For example, on September 21, IS militants stormed the army base in the city Saqlawiya, killing and kidnapping hundreds of soldiers. On October 30, two mass graves with around 220 executed members of the Sunni Abu Nimr tribe were found near the cities of Hit and Ramadi. The tribesmen had previously fought IS. Until the end of the year, hundreds of Sunni tribal members were killed by IS. Beginning in August, the US-led coalition conducted numerous airstrikes in al Anbar, especially targeting areas around Fallujah, Ramadi, Hit, al Qaim, and the Haditha Dam. In June, IS started a large scale offensive, which resulted in considerable territorial expansion. The governorates of al Anbar, Ninawa, Salah ad-Din, Diyala, and Kirkuk were especially affected by the IS advance in June. Following four days of heavy clashes with security forces, IS militants seized Iraq's second-largest city, Mosul, on June 10. Hundreds of militants armed with rocket-propelled grenades, sniper rifles, machine guns, and suicide bombs fought their way into Mosul. According to estimations by security sources, one thousand soldiers died trying to prevent IS taking over Mosul. IS freed at least 1,200 inmates, mostly militants, from prisons and also took control of the Ghizlani army base south of Mosul. Hundreds of thousands of people fled Mosul, mostly to the Kurdish regions. On June 12, the Kurdish regional government (KRG) announced the establishment of the Khazir refugee camp in cooperation with the UN near the city Erbil, Erbil province. The governorate Diyala was also hit by IS combat actions and affected by highly violent encounters between IS and its opponents. For example, on June 13, IS conquered the towns Jawala and Sadiyah. The June offensive by IS also spread to Salah ad-Din. On June 5, around 200 IS fighters attacked the city Samarra. Government troops launched a counter-offensive and regained control over Samarra. One day after taking over Mosul, IS militants captured parts of Tikrit, the provincial capital, using more than 60 armored vehicles. Thereupon, hundreds of cadets stationed at Camp Speicher near Tikrit withdrew to Baghdad. After leaving the camp, they were captured by IS fighters and executed. Human rights organizations identified several places of execution and estimated that between 560 and 770 cadets were shot dead. In order to regain control of Tikrit and other cities in Salah ad-Din, the military

launched a large-scale operation on June 26. The operation was backed by Sunni tribesmen and Shiite volunteers and involved airstrikes and airborne troops. On July 16, Sunni militants attacked the town of Amerli, with a largely Shiite Turkmen population, marking the beginning of a two-month IS siege. On August 31, a joint operation by security forces, Peshmerga fighters, and Shiite militias, which was supported by US air strikes, broke the leaguer [→ Iraq (Kurdish Regional Government)]. At least 40 militants were killed. The next day, Sulaiman Bek, another besieged city in Salah ad-Din, was retaken in a joint maneuver by Shiite militias, Peshmerga fighters, and the Iraqi Air Force, killing around 22 militants. During their June offensive, IS fighters also took control of most parts of the city Baiji and besieged the local refinery, which was the biggest source of fuel for domestic consumption. In late October, security forces with support by Shiite militias and airstrikes by the international coalition started to advance toward Baiji and the besieged refinery. Three weeks later, security forces entered the refinery and broke the five months siege. However, fighting between militants and security forces did not cease in Baiji.

At the beginning of August, IS assaulted the Sinjar district in Ninawa, home to the minority group of Yazidis. Due to the IS advance in the area, tens of thousands of Yazidis fled into nearby mountains. During the IS offensive in Sinjar, militants killed at least 500 Yazidis and kidnapped at least 300 Yazidi women. Kurdish forces managed to help tens of thousands of Yazidis flee Sinjar toward Kurdistan. Numerous Yazidis, mainly children, died of thirst and hunger in the mountains, which remained besieged by IS until December. Starting on December 17, Peshmergas fighters, who were militarily backed by the international coalition providing air support, as well as Yazidi fighters, and Kurdish forces from Turkey and Syria, started an operation to advance toward Sinjar and break the leaguer of the Sinjar Mountains. Up to 10.000 Peshmerga were mobilized for the operation. On December 18, Peshmerga forces and allied fighters ended the siege of the Sinjar Mountains and started to move forward to push back IS from the city of Sinjar. According to Kurdish sources between 250 and 300 IS fighters were killed until December 21.

On August 18, Kurdish and government forces retook control of the Mosul dam from IS after days of fighting aided by multiple airstrikes from the international coalition.

Additionally, militants frequently targeted public figures, political institutions, and crowded public places, mainly in Shiite districts. Car bombs, roadside bombs, suicide bombings, as well as mortar shells predominantly hit the capital Baghdad. For instance, on February 5, four car bombs exploded in the "Green Zone" and on a square in central Baghdad, leaving at least 23 people dead. On June 7, a dozen car bomb explosions killed a total of 60 people in mainly Shiite areas. Other provinces were also affected. For instance, on February 18, seven car bomb attacks across Babil killed at least 35 people. In Karbala, Karbala province, site of the tomb of Imam Hussein, a Shiite shrine, five car bombs killed at least 15 and wounded another 48 on October 20. *ami, fz, sge, gak*

The dispute between the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi government in Baghdad over secession and natural resources remained non-violent.

As in previous years, the period of observation was marked by disputes over the distribution of oil revenues. On January 8, the KRG started to export its crude oil through the new pipeline between the city of Kirkuk and the Turkish city Ceyhan, Adana province, without the consent of the government. The KRG accused the government of withholding parts of its constitutionally guaranteed 17 percent of the federal budget. On November 13, after months of mutual accusations and continuing oil sells by the KRG, the two sides agreed on the distribution of Kurdish oil revenues between the KRG and the government.

On the military level, however, Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi army cooperated against the advances of the Islamic State (IS) [->Iraq (Sunni militant groups)]. For instance, on June 11, the Iraqi army announced it would work on a joint operation with Peshmerga fighters to free the city of Mosul, Ninawa governorate. In late August, joint forces lifted the IS siege of the city of Amerli, Salah ad-Din governorate. The military cooperation did not remain without disputes. For example, after Iraqi troops had withdrawn due to IS activities, Peshmerga forces took control over the disputed, oil-rich city of Kirkuk on June 12 and refused to pull back its forces. Repeatedly, Kurdish officials stated that the government did not allocate sufficient financial and military support to the Peshmerga forces in order to fight IS.

The conflict also comprised the political representation of Kurds as well as the legal status of the Kurdish region vis-à-vis the government. By the beginning of July, the President of the KRG Massoud Barzani underlined that the goal and right of the Kurds was the formation of an independent Kurdistan, and he called upon the KRG's regional parliament to form a commission mandated with the preparation of an independence referendum. On July 11, the Kurdish ministers of the federal government left the cabinet, calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. On August 14, Maliki withdrew. In September, the KRG announced to postpone the planned referendum and instead focus on fighting IS and creating a new central government. On September 8, the new Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi appointed a new cabinet, which included six Kurdish ministers compared to three under Maliki. *mlo*

IRAQ – IRAN

Intensity: **1** | Change: **END** | Start: **1969**

Conflict parties: Iraq vs. Iran

Conflict items: territory

The conflict between Iraq and Iran ended. The decades-long conflict centered in particular on the demarcation of the border line as well as the influence of both countries in the regional power system. In 1975, Iraq and Iran signed the so called "Algiers Agreement", determining that the center line of the river Shatt-al Arab should serve as the border between the countries. However, following the Iranian Revolution, the spiritual head of Iran, Ayatollah Chomeini, called upon Shiites in other Muslim countries, including Iraq, to spread the revolution and overrun their leaders. The following year, the then president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, declared the Algiers Agreement null and void. On 09/22/1980, Iraq invaded

IRAQ (KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **•** | Start: **1971**

Conflict parties: KRG vs. government

Conflict items: secession, resources

Iran, marking the beginning of the so called "First Gulf War", which lasted until 1988. The war ended with a ceasefire on 20/08/1988.

Even though Iraq and Iran increasingly improved their diplomatic ties and enhanced their cooperation in the fields of economy and trade in recent years, the border line between both countries remained a controversial issue. In November 2013, the then Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki traveled to the Iranian capital of Tehran to discuss a border agreement between both parties. In February, the foreign ministers of both countries announced that they had managed to renegotiate an agreement and wanted to implement the 1975 Algiers Accord.

In the course of the year, Iranian officials repeatedly declared their support for Iraq in fighting the Sunni militant group Islamic State (IS). By the end of year, Iran stated it had recently conducted air strikes in Iraq to combat IS with Iraqi approval [→ Iraq (Sunni militant groups)].

et

ISRAEL (HAMAS ET AL. / PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **↑** | Start: **1988**

Conflict parties: Hamas, PIJ, PRC vs. government

Conflict items: secession, system/ideology

The conflict over the creation of a Palestinian state between the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and other Islamist militant groups operating from Gaza and the government escalated to a war.

In the first half of the year, 27 Palestinians and three Israelis were killed. On January 19, Israel Air Force (IAF) killed leading Islamic Jihad operative Ahmad Saad. On January 31, Gazan militants fired a rocket from the Sinai Peninsula into Israel's Southern District. The IAF killed three militants in an airstrike on March 11, after the latter had fired a mortar at patrolling soldiers. On April 23, Hamas and Fatah announced the creation of a unity government. Additionally, the deadline imposed by US Secretary of State John Kerry for a framework agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority expired on April 29 without progress [→ Israel (PNA / Palestinian Territories)].

On June 12, three Israeli teenagers from the settlements were abducted near Hebron, West Bank, with no group immediately claiming responsibility. Israel accused Hamas of the kidnapping and started a search mission, raiding various cities across the West Bank and arresting about 400 Palestinians, among them nearly all of Hamas's leadership in the West Bank. Later in August, an autonomous Hamas cell from the West Bank claimed responsibility. Following the kidnapping, rocket fire exchanges between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and militants in Gaza increased. On June 30, the teenagers were found dead near Hebron. The following day, IAF launched 34 airstrikes in Gaza after militants had fired 20 rockets into Israel. Following these events, IDF launched "Operation Protective Edge" in July, which lasted until August 26. The IDF aimed at preventing rocket fire from Gaza and destroying the military infrastructure of Hamas and other militant groups. The operation included a ground invasion, starting on July 17. In sum, IDF killed about 2,100 Palestinians in Gaza, more than 1,400 civilians. Militant groups killed 66 Israeli soldiers and five civilians in clashes and by firing rockets into Israel's Southern District. The escalating

