

Ukraine's Regional Policy: Setting Socio-Humanitarian Priorities of Development

Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research

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The book presents the first analysis of key issues, directions of development and objectives of Ukraine's socio-humanitarian policy. The authors studied budget funding of current public and regional socio-humanitarian programs and identified their priorities. The publication highlights some problems of Ukrainian regional policy in the humanitarian area. Specifically, the authors analyzed fundamental values and preferences of the population of different Ukrainian regions and outlined mechanisms for overcoming of existing inter-regional stereotypes. The book covers issues of protection of minority rights, fulfillment of Ukraine's international obligations, major challenges of implementation of principles of transparency in the context of regional policy development and cooperation of the government with civil society institutions.

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Introduction

In the process of implementing public regional policy, ways and methods for solving social and humanitarian problems have not been addressed for long, which, however, could have facilitated formation of national cohesion and unity in Ukraine. As a matter of fact, setting key directions and priorities of regional policy, the government addressed issues of socio-economic development, especially that of the depressed regions.

On May 25, 2001, the President of Ukraine signed the decree that approved the Concept of the Public Regional Policy. The document dealt mostly with economic problems of further regional development. The Concept declared major goals of public regional policy as follows, "To create conditions for dynamic and balanced social and economic development of Ukraine and its regions; enhance living standards of the population; ensure compliance with the established public social guarantees for citizens irrespective of place of their residence; accelerate market transformation processes on the basis of increasing efficiency of regions' potential, enhancing effectiveness of administrative decisions, improving work of governmental agencies and local self-government bodies." In order to attain these goals, it is necessary "to make an in-depth analysis and appraisal of internal natural, economic, scientific and labor potentials of every region, to work out comprehensive legal, organizational, economic and other mechanisms for their effective use; carry out structural economic reforms in the regions on an innovation basis; gradually reduce territorial differences in economic development of Ukraine and its regions; strengthen economic integration of the regions taking into consideration advantages of territorial division and labor cooperation of as one of the basic economic factors enhancing competitiveness of the state in the international markets."

In their actions on formulation and implementation of public regional policy, the Ukrainian government very often disregarded the whole number of urgent problems determining the need to carry out an effective and consistent regional policy, which would foster not only decentralization of power, economic reforms, development of the regions and local self-government but also promote formation of a political Ukrainian nation through a shared national identity, maintenance and development of language and cultural diversity of national minorities and territorial communities. Actually, a system approach to public regional policy as a mechanism ensuring unity and cohesion was absent in Ukraine.

At present, socio-cultural problems of public regional policy are getting very acute. Experience of the 2004 political crisis demonstrated the dire need for development of a public regional policy as a package of coordinated strategic actions of the government. Local political elites used to speculate on the issue of the so-called "regional separatism". These politicians instigate inter-ethnic hostilities and in some way spread derogatory information against others based on race, ethnicity or religious beliefs thereby artificially provoking inter-regional confrontation. Today, both Ukrainian political elites and representatives of the so-called "third force" exploit the old historical myths and stereotypes. It is not only historical realities but also the absence of a consistent and strategic public regional policy based on the shared ideas and values that give grounds for political speculations and impede formation of a political Ukrainian nation consolidated by the shared citizenship. Given its absence, tension in inter-regional relations would only heighten.

Recent events actualized the problem of the absence of social values shared in the eastern and western Ukrainian regions. This is especially true for interpretation and understanding of Ukraine's history and culture and development of a common vision of the future. First and foremost, polarization of the Ukrainian society is observed in approaches to Euro-Atlantic integration and cooperation with the CIS states.

It is time to comprehend the necessity to elaborate a system approach, which would help to strengthen national unity and form a political and multi-ethnic Ukrainian nation pursuant to the Constitution of Ukraine.

Now, Ukrainian authorities understand these challenges. The matter in question is not only economic elements of a regional policy but also identification of humanitarian and cultural directions and priorities in the government activities, which would contribute to national consolidation, eliminate stereotypes existing in relations between the East and West, promote and strengthen stability in the society.

The Long-Term Development Strategy of Ukraine and GOV Priorities for 2006-2007 emphasizes national unity. This determines the need to take appropriate measures to reduce political and cultural polarization of the East, West and South. The document reads, "The government has worked out the Action Plan aimed at uniting the country. Its objective - all citizens of Ukraine shall feel themselves as parts of an integral nation regardless of nationality, social position, place of residence and religion. Basic instrument is to create conditions for free migration, first of all, due to the development of transport infrastructure."

For the first time over 15 years of Ukraine's independence, in his address to the Verkhovna Rada, the President of Ukraine stressed humanitarian aspects of Ukraine's regional policy, national unity and consolidation. "The focus is now moving onto humanitarian, legal and political instruments and procedures for bringing various interests into agreement and reaching understanding. I am confident that Ukrainians will become the nation that would offer the world new standards of high spiritual values, new examples of democratic culture, international accord and interstate dialogue. This is the core of our global project and of our mission," said Mr. Yushchenko.

The book highlights a number of problems of development of social consolidation; analysis of current public socio-humanitarian programs and their implementation; methods for shaping a shared national identity and overcoming negative stereotypes existent in inter-regional relations; and issues of protection of minority rights. The publication also studies actions of national authorities responsible for formulation and implementation of Ukraine's socio-humanitarian policy and presents Canadian experience of national identity policies (Canadian Content).

It is necessary to accentuate once again that formulation of a policy promoting national unity requires a system approach, a clear-cut strategic actions and maintenance of a constant dialogue between the government and society - a transparent discussion of challenges concerning shared social values, a common vision of Ukraine's future by residents of different regions and consolidation of political elites.

The book is published in the framework of the initiative "**Developing a Policy of National Consolidation: Regional Context**" of Policy Advice for Reform Project funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (www.acdi-cida.gc.ca) and managed by the Canadian Bureau for International Education (www.cbie.ca). The Project is carried out by the Situation Analysis Service of the Secretariat of the President of Ukraine in cooperation with the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research.

The goal of the Project is to promote development of public policy on meeting regional humanitarian challenges so that to maintain national cohesion and unity, strengthen inter-regional cooperation and consider needs of territorial communities.

We hope the book will help to find ways and methods for building a united civil society in Ukraine.

Yulia Tyshchenko, Head of the UCIPR Board

Budget Funding of Public Programs in the Socio-Humanitarian Area (Regional Context)

Legislative Basis

The March 18, 2004 law of Ukraine “On Public Purpose Programs” lays down fundamental principles of development, approval and implementation of public purpose programs, including socio-humanitarian ones. Under the document, public purpose programs shall be approved on the basis of the Ukrainian laws, while regional and inter-branch projects – by the Cabinet resolutions. Before the above law entered into force, public purpose programs were adopted pursuant to presidential decrees, parliamentary resolutions and Cabinet orders and instructions. Some of these programs are being implemented and funded.

The legislative acts in force provided to implement over 300 public purpose programs in 2004. Needless to say, the government could not fund all of them. The March 23, 2000 law of Ukraine “On State Forecasting and Elaboration of Ukraine’s Economic Social and Development Programs” provides for inclusion of purpose programs into the list of public purpose programs in the framework of the short-term Ukraine’s Socio-Economic Development Program (for one year). However, this rule was not applied because after enactment of the document, Ukraine’s Socio-Economic Development Programs, developed by the government and submitted to the Verkhovna Rada for consideration, have never been approved.

Therefore, funding of purpose programs looked as follows: executive authorities authorized to implement them annually presented the Ministry of Finance with applications for budget funding and, depending on the results of consideration of their applications, were or were not appointed as administrators of budget funds. According to the Budget Code, major administrators of budget funds had the right to independently select budget programs for implementation of public purpose programs. In case executive authorities failed to prepare the budget application or the Ministry of Finance did not include it into the draft budget, the public purpose program did not receive funding.

Specifically, 172 public purpose programs were funded in 2004 (56% of the total number of the 2003 programs to be implemented pursuant to the adopted legal acts).

Purpose Program Funding in 2003–2004

According to the Ministry of Economy, in 2003–2004, the amount of funds for implementation of public purpose programs totaled UAH 50,800,000,000, including:

- In 2003 – 179 programs (UAH 21,600,000,000)
- In 2004 – 172 programs (UAH 29,200,000,000)

The shares of their funding were, respectively, 92.1% and 114.8% compared to the planned indicators, inclusive of:

- In 2003: the national budget – 92.7%, other sources – 91.3%
- In 2004: the national budget – 101.2%, other sources – 146.8%.

In 2003, expenses for public purpose programs for *the labor market, social security and the pension reform* equaled UAH 218,500,000 or 57.2% of the planned indicator, whereas expenditures for programs in the area of *health care, physical culture, sports and youth policy* amounted to UAH 1,027,000,000 or 97.1%. Spending for *education* purpose programs totaled UAH 324,500,000 or 96.5% of the planned indicator, whereas expenses for public *culture* programs made up UAH

63,100,000 or 33.5%. Expenditures for public purpose programs on *tourism and recreation development* constituted UAH 13,100,000 or 96.2%.

Hence, in 2003, the government spent UAH 1,647,000,000 for programs in the social and humanitarian areas.

In 2004, expenses for public purpose programs included to the Sections “*Social Policy*” and “*Humanitarian Area*” amounted to UAH 947,900,000 or 82.0% and UAH 1,292,000,000 or 90.8% of the planned indicator respectively. In 2004, the government spent UAH 2,240,000,000 for the socio-humanitarian programs.

It is necessary to stress that due to the absence of clear criteria for structuring of purpose programs by branches, their grouping in socio-economic development programs for 2003 and 2004 differed. Specifically, *Sections* and *directions* indicated in Appendixes to the draft socio-humanitarian programs were different, which does not allow a conclusion about their budget funding.

Furthermore, in 2004, the Sections “*Social Policy*” and “*Humanitarian Area*” were supplemented with many programs providing for funding of capital investments for development of housing and communal services. Particularly, the Section “*Social Policy*” was supplemented with sub-sections “*Housing and Communal Services Reform*” and “*Construction Development and Housing Provision*”. These directions apparently have nothing in common with the socio-humanitarian area.

Sample of Socio-Humanitarian Programs

Analysis of budget funding of public purpose programs in 2003–2004 is based on a sample of socio-humanitarian projects. Actions in the framework of socio-humanitarian programs (protection of health, maternity and childhood; education and social security) served as a criterion for their selection.

The analysis demonstrated that national and local executive authorities funded **40 public purpose programs**, which had a direct or indirect bearing on the socio-humanitarian area.

The above programs were approved by the following legislative acts:

- Laws (3 programs)
- Parliamentary resolutions (26 programs)
- Presidential decrees (11 programs).

They could be grouped as follows:

- Social policy – 8 programs
- Humanitarian area – 25 programs
- Vital activity safety – 1 program
- Providing Conditions for Enhanced Socio-Economic Growth – 1 program
- Real sector development – 1 program
- Protection of human rights and freedoms, strengthening of law and order – 4 programs.

The amount of program funding totaled UAH 2,150,000,000, including 34 programs of UAH 1,150,000,000 in 2003 and 34 programs¹ of UAH 998,000,000 in 2004 or 13.2% down from the previous year (see Table 1).

¹ Coincidence of the number does not mean funding of the same programs.

In 2003, the amount of funds earmarked for one socio-humanitarian program averaged UAH 33,900,000, while in 2004 – UAH 29,400,000.

In 2003–2004, expenditure execution was 91.8% of the estimated figure.

In the structure of expenses, the largest shares belonged to:

- Humanitarian area – 70.8% in 2003 and 73.8% in 2004;
- Social policy – 22.3% in 2003 and 19.5% in 2004
- Protection of human rights and freedoms, strengthening of law and order – 5.7% in 2003 and 5.8% in 2004.

Within 2003-2004, the shares of these three directions together in all budget expenditures were 98.8% and 99.1% respectively.

In monetary terms, it looks as follows:

- Humanitarian area – UAH 815,400,000 in 2003 and UAH 736,900,000 in 2004
- Social policy – UAH 256,500,000 in 2003 and UAH 194,300,000 in 2004
- Protection of human rights and freedoms, strengthening of law and order – UAH 65,300,000 in 2003 and UAH 57,900,000 in 2004.

Neither in 2003 nor in 2004, public purpose programs were fully funded (89.8% and 94.3% respectively). Specifically, all branch programs lacked funds (see Diagrams 1 and 2).

The humanitarian area ranks the first by the amount of funding and the number of programs (25). The lion's share of budget funds was earmarked for the following three directions (98.3% in 2003 and 98.1% in 2004):

- Protection of health, maternity and childhood: 2003 – 63.0% (UAH 514,100,000), 2004 – 80.5% (UAH 576,500,000)
- Education: 2003 – 30.2% (UAH 246,200,000), 2004 – 7.3% (UAH 52,400,000)
- Culture: 2003 – 5.1% (UAH 42,000,000), 2004 – 10.3% (UAH 73,500,000).

The share of expenditures for implementation of the Programs on Tourism Development for 2002-2010 and “Journalist” amounted to 1.6% and 1.9% in 2003 and 2004 respectively (see Diagrams 3 and 4).

The humanitarian area is followed by **social policy** (8 programs), which incorporates 4 sub-sections: “*Population's Income and Wages*”, “*Employment and Labor Market*”, “*Social Security*” and “*Construction Development and Housing Provision*”.

The amount of expenses for these programs totaled UAH 256,500,000 or 70,3% in 2003 and UAH 194,300,000 or 89,1% in 2004.

In this field, the Program on Youth Housing was most important. Outlays for its implementation equaled UAH 794,285,000 in 2003 and UAH 1,495,246,000 in 2004, 88.3% up from the previous year. The Program was aimed at providing the youth with housing.

The third group “**Protection of human rights and freedoms, strengthening of law and order**” included 4 public purpose programs funded in the amount of UAH 123,200,000 within 2003–2004 (the 2003 planned indicator – UAH 5,300,000, execution – 95.6%; the 2004 planned indicator – UAH 57,900,000, execution – 99.1%).

The Program on Settlement and Accommodation of Crimean Tatars and Other Repatriates for 2001–2005 *played the key role. Within 2003–2004, volume of its funding comprised UAH 112,000,000 or 90.9% of all funds allocated for this direction.*

Sources of Purpose Program Funding

Within 2003–2004, public programs were funded mostly from the national budget (see Diagram 4). Meanwhile, in 2003, purpose programs were funded from different sources (local budgets, funds of establishments and enterprises), whereas in 2004, they were financed almost exclusively from the national budget (see Diagram 5).

In 2003, 68.5% of purpose programs were funded from the national budget, while in 2004, this indicator increased to 95.6%, i.e. funding of socio-humanitarian programs became a public concern. The difference is especially striking in the field of social policy: 48.7% and 89.4% in 2003 and 2004 respectively.

Funding from the National Budget

Within 2003–2004, public purpose programs were fully funded. The shortage of the national budget resources equaled 5% (in 2004) of the planned indicator, whereas funding from other sources was uneven (see Diagrams 7-9).

For instance, in 2003, funding of public purpose programs from other sources made up just 73.6% mostly due to ineffective planning (overestimated amounts of attracted funds).

Administrators of Budget Funds

Administrators of budget funds for implementation of public purpose programs included 15 ministries, 10 State Committees, 6 governmental agencies, the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations.

The share of the Ministry of Family, Children and Youth – the major administrator of budget funds – constituted UAH 770,400,000 or 35.8% of all funds spent for public purpose programs in 2003–2004 (see Diagram 9).

The shares of the Ministry of Health Care, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Culture and Arts, the Ministry of Agricultural Policy and the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration were also considerable (see Diagram 9).

Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations were administrators of local budget funds. Their share in expenses for public purpose programs amounted to UAH 348,700,000 or 16.2%.

The above allows a conclusion that correlation between national and local budget funds was 6/1.

The share of the 7 major administrators (the Ministry of Family, Children and Youth, the Ministry of Culture and Arts, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Health Care, the Ministry of Agricultural Policy, the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration, regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations) in program expenditures was 95.1%. The share of the rest administrators of budget funds did not exceed 5%.

The Most Expensive Purpose Programs

It would be expedient to analyze which programs were the most expensive within 2003–2004. The number of public purpose programs and their shares in the total amount of expenses are as follows:

- 20% of the total amount of funds – 1
- 10%-20% – 1
- 5%-10% – 5
- 1%-5% – 9
- 0,1%-1,0% – 15
- 0,1% – 9 (See Diagram 10).

In the Socio-Humanitarian area, the most expensive was the Program “Physical Culture - the Health of the Nation” elaborated in compliance with the law of Ukraine “On Physical Culture and Sports” and approved by the September 1, 1998 presidential decree No.963/98. The seven-year Program provided for changes in approaches to protection of health as the highest human value (1999–2005). However, exact amounts of funding were not indicated in the Program. Administrators of budget funds presented estimates of expenditures in budget applications to the Ministry of Finance.

The Program was carried out in the following spheres: athletic, sport and health-improving activities; athletic and sport activities of persons of specific professions and invalids; development of physical culture and sports, inclusive of personnel, scientific-methodical, material-technical, financial-economic, medical-biological, Informational, legislative and organizational provision and strengthening of international relations. The Program is carried out all over Ukraine though regional distribution of funds is not indicated.

Within 2003–2004, the amount of funds earmarked for its implementation totaled UAH 516,500,000 (95.7% of the planned indicator), of which UAH 507,400,000 were funded from the national budget and UAH 9,100,000 – from other sources (local budgets).

By the amount of expenditures, programs are ranked as follows (see Diagram 10):

- 227. Public Program on Youth Housing
- 245. Population’s Immunoprophylaxis Program for 2002–2006
- 027. Public Program on “Children of Ukraine”
- 188. Inter-branch Program “The Health of the Nation”
- 217. Actions on improvement of medical services for rural population
- 147. Public Program on Settlement and Accommodation of Crimean Tatars and Other Repatriates for 2001–2005.

The Public Program on Youth Housing ranked the second in volume of funding. Unlike others, the Youth Housing Program provides for both annual calculation of the amount of funds for youth housing and their regional distribution.

The Program is geared towards settlement of the housing issue through creation of conditions for youth housing development, improvement of mechanisms for the purchase of housing and development of a system of mortgage housing loans. Within 2002–2012, around UAH 5,800,000,000 shall be invested in construction (reconstruction) and the purchase of youth housing in the framework of the Program.

In 2002–2005, it was envisaged to fund the Program actions from the national and local budgets and gradually attract inter-budget sources. The planned volumes of funding from the national budget are set pursuant to the law on the national budget for the respective year, whereas those from local

budgets – by resolutions of local councils according to annually adopted long-term regional programs on youth housing.

In 2003–2004, the Program provided for allocation of UAH 250,900,000 for youth housing construction. Under-execution of expenditures was 9.8% (the national budget – 3.6%, other sources – 35.6%). Budget estimated indicators did not comply with those indicated in the Program's Table 1 – they were underestimated and constituted just 39.4% of the budgeted figures.

Hence, actual funding of the Program substantially differed from the planned amounting to just 36.0% within 2003–2004. In general, regional distribution of Program funds reflects a hierarchy of regions based on the number of population and the level of economic development (see Diagram 11).

From the viewpoint of their socio-humanitarian role, the Public Program “Children of Ukraine” approved by the January 18, 1996 presidential decree No.63/96 and the Inter-branch Program “The Health of the Nation” approved by the January 10, 2002 Cabinet resolution No.14 are the most interesting.

The Public Program “Children of Ukraine” is designed to secure the right of every child to be born healthy, survive, develop and enjoy social and psychological security. These objectives shall be achieved through national and regional activities to improve health of children and youth.

The goal of the Inter-branch Program “The Health of the Nation” is to improve the demographic situation, care and enhance the population's health, quality and effectiveness of medical and sanitary services, secure social justice and the right of citizens to health protection. It is the medical Program.

The Program on Settlement and Accommodation of Crimean Tatars and Other Repatriates for 2001–2005 approved by the May 16, 2002 Cabinet resolution No.618 is targeted toward meeting socio-economic, political, legal, educational and cultural challenges of the repatriates. The Program determines the list of top priority measures to be taken by executive authorities for settlement and accommodation of Crimean Tatars and other repatriates.

The Program aims at provision of Crimean Tatars and other deported minorities, who voluntary returned to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, with housing and creation of infrastructure in areas, where the repatriates were concentrated territorially, namely:

- Purchase of 117,000 m² of finished houses (apartments) and putting into operation of all unfinished houses
- Engineering/land surveying services
- Creation of 78 km of electric power network
- Creation of units of communal and socio-cultural infrastructure
- Completion of 529.5 km of a water-supply system, putting into operation of 182 km of a drainage system, 322 km of gas pipeline and 178.7 km of highways
- Development of material and technical basis for educational and cultural establishments, including restoration of the building of the Crimean Music and Drama, completion of 5 schools for 4,000 schoolchildren and 8 medical and obstetric stations.

Moreover, the Program provides for such activities as commemoration of the day of deportation of Crimean Tatars and other ethnicities, training of specialists for priority economic and socio-cultural branches, funding of ethno-cultural and other actions to obviate social and cultural needs of the repatriates.

Within 2003–2004, volume of the Program funding equaled UAH 112,000,000 or 5.2% of the total amount of expenses. Specifically, expenditures for execution of the Program totaled UAH 57,100,000 and UAH 54,900,000 in 2003 and 2004 respectively (see Diagram 10). This is the least expensive of the above 7 programs. It was funded by 97.4% (the national budget – 97.8%, other sources – 96.4%). The share of the national budget funds spent for this Program was 72.4%.

This social program is implemented in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

Conclusions

1. Within 2003–2004, only 40 out of over 300 public purpose programs directly or indirectly related to the socio-humanitarian sphere.
2. The share of the seven major programs in the total amount of expenditures was 95%.
3. The priority funding areas were health protection of children and youth and prevention of crime among youth.
4. The law in force did not provide for a clear and transparent procedure for program funding – the administrator set funding priorities within the limits approved by the Ministry of Finance.
5. Transparency of indicators of national and local budget funding was insufficient (the list of purpose programs to be funded was absent both in the national budget and reports on budget execution).
6. Scattered budget resources did not allow funding purpose programs in many spheres – actually, only health care and youth housing were prioritized. However, no government would undertake to finance over 300 programs.
7. Budget administrators were not interested either in optimization of the number of purpose programs or application of strict control measures for their execution, which allows for proposals to increase budget funding of the administrators' key functions on the one hand and explanation of a failure to execute purpose programs by the lack of funds on the other.

Material is prepared by an expert on economic questions Markiyan Datsyshyn, Director, Non-Governmental Analytical Center “Institute of Reforms”

Table 1

Funding of Public Purpose programs in the Socio-Humanitarian Area (2003–2004)

	Funding in 2003		Funding in 2004		Amounts of purpose program funds		National Budget		Other Sources		
	Planned (UAH thousand)	Actual (UAH thousand)	Planned (UAH thousand)	Actual (UAH thousand)	Planned (UAH thousand)	Actual (UAH thousand)	Planned (UAH thousand)	Actual (UAH thousand)	Planned (UAH thousand)	Actual (UAH thousand)	
					Actual / Planned (%)	Actual / Planned (%)				Actual / Planned (%)	
Social Policy											
Population's Income and Wages											
187 Program on Implementation of Anti-Poverty Strategy	477,0	470,7	98,7	77,0	70,7	91,8	400,0	400,0	400,0	100,0	
<i>State Committee for Family and Youth Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	77,0	70,7	91,8	77,0	70,7	91,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	-	
	400,0	400,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-	400,0	400,0	400,0	100,0	
Employment and Labor Market											
137 Public Employment Program for 2001–2004	121253,0	96482,5	79,6	11365,2	10315,6	90,8	109887,8	86166,9	78,4		
<i>Ministry of Labor and Social Policy</i>	9552,5	9552,5	100,0	9552,5	9552,5	100,0	0,0	0,0	-		
<i>State Committee for Family and Youth</i>	1161,8	552,1	47,5	1161,8	552,1	47,5	0,0	0,0	-		
<i>Ministry of Family, Children and Youth</i>	650,9	211,0	32,4	650,9	211,0	32,4	0,0	0,0	-		

<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	109887,8	86166,9	78,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	-	109887,8	86166,9	78,4
148 Public Program on Professional Rehabilitation and Employment of Handicapped	65,0	143,1	220,2	143,1	65,0	143,1	220,2	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Committee for Family and Youth</i>	65,0	143,1	220,2	143,1	65,0	143,1	220,2	0,0	0,0	-
Social Security										
119 2001–2005 Action Program Promoting the Women’s Status and Gender Equality in Society	29970,0	6175,9	20,6	2137,8	1929,0	2137,8	110,8	28041,0	4038,1	14,4
<i>State Committee for Family and Youth</i>	1005,0	914,1	91,0	914,1	1005,0	914,1	91,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Family, Children and Youth</i>	924,0	1223,7	132,4	1223,7	924,0	1223,7	132,4	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	28041,0	4038,1	14,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	-	28041,0	4038,1	14,4
129 Public Program “Ukrainian Family”	21740,0	21716,9	99,9	5697,3	5719,9	5697,3	99,6	16020,1	16019,6	100,0
<i>State Committee for Family and Youth</i>	2247,5	2329,4	103,6	2329,4	2247,5	2329,4	103,6	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Family, Children and Youth</i>	3472,4	3367,9	97,0	3367,9	3472,4	3367,9	97,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	16020,1	16019,6	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	-	16020,1	16019,6	100,0

192 Program Promoting Social Integration and Adaptation of Crimean Tatar Youth for 2002–2005	198,0	41,3	20,9	198,0	41,3	20,9	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Committee for Family and Youth</i>	78,0	28,5	36,5	78,0	28,5	36,5	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Family, Children and Youth</i>	120,0	12,8	10,7	120,0	12,8	10,7	0,0	0,0	-
215 Public Program on Social Development of the Village for the period till 2005	158210,9	96857,5	61,2	80300,0	77422,0	96,4	77910,9	19435,5	24,9
<i>Ministry of Agricultural Policy</i>	37000,0	37422,0	101,1	37000,0	37422,0	101,1	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Agricultural Policy</i>	43300,0	40000,0	92,4	43300,0	40000,0	92,4	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	77910,9	19435,5	24,9	0,0	0,0	-	77910,9	19435,5	24,9
Construction Development and Housing Provision									
227 Public Program on Youth Housing	250946,0	228953,1	91,2	210208,5	202703,7	96,4	40737,5	26249,4	64,4
<i>State Committee for Family and Youth</i>	73332,2	73807,4	100,6	73332,2	73807,4	100,6	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Family, Children and Youth</i>	169699,7	149524,6	88,1	136876,3	128896,3	94,2	32823,4	20628,3	62,8
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	7914,1	5621,1	71,0	0,0	0,0	-	7914,1	5621,1	71,0

Humanitarian Area

Protection of Health, Maternity and Childhood

064 Public purpose program “Physical Culture - the Health of the Nation”	539424,0	516461,7	95,7	530267,8	507365,5	95,7	9156,2	9096,2	99,3
<i>Ministry of Interior</i>	3500,0	3500,0	100,0	3500,0	3500,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Interior</i>	3750,0	3750,0	100,0	3750,0	3750,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Agricultural Policy</i>	5000,0	5000,0	100,0	5000,0	5000,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Agricultural Policy</i>	6000,0	8970,0	149,5	6000,0	8970,0	149,5	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Committee for physical Culture and Sports</i>	158729,7	158785,6	100,0	158729,7	158785,6	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Committee for physical Culture and Sports</i>	353288,1	327359,9	92,7	353288,1	327359,9	92,7	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	9156,2	9096,2	99,3	0,0	0,0	-	9156,2	9096,2	99,3
127 Public Program “Reproductive Health 2001–2005”	15534,4	13331,2	85,8	12569,9	12437,8	98,9	2964,5	893,4	30,1
<i>Ministry of Health Care</i>	2072,9	2072,9	100,0	2072,9	2072,9	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Health Care</i>	5657,7	5621,0	99,4	5657,7	5621,0	99,4	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Committee for Family and Youth</i>	870,5	826,3	94,9	870,5	826,3	94,9	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Family, Children and Youth</i>	1156,1	1133,5	98,0	1156,1	1133,5	98,0	0,0	0,0	-

<i>Academy of Medical Sciences</i>	1147,5	1147,5	100,0	1147,5	1147,5	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Academy of Medical Sciences</i>	1454,1	1454,0	100,0	1454,1	1454,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Academy of Pedagogical Sciences</i>	59,4	59,4	100,0	59,4	59,4	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Academy of Pedagogical Sciences</i>	151,7	123,2	81,2	151,7	123,2	81,2	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	2964,5	893,4	30,1	0,0	0,0	-	2964,5	893,4	30,1
188 Inter-branch Program “The Health of the Nation”	154450,1	151681,8	98,2	1541,4	1482,5	96,2	152908,7	150199,3	98,2
<i>Ministry of Family, Children and Youth</i>	78,5	78,5	100,0	78,5	78,5	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Academy of Medical Sciences</i>	376,2	376,2	100,0	376,2	376,2	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Academy of Medical Sciences</i>	476,0	475,4	99,9	476,0	475,4	99,9	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Academy of Pedagogical Sciences</i>	292,8	292,8	100,0	292,8	292,8	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Academy of Pedagogical Sciences</i>	317,9	259,6	81,7	317,9	259,6	81,7	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	152908,7	150199,3	98,2	0,0	0,0	-	152908,7	150199,3	98,2
217 Actions on improvement of medical services for rural population	150024,0	143417,0	95,6	141684,1	139127,1	98,2	8339,9	4289,9	51,4
<i>Ministry of Health Care</i>	59745,9	59745,9	100,0	59745,9	59745,9	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Health Care</i>	81938,2	79381,2	96,9	81938,2	79381,2	96,9	0,0	0,0	-

<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	8339,9	4289,9	51,4	0,0	0,0	-	8339,9	4289,9	51,4
223 Public Program on Youth Support	935,8	3313,4	354,1	600,0	3058,4	509,7	335,8	255,0	75,9
<i>Ministry of Family, Children and Youth</i>	600,0	3058,4	509,7	600,0	3058,4	509,7	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	335,8	255,0	75,9	0,0	0,0	-	335,8	255,0	75,9
245 Population's Immunophylaxis Program for 2002–2006	207767,1	207325,5	99,8	206498,7	206465,6	100,0	1268,4	859,9	67,8
<i>Ministry of Health Care</i>	101598,7	101598,7	100,0	101598,7	101598,7	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Health Care</i>	104900,0	104866,9	100,0	104900,0	104866,9	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	1268,4	859,9	67,8	0,0	0,0	-	1268,4	859,9	67,8
253 Public Program for Children's Recreation and Sport for the period till 2008	19779,4	29224,5	147,8	8200,0	18537,2	226,1	11579,4	10687,3	92,3
<i>State Committee for Family and Youth</i>	4200,0	4091,0	97,4	4200,0	4091,0	97,4	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Family, Children and Youth</i>	4000,0	14446,2	361,2	4000,0	14446,2	361,2	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	11579,4	10687,3	92,3	0,0	0,0	-	11579,4	10687,3	92,3
260 Public Program on Prevention of Child Neglect and Home-	967,7	561,1	58,0	945,5	538,9	57,0	22,2	22,2	100,0

lessness for 2002–2005											
<i>State Committee for Family and Youth</i>	395,5	252,5	63,8	395,5	252,5	63,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Family, Children and Youth</i>	550,0	286,4	52,1	550,0	286,4	52,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	22,2	22,2	100,0	0,0	0,0	-	22,2	22,2	22,2	22,2	100,0
283 Public Program on Development of the National Children's Health Resort Yevpatoria for 2004–2007	10289,4	7606,8	73,9	4000,0	1503,2	37,6	6289,4	6289,4	6289,4	6289,4	97,0
<i>Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea</i>	10289,4	7606,8	73,9	4000,0	1503,2	37,6	6289,4	6289,4	6289,4	6289,4	97,0
311 National HIV/AIDS Prevention, Care and Support Program for 2004–2008	17852,2	17622,0	98,7	17852,2	17622,0	98,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Health Care</i>	17852,2	17622,0	98,7	17852,2	17622,0	98,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	-
Education											
027 Public Program on “Children of Ukraine”	185986,6	183359,8	98,6	170566,1	169537,3	99,4	15420,5	13822,5	13822,5	13822,5	89,6
<i>Ministry of Agricultural Policy</i>	5753,6	5753,6	100,0	5753,6	5753,6	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Agricultural Policy</i>	1722,4	1798,1	104,4	1722,4	1798,1	104,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Education and Science</i>	96180,0	96180,0	100,0	96180,0	96180,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	-

<i>Ministry of Education and Science</i>	72,0	100,0	72,0	72,0	100,0	72,0	72,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Health Care</i>	15949,7	98,9	15777,7	15949,7	98,9	15777,7	15777,7	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Health Care</i>	31116,3	100,0	31115,2	31116,3	100,0	31115,2	31115,2	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Committee for Family and Youth</i>	4347,7	95,8	4167,2	4347,7	95,8	4167,2	4167,2	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Family, Children and Youth</i>	11801,6	94,5	11157,6	11801,6	94,5	11157,6	11157,6	0,0	0,0	-
National Space Agency	400,0	84,4	337,4	400,0	84,4	337,4	337,4	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ukrainian Academy of Agricultural Sciences</i>	149,6	100,0	149,6	149,6	100,0	149,6	149,6	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ukrainian Academy of Agricultural Sciences</i>	128,7	116,2	149,6	128,7	116,2	149,6	149,6	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Academy of Medical Sciences</i>	967,2	100,0	967,2	967,2	100,0	967,2	967,2	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Academy of Medical Sciences</i>	1217,7	100,0	1217,2	1217,7	100,0	1217,2	1217,2	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Academy of Pedagogical Sciences</i>	390,9	100,0	390,9	390,9	100,0	390,9	390,9	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Academy of Pedagogical Sciences</i>	368,7	82,5	304,0	368,7	82,5	304,0	304,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	15420,5	89,6	13822,5	15420,5	89,6	13822,5	0,0	15420,5	13822,5	89,6
124 Public Program on Talented Youth	7834,6	175,5	13746,6	6113,6	197,5	12076,9	1721,0	1669,7	97,0	
<i>Ministry of Education and Science</i>	1204,8	83,4	1004,8	1204,8	83,4	1004,8	1004,8	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Committee for Family and Youth</i>	2074,1	214,3	4444,6	2074,1	214,3	4444,6	4444,6	0,0	0,0	-

<i>Ministry of Family, Children and Youth</i>	2834,7	6627,5	233,8	2834,7	6627,5	233,8	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	1721,0	1669,7	97,0	0,0	0,0	-	1721,0	1669,7	97,0
132 Public Program on Informatization of Secondary Educational Institutions and Computerization of Rural Schools for 2001–2003	93621,2	93264,0	99,6	86500,0	86500,0	100,0	7121,2	6764,0	95,0
<i>Ministry of Education and Science</i>	86500,0	86500,0	100,0	86500,0	86500,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	7121,2	6764,0	95,0	0,0	0,0	-	7121,2	6764,0	95,0
199 Public Program on Development of Extracurricular Educational Establishments for 2002–2008	8465,5	8310,5	98,2	0,0	0,0	-	8465,5	8310,5	98,2
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	8465,5	8310,5	98,2	0,0	0,0	-	8465,5	8310,5	98,2
Culture									
089 Public Program on Preservation of Library and Archive Funds for 2000–2005	1308,5	1284,0	98,1	1023,5	1023,5	100,0	285,0	260,5	91,4
<i>Ministry of Culture and Arts</i>	1023,5	1023,5	100,0	1023,5	1023,5	100,0	0,0	0,0	-

<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	285,0	260,5	91,4	0,0	0,0	-	285,0	260,5	91,4
141 Public Program on Revitalization and Development of Ukrainian Cossacks for 2002–2005	10,0	10,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-	10,0	10,0	100,0
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	10,0	10,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-	10,0	10,0	100,0
145 Museum Assistance Program for 2001–2005	18120,9	13072,6	72,1	17591,5	12794,8	72,7	529,4	277,8	52,5
<i>Ministry of Culture and Arts</i>	8773,4	8715,3	99,3	8773,4	8715,3	99,3	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Culture and Arts</i>	7591,6	3312,4	43,6	7591,6	3312,4	43,6	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Committee on Archives</i>	718,4	403,4	56,2	718,4	403,4	56,2	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Committee on Archives</i>	508,1	363,7	71,6	508,1	363,7	71,6	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	529,4	277,8	52,5	0,0	0,0	-	529,4	277,8	52,5
149 Public Program on Film Industry Development for 2003–2007	32319,1	30002,1	92,8	32199,1	29882,1	92,8	120,0	120,0	100,0
<i>Ministry of Culture and Arts</i>	19327,2	18601,2	96,2	19327,2	18601,2	96,2	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Culture and Arts</i>	12871,9	11280,9	87,6	12871,9	11280,9	87,6	0,0	0,0	-

<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	120,0	120,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-	120,0	120,0	100,0
230 Public Program on Library Funds for the period till 2005	18136,7	10766,3	59,4	11721,6	9977,7	85,1	6415,1	788,6	12,3
<i>Ministry of Culture and Arts</i>	6385,0	5872,6	92,0	6385,0	5872,6	92,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Culture and Arts</i>	5336,6	4105,1	76,9	5336,6	4105,1	76,9	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	6415,1	788,6	12,3	0,0	0,0	-	6415,1	788,6	12,3
238 Public Program on Certification of Cultural Heritage Units for 2003–2010	404,7	315,7	78,0	308,1	274,5	89,1	96,6	41,2	42,7
<i>State Committee for Construction and Architecture</i>	122,5	122,5	100,0	122,5	122,5	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Committee for Construction and Architecture</i>	185,6	152,0	81,9	185,6	152,0	81,9	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	96,6	41,2	42,7	0,0	0,0	-	96,6	41,2	42,7
242 Public Program on Assistance to Artists' Associations for 2003–2005	7265,7	7220,3	99,4	7210,7	7210,7	100,0	55,0	9,6	17,5
<i>Ministry of Culture and Arts</i>	5541,0	5541,0	100,0	5541,0	5541,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Culture and Arts</i>	1669,7	1669,7	100,0	1669,7	1669,7	100,0	0,0	0,0	-

<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	55,0	9,6	17,5	0,0	0,0	-	55,0	9,6	17,5
282 Public Program on Cultural Development for the period till 2007	67411,4	47365,4	70,3	67233,4	47184,9	70,2	178,0	180,5	101,4
<i>Ministry of Culture and Arts</i>	67233,4	47184,9	70,2	67233,4	47184,9	70,2	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	178,0	180,5	101,4	0,0	0,0	-	178,0	180,5	101,4
287 Public Program on Development and Use of the Ukrainian Language for 2004–2010	15597,0	5384,7	34,5	15597,0	5384,7	34,5	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Culture and Arts</i>	15597,0	5384,7	34,5	15597,0	5384,7	34,5	0,0	0,0	-
Tourism and Recreation									
173 Public Program on Tourism Development for 2002–2010	27326,5	24922,7	91,2	26407,9	24522,7	92,9	918,6	400,0	43,5
<i>State Tourism Administration</i>	12729,5	12729,5	100,0	12729,5	12729,5	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Tourism Administration</i>	13678,4	11793,2	86,2	13678,4	11793,2	86,2	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	918,6	400,0	43,5	0,0	0,0	-	918,6	400,0	43,5%
Information Space Development									
303 Public Program “Journalist”	0,0	22300,0	-	0,0	22300,0	-	0,0	0,0	-


<i>State Committee for TV and Radio Broadcasting</i>	0,0	22300,0	-	0,0	22300,0	-	0,0	0,0	-
Vital Activity Safety									
271 Public Program on Implementation of Decisions of the World Summit on Sustainable Development for 2003–2015 <i>Ministry of Environmental Protection</i>	50,0	49,5	99,0	50,0	49,5	99,0	0,0	0,0	-
	50,0	49,5	99,0	50,0	49,5	99,0	0,0	0,0	-
Promoting Conditions for Enhanced Socio-Economic Growth									
Regulatory Policy and Entrepreneurship Development									
212 Public Program on Youth Entrepreneurship Assistance for 2002–2005 <i>State Committee for Family and Youth</i>	3954,9	4015,9	101,5	910,0	964,0	105,9	3044,9	3051,9	100,2
<i>Ministry of Family, Children and Youth</i>	520,0	490,1	94,3	520,0	490,1	94,3	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	390,0	473,9	121,5	390,0	473,9	121,5	0,0	0,0	-
	3044,9	3051,9	100,2	0,0	0,0	-	3044,9	3051,9	100,2
Real Sector Development									
Foreign Economic Policy									
116 EU Integration Program	27128,2	19660,3	72,5	27108,2	19656,1	72,5	20,0	4,2	21,0

<i>Ministry of Economy and European Integration</i>	500,0	117,4	23,5	500,0	117,4	23,5	500,0	117,4	23,5	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Economy and European Integration</i>	500,0	233,4	46,7	500,0	233,4	46,7	500,0	233,4	46,7	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Finance</i>	20,0	0,0	0,0	20,0	0,0	0,0	20,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Justice</i>	1740,5	957,6	55,0	1740,5	957,6	55,0	1740,5	957,6	55,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Justice</i>	2150,5	1233,6	57,4	2150,5	1233,6	57,4	2150,5	1233,6	57,4	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Foreign Ministry</i>	3200,0	3200,0	100,0	3200,0	3200,0	100,0	3200,0	3200,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Foreign Ministry</i>	2100,0	2000,0	95,2	2100,0	2000,0	95,2	2100,0	2000,0	95,2	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Interior</i>	1000,0	1000,0	100,0	1000,0	1000,0	100,0	1000,0	1000,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Interior</i>	960,0	939,2	97,8	960,0	939,2	97,8	960,0	939,2	97,8	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Labor and Social Policy</i>	43,2	43,2	100,0	43,2	43,2	100,0	43,2	43,2	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Labor and Social Policy</i>	122,9	121,5	98,9	122,9	121,5	98,9	122,9	121,5	98,9	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Nuclear Regulatory Committee</i>	8,9	11,2	125,8	8,9	11,2	125,8	8,9	11,2	125,8	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Health Care</i>	150,0	150,0	100,0	150,0	150,0	100,0	150,0	150,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Committee on Communication and Informatization</i>	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Emergency Situations and Chornobyl Affairs</i>	275,0	110,5	40,2	275,0	110,5	40,2	275,0	110,5	40,2	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Transport and Communications</i>	200,0	200,0	100,0	200,0	200,0	100,0	200,0	200,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>National Committee on Technical Regulation and Consumption Policy</i>	4500,0	4500,0	100,0	4500,0	4500,0	100,0	4500,0	4500,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-

<i>National Committee on Technical Regulation and Consumption Policy</i>	8500,0	4304,7	50,6	8500,0	4304,7	50,6	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Committee for Labor Protection Control</i>	124,5	124,5	100,0	124,5	124,5	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Committee for Labor Protection Control</i>	56,5	46,5	82,3	56,5	46,5	82,3	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Tourism Administration</i>	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Tourism Administration</i>	70,0	53,5	76,4	70,0	53,5	76,4	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Taxation Administration</i>	568,4	74,5	13,1	568,4	74,5	13,1	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Committee on Securities and Stock Market</i>	10,0	10,0	100,0	10,0	10,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Committee on Securities and Stock Market</i>	13,0	9,8	75,4	13,0	9,8	75,4	0,0	0,0	-
<i>State Commission for Regulation of Financial Services Markets</i>	15,0	15,0	100,0	15,0	15,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Main Intelligence Department of the Ministry of Defense</i>	79,8	0,0	0,0	79,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	20,0	4,2	21,0	0,0	0,0	-	20,0	4,2	21,0
Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, Strengthening of Law and Order									
130 Public Program on Combating Illegal Migration for 2001–2004	6000,0	5544,9	92,4	6000,0	5544,9	92,4	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Interior</i>	3000,0	3000,0	100,0	3000,0	3000,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	-

<i>Ministry of Interior</i>	3000,0	2544,9	84,8	3000,0	2544,9	84,8	0,0	0,0	-
147 Public Program on Settlement and Accommodation of Crimean Tatars and Other Repatriates for 2001–2005	115012,0	112016,1	97,4	83000,0	81154,7	97,8	32012,0	30861,4	96,4
<i>State Committee for Nationalities and Migration</i>	60012,0	57106,4	95,2	43000,0	43000,0	100,0	17012,0	14106,4	82,9
<i>State Committee for Nationalities and Migration</i>	55000,0	54909,7	99,8	40000,0	38154,7	95,4	15000,0	16755,0	111,7
219 Public Program on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings for 2002–2005	5471,9	5548,4	101,4	416,3	499,4	120,0	5055,6	5049,0	99,9
<i>State Committee for family and Youth</i>	216,3	153,6	71,0	216,3	153,6	71,0	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Family, Children and Youth</i>	200,0	345,8	172,9	200,0	345,8	172,9	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations</i>	5055,6	5049,0	99,9	0,0	0,0	-	5055,6	5049,0	99,9
277 Program on Public Policy in Combating Illegal Circulation of Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors for 2003-2010	167,5	69,8	41,7	167,5	69,8	41,7	0,0	0,0	-
<i>Ministry of Family, Children and Youth</i>	167,5	69,8	41,7	167,5	69,8	41,7	0,0	0,0	-
Total	2341476,9	2149615,6	91,8	1794146,7	1743277,9	97,2	547330,2	406337,7	74,2

Structure of Expenses for Public Purpose Programs in the Socio-Humanitarian Area (2003)



Structure of Expenses for Public Purpose Programs in the Socio-Humanitaria Area (2004)





Diagram 3

Sub-Branch Structure of Expenses for Public Purpose Programs in the Socio-Humanitarian Area
(2004)



Shares of the National Budget and Other Sources in Funding of Public Socio-Humanitarian Programs (2003-2004)




Diagram 5

Sources of Expenditures for Public Socio-Humanitarian Programs






Diagram 6

Execution of Expenditures for Public Socio-Humanitarian Programs



**Execution of Expenditures
for Public Socio-Humanitarian Programs by Directions (2003)**


Diagram 7



- Social Policy
- Humanitarian Area
- Vital Activity Safety
- Providing Conditions for Enhanced Socio-Economic Growth


**Execution of Expenditures
for Public Socio-Humanitarian Programs by Directions (2004)**

Diagram 8




- Social Policy
- Humanitarian Area
- Vital Activity Safety
- Providing Conditions for Enhanced Socio-Economic Growth

Shares of Administrators of Budget Funds in Public Program Funding (2003-2004)




Structure and Funding of Public Purpose Programs in the Socio-Humanitarian Area (2003-2004)



Planned Distribution of Budget Funds for Youth Housing Program
(2003-2004)

UAH, mln



Funding of Socio-Humanitarian Policy Activities (as of January 1, 2005)

*By OLENA NYZHNYK,
Head of the Directorate, Department of Regional Policy,
Ministry of Economy and European Integration
and
TETYANA KRAVETS,
Head, Department of Legislative Provision of Regional Development,
Ministry of Economy and European Integration*

Socio-humanitarian policy activities provide for development and settlement of problems in the following areas: social security; education; science; culture; family, youth and sports affairs; national minorities and migration etc.

In Ukraine, agencies responsible for implementation of socio-humanitarian policy at the national level include the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, the Ministry of Family, Youth and Sports and the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration. The Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regional, the Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations, i.e. structural departments of the above Ministries, which are parts of local executive authorities, carry out these activities at the regional level.

In order to implement public socio-humanitarian policy the above Ministries and other national executive authorities develop purpose programs providing for actions on problem solving and development of respective areas.

In Ukraine, socio-humanitarian policy activities are funded from the national and local budgets and other sources pursuant to the national law (e.g. funds of international financial organizations). Meanwhile, there are a number of public programs, which do not provide for specific funding.

Public purpose programs for implementation of socio-humanitarian policy serve as a basis for calculation of the amount of budget funds needed for their implementation. A brief analysis of the state of funding of these programs is given below.

The following data would give an idea on volumes of program funding from the national budget. According to data of Ministries, the planned amount of funding of public programs (valid till January 2005) totaled UAH 1,127,400,000. The actual volume of funds earmarked for socio-humanitarian programs within the period of their implementation equaled UAH 840,200,000 as of January 1, 2005 (see Table 1).

Table 1. State of Funding of Public Socio-Humanitarian Programs by Ministries and Other National Executive Authorities

<i>National agencies responsible for implementation of socio-humanitarian programs</i>	<i>Overall volume of funding (planned), UAH million</i>	<i>Volume of actual funding as of January 1, 2005, UAH million</i>
The Ministry of Education and Science	311.9	193.2
The Ministry of Culture and Tourism	168.3	148.7
The Ministry of Family, Youth and Sports	406.2	365.2
The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy	43.6	18.2

The State Committee for Nationalities and Migration	197.4	114.9
Total	1127.4	840.2

This report presents the analysis of funding of public program activities and features of allocation of budget funds for execution of respective actions in the regions based on data of the Ministries, other national and local executive authorities responsible for implementation of public socio-humanitarian policy.

The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine

The Ministry of Education and Science carries out 19 public socio-humanitarian programs. The timeframe of their implementation fluctuates from three to ten years. The first program was launched in 1998 and the last one will end in 2012.

The planned amount of program funding totals UAH 311,900,000. However, the government actually earmarked UAH 193,200,000. The Ministry received no funding for 8 out of 19 programs.

The Ministry provided information about the amount of funds allocated for regional activities (before January 1, 2005) just on 9 programs totaling UAH 193.2. Distribution of budget funds between the regions was uneven.

The lion's share of funds for implementation of the 9 programs was allocated to Kiev (9.3%) followed by the Kharkiv (5.3%), Kyiv (5.1%), Dnipropetrovsk (4.7%), Poltava (4.5%), Odesa and Vinnytsya regions (by 4.4% each). Sevastopol (0.1%), the Ternopil (2.6%), Mykolaiv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Zaporizhzhya regions (by 2.8% each) got the smallest shares of funds.

Per capita funding of the 9 public socio-humanitarian programs in the regions averaged UAH 4.3 as of January 1, 2005. This indicator was the lowest in Sevastopol (UAH 0.1), the Donetsk (UAH 1.6), Dnipropetrovsk (UAH 2.6), Luhansk (UAH 2.7), and Transcarpathian (UAH 2.9) regions.

Information on Funding of the Public Programs Implemented by the Ministry

1) *The Program for Informatization of Secondary Educational Institutions and Computerization of Rural Schools for 2001-2003* was designed to provide 2,257 rural schools with personal computers within 2001-2003. However, only 1,986 personal computers were purchased due to the lack of budget funds (the level of program implementation – 88%).

2) *The Program for Informatization of Secondary Educational Institutions and Computerization of Rural Schools for 2004* was aimed at providing 1,698 rural schools with personal computers. However, only 1,497 personal computers were purchased due to the lack of budget funds (the level of program implementation – 88%).

3) *The Program “School Bus” approved by the January 16, 2003 Cabinet resolution No. 31 for 2003-2012*. In 2004, only 294 out of 492 buses for rural schools were purchased due to insufficient funding (the level of program implementation – 59.8%).

4) *The Comprehensive Program for Provision of Secondary, Vocational and Higher Institutions with Modern Facilities for Natural Sciences, Mathematics and Technology approved by the July 138, 2004 Cabinet resolution No. 905*. The Program was not funded till January 1, 2005.

- 5) *The Program for Computerization of Vocational Schools for 2004-2007 approved by the August 20, 2003 Cabinet resolution No. 1300. The Program was not funded till January 1, 2005.*
- 6) *The Program for Informatization and Computerization of Higher Institutions of the 1st-2nd Degrees of Accreditation for 2005-2008 approved by the September 8, 2004 Cabinet resolution No. 1182.*
- 7) *The Program "Teacher" approved by the March 28, 2002 Cabinet resolution No. 379. The Program was not funded.*
- 8) *The Program for Development of the Remote Education System for 2004-2006 approved by the September 28, 2003 Cabinet resolution No. 1494. The Program was not funded.*
- 9) *The Program for Development of Legal Education for the period till 2005 approved by the April 10, 2001 Cabinet resolution No. 344. The Program was not funded.*
- 10) *The Program for Development of Extra-Curricular Educational Establishments for 2002-2008 approved by the March 28, 2002 Cabinet resolution No. 378. The Program was not funded.*
- 11) *The Program for Development of Higher Education for 2005-2007 approved by the September 8, 2004 Cabinet resolution No. 1183. The Program was not funded.*
- 12) *The Program for Forecasting of Innovation and Technological Advance for 2004-2006 approved by the August 25, 2004 Cabinet resolution No. 1086. The Program funding is expected in 2005.*
- 13) *The Scientific and Technical Program "Resource" for 2005-2007 approved by the October 8, 2004 Cabinet resolution No. 1331. The Program funding is expected in 2005.*
- 14) *The Inter-Governmental Program "Creation of Internationally Competitive Welding Constructions, Resource-Saving Technologies, Materials and Equipment" for 1998-2004. Actual program expenditures equaled UAH 970,200 as of January 1, 2005 compared to the planned amount of UAH 2,400,000 (the level of program implementation – 40.4%).*
- 15) *The National Program "Critical Technologies" approved by the May 16, 1994 Cabinet resolution No. 310 has been implemented within 2002-2004. The planned funds were UAH 1,044,000, whereas actual program expenses amounted to UAH 1,200,000 (the level of program implementation – 87%) as of January 1, 2005.*
- 16) *Activities on Development of Scientific Research and Promotion of Production of Holographic Protection Elements approved by the June 7, 1999 Cabinet resolution No. 529-p and the November 16, 2002 Cabinet resolution No. 646 for 2000-2005. The planned funds totaled UAH 2,379,000, whereas the amount of actual expenses was UAH 1,119,200 as of January 1, 2005 (the level of program implementation – 47%).*
- 17) *The Program for Ukraine's Studies in the Antarctic for 2002-2010 approved by the September 13, 2001 Cabinet resolution No. 422-p. The Ministry spent UAH 514,900 of the planned program expenditures of UAH 600,000 as of January 1, 2005 (the level of program implementation – 85.8%).*
- 18) *The Inter-Agency Scientific and Technical Program "Nanophysics and Nanoelectronics" approved by the March 14, 2001 Cabinet resolution No. 85-p has been implemented within 2001-*

2005. The planned amount of the Program expenses totaled UAH 9,223,000, whereas the Ministry actually spent UAH 5,716,800 as of January 1, 2005 (the level of program implementation – 62%).

19) *The Program for Assistance to Talented Youth for 2001-2005 approved by the February 8, 2001 presidential decree No. 78.* Planned volume of funds totaled UAH 5,734,800, whereas actual spending equaled UAH 5,136,800 as of January 1, 2005 (the level of program implementation – 89.6%).

The Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Ukraine

The Ministry of Culture and Tourism is responsible for implementation of 8 public socio-humanitarian programs totaling UAH 168,300,000. The planned amount of funding was not provided for three programs, of which two were, however, financed.

The timeframe for implementation of four out of the eight programs expired in 2005.

Within the whole period, the government assigned UAH 148,700,000 for implementation of the seven programs. These funds were distributed unevenly – only 16 regions received funding. Kyiv had the largest share of program funds (81% or UAH 45 per capita). Furthermore, program actions were carried out in Sevastopol (5.1% of the total amount of funds), the Zaporizhzhya (2.6%), Lviv (2.2%), Kharkiv (2.1%), Cherkasy (1.9%), and Ivano-Frankivsk (1.7%) regions.

Information on Funding of the Public Programs Implemented by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism

1) *The Program for Preservation of Library Stocks and Archives for 2000-2005.* The planned amount of funds totaled UAH 3,257,700, whereas actual funding amounted to UAH 1,346,700 as of January 1, 2005 (the level of program implementation – 41.3%).

2) *The Program for Replenishment of Library Stocks for the period till 2005.* Actual program expenditures equaled UAH 9,564,900 as of January 1, 2005 compared to the planned amount of UAH 12,760,000 (the level of program implementation – 75%).

3) *The Program “Foreign Ukrainians” for the period till 2005.* 100% of the program objectives were accomplished as of January 1, 2005.

4) *The Public Program for Cultural Development for the period till 2007 approved by the August 6, 2003 Cabinet resolution No. 1235.* The planned funds were UAH 58,332,700, whereas actual expenses for the program implementation amounted to UAH 51,519,800 as of January 1, 2005 (the level of program implementation – 88%).

5) *The Comprehensive Program for Development of the Historical and Architectural Memorial “Residence of Bohdan Khmelnytsky” approved by the June 2, 2004 Cabinet resolution No. 721 shall be implemented within 2004-2010.* The planned amount of the program expenses totaled UAH 30,950,000, whereas the Ministry actually spent UAH 800,000 as of January 1, 2005 (the level of program implementation – 2.6%).

6) *The Program for Development of Museum Activities for the period till 2005 approved by the March 20, 2002 Cabinet resolution No. 442.* The actual amount of funds earmarked for the program activities equaled UAH 9,259,500 as of January 1, 2005.

7) *The National Program for Revitalization and Promotion of Ukrainian Cossacks for 2002-2005 approved by the November 15, 2003 presidential decree No. 1092.* Information about its funding is absent.

8) *The National Program for Preservation and Use of Cultural Heritage Monuments for 2004-2010 approved by the April 20, 2004 law of Ukraine No. 1692.* Information about the state of its funding is absent.

The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy of Ukraine

The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy is responsible for implementation of 6 public social programs. The timeframe for implementation of the programs fluctuates from 4 to 10 years. The first program was launched in 1997 and the last one will end in 2009.

The planned amount of funding of four programs is not indicated in the annual national budget. Hence, budget funds are earmarked for implementation of just three programs totaling UAH 43,600,000. Meanwhile, actual expenditures for the program implementation amounted to UAH 18,200,000 as of January 1, 2005.

Other public purpose programs are funded from local budgets.

Information on Funding of the Public Programs Implemented by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy

1) *The Program for Development and Improvement of Ukrainian Legislation on Labor and Professional Classification for 2004-2007.* The planned amount of the program expenses totaled UAH 2,138,500, whereas the Ministry actually spent UAH 455,250 as of January 1, 2005 (the level of program implementation – 21%).

2) *The Comprehensive Program on Implementation of the Anti-Poverty Strategy for 2002-2009* provides for developing and carrying out annual activities without approval of the amount of their expenditures.

3) *The Program “On Development of Domestic Production of the Rehabilitation Facilities of the Disabled for 1997-2007”.* Actual program expenses equaled UAH 17,781,800 as of January 1, 2005 compared to the planned amount of UAH 41,487,000 (the level of program implementation – 43%).

4) *The Public Program for Employment of the Population for 2001-2004.* Within 2001—2003, the government earmarked UAH 89,600,000 from the national budget for its implementation in the framework of the Program “State Provision of Social Services and Material Assistance to Unemployed and Uninsured Persons”. In 2004, funding from the national budget was suspended pursuant to Article 88 of the law of Ukraine “On the 2004 National Budget” governing, “Creation of new jobs, social and unemployment benefit payments shall be financed from the national and local budgets, the Compulsory Unemployment State Social Insurance Fund of Ukraine or by employers.”

5) *The National Program for Professional Rehabilitation and Employment of the Handicapped for 2001-2005.* The Program was not funded within 2001-2004.

6) *The Program for the Uninterrupted Access of the Disabled to Units of Public and State Property has been launched since 2003.* The program is funded from the national and local budgets (the planned amount of expenditures is not indicated). The program expenses totaled UAH 4,500,000. The program was not funded within 2003-2004.

The Ministry of Family, Youth and Sports of Ukraine

The Ministry is responsible for implementation of 14 public socio-humanitarian programs totaling UAH 406,200,000 (including the Youth Housing Program for 2002-2012 within 2002-2004). Actual program expenses amounted to UAH 365,200,000 as of January 1, 2005. Implementation of the programs was rather stable.

The Ministry of Family, Youth and Sports provided data only on 12 programs of UAH 360,700,000. The analysis proved that the Dnipropetrovsk region and Kyiv received the lion's shares of funds (23.1% and 11% respectively) followed by the Volyn (5.8%), Kyiv (4.1%), Donetsk (4%), and Kharkiv (3.9%) regions.

The Autonomous Republic of Crimea (1.9%), the Transcarpathian (1.9%), Chernivtsi (1.9%), Terнопil (1.9%), Zaporizhzhya (1.8%), Khmelnytsky (1.8%), Zhytomyr (1.7%), and Kirovohrad (1.7%) regions and Sevastopol (1.3%) had the smallest funding.

Per capita funding of the 12 public socio-humanitarian programs in the regions averaged UAH 7.6 as of January 1, 2005. This indicator was the lowest in the Odesa (UAH 3.1), Donetsk (UAH 3.1) and Zaporizhzhya (UAH 3.5) regions and the highest in the Dnipropetrovsk (UAH 24), Volyn (UAH 20.2) and Kherson (UAH 10) regions as well as in Kyiv (UAH 14.9) and Sevastopol (UAH 12.7).

Meanwhile, some programs, such as the Public Program for Youth Entrepreneurship Assistance for 2002-2005, are not funded through project-specific appropriations in the budget.

Information on Funding of the Public Programs Implemented by the Ministry of Family, Youth and Sports

1) *The Program Promoting Social Integration and Adaptation of Crimean Tatar Youth for 2002-2005.* Actual program expenditures equaled UAH 66,600 as of January 1, 2005 compared to the planned amount of UAH 96,000 (the level of program implementation – 69%).

2) *The 2001-2005 Government Action Plan for Promoting the Women's Status and Gender Equality in Society.* The planned funds were UAH 1,225,000, whereas actual expenses for the program implementation amounted to UAH 649,840 as of January 1, 2005 (the level of program implementation – 53%).

3) *The Program "Ukrainian Family" for 2002-2005.* The planned expenditures totaled UAH 2,913,460, whereas the Ministry actually spent UAH 2,478,730 as of January 1, 2005 (the level of program implementation – 85%).

4) *The Public Program on Prevention of Child Neglect and Homelessness for 2003-2005.* The planned expenditures totaled UAH 88,541. 100% of the program objectives were accomplished as of January 1, 2005.

5) *The Public Program for Children's Recreation and Sport for 2003-2008.* The planned expenditures totaled UAH 15,433,901. 100% of the program objectives were accomplished as of January 1, 2005.

6) *The Inter-Agency Program "The Health of the Nation for 2002-2011".* The planned expenditures totaled UAH 7,849,000. 100% of the program objectives were accomplished as of January 1, 2005.

7) *The Public Program for Youth Entrepreneurship Assistance for 2002-2005* does not provide for funding.

8) *The Comprehensive Program on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings for 2002-2005*. The planned amount totaled UAH 650,000, whereas the actual expenditures amounted to UAH 376,850 as of January 1, 2005 (the level of program implementation – 58%).

9) *The National Program for Youth Assistance for 2004-2008*. The planned amount totaled UAH 9,732,772, whereas the actual expenditures amounted to UAH 297,772 as of January 1, 2005 (just 3% of the Program objectives were accomplished).

10) *The Public Program for Youth Housing for 2002-2012*. The program is financed from the national and local budgets. Within 2002-2004, the planned amount (including all sources of funding) totaled UAH 354,425,500. As of January 1, 2005, actual expenses made up UAH 303,641,900 (the level of program implementation – 85.7%), including UAH 254,100 financed from the national budget (91.5% of the 2002-2004 planned program objectives were actually met).

11) *The Program on Public Policy in Combating Illegal Circulation of Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors for 2003-2010*. The planned funds totaled UAH 3,186,643, whereas the amount of actual expenses was UAH 82,643 as of January 1, 2005 (the level of program implementation – 2.6%).

12) *The Program for Improvement of Training of Athletes for the Olympic and Para-Olympic Games for 2002-2006*. The planned funds were UAH 5,100, whereas actual expenses for the program amounted to UAH 3,090.8 of January 1, 2005 (the level of program implementation – 60.6%).

13) *The Program “Coach” for 2003-2008* was funded in the framework of the Program “Physical Culture – the Health of the Nation”.

14) *The Football Assistance Program for 2004-2008*. The amount of expenditures totals UAH 1,607,400. The program funding is expected in 2005.

The State Committee for Nationalities and Migration of Ukraine*

*Analysis of implementation of public programs by the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration is given in the 2005 Report.

Information on Funding of the Public Programs Implemented by the Committee

1) *The Program for Settlement and Accommodation of Crimean Tatars and Other Repatriates for 2001-2005 approved by the May 16, 2002 Cabinet resolution No. 618*. The Program was financed from the budgets of Ukraine and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The planned funding included UAH 197,400,000 from the national budget and UAH 69,900,000 from the Crimean budget. Within 2002-2004, the amount of actual spending from the national budget was UAH 114,900,000 (or 58% of the planned indicator), while that from the budget of the Autonomous Republic of equaled UAH 37,830,000 (or 54% of the planned indicator).

2) *The Program for Adaptation and Social Integration of Deported Crimean Tatars and Other Ethnicities, Revitalization of Their Culture and Education approved by the January 10, 2002 Cabinet resolution No. 29*. The Program is funded by branch Ministries and Committees through specific appropriations in the national budget.

Regional Features of Implementation of Public Ethnic Policy

In addition to public purpose programs, the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regional, the Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations elaborate regional socio-humanitarian programs and carry them out through respective structures: departments for education, youth and sports affairs, culture, labor and social policy.

These regional projects either supplement public purpose programs or are developed to meet specific challenges.

As a rule, they are approved by the Crimean parliament, regional, the Kyiv and Sevastopol City Councils.

Regional state administrations furnished incomplete data on the Ministries requested. Hence, it is impossible to analyze the information received. Some socio-humanitarian policy activities in the regions are presented below.

The Odesa Region

The Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Family, Youth and Sports implemented 11 public socio-humanitarian programs in the Odesa region.

Specifically, **the Ministry of Education and Science** funded computerization of schools and the “School Bus” programs. Within 2000-2004, the amount of program expenditures totaled USD 4,900,000.

Moreover, local budget appropriations of the Odesa Regional State Administration for the regional programs “School Bus” and computerization of regional schools in 2001-2006 amounted to UAH 60,000 and UAH 257,000 respectively.

The Odesa Regional State Administration was also responsible for implementation of the following programs **in the field of education**:

- The regional Program for Development of Extra-Curricular Educational Establishments for 2002-2008 (implementation expenditures amounted to UAH 50,000 in 2004);
- The regional Program for Assistance to Talented Youth for 2001-2005 (implementation expenditures equaled UAH 140,000);
- The National Program for Legal Education of the Population (implementation expenditures made up UAH 10,000).

Activities of **the Ministry of Culture** in the Odesa region were geared toward preservation of library stocks and archives; informatization of libraries; revitalization and promotion of Ukrainian Cossacks; replenishment of library stocks; development of Ukrainian film industry; assistance to associations of Ukrainian artists; and development of documents on historical and cultural monuments (total – 8 public purpose programs). Within 2002-2004, the Ministry of Culture received UAH 7,700,000 for program implementation.

The Odesa Regional State Administration carried out the following programs **in the field of culture**:

- The regional Program for Preservation of Historical Buildings Located in the Downtown of Odesa (implementation expenditures made up UAH 7,300,000);

- The regional Program for Restoration and Use of the Akerman Fortress in Bilhorod-Dniestrovsky (implementation expenditures totaled UAH 108,000);
- The regional Program for Development of Local Lore for 2003-2010 (implementation expenditures amounted to UAH 1,000).

The Ministry of Family, Youth and Sports implemented the Public Program “Physical Culture – the Health of the Nation” totaling UAH 2,800,000 within 1999-2004.

The Odesa Regional State Administration also carried out the Programs “Children of the Odesa Region” and “Children of Ukraine”.

The Donetsk Region

In the Donetsk region, the above Ministries carried out 29 public socio-humanitarian programs, including:

- The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy – 17 public programs;
- The Ministry of Education and Science – 4 public programs;
- The Ministry of Culture – 4 public programs;
- The Ministry of Family, Youth and Sports – 4 public programs;
- The State Committee for Nationalities and Migration– 4 public programs.

The government earmarked UAH 192,900,000 from the national budget for their implementation.

Within 1998-2004, **the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy** received funds from the national budget in the amount of UAH 143,400,000. Funds of local budgets were not attracted. According to the Donetsk Regional State Administration, public activities on social security of the population were financed from the national budget. These actions were aimed at enhancing living standards of the most vulnerable social groups. In 2004, labor and social policy agencies were delegated powers of social security of citizens, who suffered the most from the Chernobyl Catastrophe and its consequences, which resulted in the increase of budget program expenditures to UAH 53,700,000.

Within 2000-2004, 4 public programs were funded through **the Ministry of Education and Science** in the amount of UAH 38,800,000. Implementation of the programs allowed resolving the problem of schoolbooks (in 2000-2004, the Ministry of Education and Science spent UAH 29,669,200 for schoolbooks), personal computers for rural secondary schools (in 2003-2004, expenses for purchase of 134 PCs were UAH 5,136,600) and transportation of schoolchildren in rural areas (in 2004, expenditures for 14 buses for rural schools amounted to UAH 1,776,000).

Within 2003-2004, the government spent UAH 791,300 for programs implemented through **the Ministry of Culture**.

Development of culture was impeded by the lack of funding (cultural activities were financed mostly from the local budget and only in 2003-2004, funds from the national budget were assigned).

Unsatisfactory conditions and outdated material and technical basis of cultural institutions, insufficient replenishment of public library stocks and the lack of funds for preservation and protection of cultural heritage presented the key issues to be settled through specific appropriations in the national budget.

Over 1999-2004, **the Ministry of Family, Youth and Sports** received UAH 9,900,000 for socio-humanitarian programs and projects. These funds were spent for activities on children, women and

youth; projects and actions of social service centers for family, children and youth; development of the material and technical basis to achieve the goals of enhanced participation, excellence, capacity and interaction in sport; extra-curricular education; children's recreation and sports.

The State Committee for Nationalities and Migration implemented the following programs:

- The Public Program "Ukrainian Diaspora" for the period till 2000 (within the whole period, its implementation was financed from neither the national nor the local budget);
- The Public Program for Social and Spiritual Revival of Roma for the period till 2006 (only in 2004, the local authorities allocated UAH 2,300 for Program implementation);
- The Public Program "Foreign Ukrainians" for the period till 2005 (in 2000, 2003 and 2004, funds for its implementation were earmarked exclusively from the local budget totaling UAH 52,500);
- Comprehensive activities on development of cultures of Ukrainian minorities for the period till 2001 (were not funded at all).

Hence, the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration received no budget funds for implementation of the above public programs.

The Transcarpathian Region

The Transcarpathian Regional State Administration gave data on regional socio-humanitarian programs.

In addition to public purpose programs **in the field of education and science**, the following programs are developed and being implemented in the region:

- The Program "Teacher" providing for payment of the scholarship of the Chairman of the Regional State Administration to the best students of higher institutions of the 1st-4th degree of accreditation;
- The Public Program for Development of Extra-Curricular Educational Establishments for 2002-2008;
- The Program "School Bus";
- The Program for Development of Education in the Transcarpathia for 2003-2012 (Section "Informatization of the Teaching and Educational Process").

The Transcarpathian Regional State Administration allocated UAH 4,700,000 from the local budget for implementation of the above programs in 2002-2004.

13 regional programs in the area of development of youth and sports were elaborated and approved. The programs provided for recreation and sports of children and youth; promotion of the women's status and gender equality in society; combating trafficking in human beings; assistance to talented youth; development of physical culture and sports; development of football; patriotic upbringing of youth; development of spirituality and moral principles of the society etc.

The Transcarpathian Regional State Administration earmarked UAH 1,700,000 from the local budget for implementation of these 13 programs.

In the field of social policy, the Main Department for Labor and Social Protection of the Transcarpathian Regional State Administration carried out the National Program for Professional Rehabilitation and Employment of the Handicapped for 2001-2005. The amount of the program expenses totaled UAH 80,000 as of January 1, 2005.

In the area of culture, the Transcarpathian Regional State Administration implemented the Program for Cultural Development for 2003-2004; the Program for Maintenance and Promotion of Non-

Material Cultural Heritage of the Region for 2003-2004; and the Program for Replenishment of Library Stocks of the Region for the period till 2005 totaling UAH 1,300,000.

The Lviv Region

The Lviv Regional State Administration gave information on public socio-humanitarian programs carried out by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, the Ministry of Family, Youth and Sports and the Ministry of Health Protection (the latter is not considered in this report).

Trough socio-humanitarian programs, **the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy** annually provides social security for about 60,000 families (including family allowances, aids to families of dependent children, maternity benefits, children's allowances and unwed/single mother), nearly 70,000 impoverished families and 2,000 handicapped from birth and their children.

Programs implemented by **the Ministry of Family, Youth and Sports** are designed for rendering assistance to low income families, inclusive of aid in resolving family and household conflicts; psychological assistance; child care; housing and employment services; legal consultations on protection of children's property rights and preparation of documents for public social, material and financial support.

Special organizations, the "Crisis Centers for Social and Psychological Assistance", provided services to families, youth and children.

Experts of the "Mobile Consulting Center" Special Service visited regional secondary schools, vocational colleges and boarding schools to hold individual psychological, pedagogical, legal and information consultations on education, employment, reproductive health and other issues to families, youth and children.

The 24-hour Help Line provided consultations to individuals in need of psychological assistance.

In the framework of the Comprehensive Program "Crime Prevention Measures for 2001-2005", experts of the Lviv Regional Center of Social Services held group training seminars and testing for inmates of the Lviv orphanage for teens. The Center has 10 special divisions, the "Social Protection of Young Detainees and Former Prisoners", which supervise the said categories of persons, hold training seminars and consultations.

The Chervonohrad- and Truskavets-based departments of the "Dovira" Consulting Center for Intravenous Drug Abusers carried out the Needle and Syringe Exchange Program.

The Lviv Youth Labor Center organized and held regional rounds of the All-Ukrainian Business Plan Contest among local youth, including a series of training seminars and consultations for young entrepreneurs. Problems of youth entrepreneurship were highlighted in the media and through distribution of information leaflets and brochures.

The Lviv Regional State Administration partially financed bank loan contracts on youth housing and purchase of personal computers for youth social centers.

Local authorities provided recreation services for families with many children, orphaned children, children devoid of parental care, handicapped children, children of servicemen and employees of departments of the Ministry of Interior, who perished on duty etc.

A number of important public actions were held, including folk art festivals for talented children; international and regional scientific and practical conferences; seminars on issues of youth policy, sharing of experience between Ukrainian and foreign youths.

Conclusions

The analysis of the state of funding and implementation of public socio-humanitarian programs evidenced the following:

One of the major failings is the absence or improper funding of public and regional socio-humanitarian programs, which often results in decreased effectiveness of their implementation.

There are a number of programs, whose implementation has never started even in several years after their approval due to the lack of financial resources.

There is the dire need to monitor all programs of all the Ministries, national and local executive authorities in order to determine their efficiency and expediency.

Public policy activities shall necessarily be funded from the national budget because they directly reflect national priorities.

The analysis indicates that funds for implementation of public socio-humanitarian programs at the regional level are distributed unevenly and without regard to necessary criteria, while the mechanism for distribution of funds is non-transparent.

This results in violations of the provision of the Constitution of Ukraine on equal access of citizens to services. Meanwhile, funds are distributed according to the principle of prioritizing the same regions. To be more precise, distribution of funds is not always based on the number of service consumers – youth, schoolchildren, students, disabled etc.

Monitoring of funds assigned by the Ministries, other national and local executive authorities for socio-humanitarian policy activities is absent at the national level at all.

Data of national and regional authorities on receipt of funds for implementation of socio-humanitarian programs in the regions essentially differ. This proves the lack of awareness of local authorities of public programs implemented in the region, which leads to their less effectiveness and scattered funds (local authorities could participate in co-funding).

Awareness of local authorities and their participation in implementation of public socio-humanitarian policy shall enhance its effectiveness. It is recommended to involve local authorities in co-funding.

It is necessary to set up and apply a mechanism for concerted actions of national and local authorities on implementation of public socio-humanitarian policy in the regions.

“Economy of Provinces”¹: Challenges of Regional Development

By MARKIYAN DATSYSHYN,
Director, Non-Governmental Analytical Center “Institute of Reforms”

When the state consists of communities – whether rural or urban..., - the primary objective of the government..., - is to govern effectively, establish and protect rights of ethnic communities – the smallest but the most important entities. If communities are poorly governed, impoverished and uneducated, the whole system of public governance will fall into pieces sooner or later.

Ivan Franko

Today, Ukrainian authorities at a variety of levels address the need to foster territorial development. The government often overstates its role in regional development believing its impact crucial in all aspects of the social and economic life. Though, international experience proves that public assistance (subsidies and privileges) is not sufficient for development of regional potential. Ability of regional/local communities to mobilize their own resources (human, financial, economic and others) is much more important. Examples of the villages Hrytsiv, the Khmelnytsky region; the Makariv district of the Kyiv region; and Baraboi, the Odesa region, evidence that goal-seeking activities proved to be more effective than all public programs over the last 15 years.

Unfortunately, there are just a few examples of successive regional development in our country. Many local officials do not support community initiatives because of the lack of budget funds. As a rule, members of local communities do not participate in the decision-making process. Thus, all they have to do is to hope for lavish subsidies and favorable weather.

On the other hand, experience of “advanced” communities confirms that the problem of money is not critical. As a rule, it is the absence of ideas or a team of like-minded persons for their realization that poses the major problem. There are a lot of ways of attracting capital in order to implement even the most absurd and fantastic ideas. It is necessary only to clearly map out a plan and apply efficient mechanisms. Correct identification of the territory’s position and competitive advantages serves as a key precondition for ultimate success because some regions are constantly competing with their neighbors for budget funds, investment and human resources.

Apparently, a correct “diagnosis” is imperative for effectiveness of state stimulation of territorial and, especially, peripheral development. That is why I paid special attention to assessment of contemporary state of regional development.

Problem Statement

The motto “Strong regions – strong state” was the focal point of many government action plans and pre-election programs of both opposition and pro-power parties. However, for the time being, it has been manifested only in competition between several regional elites for monopoly on the national market. Over the last 15 years, financial and industrial groups of Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Lviv and Kyiv have been advocating their own “regional policies”. Finally, youth migration to the capital made the Ukrainian regions “lifeless”, having intensified the effect of revenue outflow with outflow of manpower.

¹ Province (Latin provincia) - a geographically defined area outside Italy administered by a governor from Rome.

Needless to say, such regional policy neither strengthened the state nor encouraged national consolidation, especially because the government's "concern" was limited to programs and projects like developing infrastructure of the President's native village. Hence, regional policy was based on the principle "God helps those, who helps themselves" combined with lobbyist opportunities of local officials.

Territorial Development in "Ukrainian Way"

It should be mentioned that some areas and territories have become a matter of special concern of the government. Special investment treatment was introduced in 11 free economic zones (FEZ) and territories of priority development (TPD) of 9 Ukrainian regions. Attraction of private investments was necessary to settle problems of coal regions (the Volyn, Donetsk and Luhansk regions), cities with the large share of MIC enterprises (Kharkiv and Shostka) and regions affected by man-caused and ecological disasters (the Transcarpathian, Zhytomyr and Chernihiv regions).

Despite duration of this experiment (most FEZ and TPD were created in 1998-1999), assessments of its outcomes are controversial. Some experts accentuate destructive influence of FEZ and TPD on competitive environment (privileges to some enterprises within the same industry), budget losses (the amount of tax privileges often exceeded that of tax revenues) and abuses (import of commodities on preferential terms). Meanwhile, supporters of FEZ and TPD list such positive aspects as successful investment projects and solution of local problems (crisis of local enterprises, unemployment, increase of local budget proceeds etc.)

Local authorities gave strong support for special treatment but they did not risk because the lion's share of privileges and preferences of FEZ and TPD resulted in reduction of revenues of the national budget. It is the burden on the national budget and no profit from tax credits that made the Verkhovna Rada to abolish financial preferences for all FEZ and TPD in March 2005.

Without going into details about effectiveness of such step, I would like to mention that the greatest project in the field of Ukraine's regional policy failed. Some companies that performed their investment FEZ and TPD obligations in good faith, still hope to restore justice and the previous status quo. However, most subjects of special treatment do not demand the government to reimburse their losses.