conflict left more than 500,000 Gazans internally displaced. Moreover, infrastructure including hospitals, mosques, UN shelters, university buildings, and the only power plant in the Gaza Strip were heavily damaged. On July 15, Hamas fired a rocket at the village of Erez, Southern District, killing one civilian. On July 19 and 20, IDF killed more than 130 and wounded another 250 Gazans. Meanwhile, Hamas killed 16 Israeli soldiers in Gaza. 120 Gazans and three Israeli soldiers were killed in Gaza in air strikes and in ground combat on July 21. The same day, a rocket fired from Gaza hit near Ben Gurion International Airport, which led major airlines to suspend their flights from and to Israel. On July 25, IDF airstrikes and ground attacks left 68 Palestinians dead and caused about 10,000 to seek shelter in UN buildings in Gaza. Hamas targeted an infantry unit with anti-tank missiles and rocket-propelled grenades in Beit Hanoun, Gaza, killing ten Israeli soldiers. On July 30, more than 20 Gazans died when IAF shelled a UN school, suspecting militants hiding among the refugees. On August 2, IDF killed at least 120 Palestinians and damaged a university. On August 10, an initial 72 hours ceasefire agreement was reached, which was mostly observed and later gradually extended for a total of six days. On August 19, following rocket fire from Gaza, Israel recalled its negotiators from truce talks in Cairo. Two days later, an Israeli airstrike killed three high-ranking Hamas commanders in southern Gaza. On August 22, Hamas executed 18 Gazans suspected of collaborating with Israel. Following several failed ceasefires a long-term ceasefire agreement was reached under the mediation of Egypt on August 26. The deal included the easing of Israel's blockade of Gaza crossings and a gradual lifting of restrictions on fishing off the coast. On September 23, IDF fatally shot the two Palestinians suspected of killing the three abducted teenagers in a gunfight in Hebron. A man who allegedly commissioned and funded the abduction was arrested and charged by a military court. On October 21, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced an investigation of possible war crimes during the Gazan war. On November 10, IDF shot at a fishing boat off the Gazan coast allegedly located outside of the designated fishing zone, injuring three. On November 20 and December 4, Hamas tested several rockets, firing them offshore. On December 19, a rocket fired from Gaza hit Eshkol, Southern District, causing no damage. Shortly after, the IDF carried out an air strike on Hamas's infrastructure. On December 24, one militant was killed and an Israeli soldier was injured in a gunfight between militants and Israeli troops during a routine border control. vs

ISRAEL (HEZBOLLAH)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1982**

Conflict parties: Hezbollah vs. Israel

Conflict items: system/ideology

The conflict concerning ideology between Israel and Hezbollah operating from Lebanese territory continued. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) officers met for several tripartite meetings with their Lebanese counterparts under the auspices of UNIFIL [→ Israel - Lebanon].

The Israel Air Force attacked an alleged weapon convoy facilitated by Hezbollah on the Lebanon-Syria border on February 24. On March 5, Israeli gun fire prevented alleged Hezbollah fighters from planting a bomb on the Syrian border. On March 14, Hezbollah attacked an Israeli armored patrol

near the disputed Shebaa Farms with an explosive device, injuring four soldiers. Israel responded by shelling targets in Lebanon. On October 5, Israeli security forces opened fire on a group illegally crossing the border into Israel from Lebanon. A Lebanese soldier was accidentally wounded in the firefight. Two days later, a bomb planted by Hezbollah injured two Israeli soldiers near the Israeli-Lebanon border. IDF responded by shelling two Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon. On December 8, two members of Hezbollah were killed in an Israeli airstrike on weapon storage sites near the Syrian-Lebanese border.

hl

ISRAEL (PNA / PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: PNA vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, system/ideology, resources

The violent conflict over the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), led by President Mahmoud Abbas of the al-Fatah party, and the government continued. Following the announcement of a unity government by al-Fatah and Hamas on April 23, Israel suspended peace talks with the PNA that had started mid-2013 [→ Israel (al-Fatah - Hamas)]. Moreover, a framework agreement scheduled for April 29 was not reached, marking the end of the negotiations mediated by US Secretary of State John Kerry. The framework paper was meant to deal with core issues such as security arrangements, settlers, and the status of Jerusalem.

Throughout the year, Palestinians increasingly attacked security personnel and civilians and staged demonstrations in Israel, the West Bank, and around checkpoints. In addition, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) increasingly conducted raids, searches, and arrests in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. According to the UN, IDF killed over 50 Palestinians and injured over 5,600 in the West Bank and Jerusalem, while Palestinians killed 17 Israelis in the West Bank and Israel. A series of reprisal attacks in the West Bank continued on a nearly daily basis. For instance, on March 12, Israeli settlers slashed car tires and sprayed anti-Arab graffiti on walls in the village of Jaljulya. In addition, on May 23 and 24 Palestinians attacked Israelis with stones and firebombs in the West Bank. On June 12, two Palestinians kidnapped and later killed three Israeli youths in the West Bank, which was followed by protests in Israel and around the world as well as an increase of violence especially in Jerusalem and the West Bank. IDF launched "Operation Brother's Keeper" in search of the missing Israelis. They searched at least 2,200 houses in the West Bank, raiding some and arresting nearly 2,200 people between June 12 and August 31, and they demolished 82 Palestinian-owned buildings. These events preceded Israel's military operation in Gaza Strip [→ Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian territories)]. On July 2, two days after the bodies of the youths were found outside Hebron, three Israelis abducted and killed one Palestinian teenager in the Jerusalem Forest. After a soldier had shot dead a Palestinian during a riot in Wadi Joz, East Jerusalem on August 31, hundreds of Palestinians protested Israeli forces in Jerusalem, for instance on September 1 and 7. The IDF injured several protesters using tear gas and rubber bullets. Furthermore, IDF killed a Palestinian and injured several others during a clash in a

refugee camp near Ramallah on September 10. The soldiers carried out an operation to arrest a wanted Hamas operative, raided the camp, and were attacked by 50 Palestinians with explosives, burning tires, and stones.

On September 30, settlers bought homes in the East Jerusalem Arab neighborhood of Silwan, the largest Jewish purchase of homes in Silwan since the process began in 1986, which further raised tensions in Jerusalem. On October 22, a Palestinian from Silwan crashed his car into a crowd of people in Jerusalem, killing an infant and one woman. Another Palestinian shot and injured a right-wing activist during a rally in Jerusalem on October 29, in which protesters demanded more access and rights to the Temple Mount for Jews. Police killed the assailant on October 30 in a shootout in Jerusalem. The same day, security forces ordered the closing of the Al-Aqsa compound to all visitors. Reopening the mosque the next day, government imposed strict restrictions on Palestinians seeking to enter it, which further triggered large protests in Jerusalem. Palestinians continued assaults on civilians and frequently attacked and damaged the light rail in Jerusalem. On November 10, a Palestinian stabbed a soldier to death in Tel Aviv. Consequently, the IDF increased patrols along roads in the West Bank on November 11. Israelis repeatedly protested against the increased violence by Arabs and demanded more security in Jerusalem.

The Central Bureau of Statistics found that Israeli settlement-construction dropped by 62.4 percent by October. However, the government approved 243 new houses in the West Bank on December 25. dg

JORDAN (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The conflict over the orientation of the political system between opposition groups and the government continued on a violent level.

Demonstrations took place sporadically on Fridays, with protesters calling for reforms and the abolishment of corruption, as they did on January 24 in Irbid. The killing of a Jordanian-Palestinian judge at the King Hussein border crossing by an Israeli soldier on March 10 led to demonstrations and violent clashes between police forces and demonstrators. On March 18, parliament held a vote of confidence, prompted by the incident and Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour's decision not to expel the Israeli ambassador. The majority voted in favor of the government. The next day, riot police in the capital Amman beat protesters with truncheons while the latter threw stones at the police and attempted to block the road. At least eleven were injured.

From April 20 to 27, several violent clashes and at least four armed gunfights between rioters and the police in the city of Ma'an, Ma'an governorate, resulted in the death of one civilian and the injuries of five policemen and at least seven civilians. The riots were sparked by armed men who shot at police personnel guarding a courthouse, wounding two in the process. Rioters set on fire, shot at, and damaged government, police, bank, school, and private buildings and blocked roads with burning tires while police used tear gas. According to Interior Minister Hussein Majali, police forces arrested 158 people. On June 11, the State Security Court sentenced two opposition activists associated with the Muslim Brotherhood

and other popular movements to three month prison terms for undermining the state and insulting the king. On July 9, senior members of the banned Islamic Liberation Party were sentenced to six months in prison.

Between June 23 and 29, further violent clashes between rioters and police forces took place in Ma'an. Police killed two civilians in a raid, sparking riots and demonstrations all over the city. Police used tear gas to disperse around 100 protesters who blocked roads with burning tires. On the final day, armed men shot at the police, injuring two.

On July 9, the government blocked nine news websites it deemed unauthorized in accordance with its controversial media law of 2012. On August 3, armed men killed one police officer on patrol in Ma'an and injured three others using automatic rifles. On October 10 and 11, about 100 street vendors protested the government's decision to relocate a market in Amman. Some demonstrators used gunfire and Molotov cocktails against police forces who in turn deployed tear gas. Four people were injured. On October 27, government arrested influential Salafi-jihadi theorist Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi on the charge of promoting terrorism on the Internet, after having been released from five years in prison in June. On November 20, police arrested the deputy head of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan, Zaki Bani Irshid, on the charge of violating newly amended anti-terrorism laws.

bsc

KUWAIT (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: opposition movement vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between the opposition movement and the government continued.

On January 9, a court in the capital Kuwait City sentenced human rights activist Abdullah Fairuz Abdullah Abd al-Kareem to a five-year prison term with subsequent deportation for criticizing the Emir on Twitter. Accusing him of verbally assaulting TV broadcaster al-Shahed, the court penalized opposition figure and former Member of Parliament Musallam al-Barrak to one week in jail on January 27. On April 12, opposition groups called for broad democratic reforms on a political, constitutional, and legislative level. On June 9, a judge closed down Al Watan and Alam Al Youm newspapers for publishing a story on videotapes purportedly disclosing former officials plotting a coup. Royal family member Sheikh Ahmad Fahad al-Sabah handed the tapes over on April 9.

In widely boycotted parliamentary elections on June 27, citizens elected five pro-government candidates. Elections were held after five opposition members resigned in April 2014 due to the denial of a request to question Prime Minister Sheikh Jaber Mubarak al Sabah over corruption. The public prosecutor detained al-Barrak on July 2 for supposedly insulting the judiciary during a rally on June 10. On September 1, court adjourned his trial to October 20. On July 3, thousands of people gathered outside al-Barrak's residence in Kuwait City, demanding his release. Protests continued the following days, with riot police repeatedly firing tear gas and stun grenades at the protesters. Police forces arrested at least 30 people and left dozens injured. The ministry

of interior accused protesters of throwing petrol bombs at the jail in which al-Barrak was detained. Throughout the year, government revoked citizenship of several opposition figures, including that of former Member of Parliament Abdullah al-Barghash, Saad al-Ajmi, and owner of pro-opposition TV station Al Youm and Alam Al Youm newspaper, Ahmad Jabr al-Shemmari, as well as 18 others. These measures were taken due to alleged security concerns and illegal double nationalities. On July 23, the information ministry withdrew the licenses of two media outlets covering opposition news. A court sentenced 13 people to two years in prison for reciting al-Barrak's 2012 speech on October 22. On November 27, the Constitutional Court rejected a petition by the opposition coalition demanding the dissolution of the parliament.

sep

LEBANON (SUNNI MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: Abdullah Azzam Brigades, al-Nusra Front, ISIS et al. vs. government, Hezbollah

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis between Sunni militant groups and the government, supported by Hezbollah, erupted. The conflict was affected by the ongoing Syrian civil war and Hezbollah's involvement in it, with attacks and skirmishes concentrating on the capital Beirut, Tripoli, and Beqaa governorate [→ Syria (opposition groups)]. Throughout the year, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) increased their presence in the north and northeast of the country, concerned with protecting the integrity of its borders, maintaining internal security, and curbing growing Islamist activity.

On January 25, Abdullah Azzam Brigades, ISIS, and al-Nusra Front declared war on the Lebanese army and Hezbollah. The same day, grad rockets hit Hermel, Beqaa governorate. Between January and March, Sunni Islamist groups carried out several bomb attacks on Hezbollah strongholds and LAF checkpoints throughout Lebanon, killing at least 31 people. On January 2, a car bomb attack claimed by ISIS killed five and injured at least 66 near Hezbollah's political bureau in south Beirut. Also in Beirut, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades carried out a suicide bombing near an Iranian cultural center on February 19, killing at least five and injuring over 120. The al-Qaida affiliated al-Nusra Front conducted several suicide bombings in and around Hermel, which killed ten people and injured at least 40. On March 29, a car bomb detonated at an army checkpoint in Arsal, Beqaa left three soldiers dead. Liwa Ahrar al-Sunna claimed responsibility for the attack. Subsequently, the LAF seized weapons and arrested an alleged al-Nusra commander during raids in the Beqaa Valley in January and February. In June suicide attacks against army checkpoints in Beqaa and Beirut left three people dead and 32 wounded. On June 13, government approved a security plan for the city of Tripoli and the Beqaa Valley. The plan called for the deployment of troops in the corresponding areas in order to seize weapons and arrest suspected militants. On June 29, ISIS declared the founding of a caliphate, currently comprising territory in Syria and Iraq, and renamed itself the Islamic State (IS) [→ Syria (opposition groups); Syria (inter-opposition violence); Syria (NC, Islamist Groups - KSC / Kurdish Regions)]. Beginning in July, the LAF, supported by Hezbollah, was engaged in heavy fighting with Sunni Islamist groups, especially

al-Nusra and IS, in and around the northeastern town Arsal. On July 12 and 13, Hezbollah and Sunni fighters clashed between the border town of Arsal and the Qalamoun mountains. At least seven Hezbollah fighters and nine Sunni militants were killed and over 70 wounded. Following the clashes, the Lebanese army deployed elite units from the southern border with Israel to the Beqaa Valley [→ Israel - Lebanon; Israel (Hezbollah)]. In August, skirmishes between the LAF and Sunni militants continued. After the militants attacked two army checkpoints near Arsal on August 2, Lebanese troops countered them in the surrounding mountains using mortars. The fighting lasted for five days and killed at least 14 soldiers and 50 militants, while 86 were wounded. During the fighting, al-Nusra and IS captured between 22 and 27 security forces. Following the kidnapping, al-Nusra repeatedly demanded the release of prisoners from the Roumieh prison in Beirut, threatening to kill the captives. In late August and throughout September, al-Nusra and IS published videos showing the beheading and shooting of five hostages. In response to the kidnappings and beheadings, both Shiites and Sunnis were abducted in Arsal, and Lebanese nationals torched the tents of Syrian refugees in Beirut and Brital, Beqaa. On September 19 and 20, a roadside bomb in Arsal and a suicide attack in Khraybeh, Mount Lebanon governorate resulted in the death of two soldiers and three Hezbollah fighters. Following the bombings, the LAF arrested over 200 people, most of them Syrians. On October 5, al-Nusra attacked a Hezbollah patrol near Baalbek, Beqaa and killed up to ten Hezbollah fighters, while Hezbollah claimed to have killed dozens of the attackers.

In addition to the ongoing fighting in the north and the northeast, in Tripoli, the Sunni-dominated capital of the North governorate, clashes intensified along divides exacerbated by the Syrian civil war. While predominantly Alawite Jabal Mohsen and predominantly Sunni Bab al-Tabbaneh neighborhoods repeatedly clashed over the year, the LAF engaged in combat with Sunni militants believed to be in collaboration with IS [→ Lebanon (Sunnis - Alawites)]. In October the army raided two Syrian refugee camps and arrested over 40 people, among them Ahmad Salim Mikati, who had allegedly been involved in the beheading of Lebanese security forces in September. During the raids, the army killed four people in shootouts. On October 24, Sunni militants attacked army checkpoints in Tripoli wounding at least twelve soldiers. The next day, the army attacked a market in Bab al-Tabbaneh with helicopters firing rockets.

Due to heavy fighting, the army deployed tanks to Tripoli on October 26. The clashes left eleven soldiers, 23 militants, and eight civilians dead, and over 160 people wounded, among them 92 soldiers and 63 Sunni militants. Thousands of Tripoli residents temporarily fled their homes. Meanwhile, fights also erupted in the northern villages Minyeh and Mhamra, North governorate. In Minyeh, militants killed a soldier with a rocket-propelled grenade, followed by military helicopter airstrikes. In the Mhamra battles, militants killed two soldiers. In the following weeks, the army detained over 70 people charged with involvement in the October clashes and seized weapons and ammunition. twe

LIBYA (FEDERALISTS / CYRENAICA)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: Congress of the People of Cyrenaica, Council of Cyrenaica in Libya, Cyrenaica Federalists, Cyrenaica Transitional Council, Political Bureau of Cyrenaica vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy, system/ideology

The conflict between several federalist groups based in the region of Cyrenaica and the government over autonomy turned violent.

The first half of the year was dominated by incidents concerning the oil ports, seized by federalists around Ibrahim al-Jathran, head of the Political Bureau of Cyrenaica. On January 6, a Libyan Navy vessel directed warning shots towards a Maltese tanker trying to dock near the Es Sider oil terminal. The next day, federalists controlling the oil terminals announced that they would sell oil from the ports. On January 8, Prime Minister Ali Zeidan declared that any ship trying to get to the terminal would be destroyed by the Navy. On March 8, an oil tanker called Morning Glory docked at the oil terminal Es Sider. The same day, Zeidan announced that the Libyan Navy would bomb the tanker should it try to leave the port. In reaction, the federalists said that any attack by the government would be a declaration of war on the people of Cyrenaica. On March 11, the Morning Glory managed to break through the blockade by Libyan Navy vessels. Five days later, US Special Forces captured the tanker in international waters, causing no harm to its personnel, and handed it over to the Libyan Navy on March 22. The same day, federalists aligned with al-Jathran attacked an army base near Ajdabiya, Al Wahat district, leaving no casualties. On April 6, the government reached an agreement with the federalists, who agreed on handing back the oil terminals. On July 2, federalists relinquished the control of the two remaining oil ports to the government. The same day, the newly elected Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni declared that the crisis was over.

On November 7, al-Jathran supported the internationally recognized government in Tobruk, announcing he and his followers would declare independence for Cyrenaica should the rival parliament in Tripoli gain support from abroad [→ Libya (opposition groups)]. Al-Jathran forces were also involved in clashes over the oil port in Es Sider that started on December 13, in which elements loyal to the rump government attempted to stop advancing Libya Dawn allies. aje

LIBYA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Operation Dignity, Zintan brigades vs. Libya Dawn, Misrata brigades, Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between opposition groups and the government escalated to a war. Starting in August, governmental control was contested by the internationally recognized

House of Representatives (HoR), elected in June, and the General National Congress (GNC), the former legislative authority. The latter was reinstated by politicians opposing the HoR. Each side was supported by a loose alliance of militias which in turn pursued independent aspirations of subnational predominance. Since the ousting of former president Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011, the government failed to effectively disband or incorporate militias. Numerous militias, especially Islamist, proliferated and consolidated their power in the country. As in previous years, the situation was characterized by the absence of rule of law and a functioning state security apparatus.

Throughout the year, violent confrontations took place between rival militias all over the country and especially in the cities Benghazi and Tripoli and their respective districts. Additionally, targeted killings and assassinations were directed at politicians, human rights activists, and army officials. On January 12, for example, deputy minister for industry Hassan al-Droui was gunned down in the streets of Sirte, Sirte province, by unknown assailants. On March 17, a car bomb detonated in front of a military academy in Benghazi, killing at least eight soldiers and injuring twelve.

The GNC extended its mandate a few days before its expiration on February 7. The same day, thousands took to the streets of the capital Tripoli in protest over this decision. The GNC, comprised of an Islamist majority, was also targeted by renegade General Khalifa Haftar who declared it dissolved and called for new elections in a televised announcement. Haftar, who had served under Qaddafi and later participated in the coup, launched "Operation Dignity", starting with an attack on Islamist bases in Benghazi on May 16 using military aircraft and helicopter gunships. 75 people were killed and 141 wounded in the ensuing fighting. Operation Dignity forces were constituted by the so-called National Army, a nationalist group including former soldiers, supported mainly by the Al-Zintan Revolutionaries' Military Council, referred to as Zintan brigades, and the elite army unit Saiqa Special Forces. On May 18, Haftar's forces stormed the parliament in the capital Tripoli, using mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and anti-aircraft guns. They blocked roads leading to the building as clashes spread throughout the city, killing two and wounding over 60.

Legislative elections for the House of Representatives were held on June 25. To reduce tensions, party lists were replaced by independent candidates. However, only 188 of 200 seats could be assigned due to security reasons. Islamist candidates did not reach a majority.

On July 13, an alliance of Islamist groups called Libya Dawn, prominently among them Misrata brigades and the umbrella group Libya Shield Forces, attacked Tripoli International Airport. Heavy combat continued for weeks between the rival factions and spread into the neighborhoods surrounding the airport, with Libya Dawn using rockets, mortar rounds, and tank fire. Haftar claimed to have returned the fire with war planes. On August 23, Libya Dawn seized the airport, which was previously controlled by Haftar-affiliated Zintan militias. At least 150 were killed and 450 wounded in the battles, including civilians. Amidst months of combat between rival groups in Benghazi, Islamist militias led by the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries took control over the main camp of the Saiqa Special Forces on July 29. The latter withdrew from the base following days of heavy clashes and shelling, in which 30 were reportedly killed. Since mid-July, at least 70 were said to have been killed and about 290 wounded in Benghazi.

Due to the violence and instability in Tripoli, the newly

elected HoR and the government of Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni, who took up office in March following Ali Zeidan's ousting, moved to the eastern city of Tobruk in August. While the majority of representatives participated in the parliament's opening meeting and called for national unity on August 4, pro-Islamist members boycotted the session. Meanwhile, a coalition of politicians dismissing the parliament reinstated the GNC in Tripoli, with Nouri Abusahmain as its president. On August 25, the GNC appointed Omar al-Hassi as prime minister and tasked him with forming a "salvation government", which he did on September 2. Hence, both governments contended for legitimacy and financial resources, with the government in Tobruk garnering international recognition. Haftar aligned his forces with al-Thinni's government as violent confrontations with rival groups based in Tripoli continued.