Most probably, both national authorities and investors will pretend they turned the page of economic history. As a result, underdeveloped territories, which had expected to attract foreign investments by means of fiscal privileges, ended up losing.

The September 2005 law "On Stimulation of Regional Economy" provides for the application of a system approach to state stimulation of regional economic development due to a new form of relations between the center and the regions (on the basis of the so-called agreements on regional development).

Furthermore, the law gives definition for the depressed territories – peripheral, backward and underdeveloped regions. Under the law, the depressed territories are divided into three categories: industrial regions (the share of industrial employment is higher than that of agricultural employment), agricultural regions (the share of agricultural employment exceeds that of industrial) and towns of regional subordination. Depression criteria are set for each group. The Cabinet of Ministers shall annually determine the depressed territories on the basis of monitoring results (for the period of up to 7 years).

The law declares the state's readiness to invest in development of industrial, communication and social infrastructure of these territories and regions, support small businesses etc. Depressed regions obviously require application of radical social and economic measures. However, with regard to limited budget resources, the government could hardly cope with this task. Hence, it is expedient to differentiate between directions and importance of public support and the role of local authorities in this process. The above is especially true in view of large regional discrepancies: in Kyiv, the regional GDP per capita is six times higher than that of the most successive regions, volume of attracted investments is higher more than 50 times, the average level of salaries and wages – 8-10 times.

European Experience

In developed economies, two trends have been observed recently: towards growing political influence of the regions and towards growing number of regional economic initiatives. The EU model of regional development is based on strategic partnership between the government, regional authorities, business and public organizations. Importance of a regional component for the EU enlargement is accentuated by a popular motto “Europe of Regions”.

EU regional policy addresses underdeveloped and structurally underdeveloped regions. Each of these groups requires an individual approach to key challenges. Principles of EU regional policy provide for a program approach to funding of problem regions: funds are assigned for special programs (target points influencing development of the whole region). So, not only in Ukraine allocation of funds according to the “development-improvement-enhancement” principle had no specific effect.

Underdeveloped regions are characterized by quantitative (per capita GDP) and qualitative (impact of problems) indicators (see Table 1). Quantitative indicators are used to characterize structurally underdeveloped regions – crisis industrial and rural territories (high unemployment level, high share of employment in agriculture and fish industry). Moreover, problem regions are identified on a basis of comparative analysis of EU average figures: the unemployment level shall be higher than the average (over 110%), while the share of agricultural employment shall be at least twice higher compared to the average.

Table 1. European and Ukrainian Experience of State Stimulation of Territorial Development

	<i>Ukraine</i>	<i>European Union</i>	<i>Russian Federation</i> (Draft No. 91010-3)
Object	Depressed region	Problem region	Depressed region
General criteria	Gross added value per capita	GDP per capita, unemployment level	Decline of production in major industries
Classification of territories and assessment criteria	<p><u>Regions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gross added value per capita within the last 5 years <p><u>Industrial regions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unemployment level, - Share of industrial employment, - Industrial output per capita within the last 	<p><u>Underdeveloped regions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - GDP per capita (less than 75% of the average), - Density of population (less than 8 persons per m²), - Regions with specific problems <p><u>Structurally underde-</u></p>	<p><u>Subject of RF:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Number of population (not more than 500,000 persons), - Multiple decline (3 and more times) of production in major industries (share of personnel is not less than 15% of the total number of employed or share in gross regional product is not less than 20%), - Share of earmarked budget

	<p>3 years</p> <p><u>Agricultural regions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Density of rural population, - Natural growth of population, - Share of rural employment within the last 3 years <p><u>Towns of regional subordination:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unemployment level (long-term), - Average wages and salaries within the last 3 years 	<p><u>veloped regions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unemployment level, - Share of industrial employment, - Dynamics of industrial development <p><u>Agricultural regions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Density of population (less than 100 persons per m²), - Share of agricultural employment, - Unemployment level <p><u>Urbanized regions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unemployment level (twice higher than the average), - Impoverishment level, - Ecological factors, - Crime level, - Education standards <p><u>Fish industry areas:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Share of employment 	<p>funds in the consolidated federal expenditures shall be not less than 50% within the last three years</p> <p><u>Territory of Subject of RF:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Within the limits of one municipal unit or several neighboring units, - Homogeneity of economic structure in each municipal unit, - Multiple decline (3 and more times) of production in major industry of the said territory over the last 12 years, - Worse indicators of unemployment level and correlation of income and subsistence minimum (compared to the average)
Methods of stimulation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Agreement on regional development - Assistance program for the depressed regions 	Regional Development Plan providing for an implementation strategy and evaluation of national and regions contributions	Federal program for assistance to depressed territories
Forms of stimulation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Public capital investments in infrastructure development - Assistance, including financial, to small enterprises - Allocation of international aid for meeting socio-economic and ecological challenges - Employment, re-training and advanced training programs 	Program approach to funding of problem regions: funds are assigned for special programs (target points) influencing development of the whole region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Revocable and irrevocable funding - Granting of preferences and privileges to enterprises carrying on business activity in the depressed regions, assistance in restructuring and personnel retraining - Legal, organizational, financial and other assistance to federal executive authorities and local self-government bodies
Advisory boards	Ministry of Economy	EU Structural Funds	Authorized federal executive agencies, Association of Economic Cooperation between Federal Subjects of the Russian Federation

Economic Dimension of Regional Development

Principles of Ukraine's regional policy were de jure established by the 2001 presidential decree "On the Concept of Public Regional Policy". However, practical activities on promoting development of some territories have been carrying on right after the declaration of Ukraine's independence. Stable association of Ukrainian financial and industrial groups with certain regions (the Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk and Kharkiv regions) demonstrates the importance of geographical concentration of resources on the one hand and essential differences in conditions for territorial development on the other.

Kyiv ranks the first by GDP per capita volume, as the integral index of the economic productivity of the region, followed by regions with the great share of the processing industry in the economy (over 25%): the Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya and Poltava regions. Hence, the largest regional economies of Ukraine are industrial in nature.

The share of the infrastructure industries is the highest in the gross added value (GAV) of the boundary regions: the Odessa (30%) and Lviv (18%) regions. The share of real estate transactions and rent services is large in the economy of Kyiv (16.6% of the GAV), Sevastopol (14.3%) and the Kharkiv region (10%).

Within the past 5 years, rates of regional erosion of the Ukrainian economy have been growing. This is evidenced by dynamics of the regional GDP per capita: in 1996, its maximum value (Kyiv – UAH 1,900) was 2.7 higher than the minimum (the Transcarpathian region – UAH 700), whereas in 2003, the difference increased to nearly 6 times (the Ternopil region – UAH 2,300 and Kyiv – UAH 13,400).

The share of the GAV generated in the wholesale and retail trade can be viewed as indirect characteristic of the regional market capacity. Disregarding the large share of trade in the economies of Kyiv (26%) and Sevastopol (24%), in the regions ranking the last by per capita GAV (the Transcarpathian – 13%, the Chernivtsi – 16% and the Volyn regions – 20%), the share of the wholesale and retail trade is relatively higher compared to the more developed regions.

Another interesting regularity is observed in agricultural specialization of the regions: those with the major share of agriculture in the GAV structure are, as a rule, economically backward. With the average share of agriculture of 14%, the majority of the regions (by 2% each in the national GAV) generate 25-20% of the regional GAV.

The Ukrainian regions noticeably differ in the volume of investments in capital asset. In 1990, the share of Kyiv and the Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya, Kyiv, Luhansk, Odesa and Kharkiv regions was 52% of the overall volume of attracted investments, whereas in 2004, it grew to 60%. Regional distribution of investments is also heterogeneous: over 30% are placed in Kyiv and almost 40% - in the seven regions.

Dependence of local budgets upon inter-budgetary transfers complicates the situation: the share of transfers from the national budget grew from 15% in 1998 to 42% in 2004. In some regions, revenues from local taxes and duties generate just 5-7% of local budgets and less than 1% of village budgets. The share of transfers from the national budget is over 60%.

Difference in local budget revenues and expenditures per capita (together with transfers) is striking as well. Within 9 months of 2005, this indicator was the highest in Kyiv (UAH 1,634.5/UAH 1,677.2) and

the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (UAH 809.9/UAH 754.9) and the lowest in the Luhansk region (UAH 616.6/UAH 546.4).

Depression or Backwardness?

I would like to detail the term “depressed territory” – the most important aspect of the law “On Stimulation of Regional Economy”. In economics, a depression is the term commonly used for a sustained downturn in the economy. Like a recession, the start of a depression is characterized by increases in unemployment, restriction of credit, reduced output and investment, price deflation, numerous bankruptcies, and reduced amounts of trade and commerce. Following this logic, the territory is deemed depressed, if it was previously characterized (say, under the USSR) by certain economic development (mostly due to material production) partially lost as a result of the transformation processes or change in the market situation. Meanwhile, the previous production infrastructure and manpower resources were retained.

If production units are not placed on a given territory due to historical reasons, the territory shall be referred to as “underdeveloped”, “backward” or “problem”. Consequently, measures applied by the government on such territories shall be different (social security, subsidies etc.) from those taken in regions with declined major branches of the regional/local economy (budget investments, stimulation of small enterprises for reduction of the unemployment level etc.).

Needless to say, transition of the territories from “depression” to “recession” is marked with the increase of production and investments, which can be traced by dynamics of the relevant indicators. Hence, to diagnose the region as “depressed”, it is necessary to analyze its static (absolute value) and dynamic (indices) figures.

This approach can be best explained by the example of applying the above depression criterion to the regions and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Candidates to the “depressed” status are the regions, which had the lowest average indicators of per capita GAV (GAV is the equivalent to the regional GDP) within the past 5 years. It should be mentioned that the State Committee for Statistics calculates this figure with a considerable (one-and-a-half-year) delay. So, let’s study dynamics of the indicator in financial terms within 1997-2001.

The Chernivtsi (UAH 1,304), Transcarpathian (UAH 1,356) and Ternopil (UAH 1,394) regions and Sevastopol (UAH 1,582) were the outsiders. The average per capita GAV of Sevastopol of UAH 1,582 is mostly determined by its low values in 1997-1999, since in 2001, the indicator reached the level of UAH 3,154 (the city ranked the 10th in Ukraine). None of these three regions ranked higher than the 24th. Therefore, **the Chernivtsi, Transcarpathian and Ternopil** regions² can be classed as depressed territories on the basis of the above specific criteria. However, these regions are characterized by the lowest level of urbanization (the share of rural population equals 70-80%, disregarding the population of regional centers).


A comparative analysis of static (average rates of growth – physical volume index – of per capita GAV for the period of 1999-2003) and dynamic figures (average per capita GAV volume for the period of 1999-2003) considerably clarifies the situation (see Figure 1). Origin of the X and Y coordinates is represented by the average value of analyzed indicators³. Hence, all Ukrainian regions can be grouped into the four categories:

² It is necessary to add that these three regions are inhabited by 7% of the Ukrainian population (13% of the total rural population of the country).

³ Average indicators within 1999-2003: per capita GAV – UAH 3,222, rate of growth of per capita GAV - 107%.

- “*Dynamic heavyweights*”: regions, which have higher than the average GAV indicators and demonstrate high rate of growth (Kyiv, the Zaporizhzhya, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk and Kharkiv regions)
- “*Slow heavyweights*”: regions, which have higher than the average GAV indicators but demonstrate low rate of growth (the Odesa, Kyiv and Poltava regions)
- “*Dynamic lightweights*”: regions, which have lower than the average GAV indicators and demonstrate low rate of growth (the Luhansk, Volyn, Kirovohrad, Transcarpathian and Mykolaiv regions and Sevastopol)
- “*Lightweight outsiders*”: the rest 13 regions remarkable neither for growth rates nor for per capita GAV volume are candidates for the status of the “depressed regions”.

Рис.1 Темп зростання регіональної валової доданої вартості (ВДВ) на одного жителя (вісь Х) та ВДВ на одного жителя (вісь Y) по регіонах України без м. Києва (середнє значення за 1997--2001рр.)



The analysis results indicate that identification of the “depressed territory” only on the basis of the value of the per capita GAV does not reflect the real state of affairs. Dynamics of regional development can give a more complete picture. Hence, it would be expedient to recognize the Chernivtsi, Transcarpathian and Ternopil regions as the “backward regions”. Major candidates for the status of the “depressed territories”, on the basis of the 1997-2001 analysis results, are the Chernivtsi, Transcarpathian, Rivne and Kherson regions and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

Of special note is the very nature of the per capita GAV indicator, which does not sufficiently consider the share of human services in the GAV. An emphasis shall also be made on regional differences in the so-called informal and shadow employment caused by proximity of the Transcarpathian and Chernivtsi regions to the West Ukrainian border. Within 1999-2002, these regions were outsiders by the share of the official GAV, whereas they ranked among the first ten Ukrainian regions by per capita retail turnover.


Hence, the results of the economic activity within 1997-2001 demonstrate that the Rivne, Zhytomyr and Kherson regions and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea shall be referred to the depressed territories, while the Chernivtsi, Transcarpathian and Ternopil regions – to the backward territories.

Vox Populi

Effectiveness of public policy actions is mostly determined by a correct “diagnosis” of regional problems and effectiveness of the remedies applied. As official statistics does not reflect the real state of affairs at the local level, the Institute for Reform⁴ conducted a poll on the basic aspects of the issue of territorial development (*see Diagram 1*).

According to the majority of respondents, key factors of economic depression are ineffective activities of regional authorities and features of its historical development (decline of major industries, population crisis etc.). National authorities agreed to correct this drawback through drafting new laws and developing new strategies. As for the second failing, it is the regions that have to find ways of revitalizing priority industries, determining regional specialization and competitive advantages.

Diagram 1. Factors of Economic Depression of Territories/Regions



The poll conducted among representatives of different sectors of the society (state officials, entrepreneurs, members of public organizations and the media) indicated different and sometimes even antipodal opinions. Specifically, members of governmental agencies regard large distance from main cities and communications and high share of agriculture in the of national economy as the major factor of regional depression, whereas the general public and business emphasize ineffective activities of regional/local authorities.


As a matter of fact, structurally underdeveloped regions will receive the government’s assistance only if they create favorable climate for development (elaboration of development strategies and programs are necessary preconditions). Development programs and strategies encourage better understanding of the role and potentials of the regions and help to correctly identify priorities of its development, competitive advantages and readiness for cooperation. According to polling results, the majority of local authorities (28%) – the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Luhansk, Poltava, Zhytomyr,

⁴ In 2004, 553 representatives of regional/local authorities of 16 regions and 57 commercial directors of the majority of regions were polled.

Vinnitsya and Khmelnytsky regions – mentioned geographical location of their regions as the major advantage. Another advantage was cheap manpower (20%). However, the respondents could not answer the question “How much are labor costs in your region compared to the neighboring ones?”

9% of the respondents listed support of local authorities and 2% – the low level of corruption. Hence, they focused attention on factors independent of regional/local authorities, having justified low economic indicators not by their inactivity but unsound and inconsistent public policy.

Answers to the question “What are the major rivals of your region in competition for investments” serve as another evidence of the above thesis. Over 30% of the respondents mentioned Kyiv as the territory with specific competitive advantages. Other key competitors included the industrial regions – the Donetsk (15%), Dnipropetrovsk (16%) and Lviv (15%) regions. Such selection of competitors of the agricultural regions (the Poltava, Khmelnytsky, Vinnitsya, Zhytomyr and Chernihiv) can be viewed rather as justification of failures than the desire to win. In fact, a first league football team can easily explain the loss to “Shakhtar” or “Dynamo” to its fans and many Ukrainian boxers dream to be knocked out by one of the Klitschkos...



Conclusions

Effectiveness of public regional policy will mostly depend upon the ability of the government to find the “golden mean” between support to the “strong” and assistance to the “underdeveloped” territories. At the same time, a new philosophy of territorial development shall be based on a synergic effect of cooperation between power, business and the general public. Unfortunately, legal mechanisms promoting this cooperation are absent. It is enthusiasm and competence of local authorities and insistence of public activists that shall determine success in each individual case.

Hence, it is safe to state that there is a certain evolution of approaches to public regional policy: from granting taxation privileges to investment of budget funds in regional development programs. Will the new policy be more effective? We shall wait and see what happens.

Analysis of Powers of National Executive Authorities Responsible for Development and Implementation of Public Socio-Humanitarian Policy of Ukraine

This study is targeted towards analysis of powers of national executive authorities in the area of development of public socio-humanitarian policy promoting national cohesion and mechanisms for its implementation in compliance with legislation in force. Therefore, the article shall present analysis of powers of the President of Ukraine, the Secretariat of the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Ministries and other national executive authorities.

The analysis will help to assess the current situation in this field and outline guidelines for public socio-humanitarian policy promoting national cohesion and unity.

The President of Ukraine

Though formally the President of Ukraine does not represent national executive authorities but as *the Head of the State he can strongly influence development and implementation of Ukraine's public policy in all areas*. Under Article 102 of the Constitution of Ukraine, "The President is the Guarantor of state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, the observance of the Constitution of Ukraine and human and civil rights and freedoms." Presidential powers with regard to regional policy are enshrined in Article 106 of the Basic Law reading, "The President of Ukraine appoints, on the submission of the Prime Minister of Ukraine, members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, chief officers of other central bodies of executive power, and also the heads of local state administrations, and terminates their authority in these positions (Paragraph 10); revokes acts of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and acts of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Paragraph 16); adopts a decision, in the event of necessity, on the introduction of a state of emergency in Ukraine or in its particular areas, and also in the event of necessity, declares certain areas of Ukraine as zones of an ecological emergency situation - with subsequent confirmation of these decisions by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Paragraph 21)."

Article 106 of the Constitution also governs, "The President of Ukraine, on the basis and for the execution of the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine, issues decrees and directives that are mandatory for execution on the territory of Ukraine. Acts of the President of Ukraine, issued within the limits of authority as envisaged in subparagraphs 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23 and 24 of this Article, are co-signed by the Prime Minister of Ukraine and the Minister responsible for the act and its execution."

The Head of the State can exercise his authority relating to regional policy through "creation, within the limits of the funds indicated in the national budget, consultative, advisory and other subsidiary bodies and services (Paragraph 28, Article 106 of the Constitution)." The *Political Council at the Office of the President of Ukraine was formed as a consultative and advisory body* pursuant to the October 12, 2005 presidential decree No. 1435/2005 and for the purpose of establishing a constant and constructive dialogue between the President of Ukraine and political forces represented in the parliament, ensuring the most complete consideration of their proposals and recommendations for development and implementation of public policy according to Paragraph 28, Article 106 of the Constitution of Ukraine.

Under Paragraph 3 of the document, major objectives of the Presidential Political Council shall incorporate the following:

- Establish a constant dialogue between the President of Ukraine and political forces represented in the parliament, develop proposals for constructive cooperation between them so that to promote democratic reforms and formation of a civil society in Ukraine;

- Analyze and discuss Ukraine’s socio-political and socio-economic situation, issues of domestic and foreign policy so that to find effective solutions and map out a sustainable development strategy;
- Foster coordination of positions and actions efforts of political forces on acute issues of Ukraine’s social life.

The June 10, 2005 presidential instruction No. 1088/2005-пр “On Regional Reception Offices of the President of Ukraine” set up *regional Reception Offices of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regional cities, Kyiv and Sevastopol to work with citizens’ appeals*. According to Paragraph 3 of the Instruction, regional Reception Offices of the President of Ukraine shall be empowered to:

- “Ensure the exercise of the constitutional rights of citizens to file appeals to national authorities, local self-government bodies and their officials on protection of their legitimate rights and interests;
- Consider citizens’ appeals to the President of Ukraine and the Presidential Secretariat and make reports based on the consideration results;
- Foster citizens to resolve problems indicated in their appeals to national authorities, local self-government bodies and their officials”.

On May 25, 2001, the President of Ukraine signed the decree No. 341/2001 “On the Concept of the Public Regional Policy” that approved *the Concept of the Public Regional Policy*. The Concept emphasized the need to develop a new and effective public regional policy and defined it as “a part of the national strategy of social and economic development of Ukraine that is tightly linked to the administrative and territorial reform and improvement of the administrative and territorial system.”

The Concept provided to enhance effectiveness of public policy on regional development, increase the role and responsibility of local executive authorities and self-government bodies in socio-economic development of the regions. However, the need for humanitarian development was not accentuated despite a beneficial effect it might produce.

The President of Ukraine influences development and implementation of Ukraine’s public regional policy through signing laws passed by the Verkhovna Rada.

Specifically, on September 8, 2005, the President signed the law of Ukraine No. 2850-IV “On Stimulation of Development of the Regions” laying down legal, economic and organizational fundamentals for implementation of public regional policy towards stimulation of development of the regions and combating regional depression. The law entered into force since January 1, 2006.

In compliance with the law, “Stimulation of development of the regions (the territory of Autonomous Republic of Crimea, oblasts, cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol) shall mean the complex of legal, organizational, scientific, financial and other measures, aimed at achievement of sustainable development of the regions by means of integration of economic, social and environmental interests at the national and regional levels, the most efficient use of regions’ potential in the interests of the population and the State in general.”

Article 1 defines the “depressed territory” as “a region or its part (district, city of oblast subordination or several districts and cities of oblast subordination), the level of development of which, according to the indices stipulated by this Law, is the lowest among the territories of a certain type.”

According to state officials, the key objective of combating territorial depression is to create and promote conditions for effective regional competition. For this purpose, it is necessary to appropriate not less than 0.2% of revenues of the national budget to fund development and

implementation of annual public programs on overcoming depressed situation of the territories. However, maximum term of qualification of the territory as depressed cannot exceed seven years. Perhaps, funding within the seven-year period is believed sufficient to attain the above objective.

Proposals for designating the territory as depressed are based on the results of annual monitoring of development of the regions, districts and cities of oblast subordination. Monitoring shall be carried out by services of the Secretariat of the President of Ukraine and other national executive authorities.

Singing of the decree “On Special Measures to Enrich and Develop the Culture and Spirituality of Ukrainian Society” by the President of Ukraine on November 24, 2005 evidences his understanding of the need to formulate a new Concept of socio-humanitarian policy of Ukraine. The document is aimed at furthering consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation, its historical consciousness, strengthening of respect for national traditions and cultural heritage in the society, enhancing effectiveness of public policy and activities of governmental agencies in this field.”

Consequently, the Cabinet of Ministers, national and local executive authorities shall prioritize development and enrichment of culture and spirituality of the Ukrainian society.

The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine shall, “Present, within a two-months period, a draft Action Program for the enrichment and development of culture and spirituality of the Ukrainian society providing for specific activities on improving relevant legislation; developing Ukrainian film, publishing and archive industries; creating conditions for effective work of chistorical and cultural centers linked to the study of important events in Ukrainian history, life and activity of outstanding cultural figures, academicians and artists; fostering respective scientific research; publishing encyclopedic, reference and popular scientific literature; creating museums, exhibitions and monuments honoring fighters for freedom and independence of Ukraine in the capital and large cities; and promoting active international cooperation, especially with the UNESCO.” However, the Yekhanurov’s government resignation on January 10, 2006 impeded elaboration of the draft Action Program.

Under the November 24, 2005 presidential decree, the **National Culture and Spirituality Council** was set up. Under the decree, the council is “a presidential consultative and advisory body,” whose functions are “to analyze the development of culture and spirituality in Ukraine, prepare proposals on how to revive Ukrainian traditions and form the image of Ukraine, and make proposals for the development and effective functioning of the Ukrainian language, preserving the cultural heritage, and developing the film and the publishing industries of Ukraine.” The Council shall present the President of Ukraine with its proposals and observations. Academician of the national Academy of Sciences of Ukraine MP Mykola Zhulynsky was appointed the Chairman of the Council. Mr. Zhulynsky said, “The Council’s goals are to monitor Ukraine’s historic and cultural heritage and define priorities in the language, culture, information, publishing, television radio and film industries.” The Council’s members include Vice Premier Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, Minister of Culture and Tourism Ihor Likhovy, singer and President’s Advisor Volodymyr Gryshko, Honored artist Vasyl Vovkun, poetess Lina Kostenko, writer Oksana Zabuzhko, academician Ivan Dziuba, philosopher Myroslav Popovych, composer Yevhen Stankovych, other prominent artists and public figures.

On January 26, 2006, the first meeting of the National Culture and Spirituality Council was held. Its participants proposed the Head of State to establish such councils in at regional state administrations and the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

The Secretariat of the President of Ukraine

The Secretariat of the President of Ukraine is an administrative unit established by the President of Ukraine to ensure the exercise of his duties in accordance with Paragraph 28, Article 106 of the Ukrainian Constitution and the October 14, 2005 presidential decree No. 1445/2005 “On Creation of the Secretariat of the President of Ukraine”. The decree also set up, within the Presidential Secretariat, a number of services responsible for regional policy development, including: the Main Service of Regional and Manpower Policies, the Main Service of Political Analysis, the Main Service of Institutional Development Policy, the Main Service of Socio-Economic Policy, the Main Service of Humanitarian Policy, the Main Service of Humanitarian Policy, the Situation Analysis Service etc.

Under Paragraph 5 of the decree No. 1445/2005, President’s Advisors on respective issues chair the Main Service of Regional and Manpower Policies, the Main Service of Political Analysis, the Main Service of Foreign Policy, the Main Service of Legal Policy, the Main Service of Institutional Development Policy, the Main Service of Socio-Economic Policy and the Main Service of Humanitarian Policy.

President’s Advisor, Director of the Civil Society Institute and deputy of the Verkhovna Rada in 1990-1994 Victor Tkachuk chairs the Main Service of Regional and Manpower Policies. Former Spokesman of the Foreign Ministry and former Deputy State Secretary of Ukraine Markiyanyuk Lubkivsky was appointed the President’s Advisor and Chairman of the Main Service of Humanitarian Policy on December 20, 2005.

Nowadays, the President of Ukraine, within his competence determined by the Ukrainian Constitution and law, can essentially affect development and implementation of socio-humanitarian policy of Ukraine. The Head of the State pays close attention to the process of formulating a common policy geared towards consolidation of the Ukrainian society.

Considering that some legislative documents on the structure of the Secretariat of the president of Ukraine, functional duties and responsibilities of its departments have been issued recently (see the October 14, 2005 presidential decree No. 1445/2005, the October 12, 2005 presidential decree No. 1435/2005, the June 10, 2005 presidential instruction No. 1088/2005-пр and other legal acts), separation and coordination of powers to develop and carry out Ukraine’s socio-humanitarian policy based on regional needs and the necessity to strengthen national unity are under way.

The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine

The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is the highest body in the system of bodies of executive power (Article 113 of the Constitution of Ukraine). According to Article 116 of the Ukrainian Constitution, the Cabinet of Ministers, “Takes measures to ensure human and citizens’ rights and freedoms (Paragraph 2); ensures the implementation of financial, pricing, investment and taxation policy; the policy in the spheres of labor and employment of the population, social security, education, science and culture, environmental protection, ecological safety and the utilization of nature (Paragraph 3); elaborates the draft law on the State Budget of Ukraine and ensures the implementation of the State Budget of Ukraine approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and submits a report on its implementation to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Paragraph 6); directs and co-ordinates the operation of ministries and other bodies of executive power (Paragraph 9).”

Article 118 of the Constitution governs, “Heads of local state administrations are appointed to office and dismissed from office by the President of Ukraine upon the submission of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. In the exercise of their duties, the heads of local state administrations are

responsible to the President of Ukraine and to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and are accountable to and under the control of bodies of executive power of a higher level.”

Consistent actions of the Cabinet on regional development had to begin with practical application of provision of the Concept of the Public Regional Development approved by the September 13, 2001 Cabinet resolution No. 437-p “On Measures for Implementation of the Concept of the Public Regional Policy”. The resolution appointed agencies responsible for the Concept’s implementation.

The first stage of the Concept’s implementation (2001—2003) demanded governmental agencies to institute a number of measures, some of which have already been taken, whereas others must follow.

Major activities within that period provided for drafting and amending the laws on regional policy and local government, in particular: differentiate functions and responsibilities of national and local executive authorities and local self-government bodies; justify public incentives to development of the Ukrainian regions, including depressed territories; and regulate employment in local self-government authorities.

The Concept emphasized the need to “determine the central authority responsible for the regional policy and support for local government; establish the regional development network; develop the infrastructure of regional and interregional agrarian markets: commodity exchanges, wholesale markets, agribusiness houses, auctions, trade fairs, farm supply cooperatives, brand retailers and others; implement the public system of registration of lands, other real estate and property rights, develop respective national and regional information systems and databases; enshrine, on a long-term basis, in laws scientifically-grounded standards for deductions from national taxes and duties (mandatory payments) and transfers to local budgets; ensure increase of revenues of local budgets, in particular through taxes imposed on land and property; switch to balanced budgets of a variety of levels formed on a real income basis and optimized costs according to the minimal standards of budgetary provision.

The Concept also demanded to “improve mechanisms for control exercised by territorial communities over activities of local governments and their officials; adopt the state support program for local government; determine the legal framework for the communal property, complete works on the assignment of state property (primarily social purpose objects) in communal property, differentiation between units of the joint ownership of territorial community objects currently run by regional and district councils; improve mechanisms of strategic state planning of regional development, advance system of national and regional forecasting and socio-economic development planning.”

Since not all activities were accomplished, necessary preconditions for realization of *the second stage of the Concept* (that began in 2003) *have not been created*. Meanwhile, the second stage provided for the following actions vitally important for socio-humanitarian unity of Ukraine:

- “Implement tender framework for allocating state investment funds in the regions;
- Develop the General Scheme of economic zoning of Ukraine and the National Program for Land Protection;
- Set up and promote cross-border and interregional economic cooperation within the improved legal framework;
- Develop state and local budgets in the areas of education, health, social security and culture on a basis of national social standards;
- Transit to the direct relations between the State Budget and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, oblast and regional budgets as well as with the budgets of territorial communities;
- Elaborate interregional social programs and projects and determine their funding sources;

- Create economic, organizational and legal prerequisites for implementing basic principles of regional sustainable development;
- Develop and implement public policy in the area of regulation of the intraregional and interregional labor migration;
- Establish regional centers of advanced technology transfer and commercialization;
- Develop national and regional information systems about regions, their potentials, needs as well as territorial communities of Ukraine;
- Create economic conditions and relevant legal framework for Ukraine to participate in pertinent activities on the EU regional policy.”

Approval of the Regional Development Strategy of Ukraine marked the next step in the government legislative activity. Under Article 3 of the September 8, 2005 law of Ukraine No. 2850-IV “On Stimulation of Development of the Regions”, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is responsible for implementation of *public policy on stimulation of development of the regions*.

The document governed, “Stimulation of development of the regions is necessary to ensure their sustainable development in the interests of Ukraine; enhancement of living standards of the population; eliminate poverty and unemployment, form the middle class; effectively utilize economic, scientific, labour, environmental and other resources as well as specific characteristics of the regions in order to improve living standards of the population and optimise specialization of the regions in the production of goods and services; creation of equal conditions for dynamic and balanced social and economic development of Ukrainian regions; comply with the established public social guarantees for each citizen irrespective of place of his/her residence; combat depression of some territories, timely and comprehensively respond to environmental challenges.”

Stimulation of development of the regions shall be based on the following principles: “Balancing of national, regional and local development interests, setting of scientifically-grounded priorities for regional development with regard to suggestions of local self-government bodies; targeted approach to problems of socio-economic development, creation of favourable investment climate in the regions; maximum approximation of services provided by public authorities and local self-government bodies to consumers; concentration of funds of the national budget, local budgets and other resources on a competitive basis in order to ensure their most efficient use so that to achieve objectives of regional development; cooperation and mutual responsibility of national and local executive authorities, local self-government bodies, scientific and non-governmental organizations and other actors in addressing problems of regional development.”

Article 3 of the law “On Stimulation of Development of the Regions” reads, “Coordination of the activity of national and local executive authorities and local self-government bodies in the sphere of public stimulation of development of the regions, implementation of regional development strategies is carried out according to the agreements on regional development concluded between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and Verkhovna Rada of Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regional, the Kyiv and Sevastopol City Councils and implemented in compliance with this Law and other legal acts.”

Under the law, the agreement on regional development provides for the following:

- “Joint actions of national and local executive authorities and local self-government bodies on implementation of the Regional Development Strategy in the regions;
- Joint actions of national and local executive authorities and local self-government bodies on implementation of regional development strategies;
- Procedure, amount, forms and terms of financing of joint actions established by the Parties according to the national and local budgets;

- Procedure for reporting on implementation of the agreement on regional development by the Parties;
- Responsibilities of the parties for non-execution or improper execution of the actions envisaged in the agreement;
- Procedure for introduction of changes to the agreement;
- Procedure for entering into force, terms and conditions of the agreement.”

The agreement on regional development can also include some other provisions by mutual consent of the Parties (Article 4 of the law “On Stimulation of Development of the Regions”).

In compliance with Article 5 of the document, “Conclusion of the agreement on regional development can be initiated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and Verkhovna Rada of Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regional, the Kyiv and Sevastopol City Councils.

In case of need the other local self-government bodies can submit their proposals for conclusion of such agreement and/or introduction of changes to Verkhovna Rada of Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regional, the Kyiv and Sevastopol City Councils accordingly.”

Depressed territories are divided into the following groups:

- Regions;
- Industrial areas - areas, where the share of the population employed in the industrial sector is higher than that employed in agriculture;
- Rural areas - areas, where the share of the population employed in agriculture is higher than that employed in the industrial sector;
- Cities of regional subordination.

The territory is qualified as deprived in order to create legal, economic and organizational fundamentals for applying, by national authorities and local self-government bodies, special measures for stimulating development of such territories (Article 6).

The law “On Stimulation of Development of the Regions” governs, “In order to stimulate development of depressed territories the following measures can be applied to them:

- Target allocation of public capital investment grants for development of industrial, communication and social infrastructure;
- Governmental support, including financial assistance, to SMEs, promotion of establishment of units of business development infrastructure, such as business centers, business incubators, innovative and consulting centers, venture funds etc.;
- Direction of international technical assistance to address acute social, economic and environmental issues as well as implementation of other urgent measures;
- Promotion of employment, purpose funding of retraining and advanced training programs, programs for professional development of human resources, stimulation of labor migration, improvement of the social sphere, especially housing, health and environmental protection;
- Provision of other public assistance to development of such territories” (Article 7).

The following territories are qualified as depressed:

- “Regions, where average indices of the per capita gross added value (GAV) are the lowest within the last five years;
- Industrial areas, where average indices of unemployment and industrial employment rates are the highest, whereas per capita industrial output and average salary rates are the lowest within the last three years;

- Agricultural areas, where the birth-rate and density of population are the lowest, whereas the share of the population employed in agriculture is the largest and per capita agricultural output and average salary rates are the lowest over the last three years;
- Cities of regional subordination, where average indices of unemployment rate, especially long-term unemployment are the highest, whereas of average salary rate is the lowest over the last three years” (Article 9).

“Industrial and agricultural areas as well as cities of regional subordination are qualified as depressed, if relevant indicators of their development meet simultaneously all the criteria specified in the first part of this Article” (Article 9 of the law “On Stimulation of Development of the Regions”).

Pursuant to Article 10 of the law, “Proposals for designating the territory as depressed are based on the results of annual monitoring of development of the regions, areas and cities of regional subordination in compliance with indicators specified by this Law.

Monitoring of indicators of the development of the regions, areas and cities of regional subordination is carried out by national executive authorities responsible for economic policy, the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regional state administrations, the Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations on the basis of data of government statistical reports and other official sources of national executive authorities following the procedure established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

According to the results of monitoring the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine defines: territories qualified as depressed and their boundaries; term of validity of the depression status of the territory; activities of public stimulation of development of the territory in order to combat depression, forms and terms of application of the said activities; the ratio of public, regional and other financial resources appropriated for implementation of the programs on overcoming depressed situation of the territories; the term of submission of draft programs on overcoming depressed situation of the territories.

According to the Law the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine can specify additional activities for stimulating development of the depressed territory. Maximum term of qualification of the territory as depressed may not exceed seven years.

In the event that, despite implementation of the program on overcoming depression, the territory remains depressed by the development indicators specified by this Law, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, by agreement with a respective local council of depressed territory, can extend the term of qualification of the territory as depressed but no longer than for a five-year period.”

The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approves the programs on overcoming depressed situation of the territories.

“Measures for stimulation of regional development and combating the depression of territories are funded through specific appropriations indicated in the Budget Act and resolutions on local budgets (the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regions, cities of regional subordination (republican subordination (in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) and district budgets) for respective years and other sources, as provided by the legislation” (Article 12).

“A national executive authority responsible for economic policy and other central executive authorities are the major administrators of funds of the national budget allocated for stimulation of regional development and combating depression of the territories” (Article 12). “In April following

the financial year end, the national executive authority responsible for economic policy tables in the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine a report on implementation of the agreements on regional development, the programs on overcoming depressed situation of the territories and the use of funds earmarked for these purposes from the national budget of Ukraine” (Article 13).

Hence, as the highest body in the system of bodies of executive power, the Cabinet considerably influences development and implementation of Ukraine’s regional policy.

Enactment of the September 8, 2005 law of Ukraine No. 2850-IV “On Stimulation of Development of the Regions” (entry into force from January 1, 2006), essentially alters priorities for the government actions on development and implementation of Ukraine’s regional policy. First and foremost, the role of structural departments of the Cabinet in elaboration of the the Regional Development Strategy of Ukraine (Article 3), conclusion of the agreements on regional development between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regional, the Kyiv and Sevastopol City Councils and their implementation (Article 3) and development of the programs on overcoming depressed situation of the territories (Article 11) will change.

On entry into force of the law “On Stimulation of Development of the Regions”, the role of relevant Ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy, shall enhance. So, methods of their activities shall also be revised, importance of statistical data on regional development and responsibility of regional authorities for their performance shall grow. Functions of the Vice Premier for regional policy and the Parliamentary Committee for Regional Policy shall also change.

It is necessary to mention that the position is vacant since Roman Bezsmertny’s resignation despite promises of Prime Minister Yuri Yekhanurov to announce a candidate for this post in early January 2006. However, the long-expected appointment has not taken place. Instead, the Verkhovna Rada made the decision on resignation of the Yekhanurov’s government. Nevertheless, the position has not been abolished and Mr. Yekhanurov supported its retention.

The department for humanitarian policy has been established at the Cabinet Secretariat to coordinate activities of ministries and other governmental agencies.

Ministries

Ministries have respective departments dealing with development and implementation of regional policy within the scope of their authority.

According to the October 23, 2000 instruction No. 1159/2000, **the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine** takes part in development of public regional policy and organizes activities on its implementation.

The Ministry provides organizational-methodical support and coordinates work, concerned with formation and fulfillment of regional and interregional programs, which are fully or partially financed from the state budgets, by central and local executive authorities, local self-government bodies, keeps records of these programs and participates in preparation of expert recommendations regarding appropriateness of their adoption and in execution of complex analysis and assessment of these programs, efficiency of usage of budget funds; composes and submits to the Ministry of Finances of Ukraine the draft list of interregional, regional and local programs, which are proposed for financing in proper budget period.

The Department of Regional Policy of the Ministry is responsible for regional development planning; monitoring and analysis of the socio-economic situation in the regions; development of cross-border cooperation; and coordination of activities of regional economic services. The Department participates in LARGIS II Project implemented by the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine and funded by the British Government's Department for International Development (DFID). The project is geared towards developing a State Strategy for Regional Development of Ukraine till 2015 reflecting European standards and approaches and including recommendations for the necessary institutional changes to support implementation of the Strategy.

According to the October 26, 1999 instruction, **the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine** performs the following functions in the field of regional policy:

- Develops drafts of the national budget, forecasts of the consolidated budget, determines a procedure for and terms of submission, by national executive authorities, the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regional, the Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations, information necessary for preparation of drafts of the national budget;
- Tables in the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine proposals for improvement of relations between the national, local and the republican budget of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea;
- Coordinates, within its competencies, activities of national executive authorities on complete and timely receipt of taxes, duties and other mandatory payments to the national and local budgets;
- Develops propositions on formulation of public taxation policy, sets a procedure for submission of information necessary for analysis of efficiency of the taxation system and proposals concerning its improvement by national and local executive authorities;
- Grants loans from the national budgets following the established procedure in case of temporary cash deficits in the execution of the budgets of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regions, the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol, which are to be repaid within a given period of a respective budget year;
- Conducts audit of financial and accounting statements, reports, plans, estimates and other documents relating to the use of budget funds in Ministries, other national and local executive authorities, local self-government bodies, enterprises, organizations, banking and other finance and credit institutions of all forms of property; receives explanations, information and data on issues emerged during audit inspections.

The Department for Territorial Budgets of the Ministry coordinates funding of regional policy activities.

Now, I would like to proceed with analysis of **the socio-humanitarian area** of public policy promoting national unity and cohesion. The Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine (under the Constitution of Ukraine of June 28, 1996, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine was composed of three Vice Prime Ministers, whose competencies were not determined; on entry into force of the law on constitutional changes on January 1, 2006, the number of Vice Prime Ministers is not limited) and respective Ministries are responsible for development of socio-humanitarian policy.

According to the December 13, 2002 Cabinet resolution No. 1904 "On Functional Responsibilities of the Prime Minister, the First Vice Prime Minister and the Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine", the Vice Prime Minister for Humanitarian Policy organizes activities on development and implementation of public policies in the following areas: humanitarian, scientific and technical, political and ideological, youth and family affairs, health care, education, science, exhibitions and innovations, culture and arts, press and information, physical culture and sports, tourism, interethnic and inter-confessional relations and language. The Vice Prime Minister for Humanitarian Policy coordinates and controls activities of respective government agencies in cooperation with the Service of the Vice Prime Minister and the Department for Humanitarian Policy at the Cabinet Secretariat.

The Department of Analysis and Forecasting of Regional Socio-Cultural Development has been set up at **the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Ukraine**. Under to the instruction approved by the December 2, 2005 presidential decree No. 1688/2005, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Ukraine performs the following functions with regard to regional socio-humanitarian policy:

- Elaborates and carries out actions on creation of conditions for revitalization and development of Ukrainian culture, cultural identity of indigenous peoples and national minorities, different arts, amateur performances, centers of traditional folklore, artistic crafts and trades;
- Develops requirements for creation of a socially important network of cultural institutions, enterprises and organizations in every administrative and territorial unit; sets criteria for minimum provision of citizens with cultural services; monitors compliance with these requirements and standards according to the law in force;
- Organizes and holds international, national and regional artistic festivals, contests, auctions, trade exhibitions and other actions on issues within its competence;
- Exercises organizational-methodical control in the field of museum activities, accounting, preservation and use of state-owned assets of the Museum Fund of Ukraine; fosters creation of a modern museum infrastructure, development of a museum network; issue permits for removal of relics of the Museum Fund of Ukraine.

In 2005, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism took part in development of the Concept of the National Program for Protection, Revitalization and Development of Artistic Crafts and Trades. The Ministry paid close attention to challenges of multicultural development of the Ukrainian regions. On December 2-6, 2005, the All-Ukrainian Forum of ethnic cultures “We Are All Your Children, Ukraine!” was held in Kyiv. The action was carried out in the framework of the cultural and artistic initiative “Ukraine - the Open World” of the Ethnic Communities Council of Ukraine, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, numerous governmental and public organizations. The goal of the Program was popularization and promotion of cultures of Ukrainian national minorities throughout Ukraine and in the major nations of the world. On December 21-22, 2005, the Ministry held a roundtable on “Cross-Cultural Dialogue as a *Conflict Prevention Means” in Simferopol and Bakhchisarai (the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) in the framework of the NATO-Ukraine 2005 Target Plan.

At present, the Ministry works on the draft Action Plan for enrichment and development of culture and spirituality of the Ukrainian society.

In compliance with the June 7, 2000 presidential decree No. 773, **the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine** carries out educational and scientific programs on revival and promoting of national culture, Ukrainian and minority languages, ethno-cultural traditions of indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine.

In practice, minority right to education is ensured in compliance with programs of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine in cooperation with departments for education and science at regional state administrations. The Department for Legislative Provision and Regional Cooperation and the Department for Minority Language and Education Policies of the Ministry coordinate and control respective activities.

Meanwhile, experts share the opinion that the following are the major hindrances to development of the minority education system in Ukraine:

- The absence of administrative structures responsible for development, assessment and support to minority schools;
- The absence of alternative education systems (“second chance schools” or combined educational models);
- The absence of high-quality education programs, materials and methods for instruction in minority languages;

- Centralization of education systems, which impedes teachers to accommodate to specific linguistic and cultural composition of classes;
- The absence of a system of training and advanced training of teachers of minority languages, culture, tolerance etc.

Solution for the above problems provides for developing an effective system of mechanisms, which would consider characteristics of settling, composition, numerical strength, the level of cultural and educational needs of certain ethnic groups.

In conformity with the instruction approved by the August 18, 2005 presidential decree No. 1176, **the Ministry of Family, Youth and Sports of Ukraine** participates in formulation and implementation of public policies for family, children, youth, physical culture and sports, demographic processes, equitable treatment of men and women, family violence prevention, in particular:

- Protects of reproductive health of the population, increase of fertility; ensures social and legal protection of maternity, paternity and childhood;
- Promotes development of different types of children's school extra-curricular education and activities of extra-curricular educational institutions; development and realization of creative and intellectual abilities of children and youth through holding competitions, contests, sports days, tournaments, exhibitions, festivals, conferences, forums, congresses etc.;
- Assists children, youths and athletes, including the disabled in physical culture and sport on the principles of patriotism, national consciousness, dignity and interethnic tolerance.

The Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, specifically, **the State Department for Religion Matters**, is an important agency in the area of compliance with the law and the exercise of the civil right to freedom of conscience.

The State Department for Religion Matters, which previously functioned as an independent State Committee and now **is a part of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine** pursuant to the August 18, 2005 Cabinet resolution No. 770, carries out the following activities:

- Develops mechanisms ensuring implementation of public policy on religion, church and religious organizations; coordinates actions of executive authorities on establishment and regulation розробляє механізм забезпечення реалізації державної політики щодо релігії, церкви та of relations between the State, the Church and religious organizations;
- Registers statutes of religious organizations;
- Keeps records of Ukrainian religious organizations and cult buildings owned or used by these organizations;
- Furthers settlement of issues concerning restitution of former cult buildings and other church properties to religious organizations;
- Facilitates, by the request of religious organizations, agreements with national executive authorities and local self-government bodies;
- Provides organizational-methodical assistance and consultations on application of the law on freedom of conscience and religion;
- Organizes and holds forums, conferences, seminars and other actions on issues within its competence.

State Committees

The State Committee for Nationalities and Migration of Ukraine and the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine are the key agencies in the area of development and implementation of regional policies for interethnic relations and dissemination of information.

According to March 19, 2002 presidential decree No. 269, the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration, following the established procedure, shall prepare proposals on development of public policies in the field of interethnic relation, migration, protection of the rights of Ukrainian national minorities and refugees, maintenance of ties with Ukrainians residing outside the territory of Ukraine, implement these policies; exercise control and inter-agency coordination in this field; and regulate issues related to its competence.

In regard to its duties and responsibilities, the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration shall:

- Make proposals for development and implementation of public policies on issues within its competence, develop respective draft programs and ensure their implementation;
- Participate in elaboration of the drafts of the national budget, the Public Program on Ukraine's Economic and Social Development and the government Action Plan;
- Encourage activities of public minority organizations in Ukraine and Ukrainian nationals residing outside Ukraine;
- Provide organizational and methodical assistance and consultancy to executive authorities and local self-government bodies on issues within its competence;
- Coordinate actions of national and local executive authorities on safeguarding rights of national minorities, persons previously deported on ethnic grounds, refugees, other categories of migrants; setting up and maintaining ties with foreign Ukrainians;
- Initiate actions on prevention of interethnic and racial hostility.

The Council of Heads of All-Ukrainian Organizations of National Minorities functioning at the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration is responsible for the following:

- Participate in drafting of proposals for legislative acts, Concepts of public programs and other legal documents on interethnic relations and minority rights in Ukraine;
- Promote national identity of all ethnicities populating Ukraine and obviate their ethno-cultural needs;
- Initiate actions on prevention of interethnic and racial hostility
- Initiate and support creation of educational institutions of different types (Sunday schools, courses, study groups and others) providing the study of language, history and culture of national minorities;
- Initiate and take part in celebrations, charitable actions, programs, festivals, competitions and contests encouraging spiritual revival of Ukrainian minorities;
- Ensure coverage of these events and actions in the media;
- Organize and participate in congresses, forums, scientific and practical conferences, sessions and seminars on interethnic relations and ethnic development;
- Render organizational assistance to ethno-cultural societies in the regions, facilitate development of minority literature, arts and the media;
- Cooperate with national minorities, governmental agencies and public cultural centers of national minorities so that to meet their educational needs, promote study of and respect for the national and minority languages and tolerance to minority cultures and languages.

According to the instruction approved by the June 30, 2004 presidential decree No. **696/2004**, **the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine** is a specially authorized national executive authority responsible for implementation of public information, publishing and language policies.

The State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting (SCTRB) generalizes practice of applying legislation on issues within its competence, makes proposals on its improvement and presents them to the President and the Cabinet for consideration following the established procedure. The SCTRB organizes and controls implementation of legal acts.

The Committee's major tasks include:

- Coordinate and ensure methodical provision of activities of the national media, including the National Television Company of Ukraine, the National Radio Company of Ukraine, the State Radio Company "Krym", regional state television radio companies, the Kyiv and Sevastopol regional state television and radio companies, news agencies, state publishing houses, printing, book publishing and distribution companies;
- Enhance artistic quality of Ukrainian TV broadcasts, protect public moral from adverse impact of low-quality audio and video products, ensure competitiveness of Ukrainian information products on the international market and monitor implementation of legislation on public moral;
- Ensure the use and development of Ukrainian as the national language in all aspects of life, the use and development of minority languages, encourage satisfaction of language needs of foreign Ukrainians;
- Analyze the state and trends of the use and development of languages in Ukraine, compliance with provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine and legal acts on languages.

The SCTRБ may form a scientific and technical council and other respective advisory bodies for consideration of scientific recommendations promoting development of the media and publishing industries.

Conclusions

- The key challenge of socio-humanitarian policy to be met by the government is not the absence of relevant agencies but their uncertain functions and objectives. In Ukraine, there are executive authorities empowered to consistently implement public socio-humanitarian policy.
- The Vice Prime Minister manages these bodies through the exercise of his powers though he has no financial tools.
- Socio-humanitarian transformations in the regions are impeded also by the absence of a clear vision of priorities of public policy promoting national consolidation on the basis of shared values.
- The legislature - the Verkhovna Rada, executive authorities - ministries and departments - and advisory bodies - the Secretariat of the President of Ukraine - could encourage development of such policy. The role of local self-government bodies, artistic unions, charitable funds, ethno-cultural societies and other organizations is also significant.
- Ukraine's socio-humanitarian policy promoting national consolidation shall be based on a supranational state, democratic society and multiculturalism as social values.
- Over 2005, the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet, the Presidential Secretariat and other executive authorities took actions to promote regional socio-humanitarian policies.
- The analysis proves that activities recommended in legislative documents, e.g. balancing of development and living standards in the regions, could enhance effectiveness of public socio-humanitarian policy.
- Nevertheless, some legislative acts - presidential decrees and the Cabinet resolutions on development and promotion of public socio-humanitarian policy - are implemented partially or improperly or at the wrong time. Loss of time is becoming a specific feature of actions of governmental agencies and one of the major factors of postponement of problem solving.
- Temporary obstacles to economic, social and humanitarian development of the regions and national unity have not been removed yet. This is especially true for elaboration of mechanisms for local self-government initiatives on development of the regions, change in the procedure for sharing of powers and responsibilities between national authorities and local self-government bodies and change in the procedure regulating inter-budget relations.

The article is prepared by expert on humanitarian issues Svitlana Kononchuk in the framework of the initiative "Developing a Policy of National Consolidation: Regional Context"

Difference in Values between Various Regions of Ukraine: Possible Ways to Address the Problem of the "Disunity Of Ukraine"

By ROSTYSLAV PAVLENKO,

Chief, Situation Analysis Unit, Secretariat of the President of Ukraine
and

OLENA VITER,

Senior Consultant, Speech Writing Unit, Secretariat of the President of Ukraine

The issue of the "Ukraine's disunity" has been mentioned as a potential risk each time when crucial changes are to begin in Ukraine, when social situation grows tense and the behavior during election campaign turns aggressive.

The difference between Eastern and Western Ukraine was discussed extensively during the strive for independence in 1991. Later the maps showing division of the country along the Dnepr River were demonstrated after the second round of presidential elections in 1994 and after the win of opposition by party system in 2002. Eventually the issue appeared the most sharply discussed in 2004 during Presidential election campaign and Orange Revolution, protesting against the attempt to falsify the voting results for the sake of the nominee associated with the Eastern Ukraine.

A year after the presidential elections this issue still remains sharp and again is involved into speculations in the election campaign of 2006. Public opinion poll hold by Razumkov Center suggests that in fall 2005 55.9% of respondents supported the statement that the split of the society "into two conflicting parties" had occurred during election campaign and had been preserved until the poll moment¹.

The question posed by KIIS (*Kyiv International Institute of Sociology*) was even sharper: whether the split to Eastern and Western Ukraine is a division between two *fighting* parties? – and 34.7% of respondents supported this statement. It's worth noting that the party that believes itself to be a looser feels the difference more gravely. While in the Western Ukraine this idea is provided by only 23.9% and by 29.5 in the Central Ukraine, then in Eastern Ukraine this statement is supported by almost 54% of the respondents.

Moreover, around 10.7% of respondents believe that the contradictions grew sharper, and 44% think that the situation has not changed; and only 22.9% can say that the relations became more smooth. The regional spread of opinions within regions remained uneven: Western Ukraine: 6%, 41% i 36.7% correspondingly; Central Ukraine: 7.8%, 42.6%, 25%; Southern Ukraine: 12.1%, 38.8%, 23.4%, and Eastern Ukraine: 17.6%, 55%, 5.5% correspondingly².

The issue of "disunity" comes from historic events of long standing, related to the Great Devastation period in Ukrainian history, when the Left- and Right-Bank Lands had different hetmans and belonged to different alliances, which resulted in their entry to different states.

This "disunity" has become one of the stereotypes of Ukraine's perception in the West; western authors traditionally speak of Ukraine as about "unpredictable nation" (Andrew Wilson) and show the great Cordon between civilizations on the map of Ukraine, that reflects the conflict of civilizations (Samuel Hantington). Even modern research on the post-Soviet countries, taking into account the events of Orange Revolution, emphasizes the necessity to create "unified (single) nation" as one of the most important tasks of Ukrainian policy³.

¹ See: Опитування Українського центру економічних і політичних досліджень ім. Олександра Разумкова, 28 жовтня - 3 листопада 2005 р.

² Мостова Ю., Рахманін С. Рік після Майдану: повторення непройденого // Дзеркало тижня. - 2005. - 19 листопада 2005 р. - № 45. - С. 2.

³ Krastev I. Russia's Post-Orange Empire // Brzezinski scholars Forum Materials. - Kiev, 2005.

The same legacy was inherited from the past by other European nations, including the Poles, Germans, and Italians. Still Ukrainian inter-regional differences are more distinctive as they simultaneously have various dimensions: geographical, economical and the cultural one. This is enhanced by rather vague unifying idea that has to be "common denominator" for the self-identification of people from different regions of Ukraine. Below we will show that despite all the contradictions the idea of such unification exists in the society and contradictions do not lead to the extreme demands for separation. Still we would emphasize that Ukrainian society would benefit much more if it manages to transform inter-regional contradictions to constructive process and practically implement the ideas of "Unity in Diversity". Otherwise either real or imaginary differences will prevent Ukraine from cooperation between regions and tempt the neighbors with an opportunity to get use of the contradictions for their own benefit.

Combination of the abovementioned factors has lead to formation of different values among people from different regions of Ukraine; people's views on the role of a person, the society and the government vary from region to region, and they possess distinct views on the geopolitical position of the country, living priorities, etc.

By now, the government has not found adequate methods to settle the problem of "disunity", we mean it has no idea how to develop single space for unified values, concepts and symbols. The new government will face this problem in its most complicated form, as during election campaigns of 2004 and 2004 the "disunity problem" was artificially stirred up and regional differences were brought at the foreground, mainly by political forces associated with the "old political regime", by hands of both Russian and Ukrainian political strategists, hired by those old political forces. We cannot expect the country to obtain rapid economic growth, gain appropriate importance in the geopolitical region and acquire intensive social and economic development momentum without solution of the "disunity problem" and without putting an end to formation of negative stereotypes among people from different regions due to diversity in values.

Below we will discuss the factors that support the "disunity" and make political use of it; we will also review the factors that promote integration and prevent the society from eventual disruption. We would also discuss ways to unite the society and urgent steps to be made to do this.

Our proposed immediate steps to strengthen the integrity of the society will lay the foundation for legislative framework aimed at implementation of the policy of national unification.

I. The factors promoting "disunity" are still active in Ukraine

The impact of the factors is driven by geographical position of the areas, and by the production structure that pre-determines basic employment schemes and behavior, the history of formation and interrelation of main social groups that influence the mentality. The factors did not appear to be strong enough to disrupt the country, but they remain proactive in their conservation of the "disunity" problem, preserving it in its inactive condition that does not allow taking off the problem from the agenda.

1. Vague national idea: weak positive myth about the nation incapable to unify different regions

By now Ukraine lacks unified system of values that would be determinative for self-identification of people and could become the reference point for this identification. "Quest for national idea" has become the self-sufficient process, especially this is true for national and patriotic discourse, but the process did not produce any output. In late 1990s and early 2000s experts discussed even some

substitutes to the national idea, for example the idea of European integration as an objective that is favorably taken by people from all the regions of Ukraine.

The demonstration that the society could be united around clearly defined values became one of the most far-reaching outcomes of Orange Revolution. The values of Maidan, including freedom of speech, human rights, fair and transparent elections, - have united people from all the regions of Ukraine, people from different social and age groups. Despite the fact that Maidan was aimed at a fight against the regime, those values turned it out into pronouncedly peaceful campaign. After Maidan it became possible to speak about the mission of Ukraine to serve as a pattern and provider of democratic changes in the region. It seemed that the Ukrainian nation had a chance to shift from inventing national idea to playing active role in processes taking place in the Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics at large.

The revolution did not resolve the problem of "disunity". Instead a large part of population, mostly in the Southern and Eastern Regions kept aloof from the events Orange Revolution and follow-up, and took them indifferently⁴. When the reality proved to be far from the most optimistic expectations, the politicians who lost in 1994 have found the arguments to question the Maidan values. Those values had to surpass serious ordeal and the Ukrainian nation has to understand that full-fledged implementation of those values is time-consuming and requires some effort from both the government and the public. Besides, the values are to be accepted by the majority of people in all the regions. Absence of serious anti-Orange actions despite rather strong propaganda of anti-Orange political forces suggests that the majority of people still have wait-and-see attitude and will evaluate the effectiveness of new public policy after its outputs.

Thus the success of Orange Revolution as an event capable to strengthen national unity depends on the success of the new government in the areas that are important and obvious for people: the life standard, elimination of corruption, etc. The data of the National Sociology Service suggest that in October 2005 50.2% of respondents expected that the new government will stop the price increasing, 28.8% believed it will increase anti-corruption combat, 25.3% expected for the rise of living standard, while 5.9% called for increasing the freedom of speech and 7.6% - for suing the falsifiers of the elections⁵.

A *success* seems to be the most crucial pre-condition for creation of positive myth capable to unite a society. Despite objective economic troubles the state has to demonstrate to its people the capacity to reach some progress, to show its victories and straightforward movement.

2. Considerable differences in economic development of the regions and inefficiency of the government regional policy

Due to uneven spread of economic facilities and shortcomings of budgeting, enhanced by actual absence of public regional policy, the living standard of people in various regions differs much. Moreover, between the inhabitants of "donor" regions and "recipient" regions negative stereotypes have been being formed.

For example the State Statistics Committee data show that in 2005 the average wage in Ternopil region was 2.4 times smaller than in Kyiv, while unemployment rate was 15.5 times higher.

The revenues of the budget of the capital are 10 times more than the Odessa budget revenues; while the difference in population amounts only to 2.5 times.

⁴ Паніна Н. Українське суспільство 1994-2005: соціологічний моніторинг. - К., 2005. - С. 88.

⁵ See: Опитування Всеукраїнської соціологічної служби, жовтень 2005 р.

Revenues from local taxes and dues in Volynska, Chernivetska and Ternopilska oblasts constitute only 30% of local budgets while in Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk oblasts and in the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol this indicator exceeds 60%.

Relatively high indicator of the average wage (856 hryvnya) is driven by the indicators of only 7 regions: the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol, and by Dnipropetrovska, Donetska, Zaporizka, Kyivska and Luhanska oblasts.

In the Ternopilska, Cherkaska, Ivano-Frankivska oblasts the unemployment burden amounts to 20-25 persons per one work place that is three times higher as the average in the country. In these oblasts each tenth person able to work works abroad: either in Europe or in Russia.

Considerable heterogeneity exists in spread of foreign investments throughout the territory of Ukraine. As a rule they are directed to more economically developed regions.

Besides traditional division into "industrial East and rural West" reflecting the uneven spread of production facilities, the great differences exist between neighboring regions, which is caused by lack of coordination between them and by the absence of the state regional policy. Thus, Sumska oblast produces commodities for a total amount of 90 hryvnya per capita, while the same figure for neighboring Chernihivska oblast is 18 times higher.

Moreover, strong adherence to giant industrial enterprises is another peculiar feature of the "industrial East", and it provides not only the opportunity to obtain income but also includes a risk related to great dependence of such enterprises on market conditions, power consumption capacity and policy of the owners in respect of the employees. In Donetsk regions dozens of settlements are nearly devastated. In Velyko-Novosilkyivskyi Rayon of the Donetsk oblast 77 persons compete for one work place, while in the Oleksandrivskyi Rayon of the same oblast this figure amounts to 60 persons⁶.

Similar problems exist in other industrial oblasts and solution of the problems will require multi-billion allocations from the state budget⁷.

The problem is enhanced by the fact that in the nearest future Ukrainian economy will recover from shock caused by the increased prices on Russian gas which in short-time perspective will decrease incomes of the majority of big metallurgical, chemical and other enterprises in the South and East of Ukraine.

Current structural challenges are combined with inefficient budget policy and absence of regional policy. Particularly, should the revenues from income tax on both persons and enterprises remain in local budgets (before re-allocation through the central budget) this would lay more solid foundation for local development and create additional stimuli for the promotion of business by local governments, which in its turn would increase the revenues.

On the other hand, despite the development of legislative framework that will be discussed below, local mechanisms for economic development are created slowly; while at the national level financial decentralization and policy towards investment involvement still remain a subject for discussion rather than a component of implemented strategy.

⁶ Державний комітет статистики України // www.ukrstat.gov.ua

⁷ Киселев С. Голодный "кормилец" // Компаньйон. - 2004. - № 49.

No comprehensive concept of regional policy has been produced. The authors of the report "On international and domestic situation of Ukraine in 2005" believe that "systemic analysis of regional asymmetry prove the existence of three main trends:

- divergence between Kyiv and the "industrial triangular, including Donetsk, Dnipropetrovska and Zaporizka oblast) and the rest of Ukrainian oblasts;
- convergence within the "Industrial triangular" driven mainly by mono-specialized nature of their foreign trade;
- anticipatory increase of economic growth in the capital of Ukraine, which is not driven by administrative regulation and is caused by the world tendencies of business accumulation in the main megapolis⁸.
- economy of boundary regions in the East and West of Ukraine is more closely related to the neighbors abroad than to the Ukrainian neighbors. This increases stratification of the society and undermines the developing feeling of unity among people of all the regions.

Thus, integral regional policy should contain not only the list of principles and laws that are to be adopted; it also should include a set of measure promoting regional and local development and uniting efforts of both public and private sectors in the use local resources and coordination of steps on investment climate improvement. Particularly the latter would mean effective monitoring of implementation of the business liberalization measures that were undertaken in 2005.

The *integrity* of regional policy is necessary for comprehensive analysis of real situation in the regions, for bringing together local governments, businesses and public to cooperation and search for resources to develop both home and foreign investments, creation of new jobs for qualified employees and increasing living standard in all the regions of Ukraine.

The separate aspect of this policy should emphasize *strengthening of interregional cooperation* and promote more active mutual involvement of resources and launching of joint development projects. The success of this policy would activate such a powerful factor as assessment of social and economic situation in the society that will increase social optimism and strengthen positive identification of Ukrainian people with the nation as a whole.

3. Differences between people from different regions by basic criteria for self-identification

Public opinion polls suggest that people in different regions assess differently such issues as culture and language problems, historical past and foreign policy course of the country. Moreover, inhabitants from different regions think there are more cultural differences between them and people from other Ukrainian regions than between them and their foreign neighbors.

The data from the public opinion poll hold by the Razumkov Center suggest that between December 20 and 27, 2005⁹, the majority of respondents in all the regions have stated considerable similarity in culture, traditions and vision of Ukrainian and Russian citizens (44,2%), and also of Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine (48,6%). At the same time in all the regions there was much smaller percentage of respondents stating the same about culture, traditions and views of the residents of Halychyna and Donbas (9.2%).

The majority of residents in all regions of Ukraine are friendly to the residents of other Ukrainian regions (average indicator is 63%). However, there is obvious estrangement in relations between the residents of the Western regions and the residents from the East and South: among Western

⁸ Див.: Доповідь "Про внутрішнє і зовнішнє становище України у 2005 році". - К.: НІСД, 2006. - С. 195.

⁹ Регіональні особливості ідейно-політичних орієнтацій громадян України. "Чутливі" теми в контексті передвиборної кампанії // Результати соціологічного дослідження. - К.: Український центр економічних і політичних досліджень ім. Олександра Разумкова, лютий 2006 р.

residents 57% have positive attitude to the Eastern and Southern residents, while in the Eastern and Southern Ukraine only 50% express their positive attitude. At the same time the attitude to foreign country, for Russia (73%), in the Eastern and Southern Ukraine is more favorable than to the counterparties from the Central (62%) and Western Ukraine (50%) and Halychyna (50%).

One could observe great difference in the attitude of residents from the regions to the issue of self-identity (particularly, in terms of the issue of the official language use), and also to the most crucial historical events and to "pro-European" or "pro-Russian" guiding lines in foreign policy.

The data of the mentioned poll prove that quite different percentage of people in different regions would support the official status of the Russian language: in the Western region this idea is supported by only 3.2%; while in Central Ukraine 27.1%, support it; while in the South the number of supporters amounts to 54.8%, and to 57.8% in the East. Preservation of the official status of the Ukrainian language alone is supported by 78.6% of respondents in the West, 41% in the Centre, 12.2% in the South and 14.6% in the East. The "tradeoff solution", with preservation of the Ukrainian language as the only official state language with simultaneous status of the official Russian languages at the regional level is supported as follows: 15.3% of respondents in the West of Ukraine; 25.1% in the Central Ukraine; 14.2% in the South and 21.3% in the East of Ukraine.

For the prevailing majority of the residents in the Western oblasts the top-priority in foreign policy is to strengthen relations with the European Union member-countries (58.8%), while for the residents in the East and South the same importance put on relations with Russia (62.1% and 56.6% correspondingly). It's interesting to note that residents of Central Ukraine believe the Russian perspective more attractive than the European one: 32.4% of respondents support the first option and only 26.8% stands for the second alternative. The same differences one could observe in the responses to the questions about Ukrainian membership in various international unions (EU, NATO): entry to the EU is supported by 64.6% of respondents in the Western Ukraine and by 29.6% in the Eastern Ukraine; joining NATO is supported by 31.3% and 7.2% respectively.

Besides, the abovementioned public opinion poll proves there are even more deep contradictions in the evaluation of the historical past. It suggests the characteristics which do not follow traditional scheme of the "Western + Central Ukraine" versus "Eastern and Southern".

Thus, the biggest number of people desiring to restore the Soviet Union is in the South (27.2%; and among them 46.2% support this idea despite its impossibility). In Central and Eastern Ukraine both parts of nostalgic-minded people amount to 51% in total (although in the Central part 31% of respondents believe that restoration is impossible, while in the East this indicator amounts only to 21%). At the same time in the Western Ukraine both categories of nostalgic-minded citizens is slightly higher than 15%.

On the other hand, in the Western Ukraine only 36% of respondents agree that the name of "Great Patriotic War" renders the real struggle against the Nazi Germany, while in the other regions two thirds of people support this name. The neutral name of "The Second World War" is positive accepted by 40% of respondents in the West and lesser than 30% in the rest of the regions.

60% of respondents in the South and 54% of respondents in the East consider Ukrainian history is and integral part of the Russian and Belarusian history. In the Central Ukraine the same opinion is supported by 41.7% and by 17.4% in the West. Only 46% respondents in the West believe they are heirs of Kiev Rus cultural and historical legacy, while in the Central Ukraine this opinion is shared by 26% and by 17.6% and 9.6% in the South and East correspondingly. As the poll covered also the respondents from the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea, than we may say that the results were distorted due to the responses of the Crimea residents.

The regional differences in evaluation of the most crucial historical events and future perspectives are reflected also in the assessments of today reality. Public opinion poll undertaken in October 2005 by the Democratic Initiatives Fund revealed considerable differences in what people believe to be the right course of the country development. While in the Western Ukraine 48.8% were thinking that Ukraine is following the right path, then in the Center this number was only 24.7%, in the North-Eastern Ukraine -12.96 and in the Southern East -18%, in the South -14.9% and only 4.7% in Donbas Region.¹⁰

As soon the election campaign expands and activity of political forces increases, and adherence of electors to the political "messages" of their preferred parties strengthens, one could observe more manifested difference in view. Thus, the KMIS public opinion poll in February 2006, when respondents were asked whether they believe the country follows the right path, showed that it was supported by 35.5% of respondents in the Western Ukraine, 22.1% in the Centre, and 11.8% in the South, and by only 4.7% in the East¹¹.

Finally, people in different regions have different opinions about the institutions that allow them to influence public authorities and elections. The sources of such deviations require separate research to clarify whether this is the matter of degree of belief that the community can change the situation in the country; or this is lack of trust to the public administration mechanisms; it may be inability to accept this government as "my" government and that is, worth attention and effort; sometimes this is the attitude to the government as to the *stranger*, that is, not interesting.

However, according to the Razumkov Center data obtained in October 2005 after a poll, among respondents stating that they are familiar with the Ukrainian election system there were 41.6% of respondents in the West, 37.9% in the Central Ukraine, and 19.1% in the East. Among that number, people saying that they know the elector's rights and specificity of election procedures quite well amounted to 18.7% in the West and 11.7% in the South. Although the majority of respondents (including 53.6% in the Center and 63.1% in the West) confessed that they know the rights and procedure "approximately".¹²

Serious discussion with participation of both experts and public about the self-identity issues would allow to get rid of some stereotypes and demonstrate to the citizens the opportunity to exercise their language, religious and cultural rights on the framework of active legislation even without its radical changes and creation of additional problems.

On the other hand, only *jointly adopted agenda* of both parties, that will lay the foundation for such discussions, would allow the parties to understand each other and to become prepared to reach a consensus. The main objective of the consolidation policy is to find joint goals, and for the sake of these goals to translate the self-identity issue from the political field into the legislation field. This implies strict implementation of the active legislation about the rights and exercising of these rights not for the harm of the opposite party and not for demonstration of the might and exclusivity of a party, but for finding practical ways to implement the slogan "Unity is in Diversity".

¹⁰ В зоні Януковича всі не задоволені життям // Українська правда. - 5 грудня 2005 // <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2005/12/5/36335.htm>

¹¹ Політичні орієнтації населення України: за два місяці до виборів. / Прес-реліз за даними опитування, проведеного з 18 по 28 січня 2006 року. - К.: КМІС, лютий 2006 р.

¹² Вибори-2006: умови, суб'єкти, наслідки. / Інформаційно-аналітичні матеріали до круглого столу "Політичні партії в Україні на старті виборчої кампанії-2006". - К.: Український центр економічних і політичних досліджень ім. Олександра Разумкова, грудень 2005. - С. 12-13.

Interim conclusion: regional differences and political use of these differences result in a situation when the official Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture have to compete for the role of integrating factor in Ukraine.

Numerous aspects of interregional differences are analyzed in the works referred to in this article. General conclusion is not satisfactory: during the years of independence the differences described in the works were not smoothed. However, the life in independent Ukraine has considerably increased the level of self-identification of the citizens: the census of 2001 shows that 77.8% of respondents said they were Ukrainians, while in 1989 there were only 72.7% of them, and 67.5% believed the Ukrainian language was their native language versus 64.7% in 1989¹³.

But although the majority of population do not doubt in their belonging to the main ethnicity, understanding the essence of this meaning is quite different among different regions. The difference was much strengthened by the stay of Ukraine within Russian and Russian-speaking cultural and informational space alongside with insufficient and poor attempts to fill this space with Ukrainian cultural products.

The Ukrainian language and culture in Soviet times possessed secondary role of "national peculiarity" (as the Russian language remained the language of economic relations, scientific research, public administration and both elite and popular culture); and later they ought to fill a range of social niches attributed to the "official and literary style" of speech, colloquial style and other styles of everyday use. But under conditions when in Ukraine up to 80% of printed products are produced in the Russian language, and mass media of the neighboring state (including the electronic ones) have free access to the Ukrainian audience, then the Ukrainian language and "Ukrainian cultural environment" is in the situation of "unfair competition" and has to compete with Russian cultural production which possess much more resources. Thus, for 2006 the Russian Budget allocates 10 billion rubles (about 2 billion hryvnya) for support of TV broadcasting companies¹⁴, while \$63 million are allocated for the cinema development (including only 50% of state funding in total funding the movies" production. Now investors more readily invest in this sphere after early 2000s when state contributions amounted to 80%)¹⁵. Currently Russia produces 1200-1300 hours of movies annually (including TV soap operas)¹⁶.

As soon as limited access of the Ukrainian audience to Russian mass culture products is impossible for multiple reasons, the best response could be provided through support of competitive Ukrainian (Ukrainian-speaking) cultural products and creation of opportunities for free creative work in the Ukrainian language alongside with incentives to this activity. Unfortunately the lack of funds and absence of systemic approach, together with vague priorities in the objective implementation resulted in a range of state programs that remained on paper.

"Politicization" of the self-identity issues and involvement of these issues into political struggle on the ground that for the majority of people in Eastern and Southern oblasts its more convenient and usual to communicate in Russian threatens with preservation and deepening of differences. Moreover, those differences may become the grounds for self-identification strengthening the contradiction between "we and they" ("I am a Russian speaker, not a Ukrainian speaker" instead of "I am Ukrainian"). Against a background of the election campaign (including post-election period

¹³ Дані Всеукраїнського перепису населення 2001 року. / Державний комітет статистики України // www.ukrcensus.gov.ua

¹⁴ Из бюджетной таблицы планируемых в 2006 году расходов на культуру, кинематограф и СМИ // www.gipp.ru/zip/8953_budget2006_smi.doc

¹⁵ На развитие кинематографа выделено \$63 млн. бюджетных средств // www.news-24.ru/hronic/print-15881.html

¹⁶ На телеканалах "Газпром-Медиа" появятся сериалы собственного производства // Ведомости. - 7 июля 2003 г. // www.smi-nn.ru/?id=15316

as formation of Parliamentary majority and the Government in line with the Amended Constitution promises to be not smooth) this new method of identification may deeply separate the residents of different regions.

The situation in mass media requires special attention because despite eliminated official censorship both political and business interests of the media owners force the journalists to distort information and describe the country in negative tone. The problems that had to become a subject for discussion about the country interests are presented in a format of terrifying story of the cold-war times, like it happened with the issue of joining NATO.¹⁷

With this "media support" habitual complaints about "shortcomings of the public information policy" or "lack of understanding of social responsibility among journalists" are not enough. The problem requires solutions at various levels simultaneously, which we discuss below.

Trying to preserve unbiased position we would like to mention that by now indicated problems did not manage to overcome the actors that strengthen the Ukrainian nation. Despite all the differences between the regions integration processes in the Ukrainian society develop at least with the same intense as the disintegration ones.

II. Integration processes in Ukrainian society are active enough to prevent from disunity

1. The sense of belonging to this country as both the nation and country gradually increases

Above we have mentioned that the years of independence increased number of those who believe they are Ukrainians and think that Ukrainian is their native language. Monitoring of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine suggests that the dynamics of responses to the question: "Do you believe Ukraine is your Motherland?" in 2005 and 2003 was as follows: "Yes" was said by 90.6% and 76.3% correspondingly, while "No" was chosen by 3.3% i 6.4% respectively; 6.1% i 16.8% correspondingly were not sure,

The same trend could be seen among representatives of all the nationalities living on the Ukrainian territory. In a group of people believing they are Russians by ethnicity and saying that Russian is their native language the adherence to Ukraine as their Motherland has increased in 20%. At the same time the portion of those identifying themselves as "the USSR citizens" has dropped from 13.1% to 8.1%¹⁸.

The patriotism manifested by the residents of all the regions is rather high. Rather high percentage of respondents showed their rather good attitude to Ukraine in general (73.4% average to Ukraine). In all the regions majority of residents believe they are patriots of Ukraine (74.1%). Also absolute or relative majority of people expressed their readiness to defend this country in case of a war (average indicator for Ukraine is 53.1%)¹⁹.

¹⁷ As for the manipulating use of the international issues see: Тищенко Ю. НАТО і референдум у виконанні нової опозиції // Українська правда. - 6 грудня 2005 р. // <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2005/12/6/36365.htm>; Сушко О. Кампанія "Анти-НАТО": передвиборчий карнавал та інструмент реваншу // Українська правда. - 21 грудня 2005 р. // <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2005/12/21/36888.htm>;

about ratio of positive and negative materials in Ukrainian mass media see: Янукович не вилазить з телевізора, а нашоукраїнців жодного разу не похвалили // Українська правда. - 22 лютого 2006 р. // <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2006/2/22/39041.htm>; Медіарейтинг політиків // КомІнформ // www.cominform.kiev.ua/rating/

¹⁸ Доповідь "Про внутрішнє і зовнішнє становище України у 2005 році". - К.: НІСД, 2006. - С. 35.

¹⁹ Регіональні особливості ідейно-політичних орієнтацій громадяни України. "Чутливі" теми в контексті передвиборної кампанії // Результати соціологічного дослідження. - К.: Український центр економічних і політичних досліджень ім. Олександра Разумкова, лютий 2006 р. - С. 8-9.

According to the public opinion polls the majority of Ukrainian citizens do not support the idea of federalization. The Razumkov Center and KMIS data prove that in May 2005 only 12.6% of the respondents supported the idea of federalization²⁰. Moreover, the same Center's survey hold in the days of Orange Revolution, when propaganda for federalization and establishment of the "Southern- and Eastern Autonomy" has reached its peak, this idea was supported by only 30% of respondents in Donbas and less than 25% in the Eastern and Southern oblasts of Ukraine²¹.

It's worth mentioning that alongside with national self-identification we can speak about *local self-identification*. In late 2005 the Razumkov Center undertook a poll and respondents stated that they feel they were more the citizens of definite settlement, village, town and city more strongly than citizens of the region and even the country 38,2% against 20,4% and 30,7% correspondingly with minor differences in responses between the regions.

Generally Ukrainians are unsatisfied with the situation and procedures in their communities (49% of unsatisfied respondents against 13% of satisfies ones), and thus they put clear claims as to the local governments²². Such measures as establishment of conditions and institutions for addressing the most acute problems and public involvement to these institutions are recommended by the experts as a necessary step to consolidate different groups at local level that will promote formulation of joint agenda capable to smooth differences and create positive practice of problem solution.

2. Residents of different regions have much similar in assessment of the development priorities while separating issues are comparatively less important

Residents of different regions of Ukraine are unanimous in assessment of socio-economic and social and political problems. During the entire period of sociological monitoring people say that social problems add risks, including living standards, prices increasing and employment are the most important.

According to the surveys in April-May, 2004, undertaken jointly by "Democratic Initiatives" Fund and KMIS, the absolute majority of people were concerned about their income and living standard (86%), criminal situation (49%), environmental protection (36%) and ethics issues (22%).

The same survey proves that people were much less concerned about the language and geopolitical issues: the state independence was important for 9% of respondents, relations between the Eastern and Western Ukraine were interesting for 7%, the Russian language use was important for 7% and the use of the Ukrainian language was a concern for 5%.

According to a survey undertaken by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in 1999, 70.2% of respondents felt they were lacking real friendship, while in 2005 this figure dropped to 68.2%.

As for the social needs of Ukrainians, here the major importance is given to the stability both in the country and society (66.6 - 67.7%). The surveys of the Institute of Sociology of NANU show that in 1999-2005 Ukrainians required public protection against the decrease of living standard (78.8 - 76.9%), ensuring the order in the society (75.4—68.7%), compliance with active legislation (70.8 - 68.7%), and also confidence in the future (72,2-66,9%).

²⁰ Доповідь "Про внутрішнє і зовнішнє становище України у 2005 році". - К.: НІСД, 2006. - С. 192.

²¹ Опитування Українського центру економічних і політичних досліджень ім. Олександра Разумкова, грудень 2004.

²² Паніна Н. Українське суспільство 1994-2005: соціологічний моніторинг. - К., 2005. - С. 106.

In line with a research held in September-October 2005 by the National Sociology Office the official status of Russian language was an issue of concern for only 10% of respondents (this was 15th top-priority among the 19 possible options).

Speaking about rather low value given to the Russian language status it should be noticed that explains great difference in the obtained results of the surveys. The responses mainly depend on the context of formulating the issue in its relation with the everyday life. Naturally standing in a line with social problems the language problem is taken as less important as the language of communication is not oppressed and in a range of risks its rating is among the most negligible ones. However if the question is raised about the *change* of its status, for example, about supporting a party that stands for giving official status to the Russian language or for the change of the language status "in principle" , then responses are quite different.

The Razumkov Center surveys in fall and winter 2005 19.6% of respondents are ready to support the party whose objective will be to give official status to the Russian language; 37% are ready to support the official status of the Russian language "in principle" (35% believe that the Ukrainian language has to be the only official language while the Russian should be used only in everyday occurrence; an only 20% think that alongside with the only official Ukrainian language the Russian language may be used as the official only in some regions)..

Thus, among all the problems the importance of the language issue is negligible, despite the fact that it is one of the most politically engaged among all the self-identity issues in Ukraine. However, under conditions of political address to this problem with simultaneous calls to change the status quo, then many advocates of the higher Russian language status appear. Such "contextual dependence" on the issue provides grounds for discrepant interpretations.

At the same time there are reasons to suppose that if nobody raises the issue of the language status at political level, then the absence of language oppression in practice gradually will decrease the acuity of the disunity due to language issues. Sociologists indicate an interesting phenomenon: the majority of Ukrainian citizens believe their native language is Ukrainian even if they communicate in Russian in everyday life (or even the mixture of both languages). The data supplied by the "Democratic Initiatives" Fund in January 2006 show that 60% of respondents stated their native language was Ukrainian, 73.3% said their native language was Russian. At the same time 36.1% of respondents said they communicate mainly Ukrainian at home, 33.3% indicated they communicate in Russian, and 29.5% said they use both Russian and Ukrainian depending on the circumstances"²³.

This self-identification phenomenon "translated" through the elections to the Verkhovna Rada actually prevents from introducing changes to the constitution and granting the Russian language the status of the second official language throughout the whole territory of Ukraine.

However the abovementioned regional differences allow politicians to play another game: to raise the issue of so called "regional languages". During the election campaign-2006 there were some events like decision of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea about "the status of the Russian language as the second official state language" (without indication of this state), and the decision of the Kharkiv City Council about the Russian language as the "regional official language" in the city of Kharkiv, - which caused extremely negative reaction of the official Kyiv establishment. Thus, those regions challenged the political situation and the response to it should be provided after the elections: the status of the languages has to be harmonized with the European Charter of the

²³ Громадська думка населення України - січень 2006 року. / Результати соціологічного дослідження. - К.: Фонд "Демократичні ініціативи", лютий 2006. - С.12-13.

Regional Languages and Language Minorities that took force for Ukraine since January 1, 2006 and actually has no implementation mechanisms in Ukraine.

After parliamentary and local elections the "fight of jurisdictions" between Kyiv and local Radas with regard of the language issue is very probable, and the Constitutional Court should resolve this problem.

Comparatively low priority of self-identity issues for the citizens provides the idea that is very important for the stability of Ukrainian society: discussed opposition remains the intrinsic problem of political elite and has a chance to be resolved through acceptable trade-off, especially taking into account that these elections open the longest intra-election period in the new Ukrainian history, that will decrease emotional tension in the society).

3. The society is disposed to peace and mutual understanding: people in the regions to whom the "disunity" apologists appeal are not eager to take action

Disposition of Ukrainian society to peaceful settlement of all the disputes is fixed by many surveys. Thus, the Razumkov Center survey hold in October-November 2005 shows proves that although 56% of respondents agree that "the society is divided into two conflicting parties", but 47% prefers those political forces that aims to unite the society even if this will make them loosing to their political opponents. Only 31% support those parties that will stand upon their viewpoint at any price²⁴.

Conflict potential of the self-identity issues is low because of differences in values of different social groups and their attitude to the ways of expressing and defending their viewpoint. Groups of electors whose rights are supposed to be protected by politicians concerned with self-identity issues are comparatively less ready to take action. The Institute for social and political psychology, NANU, on the eve of the second round of presidential elections Viktor Yanukovych's supporters was ready to strike on the streets while among Viktor Yushchenko's followers there were only 53% of such people. Before the second round of presidential elections the number V.Yushchenko's supporters ready to stand for their choice has increased by 75%²⁵.

The underlying reasons for such metamorphosis are worth being studied separately, but practical output of it is the low possibility of mass strikes and protest actions supporting the idea of the Russian language as the second official language, integration with Russia, which are capable to translate the "disunity" from the level of ideas to the level of reality and direct confrontation.

Disposition of the Ukrainian society to peaceful settlement of all the contradictions is also proved by the readiness to conciliation reflected in many surveys. For Ukraine both Spanish and German models of "forgiveness and unity" would be understandable and acceptable. The Razumkov Center survey proves that 51.6% of respondents (with minor regional deviations) agree that "It is necessary to forgive each other and accept that there were neither right nor wrong people" in all the wars and conflicts separating Ukrainians. Under this conditions only 29.7% insist that those guilty should be persecuted even after many years passed²⁶.

These social moods make any escalation of the conflict around self-identity issues *politically hopeless* and bring hope for gradual and constructive resolution of the "disunity" issue. If the

²⁴ Опитування Українського центру економічних і політичних досліджень ім. Олександра Разумкова, 2005 р.

²⁵ Бурковский П. "Протестантская" этика для новой Украины // Компаньон. - 2004. - № 50.

²⁶ Регіональні особливості ідейно-політичних орієнтацій громадян України. "Чутливі" теми в контексті передвиборної кампанії // Результати соціологічного дослідження. - К.: Український центр економічних і політичних досліджень ім. Олександра Разумкова, лютий 2006 р. - С. 6.

citizens realize that raising the self-identity issue will result in a conflict they will substantially decrease the support of political forces raising the issue.

Interim conclusion: the Ukrainian society preserves strong integration potential and implementation of this potential will require concentrated effort contributed to the 'growth points'.

Thus, we may state that integration degree of the Ukrainian society is assessed with that famous approach to a glass that is half-filled with water. Optimists believe the glass is half-full, while the pessimists think it is half-empty. By now this balance prevented the society from real disunity and conscious manipulations of politicians with self-identity issues were unsuccessful.

However, existence of mutual negative stereotypes among people living in different regions and disproportions in regional development considerably hinder sustainable development of the country and prevents comprehensive implementation of its potential.

The majority of Ukrainian people believe that rallying Ukrainian people to united community is possible on the social and economic and political and legislative, but not on the cultural and mental grounds.

Relative majority of respondents in all the regions said that striving for increased welfare of Ukrainian people is the main factor for unification (37% in average). The Central Ukraine has shown interesting phenomenon, when supporters of social-economic unity were only 25% and supporters of unity based on political ideas and principles amounted to 19.5%). The second place by the number of supporters is occupied by the equal rights of citizens and con-existence within one state (28.2%). Finally, the support for knowledge and understanding of the Ukrainian culture and language as a consolidating factor is substantially different in the Western and Eastern regions (20.3% and 3.3% correspondingly)²⁷.

Eventually, an immediate task of the government is to promote integration of the society by all possible political means, and establish more rational model of interregional relations.

III. To make the necessary things you should begin with the most feasible things

As the "disunity" problem is not new, possible solutions are described in many research works and publicity materials. The programs of main political parties also contained provisions about strengthening consolidation of the Ukrainian nation. It's worth noting that both before the elections of 2004 and after them all the parties speak about "unity". The only difference is that *after* the elections-2004, when the "implicit moratorium" on the exploitation of self-identity issues was broken, the ideas about "unity" coexist with the slogans to federalize the country and other ideas that obviously will not strengthen the declared unity.

In the view of prospective politicization of the self-identity issues after the elections-2006, Ukrainian authorities might do some steps aimed at neutralization of the biggest risks born by "disunity" and make use of the opportunities suggested by diversity of life in the regions.

1. External pressure mobilizes the society and do not create preconditions for long-term union

External pressure may become a specific factor that may unite a society. In this case, the shift of priorities forces to forget about internal disputes and quarrels. At the time this situation may not last

²⁷ Ibid.

long and after some short "splash of emotions" the society will immediately recollect unresolved problems.

The brightest illustration of such mobilization under external pressure was the dispute between Ukraine and Russia about Tuzla Island in fall 2003. At that time Russia began construction of a dam from Russian Taman Peninsula to Ukrainian Tuzla Spit Island without any coordination with Ukrainian party. The Russian party grounded its position by the indefinite status of the island of Tuzla Spit, but it was unable provide documents supporting the Russian Federation title for the island.

Under these conditions Russia was taken by Ukrainian society as an external aggressor. The Ukrainian Ministry of the Foreign Affairs declared this action to be unfriendly and violating the Ukrainian territorial integrity. The response of the Ukrainian government was supported by the half of Ukrainian people. This conflict has decreased the number of Ukrainians supporting union of Ukraine with Russia by 6%, and increased the number of people believing that both countries have to be independent and friendly nations by 5%²⁸.

But the conflict around Tuzla Island was quickly forgotten by the society and did not remove the contradictions that came to a background during the "Tuzla conflict". Later the most active became issues about the status of the Russian language as the second official one and about recognition of the UPA veterans as warriors defending the country from aggressors in the Second World War; this practically did not change the percentage of those who supported the entry to the "Single Economic Space" Union.²⁹

This effect resulted from such actions of the Russian Federation as increasing the gas prices and a ban of import of cattle-breeding products. Social opinion polls prove that 26.2% of respondents declared their attitude to Russia got worse, while 41.7% have not changed their opinion.³⁰ Immediately after the gas crisis sociologists have registered increase of support to the President and pro-President political parties³¹.

However, even in these assessments one could see regional differences: people take external irritants in the light of their personal values and expectations, and, moreover, consider the comments and viewpoints of the political forces that they support. Accordingly, unlike the "Tuzla conflict", the gas conflict was accepted with great regional differentiation: Russia is seen as guilty side by 5% of respondent in the Eastern Ukraine and by 41% in the Western regions³².

Thus, without finding internal ways to smooth the regional differences external factors will not bring the country to sustainable consolidation of the society.

2. The authority of the nation in international affairs helps to create internal base for overcoming internal conflicts

The perspective to see your country as influential and authoritative actor in the international relations looks more promising. The pride for the nation is a natural feeling of a citizen and

²⁸ Вопрос о Тузле. Взгляд из Украины // Политком // <http://www.politcom.ru/2003/zloba3473.php>

²⁹ Украинцы спокойно переживают конфликт вокруг Тузлы // Форум // <http://media.topping.com.ua/news/society/2003/11/17/220553.html>

³⁰ Украинцы и россияне не любят друг друга // Корреспондент. - 8 февраля 2006 г.

³¹ "Наша Україна" скорочує розрив // Українська правда. - 1 лютого 2006 р. // <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2006/2/1/38270.htm>

³² Політичні орієнтації населення України: за два місяці до виборів. / Прес-реліз за даними опитування, проведеного з 18 по 28 січня 2006 року. - К.: КМІС, лютий 2006 р. - С. 6-7.

strengthening this feeling through real actions will create positive background for self-identification with the nation among people from all the regions.

To play active role in the international stage or at least in the region, and, moreover for integral perception of this positive role by a society, the government has to formulate its international mission and actively implement it. Instead of being aimed at the "internal problems", like European or Euro-Atlantic integration, this mission should be aimed at external promotion of the national interests through active influence of other nations. Effective achievements at the international stage become the acquiring of both the society as whole and each person in particular. The pride for the success often overlaps claims that conflicting parties inside the country may communicate to international community criticizing the government policy.

Possessing scarce resources for active impact on the processes in the region and for expansive economic policy and policy of force the nation either may choose becoming a provider of definite principles and ideals attractive for other nations or it may rather narrow sector for applying its efforts and obtain the outputs important for its citizens.

Tolerant foreign policy is a factor that positively influences social stability. It allows aiming the society at development factors not at struggle and conflicts. Ability to find mutually satisfactory solutions and prevent potential conflict is the sign of wise public administration. Solutions of this kind appear to be the most beneficial in long-term perspective, although they require big efforts and a lot of patience. This policy has additional positive factor: it provides opportunity for applying international mechanisms of reconciliation for integration of the nation and proves that there is no disunity that could not be overcome.

Thus, European Union would not be possible without the conciliation of France and Germany. This reconciliation took place gradually through both practical and symbolic steps. "Good neighborhood" relations were constructed gradually between the French and German cities, and special effort was given to economic integration. On the other hand special action was taken to turn separating symbols into the uniting ones. A good example is a War Cemetery in Verdun, which was visited together by the French and German Presidents.³³

As for the international affairs, Ukraine managed to demonstrate the similar steps. In summer 2005 both Ukrainian and Polish Presidents participated in the opening of The Orliata Cemetery in Lviv that provided an opportunity to resolve old problem in the relations between the Ukrainians and the Poles. As for today, the amount of negative information about Ukraine in Polish mass media has decreased significantly, and this makes positive impact on the public opinion in Poland about Ukrainians and removes many conflicts at interpersonal level.

Ukraine has entered the twenty of most peace-promoting countries; more than 25 thousand of soldiers have passed their training in 20 peacemaking military detachments³⁴. With adequate informational support, peacemaking mission of Ukraine may become one of the sources of proud for its citizens.

Ukraine's attempt to initiate reconciliation of the conflict in Pridnestrovie, in case of its success, also could become a source of proud for the citizens about the important role of the country.

³³ Бжезинський З. Україна й Польща в контексті європейської інтеграції // Стратегічна панорама. - 1998. - № 3—4 // http://www.niurr.gov.ua/ukr/publishing/panorama3_4/Brzez_t.htm

³⁴ Україна 24 жовтня разом зі світовим співтовариством відзначатиме 60-річчя створення Організації Об'єднаних Націй // Укрінформ. - 22 жовтня 2005 р. // <http://www.ukraine-embassy.co.il/ukraine/news/index.php?&rb=7&text=10868&ppage=19>

As many events of the historical past are taken differently in Ukrainian society, then creation of jointly perceptible senses grounded on the country's mission in the regions and in the world, may become good integration factor. However, interpretation of the "mission-implementing" steps also may be viewed in the light of stereotypes if external successes would not be supported significant positive changes inside the country.

3. Pride for the achievements of the country is among the factors capable to unite a society

This method was used by France in the times of Charles de Gaulle: after the war the government tried to unite people and gain recognition through increasing national dignity, focus on the prestige of the French language, culture and history.

Successful and in some aspects unique Orange Revolution made Ukrainians popular in the world for some time, having turned them from "unknown third-type nation" into the citizens of a democratic country. Willing to belong to the "recognized" nation many Ukrainians who kept silence about their nationality started to speak loudly about it. "Belonging to Ukrainians" become one of the factors having a chance to unite the society. In spring comments of people from different regions of the country differed, but this difference was not very big. The majority of respondents said that for 43% their dominating emotion was hope, for 14% it was satisfaction, and for 6% it was joy; and thus two thirds of respondents said that their reaction on the new government was positive. In general, election V.Yushchenko as the President and assignment Yu. Tymoshenko as the Prime Minister were positively taken in Eastern Ukraine by 52% and 53% correspondingly, in the South by 50% and 46% respectively. Economic situation in Ukraine for the first three months of 2005 was assessed as satisfactory (3.97 points from 10-point national scale); while the highest assessment was given in the Western regions (4.96), the lowest one – by the respondents from the East and Southern Ukraine (3.50 and 3.60 points respectively)³⁵.

The phenomenon of disappointment, which came over Ukrainians in late summer of 2005 and was enhanced by disunity among the politicians, requires special research. However it may be, differences between the regions strengthened again and Ukrainian government again faced the problem of unifying symbols.

The irony of political process is that "political" disunity involved even the figures that in all the societies bear a unifying mission: the starts of sports, popular singers, popular music groups, etc. probably, "the exit" of Vitaliy Klychko or Ruslana Lyzhychko into political stage is not an irreversible step; Sophia Rotaru participated in the previous elections and was back to the stage. Anyway, for many figures willing to be associated with their original role it will be necessary to pass through the process of de-politicization during the upcoming inter-election period.

It is clear that this situation opens ways for new projects and making of new stars, but taking into account the pressure of Russian market, this will require purposeful policy allowing to support talented people without putting them in the rigid frames and creating corrupt schemes. This support requires clear formulation what is a "Ukrainian content" worth of support; establishing guarantee of fair and unbiased granting of support and prevention from abuses. It also will require decision about the way how the products of this support will be delivered.

These tasks remain on the agenda. The same is also true for the research, innovation and other creative projects capable to demonstrate that Ukrainian citizens can be successful in up-to-the-day fields.

³⁵ "Сто днів нової влади". Загальні висновки та рекомендації за результатами фокус-групового дослідження. - К.: НІСД, 2005.

4. Unity of a society depend on the successful economic re-integration

Both international successes and domestic projects will remain unnoticed or have no effect if economic disintegration is not overcome and efficient model of regional economic policy is not developed. Each region has its comparative advantages and local opportunities for development, which should be found; and efforts should be contributed to employ those opportunities; and coordination should be taken with the efforts with neighboring regions.

Main objective of this kind of policy is to smooth existing disproportions and to provide Ukrainian citizens with adequate life conditions irrespectively of the place of residence.

The key measure to resolve the problem is to cope with unemployment and creating new jobs with adequate remuneration. One of the most efficient ways to cope the outreach is promoting establishment of new small- and medium-size enterprises.

The State Statistics Committee data shows that the number of small-and medium-size enterprises per 10 thousand of people in Ukraine is much lesser than in the central and Eastern Europe. Only 7.2% of capable-to-work people work in such enterprises and they produce 7.7% of general production in Ukraine. Around 50% of small enterprises work unprofitably for rather long periods of time. Small-size business develops mainly in the mediation and trade sectors, and by now it has not become active provider of innovations and reliable partner of big businesses.

At the same time, the government alone cannot find in each region the fields for rapid development of small- and medium-size business and creation of jobs. This is the task of local governments and local self-government bodies. The structure should be in place at local level, which will assist people with solution of their social problems. In post-Soviet society, where paternalist traditions are still strong, people with social problems feel discomfort and try to find easy solutions and blame somebody; thus people could be easily manipulated by political forces.

Special form of mediation between a person and public authority with the emphasis on encouraging private initiative is partnership of the government, community and business. Establishment of this partnership requires the following steps:

- creating public councils including representatives of the local authorities, local self-government, businesses and NGOs and people's associations;
- discussing the key issues of local at the meetings of these councils, including budget priorities, prospective investment projects, possible ways of the investments involvement, opportunities for the property use;
- openness of the government bodies and self-government bodies for the community: from more reception days and longer reception hours to publication of draft key decisions for public discussion, particularly draft local budgets, infrastructure development plans (including roads), construction development, etc.;
- continues monitoring of effectiveness of the authority actions based on dynamics of social-economic indicators, life standard rate, degree of satisfying people's needs, etc.;
- decreasing administrative burden on citizens, simplification of administrative procedures, monitoring of the effectiveness of the measure;
- using opportunities to involve domestic and foreign investments, better assets management, involvement additional revenues to local budgets.

The work of such councils should involve broad public and representatives all interested groups³⁶. Hence, the task of local state administration may include ensuring adequate membership and workability of such councils which will play role in both social-economic planning and in integration of various social groups for implementation of joint objectives.

These local efforts should be coordinated from the top-administrative level and ensure exchange with best practice experience, integration of resources and integration of communities of the settlements, rayons and oblasts.

5. Translation of the Ukrainian language and culture into uniting factor will require high standards and competitive products

Politicization of self-identity issues in the Ukrainian society, including the language and culture, has bifurcated a strange phenomenon: the use of the official state language is much lesser than the use of the neighboring state official language, and instead of being the integrative factor, the official language becomes a pre-text for discussions and calculations of quantity of Ukrainian and Russian schools, bargaining for the spheres of application, gaining of various statuses, etc.

Despite the claims about forced "Ukrainization" the fact proves that real situation is adverse. More than 80% of printed production in Ukraine is the Russian-language products. National book-publishing is in stagnation: Ukraine publishes 0.4 Ukrainian books per capita annually, not taking into account the textbooks; but even including the textbooks this figure will reach only 1 book per capita. At the same time in Russia this rate amounts to 3.2 books, and Poland - 9.5, and in Germany - 12 books per capita annually. Ukrainian publishing houses produce only 10% from the general market supply. The lack of Ukrainian-language books is compensated by the supply of Russian-language printed products, which supports demand on Russian-language books.³⁷

For a long period journalists and politicians explained their choice of Russian sources and the Russian language by "inability of Ukrainians to produce quality products; some politicians keeps using these arguments even today.

The evidences to support this statements are provided from unsuccessful attempts to create serials as "Roksolana" and "A pray for Hetman Mazepa", that despite all the expectations have not become popular among mass spectators" audience; and low ratings of Ukrainian musical products at the international stage: one of the most popular Ukrainian singers Oleksandr Ponomariov has gained rather a high rating in Eurovision-2003, while many Ukrainian singers consider the Russian pop-music more highly developed than the Ukrainian one.

The recent two years have changed the situation drastically, and Ukraine unexpectedly has demonstrated the highest level of quality in some artistic projects. Ruslana Lyzhychko has won a victory in Eurovision-2004 with its songs based on Ukrainian folk songs of the Carpathian region. The world bestseller about Harry Potter was first translated into Ukrainian than into Russian, and experts believe the Ukrainian translation to be even more adequate. Some Ukrainian pop-stars have shifted to the English-language songs striving for more competition with the singers of world-famous hits, or have become popular in Russia with their Ukrainian-language repertoire.

³⁶ Круглашов А. Етнополітична гармонізація: чи під силу це завдання новоутвореним євро регіонам? // Євро регіони: потенціал міжетнічної гармонізації. - Чернівці, 2004. - С. 28.

³⁷ Костив І. Українское книгоиздание: партизаны выходят из осады // Главред // glavred.info/archive/2005/09/20/110002-9.html; Забужко О. Україна стоїть на порозі гуманітарної катастрофи. - 11 листопада 2005 р. // <http://www.artvertep.dp.ua/news/711.html>

Very similar situation is in Ukrainian journalism. Till recently the Russian journalism was the "highest standard" for Ukrainian colleagues, which had to be complied with. Invitation of Russian journalists to work in Ukraine was taken as recognition of their capacity to create more quality product. However, cancellation of the state censorship has changed the approach. As a result of this, biased programs of the "Varangians" were displaced from prime-time.

"Ukrainization" of the society may proceed only under willingly recognition of the higher quality of Ukrainian products by Ukrainian customers and due to its recognition in the world. Forced transformation of the Russian schools into Ukrainian ones, change of the textbooks and obligatory requirements to use the Ukrainian language will be taken as a pressure and may increase tension in the society.

To increase competitiveness of Ukrainian cultural products it is useful not only to create favorable conditions for its free development, but also establish open and transparent competitions for governmental support of best artistic projects. This approach would allow make better use of scarce financial resources and unite the organizational capacity of the state with the civil society potential. At the same time, Ukrainian artists should be prepared to produce mass cultural products to make them profitable for sponsorship by big financial companies.

6. President as the head of the state may play leading role in the policy of social consolidation

A society divided on any basis is not only a Ukrainian phenomenon. Many European countries overcame ethnic, religious and even language divisions. Possible successful solutions could be different but the key for this success always was produced through united effort: there always was a necessity to find a tradeoff not breaching the vital interests of any side. One of the classics of modern political sciences Arendt Lijphart has developed this idea from the concept of consensus democracy³⁸. The main characteristic feature of this democracy that distinguishes it from traditional "democracy of the majority" is a necessity to consider all important interests and thus prevent conflicts. This model shows the best outputs, when no social groups possess decisive advantage and the majority is shaped by only some percent. The institutional examples of application of this principle are as follows: voting through qualified majority; necessity of preliminary negotiations, various forums and committees for preparation of negotiated decisions. However, there is one condition that is obligatory for successful application of the principle: the parties should be willing to preserve social integrity and ready to reach a tradeoff with this purpose.

In the self-identity issues, particularly in the language issue, institutes of consensus democracy could be successfully applied in Ukraine. We even have some examples: Articles 10 - 13 of the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea actually envisage the use of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of life. In the peninsula the ratio of Russians to Ukrainians is 1:2.4, and the ratio of educational institutions with the Ukrainian and Russian language of instruction is 1:100, including kindergartens; from 638 schools only four schools provide instruction in Ukrainian, while 14 schools provide instruction in Crimean-Tatar language. Taking into account these facts the consensus mechanisms could be used for protecting interests of the Ukrainian speakers.

The counter-argument, often provided to this, is that such "speakers" do not wish to communicate in Ukrainian as the Russian language is more habitual and convenient for them. In this context, it's better to recollect another tool of the modern political science, which is called "affirmative action"³⁹.

³⁸ See.: Lijphart A. Patterns of Democracy. - New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.

³⁹ See: Affirmative Action // Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy // <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/affirmative-action/>

The essence of this tool and concept is that the equity in terms of equality of opportunities is reachable only when competing subjects are liberated from inequality caused by independent and unfavorable factors. This principle is applied to people who enter a University, having limited access to education, and to the languages, which have different spheres of circulation and are differently accepted by government bodies. To make equally favorable conditions for the use of the Russian and Ukrainian languages the existing distortions, caused by previous "Russianization", should be eliminated. On the way of this elimination it would be helpful to apply the measures described above about encouraging Ukrainian products, and also other steps, described in the reports in this collection.

Thus, looking for consensus, Russian speakers will stand for their right to use their native language as broadly as possible in various spheres, while Ukrainian speakers will possess the right to find support that will compensate unequal primary conditions.

Often a special body is established to reach a consensus with the responsibility to maintain negotiations between parties and for maximal satisfaction of both parties. For example, for settling the conflicts between communities that suffered from the Nazi occupation in the war times and the Germans, special reconciliation funds were created in the countries. Thus, in Austria it was called "Reconciliation, peace and cooperation", in Germany it was highlighted "Memory-responsibility-the future". These funds not only paid compensation to Ostarbeiters (people from the occupied territories who were forced to work in the Nazi Germany), they became a symbol of reconciliation and rapprochement between inimical nations⁴⁰.

It would be useful to establish such reconciliation fund in Ukraine. As for today, there are many issues that cannot be resolved "at the upper level", and require serious systemic work and public dialogue. For instance, reconciliation of the Second World War veterans and UNA-UNSO warriors is impossible without shaking hands. The task of the governments is neither to judge and put labels of what is "right" and "wrong", nor leave the conflict unsettled: it is necessary to create conditions for the dialogue and then do not interfere.

Besides creation of special institutions, the head of the state has a great role in the unification of different communities, as he is not only formal representative but a symbol of the integral state and the head of the nation. The head of the state shall become a unifier of the speakers of different languages and believers of different churches, of the residents of all the regions. His equidistant position might prevent from offences, accusations in preferential attitude and political conflicts.

Ukraine may find a good model in Spanish example, which is called a "classical model of reconciliation". On November 22 (by the way, now it is the Freedom Day in Ukraine), 1975, after several dozens of years of Franco dictatorship, the Spanish throne was returned to Juan Carlos I. At that time the Spanish society experienced severe conflicts between supporter of the monarchy, Franco and communists. Announcing this speech from the throne the new king has completed it with the words: "The king wants to be a king for all the people and for everybody. If we manage to preserve our unity we will win the future. Long live Spain!" At the same time the king did not provide any comments on the previous conflicts, on the winners and losers, and the history began from *tabula rasa*⁴¹. The same concept is embodied in the monument to the killed in the civil war in Spain: there is one monument to all of them, irrespectively of the ideological background.

Current policy implemented by President Yushchenko is based on similar principles. Strive to unity did not allow to turn Orange Revolution into a conflict. The majority of Ukrainians has

⁴⁰ Подписаны соглашения о выплате компенсаций остарбайтерам // <http://www.prima-news.ru/news/news/2000/7/18/14540.html?print>

⁴¹ Vivat, король! // Столичные новости // <http://cn.com.ua/N227/meeting/monarch/monarch.html>

demonstrated that an aspiration for freedom and changes are the value in itself. Currently consolidation of the society is one of the priorities of new government.

The President, being guarantor of the Constitution and the rights and freedoms of citizens possess legitimate power and mandate to direct the work of central and local executive bodies at implementation of real measures on strengthening social consolidation.

7. Increasing comprehensiveness and efficiency of legal framework requires new approach

Ukrainian researchers traditionally emphasize that "there are many good laws in the country, but they are not implemented properly". In our opinion existence of the laws that are not implemented means that they are lacking good implementation mechanisms. Possible solution to the problem partially is in the scope of judicial system reform, which has to make judicial system reliable and fair. Partially the solution depends on administrative reform, which is called forth to optimize relations within the executive branch and streamline efforts at the law implementation, provision of rights and freedoms of the citizens.

However, up to the completion of these reforms there are only regulations and legislation that can address the problem, and they are to structure legal framework and aim it at the fulfillment of necessary actions.

The "deferred" nature of many presidential decrees, state programs, and government decisions approved in previous years was their main shortcoming. Instead of setting the implementation mechanisms and monitoring tools, numerous regulations required drafting and submission of new provisions to the Verkhovna Rada, which provisions required another provisions, until one day this circle became broken. That is why twice a year the decrees about anti-corruption combat were published, while real anti-corruption combat did not achieve any success.

Transparent implementation mechanism, clear criteria measuring implementation success and ability to monitor implementation should become the new elements of presidential decrees, particularly in the sphere of social consolidation. These purposes are feasible if a decree envisages cooperation with civil society organizations. Such cooperation may include: steering and expert committees, which are not new in national juridical practice; provision of feedback mechanisms, responsibilities and rights of the committee members; transparent procedure of the membership formation and financing of the activities.

In the sphere of the society consolidation, the "entry point" could be provided by presidential decrees aimed at setting two abovementioned principles: the consensus democracy and affirmative actions. Neither provision of the presidential decree may not limit anybody's rights; it should only create new rights aimed at compensation of unequal primary conditions.

Thus, to encourage creation of competitive Ukrainian cultural products its worth to define what is "Ukrainian contents" with attention to the language of the product, nationality (citizenship) of the author and on the source of financing contributed to the project.

The principle of consensus democracy requires approval of integrative decree, which would provide for additional forms of liability for the manifestation of xenophobia, encouraging intra-national and other kinds of hostility, and ensure mechanisms for prevention of these manifestations jointly with the civil society organizations.

Nationwide and Regional Interests in Modern Ukraine

By OLEKSANDR MAIBORODA,

Doctor of History, Head of Ethnopolitical Science, Institute of Political and Ethno-National Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

Preamble

The Ukrainian presidential elections of 2004 have detected a regional rift. Actually, regional differences were not concealed, on the contrary, they were widely known. However, the degree of regional opposition was a surprise. The fact that these differences were a driving force behind political mobilization of regional population leads to the need for realizing the nature of the regional rift, as well as for identifying the factors of smoothing over the dividing lines, if not its complete overcoming. Naturally, we are speaking not about the dissolution of administrative borders, but of socioeconomic lines, determining divisions of people's interests and needs.

The presence of these lines was demonstrated in the statement by the then-Head of Donetsk Oblast State Administration, made in December 2004: "There's no national uniting idea in Ukraine. We think and feel differently". His colleague, Donetsk Mayor O. Lukyanchenko called for a national idea to unite the society. To tell the truth, he viewed such idea as "Strong regions mean strong Ukraine"¹.

Regional differences will never be leveled. On the other hand, it is important to find such a nationwide *modus vivendi* that would deprive regional interests and needs of disintegration potential. A comparison of regional notions of similar interests and needs could be quite beneficial in achieving this goal.

A quite broad and active mass support in Eastern and Southern oblasts of the all-level deputies assembly, held in Severodonetsk, in December 2004, where the issue of autonomization and federalization of Ukraine was discussed, led to popular fears of possible collapse of the country. However, eventually, it became clear that although the idea of autonomization still has its supporters, after all, for example, even in Donetsk, during election campaign, students preferred the idea of preventing collapse of Ukraine, as shown by meeting of Donetsk students named "Young People are the Future of Ukraine", and press conference of leaders of Donetsk student organizations in early December 2004².

Naturally, the sources of regional opposition were interpreted differently in the West and in the East. In Ternopil oblast, people thought that the division among regions was created artificially to prevent unity of Ukrainians³. In Donbas, readers answering local journalists had a different opinion: "For three generations, the Galicians were raised in the spirit of hatred of the East, hence are the results!"⁴. There's another position that cannot be omitted: the media, which described the opposition (meaning "the orange camp" then) positively, are to blame⁵.

The opinion above shows the significant role of mass media in the formation of regional apprehension of current developments. Therefore, materials from local mass media are important sources for studying of the correlation between regional and nationwide interests.

In particular, regional press is among the channels of manifestation of regional moods. Due to their functional specifics, they put on the agenda the most topical and urgent specific problems, publish ideas as to settle them, and influence popular opinion. A comparative analysis of publications in the press from different regions of Ukraine covering issues of greatest urgency and importance for the people enables us to detect both incompatible regional views on the settlement of most topical

social issues, and solidary positions in this regard. Thereby, the search for an inter-regional compromise as a crucial factor of national integration will be eased considerably.

The need for such comparison was acknowledged at the political level as well. Thus, V. Zubanov, People's Deputy of Ukraine, a member of the Regions of Ukraine group, during his visit to Volyn, spoke in favor of mutual exchange of information among western and eastern regions, as well as joint conferences, roundtables and telebridges⁶.

Journalists themselves realize the role of mass media in the creation of social atmosphere of mutual understanding. The creation, in March 2005, of the Union of Orthodox Journalists under the Simferopol and Crimea Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which includes those who understand their responsibility for fellow citizens' state of mind and healthy moral/ethical climate in the society, was symptomatic in this sense⁷.

The present analysis of materials of regional mass media is concentrated on the basic issues that are the most topical today both for individuals and regional societies. These issues include the following:

- ethno-social and interregional relations;
- social sphere;
- language and cultural processes;
- spiritual sphere;
- environmental condition;
- economic development;
- system of power and its communication with the society;
- external factors of protecting public interests.

The analysis covers press materials from majority of oblasts of Ukraine from summer 2004 (launch of presidential campaign) till summer 2005 (first results of the new government). Attention is paid to publications covering issues above, presenting views of the authorities, business, experts, and journalists themselves. The analyzed publications presented different sectors of social and political thought – mostly liberal, leftist, and national-democratic.

1. Ethno-social and interregional relations

Judging from the press materials, there's no regional fatalism regarding the prospects of formation of a single nationwide psychology. Thus, *Donbas*, a liberally oriented newspaper, after the loss of the eastern presidential candidate, wrote: "we all strive for the same goal: to obtain a merit-based society, with rooted liberty, and strong economy driving towards better future". Under such conditions, there will be no "friend or foe" division among Ukrainians⁸. It's quite another matter that in the east they treat attributes of national independence with greater restraint. *Donetsky Kryazh* newspaper is a mouthpiece of such regionally conservative moods. Thus, in 2004 editorial on the celebration of Independence Day, it stressed that for many people that day remains a simple day-off, therefore, "this year, local authorities' efforts to make the holiday less politicized, naturally, played their positive role for Independence Day". At the height of autonomist demarches of the eastern elite during the presidential elections, the same newspaper claimed that in the western region, "they are not ready yet to recognize variation of people, even of one nation, in different regions". Eastern arguments regarding autonomism are that while "nashisty" (members and adherents of *Our Ukraine (Nasha Ukraina)* bloc) condemn that movement in the East, they do not react to Crimean Tatar's demands of a national-territorial autonomy⁹.

The selection of topics included into ethno-social sphere is different. In the eastern region, publications are more impregnated with rhetoric influenced by internationalism tendencies,

traditional for the region. For example, *Donbas* newspaper expressed its concern with the regional opposition between Cossack organizations of “dontsy” and “zaporozhtsy”¹⁰. A separate article was dedicated to the promotion of activity of the authorities in the sphere of support of ethnic minorities¹¹. Luhansk press covered outbreaks of anti-Semitism as well¹². Odessa press covered the issue of creation of a House of Friendship of Peoples for ethnic cultural organizations¹³.

The character of relations between Crimean Tatars and Slavs in the Crimea remains a serious obstacle to the nationwide unity. In particular, Crimean Tatar press sometimes publishes articles that incite self-isolation of Crimean Tatars from other ethnic groups. *Holos Kryma* newspaper published an article that called stimulation of “voluntary blood-mixing through cross marriages” a “crime” against indigenous people; in particular, it was viewed as a violation of the right of Crimean Tatars to preserve physical, psychical and genetic health of the people¹⁴. In turn, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Commune of Crimea O. Radivilov intimidated Crimean residents in *Krymskaya Pravda* newspaper: “Be ready to protect your civic rights. Unfortunately, nobody will do this for you any more”¹⁵.

The western Ukrainian press covers and interprets interethnic relations quite inconsistently, even by one and the same media. Back in summer 2004, *Vilne Zhyttya*, a newspaper from Ternopil, condemned the “Ukraine for Ukrainians” slogan¹⁶. However, not later than in August, new intonations emerged in the newspaper: “Fear of arrivals has led to a popular paralysis of spirit”¹⁷. In September 2004, there were two articles published simultaneously in the newspaper. One of them criticized pro-Russian forces for failing to understand that Russia does not really need them, merely using them in its political practice, always aggressive and hostile towards culture of any nation. At the same time, the newspaper noted that “Russians and ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine have a common goal to become free from ethnic superstitions and live like humans”¹⁸. A neighboring article contained much harsher views: according to them, Ukraine is being robbed by non-Ukrainian groups¹⁹.

When the election campaign of 2004 became more active, the rhetoric of the newspaper became even more radical: “If we take a closer look at the situation, we’ll come to the following conclusion: Ukrainian culture is in the hands of *mankurts*, incidental people, who have criminally seized power in the art and who destroy it”²⁰. Shortly before that, *Radyanska Volyn*, a leftist newspaper, criticized capitalism as a business plan to destroy national economy first, followed by the state and its people. According to the newspaper, only cosmopolites and people whose interests in life will never rise above striving for profits and personal enrichment can act in such manner²¹.

Vilne Zhyttya newspaper called for attention to the lack of national pride. *The Statement of Organized Nationalist Ukrainian Nationalism*, signed by A. Gaydamaha, M. Plavyuk and O. Tyagnybok, was published in the newspaper, recalling that “at the heart of nationalism is a progressive movement, globally recognized victor of colonial empires and creator of independent states”²².

In Western Ukraine, there are repeated complaints about the absence of “ethnic origin” field in national passports. An example is an article in *Chas*, a newspaper from Chernivtsi, which claimed that “the absence of ethnic origin field is nothing but pathology of social phenomenon”²³.

2. Social sphere

An analysis of regional press shows that regional population should be solidary as regards profound social issues, i.e. issues that are vitally important. For instance, Mr. O. Yefremov, Head of Luhansk Oblast State Administration named the following typical issues, referred to him by the residents: employment, gasification, repair of roofs, salary arrears, and low pensions²⁴. Similarly, Kherson

residents complain to public authorities about social care, material assistance, ensuring adherence to the Residential Code, and law enforcement²⁵.

An article in *Verzhe*, a newspaper from Kherson, demonstrates a higher priority of social issues for the residents of East and South; it negatively assesses the attitude of President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko regarding the construction of a new bridge across Khortytsya Island in Zaporizhzhya: “Public reverence for the sanctity of Khortytsya and raising the issue of creation of a national shrine to the detriment of comfort of local residents are nothing but a display of ‘farm mentality’ which revealed in a faggot of dreams and unrealized hopes of common Ukrainians, who fail to understand that it’s rather a political project, not a realistic one, and that it won’t improve their welfare, as far as no interests of common people are behind it”²⁶.

During the presidential elections, *Reporter* newspaper from Ivano-Frankivsk, speaking on V. Yanukovich program, underlined primarily its social aspects: social equality and justice, social guarantees, residential and educational subsidies for the young, fair remuneration etc.²⁷ In turn, *Donetsky Kryazh*, after the elections, provided a platform for O. Moroz, a socialist leader, to remind about Yushchenko’s promise to implement a social package: to raise salaries and pensions, to provide free medicine and education, lower utility tariffs etc.²⁸

At the same time, the social policy approaches are not completely similar. While the press in the east praised pension-related moves by V. Yanukovich, they were criticized in Western Ukraine. The increase in pensions was called “cynicism and humiliation of the people”, an “election bribe”; growing debts to the Pension Fund were forecasted²⁹. However, the whole Ukraine demanded timely payment of pensions and salaries. At least, that’s what Donetsk residents said in opinion polls after the arrival of the new government³⁰.

It should be noted that both industrialized and agricultural regions are equally alarmed by rural problems. Both East and West cite rural unemployment, poverty, lack of potable water, communications, and incomplete implementation of the Law on Priority of Social Development of the Countryside and Agricultural Complex of the Economy³¹.

Regions agree that the settlement of land property issue is among means of resolution of social problems. Donetsk press speaks about the impossibility of implementation of legal acts and regulations on allocation of land to rural cultural workers, teachers and doctors, as far as the land has already been shared. Another problem is the issue of land certificates; only 6,500,000 out of 16,000,000 villagers have obtained them.³²

Vilne Zhyttya from Ternopil covers another side of the same problem: protracted process of replacement of land certificates with state acts of land property. The newspaper lists the unsettled documentary formalization of land property rights among the reasons of villagers’ hardships. Another problem is the absence of rent contracts with share owners³³.

The connection between land issue and social development is especially evident for Crimean repatriates, who still experience problems with allocation of land plots at the southern bank of the Crimea³⁴.

Utility problems are common for the whole Ukraine, and not only in terms of comfort of residence. *Khersonsky Visnyk* underlined their broader aspect, the connection with labor migration, as one of means of settlement of employment problem³⁵. The press discussed two major ways of its settlement: state retention of utility tariffs at the expense of budget funds or active introduction of market principles in the utility sector, so that housing departments could become self-running, with prospects of becoming private³⁷.

Other utility problems covered by the press are also common for the whole Ukraine. In Kherson, the decision to compensate depreciated deposits with utility payments is viewed as unfair towards punctual utility payers³⁸. In Ternopil, insufficient funding of social programs for Chernobyl veterans, especially as regards housing, causes alarm³⁹.

Youth problems draw similar attention in the regions. Special attention is paid to educational aspects. Until now, tuition fees are discussed. *Poltavska Dumka* proposes to guarantee fee higher education for everybody, secondary schools remaining free⁴⁰.

In addition, the same newspaper speaks about the need to bring education closer to the needs of economy. Press publications in other regions prove the urgency of the problem. In industrial Donbas, a lack of technical workers is evident because of declining vocational schools and scarcity of engineers, with abundance of lawyers, managers and economists⁴¹. Ternopil press also speaks about disparity between the numbers of graduates and market needs⁴².

In addition, in Ivano-Frankivsk region there's concern with the absence of specialists in the countryside and the condition of education in rural schools, as shown by an interview with education management of the region⁴³.

Poltava press stresses the importance of introduction of market economy principles, such as competition, freedom of choice, openness and mobility, in the education⁴⁴.

Youth employment and guarantees of first workplace are another aspect of the youth problem covered by regional press⁴⁵. An author from Donetsk stresses the importance of the state approach to the matter. Lviv press hopes to overcome youth unemployment⁴⁶ due to the state interference, in particular, incentives for employers to provide first workplaces.

Reporter newspaper from Ivano-Frankivsk highlighted yet another aspect of the youth problem, evident throughout Ukraine: encouraging creation of young families through the settlement of housing issue⁴⁷.

Labor safety remains an important social problem. Primarily, it alarms eastern industrial and mining regions. *Molodogvardeets* and *Donbas* newspapers have repeatedly taken note of the problem⁴⁸.

A shift from general rhetoric to discussion of concrete ways of settlement of labor safety problems is expected. The eastern region begins application of European labor safety requirements. The ways to decrease gas contamination in mines are being discussed. In particular, the use of American method of extraction of gas from earth with subsequent construction of mines, together with preservation of experienced specialists, is suggested⁴⁹.

Legal support of labor safety is an important issue. In this regard, *Molodogvardeets* from Luhansk drew attention to the fact that the draft Labor Code of Ukraine provides no social care for wage laborers⁵⁰.

Medicine development remains a subject of discussion. For instance, there are arguments in Kherson that medical services can be provided successfully using charity foundations⁵¹. Instead, in Khmelnytsky oblast, there's discontent with commercial character of majority of insurance companies; it is asserted that commercialization of healthcare is inexpedient economically, because the majority of the sick are disabled and poor people⁵².

The press from Western Ukraine has raised several nationwide social issues, the resolution of which requires a change of moral basis of the society. One of them is the family violence, and a lack of social workers to settle the issue⁵³. Waifs and “social orphans”, caused by labor emigration of parents, pose another problem⁵⁴. Yet another problem caused by labor emigration is a lack of crèches and kindergartens for children left by their parents⁵⁵. Special attention was paid to homeless people, resulting in certain experience of their social adaptation⁵⁶.

3. Language and cultural processes

The analysis of regional press has showed nationwide concern with vulgarization of cultural process in Ukraine. *Khersonsky Visnyk* was offended by the domination of so-called *blatnoy* (rogue) music in *marshrootkas* (jitneys), and turned attention to the experience of Kiev City State Administration to combat this phenomenon, stressing the importance of legislative support⁵⁷. *Verzhe* newspaper from Zaporizhya was disturbed by the fact that the people are more and more interested in celebrities’ privacies instead of thinking on the sense of life, happiness being equated to material wellbeing, while mass culture parasites on primitive instincts⁵⁸. In Donbas, the press tried to disseminate positive experience of preservation of traditional culture, in particular, using the example of Tatar community, which passes pride of the motherland and true patriotism from generation to generation, inoculating love for national music and cultural traditions, viewing songs as a tool for ennoblement of spirituality⁵⁹.

At the same time, eastern press sometimes publishes articles aimed against Ukrainian ethnic culture. *Donetsky Kryazh*, in particular, insisted that Ukrainian culture is untraditional for Donbas. The cause for that was a child reading book called *Donbas Periwinkle*, which, according to the newspaper, contained “many *chumaks*, towels, mothers and periwinkles, but so little Donbas, its people and spirit”. The newspaper considers the propaganda of Ukrainian culture as a social control, aimed supposedly at “forgetting the Russian language, originality and diversity of culture and brave of Donbas people”⁶⁰. On the other hand, *Donbas* newspaper tried in lengths to paint a positive image of Western Ukraine, its people and cultural traditions⁶¹.

The press of central oblast is concerned with the loss of cultural possession. *Poltavska Dumka* turns attention to the fact that new commercial buildings destroy architectural faces of cities. The newspaper published an appeal by participants of “Ukrainian National Idea: Origins and Present Condition” roundtable, held in Poltava, calling for use of best standards of Ukrainian culture, stressing its deep roots, ancient and glorious history and great possessions, and turning down attempts to reduce Ukrainian culture to bloomerish antiquities.

An interview with representatives of Crimean Tatar intelligentsia, published in *Holos Kryma*, reminded about the need to preserve national cultural heritage: “The mentality of Crimean Tatar people was created for centuries in the traditional city environment, including the streets, city and village blocks... The miserable condition of cultural heritage of Crimean Tatars is a global indicator of defenselessness of indigenous people and their heritage in the face of tyranny and despotism”⁶².

Western Ukrainian press has been traditionally raising the issue of preservation of cultural heritage. Here one may see similar appreciation of experience of preservation of national memory by ethnic minorities, in particular by Greeks⁶³; at the same time there’s concern with the passive attitude of the young people and a lack of national feelings of the young, disdain for Ukrainian language, and domination of mass music⁶⁴.

Western Ukrainian press is more passionate in search for antidote for cultural vulgarization attempts. *Galychyna* from Ivano-Frankivsk insists that the problem is not only about insufficient support of Ukrainian culture by the state. People themselves should polish their esthetic tastes. On

one hand, country schools cherish traditions, but that's about it: "And then there's total darkness, caused by unwillingness to learn something new, and intellectual and emotional infancy. It went so far as to the situation when senior pupils have no idea of modern Ukrainian writers. Therefore, cultural situation in the region may be considered "an ignorance dressed in folk attire"⁶⁵.

The *Express* newspaper from Lviv has similar thoughts: "Annual festivals of ethnic music, regularly held in Transcarpathia, recent victory of Ruslana, with her seemingly Hutsul "Wild Dances", at Eurovision Song Contest, created an illusion of a kind of renaissance of Hutsul traditions. At the same time, it is becoming harder and harder to hear a true *kolomyjka* (folk song) in the mountains, while authentic folklore is carried mostly by old people who have nobody to hand over century-long traditions"⁶⁶.

In Chernivtsi oblast, the press turns attention to the direct dependency between national cultural processes and general development: "To love Ukraine, to live in accord means to value and know its history, state language, culture, faith, folk traditions, to love the state that cares for the development of ethnic cultures and raises spirituality of each citizen, protects the people, provides opportunities for their realization and obtaining decent salaries. Under such conditions, our state will become a country of global level of development, and the Ukrainians will turn into a modern nation, respected globally"⁶⁷.

It is indicative that different regions demonstrate similar understanding of the preservation of classical cultural heritage. Thus, in Kherson oblast, the press emphasizes a necessity for growing interest to classical music, while in Ternopil oblast there's concern with a decline of opera because of scarce funding⁶⁸. The preservation of historical monuments is yet another subject of common concern. In Lviv oblast, emphasis is made on the losses because of removal of cultural artifacts from Ukraine: "Mostly they were stolen and brought to Moscow. Here we may act maybe through an international court, but still there are no guarantees". The newspaper calls for scientific proofing of Ukrainian property of removed artifacts, and for pressure on officials for greater activity in that regard⁶⁹. Attention is paid to specific monuments as well. In Poltava oblast, there is a concern with destruction of ancient Slavic burial mounds, in particular, with danger to Stovburova Mogyla⁷⁰.

The condition of cultural establishments is a common regional problem. In Donbas, relevant articles turn attention to decline of cultural centers and libraries, and scarce funding of museums. In Kherson oblast they believe that it is impossible to survive without centralized support of culture, and call for spreading of Rivne experience of restoration of culture infrastructure in rural areas so that every village would have only one, but really working, cultural center⁷¹.

In central oblasts, the press criticizes the practice of spending tremendous amounts of money on organization of festivities, while this money is managed by few individuals, they are indifferent to the future of museums; attention is drawn to insufficient funding of not only museums, but also musical schools and creative teams⁷².

In Ternopil oblast, attention is concentrated on factors preventing the development of cultural process: low salaries of culture and art workers, practice of funding shortfall of cultural establishments, including professional teams, lack of money for purchase of instruments for musical schools and books for libraries, and problems of heating of cultural establishments⁷³.

Language issue is the most confrontational one, as confirmed by regional press analysis. Draft law on languages, submitted by O. Moroz, socialist leader, provided a new impetus for discussion. *Donetsky Kryazh* had a special interview with him in order to provide a platform for arguments in favor of the draft law⁷⁴. As it should be expected, regional press made completely different assessments. In the East, the position of the Russian language *Donbas* newspaper may be

considered typical; however, the newspaper consistently supported the development of the Ukrainian language and its broader use, and against granting the Russian language the status of second state language (so to say, nobody forbids speaking Russian); it popularized Ukrainian written records and persuaded its readers that legalizing Russian as a state language is nothing else but speculations of unfair politicians. At the same time, the newspaper supported the draft law by O. Moroz⁷⁵.

In the East and West, the press disseminates negative attitude towards spreading Ukrainian in the sphere of education and decreasing number of Russian language and literature lessons⁷⁶. Even more so, there are attempts to discredit the Ukrainian language itself. *Verzhe* newspaper from Zaporizhyya claims that “everyone knows very well that expressive means of Russian and its lexical composition are much richer than those of Ukrainian”. Another newspaper from Zaporizhyya, *MIG*, repeats the same thesis: “Modern Ukrainian, according to many literati and readers, is so obsolete that it is simply incapable of adequate description of the present-day reality”⁷⁷.

The press of southern region expresses both positive opinions regarding legalizing Russian language as a state language, and even more radical opinions that there should be the only state language, uniting the people for the achievement of a goal. Hence, aggressive political forces that care not for social interests, but for own ambitions⁷⁸ raise the language issue.

The press of the western oblasts shows complete imperceptions of granting the Russian language the status of official, let alone state language. Such harsh attitude is reinforced with concerns regarding the present condition of Ukrainian language and culture. In particular, *The Express* newspaper from Lviv published an interview with G. Udovenko, a member of parliament, where it was underlined that the principal ethno-national problem is the condition of title nation, the Ukrainians, whose language should be the language of interethnic communication in the country⁷⁹. Covering language/cultural situation in the country, *Volyn* newspaper notes: “Striving to consolidate itself ‘in a friendly circle of nations’, Ukraine faces outstanding examples of overcoming postcolonial language dependency in many countries. In the meantime, we still declare national renaissance, remaining a spiritual semi-colony”⁸⁰. Ternopil press expresses its resentment with disregard for Ukrainian in the parliament, government, presidential administration, TV, mass media, and publishing business⁸¹.

Forecast of catastrophic future of the Ukrainian language has influenced the perception of draft law by O. Moroz. As a result of presidential Decree on the Protection of the Rights of Citizens to Use the Russian Language and Languages of Ethnic Minorities, *Bukovyna* from Chernivtsi published an appeal of the Reporting and Election Conference of Chernivtsi Oblast Union of *Prosvita* all-Ukrainian Association to the President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko, deputies of the Verkhovna Rada, ministers, top officials of all ranks and Ukrainian citizens, which stated that, after the draft law by Moroz, it was the second heavy hammer that deals a deadly blow to the Ukrainian language, and probably finishes it off⁸².

In *Volyn* newspaper, a group of Ukrainian intelligentsia speaking about the draft law by O. Moroz declared that the Ukrainian language has become “one of the most flawless languages of the world”; unfortunately, many people from other ethnic groups have failed to learn the language of the title nation: “So do we really need to adjust our laws to their disrespect of us, their neglect, ultimately, to their ignorance?”⁸³.

In Chernivtsi oblast, people believe that the Ukrainian language is not only a priority, but also an obligation for every Ukrainian citizen; moreover, the language is the national immunity⁸⁴.

The same newspaper published an appeal of Chernivtsi branch of the Union of Ukrainian Females to V. Yushchenko, Yu. Tymoshenko and V. Lytvyn, containing the following wordage: “The state status of Ukrainian language has been steadily ignored by top officials... That flagrant tradition is continued today by some officials and deputies of the Verkhovna Rada, thereby proving their anti-Ukrainian, anti-state position”. According to the authors of the appeal, legalizing Russian as second state language will “bury” the language of the title nation⁸⁵.

Proskuriv, a newspaper from Khmelnytsky, has published a positive reportage of the conference of oblast organization of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, where the idea of state bilingualism and the said presidential decree were criticized, and *The Express* newspaper from Lviv gave the floor to L. Lukyanenko, a member of parliament, who warned that as far as the reality demands us to save our motherland instead of spreading Russia in Ukraine, in case of granting the Russian language the status of second state language, it will be necessary to oppose the President⁸⁶.

Leftist media are an exception in Western Ukraine: on the one hand, they are forced to recognize the role of title nation language; on the other hand, they support the idea of two state languages. *Radyanska Volyn*, for instance, recalled that during the Soviet times, much more books were published in Ukrainian, and Ukrainian songs were heard in cultural centers throughout the USSR; as a result, “the Ukrainian language enriched the Russians considerably, primarily, in literature, theater and poetry”. Hence, according to the author of the article quoted, bilingualism is a tremendous cultural resource of Ukraine; therefore, there’s no point in Ukrainian translations of technical literature⁸⁷.

Regional opposition on language issue remains hardly resolvable yet, due to its axiological substance: every part of Ukraine associates with it the establishment of certain spiritual and ideological preferences.

4. Spiritual sphere

Regional language preferences are related to different spiritual values, which have different civilization roots. Religious sources of civilization affiliation are reflected in attitude of population of regions to church problems.

In view of greater religiousness of local population, Western Ukrainian press pays special attention to the problems of churches and denominations.

Articles in Western Ukrainian press show, first of all, attitude towards religions as a weighty state-building and society-organizing factor. *Chas* newspaper from Chernivtsi asserts that the church is a “social institution, whose word and order must become the supreme guide in defending national interests. Naturally, the state authorities cannot force or even direct people to churches and denominations. However, the president of the state must have his own opinion and clear attitude towards religious and national/cultural priorities”. Proceeding from this point, the author suggests the national leaders to make the primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) rename the church as “the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine”⁸⁸.

Articles in *Volyn* newspaper contain similar rhetoric, asserting “The Church, due to its moral authority, should call upon everyone to be fair and responsible in the face of God, state law, people and himself”. The newspaper is concerned that “in Ukraine, some political and church figures try to entice the people of God from the path of virtue through thrusting a system of values fed by mass media in the absence of care of real culture by the state”. Developing this idea, the newspaper persuades that welfare and justice are possible only when “the people, as a whole, and each human

being, in particular, consolidate in major spiritual ideals, on which the whole social tradition is based. We are speaking about faith, love, spirit of patriotism, beneficence and self-sacrifice”⁸⁹.

Vilne Zhyttya from Ternopil condemned local authorities of Chortkiv because of their refusal to allow construction of a new Christian church, saying: “without God’s blessing it is impossible to invigorate the society”. In reply, Chortkiv local authorities noted: “We can build many churches and decorate them with gold and silver, but what’s good in that if there’s no true God in our souls?”⁹⁰

The special attitude of western Ukrainians to the social role of the church is demonstrated by the reaction of local press to the declaration of Constantinople representatives that the Universal Patriarchate considers illegitimate the annexation of Kiev Archdiocese to Moscow Archdiocese in 1686. In this regard, *The Express* newspaper from Lviv expressed hope that the new political conditions will allow the establishment of a Single Local Orthodox Church in Ukraine⁹¹.

The same newspaper raises the issue of state recognition of theology as a science, publishing the opinion of M. Marynovych, Dean of the Catholic University, who is discontented by the fact that as far as the state does not recognize theology, those who study it are not students in formal sense, they cannot enjoy some social benefits and obtain diplomas of state pattern⁹².

The anti-Catholic sacred procession of Orthodox Christians, held in Kiev in November 2004, obtained purely political assessment from *The Express*: “An event, organized by the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods of Ukraine, Alexander Nevsky Orthodox Brotherhood and the Russian Movement of Ukraine, may be viewed only as an attempt to destabilize even more the political situation in Ukraine on the eve of elections”⁹³.

The church is still considered a defender of Ukrainian ethnicity in Western Ukraine. Thus, *Vilne Zhyttya* from Ternopil opposes putting regionality higher than Ukrainian ethnicity; it condemns neglect of the Ukrainian language by priests of Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate, as it was demonstrated in Zholoby Village, Kremenets rayon, where Ukrainian-language church literature was burnt⁹⁴.

At the same time, western Ukrainian press underlies the humanistic function of the church. *Vilne Zhyttya* provided a floor to a priest for expression of his admiration of the joint prayer by the Pope John Paul II and Constantinople Patriarch Bartholomew, crying: “Oh God! Please put some mind into the heads of the authorities, our leaders, so that they would remember: we want peace, accord, we want brother unity, not opposition”⁹⁵. The newspaper propagated the importance of prayer, which must become “top priority in life”⁹⁶.

In the East, attitudes towards religion and the church are more reserved. In this regard, speeches against the use of the church in elections, for inter-denominational tolerance⁹⁷ in accordance with the separation of the church from the state principle, are typical.

In addition to church/religious, the press pays attention to such aspect of spirituality as the attitude to the values of the communist era; the remainders of that era are streets named after communist leaders and monuments to them. The western Ukrainian press directly condemns those Ukrainian cities that have not renounced their names that include the names of Bolshevik chiefs (“the executioners, butchers”). Central Ukrainian media support such position, speaking in favor of renaming streets that bear communist symbols and removal of monuments to Lenin⁹⁸.

The leftist press replies that the destruction of symbols of soviet era would mean the destruction of human memory, and that it’s open fascism in its modern form⁹⁹.

Donetsk press addresses the monument issue outside political/ideological criteria. Thus, *Vecherny Donetsk*, based on readers' opinion, initiated the discussion of the idea of immortalization of the memory of the people who honored Donbass¹⁰⁰.

It turned out that the demands to liquidate communist symbols could unite conflicting parties. Thus, *Holos Kryma*, a Crimean Tatar newspaper, informed about the position of the opponent of Crimean Tatar movement, the Congress of Russian Communes of Crimea, which spoke in favor of returning historical names to streets named after Bolshevik leaders, and about the intention of the Congress to set up a monument to victims of communist repressions¹⁰¹.

5. Environmental conditions

Poor environmental conditions are a national problem, attitude to which reveals common regional interest. It is chiefly caused by the fact that each oblast suffers from pollution of the environment, though this problem is especially acute for eastern oblasts. The local press describes state of the environment in detail. The press from Donetsk, for example, writes about threatening situation in the oblast, giving data that man-caused emissions in the oblast make up 70 tons per square kilometer, that there exist 580 waste banks here, 14 of which are on fire, that the oblast has the lowest coefficient of population reproduction and that death rate surpasses birth rate by 2.7 times. According to the press, Luhansk oblast is the third in Ukraine with respect to emissions. The press from Kherson accuses authorities of indifference to the problem of burial places for chemical weed and pest killers (there three of them in the oblast), as well as to the problem of waste dumps in collective farms, though it is these dumps that cause infectious diseases. The press from Zaporizhzhya is concerned about the fact that 50% of children suffer from allergy because of poor environmental conditions¹⁰². It is natural that the issue of environmental cleanness is so seriously dealt with in the East: "If somebody does not want to take care of people's health, we must apply to him the severest measures up to closing separate factories and sectors"¹⁰³.

Environmental threat has not yet obtained such a scale in the West. The press from Lviv even published information, according to which general environmental situation in Ukraine was better than in Europe judging by existence of living organisms acutely reacting to pollution¹⁰⁴. The general environmental situation is most likely improved by low industrialization of oblasts in the Centre and West. The problem of trash dumping is the most topical here. *Moloda Galychyna* newspaper takes up the issue of utilization of sludge originating from Hungary. The press from Poltava drew attention to the town trash dump, though the call for "removing" this "dark stain" was not accompanied with corresponding technological methods. In the East, acuteness of the problem of waste is intensified by wider possibilities of its processing. The local press popularized, in particular, a thermolysis method developed in the region and proposed establishing a new industry, namely that for trash processing¹⁰⁵.

The regional press repeatedly discussed problems of nature preservation. The press from Donetsk spoke out against cutting down greenery during construction, drew attention to preservation of reserve territories. The press from Kherson tried to encourage people for taking part in actions for preservation of the remains of the Lower Dnieper plavni, a greater part of which was wiped away as a result of constructing a cascade of electric power stations on the Dnieper River. The problem of water supply became topical in Lugansk¹⁰⁶.

Protection of the environment is a uniting issue for all regions, but efforts directed to its implementation are still local in nature.

6. Economic development

Settlement of the abovementioned problems, which belong to regional and national interests, needs material and financial support, as well as search for means of implementing social and humanitarian projects.

Naturally, economic development is one of the key issues discussed by the regional press. People in Donbas are especially concerned about a decrease in economic indices, in the first place in industries, which form economic image of the region, namely coal-mining, machine tool, power engineering, electronic, and other industries, including agriculture. Increase in production of goods and saturation of the market, as well as efficient functioning of crisis free economy are regarded in the region as the main method for fighting against inflation. The press from Donetsk calls for establishment of a social movement for economic revival of the country with the aim of overcoming the crisis in 2–3¹⁰⁷ years instead of 10 – 20.

Pricing is one of the priority economic issues, which are directly connected with ability of people to satisfy their social and cultural interests. The press discusses two ways for its settlement, namely market and administrative ones. It should be noted that preference of this or that way correlates neither with Pro-European nor Pro-Eurasian rhetoric. For example, in the eastern region, where sympathies for the left and Russia traditionally prevail, the press popularizes ideology of market fighting against inflation. *Express-Club* in Luhansk, for example, provided in 2004 the then head of the Oblast State Administration O. Yefremov with opportunity to give publicity to his view of ways for solving the problem: "Active saturation of the market with qualitative products as the main instrument of controlling prices"¹⁰⁸. The same point of view was expressed in a Crimean newspaper, which cast doubt on efficiency of administrative control over prices. In its point of view, economic growth in the country would contribute to absorption of the money stock. It is characteristic that possibilities of the growth are coordinated with taxation level of large and medium enterprises¹⁰⁹.

People in the industrial Kharkiv connect controlling of meat prices with restriction of import of the product aimed at favoring national producers¹¹⁰. In the Kherson oblast, proposals are expressed to strengthen administrative control over prices with the purpose of making entrepreneurs observe legislation on pricing and rendering impossible an ungrounded rise in prices and falsifications in calculation of process costs¹¹¹.

An article in *Hryvnya* newspaper from Kherson can be considered to be indirect stimulation for administrative interference in activities of the meat market¹¹², since it named taking out of cattle by the dealers to adjacent oblasts as one of the causes of growth in meat prices in 2004.

Vilne Zhyttya newspaper from Ternopol also greatly relies on state control over prices. It states that "administrative interference in economy is not a bad thing" and the government should organize fairs, at which producers would sell goods. The newspaper reflects mood of the local population: administrative price restrictions should be imposed at least before holidays, so that prices do not rise at this time¹¹³.

Saturation of market with foodstuffs, prices of which particularly influence social position of population in Ukraine, depends on level of development of agricultural sector. Its condition is subject of concern in all regions. People in Donetsk region are especially concerned with such phenomena in villages as unemployment, decline of social sphere, uncertainty in optimal size of farms, delays in issuance of state land certificates, lack of attention to problems in the agricultural sphere on behalf of the government and the state as a whole¹¹⁴.

In industrial development, hopes are mostly set upon the market, whereas in agricultural upon the state. A point of view is widely spread that it is the state that should fix minimal procurement price for crops and make guaranteed procurement (*Molodogvardeets* newspaper from Luhansk contains confession of an anonymous farmer that he managed to sell crops to the state only after giving a bribe¹¹⁵).

Materials of the regional press provide grounds for considering that people in the regions are aware of such national danger as loss of farmers' interest in production of crops.

"Sure thing, – the author of the article in *Molodogvardeets* notes, – those who process grain do not care at all, how much a farmer would receive for his work, they will “screw his arms” till the end, they have enough possibilities for that, and the farmer has no space for maneuvers as terms for returning credits come very soon". According to observations of the author, farmers tend to reduce areas under crops¹¹⁶. *MIG* newspaper from Kherson prompts the same conclusion noting that prices make production of crops unprofitable¹¹⁷.

The regional press names mechanisms for supporting the agricultural sector, among them being provision to farmers of credits in the amount of UAH 3-4 million for 5–10 years at low interest rate (in such a case they will not have to farm land to those who spoil it with improper irrigation), renunciation of crediting against pledging property which value exceeds three times the amount of loan, and crediting of even those farmers who have debts¹¹⁸.

Judging by the press, people in all regions understand that economic crisis cannot be overcome without technological renewal of production process. This problem is actively discussed in the eastern and southern parts of the country.

Donetsky Kryazh newspaper, touching upon further fate of metallurgical complex, publishes an article about the need of its re-equipment on the basis of large-scale social programs. The other article states, "Current technical level of metallurgy and ore extraction in Ukraine cannot satisfy modern economy at all". The newspaper contains warning of director of one of the machine-building enterprises that Ukraine can become a place with non-technological and dirty production, which threatens it with global falling behind in historical development¹¹⁹.

Calls for renewal of hi-tech enterprises and revival of science for the purpose of producing science intensive products are contained in a number of articles of the Donbas newspaper¹²⁰. The Donetsk press mentions particular technological issues to be solved. They include, for example, energy conservation, development of technology for extraction of mine gas¹²¹.

Possibilities for technological renewal of the leading industries, including shipbuilding and agricultural sector, are being discussed in Kherson oblast. The *Hryvnya* newspaper, for example, publishes point of view of a captain concerning the necessity of complete renewal of fixed assets of ship building enterprises, including meltdown of outmoded facilities (it should not be regarded as "dumping" of enterprise). *Naddnipryanska Pravda* newspaper cites words of a farm head who considers that dictatorship of technologies is the keystone of success in agriculture. The latter newspaper contains also view of the head of oblast department for water economy concerning prospects of irrigation farming, namely application of developments of scientists, designers, and use of new machines for irrigating a territory of 470,000 hectares¹²².

The Chernivtsi press also calls for revival of powerful complexes in the agricultural sector, which could become plants for production of foodstuffs in case of introduction of new advanced technologies¹²³.

A lack of financial resources in Ukraine forces reliance on investments as an instrument in overcoming economic stagnation. Encouragement of investments (state and private, including foreign ones) is periodically discussed in the regional press. Problem of state support to the mining industry, which annually needs UAH 6 billion subsidies, is especially topical for Donbass¹²⁴.

Creation of favorable legal conditions for encouraging flow of investments to the regions is an important topic. *Vechernyaya Odessa* newspaper determined encouraging of investments as one of preconditions for economic stir-up¹²⁵. Discussions related to this issue became more intensive after decision of Yuliya Tymoshenko's government to withdraw tax privileges and special customs regime as regards free economic areas and priority development territories. The Crimean and Kharkiv press regarded it as a hard blow to investments. This conclusion was illustrated in the Crimea by situation in ship repair industry. As a result of abolition of zero taxation rate for export of works and services, the cost of works substantially rose, which caused a decrease in orders¹²⁶.

Negative evaluation was given to attempt of President Viktor Yushchenko to veto (it was overrode by the Verkhovna Rada) the law on state support to ship building industry because of its conflicting with principles of the European Union¹²⁷.

The state support issue is also taken up with regard to agricultural sphere. People in Luhansk region consider that it is necessary to subsidize stock-breeding, provision of forage resources, as well as procurement of foreign equipment, not of only domestic one which is often more expensive, but less reliable and productive¹²⁸. *Ekho* newspaper from Zhytomyr provided socialists with possibility to publish their scheme for state regulation of the meat market: to restrict import of the product up to 300,000 tons per year, to sell the quota and to use the received money for rendering support to stock-breeding and poultry farming¹²⁹.

Some articles in the regional press direct their attention to the idea of public management of economy. For example, a local businessman called his colleagues in *Zorya Poltavshchyny* newspaper for creation at the state level of general mechanism, which would regulate market relations¹³⁰. Such position reflects public moods condemning Ukraine's economy for being clannish and oligarchic¹³¹.

7. Jural state and civil society

Establishing of efficient system of state authority and ensuring democratic nature of society constitute the second factor after economy in ensuring social and cultural needs of the Ukrainian population and the second subject of attention of the regional press.

Evaluation given by the regional press to the state authorities reflects general public mood. Negative attitude towards authorities, whether they belong to the period of Kuchma or to the modern one, is typical for the press of all regions without any exception. People in Donbas think that authorities, which are clannish and live separately from the folk, are to be blamed for economic crisis together with "separative princelings"¹³². *Verzhe* newspaper from Kherson also writes about separation of the authorities from the folk, their insincerity and closeness, transformation of social barrier into a caste one. People in central oblasts are convinced that out of three Ukraines, namely Diaspora, people's Ukraine and official Ukraine, only the latter lives independently of the citizens. They also believe that these nomenclature authorities are predatory and unpatriotic, unlike, for example authorities in Poland. Deputies-businessmen are characterized as people who have no idea of business, they only "sit at the budget trough and gobble", not a bit caring of living standard of people¹³³. The West also considers that Ukrainian authorities turned out to be unbearable for the Ukrainians since they were not united, which caused economic crisis¹³⁴.

Conflicts within authorities are condemned. For example, struggle for the post of Odessa mayor between E. Gurvits and R. Bodelan caused worry of the local press and local politicians in the first place because of a probable decrease in the flow of investments¹³⁵.

Negative attitude towards authorities is also stimulated by excessive increase in number of officials and deputies, as well as their ungrounded privileges¹³⁶.

The press in all regions emphasizes the need in political stirring up of the population and importance of democratic values. These two things were heard more often especially after the "orange revolution". The democratic press in Donbas tried to convince everybody, even during period of regional confrontation during last presidential elections, that this confrontation meant that "population began to transform into a nation – slowly, gradually, but confidently". Notwithstanding the general mood, caused by defeat of the regional candidate for the presidential post, the democratic press insisted "if we speak about revolution, we should say that it took place in souls and hearts, at the moral and ethical level. People began to transform gradually into a nation, outlines of civil society became visible". In any case, people began to strongly believe that they would be able to achieve much in fighting for their rights and freedoms. The press tried to strengthen optimistic mood of people concerning the future, and to encourage them in expressing civil position, explaining that mass-meetings and tent towns are a result of awakening of the society¹³⁷.

Newspapers from Donetsk emphasize rise of a civil society, which gives the opportunity to get rid of feeling of national inferiority. They also want to lay stress on positive achievement of the "orange revolution", which consists in the fact that "future authorities will pay attention to public opinion and will be afraid of acting at their discretion".

It is important that the press attempts to prevent deepening of the regional split, emphasizing that real confrontation in Ukraine exists only between the society and "completely corrupted state", whose deeds should be severely controlled¹³⁸. Developing these ideas, the press from Donetsk popularizes experience of citizens' participation in elaboration of legal foundations of the society, in particular, activity of Legislative Initiatives Centre founded in Donetsk Oblast Council, which prepared more than 30 draft laws¹³⁹. The press of the Crimea also stands for the idea of control over authorities. *Pervaya Krymskaya* newspaper provided a leader of *Prozora Vlada* public organization and a people's deputy A. Senchenko with opportunity to express his thoughts on this matter. He regards that procedures for interaction of citizens with authorities must be understandable and transparent, the principal criteria of transparency of the authorities, such as accountability, publicity and informational openness being strictly met. In addition, it is necessary to stop the practice of establishing commercial structures issuing unnecessary paid certificates at the authorities, at the Ministry of Interior in the first place¹⁴⁰.

The left press is especially implacable to authorities, mainly for ideological reasons. Communists from Volyn try to convince that they struggle for "Ukrainian people's becoming a nation, not "small Ukrainians", as well as for concentration of the power in hands of people, not of corrupted and related to mob clans authorities"¹⁴¹.

The problem of interaction between authorities and society is considered as regards making people proud of their own history, aware of the idea of integrity and need of the European choice and aspiration for European values. Previous authorities lost the society's trust in because of being opposed to people and subordinating almost all mass media. However, the newly elected authorities, in opinion of journalists, are not only indifferent to evaluations of the mass media, but also continue to put pressure on them¹⁴². The press from Poltava became concerned about poor working conditions of rural non-government organizations and vulnerability of rural trade unions¹⁴³. The issue of authority's obligation to cooperate with trade unions, in the first place with

independent ones, is also topical for Luhansk region¹⁴⁴. The same issue has wider scale in the Kherson region, where the need of introducing «trilateral consensus» practice (authorities – trade unions – employers) and adopting to this end of law On Social Partnership is considered¹⁴⁵.

The regional press reflects ambiguous attitude towards drafts of political and administrative and territorial reforms at the local level. *Donetsky Kryazh* newspaper publishes in this connection statement of the Social Party's representative G. Samoilyk, who thinks that having adopted the law on political reform Verkhovna Rada saved Ukraine and created a preliminary draft of a new country. In general, the press from Donetsk positively evaluates the idea of parliamentary-presidential republic, which is the main element of the political reform. Quite different evaluation is given to proposals on administrative and territorial reforms. *Donetsky Kryazh* newspaper published commentary of Doctor of Economy V. Vasylenko, who thought that this reform was aimed at weakening of local opposition. In his opinion, the existing regions should be enlarged by consolidation of oblasts under authority of single economic entity, economy should be managed with the help of single mechanism and the county should not be divided into several territories with separate government¹⁴⁶.

People in regions consider it necessary that reforms are not just formally implemented, but used for solving problems in relations of local self-government authorities and state authorities. This issue was discussed at the 7th meeting of the Association of Cities and Communities of Ukraine in July 2004. Giving interview to the press, mayor of the city of Berdyansk emphasized that political reform had to be implemented together with administrative reform, which required widening powers of the local self-government and liquidation of rayon state administrations. People in Mykolaiv oblast are convinced that territorial reform should be economically grounded, though in general the idea of reforming is positively evaluated as a significant step on the path towards democracy according to the European Charter of Local Self-Government ratified by Ukraine¹⁴⁷. In the western region, draft political reform was unconditionally accepted only by the left, who regard it as a possibility to limit powers of pro-western, and thus unbearable for them, president¹⁴⁸. National Democrats also regard the political reform with caution, being afraid of that that it can strengthen positions of pro-Russian forces and will allow representatives of the old power to maintain "own paradise life"¹⁴⁹.

As far as draft administrative and territorial reform is concerned, it was criticized in newspapers of the western Ukraine for containing no changes in the system of authorities and having deep objectives incomprehensible for citizens of the state. *Moloda Galychyna* newspaper emphasizes the need of settling with its help of such problems as budget relations, division of regions into rich and poor, confrontation between mayors, governors and heads of oblast councils¹⁵⁰.

One of the prejudices concerning draft administrative reform is based on the fear that it will result in increase of bureaucracy. According to calculations of deputy head of Chernihiv Oblast State Administration O. Obushny, if the number of officials in rayon councils remains at the level of rayon state administrations, their number in villages of oblast will increase by half¹⁵¹.

The administrative and territorial reform is also intensively discussed in the eastern oblasts because of significant popularity of idea of Ukraine's federalization in the region. Issue of federalization was taken up by the eastern Ukrainian elite in the heat of the presidential elections 2004 as a reaction to "orange revolution" and unwillingness of the Centre and West to acknowledge victory of candidate from the East. It was then when *Donetsky Kryazh* laid emphasis on significant contribution of southern and eastern oblasts into formation of national gross domestic product. The newspaper opposed eastern toilers to "Kiev bureaucrats" and "Galician loafers" and put sacramental question: "Aren't subsidies assigned by budgets of the eastern regions of Ukraine through Kiev too large? Would it not be fairer to keep a greater part of the money earned?"¹⁵². Other pretensions to

Yushchenko's team were also published. Yushchenko himself was depicted as exponent of interests of solely Galicia. In particular, they were expressed by a head of trade unions of coal-miners M. Malandin: they "openly practice neo-fascism ideology and call for beating "Moskals" and "Jews", "implant state language by force", "assumed the right to teach us how to live, what language to speak and what gods and in what way to pray"¹⁵³. Federalization idea was justified in the Donetsk press by "separatist" position of oblast councils of western oblasts, which refused to acknowledge victory of the eastern candidate¹⁵⁴.