In late September, UNSMIL, headed by Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya Bernardino Leon, urged the warring factions to hold talks and reach a peaceful solution. On October 10, UNHCR stated that approx. 100,000 civilians had fled Tripoli and another 15,000 had fled Benghazi due to fighting over the previous weeks. From October 11 to 13, Zintan militias attacked the towns Kikla and Gharyan, Jabal al Gharbi district, thought to be supporters of Libya Dawn. At least 46 died and more than a 100 were injured. On October 15, Haftar's forces launched an offensive against Islamist militias in Benghazi, including Ansar al-Sharia, to regain control over the city. At least 450 people were killed in those clashes by the end of November. On November 6, the Supreme Court ruled the newly elected parliament unconstitutional.

In an effort to stop rival militias from advancing, on December 13, brigades loyal to the government in Tobruk conducted airstrikes at Libya's biggest oil ports at Es-Sider and Ras Lanuf, Sirte district, killing four and wounding seven. The Tobruk-allied forces were accompanied by Ibrahim al-Jathran, a militia leader representing Cyrenaica federalists [→ Libya (Federalists / Cyrenaica)]. One of the storage tanks at Es-Sider port was set on fire by a rocket on December 25. On the same day, 19 people were killed in clashes in the surrounding areas. Since the beginning of the fighting in mid-December, a total of at least 71 militiamen were killed and 270 wounded. Subsequently, on December 28, Haftar's militias carried out an aerial attack on Misrata, a stronghold of Libya Dawn militants. [cro](#)

MOROCCO (POLISARIO / WESTERN SAHARA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: POLISARIO vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The conflict over the secession of Western Sahara between the Popular Front of the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) and the government continued at the level of a violent crisis. Throughout the year, demonstrators repeatedly demanded independence from the central government and condemned the exploitation of natural resources in different cities of Western Sahara.

On February 15, protesters staged a demonstration in al-Aaiún, Laáyoune region, demanding the release of Sahrawi prisoners and the extension of the MINURSO mandate. Police forces in plain clothes later dispersed the protests with batons. On March 16, at least 500 Sahrawi held demonstrations

in various cities across Western Sahara. For instance, at Smara Street in al-Aaiún security forces in plain clothes dispersed the demonstration with batons. At least 80 Sahrawi were injured. Furthermore, about 100 Sahrawi staged a demonstration in Cabo Bojador, Laáyoune region against the activities of US oil company Kosmos Energy. Police and auxiliary forces intervened and seven Sahrawi were injured. Another demonstration took place in Ad-Dakhla, Oued ad-Dahab-Lagouira region. Security forces dispersed the crowd, resulting in the injuries of five people. On April 29, the UN Security Council extended the MINURSO mandate for another year until 04/30/2015. Again, on May 15, at least 100 Sahrawi took to the streets in al-Aaiún. Clashes with police forces resulted in injuries. On June 6, a demonstration organized by the Ak Akdeim Izik Coordination for peaceful activism took place in al-Aaiún. Security forces intervened and 15 Sahrawi citizens were injured. At the end of June, the African Union appointed Joaquim Chissano as a special envoy for Western Sahara. The foreign ministry, however, rejected the decision. [ari](#)

SAUDI ARABIA (SHIITES)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: Shiites vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between Shiites and the Sunni government continued. The conflict mainly took place in the predominantly Shiite Eastern Province, particularly in and around the town of Awamiya, which had been the center of unrest since mass protests began in 2011. Shiites demanded democratic reforms and an end to social and economic marginalization due to sectarian discrimination. On February 20, security forces raided a house in Awamiya, Eastern Province. Two officers and two Shiites were killed in an ensuing gunfight. One of the suspects killed was a prominent local photographer who had documented demonstrations and protester funerals in the Eastern Region over the previous three years. On May 27, a court convicted Ali al-Nimr, the nephew of prominent Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, of sedition and rioting and sentenced him to death. Ali al-Nimr was the second Shiite to be sentenced to death that week for his involvement in unrest in Qatif, Eastern Province, in June 2012. Overall, five Shiites who had been involved in anti-government protests, including Sheikh al-Nimr, were sentenced to death in the course of the year. Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef visited Eastern Province on November 7 to offer his condolences to the relatives of the nine victims of the November 3 attack in al-Dalwah, Eastern Province, in which Shiites were killed by IS affiliated militants attacking a mosque. On December 14, a gunman killed a soldier near the village of Awamiya, Eastern Province. Six days later, security forces raided the attacker's hideout and killed him as well as four other gunmen in Awamiya. The four gunmen shot at security forces who used armored vehicles. Constituting the most fatal incident in Awamiya in recent years, more than 20 people were wounded in the crackdown. [ami](#)

SYRIA (INTER-OPPOSITION VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **5** | Change: ↑ | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: ISIS vs. al-Nusra Front vs. Islamic Front vs. Islamist groups vs. NC
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance, resources

The conflict between the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC) and their military wing Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Islamist groups, such as the al-Nusra Front, the Islamic Front and the Islamic State (IS), over resources, subnational predominance, ideology, and the orientation of the political system escalated to a war.

Throughout the year, the al-Qaida leadership under Aiman al-Zawahiri distanced its group from activities committed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and urged the various Islamic and Islamist brigades operating in Syria to cease fighting themselves and to fight together against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Al-Qaida's general command announced that it did not have any organizational ties with ISIS and formally disassociated itself from al-Qaida on February 3. The split between the al-Qaida affiliated al-Nusra Front under Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani and ISIS under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi intensified. On June 29, ISIS announced to have established a caliphate. Consequently, ISIS changed its name to Islamic State (IS). Al-Jawlani announced his aim to establish an emirate on areas where al-Nusra was deployed in mid-July, underlining the difference between an emirate and a caliphate.

In the beginning of the year Islamist and moderate groups, mainly under the newly established umbrella groups Syrian Revolutionary Front (SRF) and Mujahideen Army, launched an offensive against ISIS in northern Syria. Initially the offensive concentrated on the governorates of Idlib and Aleppo, pushing ISIS out of the area in March. Between April and June, battles concentrated mainly on the oil-rich governorate of Deir al-Zor, which borders Iraq. According to the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, approx. 6,000 people were killed by June. Towards the end of the year, al-Nusra started an offensive against moderate groups such as the FSA in Idlib and later in Dara'a.

On January 2, fighting erupted between ISIS and other Islamist groups in the town of Atarib, Aleppo, after ISIS had reportedly killed two commanders in imprisonment. The clashes expanded to other parts of Aleppo and Idlib. By January 7, at least 34 fighters from ISIS and its ally Jund al-Aqsa were killed in the district of Jabal Zawiya, Idlib. On January 8, Islamist groups expelled ISIS from its headquarters. According to reports, at least 1,400 died in clashes in Aleppo and Idlib by the end of January. Whereas SRF and the Mujahideen army declared war on al-Baghdadi's followers, the umbrella group Islamic Front, formed in November 2013, officially distanced itself from the offensive. However, several of its subgroups, such as Ahrar al-Sham and the Liwa al-Tawhid Brigade, frequently engaged in clashes with ISIS in Aleppo and al-Raqqah governorates.

After days of clashes between al-Nusra Front, its allied groups, and ISIS over the city of Raqqah, al-Raqqah, ISIS took control of the city in mid-January. Additionally, ISIS detonated several car bombs in Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, and al-Raqqah governorates. While ISIS retreated from parts of northern Aleppo, at least 26 people were killed in an ISIS car bomb

attack in the city of Jarabulus, Aleppo, on January 15. ISIS allegedly reinforced its personnel by sending a 70-car convoy from Raqqah to Jarabulus. Two days later, clashes between the Liwa al-Tawhid Brigade and ISIS left at least ten dead. ISIS executed another 40. At the end of January, the Salafi preacher Abdullah bin Mohammed al-Moheisini proposed a peace plan, the Umma Initiative, to mediate the conflict. The main factions signed the statement, but ISIS rejected it.

On February 1, ISIS detonated a car bomb near a base of the Liwa al-Tawhid Brigade in Aleppo, killing at least 26, including the commander of the Brigade. The same day, ISIS ambushed Suqour al-Sham in Hama governorate, killing its leader. In February, al-Nusra Front and allied groups, such as Ahrar al-Sham, launched an offensive against ISIS in Deir al-Zor, seizing factories. The ISIS commander in Deir al-Zor was killed during combat action on February 8. Meanwhile, further skirmishes erupted between both sides in Aleppo and al-Hasakah. Abu Khalid al-Suri, al-Zawahiri's Syrian representative, was killed in an ISIS suicide bombing along with six comrades at the Ahrar al-Sham headquarters in Aleppo on February 23. Subsequently, al-Jawlani issued an ultimatum to ISIS, demanding ISIS to either submit to arbitration by clerics or retreat from Syria.

In the following days, ISIS retreated from parts of Aleppo and moved to and around its stronghold in al-Raqqah. Additionally, by mid-March, ISIS had completely withdrawn from Idlib and Latakia governorates under monitoring by al-Nusra. However, around 3,000 ISIS fighters were deployed from al-Raqqah to the eastern governorate Deir al-Zor. In an attempt to recapture positions that al-Nusra and allied brigades had taken from ISIS in the beginning of the year, ISIS started a three-month offensive in Deir al-Zor in April. Between April 10 and 11, at least 68 people were killed in skirmishes in the border village of Haseen and the town of Albu Kamal. According to reports, ten days of fighting left up to 230 dead and at least 100,000 internally displaced in Deir al-Zor by May 10.

ISIS captured key locations from rival groups in Deir al-Zor by mid-May. On June 8, al-Nusra and allied brigades captured the al-Kharrat oil station after clashes with ISIS. The same day, fighting erupted between ISIS and al-Nusra, the latter supported by al-Zubair brigades, in the town of Khasham, killing 28 ISIS fighters and five others. Afterwards, ISIS took hold of surrounding areas of the al-Hrayji village. In clashes that lasted six weeks, a total of 241 ISIS fighters and 354 from other brigades were killed in Deir al-Zor by June 10. On June 20, ISIS seized the al-Qaim border crossing on the Iraqi side after Iraqi security forces had left [→ Iraq (Sunni militants)]. Al-Nusra and FSA, in control of the Syrian part of the border crossing, Albu Kamal, retreated from the Syrian side of the border. Three days earlier, Albu Kamal had been captured by FSA and al-Nusra from government forces [→ Syria (opposition groups)]. According to reports, the Albu Kamal brigade of al-Nusra pledged allegiance to ISIS, enabling ISIS to control both sides. On July 3, ISIS seized the al-Omar oil field close to the border of Iraq and the Tanak oil field in the Sheiyat desert, Deir al-Zor. Al-Nusra front, previously controlling the al-Omar oil field, left without counteraction. Meanwhile, several local tribal fighters pledged allegiance to ISIS commander al-Baghdadi.

Combat also erupted in several parts of Aleppo governorate throughout May. For instance, on May 15, a car bomb detonated at the Bab al-Salam border crossing, Aleppo, killing at least 43. On July 1, at least twelve Islam Army fighters were killed in three-day clashes with IS in the town of Maydaa, Damascus governorate. The next day, brigades in

parts of Aleppo, Deir al-Zor and al-Raqqah announced they would lay down their arms within a week unless the exiled NC supported them in fighting IS militarily. In a three-week offensive in July, Islamist brigades and FSA expelled ISIS from parts of Damascus. On July 22, 80 IS fighters consigned their weapons after one week of clashes with FSA and al-Nusra in the suburb of Yilda. Additionally, IS retreated from Yarmouk district, which they had controlled for a month.