It should be still noted that evaluations of federalization idea often differed in the political and scientific circles of Donbas. The then leaders of oblast tried to convince that federalization would mean closer cooperation of regions and disappearance of border between the Southern East and the West of Ukraine, rather than separatism. As against, leading economists, in particular Doctor of Economy L. Omelyanovych, said that regions of Ukraine were complementary to each other and that Donbas did not have independent financial system, industry of the oblast was energy- and iron-intensive, and that prime cost of its products constantly grew. In view of the abovementioned, it was proved that feeling of superiority planted in Donbas was ungrounded and ephemeral, and thus dangerous¹⁵⁵.

Even after defeat of the eastern federalists, the idea is supported in Donbas concerning federalization of Ukraine on the basis of specializing of its regions or, at least, giving them more independence¹⁵⁶.

Guarantee of law is one of the issues intensively discussed in the regional press. It is directly connected with due functioning of the law enforcement authorities. The latter issue is very important in view of the attempts to politicize law enforcement authorities in Ukraine and to involve them in political confrontation. Among such attempts was appeal of the Russian Movement of Sevastopol to the army, law enforcement authorities and Security Service, to join the opposition¹⁵⁷.

Special attention is paid in regions to high level of corruption in the country, especially within controlling authorities and Ministry of Interior¹⁵⁸. Corruption causes great concern because, among other things, it is one of the factors frightening away investors¹⁵⁹. Besides, the regional press takes up the issue of fighting against economic crimes, against the so-called small corruption, which spreads to individuals. People in the Crimea even regretted that Russian practice of pulling down cottages build with violations of legislation was not used in Ukraine¹⁶⁰, which can be regarded as manifestation of radicalization in the public mood.

8. External factors in ensuring national interest

Discussing by the regional press of issue concerning expediency of this or that external orientation reveals quite different views of key national interests. The southern and eastern Ukrainian press lays emphasis on material consequences of geo-strategic choice. *Krymskaya Pravda* newspaper cites words of leader of *Soyuz* Party O. Kostusev: "living standard of people is the only national idea, which can unite all regions and all citizens and is worthy of doing it" and notes that one cannot but agree to this point of view. Writing about European choice, the newspaper emphasizes that aspirations for Europe mean aspirations for better life, European salaries, accessible education and qualitative medicine in the first place. At the same time, the newspaper denies these aspirations, asking what for Ukraine should adapt itself to other's living standards¹⁶¹.

Donetsky Krayazh newspaper publishes opinions of representatives of local industrial elite. Some of them consider that Ukraine's joining the World Trade Organization will cause standstill in machine building and textile industries, unemployment and decrease in purchasing capacity of citizens.

Other representatives are convinced that Ukraine should make its products science-intensive, efficient and intellectual, so that sacrifices, which are inevitable on the way to Europe, come true in view of final result¹⁶².

Basing itself on insufficient competitiveness of the Ukrainian products and Ukraine's dependence on Russian energy resources, the press from Donetsk expresses its support to Eurasian vector in foreign state policy more often than the press of other regions¹⁶³.

During presidential elections, even democratic editions of central and western oblasts (perhaps, because of dependence on administrative resources) published opinions that enterprises of domestic defense industry would turn to be unnecessary in case of Ukraine's joining NATO. In addition to the above, if we gave the right of taking decisions into other's hands, as it was done by former socialist countries when they joined the EU, we could lose independence, while joining single economic space would allow to increase goods turnover with Russia, as well as to strengthen cooperation in gas and oil industry and metallurgy¹⁶⁴.

33 *Channel* newspaper from Vinnytsya stimulated reflections of oblast's citizens by publishing forecasts of Kiev Social Expertise Centre concerning development prospects of different industries in case of Ukraine's joining the WTO. According to the Center's conclusions, increase in number of working places is possible in racket-building, chemical and banking industries, as well as in the sphere of finances, communication, recreation, tourism, trade and building. Decrease in employment is foreseen in food and furniture industries, science and scientific services, polygraph, machine building and gas industries. The most negative results are expected in pharmaceutical industry, car building, coal-mining, and meat and milk industries, etc¹⁶⁵.

Economic aspects of foreign policy choice are also discussed by the western Ukrainian press. In their publications, though, they more often and more clearly emphasize connection between this choice and social order and political structure of the country. Publications in *Galychyna* newspaper from Ivano-Frankivsk can serve as an example. They stress the need of introducing democracy as a condition of integration to Europe, implementation of civilized internal policy, ensuring freedom of speech, formation of civil society and reformation of social life. Thus, the newspaper thinks that we should not take umbrage at the Ukrainian authorities for their obvious faults, since there is no alternative to democratic development¹⁶⁶. The same position was expressed by *Vilne Zhyttya* newspaper from Ternopil, which supported international organizations that were accused by Kuchma's regime of purposeful discrimination of Ukraine¹⁶⁷.

Conclusions and recommendations

Formation of common classical features of national identity in Ukraine (common language, culture, religion, historical "myth") seems improbable, at least, in the near future. So far, integration of nation is influenced by such factors as idea of common territory, common statehood, as well as common dream of renewal of the country, of jural and social state, civil society and crisis free economy.

Existence of psychological differences between people from different parts of Ukraine will not necessarily have fatal impact on the process of national consolidation. Psychological purposes often change depending on historical circumstances. That is why people's state of mind, which is based on confidence in their own ability to overcome economic and social crisis, can become a common national feature. Integration possibilities of such idea have a high potential since it can be implanted at the individual and social levels.

Formation of such idea is facilitated by existence of a large range of common economic, political and cultural problems. Reaching of public consensus concerning ways of their settlement is impeded by differences in regional priorities. These differences can be still overcome. Besides, their existence can help in formation of compromise national position as regards optimal social-political and social-economic patterns, manner and contents of implementing the concept of jural state and civil society.

Formation of Ukrainian national identity on the basis of common idea of self-sufficiency involves risks. Firstly, self-sufficiency can be used as an argument against western strategic vector. Secondly, it can be used for substantiating policy of state protectionism in economy, though it is protectionism that causes preservation of technological stagnation of the country. That is why the idea of self-sufficiency, which is implanted in the society, should be based on confidence in national ability to introduce European social and legal standards in the country without somebody's assistance, as well as to form democratic political culture and make it an essential attribute of everyday behavior of individuals, social strata, economic groups and political parties.

The national identity can include idea of territorial solidarity as an objective historical entity for population of Ukraine. This identity component can be formed on the basis of caring of ecological state of common residential territory as a condition of biological self-preservation and progressive self-reproduction of the population.

The following measures of state and local authorities can significantly contribute to formation of common national ideological unity:

1) Cabinet of Ministers and Verkhovna Rada shall initiate an uninterrupted national discussion to find an agreed formula of social life as its result. The formula should include interests, needs and values of material, spiritual and humanistic nature. Everyday public discussion can be held in the form of periodical regional debates about pressing social problems with participation of politicians, businessmen, representatives of the authorities and experts. Effectiveness of such debates must be conditioned by mutual availability to population of information about problems of the regions, as well as of proposed ways of their settlement;

2) Cabinet of Ministers shall elaborate and submit for discussion a regional and sectoral pattern of Ukrainian national market, which must take into account tendencies of global development, historical experience of Ukraine and potential of its regions, as well as determine directions for regional cooperation aimed at its formation. Regional cooperation, distribution of funds according to program of national market formation should be regarded by Secretariat of the President as a key factor in ensuring national security;

3) State Committee on Nationalities and Migration, other institutions dealing with ethnical and national matters shall set a rapid response to ethnical and social disproportions as a priority direction in ethnical and social policy. Detection of these disproportions became difficult after cancellation of "ethnic origin" field in passports and service questionnaires of citizens. As a result, state authorities are to decide now whether to resume practice of fixing ethnicity of employees or to find other means for constant monitoring of social and professional composition of ethnical groups. The second variant can be implemented through ordering by the Cabinet of Ministers of sociological researches, scale of which would allow getting information about social well-being of ethnical groups;

4) Verkhovna Rada, Ministry of Finance shall provide, in the state and local budgets, a several time increase in expenses for formation of free communal housing stock for provision of housing to

internal working migrants. At the same time, State Employment Service should improve availability to population of information on vacancies in regions;

5) Initiate the state educating campaign aimed at commanding respect to traditional folk culture of ethnical groups of Ukraine, as well as making people aware of non-separability of ancient and modern specimens of culture and understanding cultural process as a constant interethnic culture merging, regular emergence of cultural innovations. To establish, to this end, History and Culture of Ukraine television channel which would constantly function and be financed by state;

6) Provide privileges for book printing in the Ukrainian language, including publishing cultural studies works and works in the sphere of art studies. To initiate stately financed publication of Museums of Ukraine album series with full catalogues of museum funds. To elaborate and strictly implement state plan for regional exchange with displays of museum exhibits and performances of artistic groups;

7) Ministry of Culture shall replicate lists and photographs of historical and cultural relics stolen from museums of Ukraine; introduce remunerations for those who assisted in search of national values or prevented their smuggling, or impeded stealing of artifacts by "black archeologists"; elaborate assessment system for found treasures and ensuring immediate compensation of corresponding sum to those who found them;

8) Efficient instruments in formation of national unity can include Ukrainian social movements or periodic campaigns aimed at overcoming economic, social, environmental, legal, political and other problems existing in the country. Such measures will strengthen citizens' idea of united nature of regional and national interests, which should constitute basis for the development of Ukrainian identity.

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Ukraine in Search of New Reintegration Models

By VOLODYMYR LUPATSIY,
Executive Director of the Center for Social Studies "Sofia"

Reintegration as the Issue of Public Governance

Socio-political unity and effective tools of socio-cultural consolidation are basic preconditions for application of any National Development Strategy. Governments, which do not realize the role of mechanisms for social reintegration, national identity and accomplishment of their global missions, risk losing international competitiveness. In this case, disintegration tendencies become pronounced, while regional, ethnic and religious differences start developing into conflicts.

Approaches to maintenance of national integrity and unity shall, above all, be based not on "social statics" but "social dynamics". It is necessary to understand that integration and disintegration are immanent features of the society. **By reintegration I mean the process of maintenance and management of a dynamic balance between integration and disintegration elements of development of a state, nation and society.** In other words, being key characteristics of social systems, reintegration mechanisms do not emerge in response to their split. Only a failure or breakdown of reintegration mechanisms evokes social split and disintegration.

Hence, **reintegration is a method to achieve a balance between rightist and leftist processes in a country.** On the other hand, reintegration policy is targeted exclusively towards live components of an entire society or nation. Reintegration is **a strategy for preventing a situation, when a malfunction of a social system transforms into the process of irreversible disintegration.**

In a broader sense, the idea of reintegration will allow analyzing some traditional regional problem and correctly assessing reasons for the 2004 electoral split.

Regional Differences: Historical Heritage or Consequences of the Reintegration Model's Collapse?

Most studies on and discussions of reasons for the election split, which entailed regional disintegration, are focused on the background of Ukrainian regional distinctions. Historians, sociologists, economists and political scientists like to "*chew over*" **historical background of regional differences in Ukraine.**

So, the key challenge of Ukrainian regionalism is that the public opinion and political consciousness are actually monopolized by experts and officials **adherent to "historical determinism" from methodological and ideological viewpoint¹.** Specifically, "historical determinists" are deeply convinced and, therefore, attempt to persuade the society and political elites that regional confrontation and disintegration are not consequences of the lack of governmental control of regional processes but results of historical development.

From a practical viewpoint, "historical determinists" are promoters of "political demobilization" of power. They directly or indirectly convince both the government and society of the need to yield to historical specifics of regional distinctions instead of developing effective mechanisms for economic and social reintegration.

¹ "Historical determinists" - people, who believe that history determines activities of individuals and the society. As a rule, "historical determinists" underestimate or disregard the fact that specific economic and political interests and circumstances determine goal-seeking activities of individuals and social groups, whereas historical experience is just a pillar for administrative decision-making and program development.

In general, there are a number of conceptions “explaining” and justifying politization of regional differences.

Adherents to a socio-economic approach propose numerous versions of Ukraine’s division by economic areas. Depending on a classification type, Ukraine is divided into 3, 5, 9 or even 10 territories. For instance, the Chernivtsi geographical school suggests formation of the following 10 regions: the Donetsk, Carpathian, Crimean, North Eastern, North Western, East Northern, Podil, Trans-Dnipro, Trans Black Sea, Central and Capital.

Researchers focused on cultural and historical distinctions divide Ukraine as follows: the Transcarpathia, Halychyna, Northern Bukovyna, Volyn, Polissya, Right-Bank, Left-Bank (Hetmanshchyna), Sivershchyna, Slobozhanshchyna and Novorussia (Trans Black Sea, the Zaporizhzhya region, Tauria, Donbas and Crimea).

According to the “Clash of Civilizations” theory popularized by S. Huntington, people’s cultural or religious identity will be the primary agent of conflict in the post-Cold War world. Ukraine belongs to countries located on the boundary between Huntington’s Protestant, Roman Catholic and Orthodox civilizations. Hence, his followers distinguish between just two incompatible civilizations in Ukraine.

Each classification gives a lot of interesting and useful information, which, however, cannot but be critically perceived. Citizens and officials interested to develop an effective reintegration model must pay attention not to regional differences but social factors that generate and reproduce them. In fact, Ukraine cannot *apply the old model any longer*. When politicians and journalists discuss historical and cultural features of some regions, they don’t even understand that regional borders are not natural but **artificial and inherited from the previous political and administrative regimes**. For example, the so-called Halychyna and Bukovyna are rather **products of domestic geo-policies of countries and empires, to which respective Ukrainian territories belonged** than historical and cultural characteristics.

Perhaps, it is not bad to pay close attention to the background of regional distinctions. Though, in practice, politicians and officials would be dissatisfied with a simple statement of historical facts that caused regional differences. An emphasis on historical predestination of the election split and regional disintegration does not explain their reasons but *implicitly substantiates a fatalistic perspective for Ukraine*. Logic of “historical determinists” is simple: as inter-regional tension has deep historical roots and as history cannot be rewritten, so Ukraine is doomed to West-East confrontation and conflicts because the West will never understand Asian culture.

Reintegration policy described in this article is based on complete refutation of historical fatalism and determinism, which distort reality either in practice or in theory. Notwithstanding unusual situation in Ukraine, available regional differences and socio-cultural diversity are not unique in the contemporary world. Most countries are multi-ethnic and multi-religious. In many of them, there are regions with striking historical and cultural dissimilarities.

Despite “the map of two Americas” demonstrated by the US media at the last presidential elections, none of politicians advocated northern or southern autonomy of the United States. Catholic Bavaria remarkable for its considerable historical and cultural distinctions is not a precedent for drawing social and political borders within Protestant Germany. Modern political geography gives numerous examples of how governments make regional differences not a challenge but a competitive advantage.

Hence, a question arises: *if regional differences are typical for most countries, why do some states (e.g. Ukraine) dramatically politicize them, whereas others manage to avoid regional confrontation jeopardizing national security? Why do some governments view regional differences as contrasting, whereas others treat them as complementary? And, finally, why do some countries “brand” their regional differences and socio-cultural diversity, whereas others cannot attain interethnic peace and cohesion for years?*

Apparently, generalization of history alone cannot serve as an answer to these questions. It is necessary *to study and analyze socio-political mechanisms regulating economic, political and social reintegration processes*. Integrity and socio-political unity are not only historical consequences but also the results of functioning of socio-political mechanisms. Countries, where a sound reintegration policy is absent, national identity is vague, information and cultural spaces are not shaped, provoke leftist tendencies and strengthening of local or regional identities. Consequently, when latent interethnic tension develops into inter-regional confrontation, it is expedient to look for an answer in history textbooks but *analyze social reasons for and factors of disintegration*.

I. Disintegration Factors Determined by Globalization

Search for an effective reintegration model is a topical problem not only for new democracies. Given globalization, almost all countries are under pressures. Most of them are forced to look for instruments to mitigate global factors provoking social split and disintegration.

- Weakening of the Role of Traditional Institutions

Protection of frontiers is not a guarantee of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Development of up-to-date communication and multimedia technologies weakens the capacity of governments to supervise national information, educational and cultural spaces. Meanwhile, influences of globalization threaten both security and consolidation instruments of nation-states.

In the contemporary world, mechanisms for individual and group socialization are being radically changed. Group socialization is no longer linked to a place of birth and ethnic identity. The role of traditional institutions (citizenship, education, church), which were imperative for social and political cohesion, is decreasing. Political elites also demonstrate unwillingness to mobilize the society totally deprived of the government's security and concern.

- Globalization instead of Traditional Separatism

Influence of the so-called geo-economic factors is getting more and more powerful. Nowadays, many regions are involved in the international trade, get fantastical profit and do not share it with the state thus evading the national law. Nevertheless, this does not mean that regions embark on the way of separatism but are affected by the globalization process. Its consequences are ambiguous as well. As a rule, regions differ in their intentions to benefit from an entry to global markets. As a result, inter-regional gaps are widening. For instance, in China, coastal regions take the lead in the level of economic development (compared to interior provinces).

- Loss of Integrity and Homogeneity

The majority of rich and developed economies are challenged by mass and uncontrolled labor migration. The Great Migration of the last 20 years evidenced total inability of most European states to stomach and socialize migrants. Even on obtaining citizenship, the large share of migrants is not integrated into a socio-cultural space of their new motherlands. Specifically, nation-states

face problems caused by:

- Transformation of mono-ethnic groups into multi-ethnic communities
- Drastic changes in ethnic, cultural and race characteristics of the society
- Creation of self-isolated linguistic, ethnic and religious communities, whose existence destroys moral, legal and even political institutions – pillars of western democracies.
- **“Identity crisis”, which develops into a global challenge .**

Most countries influenced by globalization, experience problems of identity reproduction. Furthermore, only states able to effectively reproduce their national identities can mobilize efforts and implement breakthrough development programs. One of the most indicative examples is a group of East Asian countries, which managed not only to create industrial infrastructure within a short period but also to tread on the heels of technologically advanced economies.

The identity issue has yet another aspect. Today, self-organized groups based on shared religious, cultural and ethnic values are offered new opportunities for communication and reproduction of group identity. New transnational communities and global ethnic networks are being formed within nation-states thus challenging homogeneous identity.

- Division into Megapolises and Provinces

Division or split of the contemporary world into megapolises and provinces is a side effect of globalization. Very often, it is more difficult for people, who live in megapolises, to understand their provincial compatriots. The gap in the level of income, industrial consumption, information provision, infrastructure development, access to education and medical services places an invisible barrier between megapolises and provinces.

There are many other examples of disintegration trends emerged under the influence of globalization. However, it is obvious that given globalization, traditional mechanisms for reproduction of national unity and integrity do not work. ***Maintenance of national unity and integrity is the major goal of public policy and depends upon effectiveness of a selected reintegration model.*** At present, political consolidation and social integration are not spontaneous phenomena. In other words, reintegration means a technology, which must be constantly mastered and updated, if a country strives to maintain sustainable development.

II. Internal Disintegration Factors

Ukraine is also influenced by numerous external factors of disintegration. Though, it is internal or endogenous factors that cause a collapse of reintegration models and create preconditions for inter-regional confrontation.

- **Two-Sector Model of Economy**

A two-sector model appeared as a consequence of spontaneous restructuring and transition to market economy. One sector is represented by export industries (the metal-coal-coke chain), whereas the other includes branches oriented to the domestic market. It is not the two-sector model but the absence of conditions for free capital mobility between export industries and branches oriented to the domestic market or high-tech production. Consequently, ***uncontrolled and uneven development of the two-sector model of Ukraine’s economy became the major factor of increasing regional imbalance. Economic growth based on export industries concentrated in the southeastern regions had no national effect.*** In the southeastern regions, economic development fostered creation of new jobs and increase of salaries and wages, whereas in others, people found themselves on the verge of economic and social stagnation.

- **Regional Autarchy**

The government's "flirtation" with regional elites and situational policy of "peaceful co-existence" gave rise to regional economic autarchy.

Foundations of regional autarchy were laid in the period of economic collapse, when most regions had to resort to subsistence policy. The crisis of a system of inter-regional division of labor led to development of subsistence economy. Trade protectionism was the key manifestation of economic autarchy at the regional level. To stop outflow of financial resources, the majority of local administrations supported monopolization of regional markets by local manufacturers. In most regions, authorities placed artificial administrative, bureaucratic and trade barriers to commodities made in other regions. Hence, it is regional economic autarchy that causes collapse of the integral national economy, deficiency of legislation, information and cultural isolation.

- **Preservation of the Centralist Model of Regional Subsidiarity**

Preservation of the centralist model of regional subsidiarity is not limited to the issues of economic prosperity and social justice. The subsidiary model distorts the meaning of the term "small motherland" traditionally interpreted as memory of and respect for the place of one's birth (village, town, city). So, in mass social consciousness, the term "small motherland" is substituted with "clannishness" (region, district). At the same time, the centralist model of regional subsidiarity implies that in order to protect interests of their territorial communities, deputies of some local councils (village, town, city) have to team up to lobby for "extortion" of money from the national budget.

Needless to say, quasi-regional identities ("Vinnytsya", "Kharkiv", "Odesa", "Donetsk") start to exist independently. Representatives of these identities intend rather to mobilize regional elites *that should combat central bureaucracy and national identity* than to elaborate development programs for their territorial communities. For this reason, it is impossible to overcome leftist tendencies ongoing in the regions by means of decentralization. It is more important to solve the issue of sharing of powers and responsibilities between regional (district) administrations and local self-government bodies. National identity is based on the principle of dynamic subsidiarity means giving roles and responsibilities to local self-government.

- **Neo-Imperial Status of the Capital**

The neo-imperial status of the Ukrainian capital intensifies confrontation between national and regional identities. Merger of business and government and the model of rent capitalism, developed over the period of initial accumulation of capital, deformed the nature of Ukraine's economy and the status of Kyiv as the capital.

Presently, Kyiv is not only performing its metropolitan functions but also becoming the political and economic quasi-center of the country. Structures responsible for redistribution of major financial, material and political resources of Ukraine are physically and administratively concentrated in Kyiv. Relations between the capital and the regions are marred and have more and more in common with a system of internal colonialism.

As a result, Kyiv's metropolitan functions are replaced with its metropolitan status. Now, the city budget is formed of revenues from political rent, the lion's share of foreign investments and speculations on the real estate market. This situation is dangerous for both the regions and Kyiv itself. The construction boom caused by speculative price rise threatens to completely destroy the

city's unique landscape and architecture. That is why the key objective it is not decentralization so briskly discussed by regional bureaucrats but resumption of Kyiv's metropolitan functions. Ukraine needs the capital able to assume the role of a spiritual stronghold, a catalyst of socio-cultural initiatives and democratic changes.

III. Evolution of Reintegration Models in Ukraine

To adequately perceive the situation relating to reproduction of integrity and socio-economic unity in Ukraine, it is necessary to study dynamics of reintegration processes. Over 15 years of Ukraine's independence, at least, two reintegration models have existed.

1. Bureaucratic Model

The bureaucratic model of reintegration has been formed since the moment of declaring independence. The model was based on the administrative-bureaucratic vertical of power formed within a relatively short period. Post-Soviet nomenclature established control in Ukraine and encouraged formation of a single legal space. Due to the absence of influential political parties and powerful civil society institutions, bureaucracy became the major actor responsible for policy- and administrative decision-making.

As the initial accumulation of capital was under rigid public control, notwithstanding all their efforts to blackmail the government, regional and business elites had to take the lead in national policy.

Total control of public information channels was typical for the bureaucratic model of reintegration. However, the state did not control content of information. So, despite its legal independence, Ukraine remained in other's information and cultural spaces.

Cultural policy became of a pronounced lingo-centrist nature. Instead of pursuing a consistent language policy, the government resorted to the so-called pseudo-ukrainization limited to the use of Ukrainian in paper work, whereas actual problems and issues remained unsolved. Cultural policy of that period can be characterized as "baggy trousers" policy.

Nevertheless, by the end of the period of initial accumulation of capital, the bureaucratic model enabled authorities to maintain territorial integrity and political cohesion.

2. Clan (Corporate) Model

At the stage of privatization, Ukraine transited from the bureaucratic to the clan or corporate model of reintegration. It is private oligarchic capital that organized and then expanded economic and political exchanges in Ukraine.

First, shadow distribution of spheres of influence between powerful financial and economic groups (corporations or clans) took place. Despite Ukraine's official political division, each clan controlled distinct industries, economic territories and regions. Consequently, Ukrainian administrative and territorial system was essentially transformed. The rigid administrative vertical was replaced with "Matreshka" composed of departmental, corporative, oligarchic and bureaucratic closed territories and enclaves. Since new territorial borders not always coincided with administrative frontiers, the model was based on economic, financial and administrative infrastructure of the main oligarchic clans and groups.

Second, the state lost its monopoly in the information space because of arrival of the private media.

But again, content of information was beyond public control. As before, Ukraine remained in other's information space. Moreover, the private media holdings joined the electoral fight and started inflaming inter-regional, interethnic and inter-confessional hostility.

Finally, priorities of cultural policy also changed because newly formed regional elites had to maintain their image in the eyes of voters. Investments began to flow in culture (mostly, regional symbols and local lore). Again, it was not national but regional identity that developed. Local ideology was the underlying principle of Ukraine's cultural policy of that period. National cultural programs could be counted on the fingers of one hand (Ruslana Lyzhychko's victory at the Eurovision 2004 Song Contest).

3. Socio-Political Model

The 2004 electoral split marked the collapse of the clan model. Now, there is the dire need to switch to the socio-political model of reintegration to maintain Ukraine's integrity. A new strategy shall aim at *creating mechanisms to keep balance between integration and disintegration factors of development of a state, nation and society* instead of overcoming external manifestations of social disintegration.

This model provides for combination of administrative, economic and political tools of integration and consolidation of the Ukrainian society.

It is not bureaucracy or clans but political parties, civil society institutions and local self-government bodies interested in development of the national market and infrastructure that are the main promoters of the socio-political model.

A reintegration program and strategy must be mapped out. Policy of national identity (incorporating all local and regional identities) must be formulated and promoted.

In fact, a new reintegration strategy must be developed on the basis of multifaceted and interdisciplinary approaches. The terms "spatial development", "internal geo-politics", "development and use of network infrastructure", "models of creation and governance of new macro-regions" shall be added to the political vocabulary.

4. Integration Mechanisms

Application of an effective reintegration model shall not be limited to revision of conceptual principles of formation and reproduction of Ukraine's social integrity. A successive reintegration policy shall be based on *a technology of forming and reproducing single spaces* (in the economic, socio-political, cultural, information and civil security areas).

- Completion of the Single Economic Market

First and foremost, it is necessary to complete the Ukrainian single economic space. Available tools of control allow the government to stop the practice of placing artificial administrative and trade barriers in relations between the Ukrainian regions and territories. This does not require large financial resources and new legislative acts. Understanding of importance of the problem and political will of national authorities would be enough. National business associations could join the government because they suffer the heaviest losses from the shadow "feudal" barriers.

At the same time, administrative and political actions would be insufficient, if they are not attended with institutional changes. Only completion and institutionalization of the national capital,

commodity and labor markets could guarantee establishment and development of the single economic space in Ukraine. The government shall assume a function of market maker and support business and public initiatives for creation of national infrastructure of the stock, land, real estate and freelance markets.

- Model of Regional Reinvestment and Capital Mobility

The socio-economic disintegration evoked by the two-sector model cannot be overcome without intentional interference of the state. Recent events evidenced that existent quasi-market instruments alone cannot reestablish macro-economic balance. The government and large capital shall jointly look for tools and guarantee mechanisms that would ensure free mobility of surplus capital between the regions and industries. This would help to eliminate confrontation between exporters and manufacturers oriented to domestic market development. The government shall be the key actor in initiating, elaborating and implementing national development programs and projects with involvement of private and state-owned enterprises, banking institutions and investment companies.

- New Macro-Regions and Macro-Economic Clusters

The split of the Soviet system of industrial cooperation entailed disintegration of Ukrainian macro-economic division. For the time being, the Donbas is the only industrial macro-region. Over the period of Ukraine's independence, no new powerful economic cluster, which could be the pillars of for new macro-regions, has been created.

Hence, a new regional policy must simultaneously set two objectives: create the new economic clusters as a basis for new macro-regions and establish infrastructure of macro-regional governance. Should the government fail to form 3-5 economic clusters, it would be able to diversify sources of budget revenues and bridge gaps in economic development of the regions. Therefore, *creation of the new economic clusters shall help to alleviate tension between the donor and recipient regions* in the process of distribution of the national budget.

National authorities shall determine the number, type (industrial, scientific and technological, transport and communication) and regional geography of the new clusters. Regional state administrations shall mobilize resources for participation of economic entities in inter-regional (national) projects. Needless to say, none of administrative and territorial units (regions) will be able to independently create an economic cluster (industry) compliant with requirements of international competition. Even should a region launch a new cluster project, it would have to cooperate with other regions and be dependent upon public support both on the domestic and foreign markets.

- New Priorities of Ukraine's Spatial Development

Ukraine is characterized by economic and socio-cultural discrepancies between the village and the city. Regional imbalance inherited from the former USSR is caused by existence of the quasi-urbanized and rural (industrial and agricultural) regions. Application of market and management instruments will not suit to bridge these gaps. Apparently, Ukraine will not be able to develop, if it fails to apply new approaches to placement of the production forces. Given the situation, traditional approaches of the period of industrial modernization either do not work or have the adverse effect. It is necessary to put into practice up-to-date models of spatial development so that to redress regional imbalance.

First, Ukraine shall reject the extensive urbanization model based on the principle of internal colonialism. The village can no longer be the resource supplier and the market for the industrial city.

Second, city-millionaires shall lose their monopoly as the centers of location and development of science and technology due to Ukraine's involvement in globalization processes and creation of post-industrial economic sectors. Not only city-millionaires but also other cities and regions will have a chance to be a basis for formation of any post-industrial and high technology sectors, if they are able to create favorable business and investment climate on their territories.

Finally, in view of interests of internal geo-policy, it is recommended to apply the spatial development strategy to Vinnytsya, the Kherson-Mykolaiv agglomeration, Poltava and Sevastopol. These cities have high infrastructure and manpower potential to become the equalizers of Ukraine's spatial development. Priority development of the triangle Vinnytsya-the Kherson-Mykolaiv agglomeration-Poltava and Kyiv-Sevastopol would enable the government to equalize quasi-urbanized cities in the southeastern regions, develop the Crimea and the northern Trans Black Sea territory.

- Infrastructure of Inter-Regional Socio-Cultural Exchanges

The government shall promote inter-regional cooperation and partnership between educational and cultural institutions.

Seeking to develop the single socio-cultural space, Ukraine must maintain and promote horizontal associative relations, national and international inter-regional cooperation in the humanitarian area.

Decentralization and development of the multidimensional socio-cultural space provide for creation of a prestigious nomination system. Specifically, it is necessary to elaborate and give socio-political definitions for "theatrical capital", "silicon valley", "festival pavilion", "cross-cultural dialogue center", "architectural museum" and "folk capital". In Ukraine, there are enough cities and towns ready to compete for these nominations.

In the long run, it is the absence of political will that over 15 years prevented Ukraine from developing a system of youth and student inter-regional exchanges. We could hardly overcome regional isolation without expanding geography of youth exchanges, i.e. unless there are people, who live in the Crimea but have never been in the Transcarpathia, or those, who traveled all over Central Europe but have never seen the Black Sea. National identity requires personal experience and knowledge of Ukrainian regions: from the Transcarpathia to Luhansk, from the Black Sea to the Polissya etc.

- The Single Information Space and Information Security

Public information policy supported by the media plays the major role in implementation and promotion of reintegration policy. Its strategic tasks include *creation and reproduction of the single information space* and establishment of an effective system of *information security* in Ukraine. According to experts, Ukraine is the only state without the single information space.

Encouragement of the single information space and creation of the information security system shall prevent the use of the national information space by foreign entities (states, international organizations and multinationals) as a tool of influence on the course of internal economic and political developments.

Protection of Ukraine's information space provides that the government shall assume responsibility for:

- Secure the right of citizens to receive unbiased, up-to-date and detailed information about the course of developments in Ukraine and in the world;
- Protect mass consciousness from information and psychological aggression against Ukrainian citizens;
- Prevent the use of the national information space for eroding national identity;
- Prevent the use of the national information space for fomentation of interethnic, inter-confessional and inter-regional hostility;
- Liquidate areas and territories generating and disseminating biased and misleading information about activities of national authorities.

Given limited time and money, the government shall meet the following challenges impeding consistent actions in the field of information security:

1. Political will and programs for enhancing effectiveness of *the use of information infrastructure*, which is directly or indirectly controlled by the government, are absent. The government shall *resume its function of key actor on the market for creation, promotion and dissemination of information and knowledge*. Implementation of public information and reintegration policies requires a network of state-owned and private media promoting these policies.

2. *A system of monitoring and evaluation of the level of Ukraine's information security, the role of the media in reintegration policy and reproduction of national identity is absent*. The Ukrainian information space is especially vulnerable at the regional level because national authorities and politicians pay little attention to the course of events and their coverage in the local media. So, inter-regional and inter-ethnic stereotypes and distorted mentality of the population are formed and developed under the regional media's influence.

3. A model of liberalization of infrastructure markets of the Ukrainian information and cultural spaces is deficient. As there is *no legislative act on the foreign media in Ukraine*, many media projects erode national identity and legitimacy of governmental agencies. It is necessary to organize and hold parliamentary hearings and a session of the National Security Defense Council on the current situation and perspectives of information security.

4. The absence of public control of information content poses the most serious problem of the Ukrainian information space. Specifically, Ukraine *lacks policy geared toward support of the system of production, distribution and promotion of Ukrainian information products*. Some regional authorities de facto pursue policy of information autarchy towards Ukrainian information products.

5. To make the Ukrainian content competitive in the national information space, the government shall *create information infrastructure provision of first-hand information about world developments*. Incidentally, Most Ukrainian media suffer from the absence of an effective network of journalists abroad. The Ukrainian media are not accredited at the international organizations. For this reason, even the national media have to report what others have said, use others' videos and voice opinions about events they often do not share.

Instead of Conclusion

It is necessary to emphasize that the electoral split during the 2004 presidential elections was not evoked by historical and cultural differences of the Ukrainian regions. An accent on historical predestination of the election split and regional disintegration does not explain their reasons but *implicitly substantiates a fatalistic perspective for Ukraine*. As a matter of fact, the election split and growing interethnic (languages and religious) conflicts are not historical consequences but the results of the reintegration model's collapse.

Reintegration shall mean the process of maintenance and management of a dynamic balance

between integration and disintegration elements or rightist and leftist tendencies of development of a state, nation and society. Reintegration is a result of public purpose policy and therefore cannot be achieved spontaneously or traditionally.

Consequences of the electoral split cannot be eliminated by means of campaigns or mottos in support of social peace and understanding. It is necessary to study and analyze socio-political mechanisms regulating economic, political and social reintegration/disintegration processes.

Internal factors of leftist trends and splits in Ukraine include the two-sector model of economy, regional autarchy, the centralist model of regional subsidiarity, influences of the neo-imperial status of the Ukrainian capital etc.

Disintegration may be eliminated by means of transition from the clan to the socio-political model of reintegration. It is not bureaucracy or political and economic clans but parties, civil society institutions and local self-government bodies that are the major promoters of the socio-political model of reintegration.

A new reintegration policy shall be based on *a technology of forming and reproducing single spaces* in Ukraine (in the economic, socio-political, cultural, information and civil security areas)

Specifically, the following actions must be taken:

- Completion of the single economic market
- Application of the model of regional and industrial reinvestment
- Creation of new macro-economic clusters and implementation of inter-regional cooperation programs and projects
- Application of new priorities of Ukraine's spatial development
- Establishment of infrastructure of inter-regional socio-cultural exchanges
- Formation of the single information space and the system of information security
- Implementation of socio-cultural projects towards integrating local (regional) identities into Ukraine's national identity.

Analysis of Issues of Considering Soviet Heritage in Ukraine's Socio-Humanitarian Policy

By *OLEXIY KORDUN*,

Senior Advisor, Situation Analysis Service, Secretariat of the President of Ukraine

In fact, culture is the universal key to understanding the social world, forecasting ways and forms of its transformation. Therefore, **development of a strategy for socio-cultural unity in Ukraine shall inevitably precede shaping of a national unity policy**¹.

Unfortunately, despite general recognition of dual **biosocial human nature**, public policies, even humanitarian ones, are often based on primacy of biological mechanisms. This results in artificial imbalance of the socio-humanitarian area, manifested in moral decline, spirituality crisis and value vacuum. These factors cause disorientation of Ukrainian society, pessimism and the lack of faith in political and economic changes.

A dangerous stereotype found in today's society is associating education, science, culture and health care with "**human services**". Such approach serves as a theoretical substantiation of the residual principle, according to which these industries are funded, despite a common knowledge that they are determinants of social welfare and moral health and thus must be protected by the government.

One cannot but agree with Ukrainian philosophers that the humanitarian area represents not "a social sphere separated from economy and politics but the social life as such, characterized (assessed, understood and organized) through the prism of human priorities and values. It is a special social "section", i.e. that of intersection of human interests."²

Furthermore, according to experts, **at present, the level of public administration through social processes must strongly depend on effectiveness of such tools as culture, traditions, moral norms, ideology, maturity of consciousness, awareness and integrity of thinking** etc. Influence of these mechanisms must change the very nature of administrative relations³.

In this article, I shall analyze **public socio-humanitarian policy in its narrow sense – as a system of activities of the government targeted towards spiritual development of society and individuals and satisfaction of their spiritual needs**. Consequently, the socio-humanitarian area shall be studied as the sphere of education, science, culture, health care and others. Major directions of implementation of public socio-humanitarian policy are as follows:

- Public and regional support to the humanitarian sphere, creation of adequate conditions for teachers, creative workers, artists and cultural figures;
- Activities of authorities at a variety of levels in revival of history, language and culture of Ukrainians as the core nation;
- Promotion of cultural identity of national minorities, their inclusion in state-building processes;
- Guarantees of civil rights to freedom of religion, inter-confessional peace and harmony in the regions;

¹ O. P. Lanovenko, Socio-Cultural Aspect of the National Consolidation Strategy // Ukraine's National Unity Strategy: Searching for Models of Interethnic Integration. Materials of the expert roundtable on "Developing a National Consolidation Strategy in Ukraine: Searching for Models of Interethnic Integration", Uzhgorod, March 18, 2000. Uzhgorod: V. Padyaka Publishing House, 2000, P. 23-26

² V. Andryshchenko, L. Gubernsky, M. Mykhalchenko, Culture. Ideology. Identity: Methodological Analysis. K.: "Ukrainian Knowledge", 2002, P. 487

³ S. A. Kindzersky, Public Humanitarian Policy in the Regions // <http://www.rusnauka.com/Article/Gosupr/16.html>

- Encouragement of formation of a national education system based on changes in all aspects of life and regional characteristics;
- Creation of favorable conditions for development of book publishing, increase of the share of Ukrainian-language publications;
- Application of effective mechanisms for funding cultural institutions – museums, theaters and libraries;
- Preservation and enrichment of history and culture of the Ukrainian nation;
- Creation of favorable conditions for improvement of physical health of the population, its wider access to physical culture and sports.

It is necessary to mention that in this analysis, the term “**identity**” means **a unique combination of features typical for only one community and its members and characterized by common ancestry and history (common historical myth), language, culture, religion, race and spirits (mental constitution)**. Availability of all features is not necessary to confirm identity of an ethnic group⁴.

The term “Soviet identity” (“post-Soviet consciousness”, “Soviet way of thinking” etc.) is rather a generalized metaphor for a complicated and internally contradictory ideology typical for many Ukrainians than a clear scientific term (though it is used in scientific works). Therefore, I would not dare define this phenomenon but **describe it though characteristics inherent in this ideology**.

According to Yaryna Borenko, the above phenomenon is referred to as **archaic-industrial consciousness**. She wrote, “*For archaic-industrial consciousness, ideal of Ukraine is embodied in industrialized cities, whose goals are indicators of consumption of steel per capita and values – industrial units, for which this steel is smelted*”⁵.

Volodymyr Vitkovsky makes even more critical conclusions. In his viewpoint, Soviet mentality is based on features impeding active development of contemporary Ukraine, namely:

- 1) Inertness of the object, expectation of changes only as a result of exterior subject-independent factors;
- 2) Conservative, inert and stereotyped thinking;
- 3) Negligence, dishonorableness and the lack of punctuality;
- 4) The gap between word and deed;
- 5) Authoritarian thinking and behavior, poor knowledge about fundamental human rights;
- 6) Disregard for natural human merits and excessive “respect” for external attributes (social position, financial status and ties);
- 7) The unbridgeable psychological gap between the upper and the lower classes. In Ukraine, this phenomenon is especially abnormal because of the absence of the hereditary elite: the village is dying and the working class is on the verge of poverty, whereas yesterday’s graduates of vocational colleges hold 80% of the higher offices;
- 8) Idolatry of power and aspirations of some individuals to reach its top by fair means or foul in a terrible combination with mass hatred to authorities and blunt opposition to their initiatives;
- 9) The high level of mass readiness for corruption;
- 10) Legal nihilism, neglect of democratic methods in favor of “traditional” mechanisms for problem solving⁶;
- 11) Aspirations to realize extensive options for development manifested in different forms, including Rusophilia, “registered” emissions, subsidies to collective farms and other institutions

⁴ O. M. Maiboroda, Problem of Shaping a New Identity of the Ukrainian Nation // Materials of the expert roundtable on “Developing a National Consolidation Strategy in Ukraine: Searching for Models of Interethnic Integration”, Uzhgorod, March 18, 2000 / Interethnic Forum of Ukraine, Uzhgorod, 2000 // http://rdu-old.narod.ru/fbook_1/strat_1.htm

⁵ Y. Borenko, “European Dream” and the Ukrainian City: A Decade of Political Vanity // *Ї.*, 2003, No. 21

⁶ V. Vitovsky, Ukraine: the Third Millennium – in the “Third World”? (Speech at the seminar “*Ї*”, January 23, 2001)

typical for feudal system, “extortion” of IMF loans, thefts of Russian natural gas, search of Polubotko’s treasure and so on and so forth.

A series of studies evidenced the following components of post-Soviet consciousness:

- Positive attitude to governmental agencies: state-run banks and state-owned property. Specifically, **the level of trust in the Army is high**, notwithstanding a number of tragedies (the missile that hit the apartment house in Brovary, the shot down Russian airliner, the Sknylov tragedy);
- Negative attitude to western countries, values and intergovernmental structures (the indicative example is attitude to NATO);
- The lack of knowledge of Ukrainian history coupled with dominance of Soviet historical mythology;
- Internationalism, the low level of interethnic conflicts.

By the way, the “international” nature of the Soviet identity essentially reduces a threat of interethnic conflicts. The exception relating to some manifestations of xenophobia against Jews and Crimean Tatars only confirms the thesis about dominance of post-Soviet consciousness in Ukraine. Needless to say, tacit anti-Semitism and disdain for eastern ethnicities were elements of the Soviet ideology.

In the Ukrainian ethno-political space, there are no interethnic conflicts, which could not be resolved by means of compromise. Results of sociological research prove that at the household level, interethnic hostility is almost absent due to interethnic marriages, business partnership, multi-ethnic labor collectives etc.

This might serve as an alternative solution.

I would analyze **a local (Ukrainian) version of the Soviet identity**, which is mostly determined by mental features of the Ukrainian nation. By the way, backward orientation inherent in the Soviet identity is typical for the Ukrainian psychic type.

Academics distinguish the following features of the Ukrainian national character:

- 1) Universal and synthetic world outlook;
- 2) Priority of moral, conservatism, devotion to traditions, stable family relations, great importance of gender moral;
- 3) High perception and emotional sensitivity;
- 4) Love to freedom, aspiration to independence;
- 5) Democracy;
- 6) Introversion of higher psychic functions: self-absorbedness, loneliness, communication of individuals with their inward worlds (“hut” as a peculiar symbol of Motherland, which also has a deeply personal meaning);
- 7) Tendency to form small groups on the basis of mutual sympathies instead of shared goals and concerted actions;
- 8) Practicality, practical mind, and tendency to self-education, orientation not to words but specific actions, priority of senses, self-confidence, diligence and love to land;
- 9) Dominance of unconsciousness, whose individual component is described by a complex of “oppressed, persecuted, discriminated and insulted”, whereas a group element is characterized by the archetype of “fertile Mother Land”⁷.

⁷ A. F. Gutsal, S. L. Nedbaevsky, Portrait of the Political Leader in the Historical Interior // Strategic Panorama, 1999, No. 1-2 // <http://www.niurr.gov.ua/ru/publication/methodology/90914portret.htm>; N. Popova, M. Fursa, National Culture and National Consciousness // Ukraine: Cultural Heritage, National Consciousness and Statehood, Lviv, 1998, No. 5, P. 503-510

Therefore, Soviet consciousness of the majority of Ukrainians differs from that of Russians because it was formed as mass consciousness of a periphery of the Russian Empire⁸, highly developed and strategically important for the USSR but nevertheless a periphery. This is a consequence of unification policy of the metropolitan towards colonies propagated in the form of internationalism, which is confirmed by a much higher level of xenophobia of Russian society.

“According to assessments of a number of sociological centers, including the Institute for In-Depth Social Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Independent Institute for Social and Ethnic Issues, the number of people, who deem that Russians must enjoy wider rights than other ethnicities, considerably grew within the past 6 years. In 2004, the number of followers of “Russian primacy” exceeded that of internationalists believing Russia a home for many peoples, who enjoy equal rights and privileges. Ethnic phobias – negative attitude to migrants, especially persons belonging to the so-called visual minorities, i.e. those, who have a non-Slavic appearance, – recently remained at the level of 50%. In the largest social groups (pensioners, workers and employees) it reached 75% of respondents”⁹.

“Russian xenophobia radically differs from that in European countries, where its highest level was reported among youth (students are leaders of ethnic negativism) and the stable increase – among persons with higher education. In this categories of respondents, negative attitude toward national minorities doubled and reached 69% within the last seven years”¹⁰.

The process of formation of national consciousness in our country differs from that in Russia as well. Ukraine’s socio-economic situation is viewed as an obstacle to shaping national identity and increasing national consciousness, whereas the Russian crisis serves as an incentive to the growing role and value of Russian identity. According to data of sociological research, 85% of Russian citizens are proud of their identity (Russian), while over 80.5% are proud of their country (Russia)¹¹.

“Glorious history and rich national culture” became the source of self-esteem of Russians, whereas **most Ukrainians do not know their history and culture.**

Territorial expansion – like many countries, Ukraine is not ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous. Borders between ethnic groups and their languages do not coincide in our country.

By its cultural and geographical characteristics, Ukraine can be divided into the following two major parts: 1) ethnographically Ukrainian Center and West; 2) the area of colonization – East and South. Of special note is the Crimea, where Russians represent the majority of the population and where the indigenous people, Crimean Tatars, remained¹².

⁸ D. Pybody, A. G. Shmelev, Psychological Analysis of Stereotypes of Russian Character: Cross-Cultural Aspect // Psychology Matters, 1993, No. 3, P. 101-109

⁹ V. Solovey, Birth of the Nation. Historical Essence of New Russian Nationalism, www.postindustrial.net/doc/free/Solovey.doc

¹⁰ E. Pain, Direction of the Ethno-Political Vector: Russia Threatened by New Ethnic Conflicts // Independent Newspaper, May 27, 2003; E. Pain, Why Xenophobia Got Younger: Scales and Mechanisms of Shaping Ethnic Prejudices // Independent Newspaper, October 14, 2003

¹¹ Decade of Russian Reforms As Seen by Russians, Analytical Report / Institute for In-Depth Social Studies, RAS; Russian Independent Institute for Social and Ethnic Issues, M., 2002, P. 69-70

¹² S. I. Mitryaeva, Developing A National Unity Strategy (Regional Aspect) // <http://www.politik.org.ua/vid/publcontent.php3?y1&p9>

Dominance of people with the Soviet identity is typical for the second zone. This group is territorially concentrated in Eastern Ukraine, the industrial Ukrainian-Russian region populated by many ethnic Russians and persons of mixed identity¹³.

Political preferences – according to data of sociological studies, Ukrainian citizens, who position themselves as “citizens of the former USSR”, give preference to communist and socialist ideologies (33.9% and 9.4% of respondents respectively).

Ethnic and linguistic identities are not determinant for representatives of the Soviet identity. Meanwhile, **Russian is a dominant factor**, because under the USSR, the Russian language was a sign of loyalty to the ruling regime. Recent sociological studies conducted by the International Institute of Sociology and the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy National University demonstrated that ethno-social composition of the Ukrainian population substantially worsened compared to data of the 1989 Census. In general, Ukraine’s population mostly consists of the three large ethno-linguistic groups (94%): Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (about 40%), Russian-speaking (33-34%) and Russian-speaking Russians (21%)¹⁴.

Russian is the language of the Ukrainian administrative elite. That is why, in the opinion of O. Maiboroda, the status of Ukrainian as the only official language is an effective incentive to overcome a traditional imperial-bureaucratic complex of Russian-speaking officials¹⁵.

Language stereotypes of this category of the population are generated by the Soviet dogma of Ukrainian as the secondary language. Under the Soviet Union, Russian language and culture dominated in the urban environment, whereas Ukrainian language and culture were considered as rural and archaic.

Religious characteristics – Ukrainians are divided into “friends” and “enemies” by their religious identity. Greek Catholics are associated with “heretics” and “betrayers of true Orthodox Church”.

Today, religion in Ukraine is identical to communism. In the viewpoint of M. Marynovych, diversity is perceived not as religious pluralism but as a split and violation of social order, which must be eliminated¹⁶. The above explains religious intolerance constantly instigated, say, by the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine.

Moreover, the hierarchy and clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy (UOC-MP) are constantly exploiting elements of post-Soviet consciousness. The UOC-MP advocates restoration of the USSR labeling Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty as a “dramatic mistake”. Propagation of this kind became especially active in 2000 due to debates surrounding canonization of Russian Emperor Nikolai II. Odesa Archimandrite of UOC-MP Tit was quoted as saying, “Tsar Nikolai the Second is a saint, who made Russian a prosperous country before the notorious Revolution of 1917. We need only such statehood.”¹⁷ A pro-imperial position of the UOC-MP makes its ally of communists: during the 1999 presidential elections, the Church gave

¹³ M. O. Shulha, Civil Self-Determination of the Ukrainian Population // “Ukraine’s Political Portrait” Bulletin, Democratic Initiative Fund, K., 2001, P. 21-22

¹⁴ M. Strika, Regions of Contemporary Ukraine: Consolidation or Disintegration? // September 5, 2001

¹⁵ O. M. Maiboroda, Problem of Shaping a New Identity of the Ukrainian Nation // Materials of the expert roundtable on “Developing a National Consolidation Strategy in Ukraine: Searching for Models of Interethnic Integration”, Uzhgorod, March 18, 2000 / Interethnic Forum of Ukraine, Uzhgorod, 2000 // http://rdu-old.narod.ru/fbook_1/strat_1.htm

¹⁶ M. Marynovych, The Role of the Church in Building a Post-Communist Society in Ukraine // <http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n22texts/marynovych.htm>

¹⁷ Justice, 2000, No. 3 (19)

support to leader of the Communist party Petro Symonenko. The media of UOC-MP are campaigning for severance of diplomatic relations with the West, NATO and the European Union. .

A. Borkovsky indicatively illustrated the structure of post-Soviet mass consciousness. He wrote that associations of people depend upon their perception. He said, “*V kogos’ pry slovi Ukraina brynyt’ sertse i vodnochas skalaetsya kartyna z Dneprodzerzhynska, Dnepropetrovska, Kakhovky, yastrebkov, nashykh rebyat iz zagrantoryadov, pravoslavnykh oplotiv na Zakhodi, Ponevoliuvachiv-polyakiv, Krymskotatarskykh zagarbnykiv, chortovykh banderovskykh psiv, geroichnogo radyanskogo soldata, prekrasno-zolotykh ta zhovto-garayacykh svyatosofiyskykh ban’*, SPRAVZHYA UKRAINA DO DNIPRA, A DALI ZAPADENTSI, SPOLSHCHNI BANDERY, SHCHO NASHYM V SPYNU STRILYALY, spalenі kolgospы, predatelstvo Mazepy...

V inshogo pry slovi Ukraina brynyt’, plache, smietsya sertse, a yogo rosum vpravno podae ti chy inshi asotsiatyvni kartyny-obrazy, yak-to: Stanislav, Karpaty, SPRAVZHYA UKRAINA DO DNIPRA, A DALI MOSKALI, peremoga pid Konotopom, Schevchenko-Mikhnovsky-Dontsov-Franko-Lypynsky, Makivko-Kruty, dvakolorymoivdvakolory, Zoloty Lev na syn’omy tli, golosuvaty tilky za vusatukh, ne obdurysh – ne prodash, fainyi polyak Polshchu doglyada, ne mozhna robyty v nediliu, bo liudy budut vydity, golosuvaty za Marchuka, bo vin pravdyvyi nash kholop I mudra liudyna, ale z general KGB, nu toi sho, ale z to penvi zaslugy treba maty, aby staty generalom KGB v toi chas, nu to I do universytetu ne vsikh braly, ale z vin zavidyvav politykoiu ta nationalistamy, ta to brekhnay; nema nichogo lipshogo za nashi Karpaty; ta nu ne zvyazuisya – to bandyta, a my z kumom I tak mudro zrobymo; miy did na triokh paniv robyv¹⁸.”

Problem Statement

Human ideology plays the key and imperative role in development of the socio-humanitarian area. This article is based on understanding of this fact. I assumed that tension in East-West relations is caused not only by socio-economic factors, linguistic differences and different vision of cooperation with Russia but also by some ideological distinctions typical for western and eastern Ukrainians. These distinctions are manifested in their assessments of the same historical events and figures, different behavior and even different attitude to Ukraine’s independence. Such delicate and subtle elements of ideology and world outlook serve as filters, through which western, central, eastern and southern Ukrainians perceive their neighbors-compatriots.

The above negative inter-regional stereotypes place barriers in communication with representatives of different regions and even can develop into interpersonal conflicts on political grounds.

In September 2005, focus group studies were held in the framework of the initiative “**Developing a Policy of National Consolidation: Regional Context**”. The studies proved availability of numerous stereotypes existing in the Ukrainian regions, including cultural, linguistic, historical and religious ones.

For instance, the research held by the National Institute for Strategic Studies on November 5-13, 2005 evidenced stereotyped differences in attitude to Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy.

The high level of dependence upon Russia (57.2%) – this is especially true for residents of the eastern regions and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (up to 85% of respondents). However, these are consequences of rigid dichotomy.

¹⁸ A. Borkovsky, Ukraine: 10 Years of Myth // <http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n22texts/borkovsk.htm>

There is the decrease of the followers of the so-called iron-hand (31.6%) – consequently, the number of supporters of the democratic system amounts to 68.4%. It is interesting but this number is identical for all the Ukrainian regions. In the central and northern regions (Kyiv included) democracy is supported by 72.2% of respondents¹⁹.

The results of these and other studies give grounds to conclude that **the Ukrainian nation has not been formed in our country in the modern sense of this word.**

According to Kostyantyn Symons-Symonolevych, “a contemporary nation can be defined as a territorial community sharing a certain modern culture and “bounded” by a strong sense of unity and solidarity; it is a community characterized by historically ingrained understanding of national identity and is willing to have political self-governance.”

Ukrainians do not form a uniform community consolidated by a common political mythology, values and symbols, i.e. they do not have a civic nation in a true sense of this world.

I came to a conclusion that *the common values shared by Ukrainians (e.g. political mythology, values and symbols) are inherited from Soviet Union and not from our independence.*

That is why the subject of my analysis is *specific features of outlook and ideology of Ukrainians* generated by historical heritage and their influences on the processes of cohesion and consolidation of the young Ukrainian nation.

Hence, studying various peculiarities of ideological stereotypes and common features of Ukrainians, who live in different regions, we face phenomenon, which can conventionally be referred to as **the Soviet identity.**

The phenomenon emerged in the early 1980s, prior to disintegration of the Soviet Union. A supranational community was formed, whose ideology and mode of life was unique and different from the rest of the world. The Soviet Union collapsed and new states emerged but **even for the time being, there are people, who associate themselves with the former USSR .**

According to data of sociological research of the National Institute for Strategic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 8% out of 1,800 respondents identify themselves with citizens of the former USSR²⁰ (see Table 2).

Table 1. Dynamics of Self-Determination of Ukrainian Citizens, Data of the Sociology Institute, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (in %)

<i>Whom do you identify yourself with?</i>	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Did not answer	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.2	0.2	0.1
Resident of the village, district or city you live in	31.3	30.2	31.6	32.3	30.5	24.3
Resident of the region(s) you live in	6.9	8.6	5.9	4.8	6.7	6.4
Ukrainian citizen	41.0	34.6	41.0	41.1	44.2	54.5

¹⁹ About Political Preferences of Voters on the Eve of the Parliamentary Elections / National Institute for Strategic Studies, November 5-13, 2005 (Information reference)

²⁰ N. Panina, Sociological Monitoring: Ukrainian Society 1994-2005: The Crucial Year, K.: IC NAS Ukraine, 2005, P. 60

Representative of your ethnicity, nation	0.0	0.0	3.0	2.5	3.1	2.1
Citizen of the former USSR	12.2	17.8	12.7	13.1	10.7	8.1
European citizen	2.8	2.8	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.8
Cosmopolitan	5.6	5.7	2.7	3.6	2.4	2.4
Other	0.0	0.0	1.6	2.0	1.4	1.4
Total	1,810 100.0	1,800 100.0	1,799 100.0	1,800 100.0	1,800 100.0	1,800 100.0

Data of other analyses differ a little²¹, e.g. the 2000 research of the Center for Social and Marketing Studies “Socis” at the request of the State Property Fund of Ukraine indicate the following (see Table 2):

Table 2. Distribution of Answers of Ukrainian Respondents (in %)*

Regions	Ethnic Ukrainians (officially)	Identify themselves with Ukrainians	Identify themselves with the Soviet people	Speak Ukrainian at home	Advocate the use of Ukrainian as the national language	Belong to Ukrainian Christian confessions
Western	92.78	91.70	2.17	93.86	51.23	63.57
Northern	90.67	88.06	6.72	75.75	57.84	51.98
North-Western	95.88	86.60	5.15	90.03	90.26	89.57
Central	89.44	80.00	6.62	78.33	65.56	50.25
South-Western	82.53	77.32	4.83	79.93	26.06	25.99
Kyiv	80.93	77.12	9.72	30.08	70.34	50.33
North-Eastern	79.51	66.39	11.07	47.54	86.94	55.89
South-Eastern	78.26	63.77	19.39	36.23	51.80	47.45
Southern	76.45	61.22	13.04	38.78	83.27	67.30
Eastern	46.74	32.81	25.16	4.94	12.10	20.00
The Autonomous Republic of Crimea	18.82	6.28	28.25	0.90	35.15	36.30
Ukraine Total	75.38	65.82	12.52	51.48	56.50	53.25

* The regions are grouped as follows: the Western region (the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil regions), the South-Western region (the Transcarpathia and Chernivtsi regions), the North-Western region (the Rivne, Volyn and Khmelnytsky regions), the Northern region (the Zhytomyr, Kyiv and Chernihiv regions), the Central region (the Vinnytsya, Cherkasy, Poltava and Kirovohrad regions), the North-Eastern region (the Sumy and Kharkiv regions), the Eastern region (the Luhansk and Donetsk regions), the South-Eastern region (the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhya regions), the Southern region (the Odesa, Kherson and Mykolaiv regions) and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea²².

²¹ A. Tolpygo, Ethno-Cultural and Ideological Orientations of the Ukrainian Population. Data of Sociological Research // “Socis”, 1998, No. 4, P. 76-77; O. I. Utkin, Socio-Political Stability in the Region: Ethno-Political and Inter-Confessional Factors, K., 1998, (“Regional Development”, Issue No. 3. P. 105

²² A. Kolodiy, Soviet Identity and Its Manifestations in Independent Ukraine //

www.politics.lviv.ua/nations/soviet3.html; See also: G. Paliy, Strengthening of the Shared National identity in Ukraine // Political Management, 2005, No. 2 (11), P. 38-45.

The same stands true about attitude of the Ukrainian population to the USSR cited by Ain Bremer. 45% of the polled residents of Lviv, 42% - of Kyiv and 75% - of Simferopol are positive about the Soviet Union. As far as rusification is concerned, the figures are as follows: 12% - in Lviv, 49% - in Kyiv and 88% - in Simferopol. In other words, this means that not all Ukrainians feel nostalgia for the Soviet Empire.

One should not be a professional sociologist to understand that a desire to retain the Soviet Union shall by no means be associated with its restoration. A passive agreement with its existence does not imply an active aspiration to restore it²³. Such a position was strikingly described by Olexandr Moroz, **“The one, who does not feel sorry for the Soviet Union, does not have heart but the one, who attempts to restore it, does not have consciousness.”**

What is the reason for such conserved consciousness?

First and foremost, it is a **gradual shaping of the shared Ukrainian identity** determined by difficult historical circumstances.

Ukrainian scientist O. Maiboroda distinguished the following factors impeding shaping of the common Ukrainian nation:

- 1) Economic crisis that blocked formation of a common national market, a vital component of a political nation;
- 2) Spiritual crisis, disintegration of social ties determining all kinds of collective identities, inclusive of ethnic one. Its destructive consequences threaten formation of the national identity;
- 3) Ethnic revival of the Ukrainian core nation and national minorities, which actualizes ethnic group identity and determines its dominance over a national one;
- 4) Crisis of the Soviet identity resulting in the loss of self-confidence;
- 5) Incomplete consolidation of ethnic Ukrainians, underdevelopment of national self-consciousness of the majority of them²⁴.

The last two reasons are the most inter-related.

National revival in East European countries that started after disintegration of the Soviet Union shifted ambiguous processes in young democracies. On the one hand, emergence of new states gave an impetus to revitalization of languages, cultures and historical traditions. On the other hand it heightened inter-ethnic conflicts and confrontations.

The same is true for Ukraine. The so-called regional patriotism is growing. On the one hand, it is a very positive phenomenon because it is an element of civil patriotism, which makes people be interested in their history and culture. Politically, it is manifested in formation of political parties of regionally pronounced nature (e.g. the “Souiz” Party, the Party of the Regions and the Party “Reforms and Order”). However, extreme manifestations of regional patriotism lead to the same inter-regional conflicts. Such sentiments are not dangerous unless politicians, who care only of their personal interests, artificially foment them. Under such circumstances, phrases like “We struggled for your independence” or “ We feed you all” or “We belong to Ukraine by chance” grow into political confrontation or even separatist movement jeopardizing Ukraine’s national security.

²³ M. Ryabchuk, Russians in Ukraine from the Viewpoint of American Sociologist //”Dialogue”, March 3, 2004.

²⁴ O. M. Maiboroda, Problem of Shaping a New Identity of the Ukrainian Nation // Materials of the expert roundtable on “Developing a National Consolidation Strategy in Ukraine: Searching for Models of Interethnic Integration”, Uzhgorod, March 18, 2000 / Interethnic Forum of Ukraine, Uzhgorod, 2000 // http://rdu-old.narod.ru/fbook_1/strat_1.htm

Some might see the reason in **temporary consolidation of some regions within Ukraine**.

This may be true because contemporary Ukraine emerged only after the WWII and some of its ethnic territories belong to other states for long (the USSR, Poland, Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia) even after 60 years of common development these specificities retained.

One cannot but agree that **most of all Ukraine was influenced being the Ukrainian SSR (i.e. one of the Soviet republics)**. We must recognize this fact both theoretically and practically and take consequences of this heritage into account. For the time being, the difference between Ukraine and Russia (like between all other Soviet republics) in this context is not that visible. Similarity of processes of transformation of political structures in the CIS states²⁵ demonstrates that three hundred years of co-existence within the Russian Empire influenced development of our country. These factors will continue to affect all aspects of our life. Egalitarian-collective values, the dictatorial administrative and command system – all these social components stressed by B. Gavrylyshyn as characteristics of the ruling regime of the Soviet Union²⁶ will determine development of socio-political processes in all post-Soviet countries.

In the opinion of foreign academicians, *“Ukraine of the past decade is of Soviet nature. Its borders, ethnic composition of population, its socio-economic experience, national economy, political system, health care, education and many other things are determined by the Soviet period of its history, including experience of Ukrainian East and West.*

History of Ukraine’s last decade may be interpreted differently, even like an attempt to adapt Soviet experience to new circumstances evoked by its independence. Ukrainians did not and could not have other circumstances. If you meet a peasant on the market, who curses out Gorbachev for “disintegration of the Soviet Union” and simultaneously asks, “What are we building?” you see only a “spasm” of post-Soviet consciousness that made people think in terms of empire and phrases like “Our goal is communism!”

10 years of independence could not substitute “communist” ideology with “orientation towards reforms” – it was just an effort of official Kyiv to become “a little Moscow””²⁷.

Though, such conservatism is explained by **psychological reasons**.

The Soviet identity is nothing but a response to the crisis of the early 1990s, when millions of citizens lost stability, the state-guaranteed income, found themselves on the verge of poverty, lost pride and self-confidence. The split of the Soviet Union was attended with criticism of the Soviet system as such – ideology of leaders, practice of state-building – all that served as a basis of ideology of Soviet citizens **Collapse of ideology coincided with break-up of the Soviet Union and became a psycho-traumatic factor for the majority of former citizens of the USSR.**

Hence, the Soviet identity is a kind of self-defense, a kind of a compensatory psychological mechanism, a kind of socio-cultural adaptation to changes.

Ukrainian independence, which gave people hopes for the better, did not stimulate self-identification with other (Ukrainian) identity because independence (“ukrainization”) and the socio-economic crisis ingrained in mass consciousness as the cause and effect even despite 3 million Ukrainians, who “appeared” after the referendum. Identification with Ukraine was similar to

²⁵ F. Rudych, Transformation of Political Structures in the CIS and Baltic States // “New Policy”, 1996, No. 6, P. 12

²⁶ B. Gavrylyshyn, Guidelines for the Future: Report to the Rome Club, K., 1993, P. 39-46

²⁷ M. Hidorf, “U” Dimension // “Ukrainian Cultural Chronicle “I” // <http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n22texts/neidorf.htm>

identification with a notorious post-totalitarian state. The international image of Ukraine also did it a bad favor because we were associated abroad with Vitaliy Klichko or Andriy Shevchenko at best. But most often, millions of Poles, Czechs, Italians, Slovaks and the French associated the word “Ukrainian” with “Chornobyl”, “mafia”, “organized crime”, “prostitution” and “the murder of Gongadze”...

Distrust to the state causes distrust to its population and ukrainization implanted by this state.

Social elites, especially political ones, play the major role in self-identification. Unfortunately, the “new” elite could not set good examples. Therefore, the majority of Ukrainians exemplify former Soviet or foreign political leaders (Putin, de Gol, Pinochet, Stalin and others).

Elite proved to be archaic and inadequate to Contemporaneity. In the opinion of researchers, the modern generation of Ukrainian politicians, administrators, businessmen and academicians poorly understand world development trends, shifts in ideological and value orientations. Insufficient awareness of all strata of population about the nature of existent problems and archaic-industrial consciousness do not foster orientation towards a new development strategy.

Settled way of life typical for Ukrainians does not encourage inter-regional cooperation as well. The absence of mobility is also explained by the lack of money for traveling. We are afraid of “strangers” because we know nothing about their life.

Independence was not a result of evolution in the minds of the majority of Ukrainians . Most of them were taken by surprise, when Ukraine became independent, and therefore were not psychologically ready to perceive it. To be more precise, they recognized this fact emotionally, which was proved by the famous voting at the 1991 referendum, but could not perceive and understand it mentally.

In contrast to many European nations, where formation of the state crowned one of the stages of development of the nation, in Ukraine everything happened vice versa. In fact, the state was formed first and only then the process of shaping a modern Ukrainian society began.

Hence, **psychologically, most Ukrainians belong not to another dimension (which we call the East or West) but to another epoch.**

Alternative Ways to Solve Socio-Humanitarian Problems

Since in post-totalitarian states little attention is paid to the socio-humanitarian and, especially, the socio-cultural areas, the Ukrainian government failed to develop a uniform approach to solving relevant problems.

Analysis of approaches available in theory and practice of public socio-humanitarian policy allows distinguishing the following: **the socio-economic, legal, political and multicultural approaches.**

1. Followers of **the socio-economic approach** consider inter-regional socio-humanitarian challenges in the light of socio-economic development of these regions and view solutions for socio-cultural problems as satisfaction of social and economic needs of their population. Needless to say, given the socio-economic crisis in Ukraine since the early 1990s, such approach is quite reasonable. However, it is remarkable for yet another manifestation of the Soviet ideology based on Marxian economic reductionism, according to which basis (economic relations) determines superstructure (socio-cultural needs).

2. Advocates of **the legal approach** are focused on bridging the gap in regional socio-humanitarian development from a purely legal viewpoint through detailed regulation of the status

and rights of the regions. They explain problems in the socio-humanitarian area by the absence of respective legal regulation. Extreme manifestation of this approach is the so-called “legislative graphorrhea”, i.e. drafting of declarative legal acts that cannot be applied in practice. Furthermore, the number of such legal “proposals” increases on the eve of election campaigns.

3. **According to the political approach**, inter-regional conflicts are viewed as manifestations of contradictions between large and influential financial and political groups, which represent a certain region. This approach also has the right to exist, for history of the past decade is rich in many indicative examples of such interpretation of inter-regional relations, while the media are full of articles about “wars” between the Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and other clans. Existence of “regional” political parties may also serve as an argument in favor of the political approach. At the same time, the purely political approach does not adequately explain many regional processes and other social phenomena.

4. **The multicultural approach** provides that inter-regional problems are evoked by purely cultural and socio-psychological factors. Extreme manifestations of this approach are a theoretical substantiation of neglect for definite regions, their interpretation as culturally backward or underdeveloped, cultural autonomism or separatism.

Adherents of every of the four afore-mentioned approaches suggest their own methods for solving the existing problems. However, the truth lies somewhere in between. A complex of socio-humanitarian issues needs a comprehensive approach to their settlement.

As I have already mentioned, this analysis is dedicated, above all, to socio-cultural and psychological aspects of the topic. Many inter-regional challenges of ethnic and even socio-economic nature are rooted in social and political psychology.

Hence, a new socio-cultural policy of the government is **the most optimal solution**.

The Soviet identity apparently evidences serious failings of public socio-humanitarian policy. Some Ukrainians are not psychologically ready to accept a new identity because they cannot provide enough convincing arguments for changing their viewpoint. The government still does not explain or argue in favor of its important decisions: why NATO or why the WTO instead of the Single Economic Space or how dual citizenship could adversely affect protection of civil rights and so forth.

In the opinion of experts, it is necessary to regularly and actively work with society. Unless the idea of European and Euro-Atlantic integration becomes attractive for various social strata, it will remain just a hare-brained project interesting only for a narrow circle of experts, while the Day of Europe will be celebrated only by a few Ukrainian cities²⁸.

In a democratic society, **the cultural and educational role of the state**, the key institution of national integration, increases.

Recognition of the multi-ethnic and multicultural nature of Ukrainian society as a fundamental value is the key to **development of Ukrainian ethnic policy towards preventing conflicts**. Cultural, religious and linguistic diversity of society must be recognized as **a positive factor** ensuring its spiritual wealth, while **national minorities must be viewed as its integral part**. Meanwhile, proceeding from the fact of multi-ethnicity of society, it should be realized that peaceful and tranquil life also requires the following:

- Civil unity, public policy of integration in the social, ethnic, regional and legal context
- Climate of tolerance, a cross-cultural dialogue.

²⁸ V. Anisimov, What Should We Reject by Entry into the EU // “Day”, July 6, 2005, No. 118

These conditions shall help every **ethnic group to maintain and promote its identity, preserve culture, language and traditions and make a contribution to integration and consolidation of Ukrainian society**. Failure to comply with these principles may give rise to elements of federalization undesirable at the current stage of Ukrainian society's development.

Therefore, **a new cultural policy of the government shall be based on recognition of multiculturalism** promoting cultural diversity, bilingualism, interest to other regions, ethnicities and traditions. By no means confrontation is a basis for national unity and cohesion.

Public policy must support co-existence and maintenance of unique socio-cultural regions consolidated by a shared national identity.

A new policy must prioritize not confrontation, unification, autonomization or ethnic separateness but cultural diffusion, mutual enrichment, cooperation, cultural diversity, preservation, not artificial cultivation, of differences and competitive spirit, not rivalry, of the regions

So, the matter in question is rather **national integration** than consolidation²⁹. In other words, not ethno-cultural assimilation or federalization but **ethno-socio-cultural integration** is needed (O. Lanovenko). By integration I mean interaction of two and more ethnic groups or communities that results in shaping a number of common cultural features but does not change their ethnic self-consciousness. Community of interests is manifested in a desire to build a democratic and constitutional state.

Given Ukrainian realities, the integration strategy demands national minorities to gradually adapt to fundamental values of the ethnic majority, which, in its turn, must adapt its social institutions (education, culture, administration and jurisprudence) to needs of a multi-ethnic and multicultural society. Hence, acculturation is the integration model the most adequate to the current ethno-political situation in Ukraine. Among other things, acculturation demands national minorities to master language and culture of the core nation simultaneously preserving their own languages and cultures. So, interethnic integration is understood as preservation of cultural and ethnic identity both in interethnic communication and daily contact with culture of the ethnic majority.

In this case, potential of Russian Ukrainians must be used more actively .

According to O. Lanovenko, not only the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine but also the majority of ethnic Russians living in the country have already acquired ethno-cultural features common with the Ukrainian population. Such ethno-cultural similarity allows identifying almost all Russian-speaking population of Ukraine, inclusive of ethnic Russians, as an organic and integral component of an ethno-cultural community called the Ukrainian people.

He deems this process to be quite natural. Moreover, in historical retrospective identical processes usually shaped dynamic and viable cultures based on integrated elements. Hence, ethno-socio-cultural integration referred to as contemporary society is a unique ethno-cultural mosaic³⁰.

²⁹ V. P. Troshchynsky, Challenges and Prospects of Inter-Ethnic Integration in Ukraine // Materials of the expert roundtable on "Developing a National Consolidation Strategy in Ukraine: Searching for Models of Interethnic Integration", Uzhgorod, March 18, 2000 / Interethnic Forum of Ukraine // http://rdu-old.narod.ru/fbook_1/strat_1.htm

³⁰ O. V. Lanovenko, Ukraine: Prospects of Assimilation, Federalization or Language and Cultural Integration // http://www.niurr.gov.ua/ru/publication/culture/lanov_integration.html

An idea that Russian is the language of adversaries of Ukraine's independence and sovereignty, which hampers strengthening of Ukrainian patriotism, was very harmful for ethno-cultural integration of Ukrainian society.

For this reason, Russian was not considered as a part of patriotic upbringing in independent Ukraine. The Russian-speaking population was regarded as secondary citizens, which was one of the reasons for opposition and hostility to Ukrainian statehood.

Meanwhile, according to official data, the Russian minority amounts to over 11 million persons or 22% of the Ukrainian population. As I have already mentioned, the number of Russian-speaking Ukrainian citizens does not coincide with that of Russians. Data of the recent Census proved that 85.2% of Ukrainians believed Ukrainian their mother tongue, whereas 14.8% considered Russian as their native language. However, just 3.9% of ethnic Russian regarded Ukrainian their mother tongue. As for Crimean Tatars, 92% believed their native language Crimean Tatar, 0.1% – Ukrainian and 6.1% – Russian.

Nevertheless, attitude of the Russian-speaking population to Ukraine is positive. Just 5% of Russians in Lviv and 8% in Kyiv do not want to be Ukrainian citizens – a minor share compared to the number of those, who still have nostalgia for the USSR. (For comparison: in Simferopol, 59% of Russians are negative about Ukrainian citizenship, however, this number is also smaller than that of supporters of the Soviet Union. This figure, however, shall not be understood as hatred toward Ukraine, all they want is the Crimea's separation.)

Attitude of Russians to education of their children in Ukrainian is as follows: 54% of respondents in Lviv and 65% in Kyiv want their children to study at Ukrainian (!) schools, almost all the respondents in Lviv and Kyiv (96% and 91% respectively) and 54% of Russians in Simferopol recognize fluency (!) of their children in Ukrainian as a must.

Anyway, **the absolute majority of Russian Ukrainians (knowingly or unknowingly) identify themselves with Ukraine and link the future of their children to Ukraine not in the purely ethnic but in the broad, first of all, civil sense.** At the same time, they retained ingrained prejudices (fomented by communist propaganda) against the so-called ukrainization³¹.

All Ukrainian cultural and educational strategies and policies towards the Russian minority shall be flexible and regionally differentiated. First and foremost, they shall be aimed at children, schoolchildren and students. In general, the Russian minority is positive about ukrainization of their future but feels anxiety for ukrainization of their present. The same stands true for the regions, where the Russian minority and Russian-speaking Ukrainians form the overwhelming majority of the population.

A. Gutsol voiced an interesting opinion about possible consequences of public ethno-cultural policy in the Crimea. According to him, it is expedient to start forming a multicultural community in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea on the basis of Russian dominant culture with informal inclusion of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar components. This would not only favor interethnic peace and harmony on the peninsula but also create preconditions for shaping a new generation able to appropriately represent Ukraine and its interests in the Turkic and, probably, the whole Islamic world³².

Therefore, objectives of Ukraine's ethno-cultural policy shall also include:

³¹ M. Ryabchuk, Russians in Ukraine from the Viewpoint of American Sociologist // "Dialogue", March 3, 2004

³² A. Gutsol, Ukraine on the Threshold of the Third Millennium: Ways We Choose // "Mirror of the Week", 2000, No.

- Rejection of enforcement methods and forms of regulation of the language issue in education, science and culture; switch to natural and effective (economic, social, cultural, educational and other) methods for revitalization of the Ukrainian language, promotion of other ethnic languages and cultures, encouragement of interethnic cultural harmony and mutual support;
- Re-orientation of lawmaking from protective, restrictive and conflict-provoking positions on Russian towards its legal capacity and the use of the Russian language and culture in all aspects of life.

Education plays an extremely important role in these processes.

Implementation of the above priorities demand removal of the following barriers:

- The absence of effective and high-quality educational programs, materials and teaching methodologies;
- The absence of incentives to develop and support schools providing education on the basis of the said priorities;
- The absence of a system of professional training and advanced training of teachers.

Objectives in this area are as follows:

- **Multicultural education:** programs providing knowledge of history, culture and ethnic groups co-existing in society, their potential and valuable cultural diversity. These programs must be aimed at better knowledge of methods for preventing identity and ethnic conflicts, strengthening of mutual respect and tolerance;
- **Cross-cultural education:** programs for schoolchildren of all ethnicities, who study together, must promote their mutual understanding and respect;
- **Public assistance** to people, who speak other languages, in the study of Ukrainian.

Society needs shared historical mythology. Though, this goal is very difficult to attain.

In this respect, there are more problems compared to the language issue. The current concept of Ukrainian history is Ukrainian-ethno-centrist, i.e. it is focused on the past of the Ukrainian nation with respective assessments and emphases. A political nation needs a concept of Ukrainian history common for all ethnic groups and communities.

It is necessary to develop a common vision of regional historical development, considering that different parts of Ukraine have been disintegrated for long, whereas the Transcarpathia was annexed to our country only after the WWII. Nowadays, Ukrainian history is told in “regional series” having very little in common. In some regions, authorities even make efforts to artificially contrast local history to national one.

Politologist V. Karasiov considers that in Ukraine, appeals to historical and cultural traditions evoked new micro- and macro-splits in society: de facto there is no a common historical myth perceived by society as a basic and archetypical. Lviv residents are irritated with the monument to Lenin on the Freedom Square in Kharkiv, whereas people in Donetsk are prejudiced against the cult of the OUN-UPA in Western Ukraine.

Historical and cultural aims of the early 1990s are artificial and disintegrative in nature. For this reason, they can serve as a basis only for a kind of hybrid identity, which a priori may be viewed just as a “temporary” one.