In mid-August, IS advanced in Aleppo and captured several villages. At least 40 fighters were killed and IS captured 100 Islamic Front fighters. Allegedly, IS employed US tanks and vehicles they had previously seized from the Iraqi army in Mosul, Iraq. On August 24, 320 fighters reportedly defected from Islamic brigades in Aleppo and Idlib and joined IS. On September 9 during a strategy meeting between Ahrar al-Sham, the Abdullah Azzam and Imam brigades, and other groups in an underground bunker in Ram Hamdan, Idlib, an explosion killed approx. 45 fighters and leaders. Three days later, Islamic brigades and ISIS agreed on a non-aggression pact in the Damascus suburb of Hajar al-Aswad.

In October, al-Nusra and affiliated groups started an offensive against FSA in Idlib and seized several villages. For instance, on October 27, at least twenty FSA fighters were killed in combat. In order to separate these fighting groups, 15 brigades agreed to send troops in al-Zawiya mount, Idlib, on October 31. Al-Nusra and affiliated groups seized further villages and entered the village of Deir Sonbol, Idlib, on November 1, expelling FSA from the area and accusing its local commander Jamal Maarouf of corruption. Allegedly, dozens of FSA fighters joined al-Nusra. The same day, IS fighters arrived in the village of al-Barah, the town of Kensafrah, and surrounding areas to support al-Nusra in clashes against FSA. In mid-November, al-Nusra and affiliated groups agreed to send a leader to Raqqah to hold talks with IS in order to agree on a ceasefire. IS stated that some of the brigades were supported by western countries and refused to agree on a deal.

In December, clashes erupted between al-Nusra-allied and IS-allied groups in the eastern Qalamoun Mountains, spreading to villages in Dara'a. On December 2, al-Nusra and affiliated brigades stormed the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade's strongholds in Saham al-Jawlan and Tasil, accusing them of having pledged allegiance to IS, and arrested three al-Nusra members in the town of Jamla. Several deaths were reported. The Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade denied having joined IS and announced it would send a commander to a joint court to settle the dispute. Nevertheless, the al-Nusra offensive against the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade in Dara'a continued. On December 15, citizens in the town of Sahm al-Jolan staged a protest, in which they called on both groups to fight outside the town. On December 22, the al-Mothanna Islamic Movement offered to settle the conflict between both parties in the Dar al-Adel courthouse. yal

SYRIA (NC, ISLAMIST GROUPS - KSC / KURDISH REGIONS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: NC, Islamist groups vs. KSC
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance, resources

The war over system and ideology, subnational predomi-

nance, and resources in the Kurdish regions between the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), their militia, the Popular Protection Unit (YPG), and various Islamist militant groups, mainly al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS), continued.

In 2013, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces' (NC) armed wing, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), was one of the conflict parties, although its attacks on Kurdish areas were already in heavy decline. The attacks completely subsided in 2014. The fighting between the Islamists and YPG forces continued to mostly affect the governorates of Aleppo, al-Hasakah, and al-Raqqah in northern Syria.

The beginning of the year was marked by a battle over the city of Tal Brak, al-Hasakah, between ISIS and YPG fighters, which had already begun in the end of December 2013 and lasted until January 7. 39 YPG and 21 ISIS fighters were killed in the clashes. YPG was forced to withdraw from the city. On January 21, the Syrian Kurds declared an autonomous provincial government in the country's northern Kurdish regions [→ Syria (Kurdish groups)].

Throughout the year, ISIS continuously clashed with YPG forces in the governorates of Aleppo, al-Hasakah and al-Raqqah. For instance, on February 21, YPG forces attacked ISIS fighters in Tal Brak, al-Hasakah, and recaptured the city. The clashes left 23 ISIS and three YPG fighters dead. Clashes between ISIS and YPG fighters around Tal Abyad, al-Raqqah, between April 15 and 20, left ten ISIS fighters dead. On May 29, ISIS fighters kidnapped 153 Kurdish children from the city of Kobane, Aleppo. On June 16, the YPG killed nine ISIS fighters during clashes near the village of Jarabulus, Aleppo. On June 29, ISIS released an audio message as well as a written statement, announcing the establishment of a caliphate, an Islamic state reaching across the region of Syria and Iraq, and appointing Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its caliph [→ Iraq (IS et al.)]. As a consequence, ISIS renamed itself Islamic State (IS).

In July, IS intensified its offensive against Kurdish areas. On July 9, IS captured three villages near Kobane, killing at least 18 YPG fighters, and continued advancing towards the city of Kobane. IS fighters carried out suicide attacks, targeting a YPG training camp near the city of Ras al-Ayn, al-Hasakah, killing and wounding ten YPG members on July 14. Violent encounters between IS and YPG fighters near the town of al-Sheyokh Tahtani, close to Kobane, reportedly left 14 YPG and 35 ISIS fighters dead on July 31.

In August, fighting between the YPG and IS mainly took place in the al-Hasakah governorate, close to the Iraqi border. For instance, between August 6 and 8, four YPG fighters were killed by IS fighters in clashes near the Syrian-Iraqi border. Furthermore, combat action between IS and YPG erupted in the border town of al-Yarubiya, al-Hasakah, on August 19, killing ten YPG and four IS fighters.

On September 9, YPG, FSA, and other militant groups issued a statement, declaring to have established a Joint Action Center against IS in the Euphrates area. Between September 14 and 19, IS launched an offensive on Kobane, engaging in battles with YPG fighters for villages in the vicinity of the city, using tanks and other heavy weapons. At least 140 IS and five YPG fighters were reportedly killed, and IS fighters captured over 60 villages.

Due to the ongoing attempts of IS to lay siege on Kobane, warplanes flying under the flag of the International Coalition led by the USA carried out airstrikes against IS targets around Kobane on September 26 in order to support Kurdish forces. The member states of the International Coalition, including the countries of Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan as well

as the United Arab Emirates, carried out airstrikes in Syria. In September and October, the fighting between IS and YPG remained concentrated on Kobane. Reportedly, by October 15, 258 YPG and 374 IS fighters were killed in clashes since IS had laid siege on the city of Kobane mid-September. Between October 28 and 31, at least 100 IS and 15 YPG fighters died during fighting in Kobane. On October 31, following negotiations with the Turkish government, a contingent of 150 Kurdish Peshmerga fighters from Iraq was allowed to enter Syria from Turkey in order to support the YPG's fight against IS over Kobane. During November, the fighting in and around Kobane between YPG and Peshmerga fighters and IS resulted in the death of at least 100 IS and 35 YPG fighters. For instance, on November 29, clashes between YPG and IS fighters in Kobane reportedly killed eight YPG and 17 IS fighters. In addition, the International Coalition carried out at least 33 air strikes against IS targets in and around Kobane, killing at least 92 IS fighters during the month of November. Compared to Aleppo, fights erupted less frequently in al-Hasakah and al-Raqqah during the second half of the year. However, on November 16, YPG fighters ambushed IS fighters near Abu Bakar hill in the countryside of Ras al-Ayn, killing seven IS members, including a commander. In December, the fighting between IS and YPG fighters over Kobane, as well as daily airstrikes on IS targets by the US-led coalition, continued. On December 20, YPG fighters took control of six neighborhoods and the cultural center of Kobane after clashing with IS forces.

Reportedly, at least twelve fighters died in ensuing clashes. On December 31, YPG forces allegedly controlled 70 percent of Kobane.

In the al-Hasakah province, clashes in the town of Qassiab between IS and YPG fighters killed at least 30 IS and three YPG fighters between November 24 and 25. As a consequence of the war, at least 300,000 people sought refuge in Turkey. Im

SYRIA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: NC, FSA, IS, Islamic Front, al-Nusra vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The war between opposition groups and the government of President Bashar al-Assad over national power and the orientation of the political system continued.

The opposition mainly consisted of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC), its military wing Free Syrian Army (FSA), and Islamist groups such as the al-Nusra Front, the Islamic Front (IF), and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). Clashes between opposition groups escalated to a war [→ Syria (inter-opposition violence)].

According to UN estimations in August, the death toll rose to approx. 191,000 since the beginning of the uprising in March 2011. As of November, at least 3.2 million people sought refuge in neighboring countries and 7.6 million were internally displaced. The UN-backed Geneva II Peace Conference on Syria took place between January 22 and 31 in Montreux and Geneva, Switzerland, and was followed by a second round between February 10 and 14. Neither conference yielded any results. UN peace envoy Lakhdar Brahimi stepped down on May 31 and was succeeded by Staffan de Mistura in July. Al-Assad was re-elected in June for a third

seven-year term. The removal of Syria's chemical weapons, led by the joint OPCW-UN mission, continued [→ Syria – USA]. However, OPCW reported that chlorine was systematically used in April in the villages of Talmanes, al-Tamana, Idlib governorate, and Kafr Zeita, Hama governorate. On June 29, ISIS announced the establishment of a caliphate reaching across Syria and Iraq and appointed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its caliph [→ Iraq (IS et al.)]. As a consequence, ISIS renamed itself Islamic State (IS). Beginning on September 22, the US-backed coalition, including several Arab countries such as Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, launched air incursions in Syria and Iraq targeting mainly IS, but also the al-Qaida affiliated al-Nusra Front as well as Khorasan Group.

In Aleppo governorate, government and opposition forces clashed heavily throughout the year. A government air offensive using barrel bombs and scud missiles against the city of Aleppo launched in December 2013 killed hundreds, mostly civilians, by mid-January. More than 120 people were killed between February 1 and 4. On February 6, Al-Nusra attacked the Aleppo Central Prison with a suicide vehicle carrying 20 tons of explosives. 300 prisoners were allegedly freed. Airstrikes against the al-Sham brigade in the city of Aleppo killed 70 on April 21 and 24. By July, government forces had completely seized Aleppo's industrial area and continued their advance. Opposition forces fired rockets into government-controlled areas in Aleppo between May 31 and June 1, killing at least 50 people. On November 9, government war planes bombed the town of al-Bab, killing at least 21 and wounding more than 100.

In Rif Dimashq governorate fighting continued throughout the year. Government forces reportedly killed at least 150 opposition forces, mainly al-Nusra Front fighters, near Damascus on February 26. Government forces recaptured the town of Rankous, killing 25 and leaving 100 wounded on April 9. Opposition fighters killed 35 people, mostly government forces, at an air force base near the town of Mleiha on May 18.

In an attempt to push out government forces from the southern governorates of As-Suwayda, Dara'a, and Quneitra, the FSA, IF, and al-Nusra led an offensive lasting from February 3 to May 27. Government forces reacted with a counter offensive. Combat mainly centered on Dara'a, leaving at least 600 people dead. Fighting subsided in the following months. In an opposition offensive from November 17 to 20, about 2,000 fighters from al-Nusra and allied groups seized several villages and attacked Baath City, Quneitra, one of the last government strongholds in the governorate. They utilized tanks and mortars, forcing more than 30,000 to flee.

Between mid-February and mid-March, Hezbollah-supported government forces intensified their attacks on the Qalamoun region, Damascus, pushing opposition groups such as the FSA, Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, al-Nusra, and ISIS out of the northern parts and gaining control of the town of Yabroud. Over 1,000 opposition fighters retreated to southern Qalamoun and northwest Lebanon. Allegedly, 1,000 al-Nusra militants continued to fight the government. During the entire course of combat, 40,000 inhabitants were forced to flee. Between June 21 and August 7, another government offensive cleared the area of remaining opposition forces and took control of the region. At least 900 were killed in total.

On March 21, opposition forces, mainly consisting of Ahrar al-Sham, Ansar al-Sham, the Shamal al-Islam movement, and al-Nusra, started an offensive against government-held areas north of Latakia city. In the following weeks, the government withdrew some of its battalions from Hama and Idlib to re-

locate them to Latakia and responded with airstrikes and barrel bombs. According to reports, at least 1,000 people, among them about 600 civilians, had been killed by April 1. In the first week of April, government forces started to advance and fully retook control of Latakia by mid-June.

Between April 3 and May 25, opposition forces advanced in Idlib along the M4 and M5 highway, attempting to weaken the government's logistics system. For instance on May 16, Suqour al-Sham and Sham Legion detonated approx. 60 tons of explosives underneath the Wadi al-Deif military base, using an underground tunnel which they had dug before. About 100 soldiers were killed during the attack. On May 25, al-Nusra, Harakat Hazm, and the Syrian Revolutionaries Front staged an attack on the town of Khan Sheikhoun and captured the last nearby military bases. Government forces responded by dropping barrel bombs. The same day, al-Nusra and Suqour al-Sham staged attacks by using four suicide vehicles and captured the Fanar and Shami checkpoints. On December 14, al-Nusra Front, supported by Ahrar al-Sham and Jund al-Aqsa, captured the Hamidieh and Wadi Deif base from government forces. Reportedly, at least 3,000 opposition forces engaged in the attacks, killing about 200 soldiers. Starting in mid-July, IS increased attacks against government forces, reportedly killing at least 1,100 soldiers. For instance, IS captured the Sha'ar gas field, Homs, in mid-July which led to a government counter-offensive, ending with the recapture of the field by government forces. Reportedly, IS killed at least 300 soldiers, guards, and personnel during the battles. After the gas field had changed hands several times in the months following the offensive, government forces recaptured it on November 6. Also in July, IS targeted the Regiment 121 Artillery base in Hasakah governorate and the Division 17 and 93 bases in al-Raqqah governorate. Government responded with airstrikes on IS strongholds in al-Raqqah and south of Hasakah, killing dozens.

From July 26 to September 19, an al-Nusra offensive in Hama governorate with at least 1,500 fighters was halted by the army, killing at least 150 al-Nusra fighters and destroying their vehicles and weapons.

After IS had mostly expelled other opposition groups from Deir al-Zor between April and July [→ Syria (inter-opposition violence)], they started an extensive offensive between September and December against the government's last remaining strongholds in Deir al-Zor. Whereas government forces used airstrikes, IS increasingly resorted to suicide vehicles. On November 23, IS fighters shot down a warplane for the first time. Between December 3 and 6, at least 100 combatants on both sides were killed in skirmishes over the military airport and surrounding areas. By December 9, government forces regained full control of the airport and expelled IS from surrounding villages.

Starting on September 22, US-led airstrikes mostly targeted facilities in Aleppo and to a lesser extent in al-Hasaka, Deir-al-Zor, Idlib, and al-Raqqah. For instance, on September 22, coalition warplanes attacked training sites, headquarters, and other facilities in al-Raqqah, Deir al-Zor, and al-Hassakah, killing at least 70 IS fighters and 50 al-Qaeda affiliated fighters. Additionally, a large number of airstrikes targeted IS in Aleppo, especially in and around the city of Kobane [→ Syria (NC, Islamist groups – KSC/Kurdish regions)]. Attacks on Deir al-Zor increased towards the end of the year, destroying IS headquarters, vehicles, and oil production facilities. By the end of November, over 900 people were reportedly killed, including 785 IS and 72 al-Nusra fighters, as well as over 50 civilians.

In the end of the year, the Syrian air force intensified airstrikes

on opposition-held areas. For instance, between September 11 and 17, air missiles and bombs targeting the city of Douma, Damascus and killed up to 100 militants. Between November 25 and 27, warplanes attacked the IS-stronghold of Raqqah, killing over 130 people, mostly civilians.

Violence continued to affect neighboring countries, causing dozens of foreign casualties. For instance, between January and February Abdullah Azzam brigades, al-Nusra Front and ISIS, demanded Hezbollah's retreat from Syria and set off several car bombs in Lebanon, killing at least 24. On March 19, Israeli forces attacked Syrian military facilities in Quneitra after a bombing had wounded four of its soldiers in the Golan Heights [→ Syria – Israel]. One Syrian soldier was killed. On March 23, Turkish forces shot down a Syrian military jet that allegedly had violated Turkish airspace [→ Syria – Turkey]. yal. ghe

SYRIA – TURKEY

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1946**

Conflict parties: Syria vs. Turkey

Conflict items: territory, international power

The violent crisis between Syria and Turkey over international power and territory due to spillover effects from the Syrian civil war continued [→ Syria (opposition groups)].

Throughout the year, Syrian missile defense systems put Turkish warplanes flying in Turkish territory under radar lock more than 370 times, according to the Turkish Defense Minister Ismet Yilmaz. Between January and June, Turkey scrambled fighter jets six times to intercept Syrian warplanes and helicopters which were in the immediate vicinity or entered Turkish air space. Turkey closed its border gates to Syria several times due to security reasons. The Turkish government continued putting diplomatic pressure on Syria throughout the year. On January 7, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that the UN backed Geneva II talks on Syria should focus on a future without Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In March, the Syrian Information Minister Omran al-Zoubi accused Turkey of allowing Islamist fighters to pass the Turkish border to reach Latakia governorate and fight against Syrian government troops. In September, the Netherlands announced the withdrawal of its Patriot missiles in January 2015. Subsequently, Spain stated it would replace them with an additional 130 Spanish soldiers in Adana province as part of the NATO initiative. On March 14, Turkey replaced soldiers from the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) with approx. 50 soldiers of the Turkish Special Forces Command to protect the tomb of Suleyman Shah, located in Aleppo governorate, a sovereign exclave of Turkey since 1921. On March 23, two Turkish F-16 jets downed a Syrian fighter jet that had violated Turkish airspace and Syrian military sources accused Turkey of supporting the opposition forces by downing the warplane. The Syrian jet was fighting opposition groups in the town of Kasab, Latakia, according to a Syrian military source. In the context of clashes between Syrian Armed Forces and opposition forces on the Syrian side of the border, the Turkish Hatay province was hit by mortar shells several times between March 23 and April 4.

TAF responded with cross-border artillery fire, hitting Latakia. Additionally, on March 31, a rocket originating from clashes between the Syrian government and IS hit a mosque in Yayladagi, Hatay, wounding two. On March 30, Erdogan stated that Turkey was in a state of war with Syria.

Throughout the first half of the year, combat action between Islamist groups and People's Protection Units (YPG) fighters intensified in Syria near the Turkish border [→ Syria (NC, Islamist groups – KSC / Kurdish regions)]. Consequently, Erdogan, after being elected President of the Turkish Republic on August 10, announced that he would consider the implementation of a buffer-zone within Syria on September 15. Throughout late September and early October, the Turkish government sought diplomatic support from NATO member states for the idea of a buffer-zone. On October 15, the Syrian government criticized the Turkish plans.

On September 26 and 29, mortar fire launched by IS fighters in the battle for the city of Kobane, Aleppo, hit the Turkish province of Sanliurfa.

On September 29, TAF took position next to the Turkish-Syrian border northwest of Kobane monitoring the clashes between IS and the YPG. Mortar shells fired from Syrian territory during fights between IS and YPG hit Sanliurfa on October 5 and 18. On October 20, the Turkish government met the diplomatic demands by the US government and accepted that Peshmerga fighters from the Kurdish parts of Iraq could pass through Turkish territory to Syria to support the YPG in Kobane. On October 30, the Syrian government condemned Turkey for supporting the Syrian Kurds. aje

SYRIA – USA

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: Syria vs. USA

Conflict items: system/ideology, international power

The non-violent crisis between Syria and the USA, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) over Syria's nuclear program and chemical weapons (CW) continued.

In December 2013, the deadline for destroying Syria's priority one chemicals was set for March 31 and the deadline for other chemicals was set for June 30. The joint OPCW-UN mission in Syria sent monthly reports regarding the elimination process of CW to the UN Security Council.

On January 7, the first consignment of priority CW material was shipped outside of Syria from Latakia governorate. The Syrian government blamed opposition attacks for delays [→ Syria (opposition groups)]. On January 27 and February 10, two further consignments were shipped and additional CW destroyed on Syrian territory. At the beginning of March, the OPCW announced Syria had shipped out one third of its CW stockpile for destruction. However, the US envoy to the UN stated that Syria exacerbated the negotiation process with OPCW.

On March 6, Syria declared it would destroy twelve underground bunkers and production sites by March 15. However, the destruction was behind schedule by the end of the year.


On April 11, chlorine attacks were reported in the villages of Kfar Zeita, Hama governorate, and Al-Tamana'a, Idlib governorate. During the investigations of about one dozen alleged CW attacks since April 11, a militant group attacked the OPCW-UN team when they attempting to reach the village of Kfar Zeita on May 27. The group seized two cars and damaged another with a bomb. The Syrian government denied having used chlorine and accused opposition forces of having attacked the OPCW-UN team.

On May 20, OPCW announced that Syria's declared stockpile of Isopropanol had been destroyed and that 7.2 percent of CW remained in Syria waiting for its destruction. By June 23, Syria shipped the last consignment of priority one CW material. In total, Syria dispensed about 1,300 metric tons of CW. By August 20, all declared CW materials were destroyed on US ship Cape Ray.

The OPCW-UN joint mission completed its mandate on September 30.

Four days earlier, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that the OPCW-UN led mission would continue monitoring the destruction of CW production facilities after September 30. Western countries urged further investigation on the use of chlorine in Syria. On December 3, the US demanded the monitoring of the delayed destruction. Additionally, in its September 3 report, the IAEA called on Syria to resolve outstanding issues concerning several nuclear sites. kwi

TUNISIA (AQIM ET AL.)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: AQIM, various militant groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), militant Islamists linked to Ansar al-Sharia, and the Uqbah ibn Nafi Brigade on one side, and the government on the other, de-escalated to a violent crisis. In the course of the year, militants killed a total of 39 military and police forces. Security forces responded with increased activity close to the Algerian border in the Djebel Chaambi National Park, Kasserine governorate, as well as Kef and Jendouba governorates. Overall, at least 15 militants were killed and more than 1,500 arrested.