V. Karasiov also expressed an interesting standpoint about directions of Ukraine’s further socio-cultural development. Given globalization, the link between states and citizens is weakening. Such criteria for the geo-political and state-centrist ideology as the territory, the Army and the number of

population do not reflect the essence of the state but gain new meanings in the context of such more topical and dynamic notion as space. The modern world is fighting not for territories but space and values – that is now called “soft power”.

Over the past decade, Ukraine has been forming territorial identity and patriotism and strengthening territorial sovereignty within a common state. Even despite that not all objectives of territorial identification (the administrative and territorial reform, delimitation and demarcation of borders with Russia and Belarus) are implemented, goals of the ethno-territorial Ukrainian revolution are almost attained.

During the Orange Revolution of late 2004, Ukraine had to make a decision on transition from territorial to spatial development: disintegration from the Russian and post-Soviet value space and integration into political values of democratic Europe. It was the spatial revolution, the choice in favor of the shared European identity and the course towards spatial development of European values. It is neither the West nor the East but democratic universal values and orientations that gained a new national and post-national significance for Ukraine³³.

Democracy in Ukraine compensates the absence of stable shared language, cultural, historical and spiritual values. Should the acting government fail to strengthen “post-national nationalism” as a dominant ideology, promote democratization and regional integration, return to “traditional nationalism” and more pronounced ethno-national impulses would be the only way out. This would inevitably aggravate cultural split and even territorial disintegration of Ukraine.

In order to enhance the Ukrainian identity, it is imperative to cultivate solidarity and collectivism reproduced through political participation and based on democratic institutions and rules of the law.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Existence of the Soviet identity indicates serious drawbacks of public socio-humanitarian policy. That is why in order to meet the existing challenges, it is necessary to formulate a new socio-cultural policy of Ukraine providing for the following:

1. Further **development of the cultural and educational function of the state**, which is the key to national integration; implementation of programs promoting national integration, keeping the population aware of Euro-Atlantic integration and other important decisions of the government

2. Effective use of budget funds: public humanitarian policy at the national and local levels shall incorporate **such components as analysis, forecasting, programming, monitoring, accounting, accountability and control**; identification of socio-humanitarian indicators ensuring they are embedded into the mechanism of monitoring performance of regional state administrations

Analysis of the socio-cultural environment could serve as one of its elements, including:

- The level of provision of Ukrainians with cultural institutions, establishments and organizations by types (in % to the level of needs according to public standards for different categories of inhabited localities): public libraries, clubs, amateur art groups, urban and rural cinematographic institutions
- The number of books in the Ukrainian and minority languages (thousand per capita): published, sold

³³ V. Karasiov, V. 1991/2004: “Two Revolutions” and Challenges of the Ukrainian Identity // “Day”, August 9, 2005

- The level of provision of Ukrainians with physical culture and sports institutions and facilities (in % to the level of needs according to public standards for placement and number of sports installations for different categories of inhabited localities)
- According to data of quarterly sociological polls – an integral indicator of the level of protection of political rights and freedoms (on the basis of data of panel sociological research) measured on the 5-points scale. Its elements might include:
 - Analytical report on the number and structure of publications in the media (save those, run by national authorities or local self-government bodies) about activities of the governmental agencies (positive, negative, neutral):
 - Compliance with fundamental human rights and freedoms
 - Promotion of civil society institutions
 - The level of language, religious, ethnic and gender tolerance
 - Guarantees of the right to political opposition.

3. The active use of foreign experience of public regulation of the humanitarian area creation of the National Commission on Culture analogous to Canadian Royal Commissions mandated to:

- Prepare and present the Verkhovna Rada and the President with the Annual National Reports on the state of Ukraine’s socio-humanitarian development. Basic provisions and recommendations of the Reports shall be necessarily implemented in the national budget, local budgets and legislative acts on issues of humanitarian policy
- Draft and adopt the law of Ukraine “On Culture” that would define the term “culture” and serve as a basis for development of public cultural programs
- Develop proposals for public socio-humanitarian policies

4. Rejection, by authorities at a variety of levels, of the archaic attitude to the humanitarian area as to something minor and useless active position of governmental agencies at all levels on settlement of humanitarian problems.

5. Elaboration of clear and transparent approaches to priority funding of humanitarian industries at both the national and regional levels

6. Provision of appropriate feedback while implementing humanitarian policy at all the administrative levels/levels of governance

7. Application of a multicultural approach promoting cultural diversity, bilingualism, interest to other regions, ethnicities and traditions. The policy shall prioritize not confrontation, unification, autonomization or ethnic separateness but cultural diffusion, mutual enrichment, cooperation, cultural diversity, preservation, not artificial cultivation, of differences and competitive spirit, not rivalry, of the regions

8. The intensive use of potential of Russian Ukrainians most Russian Ukrainians (knowingly or unknowingly) identify themselves with Ukraine and link the future of their children to Ukraine not in the purely ethnic but in the broad, first of all, civil sense. Only mutual acculturation could lead to emergence of viable national culture based on integrated cultural elements

9. Rejection of enforcement methods and forms of regulation of the language issue in education, science and culture switch to natural and effective (economic, social, cultural, educational and other) methods for revitalization of the Ukrainian language in society, promotion of other ethnic languages and cultures, encouragement of interethnic cultural harmony and mutual support; re-orientation of lawmaking from protective, restrictive and conflict-provoking positions on Russian in Ukraine towards its legal capacity and the use of the Russian language and culture in all aspects of life

10. Improvement of education policy, which must be based on principles of multiculturalism, respect for other peoples, potential and values of cultural diversity

11. According to data of the focus group studies, the following mechanisms of national integration shall be useful:

- On television **pay more attention to regional news**
- Create historical broadcasts
- Professionally advertise Ukrainian cities by demonstrating their cultural traditions
- Develop internal tourism (traveling, development of tourism in Ukraine)
- Develop cultural programs (celebrations of ethnic cultures, cuisines etc.)
- Share experience
- Elaborate youth programs
- Develop, within curriculum, materials familiarizing schoolchildren with history of different peoples populating Ukraine

12. Priority of Contemporaneity instead of old historical and cultural myths; strengthening of “post-national nationalism” (according to Mr. Karasiov) as ideology of political participation built on democratic institutions and rules of the law

13. Enhancement of Ukraine’s image, active participation of NGOs, the Army, church and other social institutions, which citizens trust the most.

Multiculturalism Policy and Consolidation of the Ukrainian Society: Challenges and Perspectives

By SVITLANA KONONCHUK,

Head, Political Programs, Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research

Introduction

Today, the nature and directions of Ukraine's public policy are heatedly debated. Topicality of these issues is determined by the following factors.

First, the 2004 presidential campaign demonstrated that despite the absence of interethnic confrontation, it was too early for Ukraine to rest on its laurels. A number of unsolved problems in this field determined relative effectiveness of political technologies used by one of the presidential candidates and his team-mates, who attempted to provoke artificial confrontation between western and south-eastern Ukrainian regions.

Ukraine managed to avoid the worst scenario due to the absence of acute interethnic conflicts. Though, existing problems and social sentiments made many people followers of disseminated political myths and provocative calls.

Ukrainian researcher Volodymyr Yevtukh fairly points out the absence of public policy of discrimination based on ethnic grounds¹. Meanwhile, he notes that there are manifestations of discrimination towards some ethnic groups in different areas ranging from legislation to personal rights and freedoms², which is caused by the unsatisfactory level of Ukraine's socio-economic development, insufficient protection of socio-humanitarian interests of some ethnic groups, inadequacy of the Ukrainian ethnic law, absence of effective mechanisms for the exercise of the fundamental rights of national minorities appropriate to their growing ethnic consciousness, inadequate perception of a multi-ethnic nature of the Ukrainian society by its members, lack of tolerance and biased attitude to other ethnic identities³.

One cannot but agree that a policy of purposeful discrimination towards ethnic groups is absent in Ukraine at the national level. Meanwhile, in view of the above factors, it would be expedient to discuss not only manifestations of discrimination but also certain discriminatory trends present in public policy. So, the question arises: who is being discriminated and by whom? The state, which does not properly safeguard minority rights, can be regarded as a discriminator. The matter in question is the absence of effective mechanisms for the exercise of the rights of ethnic groups and minorities in the socio-humanitarian area.

As for the legal field, the content of constitutional guarantees complies with democratic standards but, unfortunately, they often run counter to socio-political realities. For example, in Article 5 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the term "people" is used in political sense and means "the bearers of sovereignty and the only source of power in the country." In Articles 10 and 11 differentiating

¹ Yevtukh V., Experience of Solving Ethnic Problems: Conceptual Principles and Practical Measures // Topical Issues and Fields of Ukrainian Ethnic Policy: Ways of Modernization and Application of International Experience. K.:UCIPR, 2004, P. 32.

² Yevtukh V., Experience of Solving Ethnic Problems: Conceptual Principles and Practical Measures // Topical Issues and Fields of Ukrainian Ethnic Policy: Ways of Modernization and Application of International Experience. K.:UCIPR, 2004, P. 34.

³ Yevtukh V., Experience of Solving Ethnic Problems: Conceptual Principles and Practical Measures // Topical Issues and Fields of Ukrainian Ethnic Policy: Ways of Modernization and Application of International Experience. K.:UCIPR, 2004, P. 34.

between the “Ukrainian nation”, “indigenous peoples” and “national minorities”, all three terms are used in ethnic sense. Articles 10, 11 and 24 of the Basic Law and the June 25, 1992 law “On National Minorities” guarantee equal civil rights and the right of all Ukrainian citizens to free development. The Ukrainian ethnic or core nation is de facto believed the major subject of state-building, whereas, according to Volodymyr Yevtukh, the official definition for the “core nation” is absent in the Ukrainian legislation⁴.

The situation is complicated by the fact that according to data of the 2001 National Census, Ukrainian is mother tongue for 67.5% of the Ukrainian citizens, including 85% of ethnic Ukrainians, 4% of Russians and 11% of members of other national minorities. 29.6% of the population, inclusive of 15% of Ukrainians, 96% of Russians and 31% of members of other national minorities, believe Russian their native language. Hence, with regard to importance of language for ethno-cultural self-identification, ethnic consciousness of the considerable share of the Ukrainian population is open to question.

Problems in the field of Ukraine’s ethnic policy can be mostly explained by insufficient efforts of the government to influence formation of the Ukrainian political nation. Therefore, it is mistaken to state that Ukraine’s society is disintegrated. Rather, it is not fully consolidated on the basis of self-determination with the Ukrainian political nation.

Most of the above problems are not unique on the background of the world history and practice, though their solution depends, to a large extent, on the Ukrainian political and socio-economic context.

In liberal theory, there is a concept that politics shall sacrifice national priorities for the sake of the fundamental human rights and freedoms. At the same time, some theorists like Charles Taylor deem the ethno-cultural factor cannot be totally excluded from political processes⁵. He criticized what Michael Sandel called the “procedural republic”, under which the focus should be totally on individual rights and democratic and legal procedures, rather than on the historical-cultural reference points, or the ideas of the good life, by which citizens define their own identities. According to Taylor, this concept is of abstract nature because first, the condition of a viable political identity is that “people must actually be able to relate to it and to find them reflected in it” and, second, it is in fact very difficult to devise a procedure, which is seen as neutral by everyone. “The mistake here is to believe that there can be some decision whose neutrality is guaranteed by its emerging from some principle or procedure. This breeds the illusion that there is no need to negotiate the place of these symbols, and hence to confront the actual substantive differences of religious allegiance in the public square. But no procedure can dispense from the need to share identity space⁶.” In developed democracies, multiculturalism policy serves to meet these challenges.

This study is based on the multiculturalism concept suggested by Professor at McGill University in Montreal Charles Taylor⁷. The Canadian scientist defines multiculturalism as “the politics of recognition”, recognition of ethno-cultural differences, which does not entail marginalization or discrimination of ethnic groups by the state. He wrote, “We don’t have to force ourselves into an

⁴ Yevtukh V., Experience of Solving Ethnic Problems: Conceptual Principles and Practical Measures // Topical Issues and Fields of Ukrainian Ethnic Policy: Ways of Modernization and Application of International Experience. K.:UCIPR, 2004, P. 33.

⁵ Taylor C., Democratic Exclusion (and Its Remedies?) // Multiculturalism and Transformation of Post-Soviet Societies / Edit. V. Malakhov and V. Tyshkov. M.: Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2002.

⁶ Taylor C., Democratic Exclusion (and Its Remedies?) // Multiculturalism and Transformation of Post-Soviet Societies / Edit. V. Malakhov and V. Tyshkov. M.: Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2002.

⁷ Taylor C., Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition” . K., 2004.

artificial homogeneity in order to live together in peace. We can recognize different “national” (Volk) identities; even give them political expression, because each in this act of recognition acknowledges that it is not universal, that it has to co-exist with others which are equally legitimate.⁸”

According to the multiculturalism concept, individuals should freely use their own ethnic cultures. They do not have to adopt traditions, customs and values of either their own or the dominant ethnic group. They should not suffer from discrimination on ethnic grounds and must be protected from violence on the part of their ethnic group caused by refusal to follow their traditions and customs.

In practice, multiculturalism means recognition of ethno-cultural pluralism as the key value, guarantees of equal access of all ethnic groups to all civil rights and freedoms, creation and promotion of conditions for free development of ethnic cultures and elimination of obstacles to integration of ethnic groups and national minorities into a multi-ethnic society.

How can states be more inclusive? According to the UNDP Human Development Report 2004 “Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World”, creating an environment, in which multiple identities flourish begins with encouraging cultural liberty and equality between groups in cultural, political and socio-economic opportunities.

Some believe that multicultural policies undermine building of a cohesive nation with a homogeneous cultural identity, the dominant political project of the 20th century. Most states influenced by this thinking were deeply committed to fostering a single, homogeneous national identity with a shared sense of history, values and beliefs. Recognition of ethno-cultural diversity, especially of organized, politically active and culturally differentiated groups and minorities, was viewed as a serious threat to state unity, destabilizing to political and social unity achieved after historic struggles.

Authors of the Report distinguish nation-building strategies privileging singular identities through various interventions:

- Adoption of official-language laws, which define the dominant group’s language as the only official national language to be used in the bureaucracy, courts, public services, the army, higher education and other official institutions;
- Construction of a nationalized system of compulsory education promoting standardized curricula and teaching the dominant group’s language, literature and history and defining them as the “national” language, literature and history;
- Diffusion of the dominant group’s language and culture through national cultural institutions, including state-run media and public museums;
- Adoption of state symbols celebrating the dominant group’s history, heroes and culture, reflected in such things as the choice of national holidays or the naming of streets, buildings and geographic characteristics⁹.

Therefore, it is safe to state that these approaches feature realities of Ukrainian ethnic policy. Such policy apparently runs counter to the strategy of shaping the Ukrainian political nation, impedes democratic state-building and does not comply with modern democratic standards.

⁸ Taylor C., *Democratic Exclusion (and Its Remedies?) // Multiculturalism and Transformation of Post-Soviet Societies / Edit. V. Malakhov and V. Tyshkov. M.: Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2002.*

⁹ Human Development Report 2004. *Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World. M.: “The Whole World”, 2004, P. 56.*

The problem gains special importance in view of Ukraine's intention to join the European Union. Ukrainian ethnic policy shall comply with that of EU member States, most of which adopted and actively pursue multiculturalism (e.g. Belgium, Sweden and Hungary).

Estonia and Latvia, which had certain problems with protection of the rights of national minorities (e.g. the language right of Russians), were the exceptions to this rule. However, their EU entry was determined by a number of subjective reasons, Ukraine should not hope for.

In this study, Ukraine is seen as a post-colonial multi-ethnic country.

By their ethnic composition, societies can be conventionally classed as follows:

- Immigrant societies (the USA, Canada);
- Mono-ethnic societies (Germany, Poland);
- Multi-ethnic societies (Spain, Belgium);
- Multi-ethnic post-imperial societies (the Russian Federation, Ukraine, where the share of 130 national minorities in the total number of the population is 22.2%, save Ukrainians).

The major problem of the last group of societies, to which Ukraine belongs, is to achieve parity between the need to revive Ukrainian culture and develop cultures of other ethnic groups and national minorities.

The difference between Ukraine and Russia is that under the USSR, the Russian people acted as an assimilator, whereas the Ukrainian nation was assimilated. It shall be noted that Ukrainians, especially the urban population, who de facto had been considered as the Russian sub-ethnic group since the time of the Russian Empire, were the most russified among all other ethnicities of the former Soviet Union. It was more difficult to assimilate the Turkic, Caucasian or Baltic ethnoses. On the other hand, Ukraine managed to successfully resolve the issue of citizenship, which makes it radically different from the Baltic States. All persons populating the country at the moment of its independence became Ukrainian citizens.

So, the goal of this study is to consider models of multiculturalism policy applied in the EU states, Canada, the USA and Australia, analyze their advantages, failings and compliance with Ukraine's ethno-political realities and develop conceptual principles of multiculturalism, which would facilitate settlement of ethnic problems in our country.

Problem Statement

Needless to say, Ukraine was historically formed as a multi-ethnic state, where Ukrainians represent the largest ethnic community of 37,500,000 persons. The number of Russians – the largest national minority – amounts to 8,300,000 persons. Other minorities include Crimean Tatars, Beloruses, Moldavians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians, Poles, etc. Communities of immigrants from the Soviet republics, China, South East Asia and Middle East countries have been recently formed in Ukraine. Ethnic composition of some city-millionaires and the Odesa, Donetsk and Transcarpathian regions is rather diverse.

As it has already been mentioned, Ukraine's ethnic composition was formed historically, which was mostly determined by migration processes in the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires and the former USSR. These processes were also affected by such tragic events as the Feminine of the 1930s, the WWII, the Volyn developments, post-war deportation of Crimean Tatars, other Crimean ethnicities and Ukrainian Poles. At the same time, traditional ethnic composition of the population is preserved. Only the number of Jews and Poles decreased compared to 1959, whereas a positive trend towards other minorities was observed (see Table 1). Nevertheless, Ukraine belongs neither to

bi-national like Belgium nor to multiethnic like India states because ethnic Ukrainians compose the absolute majority of the population.

Earlier on, Ukraine was defined as a “multiethnic post-imperial society”, where the adjective “multiethnic” means the large number of ethnicities, whose share in the population is nevertheless three times smaller than that of Ukrainians. In its turn, the adjective “post-imperial” means that the overwhelming majority of challenges faced by our society are caused by negative consequences of ethnic policy inherited from the Soviet Union, such as rusification, which entails the need to revitalize language and culture of the Ukrainian people and other ethnicities.

Hence, declaration of Ukraine’s independence in 1991 gave an impetus to cultural revival of the Ukrainian ethnic nation. The mission of the state is to prevent a conflict of interests between the above process and the right of other ethnic groups to self-determination and promotion of their cultures. For this reason, it is too early to speak about Ukrainian post-national multiculturalism, as the process of shaping the Ukrainian nation is under way.

Before considering basic models of multiculturalism policy, it is necessary to mention that Ukraine requires development of its own strategy on the basis of Ukrainian historical heritage and principles of public humanitarian policy set forth in the Copenhagen Criteria for the EU accession – they key goal of this policy.

As for opportunities and prospects of implementation of a definite multiculturalism strategy of Ukraine, it is necessary to distinguish, at least, its six aspects:

- Policy towards the Russian community as the largest national minority;
- Policy towards Crimean Tatars and other indigenous peoples (Karaims and Krymchaks);
- Policy towards national minorities concentrated in specific geographic areas (Bulgarians, Poles, Hungarians and Romanians);
- Policy towards Ukrainian Roma;
- Policy towards other national minorities (Jews, Greeks, Volga Tatars);
- Policy towards immigrant communities.

Each policy needs a distinct strategy.

Proceeding from the afore-mentioned, I would like to address principles and strategies of multiculturalism policy.

Key Features of Multiculturalism in Different Countries

Canada became the first country in the world to adopt a multiculturalism policy. Canada is a typical example of a multi-ethnic immigrant society. Its population was formed as a result of immigration processes. None of 100 Canadian ethnic groups represents the majority of the population.

In 1971, multiculturalism was adopted as an official policy in Canada, that is, a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework. The same year, the Minister for Multiculturalism was appointed. In 1985, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Multiculturalism was established. The Canadian Multiculturalism Act was passed by Parliament and proclaimed in 1988.

Basic principles of the Canadian Concept of Multiculturalism include:

- 1) Foster recognition and appreciation of diverse cultures of Canadian society and promote reflection and evolving expressions of those cultures;

- 2) Promote full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of all origins in the continuing evolution and shaping of all aspects of Canadian society and assist them in elimination of any barrier to such participation;
- 3) Promote diverse cultures of Canadian society through legislative initiatives and federal programs;
- 4) Recognize and promote cultural pluralism and bilingualism of Canada;
- 5) Encourage cooperation of the Federal, municipal and provincial governments in promoting cultural diversity¹⁰.

In a recent report of the UNESCO World Commission on Culture and Development, Canada's approach to multiculturalism was cited as a model for other countries. Australia and New Zealand adopted the Canadian model of multiculturalism as a basis.

European countries use different models of multiculturalism¹¹.

Belgium has become a multi-national and political federation since 1993. The country is divided into three linguistic communities: the Flemish community (thus bringing together the Dutch-speakers, who live in Flanders and in Brussels), the French community (assembling the French-speakers, who live in Wallonia and in Brussels), a tiny German-speaking community in the East and multilingual, multicultural and multi-ethnic Brussels. Each of these communities has its own parliament and executive authorities and is entrusted with constitutionally assigned powers. Belgian legislative bodies, the House of Representatives and Senate, are divided into two linguistic groups: Flemish and French, to which German-speakers belong.

Flanders comprises about 55% of the Belgian population, Brussels – 10 % and Wallonia – the remaining 35%. Since 1984, the German community has its own legislative assembly and executive, which have authority in cultural, language and educational affairs. Presently, there are two official languages in the country: French (spoken in the southern and central regions) and Dutch (spoken in the northern part). The majority of citizens are bi-national: Belgians and Flemish or Belgians and Walloons, which evidences a high level of loyalty to political identity in Belgium.

A British model of multiculturalism accentuates ethnic self-determination of immigrants. Immigration is the most evident consequence of British colonialism. After the WWII, people born outside the country in British Colonies could become UK nationals. The 1948 British Nationality Act gave all members of the Commonwealth the right to enter the United Kingdom and enjoy the full range of social, economic and political rights associated with citizenship. Though national minorities did not enjoy broad rights, they were recognized as members of a multi-ethnic society based on the principles of mutual tolerance.

Nowadays, the share of English population makes up 76% of the population of Great Britain, the Scottish – 9%, the Welsh – 5% and the Irish – 4%. The Welsh Language Act of 1967 increased the status of the Welsh language in the courts and gave ministers the power of prescribe bilingual versions of official forms. Despite that English is the official language of Great Britain, in the Channel Islands and Wales, two official languages are used: English and French and English and Welsh respectively. The British government tries to work out a special status for Northern Ireland.

¹⁰ Kruhlak O., Multiculturalism in Canada: What Was Intended and What Has It Become? // Topical Issues and Fields of Ukrainian Ethnic Policy: Ways of Modernization and Application of International Experience. K.: UCIPR, 2004

¹¹ Review of multiculturalism policies in European countries is prepared on the basis of the following works:

Kotelnikov V., Multiculturalism for Europe: Challenging Immigration //

<http://www.antropotok.archipelag.ru/text/a263.htm> and Koshkarov N., International Experience of Meeting Ethno-Cultural Challenges // http://www.orenburg.ru/culture/credo/01_2003/3.html

Finland and Sweden represent a liberal model of cultural autonomy. Finns and Swedes form 93.6% and 5.6% (or 300,000 persons) of Finland's population respectively. Finnish legislation guarantees the right of citizens to the use of their native language in private and in public without discrimination. Municipalities in Finland can be unilingual (the number of people speaking the minority language, either Finnish or Swedish, is 6% or less of the total inhabitants of the municipality) or bilingual (if at least 8% or 3,000 people speak the local minority language, whether Swedish or Finnish). Helsinki, Turku and Vaasa are bilingual cities.

The 1919 Constitution and the 1922 Act enshrined Swedish and Finnish as the two national languages of Finland. Swedish speakers were given cultural autonomy. Education in Swedish is crucial for the Swedish language and culture to survive in Finland. There are about 300 Swedish comprehensive schools in Finland, which offer tuition in Swedish. 30 periodicals (300,000 issues/day) are published in Swedish. TV and radio programs are broadcasted in Swedish. Two Swedish-language universities (including the Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration) and several bilingual universities (including the University of Helsinki, Helsinki University of Technology and the Theatre Academy) provide higher education.

Sweden adopted multiculturalism in 1975 as an official political strategy based on the three principles: equality between immigrants and Swedes; freedom of choice of cultural development for immigrants; and partnership between indigenous Swedish peoples and various ethnic groups. Representation of minority interests marked the beginning of implementation of multiculturalism. In 1976, the Swedish government gave foreign citizens the right to vote at local elections and launched consultations with members of ethnic groups.

Language and educational policies became the key directions of Swedish multiculturalism. The National Multiculturalism Concept allows for bilingual education: in Swedish and in the language of a country of origin.

There are nearly 50 immigrant organizations in Sweden. In 1980s, the law against ethnic discrimination of immigrants in working and social life was passed.

However, some European countries have changed their attitude to multiculturalism just recently. France and Germany are the most indicative examples of such states. France has been following principles of procedural democracy for long placing universal democratic values over cultural ones.

The Constitution of France does not recognize national minorities. Its Preamble recalls the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789. Hence, the French Constitution stresses the existence of a political nation declared as the basic value of the country's democratic system.

Most migrants came to France from Italy, Spain and Portugal. But in 1950s, ethnic composition of emigrants started to radically change: the majority of immigrants were from Algeria, Tunis, Morocco and Turkey. So, the Islam issue posed the major problem of immigrants. Unlike European migrants, new immigrants practicing Islam could not and did not want to assimilate.

Unemployment rate in the immigrant environment amounted to 30%, which also presented a serious problem.

Having understood ineffectiveness of assimilation strategy and being guided by a thesis that cultural differences of national minorities can be perceived only in the framework of the dominant culture, the French government made efforts to launch some elements of multiculturalism in the mid-80s.

France has officially recognized minority languages and cultures since 1982. The Council on State Affairs and Culture was formed in 1985. French schoolchildren learn languages and dialects (Corsican, Catalan, Basque, Breton, Flemish and Alsatian). Corsica enjoys autonomy in culture and radio broadcasting.

Germany became an immigrant country in the early 60s but resisted to recognize this fact for long. In this country, a complicated procedure for naturalization deprived even children and grand children of immigrants born in Germany of the right to citizenship.

Nevertheless, since 1998, the social democratic government of Germany has started pursuing more loyal policy towards immigrants. German citizenship is now easier to access, especially for children of immigrants.

The German government implements a number of social and cultural programs for prevention of conflicts among immigrants and the indigenous population. Specifically, the Federal program "Urgent Measures" provides for actions on integration and social adaptation of immigrants, including formation of mixed classes in elementary and secondary schools. The government encourages re-immigration of persons belonging to national minorities through allocation of funds for their repatriation.

Hungary deserves special attention among former socialist countries that have recently joined the EU. In 1992, the law "On the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities" was adopted. Its Preamble reads, "The right to national and ethnic identity is regarded as a universal human right, that the special individual and collective rights of national and ethnic minorities are fundamental rights of freedom, which it will respect and enforce in the Republic of Hungary. The mother tongue, the intellectual and material culture, the historical traditions of the national and ethnic minorities who are Hungarian citizens and live in Hungary, and other characteristic qualities, which support their minority status, are considered aspects of their identity as individuals and as a community." Article 52 of the Section VII governs, "In the National Assembly, MPs belonging to minorities may also use their mother tongue. On the board of representatives of the municipal government, a minority representative may also use his/her mother tongue. If the contribution is made in the language of a minority, the Hungarian translation of the contribution or a summary of its contents will be enclosed to the minutes of the meeting. The minutes and resolutions of the board of representatives may also be recorded or worded in the mother tongue of the given minority - as well as appearing in Hungarian."

The afore-mentioned allows a conclusion that given globalization, most countries transit from assimilation to multicultural policy towards national minorities. Ethnically closed countries are doomed to economic, social, and cultural stagnation.

Meanwhile, practice proves the absence of universal mechanisms capable of meeting ethnic challenges because the latter are radically different and can vary within the same country depending on a situation. Social and political experience of one country cannot be automatically applied to another but adapted to current realities like in case of Australia and New Zealand, which successfully adopted the Canadian model of multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism policies of the above European states are based on common principles. First, it is recognition and promotion of cultural and ethnic identities of minorities. This goal is attained through public assistance to different cultures, development of education in minority languages in secondary schools and higher institutions and encouragement of ethno-cultural organizations.

Second, it is the right of national minorities to fully participate in political life of the country, including the right of immigrants to use their native language in official life and, in some cases, the right to political autonomy.

And, finally, it is creation of conditions for social integration of national minorities through assistance to immigrants and national minorities in learning official languages and preventing discrimination.

Possible Scenarios of the Problem Development (Risks, Alternatives)

It is possible to conclude that Ukraine's strategy of ethnic policy is not adequate to challenges in this field and insufficiently considers experience of developed democracies. The 2004 campaign indicated a possibility of artificial fomentation of these problems by some political forces for the purpose of achieving their personal goals.

The so-called East-West confrontation during the presidential elections was mostly caused by economic factors – apprehensions of the population of large industrial eastern and southern regions of socio-political discrimination in favour of western residents. Such a situation may serve as an example of presenting the political conflict as confrontation on ethnic grounds.

In the opinion of most critics, one of the weak points of the Multiculturalism Concept is that ethnicity is the key attribute of socio-cultural identity. Though, in a contemporary society, ethnic characteristics are obviously not enough for socio-cultural identity. It is shaped under the influence of such factors as social practices, social status, education and so forth.

Famous French sociologist and philosopher Pierre Bourdieu combined a structuralist framework with close attention to subjectivity in the social context. For Bourdieu, a key relationship in bridging subjectivism (the individual) (society) and objectivism in social research is that between “habitus” and “field” via practices. “Habitus” is defined as a system of temporally durable dispositions, embodied unconsciously and predisposed to function as frameworks that generate and regulate practices and ideas¹². In other words, habitus is the mental structure, through which people deal with the social world. Bourdieu argues that the habitus both produces and is produced by the social world. People internalize external structures, and they externalize things they have internalized through practices.

“Fields” are structured systems of social positions, within which struggles take place over resources, stakes, and access¹³. He regards individuals as “agents,” who are “socially constituted as active and acting in the field under consideration by the fact that they possess the necessary properties to be effective, to produce effects”. All human actions take place within social fields. Individuals, institutions, and other agents try to distinguish themselves from others, and acquire capital, which is useful or valuable on the arena.

However, proceeding from identity of ethnicity and culture, Russian academician Volodymyr Malakhov emphasizes that multiculturalism policy ignores the fact that ethnically different individuals may belong to the same culture¹². Indeed, in some multi-ethnic countries, a phenomenon of dual ethnic identity is observed, e.g. Berber-Arab identity in North Africa. Multiculturalism also does not take into account instances, when religious identity is a crucial factor of socio-cultural identification.

¹² Malakhov V., Why Does Russia Need Multiculturalism? // Multiculturalism and Transformation of Post-Soviet Societies / Edit. V. Malakhov and V. Tyshkov. M.: Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2002.

Critics of multiculturalism stress that culturalization of society entails ethnization of politics, which complicates the process of political inclusion of new members into a national community. In this respect, the problem is rooted in political and administrative factors: voluntary ghettoization of migrants is caused not by their unwillingness to get rid of cultural stereotypes incompatible with those of a host country but difficulties relating to their naturalization.

Hence, socialization of immigrants requires a comprehensive approach focused on securing their social, political and cultural rights.

This is especially true for immigrant countries. For Ukraine, it is more important to safeguard the rights of ethnic groups historically populating its territory. This objective is more complicated than naturalization of immigrants. With regard to the fact that the issue of citizenship of persons belonging to national minorities was settled positively at the onset of Ukraine's independence, of special note is the problem of minority cultural rights. Though, it must be considered simultaneously with social, political and economic factors. Given incomplete formation of the Ukrainian nation and emergence of a viable political one, ethno-cultural identity is moving to the forefront.

In a multi-ethnic society, minority rights are determined by a special law, which is viewed as a progressive stage on the way to national democratic development on the one hand but simultaneously causes isolation of minorities from the dominant ethnic group and their confrontation on the other. This might provoke conflicts, especially when a minority claims for its special status.

“Cultural autonomy” and “federalization” are solutions for meeting ethnic challenges. In Scotland and Catalonia, different types of federalization are also characterized by claims for the special status of national minorities. However, such step might be risky in case, members of the same ethnicity live in a neighbouring country.

Special rights and powers granted to minorities might urge them to radicalization of requirements: autonomy, self-determination, independence, political alienation and annexation to neighbouring mother countries. In their turn, federal structures that obviate the minority needs for ethnic autonomy put obstacles to co-existence of diverse ethnic identities, which could lead to ethnic discrimination as evidenced by the example of the former Yugoslav republics. Political concessions to ethnic communities, which are not loyal to national authorities, may evoke leftist tendencies endangering the state's territorial integrity.

According to statistical data, bilingualism and bi-nationalism are absent in Ukraine notwithstanding attempts of some politicians to prove it. Despite dominance of ethnic Ukrainians in ethnic composition of the population (77.8%) and Ukrainian (67.5% of residents believe it their mother tongue) (see Table 2), there are over 100 other ethnicities in the country.

Hence, federalization on ethno-linguistic grounds so actively advocated by some political forces has no grounds, since it cannot meet the existing challenges but causes a “latent conflict”, which may erupt into open confrontation at any time. Meanwhile, federalization of Ukraine provides for a complicated legal procedure, the first step of which is approval of a relevant decision at a referendum. I doubt of its positive effect though it would inevitably heighten tension in the Ukrainian society.

Some components of multiculturalism policy must certainly be adopted and applied in Ukraine but in a way that would not ruin its political and legal framework.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Proceeding from the above, it is possible to make some generalizations and outline guidelines for further development of Ukraine's multiculturalism policy and its application in ethno-political and ethno-cultural realities.

In developed democracies, the key element of multiculturalism strategy is integration of ethnic communities into the common socio-cultural space attended with preservation of their ethno-cultural identity. However, legal framework of minority rights will prove to be ineffective, if national minorities do not have cultural life. In this respect, the primary objective shall be maintenance and promotion of ethno-cultural identity of ethnic communities.

Meanwhile, as it has already been mentioned, multiculturalism policy must take into account specific features of some ethnic groups of Ukraine. Hence, priority strategic goals of multiculturalism policy imply solution of the following problems:

- The Russian community: *secure the right to education in minority language and the use of Russian in official life in areas, where Russians form not less than 20% of the population;*
- Crimean Tatars and other indigenous peoples (Karaims and Krymchaks): *ensure the right to education in minority languages, maintain and promote cultural identity, encourage naturalization and meet social challenges of repatriation;*
- National minorities concentrated in specific geographic areas (Bulgarians, Poles, Hungarians and Romanians): *ensure the right to education in minority languages, maintain and promote cultural identity and cultural ties with historical motherlands;*
- Ukrainian Roma: *promote socialization, maintain cultural identity, ensure the opportunity to learn mother tongue;*
- Other national minorities (Jews, Greeks, Volga Tatars etc.): *ensure the opportunity to learn minority languages promote cultural and religious identity;*
- Immigrant community: *encourage socialization and secure civil rights.*

The above problems are just the tip of the iceberg. Their settlement requires national authorities, local self-government bodies, ethno cultural communities and national minorities to map out an integral strategy¹³. A Task Force formed under the auspices of the Vice Premier for Regional Development shall mark the first step in developing a Concept of multicultural society in Ukraine. The Task Force shall consist of members of governmental agencies, MPs, local authorities, ethnic and religious communities and associations, academicians and NGOs. The Concept shall incorporate problem statement, forecasts, priority objectives of shaping a multicultural society and specific recommendations for changes and amendments to the law in force on national ethnic policy.

The next step shall be coordination of the Concept with the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Finance. After improvement, the Concept shall be approved the Cabinet resolution.

¹³ Such cooperation was practiced, while developing the Concept of national ethnic policy. The Concept was formulated in the framework of the initiative "Conceptual Principles of National Ethnic Policy: Practice and Theory" funded by the Canadian International Development Agency and implemented by the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, National Minorities and Interethnic Relations in cooperation with the Ukrainian Independent Center for Political Research in 2004. So, all the government has to do is consider the relevant draft registered in the Verkhovna Rada.

The Concept shall serve as a basis for a public program “Developing a Multicultural Society in Ukraine” to be implemented by national authorities and other responsible agencies following the presidential instructions. The Program shall provide for implementation mechanisms, stages and funding of the Concept.

This is a perspective we seek to approach. Though, even now the government must take the following actions on alleviation of regional conflicts and strengthening of interethnic peace:

- Restrict the use of ethnic attributes in public institutions, set requirement for official clothes of state officials and interior of public institutions;
- Apply a sound approach to national recognition of ethnic symbols, historical figures and events, which could be ambiguously perceived by some Ukrainians;
- Minimize opportunities for politization of ethnic processes, e.g. prohibition of formation of political parties on ethnic, regional and religious grounds;
- Revise the need for interference of the state with internal affairs of confessions, especially formation of the single Ukrainian Orthodox Church, since it runs counter to the constitutional principle of separation of the church from the state;
- Provide adequate funding of public regional and ethnic programs under implementation and ensure compliance with the law in force.

The above actions shall foster gradual shaping of post-national multiculturalism, which would allow reducing social tension and further consolidation of the Ukrainian political nation.

Public policy promoting Ukrainian identity and political nation shall be attended with consistent and well-reasoned policy for economic and socio-cultural development and information. It shall prioritize integration of the Ukrainian society on the basis of shared democratic values, while looking for the country’s place in international labour division and political alliances. If Ukraine chose the European Union, its strategy shall be based on principles of public humanitarian policy set forth in the Copenhagen Criteria.

**Table 1. Ethnic composition of the Ukrainian population
Urban and rural areas**

	Total, persons						2001 in % to			
	1959 ¹	1970 ¹	1979	1989	2001	1959	1970	1979	1989	
Total population	41869046	47126517	49609333	51452034	48240902	115,2	102,4	97,2	93,8	
Including:										
Ukrainians	32158493	35283857	36488951	37419053	37541693	106,4	106,4	102,9	100,3	
Russians	7090813	9126331	10471602	11355582	8334141	117,5	91,3	79,6	73,4	
Beloruses	290890	385847	406098	440045	275763	94,8	71,5	67,9	62,7	
Moldavians	241650	265902	293576	324525	258619	107,0	97,3	88,1	79,7	
Crimean Tatars	...	3554	6636	46807	248193	...	69.8 times more	37.4 times more	5.3 times more	
Bulgarians	219409	234390	238217	233800	204574	93,2	87,3	85,9	87,5	
Hungarians	149229	157731	164373	163111	156566	104,9	99,3	95,3	96,0	
Romanians	100863	112141	121795	134825	150989	149,7	134,6	124,0	112,0	
Poles	363297	295107	258309	219179	144130	39,7	48,8	55,8	65,8	
Jews	840311	775993	632610	486326	103591	12,3	13,3	16,4	21,3	
Armenians	28024	33439	38646	54200	99894	3.6 times more	3.0 times more	2.6 times more	184,3	
Greeks	104359	106909	104091	98594	91548	87,7	85,6	87,9	92,9	
Tatars	61527	72658	83906	86875	73304	119,1	100,9	87,4	84,4	
Roma	22515	30091	34411	47917	47587	2.1 times more	158,1	138,3	99,3	
Azerbaijanians	6680	10769	17235	36961	45176	6.8 times more	4.2 times more	2.6 times more	122,2	
Georgians	11574	14650	16301	23540	34199	3.0 times more	2.3 times more	2.1 times more	145,3	

Germans	23243	29871	34139	37849	33302	143,3	111,5	97,5	88,0
Gagauses	23530	26464	29398	31967	31923	135,7	120,6	108,6	99,9
Koreans	1341	4480	6061	8669	12711	9.5 times more	2.8 times more	2.1 times more	146,6
Uzbeks	8472	10563	9862	20333	12353	145,8	116,9	125,3	60,8
Chuvashes	8925	13610	16456	20395	10593	118,7	77,8	64,4	51,9
Mordvinians	11397	14692	16545	19332	9331	81,9	63,5	56,4	48,3
Turks	257	262	8844	34.4 times more	33.8 times more
Lithuanians	8906	10715	9658	11278	7207	80,9	67,3	74,6	63,9
Arabs	1352	1240	6575	4.9 times more	5.3 times more
Slovaks	13991	10204	8744	7943	6397	45,7	62,7	73,2	80,5
Czechs	14539	12073	10589	9122	5917	40,7	49,0	55,9	64,9
Kazakhs	4694	7555	7171	10505	5526	117,7	73,1	77,1	52,6
Letts	6919	7421	7167	7142	5079	73,4	68,4	70,9	71,1
Ossetins	3325	4554	5257	6345	4834	145,4	106,1	92,0	76,2

¹ available population

Table 2. Distribution of the Ukrainian population by nationality and mother tongue
Urban and rural areas

	Total population, persons	Number of persons, who believe their native language	In % to the number of persons of a given nationality, who believe their native language				
			Mother tongue	Ukrainian	Russian		
Both sexes							
Total population	48240902	41093957	606740	6279838	85,2	67,5	29,6
Including:							
Ukrainians	37541693	31970728	x	5544729	85,2	x	14,8
Abasins	128	24	4	86	18,8	3,1	67,2
Abkhazians	1458	317	268	797	21,7	18,4	54,7
Avars	1496	582	121	761	38,9	8,1	50,9
Austrians	112	16	28	54	14,3	25,0	48,2
Aguls	108	20	28	53	18,5	25,9	49,1
Adygeis	338	67	19	242	19,8	5,6	71,6
Azerbaijanians	45176	23958	3224	16968	53,0	7,1	37,6
Albanians	3308	1740	301	1181	52,6	9,1	35,7
Aleutians	6	-	1	4	-	16,7	66,7
Galatians	81	6	9	62	7,4	11,1	76,5
Americans	709	556	34	88	78,4	4,8	12,4
English	112	50	16	37	44,6	14,3	33,0
Arabs	6575	4071	897	1235	61,9	13,6	18,8
Assyrians	3143	883	408	1730	28,1	13,0	55,0
Afghans	1008	551	60	213	54,7	6,0	21,1
Balkarians	206	40	36	115	19,4	17,5	55,8

Bashkirs	4253	843	336	2920	19,8	7,9	68,7
Beluji	31	16	6	7	51,6	19,4	22,6
Beloruses	275763	54573	48202	172251	19,8	17,5	62,5
Bulgarians	204574	131237	10277	62067	64,2	5,0	30,3
Buryats	391	41	35	312	10,5	9,0	79,8
Vietnamese	3850	3641	29	164	94,6	0,8	4,3
Veps	281	11	186	63	3,9	66,2	22,4
Armenians	99894	50363	5798	43105	50,4	5,8	43,2
Gagaus	31923	22822	1102	7232	71,5	3,5	22,7
Dutch	139	32	36	64	23,0	25,9	46,0
Greeks	91548	5829	4359	80992	6,4	4,8	88,5
Georgians	34199	12539	2818	18589	36,7	8,2	54,4
Dargins	1610	409	199	955	25,4	12,4	59,3
Dogans	26	4	2	10	15,4	7,7	38,5
Dungans	133	4	74	49	3,0	55,6	36,8
Evens	104	19	6	7	18,3	5,8	6,7
Evenks	48	4	3	35	8,3	6,3	72,9
Entsi	26	18	-	6	69,2	-	23,1
Eskimos	153	6	9	86	3,9	5,9	56,2
Estonians	2868	416	321	2107	14,5	11,2	73,5
Jews	103591	3213	13924	85964	3,1	13,4	83,0
Mountain Jews	166	23	12	121	13,9	7,2	72,9
Georgian Jews	108	1	70	29	0,9	64,8	26,9
Middle Asian Jews	13	-	-	12	-	-	92,3
Izhotsi	812	2	1	62	0,2	0,1	7,6
Ingushes	455	164	33	240	36,0	7,3	52,7
Spaniards	965	146	412	379	15,1	42,7	39,3
Italians	420	91	110	199	21,7	26,2	47,4
Itelmans	18	1	4	6	5,6	22,2	33,3
Kabardinians	473	89	57	319	18,8	12,1	67,4
Kazakhs	5526	1041	822	3470	18,8	14,9	62,8
Kalmyks	325	17	130	170	5,2	40,0	52,3

Canadians	51	21	9	15	41,2	17,6	29,4
Karaims	1196	72	160	931	6,0	13,4	77,8
Kara-Kalpaks	117	40	12	50	34,2	10,3	42,7
Karachais	190	35	22	113	18,4	11,6	59,5
Karelians	1522	96	145	1244	6,3	9,5	81,7
Kets	37	2	7	22	5,4	18,9	59,5
Kirghizes	1128	208	221	617	18,4	19,6	54,7
Chinesees	2213	1817	73	307	82,1	3,3	13,9
Komi	1545	330	127	1046	21,4	8,2	67,7
Komi-Permyaks	1165	160	79	898	13,7	6,8	77,1
Koreans	12711	2223	700	9662	17,5	5,5	76,0
Koryaks	69	5	5	55	7,2	7,2	79,7
Crimean Tatars	248193	228373	184	15208	92,0	0,1	6,1
Krymchaks	406	68	41	263	16,7	10,1	64,8
Cubans	262	139	30	87	53,1	11,5	33,2
Krymchaks	718	244	111	350	34,0	15,5	48,7
Kurds	2088	1173	236	396	56,2	11,3	19,0
Laktsi	1019	199	271	514	19,5	26,6	50,4
Letts	5079	957	872	3188	18,8	17,2	62,8
Lezghins	4349	1507	330	2341	34,7	7,6	53,8
Lithuanians	7207	1932	1029	4182	26,8	14,3	58,0
Livs	235	46	23	43	19,6	9,8	18,3
Mantsi	43	5	9	26	11,6	20,9	60,5
Maris	4130	1059	264	2758	25,6	6,4	66,8
Moldavians	258619	181124	27775	45607	70,0	10,7	17,6
Mordvinians	9331	1473	646	7168	15,8	6,9	76,8
Nanai	42	4	3	33	9,5	7,1	78,6
Indian and Pakistani peoples	1483	1092	26	192	73,6	1,8	12,9
Nganasans	44	3	-	26	6,8	-	59,1
Negidals	52	31	-	11	59,6	-	21,2
Nentsi	217	6	32	175	2,8	14,7	80,6
Nivkhs	584	4	76	352	0,7	13,0	60,3

Germans	33302	4056	7360	21549	12,2	22,1	64,7
Nogaitsi	385	227	12	130	59,0	3,1	33,8
Oroks	959	12	179	710	1,3	18,7	74,0
Orochi	288	5	52	174	1,7	18,1	60,4
Ossetins	4834	1150	401	3110	23,8	8,3	64,3
Persians	419	251	16	110	59,9	3,8	26,3
Poles	144130	18660	102268	22495	12,9	71,0	15,6
Russians	8334141	7993832	328152	x	95,9	3,9	x
Romanians	150989	138522	9367	2297	91,7	6,2	1,5
Rutuls	137	36	12	80	26,3	8,8	58,4
Lapps	136	3	20	95	2,2	14,7	69,9
Selkups	62	1	6	49	1,6	9,7	79,0
Serbs	623	219	104	218	35,2	16,7	35,0
Slovaks	6397	2633	2665	335	41,2	41,7	5,2
Tabasarans	977	482	114	356	49,3	11,7	36,4
Tajiks	4255	1521	488	1983	35,7	11,5	46,6
Talyshes	133	28	19	78	21,1	14,3	58,6
Tatars	73304	25770	3310	43060	35,2	4,5	58,7
Tats	64	9	-	46	14,1	-	71,9
Tofalarians	18	-	5	11	-	27,8	61,1
Tuvinians	43	4	2	24	9,3	4,7	55,8
Turks	8844	7923	133	567	89,6	1,5	6,4
Turk-Meskhetsins	336	272	2	35	81,0	0,6	10,4
Turkmans	3709	719	1079	1392	19,4	29,1	37,5
Hungarians	156566	149431	5367	1513	95,4	3,4	1,0
Udegeis	42	8	6	19	19,0	14,3	45,2
Udins	592	342	9	188	57,8	1,5	31,8
Urmurts	4712	729	380	3515	15,5	8,1	74,6
Uzbeks	12353	3604	1818	5996	29,2	14,7	48,5
Uigurts	197	23	18	127	11,7	9,1	64,5
Ulchi	76	5	8	43	6,6	10,5	56,6
Finns	768	73	89	558	9,5	11,6	72,7
French	258	105	52	93	40,7	20,2	36,0

Khakhases	162	17	21	120	10,5	13,0	74,1
Khalkhas	104	56	2	40	53,8	1,9	38,5
Khants	100	6	29	55	6,0	29,0	55,0
Croats	126	23	27	38	18,3	21,4	30,2
Tsarukhs	83	16	16	31	19,3	19,3	37,3
Roma	47587	21266	10039	6378	44,7	21,1	13,4
Circassians	199	25	20	136	12,6	10,1	68,3
Czechs	5917	1190	2503	2144	20,1	42,3	36,2
Chechens	2877	1581	212	977	55,0	7,4	34,0
Chileans	13	2	5	4	15,4	38,5	30,8
Chuvans	226	36	16	160	15,9	7,1	70,8
Chuvashes	10593	2268	564	7636	21,4	5,3	72,1
Chukchi	30	3	2	24	10,0	6,7	80,0
Swedes	188	32	122	28	17,0	64,9	14,9
Shortsi	33	3	1	28	9,1	3,0	84,8
Yukagirs	12	2	-	6	16,7	-	50,0
Yakuts	304	56	47	198	18,4	15,5	65,1
Japanesees	44	21	4	18	47,7	9,1	40,9
Other nationalities	3228	1027	144	790	31,8	4,5	24,5
Nationality is not indicated	188639	-	1108	1844	-	0,6	1,0
Men							
Total population	22316317	18923640	271764	2994938	84,8	67,5	29,5
Including:							
Ukrainians	17431219	14783483	x	2635282	84,8	x	15,1
Abasins	78	14	4	49	17,9	5,1	62,8
Abkhazians	767	177	127	419	23,1	16,6	54,6
Avars	1037	421	69	520	40,6	6,7	50,1
Austrians	61	13	18	23	21,3	29,5	37,7
Aguls	58	13	12	27	22,4	20,7	46,6
Adygeis	185	41	8	130	22,2	4,3	70,3
Azerbaijanians	29618	15970	1981	11064	53,9	6,7	37,4

Albanians	1560	846	128	552	54,2	8,2	35,4
Aleutians	3	-	1	1	-	33,3	33,3
Galatians	34	3	4	25	8,8	11,8	73,5
Americans	413	327	17	49	79,2	4,1	11,9
English	68	40	6	15	58,8	8,8	22,1
Arabs	5149	3698	400	730	71,8	7,8	14,2
Assyrians	1549	436	193	849	28,1	12,5	54,8
Afghans	777	445	32	163	57,3	4,1	21,0
Balkarians	109	27	18	59	24,8	16,5	54,1
Bashkirs	2054	375	159	1455	18,3	7,7	70,8
Beluji	22	16	1	3	72,7	4,5	13,6
Beloruses	118826	19698	20538	78280	16,6	17,3	65,9
Bulgarians	98535	63529	4763	29783	64,5	4,8	30,2
Buryats	190	20	20	147	10,5	10,5	77,4
Vietnameses	2470	2342	17	101	94,8	0,7	4,1
Veps	121	3	92	20	2,5	76,0	16,5
Armenians	56492	29057	3236	23832	51,4	5,7	42,2
Gagauses	15642	11199	552	3547	71,6	3,5	22,7
Dutch	75	21	14	36	28,0	18,7	48,0
Greeks	44737	2756	1983	39790	6,2	4,4	88,9
Georgians	20069	8285	1527	10133	41,3	7,6	50,5
Dargins	896	248	103	522	27,7	11,5	58,3
Dogans	14	2	-	6	14,3	-	42,9
Dungans	60	1	32	24	1,7	53,3	40,0
Evens	51	10	5	2	19,6	9,8	3,9
Evenks	21	2	2	12	9,5	9,5	57,1
Entsi	14	10	-	3	71,4	-	21,4
Eskimos	72	3	4	35	4,2	5,6	48,6
Estonians	1254	180	143	918	14,4	11,4	73,2
Jews	50311	1547	6654	41850	3,1	13,2	83,2
Mountain Jews	89	12	5	64	13,5	5,6	71,9
Georgian Jews	53	1	30	16	1,9	56,6	30,2
Middle Asian	4	-	-	3	-	-	75,0

Jews																			
Izhotsi	416	2	1	34	0,5	0,2		8,2											
Ingushes	271	99	18	139	36,5	6,6		51,3											
Spaniards	469	105	172	177	22,4	36,7		37,7											
Italians	217	71	45	91	32,7	20,7		41,9											
Itelmans	9	-	3	3	-	33,3		33,3											
Kabardinians	246	49	32	160	19,9	13,0		65,0											
Kazakhs	2918	575	420	1826	19,7	14,4		62,6											
Kalmyks	160	10	61	85	6,3	38,1		53,1											
Canadians	27	11	4	10	40,7	14,8		37,0											
Karaims	583	35	82	453	6,0	14,1		77,7											
Kara-Kalpakhs	70	24	8	33	34,3	11,4		47,1											
Karachais	110	19	14	66	17,3	12,7		60,0											
Karelians	565	20	52	480	3,5	9,2		85,0											
Kets	15	-	3	8	-	20,0		53,3											
Kirghizes	618	138	98	339	22,3	15,9		54,9											
Chinesees	1495	1276	38	173	85,4	2,5		11,6											
Komi	517	89	43	360	17,2	8,3		69,6											
Komi-Permyaks	439	56	26	346	12,8	5,9		78,8											
Koreans	6916	1191	402	5252	17,2	5,8		75,9											
Koryaks	16	2	1	10	12,5	6,3		62,5											
Crimean Tatars	122057	112244	100	7456	92,0	0,1		6,1											
Krymchaks	203	34	16	137	16,7	7,9		67,5											
Cubans	212	128	18	60	60,4	8,5		28,3											
Krymchaks	435	159	62	203	36,6	14,3		46,7											
Kurds	1079	624	90	203	57,8	8,3		18,8											
Laktsi	542	127	116	282	23,4	21,4		52,0											
Letts	2409	470	408	1498	19,5	16,9		62,2											
Lezghins	2659	928	184	1432	34,9	6,9		53,9											
Lithuanians	3766	1082	487	2168	28,7	12,9		57,6											
Livs	177	43	13	34	24,3	7,3		19,2											
Mantsi	17	-	5	10	-	29,4		58,8											
Maris	1643	355	98	1168	21,6	6,0		71,1											

Moldavians	121892	84639	12867	22485	69,4	10,6	18,4
Mordvinians	4277	596	286	3371	13,9	6,7	78,8
Nanai	17	1	2	13	5,9	11,8	76,5
Indian and Pakistani peoples	1246	963	21	116	77,3	1,7	9,3
Nganasans	16	1	-	8	6,3	-	50,0
Negidals	42	27	-	6	64,3	-	14,3
Nentsi	84	2	12	69	2,4	14,3	82,1
Nivkhs	355	4	48	201	1,1	13,5	56,6
Germans	15769	1795	3566	10253	11,4	22,6	65,0
Nogaitsi	202	117	4	72	57,9	2,0	35,6
Oroks	404	7	83	292	1,7	20,5	72,3
Orochi	168	4	29	97	2,4	17,3	57,7
Ossetins	2814	694	219	1790	24,7	7,8	63,6
Persians	316	217	12	56	68,7	3,8	17,7
Poles	60516	7642	43139	9450	12,6	71,3	15,6
Russians	3738415	3587132	145754	x	96,0	3,9	x
Romanians	72923	66940	4453	1151	91,8	6,1	1,6
Rutuls	79	23	7	48	29,1	8,9	60,8
Lapps	88	1	15	58	1,1	17,0	65,9
Selkups	23	-	1	18	-	4,3	78,3
Serbs	392	158	56	131	40,3	14,3	33,4
Slovaks	3013	1192	1294	191	39,6	42,9	6,3
Tabasarans	569	276	56	219	48,5	9,8	38,5
Tajiks	2851	1150	283	1247	40,3	9,9	43,7
Talyshes	82	22	12	44	26,8	14,6	53,7
Tatars	34808	12064	1601	20587	34,7	4,6	59,1
Tats	37	7	-	23	18,9	-	62,2
Tofalarians	12	-	4	7	-	33,3	58,3
Tuvinians	27	2	1	14	7,4	3,7	51,9
Turks	4725	4200	66	335	88,9	1,4	7,1
Turk-Meskhetsins	198	161	1	21	81,3	0,5	10,6
Turkmans	2125	541	557	782	25,5	26,2	36,8

Hungarians	74994	71255	2811	802	95,0	3,7	1,1
Udegeis	20	2	5	9	10,0	25,0	45,0
Udins	305	172	5	94	56,4	1,6	30,8
Urmurts	1835	246	155	1394	13,4	8,4	76,0
Uzbeks	7245	2518	927	3348	34,8	12,8	46,2
Uigurts	128	19	12	81	14,8	9,4	63,3
Ulchi	38	2	5	22	5,3	13,2	57,9
Finns	323	30	38	234	9,3	11,8	72,4
French	149	76	28	39	51,0	18,8	26,2
Khakhases	75	4	9	60	5,3	12,0	80,0
Khalkhas	60	31	1	24	51,7	1,7	40,0
Khants	36	2	10	17	5,6	27,8	47,2
Croats	73	12	16	25	16,4	21,9	34,2
Tsarukhs	48	10	7	17	20,8	14,6	35,4
Roma	23498	10257	5069	3341	43,7	21,6	14,2
Circassians	101	11	12	71	10,9	11,9	70,3
Czechs	2656	485	1068	1066	18,3	40,2	40,1
Chechens	1756	972	112	616	55,4	6,4	35,1
Chileans	7	2	2	1	28,6	28,6	14,3
Chuvans	87	9	8	66	10,3	9,2	75,9
Chuvashes	4866	874	267	3675	18,0	5,5	75,5
Chukchi	13	-	1	11	-	7,7	84,6
Swedes	96	14	64	14	14,6	66,7	14,6
Shortsi	17	2	1	13	11,8	5,9	76,5
Yukagirs	7	1	-	4	14,3	-	57,1
Yakuts	134	24	24	86	17,9	17,9	64,2
Japaneses	19	10	2	7	52,6	10,5	36,8
Other nationalities	2422	785	79	504	32,4	3,3	20,8
Nationality is not indicated	90791	-	559	907	-	0,6	1,0
Total population	25924585	22170317	334976	3284900	85,5	67,6	29,7
Women							

Including:							
	20110474	17187245	x	2909447	85,5	x	14,5
Ukrainians							
Abasins	50	10	-	37	20,0	-	74,0
Abkhazians	691	140	141	378	20,3	20,4	54,7
Avars	459	161	52	241	35,1	11,3	52,5
Austrians	51	3	10	31	5,9	19,6	60,8
Aguls	50	7	16	26	14,0	32,0	52,0
Adygeis	153	26	11	112	17,0	7,2	73,2
Azerbaijanians	15558	7988	1243	5904	51,3	8,0	37,9
Albanians	1748	894	173	629	51,1	9,9	36,0
Aleutians	3	-	-	3	-	-	100,0
Galatians	47	3	5	37	6,4	10,6	78,7
Americans	296	229	17	39	77,4	5,7	13,2
English	44	10	10	22	22,7	22,7	50,0
Arabs	1426	373	497	505	26,2	34,9	35,4
Assyrians	1594	447	215	881	28,0	13,5	55,3
Afghans	231	106	28	50	45,9	12,1	21,6
Balkarians	97	13	18	56	13,4	18,6	57,7
Bashkirs	2199	468	177	1465	21,3	8,0	66,6
Beluji	9	-	5	4	-	55,6	44,4
Beloruses	156937	34875	27664	93971	22,2	17,6	59,9
Bulgarians	106039	67708	5514	32284	63,9	5,2	30,4
Buryats	201	21	15	165	10,4	7,5	82,1
Vietnamese	1380	1299	12	63	94,1	0,9	4,6
Veps	160	8	94	43	5,0	58,8	26,9
Armenians	43402	21306	2562	19273	49,1	5,9	44,4
Gagauses	16281	11623	550	3685	71,4	3,4	22,6
Dutch	64	11	22	28	17,2	34,4	43,8
Greeks	46811	3073	2376	41202	6,6	5,1	88,0
Georgians	14130	4254	1291	8456	30,1	9,1	59,8
Dargins	714	161	96	433	22,5	13,4	60,6
Dogans	12	2	2	4	16,7	16,7	33,3
Dungans	73	3	42	25	4,1	57,5	34,2

Evens	53	9	1	5	17,0	1,9	9,4
Evenks	27	2	1	23	7,4	3,7	85,2
Entsi	12	8	-	3	66,7	-	25,0
Eskimos	81	3	5	51	3,7	6,2	63,0
Estonians	1614	236	178	1189	14,6	11,0	73,7
Jews	53280	1666	7270	44114	3,1	13,6	82,8
Mountain Jews	77	11	7	57	14,3	9,1	74,0
Georgian Jews	55	-	40	13	-	72,7	23,6
Middle Asian Jews	9	-	-	9	-	-	100,0
Izhotsi	396	-	-	28	-	-	7,1
Ingushes	184	65	15	101	35,3	8,2	54,9
Spaniards	496	41	240	202	8,3	48,4	40,7
Italians	203	20	65	108	9,9	32,0	53,2
Itelmans	9	1	1	3	11,1	11,1	33,3
Kabardinians	227	40	25	159	17,6	11,0	70,0
Kazakhs	2608	466	402	1644	17,9	15,4	63,0
Kalmyks	165	7	69	85	4,2	41,8	51,5
Canadians	24	10	5	5	41,7	20,8	20,8
Karaims	613	37	78	478	6,0	12,7	78,0
Kara-Kalpaks	47	16	4	17	34,0	8,5	36,2
Karachais	80	16	8	47	20,0	10,0	58,8
Karelians	957	76	93	764	7,9	9,7	79,8
Kets	22	2	4	14	9,1	18,2	63,6
Kirghizes	510	70	123	278	13,7	24,1	54,5
Chinesees	718	541	35	134	75,3	4,9	18,7
Komi	1028	241	84	686	23,4	8,2	66,7
Komi-Permyaks	726	104	53	552	14,3	7,3	76,0
Koreans	5795	1032	298	4410	17,8	5,1	76,1
Koryaks	53	3	4	45	5,7	7,5	84,9
Crimean Tatars	126136	116129	84	7752	92,1	0,1	6,1
Krymchaks	203	34	25	126	16,7	12,3	62,1
Cubans	50	11	12	27	22,0	24,0	54,0

Krymchaks	283	85	49	147	30,0	17,3	51,9
Kurds	1009	549	146	193	54,4	14,5	19,1
Laktsi	477	72	155	232	15,1	32,5	48,6
Letts	2670	487	464	1690	18,2	17,4	63,3
Lezghins	1690	579	146	909	34,3	8,6	53,8
Lithuanians	3441	850	542	2014	24,7	15,8	58,5
Livs	58	3	10	9	5,2	17,2	15,5
Mantsi	26	5	4	16	19,2	15,4	61,5
Maris	2487	704	166	1590	28,3	6,7	63,9
Moldavians	136727	96485	14908	23122	70,6	10,9	16,9
Mordvinians	5054	877	360	3797	17,4	7,1	75,1
Nanai	25	3	1	20	12,0	4,0	80,0
Indian and Pakistani peoples	237	129	5	76	54,4	2,1	32,1
Nganasans	28	2	-	18	7,1	-	64,3
Negidals	10	4	-	5	40,0	-	50,0
Nentsi	133	4	20	106	3,0	15,0	79,7
Nivkhs	229	-	28	151	-	12,2	65,9
Germans	17533	2261	3794	11296	12,9	21,6	64,4
Nogaitsi	183	110	8	58	60,1	4,4	31,7
Oroks	555	5	96	418	0,9	17,3	75,3
Orochi	120	1	23	77	0,8	19,2	64,2
Ossetins	2020	456	182	1320	22,6	9,0	65,3
Persians	103	34	4	54	33,0	3,9	52,4
Poles	83614	11018	59129	13045	13,2	70,7	15,6
Russians	4595726	4406700	182398	x	95,9	4,0	x
Romanians	78066	71582	4914	1146	91,7	6,3	1,5
Rutuls	58	13	5	32	22,4	8,6	55,2
Lapps	48	2	5	37	4,2	10,4	77,1
Selkups	39	1	5	31	2,6	12,8	79,5
Serbs	231	61	48	87	26,4	20,8	37,7
Slovaks	3384	1441	1371	144	42,6	40,5	4,3
Tabasarans	408	206	58	137	50,5	14,2	33,6

Tajiks	1404	371	205	736	26,4	14,6	52,4
Talyshes	51	6	7	34	11,8	13,7	66,7
Tatars	38496	13706	1709	22473	35,6	4,4	58,4
Tats	27	2	-	23	7,4	-	85,2
Tofalarians	6	-	1	4	-	16,7	66,7
Tuvimians	16	2	1	10	12,5	6,3	62,5
Turks	4119	3723	67	232	90,4	1,6	5,6
Turk-Mesketins	138	111	1	14	80,4	0,7	10,1
Turkmans	1584	178	522	610	11,2	33,0	38,5
Hungarians	81572	78176	2556	711	95,8	3,1	0,9
Udegeis	22	6	1	10	27,3	4,5	45,5
Udins	287	170	4	94	59,2	1,4	32,8
Urmurts	2877	483	225	2121	16,8	7,8	73,7
Uzbeks	5108	1086	891	2648	21,3	17,4	51,8
Uigurts	69	4	6	46	5,8	8,7	66,7
Ulchi	38	3	3	21	7,9	7,9	55,3
Finns	445	43	51	324	9,7	11,5	72,8
French	109	29	24	54	26,6	22,0	49,5
Khakhases	87	13	12	60	14,9	13,8	69,0
Khalkhas	44	25	1	16	56,8	2,3	36,4
Khants	64	4	19	38	6,3	29,7	59,4
Croats	53	11	11	13	20,8	20,8	24,5
Tsarukhs	35	6	9	14	17,1	25,7	40,0
Roma	24089	11009	4970	3037	45,7	20,6	12,6
Circassians	98	14	8	65	14,3	8,2	66,3
Czechs	3261	705	1435	1078	21,6	44,0	33,1
Chechens	1121	609	100	361	54,3	8,9	32,2
Chileans	6	-	3	3	-	50,0	50,0
Chuvans	139	27	8	94	19,4	5,8	67,6
Chuvashes	5727	1394	297	3961	24,3	5,2	69,2
Chukchi	17	3	1	13	17,6	5,9	76,5
Swedes	92	18	58	14	19,6	63,0	15,2
Shortsi	16	1	-	15	6,3	-	93,8

Yukagirs	5	1	-	2	20,0	-	40,0
Yakuts	170	32	23	112	18,8	13,5	65,9
Japanese	25	11	2	11	44,0	8,0	44,0
Other nationalities	806	242	65	286	30,0	8,1	35,5
Nationality is not indicated	97848	-	549	937	-	0,6	1,0

The State Committee for statistics

Features of Implementation of Regional and Manpower Policies by National Authorities in Areas, Where National Minorities are Concentrated Territorially

By ANDRIY DUDA,

Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy National University

I. Theoretical and Legal Approaches to Formulation of Public Regional Policy

Regional policy as a policy of relations between the center and the regions is a fundamental factor of state functioning because status characteristics of the regions determine formation a respective system of political, organizational, legal and economic relations inside the country.

The definition for the “region” is absent in the Ukrainian law. By region I mean an administrative and territorial unit that includes many smaller places, all or most of which share similar attributes, such as climate, language, religion, economy, government or other natural or cultural attributes. Ukrainian academic literature suggests numerous approaches to regional division and its criteria. My analysis of public regional policy shall be based on the legal definition of the term “region” (though I do not view this interpretation optimal and unconditional). According to the law of Ukraine “On Stimulation of Regional Economy”, the region is identified with the regional level of administrative and territorial division¹. Hence, the “regions” are the territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regions, the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol.

In its turn, under this law, public regional policy is “an element of the national strategy of Ukraine’s socio-economic development closely related to implementation of the administrative and territorial reform and regulation of the administrative and territorial system. Public regional policy is carried out by executive authorities and local self-government bodies through a system of actions ensuring effective governance of economic and social development of Ukraine and its regions – the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regions, the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol².”

In my opinion, the above definition is not sufficient, for it essentially narrows the subject of regional policy. It would be more expedient to define public regional policy as the system of actions geared toward balancing of the administrative role of the center (higher public institutions determined by the Constitution of Ukraine) and interests of the administrative and territorial units so that to fully obviate social, economic, ethnic and cultural needs of citizens through the effective application of public administrative and self-governing mechanisms. In fact, satisfaction of needs of Ukrainian citizens, inclusive of those of national minorities, shall serve as a basis for territorial organization of power.

According to Article 3 of the law “On National Minorities”, national minorities are groups of Ukrainian citizens of non-Ukrainian ancestry, who demonstrate feeling of ethnic self-consciousness and community³. In other words, the above shall be understood as an option of self-identification, when national minorities are viewed as groups of Ukrainian citizens, who do not belong to the core Ukrainian nation and determine themselves as members of a certain national minority.

¹ The law No. 2850-IV “On Stimulation of Regional Economy” of September 8, 2005 // Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada, No. 51, 2005, P. 2662, P. 548

² The law No. 2850-IV “On Stimulation of Regional Economy” of September 8, 2005 // Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada, No. 51, 2005, P. 2662, P. 548

³ The law No. 2494-XII “On National Minorities” of June 25, 1992 // Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada, No. 36, 1992, P. 529

Recognizing validity (and failings) of each of these definitions, I would like to suggest my personal vision (pertinent, first and foremost, for this analysis): the Ukrainian national minority is a non-Ukrainian ethnic group of Ukrainian citizens that realizes its ethnic identity and leads its own ethno-cultural and public life.

I agree with I. Popescu, who classed satisfaction of needs of national minorities as follows: 1) the right to existence; 2) the right to maintain and develop their culture and preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage; 3) the right to set up and manage their own private educational and training establishments (pre-school, primary, secondary, technical and vocational as well as university and other higher education in the relevant minority languages); 4) guarantees of political representation in decision-making executive and legislative authorities; 5) the right to autonomy: this includes the right of national minorities to independently manage their internal cultural, educational, religious, information and social affairs by means of subventions (at the level of cultural autonomy) and definite fiscal tools (at the level of territorial autonomy possible only in areas, where minorities are concentrated territorially)⁴.

In democratic countries, minority rights are safeguarded not in the framework of regional policy but by means of national legislative acts.

However, with regard to territorial concentration of most Ukrainian national minorities, it is recommended to include satisfaction of minority needs into objectives of public regional policy, which would enhance its effectiveness.

Problem of Defining the Term “Territorial Concentration of National Minorities”

Definition for “territorial concentration of national minorities” is rather dubious. Article 10 of the law “On National Minorities” governs, “The State shall guarantee national minorities the right to preserve their living environment in the places of their historical and present residence.”⁵

The law in force does not define the term “territorial concentration of national minorities” despite the fact that it is frequently referred to in many normative acts. Lawmakers repeatedly made efforts to formalize the “territorial concentration of national minorities”. Specifically, in the process of consideration of the draft “On Information”, it has been suggested to introduce a rate of 10% of the total number of the population for identification of areas, inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities in substantial numbers, though the suggestion was rejected. Hence, the term “territorial concentration of national minorities” can be interpreted ad arbitrium. As a rule, it is understood as a homogeneous non-Ukrainian ethnic group historically formed on the territory of Ukraine.

Establishment of the fact of territorial concentration of the national minority is often problematic in view of heterogeneity of the population. The same stands true for towns of regional subordination, regional centers, the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol. Therefore, I deem it would be more logical to exclude these inhabited localities from the list of areas, where national minorities are concentrated territorially, because such areas have, as a rule, subsistence economy.

⁴ I. Popescu, *Minority Rights in the Law in Force and Ukraine’s International Obligations // Dialogue of Ukrainian and Russian Cultures in Ukraine: Materials of the III International scientific and practical conference (November 12-13, 1998, Kyiv)*. / Institute for Sociology NAC Ukraine; National Institute for Ukrainian-Russian Relations, NSDC. / Shulha N.A. (editor-in-chief), K., 1999, P. 83

⁵ The law No. 2494-XII “On National Minorities” of June 25, 1992 // *Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada*, No. 36, 1992, P. 529

In this context, there are other problems of Ukraine's public regional policy: 1) identification of the Moldavian and Romanian minorities; 2) the status of the Russian minority; 3) the absence of localization of national minorities; 4) the issue of Ukrainian sub-ethnic groups etc.

At present, implementation of public regional policy towards national minorities concentrated territorially in the Odesa and Chernivtsi regions is complicated with identification of the Moldavian and Romanian minorities. Public policy traditionally differentiated between these two minorities, which is evidenced by the 2001 National Census and ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. By the way, organizations of the Council of Europe welcomed such the position of Ukraine. The Opinion on Ukraine of March 1, 2002 of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities reads, "The Advisory Committee notes that there have been extensive debates in Ukraine on the inter-relation between the Romanian and Moldavian identities. The Advisory Committee underlines that this issue should be approached with full respect to the principles contained in Article 3 of the Framework Convention, and that there should be no attempts to impose one or the other identity on the persons concerned. In this respect, the Advisory Committee welcomes the fact that the census of 2001 recognized both identities concerned on an equal footing."⁶

Public regional policy on the Russian issue poses another problem. Representatives of the Russian minority often complain about their status and thus raise claims for Ukrainian public policy towards Russians, including speculative ideas of the official status of the Russian language, federalization of Ukraine etc. I want to cite a leader of the Russian Bloc as saying, "The Charter is perfect for Bulgarians, Romanians and Poles but not for Russians because we need more...The Charter does not allow us to exercise our spiritual and educational rights." Such a position is easy to explain. Over the whole period of Soviet power, Ukraine has been under the Russian thumb. Indeed, ethnic needs of Russians were satisfied more than completely under the USSR. For this reason, the level of satisfaction of their needs is much higher than international standards of minority protection set by the Council of Europe.

"Russian direction" of Ukraine's regional policy has another problematic aspect. It is very difficult to determine territorial concentration of the Russian minority because its members mostly live in large cities (city-millionaires, regional centers and towns of regional subordination), where clear ethnic division is absent (in contrast to settlement, villages and district towns) and language is not the key identification criterion. For instance, given dominance of the Russian language in communication, Ukrainians, who cannot and have no desire to associate themselves with the Russian ethnic community, form the majority of the population of urbanized Russian-speaking cities, save Crimean and some East and South Ukrainian cities.

Another problem is the difficulty of localization of national minorities, especially Jews and Roma.

Public support of Ukrainian sub-ethnic groups, e.g. Boikies, Lemkies, Hutsuls and Rusyns, is very important as well. These sub-ethnic groups do not belong to national minorities, though some political circles actively exploit their regional distinctions attempting to represent them as distinct nationalities. This is especially true about Transcarpathian Rusyns. The absence of a clear-cut public policy promoting Ukrainian sub-ethnic groups on the one hand and a mechanism for differentiation between sub-ethnic groups and national minorities on the other often result in politization of the problem and intensification of ethnic conflicts at the regional level.

⁶ The Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Opinion on Ukraine, 2002 // http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_Rights/Minorities/

Objectives and Principles of Public Regional Policy towards Areas, Where Minorities Are Concentrated Territorially

It is possible to distinguish principles, priorities and objectives of public regional policy towards national minorities in areas, where they are concentrated territorially.

Objectives of public regional policy towards areas, where minorities are concentrated territorially, incorporate: 1) setting of standards and creation of conditions for the exercise of rights and freedoms of national minorities; 2) application, by governmental agencies (national, regional and local), of measures for protection and promotion of national minorities (as a rule, this objectives are attained through approval and implementation of respective public and regional programs).

Principles of public regional policy towards national minorities in areas, where they are concentrated territorially, include: 1) the principle of equality (parity) and justice means the absence of preferences and biased attitude of governmental agencies towards national minorities; 2) the principle of effectiveness reflects optimal correlation between resources required, goals and outcomes of public regional policy; 3) the principle of compliance with the law: governmental agencies can carry out public policy towards national minorities only in a manner established by Ukraine's law and within its legal competence; 4) the principle of optimal concentration of resources and efforts in support of national minorities in areas, where they are concentrated territorially; 5) the principle of different interference (through regional programs and budget funding) with life of national minorities in areas, where they are concentrated territorially, depending on the level of satisfaction of their needs.

In my opinion, public policy towards areas, where minorities are concentrated territorially, implies not only purposeful activities on satisfaction of social, economic, ethnic and cultural needs of national minorities but also the whole system of guarantees of their self-development and self-actualization.

Public guarantees – a system of legal (legislative) acts setting general rules of the exercise of rights and satisfaction of needs of national minorities in areas, where they are concentrated territorially. National authorities and local self-government bodies execute public guarantees, while discharging their duties.

By no means shall public policy absolutize its own administrative influence either through functional overload or through reduction of the number of responsible institutions (agencies). Public policy is effective only when there are self-organizing mechanisms and the government's guarantees of their functioning.

It is possible to differentiate between the following basic public guarantees relating to areas, inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities in substantial numbers: 1) guarantees of local self-government; 2) guarantees of minority public organizations; 3) guarantees of the minority language rights etc.

Another direction of public regional policy towards national minorities in areas, where they are concentrated territorially, is elaboration and implementation of public and regional programs.

The law "On Public Purpose Programs" defines public purpose programs as "a complex of interrelated tasks and measures aimed at solution of the most important and topical problems of development of the state, some branches of economy or administrative territorial units, which are funded from the national budget and agreed on by the terms of implementation, responsible agencies and resources." One of the conditions for development of public purpose programs is

“existence of the problem, which cannot be solved by means of territorial or branch management and requires public support, coordination of activity of national and local executive authorities and local self-government bodies.”⁷

II. Public Guarantees of Minority Rights in Areas, Where National Minorities Are Concentrated Territorially

1. Guarantees of local self-government. Famous Ukrainian constitutionalist M. Dragomanov believed local self-government to be of paramount importance in areas, where national minorities are concentrated territorially. He wrote, “Guarantees of personal rights as well as public and local self-government are the best guarantees of national rights, which are nothing else, than personal rights: preservation of some personal features and maintenance of the most natural ways of their human development.”⁸ Actually, the right to local self-government as the right of territorial communities to independently solve issues of local concern in areas, where national minorities are concentrated territorially, can be used as a mechanism for the exercise of minority rights.

The Ukrainian Constitution and the law “On Local Self-Government” guarantee the right to local self-government. Under these documents, the basic unit of local self-government shall be a territorial community of a village, settlement or city defined as “citizens, who permanently reside within the boundaries of a village, settlement, or city, which are independent administrative-territorial units, or voluntary associations of citizens of several villages with one administrative center.”⁹ Hence, it is possible to safeguard minority rights, freedoms and interests even at the level of villages, inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities in substantial numbers.