On January 6, the military fired heavy artillery on militants' hideouts near the Algerian border in Kasserine. After a series of clashes between militants and security forces in and around the capital Tunis, the army started a large-scale operation targeting militant hideouts in the Djebel Chaambi National Park on April 29. Thousands of soldiers, backed by helicopters and warplanes, were deployed in the region. On July 16 and 17, 20 soldiers were killed and 22 wounded when dozens of militants attacked three military checkpoints near the Algerian border using rocket-propelled grenades. Following these incidents, the military deployed another 6,000 soldiers to the region. Algeria reinforced the operation on its side of the border [→ Algeria (AQIM et al.)]. In the aftermath of these attacks, the government decided to close all mosques that were not under the control of the authorities, as well as websites and broadcasting stations that had published messages from militant groups. On September 1, Member of Parliament Mohamed Ali Nasri survived an assassination attempt by five gunmen at his house in Kasserine.

Clashes between militants and security forces also occurred in Jendouba and Kef governorates near the Algerian border in the northwest. On February 16, militants shot at cars in Jendouba city, killing two civilians and two police officers. On March 17, police killed three militants and arrested six during a raid in the same city. AQIM members attacked the house of cabinet member Lotfi Ben Jeddou in Kasserine on May 27, leaving four policemen dead. On June 13, police killed two militants in clashes near the border in Jendouba,

seizing firearms and bombs. On June 29 and July 1, two roadside bombs wounded four soldiers and three policemen in Kef governorate. One day later, four soldiers were killed in a similar attack in Djebel Ouergha, Kef governorate. On July 26, militants attacked a military checkpoint in El Kef, Kef, killing two soldiers. Four soldiers died when militants attacked a bus on November 5 in the same city.

Clashes were not limited to remote areas near the Algerian border. On February 4, security forces raided a house in Tunis, whereby seven militants and one policeman were killed in ensuing fighting, among them a suspect of the assassination of opposition leaders Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi. On February 9, police shot one militant and arrested Hmed al-Malki, also suspected of being involved in last year's assassinations. mlo

TUNISIA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **2010**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power


The conflict between opposition groups and the government over national power and the orientation of the political system remained at a violent level. The year was marked by the adoption of the first constitution since the ousting of former president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in 2011 and the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections which led to a power shift from the moderate Islamist Ennahda party to the secular Nidaa Tounes (NT) party.

As announced last year, the ruling Ennahda government stepped down on January 9, paving the way for a caretaker administration. On January 26, parliament adopted the new constitution and appointed former industry minister Mehdi Jomaa as interim prime minister. On March 6, interim President Moncef Marzouki repealed the state of emergency, which had been in place since Ben Ali's resignation. A new electoral law, which had been adopted by parliament on May 1, set the date for the parliamentary elections on October 26 and the presidential elections one month later. In the parliamentary elections of October 26, NT won 85 out of the 217 mandates while Ennahda secured 69 mandates. On December 21, Beji Caid Essebsi won the run-off ballot in the presidential elections against the interim incumbent Moncef Marzouki. One day later, protests against the election results erupted in several cities. For instance, in Tataouine, Tataouine governorate, protesters torched a police station and a NT party office. In Gabès and Hamma, both Gabès governorate, and Douz, Kebili governorate, NT party offices were attacked and protesters burned car tires. In all aforementioned cities, security forces used tear gas to disperse the crowds.

In the beginning of the year, protests over the economic situation and new taxes led to violent clashes between police and demonstrators in various governorates. On January 8, in Thala city, Kasserine governorate, demonstrators attacked and partially burned a police post and in Kasserine city, "police used tear gas to disperse dozens of protesters trying to storm Ennahda offices. The same day, hundreds protested in the streets and several shops and public offices remained closed in Kasserine city after the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) had called a general strike to protest economic hardships. On January 10, one man was shot dead when police clashed with protesters near Kasserine city and

protests spilled over into Tunis the same day. mlo

TURKEY (PKK)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1974**

Conflict parties: PKK vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy

The conflict between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the government over autonomy further de-escalated amid an ongoing peace process started in late 2012.

The government held frequent talks with members of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) as well as with imprisoned PKK-leader Abdullah Ocalan through officials of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT). To establish a legal framework for the peace process, parliament adopted a Kurdish Reform Bill on July 10 which included immunity for state officials involved in negotiations and possible amnesties for PKK fighters. The government announced that an end to violence and the disarmament of the PKK were the two most important preconditions for peace. Ocalan stated that disarmament would be possible by March or April 2015, if both sides compromised on a future road map for peace. However, fighting between PKK militants and security forces continued. One gendarmerie sergeant was killed by an improvised explosive device set by the PKK in the village of Ortasu, Mardin province, on March 5. Police and gendarmerie intelligence announced on April 10 that the retreat of PKK fighters from Turkey had come to a halt.


On May 25, a two-day fighting erupted between Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and the PKK after military units had destroyed roadblocks put up by PKK-fighters to prevent the construction of military outposts in Diyarbakir. PKK fighters threw Molotov cocktails and noise bombs contained with nails, while TAF responded with water cannon. Violent encounters were also reported in the provinces of Agri, Bingöl, Hakkari, and Mardin. Subsequently, on May 28, TAF started an operation involving 100 armored vehicles to remove PKK roadblocks.

On August 20, PKK fighters ambushed a border patrol in Van province, shooting one soldier dead and injuring another. Between October 10 and 13, PKK militants attacked a military outpost in Hakkari with heavy machine-guns and rocket-propelled grenades. In response, TAF conducted the first aerial bombardment on a PKK camp in Daglica, Hakkari, since the beginning of the peace process.

On October 23, security forces killed three PKK fighters who had previously attacked a power plant in Kars province. Two days later, alleged PKK members assassinated three soldiers in the city of Yuksekova, Hakkari.

Throughout the year, violent protests left several dead as well. For instance, on June 7, during a protest against gendarmerie outpost-constructions in Diyarbakir's Lice district, security forces fired on Kurdish protesters, killing two. On August 19, security forces destroyed a PKK founder's statue in Diyarbakir. One PKK sympathizer and one soldier were killed in an ensuing clash. fsz

YEMEN (AL-HOUTHİ REBELS - SUNNI TRIBAL FORCES)

Intensity: **4** | Change:  | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: al-Houthi rebels vs. Sunni tribal forces
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance

The limited war over subnational predominance and ideology between al-Houthi rebels and Sunni tribal forces continued. The most affected governorates comprised Saada, Amran, al-Jawf, Sanaa, Dhamar, and Ibb. Al-Houthi rebels clashed with members of al-Islah party, the major Sunni opposition party, and several local Sunni tribesmen on a regular basis. Throughout the year, Sunni tribes occasionally fought alongside government forces against al-Houthi rebels [→ Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)].

At the beginning of the year, al-Houthi rebels regularly clashed with Hashed tribesmen in Amran governorate. For instance, between January 5 and 8, clashes between the two sides claimed the lives of several dozens of people after al-Houthi rebels had attacked two Hashed strongholds. The most fatal incident took place on February 2, when fights between both conflict parties around al-Houth and Khamra villages, Amran, left 150 people dead. The same day, al-Houthi rebels also clashed with the al-Ahmar tribe in Amran, resulting in the deaths of 40 people.

Additionally, violence between al-Houthi rebels and Sunni tribesmen erupted in al-Jawf. For instance, a battle between al-Houthi rebels and Sunni tribal forces on March 7 and 8 left 30 people dead. On July 16, 35 people were killed in clashes in the cities of al-Safra and al-Hajr. On August 12, al-Houthi rebels seized several administration buildings in al-Ghayl district. One day later, 15 people were killed in fights, in which al-Houthi rebels reportedly used heavy weapons and tanks.

On March 18, members of Bani Matar and Bani Hashish tribes met with President Abed Rabbo Mansur Hadi to discuss the advance of al-Houthi rebels towards the capital Sanaa [→ Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)]. Attempts to broker a lasting ceasefire, such as the June 20 agreement between al-Houthi rebels and Sunni tribal forces, repeatedly failed. During the al-Houthis march on Sanaa in September, fights between rebels and Sunni tribesmen continued. On September 16, clashes in al-Jawf and Sanaa killed 20 people. On September 30, al-Islah officials called on its members to overcome their differences with al-Houthis and announced their support for the ceasefire agreement. Nevertheless, al-Houthi rebels and Sunni tribal forces continued to fight, particularly in Ibb, in October and November. On October 17, for instance, a violent encounter between al-Houthi rebels and tribesmen resulted in the deaths of at least six people. On November 28, al-Houthi members and al-Islah party officials tentatively agreed to end the political gridlock. On December 14, al-Houthi rebels used tanks and artillery fire to destroy houses belonging to Sunni tribes. Subsequent clashes reportedly took the lives of dozens of people. lpe

YEMEN (AL-HOUTHİ REBELS)

 Intensity: **5** | Change: **↑** | Start: **2004**

 Conflict parties: al-Houthi rebels vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-
 dominance

The conflict between al-Houthi rebels and the government over the orientation of the political system and subnational predominance escalated from a violent crisis to a war. Over the course of the year, the conflict spread from the north-western governorates of Saada, Hajjah, Amran, and al-Jawf to Sanaa in the center, as the al-Houthis consolidated their control over northern Saada governorate and expanded farther south. Marib, Hudaydah, Dhamar, Ibb, and Taiz governorates were affected as well. Government troops, often supported by Sunni tribesmen, clashed with the Shiite al-Houthis on a regular basis [→ Yemen (al-Houthi rebels – Sunni tribal forces)]. In March in an official statement, President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi accused Iran of supporting al-Houthi rebels.

The fighting reached a climax in September when al-Houthi rebels took over the capital Sanaa and subsequently gained military and administrative control over vast areas in the northwest of the country, as well as extended involvement in the government.

In the first half of the year, after the Houthis had announced they would not agree with the National Dialogue Conference's final document at the end of January, confrontations mainly took place in Amran governorate [→ Yemen (opposition groups)]. For instance, clashes with security forces on the outskirts of the city of Amran left twelve people dead on March 22. Mortar attacks launched by al-Houthi fighters on military headquarters and al-Islah party members' houses on May 25 and 27 killed nine soldiers. In ensuing clashes, 34 attackers died. A ceasefire lasted only one day until June 2, when the air force launched several airstrikes on al-Houthi positions in Amran. The shelling and ensuing fights killed approx. 100 al-Houthi rebels and 20 soldiers. On June 18, military forces deployed tanks to repel attacks by al-Houthi rebels in Bani Matar, Sanaa governorate. Between June 15 and 21, the military conducted several airstrikes on al-Houthi strongholds and weapon arsenals in Sanaa and Amran governorates, leaving at least 85 people dead. Until the end of the month, al-Houthi rebels took control over military bases in Hamdan and Bani Matar district in Sanaa.

Al-Houthi rebels seized control of Amran city on July 9. The preceding three-day fighting, in which government forces conducted several airstrikes, claimed the lives of at least 34 soldiers, 70 al-Houthi rebels, and about 100 civilians. Up to 35,000 people were displaced in the region.