Their interests can be represented by the following means:

1) Election of officials of representative and administrative authorities through local elections. For example, ethnic Romanians or persons fluent in Romanian hold elective offices in areas of the Chernivtsi region, where the Romanian and Moldavian minorities are concentrated territorially. According to data of the monitoring of the Department for Internal Policy of the Chernivtsi Regional State Administration, the overwhelming majority of officials of local self-government bodies of Romanian and Moldavian districts fluently speak Romanian: village chairmen of the Hertsaiivsky, Storozhynetsky and Hlybochytsky districts – 100%; secretaries of village councils of the Hertsaiivsky district – 100% the Storozhynetsky district – 90% and the Hertsaiivsky district – 95%¹⁰. 8 Crimean Tatars or 8% of the total number of the Crimea’s population were elected to the Crimean parliament in 2002;

2) Influence on national authorities – local state administrations and territorial bodies of national executive authorities. Local state administrations can be influenced through district and regional councils, which have the right to vote for no confidence to a Chairman of a respective (regional and district) state administration by a simple or qualified majority. Instruments of influence of local self-government bodies on national executive authorities are considerably weaker though the council may require hearing of information from representatives of law-enforcement agencies;

⁷ The law No. 1621-IV “On Public Purpose Programs” of March 18, 2004 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 14, 2004, P. 13, P. 956

⁸ Dragomanov M.P. Historical Poland and Russian Democracy. K.: Zaezdny M.E. Printing-House, 1917, P. 140

⁹ The law No. 280/97-BP “On Local Self-Governance” of May 21, 1997 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 25, 1997, P. 20

¹⁰ Data of the Department for Internal Policy, the Chernivtsi Regional State Administration

3) Bodies of self-organization of the population. According to the laws “On Local Self-Government”¹¹ and “On Bodies of Self-Organization of the Population”, the bodies of self-organization of population are those set up by residents, who permanently or temporarily live on a respective territory within a village, settlement or city. Committees of the building, street, micro-districts, city districts, village and settlement committees are the bodies of self-organization of population¹². This mechanism is especially important because of the absence of the citizenship requirement in the exercise of the right to self-organization. So, the bodies of self-organization of population may represent interests of persons belonging to national minorities, who are not Ukrainian citizens but reside on the territory of Ukraine;

4) Influence on decision-making at the municipal level. In areas, inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities in substantial numbers, such persons can participate in decision-making on matters of local concern following the procedures determined by the Ukrainian Constitution and laws. Specifically, pursuant to the law “On All-Ukrainian and Local Referenda”, national minorities have the right to participate in decision-making by means of holding a local referendum¹³ and influence municipal decision-making through mechanisms established by the law “On Local Self-Government” (general assemblies, local initiatives and public hearings)¹⁴.

Article 13 of the law “On Local Self-Government” defines public hearings “as meeting with deputies of the corresponding council and officials of local self-government, during which the members of the territorial community may listen, raise issues and voice proposals, in regard to matters of local concern, which belong to the competence of local self-government”¹⁵.

Another form of participation of members of the territorial community in local decision-making is a local initiative. The law governs, “Members of the territorial community shall have the right to initiate the consideration, by the council (in the procedure of local initiative), of any issue, which belongs to the competence of local self-government. A local initiative submitted for consideration by the council following the established procedure, shall be subject to mandatory consideration at a public meeting of the council, with the participation of members of the local initiative group.” As a matter of fact, local initiatives mean a method for direct legislative drafting through submitting relevant decisions for consideration of the representative local self-government body¹⁶.

The law “On Local Self-Government” reads, “The general assembly of citizens of a village, settlement or city is a form of their direct participation in resolving issues of local concern.”¹⁷

Moreover, in areas, where national minorities are concentrated territorially, their ethno-cultural features may be described in the statutes of the territorial communities. Article 19 of the above law reads, “With the aim of considering the historical, national and cultural, socio-economic, and other characteristics of exercising local self-government, the representative local self-government body

¹¹ The law No. 280/97-BP “On Local Self-Governance” of May 21, 1997 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 25, 1997, P. 20

¹² The law “On Bodies of Self-Organization of the Population” // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 32, 2001, P. 2, P. 1449

¹³ The law No. 1286-XII “On All-Ukrainian and Local Referenda” of July 3, 1991 // Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of the USSR, No. 33, 1991, P. 443

¹⁴ The law No. 280/97-BP “On Local Self-Government” of May 21, 1997 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 25, 1997, P. 20

¹⁵ The law No. 280/97-BP “On Local Self- Government” of May 21, 1997 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 25, 1997, P. 20

¹⁶ The law No. 280/97-BP “On Local Self- Government” of May 21, 1997 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 25, 1997, P. 20

¹⁷ The law No. 280/97-BP “On Local Self- Government” of May 21, 1997 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 25, 1997, P. 20

may adopt the statute of a village, settlement, and city territorial community, on the basis of the Constitution of Ukraine and within the limits of this law.”¹⁸

Self-governing mechanisms seem even more important for guarantees of minority rights at the local level because the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages ratified by the Verkhovna Rada stipulates, “In respect of the local and regional authorities on whose territory the number of residents who are users of regional or minority languages is such as to justify the measures specified below, the Parties undertake to allow and/or encourage: 1) the use of regional or minority languages within the framework of the regional or local authority; 2) the publication by regional authorities of their official documents also in the relevant regional or minority languages; 3) the publication by local authorities of their official documents also in the relevant regional or minority languages; 4) the use by regional authorities of regional or minority languages in debates in their assemblies, without excluding, however, the use of the official language(s) of the State; 5) the use by local authorities of regional or minority languages in debates in their assemblies, without excluding, however, the use of the official language(s) of the State; 6) the use or adoption, if necessary in conjunction with the name in the official language(s), of traditional and correct forms of place-names in regional or minority languages.”¹⁹

2. Guarantees of establishment of public organizations. The law “On Public Associations” reads, “Public organizations are public associations of citizens established with the purpose of satisfying and protecting their legal social, economic, creative, ethno-cultural, sports and other common interests.”²⁰ So, national minorities have the right to set up their own public organizations. The law in force provides for the following three types of public associations: international, national and local. In areas, where national minorities are concentrated territorially, local departments of national and local minority public organizations advocating interests of their minorities are set up.

In general, the number of national and local minority public organizations in the regions with the largest territorial concentration of national minorities is large (see Table 1).

Table 1. Total Number of National and Local Minority Public Organizations in the Regions with the Largest Territorial Concentration of National Minorities (in Proportion to the Number of the Population and Numerical Strength of Ethnic Groups)²¹

Region	Number of minority public organizations	Average number of the population of the administrative-territorial unit in 2005 (thousand persons)	Share of national minorities on the territory of the administrative-territorial unit, data of the 2001 Census (%)
The Autonomous Republic of Crimea	30	1,988.7	75.7%
Donetsk region	132	4,646.3	43.1%
Transcarpathian region	51	1,246.9	19.5%
Luhansk region	32	2,424.1	42%

¹⁸ The law No. 280/97-BP “On Local Self- Government” of May 21, 1997 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 25, 1997, P. 20

¹⁹ The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Strasburg, November 5, 1992 // www.rada.gov.ua (the official site of the Verkhovna Rada)

²⁰ The law No. 2460-XII “On Public Associations” of June 16, 1992 // Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada, No. 34, 1992, P. 504

²¹ The table is compiled on the basis of the reply of the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration to the inquiry of the Main Analytical Service of the Presidential Secretariat and replies of chairmen of regional state administrations to the deputy inquiry of MP R. Chubarov

Odesa region	100	2,408.3	37.2%
Sevastopol	33	378.7	77.6%
Kharkiv region	48	2,838.2	29.3%
Chernivtsi region	25	909.8	25%

Today, it is difficult to measure real influence and numerical strength of minority public organizations. For example, in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the number of members of minority public organizations fluctuates from 200 to 2,500 persons (in total, about 30,000 persons), in the Transcarpathian region – 100,000 persons, in the Chernivtsi region – 10,000 persons in the M. Eminescu Society of Romanian Culture and 1,000 persons in the Steinberg Jewish Cultural Society etc. Understanding that these membership indicators may be inaccurate, it is nevertheless possible to conclude about influence of minority public organizations in areas, inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities in substantial numbers. By the way, an interesting trend is observed: despite the largest share of Russians in the total number of national minorities, their public organizations are the weakest in areas; they are concentrated territorially, whereas the strongest minority public organizations are Jewish, Crimean Tatar, Hungarian and Romanian.

Weak structure of some Ukrainian sub-ethnic groups at the level of public organizations is a negative fact because it is minority public organizations that exert the strongest influence on public policy at the local level.

In my viewpoint, local public minority organizations are the most active today, especially with regard to the scale of their activities and the simplified registration procedure (according to the law “On Introduction of Changes to Article 15 of the Law of Ukraine “On Public Associations”, the application for registration of a local minority public organization shall be considered within three days since the day of its filing, while the application for registration of a national or international minority public organization – with one month²²). Activities of minority public organizations at the local level proved to be extremely effective, especially in respect of advocacy of ethno-cultural interests.

As for political parties of national minorities, the laws “On Public Associations” and “On Political Parties” prohibit formation of political parties on the ethnic basis though do not impose restrictions on their statutory activities, including advocacy of minority interests²³. As a result, the Party of Hungarians of Ukraine, the Democratic Party of Hungarians and the Russian Bloc are active in Ukraine. On entry into force of the new electoral law of 2004, political parties of national minorities could strongly influence formation of representative authorities in areas, where national minorities are concentrated territorially, since they would ensure minority representation in councils and executive committees at a variety of levels.

3. Language guarantees. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages is the basic document that determined criteria of public language policy towards national minorities in areas, where they are concentrated territorially. Under Article 1 of the Charter, “The term “regional or minority languages” means languages that are: 1) traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State, who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State’s population; and 2) different from the official language(s) of that State; it does not include either dialects of the official language(s) of the State or the languages of migrants.” The term “non-territorial languages” “means languages used by nationals of the State which differ from the

²² The law No. 2852-IV “On Introduction of Changes to Article 15 of the Law of Ukraine “On Public Associations” of September 8, 2005 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 39, 2005, P. 45, P. 2445

²³ The law No. 2460-XII “On Public Associations” of June 16, 1992 // Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada, No. 34, 1992, P. 504; the law No. 2365-III “On Political Parties” of April 5, 2001 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 17, 2001, P. 93, P. 728

language or languages used by the rest of the State's population but which, although traditionally used within the territory of the State, cannot be identified with a particular area thereof."²⁴

In respect of judicial authorities, Ukraine undertook:

a) in criminal proceedings to provide that requests and evidence, whether written or oral, shall not be considered inadmissible solely because they are formulated in a regional or minority language; **b) in civil proceedings** to allow documents and evidence to be produced in the regional or minority languages; **c) in proceedings before courts concerning administrative matters** to allow documents and evidence to be produced in the regional or minority languages²⁵.

Furthermore, Ukraine undertook "not to deny the validity of legal documents drawn up within the State solely because they are drafted in regional or minority language and not to deny the validity, as between the parties, of legal documents drawn up within the country solely because they are drafted in a regional or minority language."²⁶

Except for Ukraine's international commitments, public policy towards national minorities is regulated by a number of other legislative acts.

The law of Ukraine "On Judicial System" stipulates that legal proceedings may be conducted in the national or other language acceptable for the population²⁷. Consequently, this rule may be applied to areas, where national minorities are concentrated territorially. Paragraph 3, Article 10 of the law reads, "When conducting criminal/legal proceedings, persons, who take part in the proceedings and do not speak or speak very little Ukrainian, shall have the right to familiarize themselves with the material of the case, participate in legal proceedings with assistance of an interpreter and to appear for the defence in the court in native language."²⁸ The Ukrainian law establishes a procedure for the use of other (including minority) languages in legal proceedings.

Paragraph 2, Article 7 of the Civil Procedural Code of Ukraine governs, "Persons, who do not know Ukrainian, shall be guaranteed the right to make statements, give evidence and explanations, make requests, express complaints and communicate in the native language or in a language, which they understand. Participants in the proceedings shall have the right to the free assistance of an interpreter pursuant to the procedure established by this Code."²⁹ In compliance with Article 55, an interpreter is defined as a person, who performs language interpretation activities for the court and for parties to proceedings, other court personnel, and the public and performs other job related duties as required³⁰. An interpreter shall be invited on the basis of a written application of a party to the legal proceedings approved by the court.

Paragraph 2, Article 15 of the Code of Administrative Justice of Ukraine duplicates provisions of the law on judicial system on the use of minority languages in legal proceedings. Article 68 of the document gives definition (identical to that of the Civil Procedural Code) and sets up a procedure for the use of an interpreter. An interpreter shall be invited to take part in the legal proceedings on the following grounds: 1) written application of a party to the legal proceedings approved by the

²⁴ The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Strasbourg, November 5, 1992 // www.rada.gov.ua

²⁵ The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Strasbourg, November 5, 1992 // www.rada.gov.ua

²⁶ The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Strasbourg, November 5, 1992 // www.rada.gov.ua

²⁷ The law No. 3018-III "On Judicial System" of February 7, 2002 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 10, 2002, P.1, P. 441

²⁸ The law No. 3018-III "On Judicial System" of February 7, 2002 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 10, 2002, P.1, P. 441

²⁹ The Civil Procedural Code of Ukraine No. 1618-IV of March 18, 2004 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 16, 2004, P. 11, P. 1088

³⁰ The Civil Procedural Code of Ukraine No. 1618-IV of March 18, 2004 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 16, 2004, P. 11, P. 1088

court; 2) court's own initiative. Article 68 reads, "The Court shall provide the party to the legal proceedings with an interpreter, if it comes to the conclusion about deprivation the right to fair trial due to of the party's inability to pay interpreter fees".³¹ In other words, the states guarantees free assistance of an interpreter.

Public guarantees of protection of minority languages are most fully described in the Criminal and Procedural Code of Ukraine. According to Article 19, legal proceedings shall be conducted in Ukrainian or in the language of the majority of the population of the given locality³². The Code guarantees that persons, who do not know Ukrainian, shall have the right to make statements, give evidence and explanations, make requests, express complaints in the native language or in a language, which they understands and use assistance of an interpreter. Under Paragraph 3, Article 1 of the Code, "Investigative and court records shall be given to a defendant in his/her native language or a language, which he/she understands."³³ Translation of the conviction into minority language shall be enclosed to the case.

Article 3 of the law "On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR" governs, "In the work of state, party and public bodies, enterprises, institutions and organizations located in regions (cities, districts, village and settlement Councils, villages and assemblage thereof), where the majority of citizens belong to other nationalities, the national language of such majority may be used along with Ukrainian. If citizens of another nationality constituting a majority of the population of the above administrative-territorial units or settlements do not speak their national language well enough, or if within such administrative-territorial units or settlements there are areas densely populated by several nationalities, none of which constitutes a majority of the area's population, the Ukrainian language or such other language that shall be acceptable to all population may be used in the work of the above bodies and organizations."³⁴

Article 5 of the law "On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR" reads, "Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR shall have the right to apply to state, party and public bodies, enterprises, institutions and organizations in Ukrainian, another language of their work, Russian or such other language as shall be acceptable to the parties. Refusal of a civil servant to accept and examine the application on account of not knowing the language thereof shall be punishable in accordance with the legislation in force. The decision of a body or organization on a citizen's application shall be written in Ukrainian or other working language of the said body or organization. If the citizen shall so demand, such decision may be issued in a Russian translation."³⁵

Article 6 of the law "On Public Appeals" provides, "Citizens shall have the right to appeal to national and local authorities and their officials in Ukrainian or minority language. In their turn, national and local authorities may not reject consideration of appeals written in the minority language."³⁶ Article 7 duplicates the rule of the law "On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR" reading, "Refusal of a civil servant to accept and examine the application on account of not knowing the language thereof is prohibited and shall be punishable in accordance with the legislation in force."³⁷

³¹ The Code of Administrative Justice of Ukraine No. 2747-IV of July 6, 2005 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 32, 2005, P. 11, P. 1918

³² The Criminal Procedural Code of Ukraine No. 1001-05 of December 28, 1960 // Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of the URSR, No. 2, 1961, P. 15

³³ The Criminal Procedural Code of Ukraine No. 1001-05 of December 28, 1960 // Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of the URSR, No. 2, 1961, P. 15

³⁴ The law No. 8312-11 "On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR" of October 28, 1989 // Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of the URSR, No. 45, 1989, P. 631

³⁵ The law No. 8312-11 "On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR" of October 28, 1989 // Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of the URSR, No. 45, 1989, P. 631

³⁶ The law No. 393/96-BP "On Public Appeals" of October 2, 1996 // Holos Ukrainy, October 22, 1996

³⁷ The law No. 393/96-BP "On Public Appeals" of October 2, 1996 // Holos Ukrainy, October 22, 1996

In this respect, I would like to mention that within January-November 2005, the Donetsk Regional State Administration received 13,944 appeals of citizens in non-Ukrainian language, the Luhansk Regional State Administration – 9,225 appeals (81.9% were in minority language), the Sevastopol City State Administration – 8,255 appeals (87.8% were in minority language). So, there are no reasons for stating about discrimination on the grounds of the language of administrative appeals. On the contrary, in some regions (the Luhansk and Donetsk regions and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea), members of the core nation have fewer opportunities for communication with local authorities in Ukrainian, as public receptions are conducted in a non-Ukrainian language³⁸.

Of special note are public information guarantees. According to Recommendations of the National Council on TV and Radio Broadcasting on the language of broadcasting in program concepts of TV and radio companies broadcasting in Ukraine or applying for the license, in contests for the right to broadcast in minority languages in areas, where national minorities are concentrated territorially, the National Commission shall consider, to the maximum extent possible, language requirements of this TV and radio audience. Requirements of TV and radio broadcasters to indicate local programs in minority languages in their licenses shall be necessarily satisfied. In case of local broadcasting in a city, district, village or settlement, where national minorities are concentrated territorially, programs in minority languages shall be indicated in broadcasting licensed in volumes proportionate to the officially registered share of the said minority in the local population³⁹.

4. Guarantees of preservation of ethnic features. The matter in question is, first and foremost, preservation of traditional place-names in minority language in areas, where national minorities are concentrated territorially. In this respect, a mention shall be made of the law “On Geographical Names” signed by the President of Ukraine and passed by the Verkhovna Rada. Article 6 of the law reads, “In areas, inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities in substantial numbers, the use of traditional geographical names shall be retained. Such names shall be transliterated according to linguistic features of the majority of the population of these areas. In areas, where national minorities are concentrated territorially, traditional and correct forms of geographical names may be used, if necessary in conjunction with the name in the official language(s), in minority languages.”⁴⁰

Except for public guarantees, public and regional programs represent a significant component of public regional policy on national minorities in areas, where they are concentrated territorially. Public programs perform the following functions: 1) economic; 2) social; 3) cultural; 4) support to deported national minorities and renewal of their rights⁴¹ (in this article, I will not detail approval and implementation of public programs, since it will be the subject of another analysis).

³⁸ Data are systematized on the basis of replies of chairmen of regional state administrations to the deputy inquiry of MP R. Chubarov

³⁹ Recommendations of the National Council on TV and Radio Broadcasting on the Language of Broadcasting in Program Concepts of TV and Radio Companies Broadcasting in Ukraine or Applying for the License of April 14, 2004 // <http://www.nradatvr.kiev.ua/>

⁴⁰ The law No. 2604-IV “On Geographical Names” of May 31, 2005 // Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada, No. 27, 2005, P. 360

⁴¹ See the package of documents: the Cabinet resolution No. 132 “On Establishment of the Deported Crimean People Fund” of March 14, 1992 // www.rada.gov.ua; the Cabinet resolution No. 1447 “On Approval of the Procedure for Granting of Long-Term Interest-Free Loans for Individual Housing Construction to the Repatriates” of August 9, 1999 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 32, 1999, P. 83; the Cabinet resolution No. 29 “On Approval of the Program on Adaptation and Integration of Crimean Tatars and Other Deported Ethnoses into the Ukrainian Society, Revitalization and Development of Their Culture and Education” of January 10, 2002 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 2, 2002, P. 259, P. 72; the Cabinet resolution No. 618 “On Approval of the Program on Settlement and Resettlement of Crimean Tatars and Other Deported Ethnoses for the Period till 2005” of May 16, 2002 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 20, 2002, P. 50, P. 978; the Cabinet resolution No. 1952 “On Approval of the Procedure for Provision of the Deported and Members of Their Families with Housing Built or Purchased from Budget Funds” of December 17, 2003 // Official

At the regional level, protection of minority rights and freedoms is ensured through a system of national executive authorities.

5. Guarantees of security. In the context of protection of minority rights, public regional policy incorporates a broad range of instruments, including introduction of a state of emergency. Pursuant to the law “On the Legal Regime of the State of Emergency”, a state of emergency may be declared “during periods of interethnic and inter-religious conflicts, blockage or capture of some strategically important units or areas, which may endanger public security and suspend normal activities of national authorities and local self-government bodies”⁴². The state of emergency can be declared either at the national or the local level.

National guarantees of security of national minorities are entrenched in the Criminal Code of Ukraine providing for punishment for fomentation of interethnic hostility, the laws “On TV and Radio Broadcasting”⁴³ and “On the Printed Mass Communication Media (the Press)”⁴⁴ etc.

In 2004, the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration filed a number of claims with the regional courts against the anti-Semitic publications of the “Idealist” Lviv newspaper demanding, “to stop violation of the laws of Ukraine “On Information” and “On the Printed Mass Communication Media (the Press)”. Referring to Article 18 of the law “On the Printed Media (the Press)” (“the publishing of a printed mass communication medium may be terminated by the decision of a court”) and Paragraph 1, Article 3 of this law (prohibition of fomentation of racial, ethnic and religious hostility), the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration called to suspend publication of this newspaper⁴⁵.

III. Institutional Framework of Public Regional Policy on National Minorities in Areas, Where They Are Concentrated Territorially

The Ukraine system of executive authorities responsible for regional policy on national minorities in areas, where they are concentrated territorially, includes: 1) the Council of Representatives of Minority Public Organizations of Ukraine; 2) the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration; 3) departments of regional state administrations; 4) councils (boards) of minority public organizations at the offices of chairmen of local state administrations.

The Council of Representatives of Minority Public Organizations of Ukraine is the advisory body at the Office of the President of Ukraine. With regard to public regional policy on national minorities in areas, where they are concentrated territorially, the Council has the following powers: 1) prepare proposals for developing public ethnic policy, securing minority rights and minority participation in decision-making; 2) analyze implementation of laws, presidential decrees, and the Cabinet resolutions on ethnic policy, tendencies and perspectives of Ukraine’s ethnic development and situation of national minorities; 3) analyze political, legal, socio-economic, cultural, educational, linguistic and other problems of national minorities and present executive authorities (inclusive of regional state administrations and territorial divisions of national executive authorities) with respective proposals for their solution; 4) consider drafts, presidential and Cabinet decrees,

Herald of Ukraine, No. 51, 2003, P. 259, P. 2693; the Cabinet resolution No. 626 On Measures for Meeting Social Needs of the Crimean Repatriates” of May 13, 2004 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 19, 2004, P. 109, P. 1338

⁴² The law No. 1550-III “On the Legal Regime of the State of Emergency” of March 16, 2000 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 15, 2000, P. 7, P. 588

⁴³ The law No. 3759-XII “On TV and Radio Broadcasting” of December 21, 1993 // Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada, No. 10, 1994, P. 43

⁴⁴ The law No. 2782-XII “On the Printed Mass Communication Media (the Press)” of November 16, 1992 // Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of the USSR, No. 1, 1993, P. 1

⁴⁵ See the official site of the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration: <http://www.scnm.gov.ua/ua/a?index>

international agreements and purpose programs on national minorities approved by national executive authorities, prepare relevant program proposals and recommendations; 5) make proposals for preventing discrimination, hostility and violence on the basis of ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity⁴⁶.

The State Committee for Nationalities and Migration plays an important role in safeguarding minority rights (in the wording of the law “On National Minorities”, it is referred to as the “Ministry”⁴⁷). The law No. 2494-XII “On National Minorities” of June 25, 1992 was one of the first legal acts right after declaration of Ukraine’s independence. Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 5 of the law establish general provisions on institutional framework of public regional policy: 1) respective structural departments can be set up at local executive authorities; 2) advisory boards of national minorities can be established at local councils following the determined procedure⁴⁸.

In compliance with the law “On Local State Administrations”, in areas, inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities in substantial numbers, local state administrations shall be empowered to carry out public regional programs for ethno-cultural development of national minorities and ensure implementation of minority legislation⁴⁹.

As a matter of fact, special structural departments of regional state administrations are presently the most powerful and effective mechanism for implementation of public policy in the regions. According to the typical resolution on the department for nationalities of regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations approved by the May 26, 2004 Cabinet decree, this structure belongs to the regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administration as its department but is accountable and subordinate to both the chairman of the respective state administration and the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration⁵⁰. However, subordination of the department for nationalities to the regional state administrations is more rigid: the Chairman determines their numerical strength, approves the expenditure and revenue estimate and the staff list of the department within the budget. By agreement with the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration, the Chairman also appoints and dismisses the Head and Deputy Head of the department⁵¹.

Subjects of Ukraine’s administrative and territorial system solved the above issue differently: the Republican Committee for Nationalities and Deported Citizens was set up in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, while in the Kyiv region – the Department for Religion and Nationalities.

Councils (boards) of national minorities are established at the Office of chairmen of regional state administrations. The councils (boards) perform advisory functions. As a rule, the scope of their responsibilities includes: 1) prepare proposals for implementing public ethnic policy and securing minority rights in the region; 2) analyze the current state, tendencies and perspectives of regional ethnic development and the situation of national minorities; 3) participate in consideration of

⁴⁶ The presidential decree No. 600/2000 “On the Council of Representatives of Minority Public Organizations of Ukraine” of April 19, 2000 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 16, 2000, P. 70, P. 666; see also the presidential decree No. 573/2000 “On the Council of Representatives of the Crimean Tatar People” of April 7, 2000 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 15, 2000, P. 45, P. 603

⁴⁷ The law No. 2494-XII “On National Minorities” of June 25, 1992 // Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada, No. 36, 1992, P. 529

⁴⁸ The law No. 2494-XII “On National Minorities” of June 25, 1992 // Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada, No. 36, 1992, P. 529

⁴⁹ The law No. 586-XIV “On Local State Administrations” of April 9, 1999 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 18, 1999, P. 3

⁵⁰ The Cabinet decree No. 696 “On Approval of the Typical Resolution on the Department for Nationalities of Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations” // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 21, 2004, P. 89, P. 1443

⁵¹ The Cabinet decree No. 696 “On Approval of the Typical Resolution on the Department for Nationalities of Regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol City State Administrations” // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 21, 2004, P. 89, P. 1443

legislative and normative drafts affecting national minorities; 4) make proposals and recommendations on issues of ethno-cultural development of national minorities that require legal regulation; 5) make proposals and recommendations on organization and holding of conferences, forums and symposiums on minority issues⁵².

Creation of the National Commission on Strengthening Democracy and Asserting the Rule of Law can be viewed as an institutional method for securing minority rights in areas, where national minorities are concentrated territorially. The mandate of this standing advisory body set up at the Office of the President of Ukraine is “to further Ukraine’s compliance with the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria for the EU accession with regard to maintenance of stability and effective functioning of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule law, human rights and the respect for and protection of minorities.”⁵³ It shall be mentioned that protection of rights of national minorities in areas, where they are concentrated territorially, is a key Copenhagen criterion.

The Commission’s tasks are to monitor effectiveness of implementation of legislative acts as to their compliance with Copenhagen political criteria and relevant provisions of the Ukraine-EU Action Plan and draft respective legal documents. Though the Commission decisions are of recommendatory nature, they “are mandatory for consideration by executive authorities and officials, to whom these decisions are addressed.”⁵⁴ Presently, national minorities do not effectively apply this mechanism for protection of their interests. Nevertheless, through the National Commission on Strengthening Democracy and Asserting the Rule of Law they can put into practice certain legislative initiatives (specifically, those on prevention xenophobia, implementation of requirements of the European Charter for Regional or Minority languages and others).

On October 6, 2004, the Ministry of Education and Science and the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration issued the resolution of No. 778/49 “On Approval of Typical Provision on the Cultural and Educational Centers for National Minorities of Ukraine”. According to the document, such centers are defined as non-school institutions “furthering satisfaction of cultural and educational needs of Ukrainian national minorities”⁵⁵. Cultural and educational centers can be

⁵² See documents on www.liga.net: the Order of the Donetsk Regional State Administration No. 134 “On the Council on Ethnic and Language Policies at the Regional State Administration” of March 18, 1999; the Order of the Chairman of the Mykolaiv Regional State Administration No. 626-p “On the Council of Representatives of Minority Public Organizations of the Region” of August 17, 2000; the Order of the Chairman of the Kherson Regional State Administration No. 816 “On the Composition of the Council of Representatives of Minority Public Organizations of the Region” of September 7, 2000; the Order of the Volyn Regional State Administration No. 645 “On Establishment of the Interdepartmental Coordination Council on National Minorities and Interethnic Relations at the Regional State Administration” of December 15, 2000; the Order of the Chairman of the Rivne Regional State Administration No. 206 “On the Council of Representatives of Minority Public Organizations at the Office of the Chairman of the Regional State Administration” of March 30, 2001; the Order of the Chairman of the Odesa Regional State Administration No. 909/A-2001 “On Implementation of Provisions of the Law of Ukraine “On National Minorities” in the Odesa Region” of October 30, 2001; the Order of the Chairman of the Ternopil Regional State Administration No. 200 “On Approval of Comprehensive Measures for Promotion of Minority Cultures for the Period till 2005” of June 10, 2002; the Order of the Chairman of the Chernihiv Regional State Administration No. 179 “On the Chernihiv Regional Council of Representatives of Minority Public Organizations” of May 28, 2003; the Order of the Chairman of the Cherkassy Regional State Administration No. 328 “On the Council of Representatives of Minority Public Organizations of the Region” of June 18, 2003

⁵³ The presidential decree No. 1049/2005 “On the National Commission on Strengthening Democracy and Asserting the Rule of Law” of July 5, 2005 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 27, 2005, P. 33, P. 1543

⁵⁴ The presidential decree No. 1049/2005 “On the National Commission on Strengthening Democracy and Asserting the Rule of Law” of July 5, 2005 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 27, 2005, P. 33, P. 1543

⁵⁵ The resolution of the Ministry of Education and Science and the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration No. 778/49 On Approval of Typical Provision on the Cultural and Educational Centers for National Minorities of Ukraine” of October 6, 2004 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 18, 2004, P. 232, P. 2858

founded local executive authorities and self-government bodies (as well as enterprises, institutions, organizations, public associations and Ukrainian citizens). The centers are communal property⁵⁶.

Nowadays, a network of ethno-cultural centers of national minorities has been formed in Ukraine. Their mandate is to enable all national minorities to carry on cultural activities. For example, the Center for Transcarpathian Minority Cultures has been founded in the Transcarpathian region⁵⁷, the Palace of Ethnic Culture – in the Luhansk region and the Sevastopol Ethno-Cultural Center – in Sevastopol.

IV. Manpower Public Policy in National Authorities in Areas, Where National Minorities Are Concentrated Territorially

Manpower public policy in national authorities in areas, where national minorities are concentrated territorially, is based on the principle of equal access of citizens to public and municipal service, i.e. legal guarantees of minority representation in national authorities and local self-government bodies are absent. The Constitution of Ukraine and the laws “On Public Service” and “On Local State Administrations” set up a general (non-discriminatory) procedure for holding offices at regional state administrations. Ukrainian citizens have constitutional guarantees of equal access to public service. Article 3 of the December 16, 1993 law No. 3723-XII “On Public Service” reads, “The right to civil service shall have the citizens of Ukraine irrespective of their race, ethnic identity, sex, language, religion, political and other belief, social origin, property or birth.”⁵⁸ This provision is based on rules of the international law entrenched in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of December 10, 1948⁵⁹, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of March 7, 1966 (ratified by the January 21, 1969 decree of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR)⁶⁰ and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of December 16, 1966 (ratified by the October 19, 1973 decree No. 2148-VIII of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR) providing for the right of equal access to public service. Consequently, any preferences concerning appointment of minority members to government offices shall be regarded as direct discrimination violating international standards of human and civil rights. Efforts to introduce certain preferences for minority representation in governmental agencies are made in the form of recommendations. At the meeting with representatives of Crimean authorities in May 2005, Victor Yushchenko called Prime Minister of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea Anatoly Matvienko to ensure representation of national minorities in Crimean authorities, especially their appointment to humanitarian offices (in departments for education and culture).

The Ukrainian government pursues public policy on attracting minority youth to public service. On February 14, 2002, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the Action Plan for employment of Crimean Tatar youth in public service. The Cabinet resolution provides for the “manpower reserve of governmental offices for minority members with adequate education”⁶¹.

⁵⁶ See: the resolution of the Transcarpathian Regional Council No. 462 “On the Program for Support of the Media Set Up by Executive Authorities and Local Self-Government Bodies, Educational and Children’s Periodicals, the Media Promoting Minority Languages and Cultures and Publication of Literary Works of Transcarpathian Authors” of January 10, 2005 // www.liga.net

⁵⁷ See: the resolution of the Transcarpathian Regional Council No. 453 “On the 2005-2010 Action Program of the Center for Transcarpathian Minority Cultures” of January 10, 2005 // www.liga.net

⁵⁸ The law No. 3723-XII “On Public Service” of December 16, 1993 // Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada, No. 52, 1993, P. 490

⁵⁹ The Universal Declaration on Human Rights of December 10, 1948 // www.rada.gov.ua

⁶⁰ The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of March 7, 1966 (ratified by the January 21, 1969 decree of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR) // Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of the USSR, No. 13, 1989, P. 108

⁶¹ The Cabinet resolution No. 51-p “On Approval of Action Plan for Employment of Crimean Tatar Youth in Public Service” of February 14, 2002 // www.rada.gov.ua

Furthermore, under the document, respective authorities shall have a permission to set, by agreement with the Presidential Administration, quotas on personnel training for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea not exceeding 50% of the planned admission to the Ukrainian Academy of Public Administration at the Office of the President of Ukraine and the Odessa Regional Institute for Public Administration for Crimean Tatar Youth (5 persons for day study and 10 persons for distance study on the Education Master's Program in public administration and 3 persons – for post-graduate study)⁶².

Despite the fact that these provisions of the Action Plan were not included into the resolutions on competition, status of trainee and manpower reserve, they are taken into consideration by personnel departments of the Crimea.

It is necessary to mention that the issue of legal guarantees of minority representation in civil (public and municipal) service, inclusive of service in administrative authorities, has already been placed on the agenda by international organizations. Specifically, the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life read, “The electoral system should facilitate minority representation and influence: where minorities are concentrated territorially, single-member districts may provide sufficient minority representation; proportional representation systems, where a political party's share in the national vote is reflected in its share of the legislative seats, may assist in the representation of minorities; some forms of preference voting, where voters rank candidates in order of choice, may facilitate minority representation and promote inter-communal cooperation; lower numerical thresholds for representation in the legislature may enhance the inclusion of national minorities in governance.”⁶³

This gives a chance to improve international standards of human rights. Though, it is necessary to bring international standards of equal access of national minorities to public service and governance (elimination of the discrimination principle) in line with those of preferential terms and privileges for some minorities in areas, where they are concentrated territorially (application of the principle of positive discrimination). I guess positive discrimination can be applied as an option, while renewing rights of national minorities.

V. Financial Assistance to National Minorities As a Component of Public Regional Policy

In 2005, budget expenses for assistance to national minorities were as follows:

- Promotion of minority cultures and funding of newspaper published in minority languages – UAH 2,020,000;
- Implementation of provisions of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages – UAH 900,000;
- Settlement and resettlement of Crimean Tatars and other deportees – UAH 71,400,000.⁶⁴

Moreover, the share of budget funds assigned for funding of the press (UAH 500,000) will be spent on publication of periodicals in minority languages. Under the August 31, 2005 Cabinet resolution No. 843 “On the Procedure for the Budget Funding of the Press”, budget funds shall also be

⁶² The Cabinet resolution No. 51-p “On Approval of Action Plan for Employment of Crimean Tatar Youth in Public Service” of February 14, 2002 // www.rada.gov.ua

⁶³ Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life // www.osce.org/documents/hcnm/1999/09/2698_ru.pdf

⁶⁴ The law No. 2285-IV “On the 2005 National Budget” of December 23, 2004 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 52, 2004, V. 1, P. 14, P. 3431

allocated for financing the printed media “that purposely promote languages and cultures of national minorities in Ukraine.”⁶⁵

Actually, the above amount of expenditures (especially, those for implementation of provisions of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages) is not sufficient to meet minority needs (especially because their lion’s share is appropriated for resettlement and accommodation of the deported). Meanwhile, following the procedure for the use of budget funds for actions on implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the list of such actions is long enough: 1) prepare and hold international, national and regional congresses, sessions, conferences, seminars and roundtables on the exercise of the minority language rights entrenched in the Charter; 2) hold minority language days, competitions and contests for the best knowledge of minority languages; 3) encourage publication of scientific and methodical materials, manuals, dictionaries, and reference books, develop programs on maintenance, development and use of minority designed for minority Sunday schools etc.⁶⁶

Another pronounced trend is observed: public regional policy has the high level of centralization and is not targeted towards funding of self-regulating mechanisms in areas, inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities in substantial numbers. In 2005, the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration received UAH 89,150,000 from the national budget (however, these funds were also earmarked for performance of the Committee’s functions in the field of migration policy)⁶⁷.

Recommendations

Proceeding from the analysis results, it is expedient to make the following recommendations on implementation of public regional policy in areas, where minorities are concentrated territorially:

1. Legally define the term “territorial concentration of national minorities” (as percentage of the minority’s numerical strength in the total number of the population) separately for villages, settlements, towns of regional subordination, districts and regions.

At present, there is the dire need to develop a methodology for identification of areas, where national minorities re concentrated territorially, with regard to the correlation between the minority’s numerical strength and the total number of the population, its density, availability of ethno-cultural links between minority groups and other factors. Specifically, I would recommend to set the following criteria for determination of areas, where national minorities form the majority of the population: at the level of regions, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Kyiv and Sevastopol – 15%, at the level of districts – 20%, at the level of towns of regional subordination and city districts – 30%, at the level of district cities, settlements and villages – 30%.

2. Apply criteria for meeting needs of national minorities pursuant to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; conduct biannual monitoring of needs of national minorities in areas, where they are concentrated territorially, on the basis of the said criteria.

⁶⁵ The Cabinet resolution No. 843 “On the Procedure for the Budget Funding of the Press” of August 31, 2005 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 36, 2005, P. 29, P. 2184

⁶⁶ The Cabinet resolution No. 1233 “On Approval of the Procedure for the Budget Funding of Actions on Implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages” of December 21, 2005 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 52, 2005, P. 334, P. 3276

⁶⁷ The law No. 2285-IV “On the 2005 National Budget” of December 23, 2004 // Official Herald of Ukraine, No. 52, 2004, V. 1, P. 14, P. 3431

3. Budget funding of public regional policy towards areas, inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities in substantial numbers, shall comply with the law in force and international standards and be adequate to identical activities of foreign countries towards Ukrainians.

4. Put into practice public and regional assistance programs for some national minorities, in areas, where they are concentrated territorially (like the public program towards the German minority, the regional program towards Russian Old Believers of the Chernivtsi region etc.).

5. Take resolute actions on prevention of ethnic intolerance and hostility in areas, where national minorities are concentrated territorially. This provides for activities on addressing the root causes of potential conflicts, prohibition of racist, fascist and xenophobic organizations and cooperation with minority public organizations.

All these actions must comply with the basic rule – public policy towards national minorities in areas, where they are concentrated territorially, shall maintain balance of the two factors: creation of conditions for socialization of national minorities (non-admission of “ghettozation”) on the one hand and prevention of their assimilation on the other.

New Regional Policy in the Light of Ukraine's International Obligations on the Rights of National and Linguistic Minorities

By *OLENA SEMYORKINA*,

Director, Center for Legal Reform and Legislative Drafting, Ministry of Justice of Ukraine

“The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (hereinafter referred to as the High Commissioner) has identified certain recurrent issues, which have become the subject of his concern in terms of their potential for conflict within the OSCE States. In particular, education and use of language were identified as potential sources of conflict. In order to formulate appropriate government on these two issues, the High Commissioner developed two sets of recommendations to serve as references for policy and law-makers in member-States: the Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities (1996) and the Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities (1998). In 1998, the High Commissioner identified a third source of potential conflict - the participation of national minorities in the public governance.¹”

Renewal of public policy implies not only improvement of economic welfare of citizens and a country's enhanced image on the international scene but also radical change in fundamental principles of its polity.

At present, when preparation for the administrative and territorial reform is under way, it is important to analyze its consequences for the ethno-demographic situation in Ukraine, compliance with the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/135 of December 18, 1992, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995), the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992)² and the European Charter of Local Self-Government (1985) denoting the right and the ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local population³, resolutions of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, other European standards and recommendations.

Ukraine is a party to the above and other international legal acts concerning persons or a group of persons – national and linguistic minorities on the one hand and formation of local self-government in Ukraine on the other.

In this article, we shall study provisions of the above documents, the Council of Europe and OSCE recommendations and resolutions on protection of minority rights at the local and regional levels with regard to Ukraine's new regional policy.

According to data of the 2001 National Census, in Ukraine, there are 3,750,000 Ukrainians (77.8% of the total number of the population) and 10,900,000 representatives of over 130 ethnicities (22.2%).

The number of members of the largest fifteen ethnic groups varies from 300,000 to 30,000 persons, including: Russians form the largest national minority (8,300,000 persons or 17.3%), followed by Beloruses (275,800 persons or 0.6%), Moldavians (258,600 persons or 0.5%), Bulgarians (204,600

¹ Guidelines to Assist National Minority Participation in the Electoral Process. / OSCE. Warsaw, 2001. P. 3

² Hereinafter the author deliberately uses the Charter name translated closer to the original language

³ For Explanatory Report for the European Charter of Local Self-Government, see the Russian-language site of the Council of Europe

persons or 0.4%), Hungarians (156,600 persons or 0.3%), Romanians (151,000 persons or 0.3%), Poles (144,100 persons or 0.3%), Jews (103,600 persons or 0.2%), Armenians (99,900 persons or 0.2%), Greeks (91,500 persons or 0.2%), Tatars (73,300 persons or 0.2%), Roma (47,600 persons or 0.1%), Azerbaijanians (45,200 persons or 0.1%), Georgians (34,200 persons or 0.1%), Germans (33,300 persons or 0.1%) and Gagauses (31,900 persons or 0.1%).

Moreover, there are less numerous ethnic groups numbering from 12,000 to 3,000 persons: Koreans (12,700 persons or 0.03%), Uzbeks (12,400 persons or 0.03%), Lithuanians (7,200 persons or 0.01%), Slovaks (6,400 persons or 0.01%), Czechs (5,800 persons or 0.01%), Kazakhs (5,500 persons or 0.01%), Letts (5,100 persons or 0.01%), Ossetins (4,800 persons or 0.01%), Tajiks (4,300 persons or 0.008%), Bashkirs (4,200 persons or 0.008%), Turkmen (3,700 persons or 0.007%), Albanians (3,300 persons or 0.006%) and Assyrians (3,100 persons or 0.006%).

The number of members of other ethnic groups ranges from 3,000 to 1,000 persons: Estonians (2,900 persons or 0.005%), Kurds (2,100 persons or 0.004%), Karaims (1,200 persons or 0.002%), Comi (1,200 persons or 0.002%) and Kirghizes (1,000 persons or 0.002%).

Also, there are ethnicities amounting from 500 to 300 persons: Krymchaks (406 persons), Buryats (391 persons) and Turk-Meskhetins (336 persons)⁴.

Under international legal acts, persons belonging to linguistic or national minorities can influence regional policy through:

- 1) Their representatives elected to local authorities or through participation in referendums (direct influence);
- 2) Minority organizations and advisory committees established at City Councils and local authorities;
- 3) Introduction of respective rules of the law on minority rights and guarantees into statutes of territorial communities;
- 4) Minority associations effectively participating in decisions on the national and, where appropriate, regional level concerning the minority, to which they belong;
- 5) Determination of clear and unequivocal powers of local authorities.

Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities

Article 2 “2. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life. 3. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where appropriate, regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live, in a manner not incompatible with national legislation.”

Article 5 “1. National policies and programs shall be planned and implemented with due regard for the legitimate interests of persons belonging to minorities.”

Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities

Article 5 “1. The Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage. 2. Without prejudice to measures taken in pursuance of their general integration policy, the Parties shall refrain from

⁴ Data from the official site of the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration

policies or practices aimed at assimilation of persons belonging to national minorities against their will and shall protect these persons from any action aimed at such assimilation.”

Article 10 “1. The Parties undertake to recognize that every person belonging to a national minority has the right to use freely and without interference his or her minority language, in private and in public, orally and in writing. 2. In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in substantial numbers, if those persons so request and where such a request corresponds to a real need, the Parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far as possible, the conditions which would make it possible to use the minority language in relations between those persons and the administrative authorities.”

Article 11 “3. In areas traditionally inhabited by substantial numbers of persons belonging to a national minority, the Parties shall endeavour, in the framework of their legal system, including, where appropriate, agreements with other States, and taking into account their specific conditions, to display traditional local names, street names and other topographical indications intended for the public also in the minority language when there is a sufficient demand for such indications.”

Article 14 “1. The Parties undertake to recognize that every person belonging to a national minority has the right to learn his or her minority language. 2. In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in substantial numbers, if there is sufficient demand, the Parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far as possible and within the framework of their education systems, that persons belonging to those minorities have adequate opportunities for being taught the minority language or for receiving instruction in this language.”

Article 15 “The Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting them.”

Article 16 “The Parties shall refrain from measures which alter the proportions of the population in areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities and are aimed at restricting the rights and freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the present Framework Convention.”

CE resolution RecCMN (2003)⁵ on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Ukraine⁵ adopted conclusions concerning the implementation of the Framework Convention by Ukraine reading, “Whereas a spirit of tolerance and inter-ethnic dialogue generally prevails in Ukraine, disputes related to language issues have caused tension. It is therefore crucial that the pending legislative and practical initiatives in this sphere are pursued in full compliance with the Framework Convention.”

Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities (1996)

(6) “States should endow regional and local authorities with appropriate competences concerning minority education thereby also facilitating the participation of minorities in the process of policy formulation at a regional and/or local level.”

(15) “Vocational training in the minority language should be made accessible in specific subjects when persons belonging to the national minority in question have expressed a desire for it, when they have demonstrated the need for it and when their numerical strength justifies it.”

⁵ Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 5 February 2003 at the 826th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies

(17) “Persons belonging to national minorities should have access to tertiary education in their own language when they have demonstrated the need for it and when their numerical strength justifies it.”

Explanatory Note to the Hague Recommendations

The Explanatory Note gives reference to the relevant international documents. To varying degrees, all of these instruments declare the right of minorities to maintain their collective identity by means of their mother tongue. This right is exercised, above all, through education. These same instruments, however, underline that the right to maintain the collective identity through the minority language must be balanced by the responsibility to integrate and participate in the wider national society. Such integration requires the acquisition of a sound knowledge of both that society and the State language(s). The promotion of tolerance and pluralism is also an important component of this dynamic.

Irrespective of the level of access to minority language education, which may be afforded by States, it should not be established in an arbitrary fashion. States are required to give due consideration to the needs of national minorities as these are consistently expressed and demonstrated by the communities in question.

For their part, national minorities should ensure that their demands are reasonable. They should give due consideration to such legitimate factors as their own numerical strength, their demographic density in any given region (or regions) and their capacity to contribute to the durability of these services and facilities over time.

Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities (1998)

“In regions and localities, where persons belonging to a national minority are present in significant numbers and where the desire for it has been expressed, persons belonging to this national minority shall have: (13) the right to acquire civil documents and certificates both in the official language or languages of the State and in the language of the national minority in question from regional and/or local public institutions; 14) adequate possibilities to use their language in communications with administrative authorities especially in regions and localities where they have expressed a desire for it and where they are present in significant numbers. Similarly, administrative authorities shall, wherever possible, ensure that public services are provided also in the language of the national minority.”

15) “In regions and localities where persons belonging to a national minority are present in significant numbers, the State shall take measures to ensure that elected members of regional and local governmental bodies can use also the language of the national minority during activities relating to these bodies.”

Explanatory Note to the Oslo Recommendations

Article 11(3) of the Framework Convention states that “in areas traditionally inhabited by substantial numbers of persons belonging to a national minority, the Parties shall endeavour... to display traditional local names, street names and other topographical indications intended for the public also in the minority language when there is sufficient demand for such indications.” Refusal to recognize the validity of historic denominations of the kind described can constitute an attempt to revise history and to assimilate minorities, thus constituting a serious threat to the identity of persons belonging to minorities.

States must recognize the demographic realities of the regions under their jurisdiction. Above all, States should not seek to avoid their obligations by changing the demographic reality of a region. Specifically, *Article 16* of the Framework Convention engages States to refrain from measures, which might arbitrarily alter the proportion of the population in areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities with the objective of restricting the rights of these minorities. Such measures could consist of arbitrary expropriations, evictions, expulsions as well as the arbitrary redrawing of administrative borders and census manipulation.

European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages

Article 7 “1. In respect of regional or minority languages, within the territories in which such languages are used and according to the situation of each language, the Parties shall base their policies, legislation and practice on the following objectives and principles:

<...>

b) the respect of the geographical area of each regional or minority language in order to ensure that existing or new administrative divisions do not constitute an obstacle to the promotion of the regional or minority language in question;

c) the need for resolute action to promote regional or minority languages in order to safeguard them;

d) the facilitation and/or encouragement of the use of regional or minority languages, in speech and writing, in public and private life;

<...>

f) the provision of appropriate forms and means for the teaching and study of regional or minority languages at all appropriate stages;

g) the provision of facilities enabling non-speakers of a regional or minority language living in the area where it is used to learn it if they so desire.”

Article 10 “2. In respect of the local and regional authorities on whose territory the number of residents who are users of regional or minority languages is such as to justify the measures specified below, the Parties undertake to allow and/or encourage: a) the use of regional or minority languages within the framework of the regional or local authority; <...> c) the publication by regional authorities of their official documents also in the relevant regional or minority languages; d) the publication by local authorities of their official documents also in the relevant regional or minority languages; e) the use by regional authorities of regional or minority languages in debates in their assemblies, without excluding, however, the use of the official language(s) of the State; f) the use by local authorities of regional or minority languages in debates in their assemblies, without excluding, however, the use of the official language(s) of the State; g) the use or adoption, if necessary in conjunction with the name in the official language(s), of traditional and correct forms of place-names in regional or minority languages. 4. With a view to putting into effect those provisions of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 accepted by them, the Parties undertake to take one or more of the following measures: <...> c) compliance as far as possible with requests from public service employees having a knowledge of a regional or minority language to be appointed in the territory in which that language is used.”

European Charter of Local Self-Government (ECLSG)

Article 5 “Changes in local authority boundaries shall not be made without prior consultation of the local communities concerned, possibly by means of a referendum where this is permitted by statute.”

Recommendation 102 (2001) I on Local and Regional Democracy in Ukraine of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe⁶

Article 12, Paragraph d governs, “With regard to the administrative and territorial organization of the country and the institutional framework of democracy at local and regional level, fundamental rights of local and regional authorities must always be secured by implementing Article 5 of the ECLSG which stipulates that “Changes in local authorities’ boundaries shall not be made without prior consultation of the local communities concerned, possibly by means of a referendum where this is permitted by the statute.”

With regard to local and regional authorities’ responsibilities: (a) an exaggerated number of legal acts, in some cases even contradictory, deal with the functions of local and regional authorities; (b) it is urgent to clarify the confusion existing in the relevant legislation on the basis of the subsidiarity principle, as defined in Article 4.3 of the ECLSG.

1) Election of minority members to local authorities or their participation in referendum

Pursuant to Article 3 of the 2004 law of Ukraine “On Elections of the Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council) of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Deputies of Local Councils and Chairmen of the Village, Settlement and City Councils”⁷, “Any direct or indirect privileges or restrictions on the suffrage rights of Ukrainian citizens on the basis of their race, color of skin, political, religious and other convictions, gender, ethnic and social origin, property status, place of residence, language or other characters shall be prohibited. Restrictions on the suffrage rights, not provided by the Constitution of Ukraine and this law, are prohibited.”

The laws of Ukraine “On All-Ukrainian and Local Referenda” (1991)⁸ and “On Local Self-Government in Ukraine” define local referendum as “a form whereby a territorial community adopts, by direct vote, decisions, which belong to the competence of local self-government. Any issue may become the subject of a local referendum provided it belongs to the competence of local self-government pursuant to the Constitution of Ukraine, this and other laws. Issues ascribed, by law, to the competence of state power bodies, may not be raised at a local referendum. Decisions adopted at a local referendum shall be binding for execution on the corresponding territory.”

2) Minority organizations and advisory committees established at City Councils and local authorities

The law of Ukraine “On National Minorities” governs, “The Verkhovna Rada, local executive authorities or local councils, have the right to form standing commissions on interethnic issues, if necessary. Advisory bodies composed of members of national minorities can be founded at local councils. Respective councils of MPs shall determine a procedure for their formation. The Ministry of Interethnic Affairs of Ukraine shall be the central national executive authority in the sphere of

⁶ See the site of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe

⁷ Official Bulletin of Ukraine 2004. No. 14. P. 191 (Article 965).

⁸ Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada. 1991. No. 33. P. 443.

interethnic relations. The Council of Representatives of Minority Public Organizations shall function at the Ministry as an advisory body” (**Article 5**).

3) Introduction of respective rules of the law on minority rights and guarantees into statutes of territorial communities

According to a sampling analysis, only in exceptional cases, statutes of territorial communities of Ukrainian cities and towns provide for consideration of ethnic composition of the territorial community.

The statute of the territorial community of Chernivtsi approved by the resolution of the 7th session of the local council of the 24th convocation on December 26, 2002 governs, “With regard to the city’s proximity to ethnic border of eastern Slavs and eastern Romanians, it became a multinational, multicultural and multi-religious center, where numerous ethnic groups, languages, cultures and beliefs peacefully co-exist.”

Article 2.2.3, “Territorial community shall encourage development of ethnic and other groups, create and promote conditions for their activities and peaceful co-existence.”

According to **Article 2.2.5**, members of the territorial community shall exercise their right to participate in local self-government either directly or through respective bodies of local self-government (activities of public organizations).

Article 2.2.8, “Activity of local self-government bodies shall be based on principles of public peace and harmony among members of the territorial community, protection of the rights, respect for dignity and interests of diverse social, ethnic and religious groups. In case of a conflict, a reconciliation procedure shall be used. The Executive Committee of the Local Council shall establish the said procedure. In statutory cases, conflicts shall be settled in court.”

Article 2.10.1, “Members of the territorial community shall have the right to take part in local self-government through activities of public organizations and ethno-cultural societies provided that they are registered as members of these organizations and parties.”

Article 2.10.2, “Public organizations shall nominate candidates for the Chairman of the City Council and deputies of local councils; participate in the election of the Chairman of the City Council, deputies of local and district councils, other bodies and officials elected by the territorial community of the city or territorial communities of city districts pursuant to the law and this Statute; participate in development and implementation of local self-government policy through deputies of city and district councils; encourage involvement of members of the territorial community in discussion of important issues of socio-economic and cultural development within the competence of local self-government.”

Article 2.10.3, “Any restrictions on participation of public organizations in local self-government shall be prohibited unless otherwise stipulated by the law.”

The statute of the territorial community of Ivano-Frankivsk adopted on May 7, 1999, reads:

Article 11, “The primary objective of the territorial community shall be maintenance and promotion of cultural environment, traditions and processes forming cultural image of Ivano-Frankivsk.”

Article 12 “Ukrainian shall be the language of local self-government in the city.”

Article 13 “The territorial community shall take care of ethno-cultural needs and create conditions for maintenance of national identity of all ethnic groups populating the city.”

Article 14 “The territorial community and its local self-government bodies shall preserve historical and cultural heritage of the city and its architectural identity.”

Article 18 of the statute of the territorial community of Rivne approved by the resolution of the Rivne City Council on November 2, 2001, provides for involvement of members of the territorial community in activities of local self-government bodies in the following cases:

- Election to interim supervisory committees as specialists and experts;
- Election to committees set on a voluntary basis at local self-government bodies or officials, whose list shall be approved by the City Council;
- Participation in activities of special, expert and public councils set on decisions of the City Council and its Executive Committee;
- Work, on a voluntary basis, on issues and proposals within the competence of local self-government bodies and on requests of deputies of local councils representing respective constituencies or local self-government bodies.

The statute of the territorial community of Kharkiv approved by the City Council of the 23rd convocation governs:

Article 3, “The goal and objectives of the territorial community shall be rendering assistance in development of ethnic and other groups of population, creation and promotion of conditions for their activities and peaceful co-existence with involvement of broad circles of Kharkiv residents.”

Article 19, “Ethnic equality of members of the territorial community

1. In view of multi-ethnic composition of the territorial community, equality of human rights and freedoms irrespective of their ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural identity, place of residence and political preferences as well as development of interethnic relations in the spirit of peace, mutual understanding and respect for traditions of other ethnoses shall be a matter of special concern for local self-government bodies.

2. Persons belonging to national minorities shall have the right to enjoy their own culture, profess and practice their own religion and use their own language through establishment of ethnic schools and ethno-cultural associations, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination.”

4) *Minority associations effectively participating in decision-making and determination of clear and unequivocal powers of local authorities*

We are going to analyze prescribed powers of local state administrations and local self-government bodies in the field of language and national minority policies.

Article 119 of the Constitution of Ukraine and Articles 22 and 25 of the law of Ukraine “On Local State Administrations” stipulate that within the relevant administrative and territorial unit, *local state administrations* shall:

- Implement the state and regional programs of socio-economic and cultural development, environmental protection programs, and in places with compact residence of national minorities and indigenous population – programs on their national and cultural development;
- Implement the state policy in the field of science, education, health care, culture, physical education and sport, maternity and childhood, family and youth;
- Fulfill programs on compulsory and complete general secondary education;

- Ensure implementation of legislation on comprehensive development and functioning of Ukrainian as the national language in all aspects of the economic, political and social life of the country, creation of conditions for the development and use of languages of other nationalities;
- Support the activity of creative unions, ethno-cultural societies, women's, youth, children's and other social and public associations.

According to **Article 32 of the law of Ukraine “On Local Self-Government in Ukraine”**, the following shall lie within the competence of local self-government bodies of village, settlement, and city councils:

“a) Exclusive (self-governing) powers: to manage education, health care, culture, physical culture and sports establishments; provide minors with complete general secondary education; create conditions for the development of culture, promote the revival of traditional folk art centers, ethno-cultural traditions of the population and artistic crafts; promote activities of artistic unions, ethno-cultural societies, funds, associations, and other public and non-governmental organizations dealing with health care, culture, youth affairs, physical culture and sports.

b) Delegated powers: to provide, within the scope of delegated powers, accessible and free education and medical services on the respective territory, access to education in schools offering tuition in the national or minority language, the opportunity to learn mother tongue in public and municipal educational establishments, or through ethno-cultural societies.”

Article 44, “District and regional councils shall delegate to the respective local state administrations the following powers: to prepare and submit for the council’s consideration draft programs on socio-economic and ethno-cultural development of national minorities; promote the revival of traditional folk centers, popular national and cultural traditions, crafts and trades, activities of amateur folk groups and ethno-cultural societies.”

Article 19, “Taking into account historical, national, cultural, socio-economic, and other features of local self-government, the representative local self-government body may adopt the statute of a village, settlement or city territorial community, on the basis of the Constitution of Ukraine and within the limits of this law.”

Throughout all sessions of the 4th convocation, the Parliamentary Committee on State Building and Local Self-Government has registered 16 drafts proposing changes to the laws of Ukraine “On Local Self-Government in Ukraine” and “On Local State Administrations”. Nevertheless, none of the bills suggests clarifying powers of local self-government bodies on implementation of language and minority policies.

Administrative and Territorial Powers

The law of Ukraine “On Local Self-Government in Ukraine” determines only the competence of respective authorities on solving the above issues, providing for the following:

- “Decisions on issues of administrative-territorial division, within the limits and following the procedure established by this and other laws, shall be made exclusively at the plenary meetings of village, settlement, and city councils” (**Article 26**);
- “Preparation and submission for the council’s consideration of issues concerning naming (renaming) of streets, avenues, boulevards, squares, parks, bridges and buildings located on the territory of the respective settlement shall belong to exclusive (self-governing) powers of executive bodies of village, settlement, and city councils” (**Article 37**);

- “Decisions on administrative-territorial division, within the limits and following the procedure determined by the law, shall be made exclusively at the plenary sessions of the district and regional councils” (**Article 43**).

Settlement of administrative and territorial issues is regulated by the March 12, 1981 decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR.

Drafts on introduction of changes and amendments to the law of Ukraine “On Local State Administrations”, local self-government in a community, in a district and in a region suggested by the Task Force headed by ex-Vice Premier on the administrative reform Roman Bezsmertny are made available on the official site of the Cabinet.

Analysis of the above bills evidences that their formulators failed to consider the ethno-political situation in the country, especially, with regard to decisions on renaming of inhabited localities, changes in their borders, formation and liquidation of districts in cities and towns.

The draft “**On Introduction of Changes to the Law of Ukraine “On Local State Administrations” (new wording)** suggests expanding powers of state administrations to control and supervision over enforcement of legislation on education and culture (**Article 21**).

Under the drafts “**On Local Self-Government in a Community**”, “**On Local Self-Government in a District**” and “**On Local Self-Government in a Region**”:

- Promotion of ethno-cultural traditions; activities of ethno-cultural associations; pre-school complete secondary, higher and post-graduate education; effective functioning of local museums, exhibitions, clubs and palaces of culture belongs to the competence of local self-government of *a community*;
- Promotion of ethno-cultural traditions and activities of ethno-cultural associations lies within the competence of local self-government of *a district*;
- Promotion of ethno-cultural traditions; activities of ethno-cultural associations; higher and post-graduate education; approval of programs on ethno-cultural development of national minorities, introduction of changes to these programs and control over their execution belongs to the competence of local self-government of *a region*.

As for consideration of local features in symbols of territorial communities, the new drafts duplicate provisions of the law of Ukraine “On Local Self-Government in Ukraine” reading, “1. Territorial communities of villages, settlements, and cities may have their own symbols (emblem, flag, and others) which reflect the historical, cultural, socio-economic, and other local characteristics and traditions” (Article 22).

The drafts determined the following forms of direct participation of residents (of a district/region) in local self-government: elections and referenda, general assemblies of members of the territorial community, consulting polls, local initiatives, public hearings, advisory boards at local self-government bodies and other forms of public activity.

By means of the above forms of participation, minorities can influence decisions on their language and other rights to be made by local self-government bodies.

The draft “On the Administrative and Territorial System of Ukraine” establishes basic principles of Ukraine’s administrative and territorial system based on grounds of indivisibility/unity of the state and relevant economic, geographic and demographic features of distinct territories, ethno-cultural traditions and legitimate interests of Ukrainian citizens, which could be viewed as its positive aspect (**Article 2**).

Meanwhile, the bill gives incomplete list of mechanisms for participation of national minorities in decision-making.

Pursuant to the draft, administrative and territorial units shall be named/renamed with regard to historical, cultural, geographic, *ethnic* and other traditions, local conditions and specific features pursuant to the law in force” (**Article 14**).

Decisions to name/rename the administrative and territorial unit, city or district shall be made *on the basis of results of consulting polls* conducted within the limits of the respective administrative and territorial unit, city or district.

Decisions to name/rename the settlement, town or village shall be made *on the basis of results of the general assembly of residents of the respective settlement, town or village*.

Proposals to name/rename the administrative and territorial unit, city or district shall be made in the form of the law. Proposals to name/rename the settlement, town or village shall be presented in the form of the draft resolution.

Draft resolutions on naming/renaming of the administrative and territorial unit, city, district or settlement shall be annexed with/come with decisions of the general assembly, results of consulting polls, historical data, including data on all known names of this administrative and territorial unit, city or district (**Article 24**). Data on ethnic or linguistic composition of the population shall not be presented to determine the extent, to which interests of respective minorities are considered.

The same procedure is set for decision-making on fixing, liquidation, determination and change of borders of territorial communities (**Article 16**), districts (**Article 19**) and regions (**Article 20**).

The above allows the following conclusions:

- 1) State guarantees shall not only be established in the laws on national minorities and languages but also be clearly prescribed in regulations on powers and competence of respective local authorities;
- 2) It is necessary to eliminate duplication of functions of local state administrations and local self-government bodies;
- 3) It is imperative to provide for rules of the law on participation of national minorities in decision-making on administrative and territorial issues;
- 4) It is recommended to develop rules on minority rights and guarantees in statutes of territorial communities in cases they have a national or other minority in their composition or a regional or minority language subject to protection as specified by the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages;
- 5) In the regions populated by a large number of minorities, the latter shall establish organizations representing their common interests.

Public Policy and Government Actions on Meeting Cultural and Humanitarian Needs of National Minorities in Ukraine

By *OLEXIY KOSHEL*, Director of Analytical Center “Rada”

1. Overview of Legislation

Ukraine has been forming as a democratic state within a period of radical political and economic changes in society and in the system of international relations. The European choice calls us to comply with international standards of human and minority rights, develop and promote national identity.

Being a multi-ethnic state, Ukraine adheres to the principles of building of a political nation as a society of equal rights and opportunities based on maintenance of cultural identity of national minorities and indigenous peoples.

While implementing national ethnic policy, the state ensures equal participation of members of all ethnic communities in all aspects of the economic, political and social life of the country. Ukraine guarantees all fundamental rights of national minorities indicated in international acts and regulations. The Constitution of Ukraine reads, “Citizens have equal constitutional rights and freedoms and are equal before the law. There shall be no privileges or restrictions based on race, color of skin, political, religious and other beliefs, sex, ethnic and social origin, property status, place of residence, linguistic or other characteristics.” The 1991 Declaration on Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine establishes equal political, social and cultural rights of all citizens, ethnicities and ethnic groups of Ukraine.

Under the above legal acts, persons belonging to national minorities have the right to freely exercise human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality before the law. Members of national minorities have the right to enjoy their own culture, profess and practice their own religion, obtain and disseminate information and use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination.

The law “On National Minorities” is the main document regulating the principles of national ethnic policy. The law governs, “Any direct or indirect limitation of the rights and freedoms of citizens based on ethnic grounds is forbidden and subject to punishment by the law” (Article 18). “In case provisions of Ukraine’s international agreements run counter to the law of Ukraine on national minorities, rules of the international agreements shall be applied” (Article 19). Other essential documents on the rights of national minorities incorporate the Declaration of State Sovereignty, the Act of Declaring Independence of Ukraine, the law of Ukraine “On Languages” and other legal acts.

At present, Ukraine ratified major conventions and declarations on the protection and promotion of ethnic, cultural, language and religious identity of national minorities and indigenous peoples. Provisions on the protection of minority rights are integral components of all international agreements and treaties signed between Ukraine and its neighbours.

Minority rights and relevant commitments of the state evidence that at the legislative level, Ukraine created adequate conditions for:

- Development, use and protection of languages of national minorities and indigenous peoples;
- Development of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity;
- Implementation of public and regional programs on the socio-economic and ethno-cultural development of national minorities and indigenous peoples.

Ukraine undoubtedly attained great successes in securing minority rights according to international standards, especially with regard to the fact that the Ukrainian minority legislation has been developing over the difficult period of its independence.

Ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages by the Verkhovna Rada in May 2003 marked an important step for the application of international standards of minority rights. The Charter provides for the use of regional or minority languages with regard to education, judicial authorities, cultural activities, the media, economic and social life.

However, the Krymchak, Karaim, Armenian and Roma languages were not included in the Charter's list of regional or minority languages in danger of eventual extinction. Now, the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration is working on introduction of relevant changes and amendments to the law in force.

Availability of legal mechanisms and tools for the protection of national minorities in Ukraine is a factor of stability of interethnic relations. In contrast to most post-Soviet countries, extreme manifestations of separatism are absent in Ukraine, especially in the regions, where national minorities are concentrated territorially (the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the Transcarpathian and Chernivtsi regions). Local interethnic conflicts emerge, as a rule, during political crises or before elections, which allows a conclusion about their artificial nature for the purpose of manipulating citizens' consciousness.

2. Public Policy towards Minority Educational Needs

First and foremost, minority educational rights provide for the right to education in minority language, maintenance, promotion and protection of ethnic cultures on the part of the state.

Article 53 of the Constitution of Ukraine reads, "Citizens belonging to national minorities the right to receive education or to study their language in public and municipal educational establishments and through ethno-cultural organizations."

Education is a strategic resource for the development of the Ukrainian society and a factor ensuring accelerated EU accession and enhancing its competitiveness in the international labour market. At the same time, education is an integral part of consolidation of the Ukrainian people into a political nation.

The Ukrainian law provides for the right of national minorities to secondary education in minority language. Specifically, there is a network of educational institutions instructing in minority languages.

In 2003/2004 school year, there were 20,913 secondary institutions (save special and boarding schools), of which tuition in minority languages was offered as follows:

Russian – 1,595 institutions (708,215 schoolchildren);
Romanian – 94 institutions (24,040 schoolchildren);
Hungarian – 69 institutions (16,070 schoolchildren);
Crimean Tatar – 14 institutions (4,151 schoolchildren);
Moldavian – 9 institutions (3,602 schoolchildren);
Polish – 4 institutions (1,004 schoolchildren).

In 2003-2004 academic year, 2,140 secondary institutions instructed in two and more minority languages, which proves ethnic revitalization.

15 state-owned and 2 private higher institutions – the Slavic and the International Solomon Universities – train teachers for educational establishments instructing in minority languages.

In the 2004/2005 school year, there was a trend towards decrease of the number of educational establishments offering tuition in Russian compared to the 2002/2003 school year. Their number dropped by 137 schools (96,089 schoolchildren), whereas that of institutions instructing in other minority languages remained almost the same.

In my opinion, the above can be explained by enhancement of national consciousness of the Ukrainian people and national minorities as well as more opportunities for their educational and cultural development. The reduction of the number of schools is caused by decrease of the number of Russian-speaking Ukrainians, who do not belong to Russian minority.

Changes in ethnic self-determination also prove ethnic revitalization. Data of the 1989 and 2001 National Censuses demonstrate that the number of citizens, who identify themselves as Russians, dropped by 3,060,000 (4.8%) (from 11,360,000 or 22.1% to 8,300,000 or 17.3%). These figures entailed a wave of speculations in the Russian media and among Russian politicians. However, growth of the number of some ethnicities stands against the general background. Over 11 years, the number of Armenians has increased by 180% (from 54,200 persons or 0.1% to 99,900 persons or 0.2%), Azerbaijanians – by 122% (from 37,600 persons or 0.07% to 45,200 persons or 0.1%) and Romanians – by 112% (from 135,000 to 151,000 persons). The number of Crimean Tatars rose 5.3 times (mostly due to return of the deported and high birth rate).

Notwithstanding positive aspects of political, legal and organizational actions on meeting the educational needs of national minorities, the following failings are typical for minority education and Ukraine's education system in general:

- Insufficient number of effective educational programs and materials;
- Lack of funding;
- Absence of adequate legal tools, especially those regulating charity, preferential taxation and others;
- Absence of alternative education systems;
- Lack of opportunities for receiving vocational and advanced training of teachers;
- Lack of educational institutions for the clergy.

The Soviet system of vocational and higher education of the 50-80s was rather effective for the period and role it had to play in planned economy and political system of that time. Huge amounts of money were invested in education and, especially, in higher education. The example of India, which copied the Soviet system of exact science education and now provides engineering personnel for the major military centers, proves its high quality. Though, the socialist system accentuated accumulation of knowledge, whereas the western one made an emphasis on creativity, as it trained personnel for market economy and competitive political environment.

Hence, elimination of drawbacks in minority education directly depends on the need to solve general educational problems. Development of education in Ukraine provides for the following:

1. Create and promote adequate conditions for attracting private investments. Officially, the reform of the Ukrainian education system has been lasting over ten years. However, the relevant law is still deficient. It is necessary to approve such important and vital for secondary and higher institutions documents as the law on equal access to the education market, on patronage, on preferential taxation of scientific and educational activities etc. Also, there is a need to introduce a special status "minority education specialist" enabling educators, teachers and tutors to exercise and enjoy their social and professional rights.

2. Revise curriculums in order to bring them in line with requirements of the market economy and democratic society (a shift of the accent from memorizing to application of knowledge and skills).
3. Improve material and technical basis of educational establishments.
4. Set up an effective system of retraining (first of all, minority educational specialists). Continued development of state-of-the-art technologies requires pedagogues to update their skills and knowledge, train and retrain. This is especially acute for educational institutions offering tuition in minority languages because the issue of training of educational personnel still remains unsolved (higher educational institutions of the Odesa and Chernivtsi regions and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea train educational staff for schools instructing in minority languages).

3. Public Policy towards Minority Cultural Needs

In multi-ethnic countries like Ukraine, political stability and territorial integrity depend upon maintenance and promotion of languages and cultures, preservation of historical monuments and revitalization of minority traditions.

In this context, special attention shall be paid to the government actions on meeting linguistic, educational and cultural needs of national minorities.

The state provides financial and organizational assistance to celebration and commemoration of minority cultures, memorable dates, religious and ceremonial holidays. The following large-scale cultural and artistic actions are held annually: the international Roma festival “Akmala”, the forum of ethnic cultures “We Are All Your Children, Ukraine!”, the all-Ukrainian festival “We Are Ukrainian”, the festival of Jewish art “Sholom, Ukraine!” (Kyiv), interethnic cultural festivals (Mykolaiv and Kamyanets-Podilsky), the festival “Melodies of Salt Lakes” (the Transcarpathia), the festival of minority cultures “Folk Mosaic” (the Kyiv region), the Day of Romanian culture (Chernivtsi) and numerous regional festivals and forums.

The programs towards social and spiritual revival of the Ukrainian Roma and public support to preservation of cultural heritage of the Crimean Karaims and Krymchaks reflect Ukraine’s contribution to the preservation and promotion of minority cultures.

Today, the role of minority public organizations and self-government bodies in cultural and educational development of national minorities is increasing. Article 3 of the law of Ukraine “On Public Associations” reads, “Public organizations are public associations of citizens established with the purpose of satisfying and protecting their legal social, economic, creative, ethno-cultural, sports and other common interests.” Public associations shall have the right to set up their own public institutions (educational establishments, churches, cultural centers, societies etc.).

For the time being, there are over 800 minority public organizations in Ukraine, of which 32 have the national status. The most active associations, whose activities contribute to interethnic peace and harmony in the regions, include the Association of Ethno-Cultural Organizations of Ukraine, the Union of Ukrainian Poles, the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities, the Democratic Union of Ukrainian Hungarians, the Federation of Ukrainian Greeks’ Associations and the Association of Bulgarian Ethno-Cultural Communities.

To meet minority cultural needs, national authorities and local self-government bodies encourage foundation and activities of information centers, first and foremost, in areas, where national minorities are concentrated territorially.

In Central and East European countries, these information centers are known as TV houses (for instance, in Hungary, their number exceeds 500). TV houses are set up mostly in rural areas to provide residents with the access to Internet, computers, libraries and free legal consultations.

In Ukraine, the program on information centers was launched in assistance with international organizations in areas, where the Crimean Tatar (the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) and the Hungarian minorities (the Transcarpathian region) are concentrated territorially. Though, I am deeply convinced that comprehensive public assistance (especially, with regard to premises and libraries) is needed to ensure effective work in this direction. Establishment of such centers could serve as a component of reforming rural library network.

Creation and promotion of conditions for effective activities of the minority language media is a key factor of the right of national minorities to freedom of speech, opinion and expression.

The government of Ukraine allocates budget funds for 7 minority newspapers: the “Rodn Krai” (Bulgarian-language), “Dzennik Kiyovvski” (Polish-language), “Konkordia” (Romanian-language), “Aragats” (Armenian-language), “Jewish News (Jewish-language) and “Holos Kryma” (Crimean Tatar-language). Also, local authorities of the Odesa and Chernivtsi regions fund Romanian- and Hungarian-language newspapers.

In general, there are over 200 periodicals published in minority languages. However, quantitative indicators of public assistance to minority publications demonstrate only support to the material and technical process and publishing but do not reflect satisfaction of minority needs for information in minority languages. Specifically, these figures do not evidence the actual number of readers, their distribution geography by areas, where national minorities are concentrated territorially, and other factors.

Hence, it is necessary to increase qualitative indicators pertaining to the minority media simultaneously promoting their development through:

- Design of Internet-versions of available publications and creation of the Internet media of national minorities;
- Making minority publications available on sale;
- Increase of circulation;
- Enhance quality of journalistic materials etc.

The state prioritizes development of minority publications on Internet. Since the number of Internet users grew up to 10% of the Ukrainian adult population as of September 2005, Internet design of available and new minority publications would help to expand both the number of readers and distribution geography.

4. State-Church Relations in the Context of the Exercise of Minority Religious Rights

Until 1991, Ukraine had no opportunity to pursue its own religious policy. Public tools of the Soviet Union were geared toward developing negative attitude of citizens to religion and religious organizations, destruction of churches and temples and liquidation of religious structures. This minimized influence of religion on society and resulted in partial or complete decline of some churches, especially ethnic ones (the Armenian Apostolic Church, Moslem and Karaim religious communities).

Rebirth of religious organizations in the late 1980s-early 1990s was attended by adoption of the law on freedom of consciousness and religious organizations and introduction of principles of their equality into public policy.

In the opinion of Ukrainian and international experts, the Ukrainian law in force “On Freedom of Consciousness and Religious Organizations” is one of the most liberal in the world. The document provides conditions for equality of existing religious confessions and opportunities for the exercise of the civil right to freedom of consciousness. Under the law, everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion: this right includes freedom to change his or her religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his or her religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. The restrictions permitted by international human rights law can be invoked in life-threatening emergencies and in situations, which pose a threat to the rights and freedoms of others, or in situations, which threaten public morals, public health, national security and general welfare in a democratic society.

These legal provisions were reflected in indicators of development of the Ukrainian network of religious organization. Since Ukraine’s independence, rapid growth of religious organizations (communities, theological educational institutions, monasteries, missions and congregations) has been observed. In 1991 there were 12,962 registered religious communities. In 1995 and 2000, that number grew to 18,111 and 25,405 religious organizations respectively.

As of January 1, 2005, the State Committee on Religion reported 30,805 officially registered religious organizations, inclusive of 29,587 religious communities, 378 monasteries, 173 theological educational institutions, 298 missions and 75 congregations. There were 27,902 priests, of whom 722 priests were foreigners.

Policy aimed at construction of churches and temples evidences public support to the revival and development of religious organizations in Ukraine. In 2004, the government rendered assistance to building of 369 temples and chapels, 2,445 cult buildings were under construction.

For national minorities in Ukraine, religion is a key element of ethnic self-determination. Revival and reconstruction of ethnic churches are important factors of maintenance of their cultural traditions and national identity.

In Ukraine, there is a trend towards increase of the number of religious organizations of ethnic churches, namely: the Roman Catholic Church (Polish national minority), the Armenian Apostolic Church (Armenian national minority) and the Karaim Church (Karaim national minority). The number of Jewish (Jewish minority), Moslem (Crimean Tatar minority) and other religious organizations is also growing.

As of January 1, 2005, there were 472 registered Moslem communities (in 1992 and 2000, this number amounted to 31 and 343 communities respectively) divided between 4 Spiritual Administrations: the Spiritual Administration of Crimean Moslems, the Spiritual Administration of Ukrainian Moslems, the Spiritual Center of Ukrainian Moslems and independent Moslem communities. The Spiritual Administration of Crimean Moslems has the largest number of communities – 333. Also, there are 7 Moslem theological educational establishments and 5 newspapers.

Dynamic development was typical for the Armenian Apostolic Church (4 registered religious organizations in 1992, 16 – in 2000 and 21 – as of January 1, 2005) and the Karaim Church (2 registered religious organizations in 1992, 4 – in 2000 and 11 – as of January 1, 2005).

There are 251 Jewish communities, 6 Jewish theological educational establishments and 23 periodicals. The Roman Catholic Church is also developing. It has 877 communities, 7 theological educational establishments and 13 periodicals. Though, the Roman Catholic Church experiences the

lack of theological educational establishments training priests, whose number equals 484, including 247 foreigners.

As of December 1, 2005, the State Committee on Religion reported 27,902 priests. 351 religious periodicals and 20,607 cult buildings (including those converted into chapels) were registered.

Dynamic growth of the number of religious organizations under the circumstances of the unsolved property issue and other factors entailed a number of problems, which complicate the religious life of Ukraine and could lead to escalation of religious conflicts.

Major factors of religious conflicts include:

- Property issues, whose solution requires development of both a Public Register of state-owned and communal units subjects to restitution and a procedure for their restitution to religious organizations;
- Interference of political forces with activities of religious organizations.

The above is caused by insufficient regulation of religious area by the law in force and ineffective mechanisms of its application.

Liquidation of the State Committee on Religion in May 2005 and establishment, on its basis, of a respective department at the Ministry of Justice marked an important step of public policy in harmonization of the religious life in the country. These demonstrated Ukraine's advancement towards Europe and its commitment to bring the system of governmental agencies in line with European standards (there are no analogues to the former State Committee on Religion in EU countries).

Public religious policy necessitates consideration of existing problems and application of mechanisms for their settlement. Confrontation between the two largest Christian churches, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy (UOC-MP) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchy (UOC-KP), poses the most serious challenge. Availability of religious conflicts is a key indicator of ineffective policy of the former authorities. This is evidenced by approval of the March 21, 2002 presidential decree "On Urgent Measures for Ultimate Elimination of Consequences of Totalitarian Religious Policy of the Former USSR and Renewal of the Rights of Churches and Religious Organizations", which, however, contained high risks of escalation of religious conflicts in Ukraine. The decree obliged the Cabinet of Ministers to draw up a long-term action program towards renewal of the rights of churches and religious organizations (restitution of state-owned cult buildings). Though, analysis of the document allows a conclusion that the so-called "decree for elections" encouraged the clergy and parish of the UOC-MP and gave preferences to the bloc For United Ukraine concerning the use of the largest religious structure in the country.

The September 27, 2002 Cabinet resolution approved the "Long-Term Action Program on Ultimate Elimination of Consequences of Totalitarian Religious Policy of the Former USSR and Renewal of the Rights of Churches and Religious Organizations". The document provided for development of mechanisms for restitution of a part of religious symbols, literature and documents kept in museum storerooms and archives (!). However, the formulators failed to set up either criteria for distribution of the above property among religious confessions or a procedure for the access to materials or requirements to their storage. The Program also envisaged opportunities for the use of some buildings of the National Kyiv-Pechersk Historical and Cultural Reserve and other outstanding sacral architectural monuments, which made experts conclude about the lobbyist nature of the document in favour of the UOC-MP.

In my viewpoint, the use of the said tools stimulates increase of the number of the centers of the UOC-MP, destruction and decline of cultural and historical monuments. Furthermore, the application of the resolution could do immeasurable harm to historical monuments of Polish, Armenian, Tatar and other minorities.

Therefore, there is the need to revise the above documents and develop legal mechanisms for restitution of cult buildings and property to religious organizations, which would eliminate a major reason for religious conflicts.

Another challenge is deficient legal regulation of activities of religious organizations within the system of theological and penitentiary institutions (especially, ethnic and the so-called small churches).

The law in force “On Freedom of Consciousness and Religious Organizations” was passed in 1993. Over 12 years since its adoption, much has changed in Ukraine: the church has been revived and its social status has been renewed. These drastic changes call for immediate response of lawmakers. It is imperative to improve Ukraine’s legislative.

PACE representatives accentuate the need to simplify the procedure for registration of religious organizations and accelerate restitution of illegally seized property to religious organizations.

Also, there is a dire need to bring some provisions and rules of the law in force on activities of religious organizations in line with international legal and normative acts and Ukraine’s international commitments.

The following issues need legislative solutions:

- Conditions for material and technical support to churches on the part of private persons and organizations through application of tax privileges. Needless to say that tax privileges for donors are provided by legislation of all European countries;
- Regulation of activities of religious organizations in the Armed Forces and introduction of military priests (chaplains) (the same concerns hospitals and rehabilitation establishments at the Ministry of Healthcare);
- Regulation of religious and secular education, first and foremost, instruction of religious ethics based on traditional for Ukraine Christianity harmoniously combined with study of religious traditions of national minorities and other confessions. This rule should be introduced parallel to guarantees of the right of children and their parents to reject the study of the said subjects. Mutual recognition of diplomas of religious and secular educational establishments also needs legal regulation.

Lawmakers should give definitions for “totalitarian sect”, “psycho-cult” and “destructive cult” thereby preventing Ukraine from becoming a testing area for new “White Brotherhoods”.

Experts have repeatedly emphasized the need to secure the right of national minorities to freedom of consciousness in the context of recognition, by the state, of their religious holidays as days off (pursuant to the Labour Code of Ukraine, Christmas, Whitsunday and Easter are declared the days off).

Application of new principles of relations between the state and the church shall provide for responsibility of the latter for shaping social spirituality. The religious life is a key factor of maintenance of national identity and, therefore, religious organizations must act as representatives of national interests in this field.

First and foremost, it is necessary to overcome confrontation between Orthodox churches-bearers of cultural and spiritual identity of the Ukrainian nation and national minorities. Politization of churches and lobbying of interests of some confessions by the higher officials created a source of constant tension and confrontation in society. The search of a dialogue and settlement of inter-confessional relations are challenges of national importance. Active actions of the state on religious conflict prevention and management would encourage favourable environment for the harmonious religious life and development of minority churches in Ukraine.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

The law in force and activities of national authorities, including compliance with Ukraine's international obligations, prove that the state became a consolidating factor of development and satisfaction of minority needs. Public policies towards return, adaptation and re-integration of the deported, development of minority languages and churches contributed to alleviation of interethnic tension, prevention of new conflicts, maintenance of social stability and unity.

Effective mechanisms minimizing potential interethnic conflicts provide for development of the common ideology of national ethnic policy based on new organizational and legal components. This calls for a common vision of the Ukrainian President, government and parliament on guidelines of ethnic policy and tools for its implementation.

Active participation of all power institutions in securing rights and creating conditions for development of national minorities shall also be based on continued monitoring (including efforts of NGOs) and immediate response to violations in this area. The above issues are especially acute within election periods attended by the use of manipulation technologies and could entail artificial escalation of interethnic conflicts.

In view of the upcoming parliamentary elections, there is a possibility that some political forces would stimulate intensification of ethnic conflicts. This statement is based on the following:

- Availability of contradictions, inclusive of interethnic ones, artificially created during the 2004 election campaign. The absence of precedents for responsibility of instigators of electoral fraud or other crimes may aggravate the situation;
- Low electoral threshold for political parties and blocs, which could incite some politicians to provocative actions (including those aimed to foment interethnic violence and hatred) in order to attract votes;
- Insufficient actions of national authorities on mitigating and eliminating some negative factors capable to intensify interethnic or inter-confessional conflicts (especially, issues of land property in the Crimea and restitution of property to religious organizations).

Another disturbing factor is the growing number of political parties belonging to ethnic or confessional by their names and programs (the Party of Hungarians of Ukraine registered on February 17, 2005 and the Democratic Party of Hungarians registered on March 24, 2005). There is a threat that during the election campaign, voters could perceive opposition to these parties as a conflict based on religion or ethnic background. Hence, the Ministry of Justice shall initiate revision of the rules on registration of political parties, whose names, statutes or programs allow concluding that they pertain to religious or minority parties.

In my viewpoint, in order to partially solve the above issues, it is necessary:

- Enhance mechanisms of public control of the electoral process (compliance with the rules of the law in force and ethnic standards) and summary of the election results;
- Revise rules of the law on pre-election propaganda, political advertisement and funding of election campaigns;

- Strengthen mechanisms of legal control of election propaganda, which would minimize manipulation of ethnic issues. It would be expedient to study experience of foreign countries, which apply provisions on responsibility for violation of the electoral law;
- Launch social advertisement campaigns targeted toward increase of self-consciousness of national minorities and prevention of potential ethnic conflicts.

Analysis of risks of the 2006 parliamentary elections and tools for their minimization requires joint efforts of authorities, political parties and public organizations for the purpose of developing mechanisms for application and optimization of the electoral legislation.

Hence, the government shall ensure effective legal control of ethnic and religious violations, especially within election periods. Strict compliance with the law in force and international minority standards will allow minimizing respective risks and offer practical opportunities for harmonious development of national minorities in Ukraine.

Specificity of Ensuring Transparent Government Policy-Making in the Context of Regional Development

By *OLEKSANDR SVERGUNOV*,

Senior Expert, Department of Strategic and Perspective Projects, Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine

Problem definition

Recently Ukraine witnessed a radical change in the attitude of people to government. The people became the initiator and subject of these changes. Given this fact the current governing elite considers itself as really people's government. But such a position envisages a continuous dialogue between the government and nation, readiness to listen and to hear, and, more important, to understand each other in order to improve the life of people and to consolidate the nation.

In the regions the policies of central and local authorities are not always understood by common people and NGO representatives. This opinion is more and more expressed by experts, politicians and in mass media. Thus, this information was publicized at the Ukrainian Municipal Forum in Alushta, in September 2005.¹

The most common problems for Ukrainian people in the regions are as follows: unfeasibility of great expectations, unsatisfactory social policy, inertia in reform implementation and conflicts of interests of many financial groups at the national and regional levels, contradictions between regional government and self-government bodies, changes in legislation that regulates small business, etc. In late 2004, when President Kuchma was in power, 71% of the citizens supported the change in political course. Currently, in November 2005, two thirds of population again believes that the situation develops in wrong direction².

The simplest way to decode the content of Ukrainian policy at regional level is to interpret it as a personal conflict of key Ukrainian political figures in the context of coming-up election. But in this case we exclude the programs of politicians and deal with the election technologies and fight for power. Comparing Ukraine with the advanced democratic countries we come to conclusion that in Ukraine neither political analysis technologies, nor policy communication and implementation mechanisms work; the latter, in our opinion, includes promotion of policy decisions, assessment of implemented measures, and development of new political course.

Policy analysis is a synthesis of information for providing recommendations for policy-making targeted towards customers and based on social values³. In Ukraine, policy recommendations has not become a product of policy analysis yet. Given the main aim of policy analysis to outline policy alternatives required to address social problems⁴, this aim is not actually implemented at regional level. Currently, even synthesis of available research and theories for evaluation of alternatives resolutions and decrees is rather poor. Thus, in Ukraine, one could see, on one hand, an intellectual

¹ *Дружбинський В.* Чи стане Україна державою самоврядних громад? // Дзеркало тижня. – 2005. – 8–14 жовтня. – № 39 (567). – С. 1.

² *Дружбинський В.* Чи стане Україна державою самоврядних громад? // Дзеркало тижня. – 2005. – 8–14 жовтня. – № 39 (567). – С. 1.

³ *Вейсмер Д. Л., Вайнінг Е. Р.* Аналіз політики. Концепція і практика. / Перекл. з англ. І. Дзюб, А. Олійник. – К.: Основи, 2000. – С. 12.

⁴ *Там само.* – С. 14.

need in policy analysis, and on the other hand, an increasing demand of population for clear understanding of the politicians' plans.⁵

Short-sightedness is a general weakness of Ukrainian policy towards regions; it is borne by a lack of time and orientation on individual customers rather than on the society as a whole. There is also a problem of policy implementation. As of today the situation looks like the current policy of new power can become a catalyst of social spirit. This also raises many problems related to the human rights and freedoms, the most important being the problem of dependence of the judicial branch on the executive authorities and business. This influences the national process of regions' consolidation for building united democratic Ukraine as a powerful nation.

As for enhancing the dialogue between different social and political forces both in the centre and in the regions we would like to mention:

- Separation of power from social sector, non-transparency, lack of understanding between power and mass media, dissatisfaction with principles of appointments to key positions at regional level;
- Intricate multi-party system with poor ideological content (there are almost 127 political parties registered in Ukraine), that scatters representation of social interests by parties
- Both the national parliament and parliamentarism in general are neither the factors concentrating social and political interests nor the tools for balancing different points of view (as currently there is only ad-hoc majority, instead of constitutional majority, in the Verkhovna Rada)
- Political process promotes reproduction of bureaucratic and elitist administration
- In long-term prospects, restricted presentation of public interests may lead to a decrease in number of publicly discussed alternatives, and, as a result, in the loss of interior sources for self-development of both power and society in general;
- The civil society representatives are allowed to participate in decision-making at the central and local levels only for consultations, under strict control of the state and administrative bodies.

All the abovementioned problems in establishing and maintaining the dialogue between different social and political forces in Ukraine and the policy of some government bodies impede the national consolidation. That is why for the purpose of assessing an impact of transparent policy on national consolidation it is necessary:

- to define the term "transparent policy" for unified interpretation of the received data;
- to analyze the international experience in the area of transparent policy analysis, communication tools and policy implementation;
- to analyze the situation concerning transparent policy formulation in the context of regional development;
- to seek political options and techniques of policy formulation in the context of both the regional development and national consolidation.

Definition of "transparent policy"

For analysis of transparent policy in Ukraine in the context of regional development we use the term "public", and extend our analysis to nature, policy development process and implementation of action plans of both government and self-government bodies at different levels. On one hand, there are government bodies that approve and implement certain action plans. On the other hand, in the society there are different social groups whose expectations shall be justified by the government. Therefore, "public policy" means programs and priorities of government bodies, as well as tools and

⁵ Дружбинський В. Чи стане Україна державою самоврядних громад? // Дзеркало тижня. – 2005. – 8–14 жовтня. – № 39 (567). – С. 1.

techniques of the program implementation developed by representatives of social groups with expectations of these social groups taken into account.

In everyday life in the society there exists real political competition, the strife of interests, negotiations. All these things have to be analyzed not only inside the society, but also for the society in order to gain public support. That is why, public policy means not appearance of politicians in mass media (in TV and radio broadcasts, newspapers, etc.) for self-advertisement, but consideration of interests of different social groups competing for access to social resources; it also includes analysis of their needs and consultations with them. That is the reason why we consider "transparent policy" a synonym to "public policy".

The current political process often raises the question about nature of relations between the state and society, with mutual development of decisions on important social problems including many aspects discussed in the dialogue, being the top priority. This brings us to the notion of "public sphere" that means the space of public life where society members discuss the issues of mutual interest. Hence, we define "public sphere" as the sphere of public life where public opinion is shaped. The principle of publicity provides democratic control for the government bodies' activities.

The publicity sphere is the social sphere where social thought is shaped and the public control over government is implemented. This is the area where "downstream control" (including public administration, all the state machinery, including the control system) interacts with "upstream control" (including social and political control aimed at providing the civil society with opportunity to supervise over government bodies). At any stage of the democratic nations' life, in its formation and development, this is just public sphere that, as a sphere of dialogue, ensures reliable and efficient implementation of democratic standards and rules in relations between the civil society and government. In contrast to opinion of some political analysts, public policy is not an instrument of opposition in its fight for power. It has different objectives. It is about establishing sustainable and mutually useful relations between civil society and power.⁶

Thus, the transparent policy appears to be closely related to the public involvement in government decision-making. Hence, in our analysis of transparent policy in the context of the regions we discuss ways and results of interaction between the government and public in the course of making vital decisions. The development of transparent policy targeted towards regional needs shall be considered as an inevitable condition for establishing the "participation democracy" that may replace "electoral democracy". Only public participation in decision-making is capable of transforming secret state policy into transparent and accountable public policy. We would like to mention one more characteristic of public policy: it is impossible without a system of various communications between social groups on the goals and objectives of government bodies and local self-government bodies. Therefore, we see clear interrelation of the public policy with another important component of political research, the discussion democracy.

Accordingly, the publicity sphere includes, on one hand, the government bodies that approve specific programs, as well as government activities on implementation of the programs, and, on the other hand, individual social segments whose expectations shall be a reference point for the government programs. In public policy these two parties are linked through a chain of intermediaries: deputies and political parties. The deputies ensure representation of people's expectations in preparation of political decisions. Moreover, political parties, being a special type of NGOs, can provide an outline of real needs and problems of people and articulate those problems in

⁶ *Никовская Л., Якимец В.* Публичная политика в условиях российской трансформации: Доклад на международном семинаре "Центры публичной политики в современной России" (СПб.; Пушкино, 14–15 сентября 2004 г.) // <http://www.novopol.ru/material491.html>

their election programs. Unfortunately, Ukrainian deputies, while performing their public functions, forget about their representative roles, and the parties have proved themselves to be weak players at the political scene. Another mediator in preparation and implementation of government decisions may be trade unions.

In case of electoral democracy the only way for an individual to influence the policy- and decision-making is voting in elections. In advanced democracies (democracies of participation) the mediators between government and society are, on one hand, non-commercial organizations and, on the other hand, various advisory boards under government institutions. Business entities, as well as financial and industrial groups also have a material impact on political decisions. In this case there are two types of "intermediaries": public and non-public; the latter can be considerably better developed and include levers of impact on both deputies and executive bodies, that results in flourishing corruption. The ratio between public and non-public ways of business impact on government is an important indicator of public policy development.

The intermediary mission, necessary for settling conflicts and controversial situations that arise in connection with application of legal provisions into practice, is carried out by various institutions. The judiciary system represents the state, whereas remedial legal organizations acting on behalf of the society vindicate the rights of individual people and supervise over implementation of law by the state. In late 20th century, quasi-judicial institutions like ombudsman appeared.

New links between the state and civil society in formation of transparent policy are as follows:

- scientific community that has to produce up-to-date academic knowledge and to provide sound recommendations (however, these knowledge and recommendations are not the most determinant in practice);
- experts and expert panels;
- persons who take decisions or prepare and lobby draft decisions can make use of academic research expressed by panellists for different purposes:
- for getting objective information in a form of academic recommendations and improving the quality of decisions made;
- for making the decisions more "legitimate" in the eyes of educated people and for strengthening them with references to appropriate academic expertise;
- for veiling real decision-making under ostentatious public discussions, expert assessments, development of alternative draft decision, etc.;
- for obtaining public support of pro-government decisions supported by academic experts;
- for denouncing and cancelling previously-approved decisions (the bright example is a broad use of environmental expertise for this purpose)⁷.

That is the reason why many government (and not only government) institutions began to establish permanent expert panels, their members being approved by competent bodies or officers. Although panellists sometimes (usually rather seldom) undertake expertise of some projects, their main function is to participate in the expert group meetings for discussing socially important issues under the chairmanship of top-manager of profile government institution, in the presence of mass media. Participants of such meetings usually "assume some expert recommendations as the basis". The objective of these meetings, if be considered in the light of purposes for engaging experts, is to "legitimize" in the opinion of educated society not the final decision, but a decision-making process with consideration of a broad range of experts' ideas. Strictly speaking, this approach looks like an imitation of expert activities.

⁷ Сунгуров А. Публичная политика и экспертиза // <http://www.pchela.ru/podshiv/45/public.htm>

We also would like to mention the possible types of expert examination, for example, the interagency examination, the government examination, the parliamentary examination, and examination made by order of some grant foundation or private corporation).

In recent years, great attention has been paid to public examination. The term "public examination" is about the way and manner in which any social segment or group expresses its opinion on the pressing problems; hence, the public examination means social opinion of definite social group formulated in line with the established procedure. The procedure can be established, for example, in a form of public hearings. The difference between this procedure and general public opinion poll is as follows: the hearings' participants are familiar with different points of view, expressed by experts on request of the hearings' facilitators. These points of view are based on professional examination and their impartiality is ensured by independent position of the hearings' facilitators. In other words, the public experts are professionals capable of organizing exposure of opinions of whatever community on specific issue; they are not obligatory the leaders of non-profit NGOs who provide assessments and opinions on behalf of this or that social group.

Theoretically, the coalition of local NGOs can be a facilitator of such public hearings, however, in practice; formation of such NGO coalitions or associations is rather problematic. An expert is always the advisor to somebody who commissions the examination and makes decisions. However, neglecting the creation of legitimate structures for representing civil sector interests, the "quasi-public experts" place themselves under authority of the only legitimate structure, the government bodies.

Thus, having defined the "transparent policy", we would like to discuss the formulation of transparent policy towards regional development in Ukraine.

Analysis of transparent state policy towards the national development

The principle problem at the regional level is uncertainty of the strategy for national development. In Ukraine, participants of public discussions avoid dealing with very important issue of setting strategic priorities of national development.⁸ As of today, there are no integral government policy in any region aimed at strengthening national idea and consolidating the whole population. Moreover, the political analysts emphasize that for the first time since gaining its independence Ukraine feels a lack of the nationwide project and national idea, it has experienced the crisis of national identity that cannot be overcome through political agreements; thus, the crisis persists until politicians try to arrive at a compromise by signing memoranda.⁹ This crisis expands to the regional level, too.

The national idea crisis includes the following:

- the crisis of political system (by now we have no formulated public criteria or objectives for the system transformation);
- the crisis of international relations in political, military and economic areas, as by now we have no clearly defined objectives of Ukraine's participation in the Joint Economic Area, NATO, and EU.
- regional crisis of the national identity;
- the administration crisis of power which remains authoritarian in decision-making;
- the crisis of party system, which is polarized in terms of access to administrative resources and inadequate to new proportional system of elections;
- the economic crisis, as a result of failure to set criteria for the economy development in more broad sense than GDP growth and wages increase;

⁸ Мостова Ю. Україна: Гамлетівський вибір // Дзеркало тижня. – 2005. – 2–8 липня. – № 25 (553). – С. 1.

⁹ Дацюк С. Чи стане Україна цивілізацією, або Кінець національної ідеї // Українська правда. – 2005. – 7 жовтня.

- the crisis of academic science, which is the driving force for the national innovational development, but appeared to be unnecessary for the state and business;
- the crisis of education in the light of integration in European community, as we educate the comprador elite instead of supplying human resources for the national development of Ukraine. The country feels a lack of mechanisms and tools for transforming skills and characteristics of individuals into a productive factor of output that stimulates each individual to self-improvement and to realization of his/her potential;
- the crisis of cultural policy in general and the language policy in particular because of their uncertainty;
- the current crisis of media space, interpretations of current events instead of generation of ideas.

The analysis of main political forces' activities has showed that in Parliamentary elections-2006 political blocs are established due to the bloc leader figures. It is a graphic evidence of the fact that the efforts for national idea formulation and ideological component of elections remain extremely poor. Hence, political responsibility of blocs for the nation's economic development will be weak. The regional problems will be raised at the elections exclusively in the context of winning seats in the Parliament.

Currently, the crisis in the public administration sphere is generally recognized.¹⁰ A lack of comprehensive and fundamental approach to formulation of the country strategy results in formulation of various approaches to the nation development at regional level, and in its turn, this leads to uncertainty among local elites. This uncertainty is transmitted to people. As an example, we would like to remind the controversial statements about the Joint Economic Area in early 2005. People are also discouraged with the government actions to endure legal framework for Ukraine's joining the WTO. In June 2005, the executive branch, particularly, the CMU, failed to provide quality drafting of legislation for joining the WTO, it failed to elaborate even explanations to the laws. This prevented VRU from adoption of necessary decisions, the mass media boosting a public scandal with mutual accusations of the KМУ and VRU leaders in failure to implement Ukrainian policy towards joining the WTO.

The policy of national development can be one of the factors to consolidate Ukrainian regions. An open government policy may be an instrument for implementing high national idea, while the national idea may be attractive for the regions striving to preserve their uniqueness under globalization with the mission to implement nationwide objectives. No great nation can exist without great national idea. In Ukraine, a strategic approach to problems and strategic reform implementation shall be implemented in Ukraine¹¹.

Since recently experts and politicians began to discuss the importance of national idea, which is capable of consolidating all people from all the regions. To make this idea all-national we should articulate it in "nationally acceptable" way, i.e. we need that that the experts call "linguistic convention". It is important that everybody understands the message. It is equally important, that everybody understands the message in the same way. Here, the main point is that those who listen understand adequately what is told. Obviously under the current language situation in Ukraine the language convention of this type is impossible.¹²

¹⁰ Голова Верховної Ради В. Литвин, перебуваючи в серпні 2005 року в Херсоні, сказав, що, на його переконання, сьогодні в Україні наявна "фактична криза управління" і тому потрібно повернути увагу влади до внутрішніх проблем (див.: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/domestic/story/2005/08/050812_lytvyn_govt_criticism.shtml).

¹¹ Борисова Ю. Нова влада і "третій сектор": у бій аналітиків, як і раніше, не беруть // Дзеркало тижня. – 2005. – 1–7 жовтня – № 38 (566). – С. 5.

¹² Елистратов В. С. Национальный язык и национальная идея // http://www.gramota.ru/mag_rub.html?id=54

The same is true for the economic development of Ukraine. Aggravation of economic situation in the country encourages discussing not the CMU-NBU cooperation, but strategic economic course of the government, its goals and methods of implementation.

The macroeconomic situation has a great impact on the national consolidation and situation in the regions. First of all, it deals with employment, wage growth, industry modernization, paying arrears of wages, etc. However, sharp changes in government policy towards customs tariffs and transport tariffs, small and medium business, free economic areas and priority-development areas have resulted in economic instability in Ukraine. The economic growth has slowed down. Mr. Roderigo De Rato, the IMF Mission Director, stated that Ukraine has no coordinated and well-presented open policy towards implementation of the national economic strategy (the IMF Mission led by Mr. De Rato worked in Ukraine between July 25 and August 2, 2005)¹³.

The programs towards the national or regional development can be used as examples of non-transparent policy in Ukraine. Naturally, modern Ukrainian programs are not yet the programs in full sense; they rather represent the sets of political slogans, inasmuch as real programs must be real instruments and have quite another structure. The real programs shall explain what shall be done and in what manner, they also should provide grounds for actions, as well as predict outcomes. To develop such programs the government has to involve political analysts: under democratic system "a bureaucrat" is a synonym to "political analyst". Almost each university both in the EU member states and in the USA has political analysis departments. We have no such departments in Ukraine, but there is an obvious need in them¹⁴. In 2005, the Government had to cancel some of its decisions in public (the petroleum products crisis, meat and sugar crisis, etc.). This means that the government failed to predict and forecast the impact of its decisions, although the experts outlined the necessity to do this.

Among the shortcomings of the current Ukrainian programs we would like to mention their declarative nature. They are formulated not for implementation. There have been neither institutions, legal framework nor infrastructure and trained personnel to implement even best programs in center or in regions. It should be noted that the European Commission traditionally has one tight condition for all the applicants: their transformation programs for joining the EU shall be implemented.

The state as a bearer of national interests shall play a leading role in establishment and continuous improvement of foundations and institutional instruments for implementing transparent regional policy, including individual local projects and programs. However, when the process of democratization is underway, it is more purposeful that the role of regional and local self-governments and NGOs, who are closer to local community interests, shall increase for making regional management more efficient¹⁵.

Among the shortcomings of the institutional provision of transparent government regional policy we would like to mention the absence of institutions (that is, a system of bodies and agencies) capable of implementing the objectives of government regional policy effectively and in coordination with each other. Ukraine feels an acute need in appointing (establishing) the central executive body responsible for regional and local self-government development. This body should focus on the following issues:

- drafting legal and regulatory documents on regional policy and local self-government;
- establishing mechanisms for the state regional policy implementation;

¹³ Див.: 2000 (щотижневик). – 2005. – 12 серпня. – № 32 (280).

¹⁴ Мостова Ю. У колі другому // Дзеркало тижня. – 2005. – 1–7 жовтня. – № 38 (566). – С. 2.

¹⁵ Політика регіонального розвитку в Україні: особливості та пріоритети. Аналітична доповідь. / За ред. З. Варналія. – К.: НІСД, 2005.

- implementing planning-and-forecasting mechanisms of the regional development, coordination of elaboration of regional and target regional programs;
- undertaking comprehensive monitoring of social and economic development of the regions;
- carrying out expert examination of decisions on sectoral development (clarifying the decisions' impact on regional development and inter-regional disproportions); and on coordination of the local self-government building;
- laying foundations for the administrative and territorial reform, and reform implementation;
- legal and regulatory, as well as methodological support of inter-regional and trans-boundary cooperation, etc.¹⁶.

Analysis of lawmaking activity and the politicians' compliance with legal propositions in the context of regional development

The absence of systematic legal and regulatory framework is an essential obstacle for transparent government policy towards the regions. Many issues of the regional policy are not legally regulated.¹⁷

For many experts it is clear that Ukraine essentially needs the Laws "On the President", "On the central executive bodies", on harmonization of political reform with applicable legislation and implementation of political reform, on changing relations between the regions and the center, all these laws being of paramount importance for the nation. The nation's success very much depends on the transparency and rationality of the system of power in it¹⁸. We feel a need in clear limitation of responsibilities and the scope of the bodies, structures and branches of power.¹⁹

The regions complain for imperfect laws. But we have the laws that were elaborated and approved by politicians. Currently, the bill drafting is accompanied with underdeveloped political competition. Hence, today many politicians suggest shifting from discussions about bills to political discussions, including problems, alternative solutions and implications. However, it should be noted that Ukraine has moved much forward in political correctness, as today all the parties in political struggle recognize the legitimacy of their competitors and opponents. This is a big progress in transparent policy formulation.

Ambitious personal interests of politicians expressed at public level and damaging the government image, hinder the abovementioned process. This is true for both central and regional authorities. Under these conditions one could observe positive tendencies in transparent policy development, but their free development requires active contribution from both broad public circles and government institutions.

Analysis of government policy towards administrative and territorial reform in the context of regional development and national consolidation

The Constitution of Ukraine, adopted in 1996, provides for operation of bodies of different nature at the oblast and rayon levels, namely, the oblast and rayon state administrations and oblast and rayon radas (councils). This administrative structure has proved its inefficiency because of vague distribution of responsibilities between those bodies²⁰.

¹⁶ Там само.

¹⁷ Там само.

¹⁸ Мостова Ю. У колі другому // Дзеркало тижня. – 2005. – 1–7 жовтня. – № 38 (566). – С. 2.

¹⁹ Борисова Ю. Нова влада і "третій сектор": у бій аналітиків, як і раніше, не беруть // Дзеркало тижня. – 2005. – 1–7 жовтня – № 38 (566). – С. 5.

²⁰ Політика регіонального розвитку в Україні: особливості та пріоритети. Аналітична доповідь. / За ред. З. Варналія. – К.: НІСД, 2005.

One of the basic requirements to Ukraine as an applicant for the EU membership is to decentralize its system of public administration. One of preconditions to decentralization is to involve public into decision-making at local level. Ukraine's independence provides all the preconditions for community to participate in solution of such important issues, as plans for development of regions, towns and villages. This is envisaged by the Constitution of Ukraine, the European Charter of Local Self-Government, ratified by Ukraine in 1997²¹, and by Ukrainian Law on the Local Self-Government as well²².

However, as of today, the process of self-government model implementation, which envisages active participation of local community in self-government, has many shortcomings and is non-transparent. The shortcomings of regional development include the absence of effective mechanisms of public involvement into planning of regional development. As a result, the contradictions arise between central and local authorities. During 2005, active preparation to the administrative and territorial reform was carried out; this reform is aimed at improvement of public administration system at both regional and local levels and provides for decentralization and development of local self-government.

Currently, the deputies are discussing the bill, which proposes to introduce administrative and territorial reform, according to which a community has to make up 5 thousand of people, a rayon, at least, 70 thousand, an oblast how many as it comprises. An oblast center, which is bigger than 750 thousand people, shall be considered a city-region, i.e. a separate subdivision within the oblast. According to data of the State Statistics Committee, as of September 1, 2005, the population of Ukraine amounted to 47,034 thousand people, including 31,881 thousand people who live in cities, and 15,153 thousand inhabitants of rural regions. Currently, Ukraine has 28,585 villages, and only 90 of them may be classified as big villages with population over 5,000 thousand. Only 73 among 490 regions comply with the requirements set in the proposed bill, while only 74 cities of the oblast subordination among total amount of 178 satisfy the requirements for this category of administrative units. Obviously, the reform has to change the territorial and administrative structure of the country radically. The bill envisages creation of four thousand self-governed communities. However, the rules of urban development supported with international practice has showed that such a megapolis as Kyiv has a range of influence of more than 50 km. It means that all the settlements within this range depend on Kyiv and are closely related to it. The range of influence of the oblast cities is around 30 km, rayon centers influencing the territory within the range of 10 km²³. This means that only consideration of this factor makes all the administrative changes successful, insofar as Ukraine is very exposed to unemployment, bad roads and a lack of public transport. The administrative and territorial reform shall promote the optimal development of regional economic potential, and increase the production efficiency and social standards in all regions. If those indices are low, then it is useful to increase the territory potential via involvement of new territorial components. However, as of today the, integral economic strategy of Ukraine remains ambiguous and has not been discussed publicly. New laws and regulations ensuring the reform implementation have not been adopted. The government has not outlined main strategic objectives of its policy for shaping an approach to administrative and territorial reform. Obviously, it is impossible to compare the settlements located in close vicinity to the big city and in a hundred kilometres from it. The first category of settlements does not require hospitals, culture centers and other cultural institutions, while the second group of settlements has a vital need in them.

²¹ Див.: Європейська хартія місцевого самоврядування.

²² Див.: Закон України "Про місцеве самоврядування в Україні".

²³ Дружбинський В. Чи стане Україна державою самоврядних громад? // Дзеркало тижня. – 2005. – 8–14 жовтня. – № 39 (567). – С. 1.

The analysis of local self-government has showed that local radas have neither driving forces nor incentives for development. Under the current legislation a greater part of local budgets is fulfilled through transfers from the central Budget.

People would like to elect local authorities by themselves. Both the town and village heads can be either party members or independent figures. They should not depend on party leader and should be accountable to people only for their actions. That is the reason why the bill suggests that elections to local radas in the regions will be free of party lists.

The numerous facts prove a negative attitude in the regions towards administrative and territorial reform. In June 2005, in Luhansk, public discussion of the law on territorial system in Ukraine was held, where representatives of seven regions participated, including Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhyya, Luhansk, Poltava, Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts²⁴. Comments on this event in mass media present many negative opinions.

In Luhansk oblast, a working group has developed a new system of territorial and administrative division in the oblast. Instead of 18 regions and 14 cities of the oblast subordination, uniting 938 settlements and 339 radas acting in those settlements, the experts suggested establishing 11 cities with adjacent regions and 8 separate regions. This plan provides for transition of three cities (towns) of the oblast subordination to communities with simultaneous liquidation of 10 regions. Instead of 300 radas it is proposed to establish 136 communities. Luhansk itself, as the city with adjacent regions, will consist of 7 communities.

In Kharkiv, in July 2005, the hearings devoted to the administrative and territorial reform proved that the Oblast State Administration (OSA) leaders have intention to support this reform. Under leadership of the OSA, new maps of each settlement were developed based on the analysis of various criteria, from the demographic rates to industrial indices. According to the recommendations, Kharkiv historical lands will obtain the status of Kharkiv region, while Kharkiv will become the regional city. The draft suggests creating two rayon-cities in the oblast, namely, Lozova and Kupiansk, and 14 regions. The borders of four of them, namely, Derhachiv, Zmiiv, Balakley and Iziium will remain unchanged, the rest being likely to be established by means of re-division²⁵. Nevertheless, neither communities nor common people in Kharkiv oblast seem to have any idea about the coming-up administrative reform. People are afraid of the reform and protest against it. Local journalists repeat over and over again that if the local authorities do not begin explaining why the reform is necessary, then in course of reform implementation they will face a series of active protests.²⁶

After the abovementioned hearings, O. Shapoval, the head of Kharkiv Oblast State Administration, has remarked: "In Poland the reform lasted almost 20 years. We want to pass this way in a very short period of time. In my opinion, this is a mistake. I would rather prefer to implement it during some longer period". Here is another important his statement: "I was asked by almost 10 city heads from Kharkiv Oblast: "Where is our place in that system?" This proves that even local elite leaders have no idea about the goals and objectives of the administrative and territorial reform as they are not involved into the reforming process"²⁷.

New administrative and territorial division involves many challenges, including the financial problems. The reform is likely to be implemented the administrative manner. In Poland, it cost Euro

²⁴ Ногтенко Т. Луганський "одобрямс" у деталях // Україна і світ. – 2005. – 24–30 червня. – № 24 (343). – С. 7.

²⁵ Семків В. "Вот, новий поворот..." // Дзеркало тижня. – 2005. – 30 липня. – № 29 (557). – С. 3.

²⁶ Там само.

²⁷ Там само.

12 billion granted by the EU²⁸. In July 2005, Mr. Bezsmertny, the Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine, announced that administrative and territorial reform in Ukraine requires some US \$4.5 billion at the expense of consolidated budget plus overheads in each individual region of the country.²⁹

In addition to non-transparency and groundlessness of the reform, there are problems with involvement of local self-governments in the territorial development. The Autonomous Republic of the Crimea could be an example of inconsistent and non-transparent government policy, as it tends to do things without involvement of local and regional public.³⁰

It looks like implementation of the Crimea Seashore Program will become a subject of stormy debates for more than one month, including the pre-election period. For one part of politicians this program will be a slogan and promise of prosperous life, investments inflow and bright future. For other politicians it will serve as a pretext to remind about embezzlement of public property, environmental Apocalypse and struggle for power and re-division of property against a background of different political courses of the center and the Autonomous Republic.

All the main components of “The Crimea Seashore” were discussed many times; its components are as follows: comprehensive construction of tourist centers on the seashore between Alushta and Sudak and in steppes, deserted in business sense; effective use of spa resources; modernization of infrastructure; overhaul of the roads, and upgrading of tourist services. Some of those components are partially envisaged to be implemented within the framework of other state programs (for example, “Program on the Evpatoria and Southern Crimea Spa Resorts Development”, “Program on the Crimea Sustainable Development”). Despite the fact that “The Crimea Seashore” Program was developed within the Council of Ministers of the Crimea, its concept is taken by many people as non-transparent, introduced from outside and unrealistic. Some people laugh of this concept, as it requires investments of US \$15-20 billion; other people are frightened by its controversial nature and thoughtlessness.

Long-term development programs of the territories cannot be produced by limited groups of people. One of the regional weaknesses is failure to discuss and take decisions keeping the balance between regional and central interests. Under the auspice of the Verkhovna Rada there exists the Advisory Board on local self-government issues. It’s worth mentioning that this Advisory Board is a collegial body, uniting 27 representatives from the regions, heads of the Oblast radas and mayors. All of them represent local self-government bodies. Today, meaningful position of that figures may contribute much to both policy formulation and implementation, and to economic development of the regions and Ukraine as a whole.

In September 2005, the forum of local self-government representatives that incorporated more than 400 heads of town, settlement and village councils outlined that government institutions responsible for reforms do not always participate in public events related to solving issues of local and regional development.

Therefore, the administrative and territorial reform has now several issues standing before it:

- a lack of in-depth analysis of reform-making policies on the regional level available;
- a lack of legal or legislative measures for its implementation adopted;
- a lack of financial and material provision allocated for implementing the reform.

²⁸ Дружбинський В. Чи стане Україна державою самоврядних громад? // Дзеркало тижня. – 2005. – 8–14 жовтня. – № 39 (567). – С. 1.

²⁹ <http://nrcu.gov.ua/index.php?id=4&listid=17202>

³⁰ Самар В. Кувейт? Монако? Лас-Вегас? Нью-Васюки? // Дзеркало тижня. – 2005. – 30 липня. – № 29 (557). – С. 3.

At the regional level the discussion is about the system of local government rather than about the administrative and territorial reform. An excessive concentration of power has led to the concentration of tremendous authority in the hands of the Executives, local state administrations, and this directly contravenes the European Chart of Local Self-government.³¹

In Ukraine, it should be necessary to review draft acts that change or streamline the system of local self-government. This would provide an impetus to regional development. Under conditions of the land relations reform, inasmuch as the legislation regulating the mechanism of appropriation of state lands, their transfer to private ownership and registration of land-related transactions remains imperfect, the administrative and territorial reform should be implemented with utmost caution, otherwise, it will result not only in failure to assure consolidation of the regions, but also in social crisis.

Assessment of Governmental Human Resource Policies in Respect of Regional Administrations

The legislation establishes a procedure for nominating chairs of regional state administration (the Law of Ukraine on State Administrations). At the same time, it is impossible to control in democratic manner the procedure of regional state administration chairs nomination which sometimes is extremely opaque. Conflicts between elected local mayors and representatives of regional state administrations have been reported. These conflicts are followed with political and legal pressure on mayors and with their dismissal from office. The relevant government institutions should be more careful in selecting more efficient and qualified regional personnel who would be driven in their work with a true patriotism rather than with some clan interests.

Ongoing personnel rotation in the regions leads to losses in the regional management system. Notwithstanding the declared promises of transparent human resource policies, heads of regional institutions are nominated without any explanation whatsoever as to why those specific individuals were entrusted with their respective issues or directions. The opacity of the human resource policy of the executive bodies at the regional level becomes a fertile ground for the development of corruption.

The complexity of situation with corruption in Ukraine is witnessed by the corruption rate published in 2005 by Transparency International. This corruption rate is actually "a poll of the polls" as it reflects national corruption level estimates by business entities and analysts, both residents of specific country and from abroad. The total absence of corruption is scored as 10 while the absolute corruption is estimated as 0. Consequently, the higher level of corruption is, the lesser indicator gets. According to this report, Ukraine ranked a bit higher in the rating, its 2005 indicator making 2.6 against 2.2 in the previous year. In this year's rating, Ukraine ranked 107 among 158 countries³². Rather than liquidating poverty, corruption, on the contrary, works only to increase it. Transparency International recommends low-waged countries to focus all of their efforts and resources onto fighting against corruption, accumulating a stronger will in anticorruption measures and assuring transparency in providing public access to information about budgets, incomes and expenditures insofar as this will create preconditions for changing situation for the better in future.

During the course of the public hearings on Reasons of Corruption in Ukraine and Ways of Combating It held April 11th, 2005, in Kherson, it was discovered that an acute struggle for the power has at all levels attained a marked priority over the fight against corruption. At those

³¹ Дружбинський В. Чи стане Україна державою самоврядних громад? // Дзеркало тижня. – 2005. – 8–14 жовтня. – № 39 (567). – С. 1.

³² <http://www.proua.com/news/2005/10/19/034858.html>; Інвестгазета. – 2005. – 25–31 октября. – № 43 (520). – С. 7.

hearings, two tendencies, two approaches towards overcoming public corruption became evidently clear; the first represented a tendency towards unbiased, businesslike and European-style efficient review of the issue using means proper for public associations, the Executives and the Legislature. The other concerned a tendency towards using the anticorruption topic for raucous and scandalous struggle for group and individual power.³³

Meanwhile, the majority of citizens of Ukraine (47% of the respondents) believes that regional state administration chairs should be publicly elected via the general elections procedure, and only 25% respondents are convinced that these should be nominated by the President of Ukraine. This is well within the results of the public opinion poll held by the Ukrainian Institute of Social Researches and the Social Monitoring Centre in May 2005. A considerable proportion of the respondents deemed it more feasible to elect people's deputies to the Verkhovna Rada only on the majority basis (one parliament member representing one constituency). The system was favoured by 35% respondents.

In addition, professional career of some government representatives must not depend on party or coalition-related accords. The legislative and regulatory framework of the fight against corruption shall be immediately improved. Combating of corruption within the society requires the policy towards enhancing transparency in selecting, training and appointing top managing staff.

A low quality of personnel training is another issue of paramount importance for all levels of transparent regional policy implementation. Increasing the number of professionals and improving quality of vocational training of managers for regional and local tiers of administration remain an important precondition for strengthening regional and local development capacities and their efficient use.³⁴ This requires creation and development of a relevant network of training institutions and centres.

Assessment of Transparent Policy in Respect of Government Actions Concerning Business Matters

A lack of transparent regional development policy in the 1990s led not only to growing disproportions and aggravating economic and social issues, but also to a considerable economic and public-political disintegration of the nation.³⁵

In spite of mass media democratisation, first signs of openness in government's actions, and isolated reforms, Ukraine still feels a lack of the most important component, an economic breakthrough and an abrupt increase of investment inflow in the regions (at least, as of October, 2005). On the contrary, last November marked foreign capital outflow in four regions, national capital outflow nine regions of Ukraine. The investors are still waiting for the power to show how it will resolve their problems related to cancelled free trade and former priority development areas next year.

No assemblies for assessing regional performance and local management's actions have been held on the central government level. Vulnerability points for the regions include regulation of land relations, social agendas implementation and combating hidden economy. Forceful administrative steering of the economy has finally led to a number of systemic and industry-specific crises.³⁶

³³ http://www.intellect.org.ua/index.php?lang=u&material_id=53744&theme_id=7252

³⁴ Політика регіонального розвитку в Україні: особливості та пріоритети. Аналітична доповідь. / За ред. З. Варналія. – К.: НІСД, 2005.

³⁵ Там само.

³⁶ http://www.prezident.gov.ua/news/data/1_4029.html

According to the report of Cato Institute on World's Economic Freedom in 2005, in the current year's economic freedom rating Ukraine ranked 103 among 127 countries gaining 4 positions compared to 2004 and, thus, receiving 5.5 points (as per the 10-point scale). The notion of "economic freedom" in that survey was based on four assumptions: individual selection of interests is higher than the group one; exchange (of goods, works, services, money etc.) is performed on a free market with minimum involvement of political and administrative leverage; free entry to the market and undistorted competition; protection of individuals and private property. According to Cato Institute's experts, the higher the level of economic freedom in country, the more advanced its economy and public welfare.³⁷

Starting in early 2005, many citizens of Ukraine, including businessmen, expected more transparent policies implemented in key fields of the national economy; privatisation is anticipated to be more transparent, fiscal policy to be more rational, reforms in the power and municipal utilities and economy sectors to be restored, and serious efforts to bring entrepreneurship out of shadow to be made. However, the struggle for power, property redistribution and desire to win 2006 elections are potentially controversial to the intention of economy liberalisation. That resulted not only in a decrease in investments, but also in socio-political tensions in the regions; e.g., staff workers of Nikopol Ferroalloy Works, Azot etc. enterprises in Nikopol, Severodonetsk and other towns went on protest against changing owners. The analysis of the economy management policy in Ukraine attests to its insufficient transparency. It was stated in early 2005 that all enterprises that had been illegally denationalised will get back their State-owned status. Consequently, frightened investors cut on their investments in the Ukrainian economy by 35% (against the previous year). Against such background, it is hardly surprising that whatever investors' forums and other promo actions held since were doomed.

On May 25, 2005, the Forum on Regulatory Policy as a Precondition for Openness and Transparency of the Power took place. The forum participants, including representatives of business associations, individual businessmen, heads of the central and local executive bodies, local bodies, representatives of international organisations and leading scholars of Ukraine, acknowledged a multitude of issues artificially set by the government and hindering business development in Ukraine. One of these barriers concerns unsubstantiated, not public and frequent intervention of the government in business matters. The forum was aimed at continuing the dialogue between the government and businessmen as regards development of strategy of the state economic regulatory policy development in Ukraine. It was also intended to draw attention of stakeholders to the need in a strict compliance with legally established regulatory policy-related provisions and principles. Whenever a state wants to regulate pricing on the commodities market, it means the state regulation of market formation. It is just at this stage the state may undertake regulatory actions because of creating favourable conditions for market establishment. In other words, the state must provide favourable tariffs and taxes, as well as framework conditions for imports and exports, establish processing benefits, and supervise over product distribution. These are the only issue the state might take for itself.

"A transparent government policy on timely VAT refund" is one of the headaches of entrepreneurs in all regions. The government has promised to do it so long ago: in 2005, it promised to reimburse VAT to grain traders, etc. However, VAT remains intact; the companies sustain losses, damages and insolvency. No discrimination in VAT refund between either small, medium or big business is allowed. If otherwise, it is a breach of the Constitution and must be filed to the court.

In addition to VAT refund, the regions have also raised the question of abolishing this tax altogether. A country with export-oriented economy does not need VAT which only puts brake on

³⁷ <http://www.korrespondent.net/main/130740>

its development. Under conditions, when a bigger portion of the gross domestic product is sold abroad, VAT refund is an inefficient and opaque economic policy.

The most urgent issues of separating business from the power remain in the focus of attention of Ukrainian NGOs, individual analysts and researchers. Business associations are not very active in working with the regional tier of government; meanwhile, the majority of issues arising between entrepreneurs and the government may be resolved at the regional level. The Council of Entrepreneurs under the Cabinet of Ministers has failed to provide every region with a real representative of its respective business community. Businessmen should be more proactive in promoting prospects of Ukraine's WTO accession among the public speaking openly of potential risks in certain sectors and overall benefits for Ukraine in general. For example, the national metallurgic sector will only benefit from Ukraine's accession to the WTO.

A transparent government policy in the field of economy may increase investments in the regions of Ukraine, consolidate the nation, provide a considerable increase of the living standards of the population, and reform regional political and economic frameworks. The analytical report on the Regional Development Policies in Ukraine, their Specific Features and Priorities outlines that to enhance the statehood of Ukraine, it is necessary to establish a single economic complex, to efficiently utilize local resources, benefits of labour territorial distribution and to prevent any conflicts of political, economic or inter-ethnic origin. All these factors must be assured by the regional policy as a component of the national policy. A lack of transparent policy of the central government rather than individual strive of regional leaders towards economic and political sovereignty was a reason for aggravating disintegration trends after the 5-year economic growth.³⁸

Some Communication Issues of Transparent Policy Shaping

All activities related to pursuing transparent policies should be clear for every individual citizen. A transparency of government policy depends on horizontal and vertical communications between government institutions. Experts insist that Ukrainian political figures in their fight for power only harm themselves by destroying one another without suggesting any positive change for the public. The more negative image a politician has, the lesser chances to win public trust he/she has. The countries of Western Europe, having gone through hundreds of election campaigns, have learned these regularities quite well. Meanwhile, in Ukraine only some politicians are able to see any connection between their own behaviour and its political repercussions. For example, regular public criticism by the Ministry of Economy of NBU's currency exchange policies within the first semester of 2005 not only proved problems in communications between these two central executives, but also destabilised the currency market agitations in the regions of Ukraine. Still, Ukrainians must learn the experience of those who's already been past this. Therefore, the issue of shaping transparent horizontal and vertical communications between governmental institutions remains an important task to be solved.

Various executives' insiders have unleashed an internal struggle between themselves; on top of that, currently there is a lack of sufficient political support of the government in the Parliament. This limits the terms of reviewing draft legislative acts proposed by the Cabinet. Risks related to political instability and inefficient political decisions-making remain exceedingly high in Ukraine.

Leaders of the central government comprise an unstable coalition of varied political forces often unable to agree between themselves on issue of policies and distribution of powers. These dissimilarities may become even more acute with the coming-up parliamentary elections and

³⁸ Політика регіонального розвитку в Україні: особливості та пріоритети. Аналітична доповідь. / За ред. З. Варналія. – К.: НІСД, 2005.

unleashing debates around amending the Constitution.³⁹ This is how Julia Mostovaya. A journalist and reviewer, puts it: 27 regional leaders pursue 27 state policies today, each driven by his own common sense and capacities. And this is not their fault, it's the problem of the central government who, first of all, has not decided on its priorities yet, and secondly, has never tried to set up a tasking and communication system based on regular tactic and systemic-strategic frameworks.⁴⁰

On the one hand, political leaders in the regions may take deliberate decisions based on analytic information. On the other hand, ideas, opinions from all sectors of society, both private and public, should be accumulated to support any effective political management, which is directly accountable to the people. Without this the politicians will be forced to bear on their own shoulders the burden of policy elaboration. It fully ignores the conditions in existence and not satisfies needs of all strata of society. Thus, the public policy turns out to be the sphere where the process of political communication is realized. In Ukraine, the authorities not only avoid consulting with society, but moreover, they try not to inform even local radas about considerable amount of their decisions. For instance, an appointment of district militia officers is performed without participation of local radas⁴¹. But as early as 1996, chiefs of militia administrations, Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Tax Administration were appointed in Kyiv after obligatory coordination with the city authorities. Nowadays these officials are appointed without any coordination with representatives of local communities.⁴²

If to use the same approach to recommendations in communicative political process, as to other results of political analysis, it is unlikely, that it will be possible to cover all audience. That is why; the political analysis is the beginning, but not the ending of political communication. And it's turned out to be an important condition, that it is necessary to develop both functioning and alternative strategies of communicative policy in the regions. However, a presentation of lines and concepts in politics is frequently accompanied by a minimal methodological expert examination, superficial acquaintance with fact of the matter under conditions of time deficit for holding of public meetings and limited confidence of the audience in the politicians. In this case public communication adapts itself to the audience. It is achieved thanks to recognition of other information needs and their correlation with the material; rejection of unnecessary subsidiary information; more focusing on conclusions, than on methods; giving of information by a trustworthy person; showing of sensitivity to time limitations; refusal of technical language or slang; disposition of bearing components according to the expectations of possible critics; use of visual demonstrations, in order to simplify information and to guarantee comprehension of the main items⁴³.

Recently new strategic direction in communication has been developing. It is based on combination of mass communication technology with technology of rational scientific discussion of public policy. The core of it is to develop deliberate process, i.e. mass consultations process for socially important problems inside the country, and to get more people to take part in elaboration of public policy. Such an innovation in development of public policy is a result of perception of scantiness in traditional expert researches for preparation of promising and optimal decisions while stakes are high and elite made mistakes in interpretation of public mind time and again.

Within the framework of such new strategy of communication round table discussions for top officials are carried out for formation of scenario of public policy evolution; "projects of public

³⁹ *Мостова Ю.* У колі другому // Дзеркало тижня. – 2005. – 1–7 жовтня. – № 38 (566). – С. 2.

⁴⁰ *Там само.*

⁴¹ *Дружбинський В.* Чи стане Україна державою самоврядних громад? // Дзеркало тижня. – 2005. – 8–14 жовтня. – № 39 (567). – С. 1.

⁴² *Там само.*

⁴³ *Dunn W. N.* A Look inside Think Tanks // <http://www.cipe.org/e21/dunE21.html>

dialogues” are initiated in a partnership with different organizations throughout the country so as to discuss public policy; to work together with public and trade union organizations over research orders and to elaborate, for example, alternative budget; to make public opinion polls and to develop new technologies, which permit to determine rating and significance of advantages in system of preferences; to hold municipal meetings of citizens, concerning problems of reformation of representational state institutions and even amendments to the Constitution included.

This allows the elite and the people to comprehend more neatly the instancy and scale of changes. Naturally, this new approach doesn't replace traditional methods of work, such as fulfilment of researches by order, holding of seminars and conferences, publishing of newspapers and magazines. At the same time, analysts are becoming aware of the fact, that scrupulous political analysis is a result of joint intellectual solution and social cooperation.

Specific links in mutual relations of the state and public society, which contribute to forming of transparent policy, are mass media, which are responsible for realization of public communication function. Mass media are priceless instruments in making public mind and public policy. Nevertheless, according to experts' estimations, mass media don't always realize their function in the regions.

Problem zones of communication sphere in Ukraine are, on the one hand, inadequate explanatory work of the authorities with regard to their actions and decisions; in particular in the regions state power use insufficiently information technologies to acquaint the people with its activity, intentions and plans, and finally with made decisions. On the other hand, public opinion has a little effect on actions of politicians. At the same time, it's the fact, that the process of creation of permanent relations between the authorities and the public has been intensified in Ukraine.

On importance of analytic centres and nongovernmental organizations in forming of public policy

Today, importance of analytic centres and NGO in forming of public policy regarding the regions is recognized practically by all political powers in Ukraine. Ideas of cooperation and dialogue between Ukrainian analytic centres, aimed at real influence upon public policy, and governing elite, which are occupied with actual realization of policy in life, were considered more than once both by the authorities and intellectual elite of Ukraine. For instance, this question was discussed as long as in 2000, at All-Ukrainian conference “Ukrainian brain centres and government: initiative – dialogue – cooperation”.

However, mechanisms of inculcation in reality of researches results of analytic centres and nongovernmental organizations are not worked through. NGO have actual analytic documents (draft laws; projects of alterations to the legislation in force; programmes; analytic reports; deep investigations of existent problems in the state and society and certain proposals for their resolving), which they are intended to present for realization to new authorities⁴⁴. Usually, native analysts keep in the centre of attention the most critical political and public problems of the day (starting from realization of administrative-territorial reform, separation of the business and the power up to struggle with HIV/AIDS epidemic, tuberculosis, smoking etc.)

Moreover, under conditions of development of information-oriented society the importance of analytic centres and nongovernmental organizations expands permanently. In countries with developed democracy the analysis, communication and decision-making process are the fields of direct activity of analytic centres and NGO. Just thanks to analytic centres and nongovernmental

⁴⁴ Борисова Ю. Нова влада і "третій сектор": у бій аналітиків, як і раніше, не беруть // Дзеркало тижня. – 2005. – 1–7 жовтня – № 38 (566). – С. 5.

organizations the sphere of public policy could vindicate its right for existence in the form of main realm for working out of legislative and executive political decisions concerning regional policy.

The areas of functional activity of Ukrainian analytic centres, which touch upon interests of the regions, include several directions.

Inner-party researches. Big political parties in Ukraine frequently establish own task forces for elaboration of their policy. In some cases parties may use services of NGO. Usually, parties make an order for evaluation of socio-political atmosphere in the regions and in Ukraine as a whole, analysis of electorate situation, state of regional mass media etc. But the results of these party researches are not published, as a rule, and are used only for developing their own policy.

Researches and political planning in governmental bodies. Various institutions, which function as analytic centres, are in existence at the governmental bodies (at the government, Verkhovna Rada, Secretariat of President of Ukraine, ministries and agencies). But ultimately all of these institutions are under tutelage of politicians. The legislature establishment is guided more often by information, which is provided by academicians (scientists) and branch researches for decision making with regard to current social problems, including those of regional nature. That is corresponds with world practice, in fact in different countries from time to time new ideas come out universities as well⁴⁵.

Corporative advisers. Researches and analytic works of analytic centres in the sphere of regional markets or projects related to business are used actively by profitable enterprises of Ukraine. Nevertheless the researches of a kind usually give a little advantage to politicians.

Education and scientific institutions. Groups, created at such establishments, conduct academic researches most of all. In Ukraine a lot of scientific works are published. But these materials are used nowhere except in developing of academic debate and they have, accordingly, small influence on politicians.

Educational groups occupy specific place in Ukraine. Generally they work on foreign grants basis, which are given by the countries of developed democracy. To influence at public policy they use such instruments as conferences, working meetings, books and articles, intercommunion with mass media. However this activity is not aimed at working out of certain political decisions, but at scientific guidance of debate, and at forming of views of future leaders as well.

To form a transparent policy the authorities or some political leaders may actually use “strategic combinations” of all of these institutions for diversification of decision making process and finding of the most deliberate decision amongst all the rest possible.

Nowadays, however, the ideas emerged from one or another public political proposal are even more often caused by a competition between the new centres of influence, so the debate concerning their possible consequences is brought, as a rule, to disputes between them.

Today, the role of analytic centres becomes more important, than ever. Practically there is no important question for life of the country, which would not be arranged and developed by the analytic centres. These centres of public society have an influence on all aspects of public life in the developed countries thanks to their ability to generate principal ideas, which underlie the basis of the state policy. Therefore the typical disadvantage for Ukraine is inability of some representatives of the governing elite to formulate efficiently tasks for analysts and to use the results of their

⁴⁵ http://xyz.org.ua/discussion/thnk_tnk3.html

analysis⁴⁶. It is necessary to realize in Ukraine the idea about cooperation and dialogue between the analytic centres and the government.

It is confirmed in mentioned analytic report “Policy of Regional Development in Ukraine: peculiarities and priorities”, that the essential condition for effective realization of the state regional policy is an enlargement of network of nongovernmental organizations, which are directed at the assistance in regional and local development. Such organizations are able to raise the role and responsibility of territorial communities, private entrepreneurs and every citizen for the development of their territories, to guarantee them the real participation and influence at making of solutions of important problems of regional and local development⁴⁷.

Summary and propositions

1. Despite the fact that in Ukraine there are many weaknesses in formation and fulfilment of transparent policy regarding development of the regions, positive tendencies in its forming become evident as well. More active and transparent became mass media, where problem questions of development of the state and society are discussed. Thus, the main condition of existence of any democratic state, the freedom of information, now works. Without the transparency of actions of the authorities there is not a smallest chance for the community to build the democracy. Along with the freedom of speech in Ukraine appeared the freedom of public discussions. Activities became more intense for organization of conferences, round-table discussions, seminars, where are discussed problems of development of Ukraine and its regions in particular, search of ways to consolidation of the nation above regions is carried on.

Party organizations and institutions of local governing started to form transparent active position with regard to development of the regions. The government, realizing the significance of the regions, decided to establish governmental committee for regional policy.

2. Weak point in ensuring of transparent policy in the context of development of the regions is the problem of analysis of regional policy. At a legislative level there is no precise delimitation of powers between the central authority, authority of regions and institutions of local governing, which leads to appearance of groundless decisions or irresponsible public declarations of politicians. For instance, it refers to forming of budgets. Characteristic feature is the fact that goals of public policy and local communities of regions are not always coincide. It refers to priority of accomplishment of regional programmes. It is significant that there is no coordinated transparent policy of the central power regarding the regions. Structures of the current Ukrainian power (central, regional and local) are separated, not consolidated for carrying out of regional policy.

For creation of transparent state policy, which would consolidate and develop the regions, it is necessary to take care of regulating of the system of power itself, namely: to pass laws about President, Cabinet of Ministers, the central bodies of executive power, laws and other regulations for implementation of the coordinated political reform, revision of relations between the centre and the regions, as well as to consider draft laws about alterations to the Constitution of Ukraine as regards powers of institutions of local governing.

3. Communication by the line central power – regions – people is weak. State authorities do not use enough informational technologies in the regions for acquaintance with their activity, intentions and plans, with mechanism of decision making. It is quite clear that under existing conditions the people

⁴⁶ Борисова Ю. Нова влада і "третій сектор": у бій аналітиків, як і раніше, не беруть // Дзеркало тижня. – 2005. – 1–7 жовтня – № 38 (566). – С. 5.

⁴⁷ Політика регіонального розвитку в Україні: особливості та пріоритети. Аналітична доповідь. / За ред. З. Варналія. – К.: НІСД, 2005.

consider the work of the governing bodies as not transparent. Use of experience of NGO in study of regional problems remains weak as well.

In view of above it is advisable to use all resources of informational technologies for feedback fence-mending between the society and public organizations for study problems of the regions. It is necessary to regulate the mechanism of involving of public opinion of different regions in political decision making process.

4. In Ukraine there are some contradictions in personnel policy of the authority regarding regional administrations. For example, it concerns an appointment of heads of Oblast State Administrations, local administrations, which is done without taking into consideration interests of regional and local institutions of governing. Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine does not govern efficiently personnel policy in the regions as well. The government has no rights to initiate presentation for dismissal of heads of Oblast State Administrations. Nowadays it is under the power of President of Ukraine.

Thus, the guarantee of a transparency of personnel policy in Ukraine is one of prime steps on the way to stability of nation-wide consolidation of the country, because the imperfection of the existing mechanism of formation of structure of regional governing bodies has negative effect on a political situation in Ukraine.

5. Big defect in forming of transparent policy of the authority is a weak coordination of activities of different executive bodies, inconsequence and contradiction of various decisions, which infringe on regional interests. Then in mutual relations between the centre and the regions, and also between local bodies of authority and bodies of local self-government a number of problem zones was formed. Examples of that are the unsuccessful attempts of the central authority to carry out in 2005 administrative-territorial reform in Ukraine.

At regional level there is an opinion that now it is necessary to discuss not an administrative-territorial reform, but system of power institutions in the regions, districts, cities and villages. Too rigid centralization of authority brought to concentration of huge powers in hands of bodies of executive power, i.e. local state administrations. And it directly contradicts principles of the European charter of local self-government.

It is necessary to regulate in Ukraine at a legislative level the relations between local authority and bodies of local self-government, for instance, to examine draft laws (No. 3207-1 etc.), which change the system of local self-government.

6. The unbalanced regional policy of the executive power does not give an opportunity to eliminate considerable disproportions in development of the regions, provokes conflicts of different budgets. The interbudget relations produce conflicts between levels of authority on a vertical line. The socio-economic problems of the interbudget relations are shown in imbalance of powers, responsibility and resources, which have the central and local bodies of the executive authority, and also bodies of local self-government of different levels.

To resolve this problem as an immediate task it is necessary to reform the interbudget relations. It will give a stimulus for further development of the regions and consolidation of the regions. The model of interbudget relations should be built upon mutual responsibility of central, local executive power bodies and institutions of local self-government, their partnership in the field of rendering of administrative, public and state services, and solidary responsibility for state of affairs both in the regions and in Ukraine as a whole.

7. Miscalculations in decision making policy, which refer to economic interests of the regions, have a deep influence on their development and on a socio-political situation in the regions. Vital problems today in the regions are unemployment, necessity of support of small and middle business, inculcation of innovation models of regional development, separation of business and authority. In Ukraine the model of cooperation between business and authority is not worked out. Therefore today it is expedient to support idea of creation of a number of analytic centres, which would study problems of economic development of the regions.

Disproportions in economic development of the regions in Ukraine and increase in negative tendencies lead to intensification of disintegration processes. It has negative influence on the dynamics of social processes. Therefore the interests of different social groups, which form Ukrainian society, become more diverse, and the basis for harmonization of their interests is lost. Only the conformity of economic and social goals in development of the regions of Ukraine guarantees success to the reforms. During elaboration of economic strategy of development of Ukrainian regions the market should be considered not as a purpose, but as an effective method of formation of economy of well-being of the citizens, development of economy, which creates an objective basis for consolidation of the society.

8. In Ukraine, the significance of analytic centres and nongovernmental organizations increases in formation of public policy in the context of regions development. A number of such institutions and standard of their researches and recommendations is growing. But the mechanisms of application of such results of researches are not worked through. Due to absence of own clear projects of regions development the authority is not in a hurry to use proposals of intellectual elite.

In Ukraine, it is expedient to intensify the process of involving of analytic centres, NGO and most active part of society in formation of transparent policy concerning strategy of development of the country and its regions. For a start it is necessary to work out and commence realization of several specific strategic programmes in the country, which could consolidate Ukrainian citizens at least for a medium-term outlook (for example, regarding overcoming of unemployment, development of science on basis of innovation mechanisms, support of national producer based on reduction of taxation burden, strengthening of cooperative links between the regions etc.)

Therefore, it is necessary also to create conditions for development of scientific area in the regions. Nowadays the competition of knowledge and abilities become as rigid as competition of property, but the first is interpreted by the society as more fair way of its differentiation and state consolidation.

9. It is possible to overcome negative disintegration tendencies in the state only with the help of national sound, consolidated and consolidating transparent policy concerning regions, and in cooperation with creative forces of the society. This policy should be focused on the following directions:

- formation of legislative basis of political and economic mutual relations between the centre and the regions, between the authority and local bodies of self-government, assurance of institutional and legal sphere for elaboration and realization of transparent state regional policy; creation of model of interrelations between the regions and the centre, which is coordinated with general conception of organization of state power guaranteed by the Constitution.
- Minimization of unemployment in the regions by stimulation of development of economy, securing of external economic safety of the regions and the state, support of development of industry oriented for export and replacement of import, target support of the enterprises, especially those which form towns, in depressed regions;

- assurance of economic control of the state over natural resources, strategic projects and works which form branches, support of functioning and development of national transport, energy and telecommunication infrastructure;
- carrying out of considered regulatory policy taking into account interests of the regions and big cities, support in making and evolution of integration forms of economy self-development;
- creation of market conditions of interregional economic integration, based on mutual interests of subjects of market, support of interregional cooperation of companies and entrepreneurs in the context of both state programmes and private business interests; assistance in development of small and middle private enterprise in the regions, establishment of interregional partners links in this field;
- development of scientific, educational, cultural, sanative, tourist interchange between regions;
- improvement of budget and tax relations between the centre and the regions on basis of experience of EU countries.

Summary on the Focus Group Results

The initiative “**Developing a Policy of National Consolidation: Regional Context**” of Policy Advice for Reform Project is funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/Canadian International Development Agency) and managed by the Canadian Bureau for International Education (www.cbie.ca/Canadian Bureau for International Education). Within September 2005, focus group sessions were held in the Volyn, Transcarpathian, Donetsk and Odesa regions and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Participants in the sessions included members of communities of the above regions invited on a proportionate basis by sex, age and social status.

Objectives:

- Identify understanding of stereotypes existing in the following areas:
 - a) Interregional relations; b) language; c) culture; d) interethnic relations; e) inter-confessional relations;
- Determine values typical for representatives of different regions in the context of national identity;
- Define key language, cultural and interethnic challenges;
- Find out major problems in the field of language, cultural and religious rights guaranteed by the state;
- Analyze the level of civic awareness and understanding of governmental regional policy, programs and their essence;
- Measure the level of understanding of the role and functions of the state in development of language and cultural policies;
- Analyze the level of understanding of actions (their essence, effectiveness and implementation mechanisms) to be instituted by governmental agencies to formulate a national identity policy regulating language, culture, interethnic and inter-confessional relations.

Discussion Summary

Stereotypes Existing towards Residents of Other Regions

The overwhelming majority of the participants emphasized a variety of different stereotypes relating to cultural and language identity and differences between those, who live in Western, Eastern and Southern Ukraine, evoked by geographical location, uneven economic development, historical specificities, different cultural and religious traditions.

“Everything depends on definite people though, there are some regional differences. They can be essential and include climate, the level of economic development or cultural traditions.” (Lutsk)

“Speaking about some common features, one should take into account a historical aspect characterizing an ethnicity. As for Western Ukraine, it is necessary to consider its close links with East-European countries – Czech, Slovakia and Poland. The population of Eastern Ukraine is closer to Russia and Belarus.” (Odesa)

“I think that the border that had existed before 1939 however divided Ukraine. I mean that its western part managed to maintain traditions, culture and belief. Being closer to communist Russia, Eastern Ukraine exterminated cultural heritage and traditions and made people soulless.” (Uzhorod)

The respondents outlined the following challenges:

- Language stereotypes:

“I often visit Lviv and Western Ukraine on the whole. When I was going to come there for the first time a year ago, I was warned, “Be careful about Russian!” On my arrival, I understood that information available about West Ukraine is absolutely misleading. After my first visit to Lviv, I learnt Ukrainian because I liked it very much. Now, I speak it fluently. I guess, everyone should know as many languages as possible to communicate more freely.” (Simferopol)

- Distinctions between Ukrainian regions in interpretation of historical events and conclusions on the same historical facts, especially the WWII:

“I know for sure that East Ukrainian residents associate the Transcarpathian population with “banderovtsi”. I hear the word “banderovets” wherever I go either to Kharkiv or the Crimea or Odesa. This stereotype should be broken up at the national level. When we come, people are afraid of us as though we have sawn-off rifles.” (Uzhorod)

“Local people told me that one day, the Tatars decided to provoke the massacre of St. Bartholomew during WWII. And on their return, authorities granted them construction privileges thereby depriving the Ukrainians of housing.” (Lutsk)

- Political stereotypes (an emphasis was made on regional confrontation in the periods between elections):

“A stereotype of “friends” and “enemies” was formed after the presidential elections. The country divided into two parts: Small Russia and the rest Ukraine. This is where the story (of relationship) begins. A scandal caused by our Granny, who was outraged by our refusal to vote for “the right person”, impressed us most of all.” (Odesa)

- “Budget stereotypes” (statements about unfair distribution of budget funds – “some regions are living on the others”):

“There is injustice towards donors of western regions. The share of Eastern Ukraine (the Donetsk region) in the national budget amounts to 40%, whereas that of the Lviv region does not exceed 7–8%. Donors, including the Odesa region, feed the country. It seems to me that the Ternopil region is subsidized as well. Correspondingly, the GDP is distributed unevenly (by labour results).” (Odesa)

The Odesa participants believed the 2004 presidential elections contributed to self-determination of Ukraine’s residents and viewed the idea of East-West confrontation as artificial and thrust by the media and some politicians. Hence, it is necessary to analyze the political situation.

“Much depends upon your environment. If you communicate with people, who can analyze and perceive adequately information from the media and politicians, you’ll react in one way. If people cannot perceive and analyze information, they will react differently, in a mass manner.” (Odesa)

“Don’t you see that this division is artificial? Remember the TV program saying that “the orange should go to Donetsk, whereas the blue – to Lviv”? This division has been imposed.” (Odesa)

Representatives of the western regions noted that the Transcarpathian population was associated with the offensive word “banderovtsi” and that even young people from eastern and southern Ukraine shared this opinion. So, to eliminate this stereotype, the need for explanatory work at the national level was stressed.

“I am a resident of Kryvyi Rih. In my town, people do not know what Western Ukraine is. They consider it is populated by “banderovtsi” as they believe in what they are told.” (Lutsk)

“When I was at the Odesa-based artistic college, students told me, “Speak as you do. We have never heard this way of speaking before.” It was strange for me. I invited them to the Transcarpathia and said that there were the same college and the same hospice. And they replied, “It’s not true, only banderovtsi live there!” Just imagine! I have never thought that the modern youth could think that way. I was unpleasantly surprised.” (Uzhorod)

Donetsk youth characterized the artificial nature of some stereotypes concerning various interpretations of historical events and today’s realities, as saying, *“In my mind, the society has its personal opinion but it cannot be trusted. Everyone knows about “Banderovshchyna”. Though, I think it is not true, it is stupid. We know a lot of anecdotes on this topic...” (Donetsk)*

Eastern Ukraine

The participants shared their viewpoints on residents of other regions. Most speakers associated eastern population with mining industry, mines, waste banks, social problems, a large gap in incomes, dominance of Russian cultural and language traditions.

“What is Eastern Ukraine? It is industry; it is the area, where people were resettled for development. At present, only those prosper there, who managed to catch a tasty morsel, whereas the rest still live under the Soviet Union. Donetsk is associated with a shabby provincial town of the Soviet epoch. These made an awful impression on me.” (Lutsk)

“As for the East, there is a strong influence of Russian culture here.” (Simferopol)

“Eastern Ukraine is associated with factories, mines and people, who work all the time. It is because that’s all I hear about this region. As far as I know, there are problems with miners’ wives because their husbands are not paid wages. There are numerous social challenges there.” (Bakhchisarai)

“I have never been to Donetsk but I’d like to go there to see these mines and miners. I’ve communicated a lot with Donetsk residents and found out their negative attitude to people from the Transcarpathia, Lviv and Volyn. They prefer the Russians, as it happened historically. They speak Russian and so do we because they do not understand Ukrainian. That is a contradiction.” (Uzhorod)

“As for the Donetsk region, I was there in May – it was terrible! People are impoverished, alcoholics and criminals. The population is stratified into the rich thieves and the poor. What is the most awful is that the situation is hopeless. People lost their core values once and forever.” (Odesa)

Representatives of the Odessa region emphasized their similarity to eastern residents by mentality and cultural traditions.

“In Odesa, there are many people, who came from Donetsk and Luhansk. We treat them kindly, since we have very much in common. We are not strangers because we share culture a little different from Ukrainian one. All we have our own merits and demerits. I do not want to idealize anybody but our similarity developed historically.” (Odesa)

A Transcarpathian woman was very positive about strong interest in the study of Ukrainian manifested by the Donetsk youth,

“In Zaporizhzhya, I met the Donetsk youth. I was surprised that they asked us to speak Ukrainian. I liked it. They said they wanted to learn Ukrainian but had no opportunity as the whole region was Russian-speaking. Even if they want to communicate in Ukrainian, they do not have fluency of this language. I thought nobody liked Ukrainian in Donetsk and was pleased with that desire.” (Uzhorod)

Western Ukraine

The participants associated western residents with industrious people, who advocate the national idea and maintain language and cultural traditions. Stressing a certain artificial division between the population of western and southeastern regions, an emphasis was made on family ties, which helps to overcome these stereotypes.

“I esteem western residents because they are industrious. In Odesa, there are many seasonal workers from Western Ukraine, who work hard. I met just a few Crimean resident in our city.” (Odesa)

“I associate Lviv with the word “nationalist” but not in the negative sense. This word is not bad because there is another notion “national” (Simferopol)

“I realize that there is a cultural difference between Eastern and Western Ukraine. I have never been to Lviv and it would be very interesting indeed to go there. I guess this distinction (cultural) really exists. I know it through hearsay, but would like to make sure in person.” (Donetsk)

“I do not understand western Ukrainians because of their dialect. It seems to me that they are totally concentrated on their national problems.” (Bakhchisarai)

“Western residents are not aliens. After the 2004 elections, the country was divided into two parts: Small Russia and the rest Ukraine. That’s the point. Anyway, I cannot treat them as foes because I have many relatives there.” (Odesa)

“I was in West Ukraine, where people speak Ukrainian. They want us to communicate in Ukrainian with them but they don’t speak Russian, when they come here. I think everyone has the right to culture of his/her upbringing.” (Simferopol)

The majority of Bakhchisarai participants were the Crimean Tatars, who paid attention to similarity of their temperament and rhythm of life to western residents.

“Once, I have visited Lviv. Its residents have very much in common with the Crimean Tatars but all they speak Ukrainian, go to church and so on. This trip was something special for me. People are very similar to us but simultaneously they are different. I like their hot temperament and I share their way of thinking. I felt at ease there.” (Bakhchisarai)

The participants in the Donetsk focus group pointed out stable religious traditions in the western regions, which was untypical of eastern and southern residents.

“No member of our family goes to church on Sundays. It is a must in the church.” (Donetsk)

“In contrast to Lviv, in the Donetsk region, it is not natural for people to go to church and demonstrate their belief in God.” (Donetsk)

The Volyn respondents noted the need to distinguish several areas of Western Ukraine, namely the Transcarpathian, Halychyna, Volyn and Rivne regions, for their residents differed a little in mentality.

“The West is not the West, it’s Ukrainian geographic West. In fact, the Transcarpathia is a distinct part of the West. The Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil regions are its other parts. The Chernivtsi region is yet another part. The Volyn region is yet another part. The Rivne region is yet another part. Therefore, it is not correct to consolidate all the above regions, as mentality of their residents is different. I am from the Transcarpathia and I know that interethnic problems are absent there. West Ukrainian residents are fluent in both languages. Language is a matter of time. Two neighbors can communicate in three languages. Inter-confessional hostility exists not in the Catholic or Greek Catholic but only in the Orthodox Church. In the Lviv region, people consider themselves the elite of the whole Western Ukraine. And they are partially right, for it is the only sustainable western region. Other regions are subsidized from the national budget. This causes certain problems.” (Lutsk)

Southern Ukraine

The majority of participants associate the Crimea with recreation. They underscored that low income of the Crimean population was of a seasonal nature. The necessity to develop a consistent policy on relations between the Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars populating the Crimea was accentuated. Such a position is absent due to economic development of the region and interference of politicians with interethnic relations.

“The Crimea is associated with recreation, ever-lasting summer and crowds of tourists.” (Uzhgorod)

“The Crimea experiences a communication problem because many Russians, Ukrainians and [Crimean] Tatars live there. There is no interethnic harmony on the peninsula. I went for vacation to the Crimea and could feel tension. However, most conflicts occur on a household basis. If not for politicians, people would live in piece.” (Lutsk)

“I associate the Crimea with beauty and social problems. Only resort business is thriving, there is nothing else to do there.” (Odesa)

The participants also showed interest in Odesa, which they associated with humor and prosperous businessmen. They also pointed out that due to the “Siomyi Kilometr” (the “Seventh Kilometer”) market, many Ukrainians have jobs and income.

“Odesa is really associated with humour. Its residents are so ironic and funny. I like it very much! I mean there is a golden rule, which the Ukrainians must learn – use self-criticism as a self-help method. Odesa residents stick to this rule. It seems that a sense of humour is a genetic trait, which we must cultivate.” (Uzhgorod)

“In my opinion, there are many businessmen and little Africans in Odesa. I watch TV and read newspapers. Maybe, it is a superficial viewpoint but there are a lot of foreigners in the city.” (Bakhchisarai)

“Odesa is a rich city with a lot of prosperous people. It is a large port. It has the largest market in Ukraine. Many people have jobs thanks to the “Siomyi Kilometr” (the “Seventh Kilometer”) market. I love Odesa and a sense of humor of its residents. The only thing I dislike is the Russian-speaking population. If you speak Ukrainian, almost nobody understands you.” (Uzhorod)

Volyn representatives deemed that Odesa residents were focused on events directly affecting their life and therefore showed little interest in affairs in other regions.