In al-Jawf governorate the conflict escalated as well. At least 35 were killed and dozens injured in fights between government troops and al-Houthi rebels on July 15. Further clashes claimed the lives of at least 50 people from both sides on September 5 and 6. Five days later, air force shelling killed at least 80 al-Houthi fighters in al-Ghail and al-Masloob districts. After the government's decision to abolish gasoline subsidies, al-Houthis mobilized local support and took to the streets of Sanaa on August 18. On September 1, al-Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi called for violent protests in Sanaa. One day later, the government proposed the formation of a new government and the reduction of fuel prices,

which was rejected by al-Houthi officials. After six days of fighting in Sanaa, which left approx. 200 people dead, al-Houthi rebels seized control of the capital on September 21. Many government forces put up little resistance against the al-Houthis. The government accused former president Ali Abdullah Saleh of cooperating with al-Houthi rebels. The same day, a UN-brokered peace deal was signed. However, al-Houthi rebels refused to hand over seized weapons and the control over Sanaa. In mid-October, Hadi announced Khaled Bahah as designated prime minister. Al-Houthi officials supported the decision. Despite a new ceasefire agreement, al-Houthi rebels continued to occupy government buildings in Sanaa on October 19.

During October, al-Houthi rebels advanced to areas south of Sanaa. On October 14, they seized Hudaydah city, in the eponymous governorate, with little resistance by local security forces. One day later, al-Houthi rebels captured the capital of Ibb governorate. Then, on October 16, al-Houthi rebels stormed the governor's office of Dhamar governorate. At the end of the month, the security chief of Sanaa governorate announced the incorporation of al-Houthi fighters into the local security apparatus. On November 5, al-Houthi rebels took control of Udain city in Ibb. Trying to capture the local airport of Rada city, Sanaa, they set off clashes with security personnel on November 11. Four guards and six al-Houthis were killed. In a speech on November 19, Hadi called on the military to consider the al-Houthis as "political partners". Nonetheless, al-Houthis moved farther south, repeatedly attempting to seize Taiz city in December. lpe

YEMEN (AQAP – AL-HOUTHİ REBELS)

 Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2010**

 Conflict parties: AQAP vs. al-Houthi rebels
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-
 dominance

The violent crisis over ideology and subnational predominance between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the linked Islamist militants of Ansar al-Sharia, on the one hand, and the al-Houthi rebels, on the other, escalated to a limited war. While no clashes had been reported until the end of May, the conflict intensified during the second half of the year. On March 31, AQAP announced the formation of a subgroup named Ansar al-Sharia in the Central Regions to combat Shiite al-Houthi militants in response to their increasing territorial gains against the government and Sunni tribes [→ Yemen (al-Houthi rebels); Yemen (al-Houthi rebels – Sunni tribal forces)]. In their attacks, AQAP militants made frequent use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), pre-eminently in the governorates of al-Bayda, Sa'ada, and al-Jawf.

On May 23, an AQAP suicide bomber detonated his car at an al-Houthi checkpoint in al-Jawf, killing two al-Houthi members. On June 21, AQAP and al-Houthi rebels clashed in the city of Radaa, al-Bayda, leaving two al-Houthis and one AQAP militant dead. Attacking a checkpoint in al-Safara, al-Jawf, AQAP fighters killed two al-Houthi militants on July 6.

On September 11, AQAP militants detonated three IEDs, targeting an al-Houthi march in Amran city in the eponymous governorate. Eleven people were killed. AQAP fighters allegedly shot dead 17 al-Houthi members near al-Iman University in the capital Sanaa on September 20. Two days later, Ansar al-Sharia detonated a suicide car bomb in Kataf, Sa'ada,

and later claimed to have killed 50 al-Houthi fighters during the attack. Another AQAP suicide car bomb attack targeted an al-Houthi-run field hospital in Majzar, Marib governorate, killing at least 15 people and wounding 50, on September 28.

On October 9, an AQAP suicide bomber attacking a group of al-Houthi supporters on Tahrir Square of Sanaa city killed 47 people and wounded 75. On October 20, an AQAP attack on two checkpoints in lbb governorate, manned by al-Houthi and government forces, led to the deaths of 18 al-Houthi fighters and soldiers and two AQAP militants. One day later, AQAP cleric Mamoun Hatem called on all Yemeni Sunnis to fight al-Houthi militants and reclaim their lost territory. Subsequently, Ansar al-Sharia and Sunni tribesmen formed an alliance to fight al-Houthi in lbb governorate.

From mid-October on, fighting mainly concentrated on Radaa with al-Houthis and AQAP as well as allied Sunni tribes alternately taking control of some parts of the area. From October 17 to 20 alone, clashes between the two parties, both employing rocket-propelled grenades and artillery, left about 80 people dead. On November 14, al-Houthi fighters, reportedly supported by government forces, pushed out Ansar al-Sharia militants from the village of Khazba, al-Bayda, using Katyusha rockets and heavy artillery [→ Yemen (AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia)]. At least 25 al-Houthi and ten Ansar al-Sharia militants were killed during the clashes.

On December 16, suspected AQAP militants detonated two car bombs at an al-Houthi checkpoint in Radaa killing 35 al-Houthi militants as well as 15 students in a nearby bus. Two days later, Ansar al-Sharia militants detonated two IEDs in al-Hudaydah, al-Hudaydah governorate, killing seven al-Houthi members. On December 31, an AQAP suicide bomber killed at least 26 and wounded 48 people at an al-Houthi religious festivity in the city of lbb. *aju, jri*

YEMEN (AQAP, ANSAR AL-SHARIA)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: Ansar al-Sharia, AQAP vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the linked Islamist militants of Ansar al-Sharia, on one side, and the government, supported by the USA and so-called Popular Resistance Committee forces (PRC), on the other, continued on war level.

Throughout the year, at least 880 people were killed, including civilians. Frequent AQAP attacks on military facilities and checkpoints concentrated on the governorates of al-Bayda, Abyan, Hadramout, Sanaa, and Shabwah and were often followed by clashes with government forces. Several air strikes, reportedly conducted by the US, killed at least 90 suspected AQAP members throughout the year. The air strikes, peaking in April, primarily targeted militants in the governorates of Abyan and al-Bayda but also in Hadramout, al-Jawf, and Marib. AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia continued conducting targeted killings of state officials. In several attacks on ministries, embassies, and military and civil facilities, militants used rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). At least 150 people were killed by IEDs, car bombs, and suicide bombings in the course of the year.

On January 16, about 200 AQAP fighters launched coordi-

nated attacks on three military facilities in Radaa district of al-Bayda. At least six soldiers and five militants were killed in ensuing clashes. On February 2, suspected AQAP members detonated two IEDs outside the defense ministry and the central bank buildings in the capital Sanaa and fired a mortar shell at the French embassy, injuring four people. On March 24, AQAP militants ambushed a military checkpoint near Reida, Hadramout, using automatic rifles and throwing grenades. At least 20 soldiers were killed.

Between April 19 and 21, a series of US airstrikes in the al-Mahfad region bordering Abyan and Shabwah killed at least 55 militants. On April 28, government forces from three infantry brigades and hundreds of PRC volunteers launched a joint offensive against strongholds of AQAP militants in the same region. One day later, AQAP fighters attacked a military convoy heading towards the offensive with machine guns and RPGs, killing at least 15 soldiers and taking another 15 hostage. The military operation, in which the army repeatedly conducted airstrikes and took over several AQAP strongholds, lasted until mid-May and left dead a total of at least 86 militants and 35 soldiers.

On May 9, militants attacked the main gate of the presidential palace in Sanaa, purportedly targeting the defense minister. The assault left at least four soldiers and three militants dead. On May 23, AQAP fighters dressed in military uniforms attempted to storm the city of Sayun, Hadramout. They seized a number of government buildings using a car bomb, RPGs, and mortar shells before security forces repelled the attack with the help of air bombardments. Twelve soldiers and 15 militants were killed during the fight. At the end of July, AQAP announced its intentions to establish an emirate in Hadramaut and ordered the local population to obey Sharia law. In August combats over the control of Sayun and adjacent parts of Hadramaut intensified. On August 6, clashes left 18 AQAP fighters and two soldiers dead. Two days later, Ansar al-Sharia militants executed 14 soldiers after abducting them from a bus in Shibam. On August 19, about 200 Special Forces were sent to Sayun to support the military operations against AQAP. On August 27, airplanes and helicopters bombed suspected AQAP camps in Ser Valley. Three days later, Ansar al-Sharia militants detonated two car bombs at a military base in al-Qatan. In ensuing clashes, four soldiers and 15 militants were killed.

On September 27, Ansar al-Sharia fired a rocket at the US embassy in Sanaa. No casualties were reported, but an IED attack killed one US embassy guard two months later. On December 6, a US Navy Seal commando attempted to free Luke Somers, an American journalist who had been held captive by AQAP since September 2013, in Abdan, Shabwah. However, the militants had shot Somers dead as well as another South African hostage, Pierre Korkie, shortly before the squad reached the compound and killed ten AQAP members. *aju*

YEMEN (SMM / SOUTH YEMEN)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: SMM vs. government
 Conflict items: secession

The violent crisis over the secession of South Yemen between the Southern Movement (SMM) and the government continued. Clashes resulting in casualties, kidnappings, and injured people marked the first half of the year, whereas the second half was largely dominated by demonstrations.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB

Although representatives of the General People's Congress (GPC), the al-Rashad Union and representatives of South Yemen signed the "Southern Issue Solution Document" on January 8, violent attacks continued. The following day, fighters of the SMM attacked a military checkpoint near Ataq, Shabwah. Two soldiers and two of the attackers died while several others were injured. Between January 16 and 23, SMM militants killed at least three civilians and three soldiers and kidnapped a further seven soldiers during different ambushes in al-Dhaleh governorate. The military responded by shelling houses on January 17 and 22, injuring at least 20 people.

Protests for an independent South Yemen and for the release of SMM fighters took place in several cities in the governorates of Abyan, Aden, al-Dhaleh, Lahij, and Shabwah on January 23. Four days later, government forces and armed protesters of the SMM clashed in Ataq, injuring two protesters and two soldiers. SMM launched a series of attacks on convoys and a government building in al-Dhaleh between January 30 and February 6, in which at least four people, including two soldiers, were killed and 15 injured. The gravest

clash took place on February 18 when SMM fighters ambushed a military convoy. During the incident near al-Daleh city, al-Dhaleh, seven soldiers and five civilians were killed while 14 soldiers were kidnapped.

On March 31, President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi accused Iran in an official statement of supporting both SMM and al-Houthi rebels [→ Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)]. These accusations were denied by Iran while former Yemeni vice president Ali Salem al-Beidh confirmed ties.

SMM members staged simultaneous demonstrations in al-Mukalla, Hadramawt, and in the city of Aden on April 27. On August 28, security forces opened fire on protestors in al-Mualla, Aden, killing one. Three days later, demonstrators gathered in Sheikh Othman, Aden, to condemn the military's intervention. On September 1, thousands of SMM protesters again demonstrated in al-Mukalla. Partially violent demonstrations continued in October and November in Khormaska, Aden; al-Mahfad, Abyan; and al-Mukalla. After security forces had killed a SMM leader on December 14, intensified protests erupted throughout the following week in the cities of Aden, Ataq, and al Hawta. kpb

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March 18, 2015

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CITATION

Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (2015): *Conflict Barometer 2014*, Heidelberg.

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Latinnews.com
Latin American Newsletters

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issN 1616-931X