“I associate the South with people indifferent to developments in other regions. When I studied at school, we went to Odesa. An Odesa resident asked us, “Where are you from?” “We are from Lutsk.” And he asked again, “Where is this village located?” “It is not a village, it is a town”, we replied. It was very strange to hear.” (Lutsk)

Kyiv

The respondents associated Kyiv with a city packed with cultural and architectural monuments. In their opinion, Kyiv is a city offering a lot of opportunities. However, arrogance and intolerance are typical for Kyiv residents.

“As for Kyiv... Maybe, it is just a coincidence but all Kyiv residents I met were haughty. They are so arrogant that they believe Kyiv is the center of the Earth. They are arrogant of being Kyiv residents.” (Odesa)

“I associate Kyiv with numerous cultural and architectural monuments. It is a city full of opportunities, where everyone can display his/her talents. It is the city, which is shaping Ukraine’s destiny. I associate Kyiv with the capital.” (Uzhorod)

“Kyiv is the capital of Ukraine. All its residents are so smart and rich.” (Bakhchisarai)

“You know, Kyiv residents are different. Perhaps, it sounds rough but in Odesa, people are more tolerant because we do not victimize those, who voted for Yanukovich. I have a couple of “orange” friends. We just laughed and joked, that’s all. However, people ran away from Kyiv like Natalia Mohylevska did. Before the last round, she stated that she was leaving because could not endure that pressure.” (Odesa)

Representatives of Uzhorod were negative about the lack of Ukrainian on the streets of Kyiv.

“I spent the whole week in Kyiv and did not hear a Ukrainian word. When I addressed people in Ukrainian, they looked at me as though I was an alien. It was very strange to hear Ukrainian nowhere, especially after the Orange Revolution and patriotic slogans.”

The Odesa respondents noted that many people from western regions held offices in governmental agencies.

“There are many representatives of West Ukraine in Kyiv. Not in business but in governmental agencies. This is apparent: western Ukrainians participated in any international project. This is also evidenced by statistical data.” (Odesa)

Making the Population Aware in the Context of Eliminating Some Stereotypes

The media is the easiest accessible means of information. Though, the society is prejudiced against the media because of their one-sided coverage of events, especially after the 2004 presidential

elections, which prevented people from making an objective judgment. Most participants emphasized the lack of information on social and cultural events, historical monuments and others. Therefore, the media employees should apply various methods for keeping the population aware, namely give more information about life in other regions, which would facilitate elimination of certain stereotypes. The respondents suggested the media employees the following:

- Pay more attention to regional news:

“Only Kyiv news is broadcasted on our local channels. Though, I would like to know what’s going on in the Volyn, Ivano-Frankivsk and Donetsk regions, the Crimea and the Transcarpathia.” (Uzhgorod)

- Create TV programs dedicated to historical events:

“Now, the “Ukraine’s History” program is broadcasted on Inter Channel. I watch it every time, for it is very interesting. I did not know about many things because I had not studied Ukrainian history at school. I am interested in different aspects of life in the regions.” (Bakhchisarai)

- Professionally advertise Ukrainian cities picturing their cultural traditions:

“I would like more commercials advertising our cities on TV. I did not like advertisement shown during the Eurovision Song Contest. I got frustrated, when I saw the Transcarpathia on TV. I do not know whether it was done deliberately or because of the lack of professional experience... We need more TV programs about our cultural heritage. The young generation knows nothing about Ukraine.” (Uzhhorod)

The Crimean focus group participants complained about the negative role of the media fomenting ethnic intolerance.

“Religious and ethnic hatred must be eliminated. The Ukrainian media publish materials that inflame it. Russian readers hate the Crimean Tatars and vice versa... This is done deliberately to incite ethnic hostility. If there was no hostility between the Russians and Ukrainians, parents would not say, “Why do you learn this “Khokhlyatsky” language?” We need to reconcile people somehow and tell them that the Crimea is the common home and common land for all.” (Simferopol)

The respondents enumerated other alternative sources of knowledge about life in the Ukrainian regions, including the following:

- Trips, development of tourism:

“First of all, I am interested not in politics but in historical places and cultural development. Of course, I would like to travel, read books about distant regions and see different places. I do not trust the media because of contradictable and unreliable information.” (Odesa)

“We were on vacation in the Crimean tourist center and paid a visit to its owners – the Crimean Tatars. We asked them about their culture, household and so on. This can also be done in other regions.” (Donetsk)

“We need live communication. We could go that East just to communicate with resident. And they could come to us. It would be more effective than any TV program. Therefore, people should have more communication and not be afraid of their neighbors.” (Lutsk)

- Cultural programs:

“On August 24, we celebrated the Independence Day. People could taste different cuisines at the Central Square: Armenian, Georgian, Russian or Ukrainian. They talked with each other. Perhaps, some changed their opinions about, say, the Armenians. People usually become friends when they enjoy each other’s company or share meal. We need more actions of this kind.” (Donetsk)

- Experience-sharing programs:

“It is very interesting to participate in such programs. When I go on business trips, I am always interested in life in other places.” (Bakhchisarai)

- Youth programs:

“I do not understand what’s going on. When I studied at school, we had weekend trips and often visited the Crimea. Perhaps, modern tourist agencies provide these services but in the past, such trips were much cheaper.”

“I studied at the Odesa Institute of National Economy, the Faculty for Economics. The Institute exchanged students with the Ternopil University. Ternopil students came to Odesa in summers, while we went to Ternopil in winters. It was organized at the state level. It is so simple, as we share the same country! There are many higher institutions in the Crimea, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and other Ukrainian cities. It is necessary to revive practice of student exchange programs.” (Odesa)

“Student exchange programs offering the youth opportunities to travel around the world, learn more about foreign peoples and cultures are available in every country. Students aboard are offered tickets at special prices. I suggest the same for Ukraine. The youth should be able to travel, see foreign countries and visit friends abroad.” (Uzhgorod)

- Information on budget processes:

“Actually, the media do not cover distribution of the national budget. People interested in this issue need to spend their time and efforts in order to find information.” (Uzhgorod)

According to a representative of the Transcarpathia, one trip is not enough for an objective opinion. So, it is necessary to inform people on all aspects of life in other regions. *“Unlike in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, in the Transcarpathia, amalgamation of culture and Contemporaneity is more evident. We live here and can feel this. We cannot judge about these people because we don’t see them. I cannot form an opinion from one visit to Mykolaiv or the Crimea.” (Uzhgorod)*

A participant in the Odesa focus group made a proposal to advertise filming places in Ukraine so that to make people interested in visiting. *“I would like to give the following example. According to official statistical data, after demonstration of the movie “Healing by Love”, the number of persons on vacation in Ilyichevsk grew by 30%. I mean that local TV programs can be positioned right at the places of filming.” (Odesa)*

Violations of Language, Cultural and Religious Rights

The focus group participants emphasized that violations of language, cultural and religious rights assumed great importance for our country. Although, regional approaches to settlement of this issue varied.

As for violations of **the religious rights**, the respondents stressed the following:

- Inter-confessional conflicts:

“When Gusar was being brought to Kyiv, it was just terrible! Why is the Moscow Patriarchy or the Romanian Catholic Church permitted to be in Kyiv while the Greek Catholics are not?” (Uzhorod)

- Negative examples of interference of the church with politics:

“By no means I support interference of the church (the Moscow Patriarchy) with politics. This became especially apparent during election agitation campaign. To anathematize is awful and immoral” (Uzhorod)

“Throughout the whole history, the Church and politics have been indivisible. Even when Yanukovych was baptized, it looked funny but it was a fact.” (Donetsk)

- Prejudices against the Protestants by the majority of Ukraine’s population:

“I am a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. It is not a sect but a universal church. Usually, I conceal this because attitude of people changes at once regardless of the region – western Ukraine, eastern Ukraine or Russia. Therefore, religious rights are constantly violated. Pursuant to the law, we have freedom of conscience though in reality, it is much more complicated. Many of our people are inert. Step to the left, step to the right – shooting! I’ve seen many negative examples.” (Donetsk)

- Efforts to introduce the study of religion fundamentals at secondary schools, notwithstanding the multicultural and multireligious Ukrainian population:

“Recently our President has meddled with my private religious life by saying that religion fundamentals should be taught at school. Our school is secular and I think that a few children would take courage to oppose teaching of Islam or Christianity. This is not right and the guarantor of the Constitution would not have to interfere. Maybe, my daughter is an atheist or Buddhist but being a Ukrainian citizen, she enjoys the same rights as the majority of Christians in our country.” (Lutsk)

“Officially, authorities prefer Orthodoxy. Western Ukraine objectively practices Greek-Catholicism. We, as a rule, prefer the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy advertising pomposity. In my mind, Orthodoxy stands out from other religions in a number of ways.” (Donetsk)

The Crimean Tatar respondents reported no violations of their religious rights. The only example of infringement of Moslem rights was that their religious holidays were not celebrated nationally. *“At the national level, it takes a few minutes in a news program to congratulate Moslems of the whole world, the Crimean Tatars included [because Islam is not an official religion in Ukraine]. We have just two religious holidays – Kurban Bairam and Urasa Bairam. We would like these holidays to be celebrated nationally but it is not so.” (Bakhchisarai)*

The participants from Uzhorod stressed dominance of Russian pop-music on Ukraine’s TV and radio channels, which they deemed as a violation of their **cultural rights** on the one hand and as a negative impact on the youth upbringing on the other. To solve this problem, it is necessary to considerably increase the price for licenses to broadcast foreign music in order to create more favorable conditions for Ukrainian musicians.

“Value of the license to broadcast music other than Ukrainian shall much higher compared to that for broadcasting Ukrainian-language songs or music clips.” (Uzhorod)

During discussion of violations of **the language rights**, a participant from Donetsk paid attention to frequent incidents of hostility in the western regions towards Russian-speaking population of other regions. “I was in Lviv and wanted to go to the theater. We came to the box office to buy tickets. We asked tickets in Ukrainian. But a cashier told she did not understand what we were talking. We repeated in Russian. “I do not understand,” she answered again. Then we asked our sister, who lived in Lviv, to help. She asked and the cashier gave her tickets. We felt very uncomfortable.” (*Donetsk*)

A Crimean participant stressed that citizens should know their civic rights and be able to advocate them. So, civil society institutions must carry out active cultural and educational work among the vast masses of population. *“Everybody should know his/her rights and how to stand for them. Legal consultations shall help citizens.” (Simferopol)*

Language Challenges

Representative of the Russian-speaking regions underscored magnitude of language challenges and suggested the use of both Ukrainian and Russian in Southern and Eastern Ukraine.

“Wherever they are, people must speak the language they prefer. It is not difficult in Ukraine because there are not 25 but only two major languages in the country. If people want to speak Russian, what is the problem? In some European states, there are five or eight languages. Do we want to be distanced from Europe?” (Odesa)

The youth was less categorical by making an emphasis on the need to learn the official language.

“I get surprised to hear that Ukrainian cannot be the national language in the Crimea because the Crimea is a part of Ukraine. Why aren’t Englishmen concerned about the use of English as the national language in some cities? Crimean residents must speak Ukrainian because they live in Ukraine. If the Crimea is separated, we’ll raise the issue of language preference. Though I do not understand Ukrainian, I believe it to be the primary language.” (Bakhchisarai)

“As a Russian-speaking person, I believe I should be fluent in Ukrainian, for I live here, in this country. I would not like to be prohibited to communicate with my son in the Russian language. Recently, Yanukovich wanted to hold a referendum on granting the national status of Russian. I am against this idea. I guess that it is not normal to give both Russian and Ukrainian the national status. Since we live in Ukraine, we must have only one national language – Ukrainian. Otherwise, it would be required to legitimate Hungarian, Romanian and Slovak in the Transcarpathia, which is absurd and ridiculous.” (Uzhorod)

“Lithuanian citizenship requires knowledge of this language. Why it is not a requirement in Ukraine? 70-80 % of the Crimea’s population are Russian-speaking. So, they are not prohibited from speaking Russian. However, they must speak the national language as well. The Crimea is the autonomous republic but within the Ukrainian state.” (Simferopol)

Most participants were unanimous about the necessity for state officials to have fluency in Ukrainian so that to be able to provide citizens with information and services in the language of their preference.

“Most officials do not speak the national language. They appear on television in Russian and do not even think of learning Ukrainian. I guess it is necessary, as we live in Ukraine. So, civil servants must speak the national language.” (Donetsk)

“State officials shall speak the language they prefer. However, unlike ordinary citizens, they must have knowledge of both Ukrainian and Russian to be able to communicate the language citizens prefer. This must be entrenched by legislation.” (Odesa)

Some respondents deemed that governmental language policy should be carried out step-by-step and with regard to regional language preferences. Crimean representatives of the older generation shared the above viewpoint, having emphasized the need to consider age of persons, who were to learn Ukrainian.

“This issue cannot be settled at once but gradually and in the interests of all.” (Simferopol)

“My husband is a cardio-surgeon, he is a Crimean Tatar. He speaks Russian perfectly. It takes doctors about 5-6 hours a day to take case histories and examine patients. Just imagine my husband, who came from Uzbekistan, sitting and trying to recall Ukrainian words to write 10-15 case histories...” (Simferopol)

The participants agreed about the need to learn Ukrainian and simultaneously accentuated numerous problems, including the absence of competent schoolteachers, who speak Ukrainian fluently. The same is true about higher institutions. *“Children need to learn Ukrainian. Now, the number of hours for its study is quite sufficient though children do not speak Ukrainian due to poor tuition.” (Simferopol)*

“Since my early childhood, I hear offensive words like “Moskalka” and so on. At present, I do not care. It insulted me only when I was a student. Almost all our teachers could not speak Ukrainian but only its Transcarpathian dialect. Many of my student mates came from different cities and towns: Rakhov, Vynohradov, Svalyava and others. And it was very strange, when our dialect-speaking teachers prohibited us from speaking Russian. I do not understand this. It seems to me that first of all, they had had to learn Ukrainian.” (Uzhorod)

A teacher from Odesa said, *“Today, our children found themselves in the situation, when their mentality is being broken subliminally. If I explain an eight-year-old child in Ukrainian what is “equation”, he will not understand me. So, I explain everything in Russian and only then translate it in Ukrainian. Children experience the same problem in the study of English because English textbooks give only Ukrainian translation. That is why, children have to learn not only English but also Ukrainian. It is very difficult for them from a psychological viewpoint.”*

“Yes, we live in Ukraine and our children must speak the national language but I want to suggest an alternative, either Ukrainian or Russian. For example, children learn history of Ukraine in Ukrainian, whereas world’s history – in Russian. May they have fluency in both languages. It’s OK, if our children are polyglots.” (Odesa)

Meanwhile, the Simferopol focus group participants underlined increase of the number of schoolchildren, who receive tuition in Ukrainian and intend to continue education in higher institutions. They agreed that tension in the language area would slowly ease and children, who received education in Ukrainian, would never have problems. *“You probably know about the incident at the school in the Crimean village of Komsomolskoe. This was a Ukrainian school but politicians interfered. The problem was settled easily: classes offering tuition in Russian, Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian were formed. And everything fell into place. A daughter of my nephew studies*

there at the Ukrainian-language class. She said that in 10 or 12 years tuition in the Crimea would be offered only in the national language.” (Simferopol)

Yet another problem experienced by the Russian-speaking population is transition of the justice system to the national language, which could result in misinterpretation of some legal terms and documents. *“Once I headed a scientific institution (of regional subordination) is engaged in social activities and had the state official status. We received and sent documents to Kyiv exclusively in Ukrainian. Although, when our clients came, we could not give them these papers because we lived in the Russian-speaking South. Sure, the clients would not understand many things, especially legal acts. Sometimes, legal nuances prevent people from determining their rights under the Acts.” (Odesa)*

As for the economic aspect of the issue, *“Since the early 90s, our government and private companies lost huge money on translations. I mean construction standards, judicial registers, computer facilities, technologies as well as other registers and standards. Everything in the Soviet Union was in Russian. Now, we complain about obsolete equipment and capital assets. All that did not fall from the Moon but was a result of governmental restriction policy. Within 3 (sometimes, 5-7) years, it has been prohibited to present documents in Russian. Yet, Ukrainian translations of these papers were absent. Hence, Ukraine fell 5-7 years behind the rest of the CIS countries.” (Odesa)*

A teacher from the Volyn region addressed negative consequences of rapid ukrainization of secondary schools by saying, *“Ukrainization was really harmful to those, who wanted to have tuition in Russian. Most Ukrainian teenagers do not speak Russian, which will affect their study sooner or later. For instance, the best Russian higher institutions are located in Moscow and St. Petersburg. These institutions have rich libraries packed with scientific literature necessary for scholars and experts.” (Lutsk)*

It was accentuated that in everyday life, poor knowledge of Ukrainian could entail some problems like completion of forms at governmental institutions. Hence, there is a dire need to learn not only oral but also written Ukrainian. *“I feel no oppression at all. The only problem I have is completion of forms. Colloquial Ukrainian is easy to understand from TV though it is very difficult to fill out forms.” (Bakhchisarai)*

From the viewpoint of a participant in the Odesa focus group, certain non-perception of the Ukrainian language by the Russian-speaking population is determined by poor and amateurish translations in the printed and electronic media, which forms bad habits and adversely affects public consciousness. *“At present, everything depends on an interpreter and quality of his/her translation. You see, poor or lame translation may generate negative attitude to Ukrainian. I mean the situation, when a translator/interpreter does not know Ukrainian vocabulary. These relate to all the media. Just barbarous Ukrainian, which alienates people. I think in Russian and have enough fluency in Ukrainian but my Ukrainian vocabulary is quite limited. As far as I can judge, it is because TV announcers speak poor Ukrainian, which has an adverse affect on public consciousness.” (Odesa)*

The respondents were especially negative about the reformed news program on UT-1 providing simultaneous translation into Ukrainian, since Russian-speaking taxpayers funded this Channel. *“The language we think is the language we use. Why do our TV announcers apologize for speaking Russian? Moreover, the UT-1 Channel translates Russian-language interview. It is very bad.” (Odesa)*

Actions of the Government to Maintain and Promote Cultural and Language Specificities of the Regions

West Ukrainian representatives stressed the need of governmental agencies and local authorities to develop public strategies and priorities on interethnic policy, maintenance and promotion of culture. *“Our language and cultural right are constantly violated. These rights are infringed upon not as a result of interethnic confrontation but because of the government’s failure to formulate a strategy and philosophy of interethnic relations and maintenance of cultures. It is the so-called dominance of the Russian language and Russian pop culture – a culture of gateway songs.” (Lutsk)*

In the opinion of the participants, the government should foster interethnic peace and harmony instead of provoking conflicts like during the 2004 presidential elections.

“I guess power should pay attention to challenges of other peoples populating Ukraine. The core nation is important and enjoys all the rights but we all are Ukrainian citizens and therefore the state should guarantee and supervise the exercise of our civic rights. I mean the state may not interfere with and intensify interethnic conflicts but promote reconciliation.” (Lutsk)

The respondents from the Russian-speaking regions were unanimous about the need to resolve the issue of the equal use of Ukrainian and Russian at the national level.

“Knowledge of Ukrainian is a must in education and culture. This is especially true for Crimean residents. Our authorities could make some concessions, like Canada’s government did: Quebec is officially allowed to speak French. In my standpoint, bilingualism is objective reality for the Crimea and Donbass.” (Donetsk)

“In my opinion, the use of both languages shall be equal as it was in 1991, when the first law on languages was passed and all legal acts were published in Ukrainian and Russian. This principle should be applied to the present day. Individuals should have the right to write applications, keep business correspondence, conclude contract and teach children in any language.” (Odesa)

The Crimean participants addressed the necessity for the government to pursue a tolerant ethnic policy to preserve and promote specific features of every ethnos. In the past, when all residents of the peninsula spoke both Russian and Crimean Tatar irrespective of their ethnicity, the Crimea was an example of peaceful multicultural co-existence. The participants were positive about the draft Program on development of ethnographic tourism in the Crimea for 2005–2010 providing for foundation of 28 ethnographic villages in 12 Crimean areas, which would encourage maintenance of Crimean ethnic and cultural diversity.

“I heard that Crimean authorities were going to establish ethnic villages for up to 70 ethnicities. Every ethnic village should demonstrate tourists its culture, language and cuisine. Land plots will be allotted to village residents. For instance, 20 Greek or Crimean Tatar families would populate the villages to create ethnic atmosphere – ethnic costumes, ethnic cuisine and ethnic concerts. These 20 families will live in community and demonstrate their culture to other ethnicities. A decision on the above issue has already been made.” (Bakhchisarai)

According to representatives of Bakhchisarai, current problems of the study of Crimean Tatar were not so acute as they had been in the early 90s due to establishment of schools offering tuition in this language. Nevertheless, Crimean Tatar terminology is absent in the field of natural sciences, therefore chemistry, physics and biology are taught in Russian.

“Many subjects such as chemistry, physics and biology are taught in Russian in Crimean Tatar schools because of the lack of Crimean Tatar textbooks.” (Bakhchisarai)

Other respondents believed that the government started paying closer attention to schools providing tuition in Crimean Tatar and emphasized development of teacher training programs for these ethnic schools.

“It is necessary to train personnel. The state does not train teachers of the Crimean Tatar language and therefore schoolchildren are not offered tuition in their mother tongue. Why are Ukrainian schools allowed to offer tuition in native language, whereas Crimean Tatar ones are prohibited? Crimean authorities are going to approve a program for preparation of school textbooks and teacher training. This issue is of primary importance. It happens as if the government has comprehended our problems, ethnic and cultural needs.” (Bakhchisarai)

Movies were listed as one of the most effective means of the study of the Crimean Tatar language, especially in case of the older generation deprived of the opportunity to learn it. Hence, there is the need to shoot movies in Crimean Tatar.

“I would like more movies in Crimean Tatar. When children watch movies in Ukrainian, they perceive Ukrainian and learn it very quickly. As for me, I understand Ukrainian well enough because I watch Ukrainian-language movies. It’s good for learning Crimean Tatar as well.” (Bakhchisarai)

Some Bakhchisarai participants opposed the opinion that percentage composition of the regional population had to be considered for ethnic quotas in governmental agencies. On the one hand, the above will enable politicians of different ethnicities, who are well aware of challenges of their ethnos, to be represented at all levels of the government and thereby advocate ethnic interests more effectively.

“If Western Ukraine is populated by the Hutsuls, Ukrainians and other ethnicities, why don’t we elect their representatives to the parliament on a percentage basis? In my mind, this percentage shall be determined mathematically on an ethnic basis. It’s true that a Crimean Tatar will best understand only another Crimean Tatar, while a Russian will best understand only another Russian. Every ethnos has its own specific features untypical for other ethnicities. Representation in the parliament by ethnic quotas will enable all ethnics to voice their concerns and will have a profound positive effect in general.” (Bakhchisarai)

On the other hand, members of governmental agencies and local authorities at a variety of levels should professionally settle all the issues within their competence, inclusive of ethnic challenges.

“I do not share the opinion about ethnic representation in governmental agencies. Every state official has to be tolerant towards not only people but also any issue. Every state official should be able to listen and understand. Otherwise, people would think they were not received because of their ethnic identity. However, an official could be in low spirits or the issue was out of his/her competence, which caused the denial. I mean that unprofessional approach of governmental officials to their duties and responsibilities can form negative stereotypes.” (Bakhchisarai)

The Crimean Tatar participants were especially concerned about the status of the indigenous Crimean people. From their viewpoint, the above will entail their more complete representation in national authorities at a variety of levels thereby contributing to integration of the Crimean Tatar people into Ukraine’s society.

“Official recognition of the Tatars not as a Crimean community like other ethnicities but as the indigenous people would meet all the challenges at once because pursuant to the law, 30% of the Crimean parliament’s should be composed of members of this ethnos, who well aware of our current needs and problems.” (Bakhchisarai)

At the Crimean focus group, an emphasis was made on certain interethnic tension, especially in relations between the Crimean Tatars and Russians. To overcome the problem, it is necessary to bring up young people in the spirit of peace and tolerance, introduce teaching of ethnic history at schools and hold cultural actions with participation of members of different ethnicities.

“I think youth upbringing is above all because young people have not absorbed negative emotions and attitudes dominating over the last 20 years in Ukraine. For example, I have some prejudices and negative stereotypes. Schoolchildren must learn ethnology, religion fundamentals and history of Western Ukraine to expand the scope of their interests. When a child comes home and tells his/her parents about other ethnicities, it fosters more friendly and tolerant attitude. Any barrier can be eliminated provided that people come together, say, for a holiday. I mean it would be advisable to create a cult of celebrating common holidays and festivals. Once we had a festival in Bakhchisarai and the whole city gathered.” (Bakhchisarai)

In the viewpoint of the respondents, it is necessary to disseminate information about challenges and needs of the Crimean Tatars thereby negotiating some negative stereotypes towards this ethnos.

“I have an impression that most Crimean residents believe the Tatars to be an impudent and stubborn ethnos. It seems that not only politicians but also local residents do not have enough information. The population does not know what the Tatars require and why. The Tatars want nothing for free. They demand the government to restitute their property, give back their land and houses. Hence, the population needs to be informed about these requirements.” (Bakhchisarai)

“Other Crimean ethnicities are biased against the Crimean Tatars. Even the headlines of the media scream, “The Tatars are as bold as brass!” We often hear that we seized all the land plots though we got not a bit.” (Bakhchisarai)

Distribution of the National Budget

The participants shared the viewpoint that a scheme of distribution of the national budget was unclear or difficult to understand, since this issue was little covered in the media on the one hand or was not interesting for common citizens on the other. The respondents said that more budget funds should be earmarked for local needs. Attitude to budget process reflects, to a certain extent, stereotypes towards distribution of budget resources between the Ukrainian regions. However, most participants insisted on centralized budget distribution with regard to the subsidized regions.

“When we listen about approval of the Crimean budget at the parliamentary session, do you think that we have clear understanding of anything? And then the Chairman of the Council of Ministers says that we did what we were not supposed to do. Certainly, some money shall be transferred to the center but some financial resources must remain in the Autonomy.” (Simferopol)

“I do not know how the budget is distributed though I do not understand for which purposes the Crimean authorities spend tourism proceeds, if there are neither good highways nor consumer services on the peninsula. I guess money is distributed to the developed regions but the Crimea also has certain needs. Except for the central street in Simferopol, all our highways are in terrible state.” (Simferopol)

In the opinion of Donetsk representatives, concentration of the industry mostly in the eastern, central and southern regions (inherited from the former USSR) serves as one of the reasons for difficulties of distribution of the national budget. For the above reason, West Ukraine is subsidized, as it has no developed branches, save agriculture. The respondents accentuated the necessity to redistribute budget funds to those underdeveloped areas provided that a lion's share of revenues was allocated for the budget-forming regions.

“As far as I can judge, the national budget is distributed unevenly. There cannot be unsubsidized regions in Ukraine because under the Soviet Union, the industry was developed in the Center, South and East. Correspondingly, after disintegration of the USSR, residents of the western regions found themselves in a situation, when subsidies were a must for development of that area. I think some budget funds shall be redistributed in order to offer the above regions an opportunity to develop.” (Donetsk)

The Volyn participants pointed out the absence of a public strategy for production development, which caused the need to subsidize some regions.

“I guess this issue emerged as long ago as during the 2004 elections. As a matter of fact, it is quite logical: the more a region earns, the more it consumes. However, the state should better care for those regions, which do not have high income due to definite territorial, geographic and other factors. Distribution by consumption is not correct. The God did not give us fish but the line to fish. Instead of importing sugar from Cuba, it is necessary to invest money in production and creation of jobs. In my mind, a policy of consumption is harmful. Should no changes be made in distribution of budget funds, things would be right where they started.” (Lutsk)

The Odesa focus group participants were more categorical. They believed that the lion's share of revenues should remain in the local budget. The audience was positive about a perspective on Ukraine's federal system of governance, which would help to meet interregional challenges and provide conditions for development of the subsidized regions.

“A year and a half ago, the Odesa region ranked the 5th and 24th by budget receipts and revenue sharing respectively. Odesa generated around 75–80% of local budget proceeds though its share in the local budget amount to just 40%. Of course, all this is unjust. From my point of view, the idea of Ukraine's federalization is the most perspective and logical.” (Odesa)

“If people work a lot and create surplus value, they should have incentives. Through which tools will these incentives be created? The share of surplus value should remain in this region. That is why I support federalization. I am sure that the national budget will be formed from the bottom up.” (Odesa)

The Lutsk representatives insisted that the idea of federalism should favor not national and economic unity of the country.

“We must not run to extremes and make all the regions economically independent. This may result in ethnic hostility and disintegration. Ukraine will not exist without centralized financial flows. It's incorrect to make the regions independent, for every area has its own advantages and disadvantages. Distribution of budget expenses should be made transparent. Only one parliamentary committee of about 30 members is aware of all nuances of this process, whereas the rest have no idea at all.” (Lutsk)

Meanwhile, a stress was made on the need to create and promote conditions in the subsidized regions so that to stimulate employment growth in the country and stem outflow of manpower. It was suggested to exempt those regions from some taxes.

“It is necessary to create jobs to stem outflow of manpower. Our people work abroad for a song. Patriotism is very typical for western Ukrainians though life dictates its own rules. They are forced to go abroad to earn their living.” (Donetsk)

The participants from Lutsk and Bakhchisarai believed that the regions could be economically independent through development of priority branches and attraction of foreign investments. It is local authorities that have to settle the above issues.

“Regional councils should set strategic criteria, while other authorities should deal with concrete issues. As far as the Volyn region is concerned, it has good recreation resources, which can be used for both health care and tourism. There is no need to develop machine-building here because tourism would yield much higher profits.” (Lutsk)

“There are priority items in every budget. So, an emphasis should be made on these items. I mean that if we prioritize certain spheres this year, we should spare no effort. All the rest is minor.” (Bakhchisarai)

A Volyn respondent underlined the need to strengthen national economy by granting wider powers to members of self-government bodies and ensuring transparent decision-making.

“We formed the state to serve our needs and regulate the economic sphere. The state should better perform these functions, which could be attained through self-governance and transparency.” (Lutsk)

The participants agreed that issues of everybody’s concern, i.e. those relating to health care, education, ecology, science, defense and foreign policy should be settled at the national level. At the same time, highway construction, trade, transportation, communal and social programs should be resolved by local authorities and self-government bodies, as the latter are better aware of the local needs.

“We do not see social programs to be developed (like secondary education). Nothing is changed at schools: neither school facilities nor textbooks. Schoolchildren must buy a textbook for UAH 200 though it is the government’s concern.” (Bakhchisarai)

“The road fee revenues must remain here because Kyiv officials will not come to construct or repair roads.” (Donetsk)

“We give the state defense, borders, customs and other aspects common for all the regions. Although, the lion’s share of revenues from economic development and social programs must remain in local budgets.” (Odesa)

Some participants deemed that scientific, cultural and educational issues should be settled at the republican level, since Kyiv authorities did not allocate funds for these purposes.

“I came to a conclusion that now, like under the former USSR, science, education and culture often take a back seat regardless of allocated resources. For example, our exposition at the Crimean Ethnographic Museum is not funded at all: the Ministry of Culture of the Autonomous Republic of

Crimea cannot solve this issue, for Kyiv did not transfer money. So, should cultural and educational issues be solved at the local level, we would make progress.” (Simferopol)

Other Crimean participants voiced an opinion that at the local level, funds were rationally used only during election campaigns.

“As far as I can judge, at the local level, funds are not always spent for the intended purposes. In Kerch, construction of a new trolleybus depot lasted for 15 years. New authorities assigned funds. And then funds ran out. In September, money was allocated for construction of highways on the eve of elections. Victor Yanukovych left our city but irregularity in water supply remained. This situation continues for 12 years. There is no water although funds are regularly appropriated. We need worthy political leaders.” (Simferopol)

All the respondents were unanimous about the need to carry out educational activities in order to enhance financial literacy of citizens and make them understand how the budget is formed and what tax receipts are used for.

“It is necessary to pay attention to financial literacy of the population, since people do not know how, say, the local budget is formed. When newspapers publish the amount of a budget expenditure item, many people do not understand it, save financiers.” (Simferopol)

Perspectives on a Single Ukrainian Orthodox Church

The focus group participants aired completely opposite opinions on this issue. Most Volyn participants were positive about a single Ukrainian Orthodox Church though concluded that its establishment would take long because of the need for the Orthodox clergy to reach a consensus.

“In principle, I agree that sooner or later, Orthodox churches would unite for the sake of our people, our culture and our state. Though, this process must not be urged artificially, otherwise it would entail hostility and confrontation again.” (Lutsk)

Other respondents doubted about unification because of the absence of a consensus. The Odesa and Donetsk representatives shared the above viewpoint.

“This is impossible at all, as nobody can reconcile the clergy because of different attitude. There are a lot of trifles they will never agree on.” (Lutsk)

“We must not establish a church artificially, we need to leave something natural, a piece of our heritage. The point is to what extent the Kyiv Patriarchy will be subordinated to the Moscow one. The Moscow Patriarchy stated it did not have the right to appoint a Superior of any Russian eparchy without consent of Metropolitan Vladimir. However, the latter has the right to appoint his representative in any eparchy without Moscow’s consent since it is his patriarchal domain. Probably, the idea of unification will develop in the future but I am not sure.” (Odesa)

“The Ukraine Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy will never merge with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. (The former) will agree to be a part of the latter (the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church) but will not make any concessions...” (Donetsk)

There was the opinion that people, who practice other religions, did not have the right to discuss the above issue.

“How can we make any decision, if we do not belong to Orthodoxy? I know that sports and religion cannot be talked over. Every person has a personal God. So, if they want a separate [confession], let 25 Orthodox believers debate. But we are not members [of this flock] and therefore cannot decide what is better for them. These problems are not ours but theirs.” (Odesa).

Outstanding Political, Public and Cultural Figures

V. Yushchenko, Y. Tymoshenko and V. Lytvyn were listed as the most popular and outstanding political figures. As the study has been held within September – over the period of the crisis of power – the respondents from all over Ukraine accentuated decline of trust in politicians.

“Everybody relied on Yushchenko. Everybody supported him. I would like him to overcome difficulties and assume a firmer position.” (Uzhorod)

“Volodymyr Lytvyn is the only person in the new government, whom I respect.” (Simferopol)

“I am for Tymoshenko. I support Tymoshenko, Yushchenko and their policy.” (Donetsk)

“I view Victor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko as rather trustworthy persons in our country.” (Simferopol)

“It is Lytvyn. He deserves respect for his behavior, especially against the background of the latest events.” (Bakhchisarai)

Needless to say, identification of the most trustworthy and influential persons in some regions is very subjective, since they are viewed through the prism of their personal merits and experience. Nevertheless, the participants from different regions mentioned R. Chubarov (the Crimea), L. Kravchuk (the Crimea), O. Moroz (Odesa), V. Yanukovych (Odesa), H. Moskal (Uzhorod), Y. Kushnarev (Odesa), D. Korchynsky (Odesa), S. Holovaty (Donetsk), B. Oliynyk (Odesa) and others as prominent modern political figures.

“From former politicians, I trust Kravchuk.” (Bakhchisarai)

“I respect Yanukovych. He had a cruel fate. He had been imprisoned before he came to power. This evidences his strong character. Kushnarev is interesting because he did not ruin his reputation. I also respect Korchynsky because of his populism and intention to join one or another movement. Though, he is not rushing about but holding his ground. So, there is an impression that he is concerned over Ukraine’s future.” (Odesa)

“During the 2004 pre-election campaign, we were at the sanatorium in Alushta and watched TV. Refat Chubarov appeared on TV in the interview and spoke Ukrainian. And a person from Lviv said, “Look, a Crimean Tatar speaks Ukrainian.” I mean if a person wants to succeed, he/she can succeed anyway. I guess he is considered an authority throughout Ukraine.” (Bakhchisarai)

“Borys Oliynyk – the person, who has the right for opinion, for opposition. His reputation is not tarnished.” (Odesa)

Among outstanding cultural and public figures of the present and past, the respondents pointed out I. Malkovych, I. Gasprynsky, V. Lypynsky, D. Lykhachev, B. Stupka and other people, who left remarkable traces in history.

“First of all, it is Gasprynsky. He is a brilliant representative of Turkic peoples. He was well educated. He studied abroad. He is an authority for me.” (Bakhchisarai)

“For instance, I like Malkovych, publisher of the book “A-ba-ba-ga-la-ma-ga”. He is an authority for me but a self-sufficient person, who contributed a lot to Ukrainian culture.” (Uzhorod)

“I respect my compatriot Lypynsky, as he never betrayed his principles. [It is immoral] to serve two masters ... I don’t like chameleons. Though, there are over 90% of such persons in the country.” (Lutsk)

“I like the late academician Lykhachev. His ideas are alive even today. He was the only one in Russia, who opposed transfer of museums to private hands. He said that the nation would have no future with closed libraries short of funds. Many years have passed since his death, but his words will survive through the years.” (Odesa)

“I esteem Bohdan Stupka – an eminent Ukrainian, who a famous Ukrainian, who contributed and continues contributing a lot to national culture” (Simferopol)

In the viewpoint of some respondents, no person can be an authority for them, *“If a person is a writer, one may admire his/her writings knowing nothing on his/her personal virtues... Let’s take Vincent van Gogh for example. We know his masterpieces but do not know his character. The same is true about politicians. A politician can draft only one sound bill and simultaneously have many demerits. Neither antiquity nor the famous Klychkos can be idealized.” (Odesa)*

The participants had different viewpoints concerning periods of time, when prominent figures emerged most often. On the one hand, they stated that such persons had appeared at any time though their influence was manifested much later.

“I consider that eminent persons emerge at all times. Perhaps, we do not appreciate them now but have to acknowledge their magnitude later.” (Simferopol)

On the other hand, it was emphasized that at crucial historical moments, some figures could manifest their supernatural virtues.

“It is because usually, when nothing changes and life takes its normal course, such people cannot show their worth. Only under critical circumstances, those, who manage to solve problems, become outstanding personalities.” (Donetsk)

However, this opinion was opposed by the following argument, *“It is historically proved that vacuum can appear during a political crisis. A third, fascist, force can break this vacuum. Fascist leaders also left remarkable traces in history. May Ukraine avoid such a situation!” (Simferopol)*

Rights of National, Language and Religious Minorities

Interethnic and religious issues are the most sensitive in every society. In the opinion of most participants, language, religious and ethnic minorities as well as governmental agencies at a variety of levels should make joint efforts to protect respective rights. It is necessary to found public institutions with a mandate to settle these issues, control implementation of decisions on minorities and develop a contemporary legal basis.

“I think the President should regulate these issues more generally. Lawmakers should establish rules for the above minorities and present the government with respective drafts manifesting our

will. We have the right of choice and freedom of speech. The President should only give permission and the stakeholders should solve problems on their own. Perhaps, they need someone to supervise and control their actions, someone who can judge from the outside.” (Lutsk)

“Problems emerge at all times and must be settled at all levels. Hence, every distinct issue shall be considered separately. For instance, cultural or religious issues shall be solved at the state level, since if this implies racism, it is everybody’s concern.” (Donetsk)

“On the one hand, it is very easy to say that it is only the government’s responsibility to meet challenges. We must help authorities. We must manifest a desire to do something. It is necessary that the government comprehends our needs and hears our voices.” (Odesa)

“Render to the President the things that are the President’s and communities – communities’. Councils and other representative agencies should perform their functions. Common goals can be attained by joint complementary actions and mutual control. The principle of mutual control can be seen in both nature and the society: every controller and every executive must be controlled.” (Lutsk)

Some participants considered it was the government that should protect the above rights through drafting a comprehensive package of programs and regulations to be implemented by local authorities directly aware of minority challenges.

“The above problems must be resolved only at the national level... All local efforts would be in vain, should local authorities and communities have no desire to develop and approve relevant programs and policies.” (Uzhorod)

“Actually, the community must determine itself and only then the government must pass definite laws regulating minority rights and actions. As a matter of fact, it is very difficult to develop without legal support. With legal support, the community can develop not only in a town or in a village, but also nationwide.” (Bakhchisarai)

“I guess it is a primary function of the state. This must be coordinated at the national level because in some regional authorities will agree to solve these problems, whereas others can reject. The state must protect minority interests and rights entrenched in the Constitution.” (Simferopol)

Furthermore, the participants stated that communities should take the initiative to legally protect their rights. It is necessary to properly encourage public organizations with a mandate to advocate rights of language, religious and ethnic minorities. NGOs members should coordinate efforts and act as intermediaries between citizens and national authorities.

“Ethnic communities should protect their rights through minority public organizations, as it happens at present. It is minority members, who should demonstrate initiative and integrity.” (Bakhchisarai)

“Many Ukrainian citizens are not aware of their rights. So, first and foremost, these minorities should know their rights. It’s quite normal. Of course, people can consult with experts or read about their rights. It depends upon them.” (Lutsk)

General Conclusions

□ There is a complex of various stereotypes relating to cultural and language identity and distinctions between residents of Ukrainian regions evoked by their geographical location, uneven economic development, historical specificities, different cultural and religious traditions. The

respondents differentiated between language, political and budget stereotypes (the need to distribute budget funds between the regions and unfairness of such distribution – “some regions are living on the others”).

- Information about life in other regions is insufficient. Many people are distrustful of news coverage in the media. However, interest in other regions’ life mostly concerns social and cultural developments, historical monuments etc.
- The media, especially television, pay little attention to local news covering historical and cultural heritage and traditions of different regions and thereby eliminating existent stereotypes. The participants shared the opinion that visits to other regions and communication with local residents serve as the best way of getting reliable and detailed information about their life.
- Special attention shall be paid to the youth, who does not have certain negative stereotypes. Hence, there is the need to renew educational interregional exchange programs for schoolchildren and students and create favourable conditions for their traveling around the country.
- There are numerous challenges in the field of language, cultural and religious rights of citizens. The audience was negative about teaching of religion fundamentals because secondary education should be secular. The Crimean Tatar participants reported no violations of their religious rights. The only example of infringement of Moslem rights was that their religious holidays were not celebrated nationally. Moreover, the need to develop policies on Ukraine’s international strategy, maintenance of culture and determination of priorities in those areas for national and local authorities was stressed.
- State officials at a variety of levels must be fluent in Ukrainian so that to provide citizens with information and services in the language they prefer.
- The Crimean participants addressed the necessity for authorities to pursue a tolerant ethnic policy. Governmental agencies must adhere to a policy targeted toward maintenance and development of specificities of every Crimean ethnicity. The respondents were positive about the draft Program on development of ethnographic tourism in the Crimea for 2005–2010 providing for foundation of 28 ethnographic villages in 12 Crimean areas, which would encourage preservation of Crimean ethnic and cultural diversity.
- A certain tension exists between the Crimean Tatars and Russians. To meet the challenge, it is necessary to introduce teaching of ethnic history at schools and organize cultural actions with participation of members of different ethnicities.
- There were different opinions about a perspective on a single Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Most Volyn participants were positive about a single Ukrainian Orthodox Church though concluded that its establishment would take long because of the need for the Orthodox clergy to reach a consensus. The Odesa and Donetsk respondents shared the above viewpoint.
- Scheme of distribution of the national budget is unclear or difficult to understand. Some participants emphasized the need to earmark more financial resources for local needs, others insisted on centralized distribution of budget funds with regard to the subsidized regions. The Odesa respondents were more categorical, as they believed that the lion’s share of revenues should remain in the local budget. The audience was positive about a perspective on Ukraine’s federal system of governance, which would aid to meet interregional challenges and provide conditions for development of the subsidized regions.
- Interethnic and religious issues are the most sensitive in every society. Governmental agencies, language, religious and ethnic minorities should make joint efforts to protect respective minority rights. Moreover, it is necessary to properly encourage work of NGOs that advocate these rights. NGOs members should coordinate efforts and act as intermediaries between citizens and national authorities.

Policies and Programs that Promote the Development of a Canadian National Identity

Background Documents and Information

SECTION A. CULTURE

1. BROAD LEGISLATION / POLICY

1. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/i-21.8/79663.html>

Investment Canada Act. The purpose of this Act is to encourage investment in Canada by Canadians and non-Canadians that contributes to economic growth and employment opportunities, and to provide for the review of significant investments in Canada by non-Canadians in order to ensure such benefit to Canada. Specifically of interest, such review includes requirements that foreign investments are compatible with national cultural policy objectives. Refer to Sections 14.1(5)(d), 15(a), 20(e), 24(2), 26(3), and 35(2).

2. <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb9925-e.htm>

Cultural Exemptions in Canada's Major International Trade Agreements and Investment Relationships. This document details Canada's use of cultural exemption provisions in international trade agreements, such as the *Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement* and the *North American Free Trade Agreement*, and with multilateral agreements such as the *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* (GATT) and *General Agreement on Trade in Services* (GATS). These provisions allow the Government of Canada to continue to support its domestic cultural industries. Such protectionism also applies to investment agreements as with the failed *Multilateral Agreement on Investment* (MAI).

3. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/pubs/invest/invest_e.cfm

Foreign Investment Policies and Practices in the Canadian Cultural Sector. This is a document of wide breadth, explaining a diversity of foreign investment policies and practices pertaining to Canada's Cultural Sector. It includes an overview of the *Investment Canada Act* by way of activities targeted by the legislation, the review process, and the Net Benefit Test to determine the benefit of a given investment to Canada. Specific investment policy guidelines and related measures, organized according to Cultural Activity Sectors, are present as well. Sector information is provided on Film and Video, Book Publishing and Distribution (including retail), Periodicals (i.e. Canadian content, *Foreign Publishers Advertising Services Act*, *Income Tax Act*), Newspapers, and Broadcasting (i.e. *Investment Policy*, *Income Tax Act*).

4. http://www.media-awareness.ca/english/issues/cultural_policies/international_agreements.cfm

Media Awareness Network (MAN) - International Agreements and Canadian Identity. The website covers a number of international agreements and treaties dealing with copyright and cultural trade issues, which have an impact on Canada's sovereignty over cultural matters. Primarily, the article is divided into two categories: International Copyright Agreements and International Trade Agreements. The former category includes the *Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works* (1886, amended 1979), the *Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations* (1961), the *WIPO Copyright Treaty* (1996), and the *WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty* (1996). The latter group includes the *Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement* (FTA), the *North American Free Trade Agreement* (NAFTA), the *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* (GATT) (1947, 1994), and the *Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development* (OECD).

5. http://www.media-awareness.ca/english/issues/cultural_policies/cultural_policy_chronology.cfm
MAN Media and Canadian Cultural Policies Chronology. This link leads to a chronology that traces the formative events in the history of Canada's attempt to promote and protect cultural expression from 1920 forward. It begins with Canada's struggle to protect its identity dating back to the introduction of commercial radio broadcasting in the 1920s. At that time, Canadian politicians and public leaders were concerned that U.S. radio programming would dominate Canadian airwaves. The chronology ends in 2003, with reference to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage report entitled *Our Cultural Sovereignty: The Second Century of Canadian Broadcasting*.

6. http://www.media-awareness.ca/english/issues/cultural_policies/canada_cultural_policies.cfm
MAN Canada's Cultural Policies. Herein, the website listed above briefly explores the major components of Canada's cultural policies, using historical milestones as reference points. It provides a definition of "cultural policy," with reference to Canadian Heritage's mission in this capacity. Canadian cultural institutions are also listed, in addition to explaining the nature of Canadian content and ownership regulations (as with the role of CRTC). The following areas are also reviewed in their relationship to cultural policy: Official Languages policy, program support, and taxation measures.

7. <http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/36/1/CHER/Studies/Reports/cherrp09-e.htm>
A Sense of Place – A Sense of Being (The Evolving Role of the Federal Government in Support of Culture in Canada). The aim of this study was to examine the subject as suggested in the parentheses above. Work of the paper focused on three emerging challenges: the rapid pace of demographic change in our country, the exponential evolution of communication technologies, and the globalization of economies and trade. These areas were deemed as representing formidable issues to consider when setting policy protection, support, and enhancement, of our culture and cultural institutions. The report concludes with 43 recommendations to address the aforementioned concerns, ranging from additional resources for Canada Council for the Arts to the creation of a Canadian archival network.

8. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/c-2/13565.html>
Canada Council for the Arts Act. This is the founding legislation behind the creation of the Canada Council for the Arts. It defines the objects of the Council as being to foster and promote the study and enjoyment of, and the production of works in, the arts. This legislation also details the Council's powers and duties, governance structure, financing, and responsibilities in reporting to Parliament.

9. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/s-19.6/104474.html>
Status of the Artist Act. This Act recognizes the importance of artists in Canadian society and establishes a framework to govern professional relations between artists and producers, and is comprised of two main parts. Part I establishes the Canadian Council on the Status of the Artist, whose purpose is to act as an advisory body to the Minister of Canadian Heritage. Broadly speaking, the Council is responsible for supporting and promoting the professional status of artists in Canada through such activities as information gathering, advising the Minister, and liaising with artists' associations. Part II of the Act establishes the Canadian Artists and Producers Professional Relations Tribunal (CAPPRT or the Tribunal), a labour board responsible for administering the provisions of the Act that govern relations between self-employed artists and producers in the Canadian cultural sector, within federal jurisdiction. The Tribunal reports to Parliament through the Minister of Labour. Responsibility for the cultural aspects of the Act (Part I) lies with the Department of Canadian Heritage.

10. <http://www.pch.gc.ca/pc-ch/mindep/misc/culture/hm/contents.htm>

Culture & Heritage – Connecting Canadians Through Canada’s Stories (PCH). The link above leads to a document of great breadth, as per the Federal Government’s role in protecting and promoting Canadian cultural identity (i.e. connecting Canadians through Canada’s stories). It captures Federal Government efforts across the various Cultural Sectors, including books & magazines, film & video, broadcasting, music, multimedia & the Internet, theatre, dance, and the visual arts. Also covered is the handling of heritage in Canada, trade and investment pertaining to the cultural sector, and a contact list of Federal culture and heritage organizations.

11. <http://www.pch.gc.ca/pc-ch/pubs/report/HTM/1.htm>

Culture & Heritage - Making Room for Canada’s Voices. This article is similar to the *Culture & Heritage – Connecting Canadians Through Canada’s Stories* piece, though there is a greater focus on how the Federal Government helps ensure that Canadians have access to and control of the various Cultural Sectors. Cultural areas covered in this paper include broadcasting, film & video, the music industry, book publishing, newspapers & magazines, multimedia, the Arts, and heritage.

12. <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=U1ARTU0000093>

Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee (Summary of Applebaum-Hébert Report). Herein the website provides a summary of the Applebaum-Hébert Report, as produced by the Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee appointed by the Liberal government in August 1980. The Committee’s mandate was to investigate and represent the situations and needs of those with and active interest in Canadian culture and its institutions, producing three publications through 1981-82. Amongst other things, it resulted in the creation of the Canadian Heritage Council, called for a new Broadcasting Act, encouraged extension of the CBC's Radio Canada International, and various means for the CRTC to encourage Canadian program production.

13. <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/933-e.htm>

The Arts and Canada’s Cultural Policy. This 1999 review focuses exclusively on Canadian cultural policy as it concerns the arts; that is, on the range of government actions that have a direct effect on creative and performing artists and on the organizations within which these artists work. The review describes the leading concerns with respect to this country’s cultural policy for the arts and the main responses of the Federal Government. The Background and Analysis section examines the Role of the State, Cultural Sovereignty, Access to Canadian Cultural Production, Economic Viability and Government Financing, Mode of Intervention, and the Components of Cultural Policy. The paper concludes with a listing of Parliamentary Actions taken to support Canada’s Cultural Sector.

14. <http://www.collectionscanada.ca/massey/>

The Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (Massey Commission) 1949-51. The Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (also called the Massey Commission) was one of the most important royal commissions ever undertaken in Canada. The final report includes recommendations spanning all aspects of education, culture, and the mass media. The Commission was instrumental in the establishment of the National Library, also making recommendations upon the principles that should govern broadcasting and television policies in Canada, upon federal cultural agencies, aid to research, and Canada's relations with UNESCO.

15. <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=J1SEC624169>

Summary of Massey Commission. The link provides a summary of the Massey Commission by way of its history and importance. Some of the more pertinent details are listed in the above description.

2. BROADCASTING

1. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/b-9.01/8815.html>

Broadcasting Act. The Broadcasting Act of 1991 is passed in response to the recommendations of the 1986 Caplan-Sauvageau Report, released by the Department of Communications Task Force on Broadcasting Policy. Replacing the Broadcasting Act of 1968, the new act emphasizes the importance of bilingualism, multiculturalism and the special place of Aboriginal people in Canadian society. It also promotes employment equity for women, aboriginal people and visible minorities, and emphasizes the importance of programming which is Canadian in both content and character. Additionally, the Act redefines the CBC's role as creating a "Canadian consciousness."

2. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/b-9.01/8948.html>

Broadcasting Act (Part III - Canadian Broadcasting Corporation). This part of the Act specifically makes mention of the CBC, as per its overarching objectives. The legislation also details the CBC's powers, governance structure, financing, and responsibilities in reporting to Parliament.

3. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/c-22/32753.html>

Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) Act. This is the founding legislation for the CRTC, formerly named as the Canadian Radio-television Commission. The CRTC is vested with the authority to regulate and supervise all aspects of the Canadian broadcasting system, as well as to regulate telecommunications common carriers and service providers that fall under federal jurisdiction. The legislation also details the CRTC's objectives, powers, governance structure, financing, duties, and functions.

4. <http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/37/2/HERI/Studies/Reports/herirp02/01d-toc-e.htm>

Our Cultural Sovereignty: The Second Century of Canadian Broadcasting (Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage). This report resulted from the House of Commons Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage announcement, in 2001, that it would conduct a study of the Canadian broadcasting system. The Committee's aim was to determine whether the ideals and objectives set out in the *Broadcasting Act* of 1991 were being met and whether the Act itself was in need of reform. A major concern cited was the lack of a mechanism for regular evaluation of how well the objectives spelled out in the Act are actually met. Accordingly, many of the Committee's recommendations sought to address this problem.

5. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/ri-bpi/pubs/lincoln/index_e.cfm

Our Cultural Sovereignty: The Second Century of Canadian Broadcasting (Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage) – Government of Canada's Response to the Report of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage. The report contained on this website is as suggested by the title above, addressing itself in a focused manner to many, but not all, of the recommendations in *Our Cultural Sovereignty*. It indicates the actions planned to be taken by the Federal Government in response. Topics covered include, amongst others, Broadcasting Policy, Clarity and Alignment of Mandates, Community, Local and Regional Broadcasting, the Digital Transition, and Aboriginal and Northern Broadcasting.

6. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/ri-bpi/pubs/lincoln2005/index_e.cfm

Our Cultural Sovereignty: The Second Century of Canadian Broadcasting (Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage) - Government of Canada's Second Response to the Report of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage. The purpose of this response is to establish the priorities that will guide the broadcasting system over the coming years. The response highlights the past successes and future challenges for the broadcasting system, and outlines the Government's action plan under three pillars: Focusing on Canadian Content, Governance and Accountability, and

Looking Towards the Future. The majority of the Committee's recommendations are addressed within the action plan. That being said, the response also touches on those recommendations that are not reflected in the action plan, and includes an appendix that indicates where each recommendation is considered in the text.

7. http://www.pch.gc.ca/pc-ch/pubs/ri-bi_e.cfm

PCH Broadcasting and Innovation documents. This page is merely a collection of links to documents relevant to broadcasting and innovation in Canada. The articles themselves are both Canadian Heritage publications, and also those produced by third parties.

8. <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0001012>

The Royal Broadcasting Commission (Summary of Fowler Commission). The page here articulates a synopsis of the Fowler Commission. Specifically, it makes mention that in 1955 the Royal Commission on Broadcasting, led by Robert Fowler, is appointed in response to the arrival of private television in Canada. Two of its primary recommendations included the creation of an independent regulatory agency to supervise broadcasting, and establishing minimum cultural standards for private broadcasting.

9. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/pa-app/progs/paanr-nnbap/index_e.cfm

Northern Native Broadcast Access Program. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The Program's objective is to provide funding and assistance for the production and distribution of Aboriginal radio and television programming in Aboriginal Languages that reflect Aboriginal culture, community issues, concerns and current affairs. The communications societies serve approximately 400 communities in the three Territories and the northern portion of seven provinces.

3. MUSIC

1. http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/INFO_SHT/b306.htm

Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) and Canadian Content. This is a brief article defining Canadian content, its importance, and the CRTC's role. It further defines what the Canadian Broadcasting system is composed of, and how the CRTC produces an annual broadcasting monitoring report. Several related links are also available on the site.

2. <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/statutes.htm>

CRTC (Broadcasting regulations - CanCon). This is just a page of links to the various statutes and regulations that are within the mandate of CRTC. Included are lists of Acts, Regulations (Broadcasting and Telecommunications), and Directions to the CRTC.

3. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/pubs/can-con/can_con.html

PCH CanCon Rules. This is a PCH site that goes into great detail as to Canadian content rules, and the various systems used to define it accordingly. Specifically, for sound recordings and broadcast of musical works, it explains the MAPL system (music, artist, production, lyrics) and the Sound Recording Development Program. Further, for film, video, and television broadcasting, it refers to the requirements of the regulatory and support entities: the Canadian Audio-Visual Certification Office, the Canadian Television Fund, Telefilm Canada, and the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission.

4. http://www.media-awareness.ca/english/issues/cultural_policies/canadian_content_rules.cfm

Media Awareness Network - CanCon rules. This site presents another summary of Canadian content rules, including its definition under the *Broadcasting Act*. Rules reviewed include those

governing Radio (e.g. MAPL system), Television, and Pay-TV, Specialty and Pay-per-view Television. There is also a detailing of the regulation of CanCon under co-production treaties with other countries.

5. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/fmusic-cmusf/music_fund_e.cfm

PCH Canada Music Fund. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The Program's objective is to ensure that Canadian music artists and entrepreneurs have the skills, know-how and tools to succeed in a global and digital environment. It also aims to enhance Canadians' access to a diverse range of Canadian music choices through existing and emerging media. Additionally, there is the goal of increasing the opportunities available for Canadian music artists and cultural entrepreneurs to make a significant and lasting contribution to Canadian cultural expression.

6. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/pades-srdp/pubs/policy_e.cfm

PCH Canadian Sound Recording policy. Herein this website details the Canadian Sound Recording Policy, unveiled in 2001. The Policy addresses each of the following objectives to ensure that Canadians and the world have access to a diverse selection of Canadian music on their radios, television sets, in stores, at public venues and on the Internet. First is to enhance Canadians' access to a diverse range of Canadian music choices through existing and emerging media. Second, is increasing the opportunities available for Canadian music artists and cultural entrepreneurs to make a significant and lasting contribution to Canadian cultural expression. Finally, ensuring that Canadian music artists and entrepreneurs have the skills, know-how and tools to succeed in a global and digital environment. The Policy establishes the Canada Music Fund, a series of eight programs in support of policy objectives. As well, it creates the Canada Music Council comprised of a diverse cross-section of music industry representatives to advise the Minister and the Department on the implementation of initiatives to support songwriting, composing, new musical works, specialized music, market development initiatives, sound recording entrepreneurship, and to give access to and preserve Canadian musical collections.

4. PUBLISHING

1. <http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/36/2/HERI/Studies/Reports/heri01-e.html>

The Challenge of Change: A Consideration of the Canadian Book Industry. This report is from the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, as per its study of Canada's book distribution industry began in 1999. The study was to provide background on Canada's book industry, particularly on the current circumstances of distribution, wholesaling and retailing. This study is guided by three key shifts in book industry practices witnessed in recent years, and their perceived direct and/or indirect impacts on the creation, promotion, distribution and availability of Canadian-authored works. These industry shifts are: 1) Innovations in information technology, which have fostered the possibility of new types of computer-mediated commerce (i.e., e-commerce); 2) The arrival of the retail superstore, which is reconfiguring the book retailing and distribution landscape; and, 3) New trends in book wholesaling practices and ownership, which have left some industry stakeholders wondering whether such shifts represent a threat to the distribution and availability of Canadian-authored materials to Canadians. Accordingly, the recommendations contained in the report are designed to address the long-term well-being of Canada's book sector.

2. <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0006557>

The Royal Commission on Publications (Summary of O'Leary Commission). The website here offers a summary of the O'Leary Commission founded in 1960, otherwise known as the Royal Commission on Publications. Its mandate was to examine the impact of foreign publications on domestic periodicals in Canada, with specific focus on questions of competition and national identity. Recommendations included imposing tariffs on "split-run" editions of foreign-owned

magazines, and that advertising costs for such magazines be made non-deductible under the Income Tax Act.

3. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/pol/livre-book/index_e.cfm

PCH Book publishing policy. This is short explanation of how Canadian Heritage develops, implements, and maintains publishing policies and programs in support of books to help create a stronger publishing industry in Canada. Specifically, it makes reference to the Book Publishing Industry Development Program, the Loan Program for Book Publishers, the Cultural Industries Development Fund, the Copyright Act, and the Investment Canada Act.

4. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/padie-bpidp/index_e.cfm

Book Publishing Industry Development Program (BPIDP). This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The Program's objective is to ensure choice of and access to Canadian-authored books that reflect Canada's cultural diversity and linguistic duality in Canada and abroad. The program seeks to achieve this objective by fostering a strong and viable Canadian book industry that publishes and promotes Canadian-authored books.

5. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/ppel-lpbb/index_e.cfm

Loan Program for Book Publishers (LPBP). This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The Program was a pilot project launched in December 1998, in partnership between the Royal Bank and the Department of Canadian Heritage, which helped Canadian book publishers gain or increase their access to bank financing. The loan program helped 18 publishers overcome some of the barriers they might have otherwise encountered while seeking financing, with a total of \$2.9 million in operating lines of credit approved under the Program. The Program ended in 2002.

6. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/pap/index_e.cfm

PCH Publications Assistance Program. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The Program helps to connect Canadians from coast-to-coast-to-coast, by helping all Canadians have access to the rich literature, fine reporting and fierce opinions contained in Canadian magazines and community newspapers. This is accomplished by offsetting the cost of reaching readers so that the subscription costs are the same anywhere in this vast country. The program helps to build capacity in the Canadian publishing industry, while also fostering geographic, cultural and linguistic communities through the support of local, ethnic, Aboriginal and minority language publications. The program also negotiates a reduced postal rate for inter-library loans, making library books more accessible to Canadian readers.

7. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/fcm-cmf/index_e.cfm

PCH Canada Magazine Fund. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The Program's objective is to ensure the continued vibrancy of the Canadian magazine industry, and contribute toward the production of high-quality magazines showcasing the work of a wide cross-section of Canadian creators. The CMF also helps build industry capacity through support for business development of small magazine publishers, industry development projects and support for arts and literary magazines.

8. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/pol/magazines/index_e.cfm

PCH Magazine publishing policy. This is short explanation of how Canadian Heritage develops, implements and maintains publishing policies and programs in support of magazines to help create a stronger publishing industry in Canada. Specifically, it makes reference to the *Foreign Publishers Advertising Services Act and Regulations*, *Investment Review Guidelines for Magazines*, Tax deductibility under the *Income Tax Act*, the *Publications Assistance*

Program (PAP), and the Canada Magazine Fund (including the Support for Arts and Literary Magazines component).

9. <http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/pol/magazines/fact-info/magbkgd1.htm>

Foreign Publishers Advertising Services Act (FPASA). This paper offers a succinct summary of the FPASA. Specifically, it mentions that the FPASA allows for foreign publishers to invest in Canada, create new businesses and produce a majority of Canadian content if they want to have greater access to advertising revenues, in addition to a *de minimis* exemption of up to 18% of the advertising in any foreign periodical. Details in the paper include investment restrictions for foreign publishers, Canadian content definition, tax deduction guidelines, and other issues.

10 http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/pol/magazines/sor99-330_e.cfm

Full Text of FPASA. This is the full-text version of the FPASA. The most pertinent details of the Act are expounded in the above paragraph.

11. <http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/pol/magazines/fact-info/magbkgd2.htm>

Canadian Content in Magazines: A Policy on Investment in the Periodical Publishing Sector. The Government of Canada, via this article, announces a foreign investment policy for the periodicals publishing sector that will allow investment opportunities in the publication, distribution and sale of periodicals, provided that such investments result in the production of Canadian content in magazines. It includes policy statement and investment review guidelines intended to provide guidance to investors in respect of the application of the Investment Canada Act to the periodical publishing sector.

12. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/pol/magazines/Section_19_e.htm

Section 19 amendments to *Income Tax Act*. This is a very short piece that explains how amendments to Section 19 of the *Income Tax Act*, which came into force in 2000, would affect claiming deductions for advertising in periodicals. Section 19 is the part of the *Income Tax Act* that describes the conditions under which a Canadian advertiser may deduct from taxable income the expenses related to advertising in a periodical or a newspaper.

5. FILM & TELEVISION

1. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/cc21c/2003-06/index_e.cfm

Canadian Content in the 21st Century in Film and Television Productions: A Matter of Cultural Identity. This report came about as per the Honourable Sheila Copps, in 2002, announcing a review of the definition of Canadian content as it applies to film and television production. The scope of the review extended to co-production and theatrical distribution as well. The study was conducted over three phases, including stakeholder consultations, and covered the following range of topics: Canadian Content, Official International Treaty Co- productions, Theatrical Distribution, and Challenges Faced by Aboriginal and Minority Communities. In conclusion, the review also lists eleven recommendations in respect to Canadian content.

2. http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/INFO_SHT/b306.htm

Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) and Canadian Content. This is a brief article defining Canadian content, its importance, and the CRTC's role. It further defines what the Canadian Broadcasting system is composed of, and how the CRTC produces an annual broadcasting monitoring report. Several related links are also available on the site.

3. <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/statutes.htm>

CRTC (Broadcasting regulations - CanCon). This is just a page of links to the various statutes and regulations that are within the mandate of CRTC. Included are lists of Acts, Regulations (Broadcasting and Telecommunications), and Directions to the CRTC.

4. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/pubs/can-con/can_con.html

PCH CanCon Rules. This is a PCH site that goes into great detail as to Canadian content rules, and the various systems used to define it accordingly. Specifically, for sound recordings and broadcast of musical works, it explains the MAPL system (music, artist, production, lyrics) and the Sound Recording Development Program. Further, for film, video, and television broadcasting, it refers to the requirements of the regulatory and support entities: the Canadian Audio-Visual Certification Office, the Canadian Television Fund, Telefilm Canada, and the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission.

5. http://www.pch.gc.ca/pc-ch/sujets-subjects/arts-culture/film-video/pubs_e.cfm

PCH Film and Video documents. This page is merely a collection of links to publications relevant to film and video in Canada. The articles themselves originate primarily from PCH.

6. http://www.media-awareness.ca/english/issues/cultural_policies/canadian_content_rules.cfm

Media Awareness Network - CanCon rules. This site presents another summary of Canadian content rules, including its definition under the *Broadcasting Act*. Rules reviewed include those governing Radio (e.g. MAPL system), Television, and Pay-TV, Specialty and Pay-per-view Television. There is also a detailing of the regulation of CanCon under co-production treaties with other countries.

7. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/n-8/87034.html>

National Film Act. This is the founding legislation behind the creation of the National Film Board. It defines the purpose of the Board as being to initiate and promote the production and distribution of films in the national interest. This legislation also details the Board's powers, governance structure, accounting, and responsibilities in reporting.

8. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/c-16/105837.html>

Telefilm Canada Act. This is the founding legislation behind the creation of Telefilm Canada. It defines the objectives of Telefilm as being to foster and promote the development of a feature film industry in Canada. This legislation also details the Telefilm's powers, duties, governance structure, financing, and responsibilities in reporting to Parliament.

9. http://www.pch.gc.ca/pc-ch/sujets-subjects/arts-culture/film-video/index_e.cfm

PCH Film and Video policy. This is a short statement articulating the PCH policy in relation to film and video. Specifically, it outlines five objectives for support: Reaching audiences, Reflecting ourselves, Investing in excellence, Harnessing the opportunities of new technologies, and Reaching the world. There is also a listing of PCH partners in accomplishing these goals, including the National Film Board of Canada, Telefilm Canada, the Canadian Television Fund, the Canada Council for the Arts, Canadian Audio-Visual Certification Office, Canada Revenue Agency, provincial governments and the private sector.

10. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/pnfsfv-ntpfvs/index_e.cfm

National Training Program for the Film and Video Sector. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. Specifically, the Program is meant to support national training in the film and video sector, which is at the highest level; is directed by curricula based closely on the current fundamental needs of the respective professions; and prepares the graduates for significant professional careers.

11. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/bcpac-cavco/progs/cipc-cptc/index_e.cfm **Canadian Film or Video Production Tax Credit (CPTC)**. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. Specifically, in order for a production to qualify as Canadian content for tax credit purposes, the production must meet specific criteria for key creative personnel and production costs. The CPTC is available at a rate of 25 per cent of eligible salaries and wages incurred after 1994. Eligible salaries and wages qualifying for the tax credit may not exceed 60 per cent of the cost of the production, net of assistance, as certified by the Minister of Canadian Heritage.
12. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/bcpac-cavco/progs/cisp-pstc/index_e.cfm **Film or Video Production Services Tax Credit (PSTC)**. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. Specifically, the PSTC is a mechanism designed to encourage the employment of Canadians, by a taxable Canadian or a foreign-owned corporation with a permanent establishment in Canada, the activities of which are primarily film or video production or production services. The PSTC is a tax credit equal to 16 per cent of salary and wages paid to Canadian residents or taxable Canadian corporations (for amounts paid to employees who are Canadian residents) for services provided to the production in Canada after February 18, 2003 (11 per cent between October 1997 and February 18, 2003). This refundable tax credit has no cap on the amount that can be claimed and is available to taxable Canadian corporations or foreign-owned corporations with permanent establishments in Canada.
13. <http://www.cifvf.ca/english/about-en.html> **Canadian Independent Film & Video Fund (CIFVF) – Mandate and Role**. Herein the mandate and role of CIFVF is described. Essentially, CIFVF is a dynamic private sector funding body which supports non-theatrical film, videos and new media projects created by Canadian independent producers to enable lifelong learning. The CIFVF provides financial assistance to independent producers for the development and production of English and French language films or videos and interactive digital new media programs in a variety of subject areas using the formats of documentary, docu-drama, drama and animation to inform, educate and/or instruct. Information is also provided on their programs, services, and management structure.
14. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/fct-ctf/index_e.cfm **Canadian Television Fund (CTF)**. This page provides a description of the aforementioned fund. Specifically, the CTF plays a pivotal role in the creation of high quality, distinctively Canadian programming for television. The Canadian Television Fund is a public-private partnership funded by the Government of Canada, cable companies and direct-to-home satellite service providers. With an annual budget of approximately \$250 million, its role is to enhance the creation and broadcast of high-quality, culturally significant, Canadian television programs. The CTF is an independent, non-profit corporation, governed by a Board of Directors comprised of representatives from the television, cable, production and film and video distribution industries, as well as representatives from the Department of Canadian Heritage and Telefilm Canada.
15. <http://www.nfb.ca/atonf/organisation.php?v=h&lg=en> **National Film Board Mandate**. Herein the mandate of the NFB is described. Fundamentally, the NFB's mandate is to produce and distribute distinctive, culturally diverse, challenging and relevant audiovisual works that provide Canada and the world with a unique Canadian perspective. Additionally, a detailed history of the NFB is also provided from 1939 through 2002, with links to the 2002-06 strategic plan.
16. <http://www.telefilm.gc.ca/01/11.asp>

Telefilm Canada Mission Statement. Herein the mission of Telefilm Canada is described. In essence, Telefilm Canada is a federal cultural agency dedicated primarily to the development and promotion of the Canadian film, television, new media and music industries. The Corporation provides financial assistance and strategic leverage to the industry in producing high-quality works - e.g. feature films, drama series, documentaries, children's shows, variety/performing arts programs, and new media products - that reflect Canadian society, including its linguistic duality and cultural diversity. The Corporation's initiatives aim to ensure the widest possible audience for Canadian works, both here and abroad, through support for distribution, export, versioning, marketing and industry promotion at Canadian and foreign festivals, markets and other events.

SECTION B. LANGUAGES

1. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

1. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/o-3.01/90080.html>

Official Languages Act. This is a highly important piece of legislation, of important implications for the Government of Canada and society as a whole. Specifically, it sets out the legislative framework for Canada's two official languages: English and French. There are three primary purposes of the Act. First is to ensure respect for English and French as the official languages of Canada and ensure equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all federal institutions. In particular, with respect to their use in parliamentary proceedings, in legislative and other instruments, in the administration of justice, in communicating with or providing services to the public and in carrying out the work of federal institutions. Second is support for the development of English and French linguistic minority communities, and to generally advance the equality of status and use of the English and French languages within Canadian society. Thirdly, the Act sets out the powers, duties and functions of federal institutions with respect to the official languages of Canada.

2. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/o-3.01/sor-92-48/155219.html>

Official Languages (Communications with and Services to the Public) Regulations. Detailed herein are the Regulations, as named above, as per service in the Official Languages, pursuant to the *Official Languages Act*. In particular, it defines when there is a situation of 'significant demand' for service in an official language, when it is a minority language within a given population or area. The Regulations also explain when the nature of a government office is related to the health, safety or security of members of the public. Additionally, the requirements for provision of info in both official languages are detailed in the case of the travelling public.

3. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/lo-ol/legislation/05_e.cfm

Federal institutions having specific responsibility for the *Official Languages Act*. This website provides a summary list as regards the above title. It includes both the names and a synopsis of the responsibilities of the respective institutions. The institutions on the list include: Department of Justice, Department of Canadian Heritage, Treasury Board Secretariat, Public Service Commission, Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, Federal Court of Canada, Standing Committee on Official Languages, Senate Standing Committee on Official Languages, and other Departments, Agencies and Crown Corporations.

4. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/lo-ol/legislation/01_e.cfm

Canadian linguistic policy. This is an extremely short piece regarding linguistic policy regarding official languages in Canada. It offers a brief history of policy development on official language policy, from the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1963-1970) to the new Official Languages Act (1988).

5. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/lo-ol/entente-agreement/education/index_e.cfm

OL FPT Agreements in the area of education. The document here explains the workings of Official Language agreements between Provinces and Territories with the Federal Government, in the area of education. Accordingly, some investments are made within the framework of a Protocol for Agreements reached between the Government of Canada and the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada (CMEC), the key partner for federal intervention in the area of education. This Protocol sets the framework for all the bilateral agreements in the field. Annual or multi-year cost-sharing agreements are also reached with each of the provincial and territorial governments for minority-language education to offer to members of official-language minority communities an education in their own language and for instruction of English and French as second official languages.

6. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/lo-ol/entente-agreement/services/index_e.cfm

OL FPT Agreements on the provision of services in the minority official language. The document here explains the workings of Official Language agreements between Provinces and Territories with the Federal Government, in the area of providing services in the minority official language. Accordingly, the Intergovernmental Cooperation on Minority-Language Services sub-component, of the Development of Official-Languages Community Program of PCH, aims to help provincial and territorial governments offer provincial, territorial and municipal services in the language of the official-language minority community, as well as the necessary infrastructure to provide these services.

Cost-shared investments are made within the framework of multi-year cooperation agreements with provincial and territorial governments. These agreements include multi-year action plans. Special contributions may be added to the investments in order to implement one-time short-term special projects.

7. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/lo-ol/entente-agreement/comm/index_e.cfm

OL Cooperation Agreements between PCH and Community Organizations. This website goes into explanation as per the above title. Specifically, there is an ongoing tradition of cooperation towards reaching common goals has linked community organizations to the Department of Canadian Heritage. *Cooperation Agreements* formalize this relationship and specify underlying values and principles thereto. These Agreements also specify any and all commitments agreed to by the parties as well as any community action and governmental cooperation mechanisms.

Community organizations in each province and territory respectively propose investment priorities according to targeted common goals for each community.

8. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/lo-ol/progs/dclo_e.cfm

PCH Development of Official-Language Communities Program. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The Program is designed to foster the vitality of Canada's French and English-speaking minority communities and enable them to participate fully in all aspects of Canadian life. Through partnerships and agreements with community organizations, provinces, territories, municipalities and federal departments and agencies, this program enhances the capacity of official-language minority communities to have a greater access to quality education and different programs and services in their language in their communities.

9. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/lo-ol/progs/dclo-vc_e.cfm

Community Life Component of Development of Official-Language Communities Program.

This page provides a description of the aforementioned component. The *Community Life* component of the *Development of Official-Language Communities* Program aims to enable the federal government to work with partners to offer official-language minority communities access to services in their own language, as well as the infrastructure necessary to ensure their growth and development.

10. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/lo-ol/progs/dclo-elm_e.cfm

Minority-Language Education component of Development of Official-Language Communities Program. This page provides a description of the aforementioned component. The *Minority-Language Education* component of the *Development of Official-Language Communities Program* aims to improve the provincial and territorial supply of programs and activities to provide education in the language of official-language minority communities (Anglophones in Quebec and Francophones outside Quebec), at all levels of education, and also to increase the production and dissemination of knowledge and innovative methods and tools to support teaching in the language of the minority.

11. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/lo-ol/progs/mev_e.cfm

Enhancement of Official Languages Program. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The Program is designed to foster among Canadians a greater understanding and appreciation of the benefits of linguistic duality. Through partnerships and agreements with provinces, territories and non-governmental organizations in support of second-language learning, and initiatives fostering mutual understanding between English- and French-speaking Canadians, this program brings Canadians to recognize and support linguistic duality as a fundamental value of Canadian society.

12. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/lo-ol/progs/mev-pdl_e.cfm

Promotion of Linguistic Duality component of the Enhancement of Official Languages Program. This page provides a description of the aforementioned component. The *Promotion of Linguistic Duality* component of the *Enhancement of Official Languages Program* aims to help organizations from various sectors to undertake or continue activities that promote a better understanding or appreciation of linguistic duality and to build stronger linguistic and cultural links among members of the two official-language communities. It also aims to promote the provision of services in both official languages, English and French, in order to build a bilingual capability within non-governmental organizations.

13. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/lo-ol/progs/mev-als_e.cfm

Second-Language Learning component of the Enhancement of Official Languages Program. This page provides a description of the aforementioned component. The *Second-Language Learning* component of the *Enhancement of Official Languages Program* aims to improve programs and activities offered by provinces and territories for instruction of English and French as second official languages, and to increase the production and dissemination of knowledge and innovative methods and tools to support the teaching of a second language.

14. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/lo-ol/pubs/index_e.cfm

PCH Official Languages documents. This page is merely a collection of links to documents relevant to official languages in Canada. The articles that are part of this list originate from Canadian Heritage publications.

15. <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0000741>

Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Summary). This page provides a succinct account of the abovementioned Commission. The Laurendeau-Dunton Commission, formally the Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, established in 1963 and presenting its final report in 1969, led to the policies of Official Languages, Multiculturalism and contributed to policies of Citizens' Participation and Citizenship Development. It had 3 main areas of inquiry: the extent of bilingualism in the federal administration, the role of public and private organizations in promoting better cultural relations and the opportunities for Canadians to become bilingual in English and French. The commissioners used as their guiding principle the concept of "equal

partnership" - equal opportunity for Francophones and Anglophones to participate in the institutions affecting their individual and collective lives. The commissioners were also directed to report on the cultural contribution of other ethnic groups and the means of preserving this contribution.

16. <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/press/conference/back.html>

Federal, provincial and territorial responsibilities on immigration matters. This website offers a detailed explanation as to the jurisdictional division of responsibilities for immigration. It is noted that federal-provincial-territorial working groups examine specific immigration issues, such as with settlement and language training. Mention is also made that, via agreements with the Federal Government, some provinces like Manitoba have assumed control over administration of language training. Information is also provided on the agreements with the other provinces and territories.

17. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rma/eppi-ibdrp/hrdb-rhbd/elt-clna/description_e.asp

ELT Initiative. The site here offers a basic overview of the ELT Initiative of the Federal Government. The objective of ELT is to provide job-specific language training to immigrants at Canadian Language Benchmarks (CLB) levels 7-10 in larger centres and CLB levels 1-10 in smaller centres where no language training infrastructure exists. The ELT initiative is an important component of the Government of Canada's efforts to attract highly skilled workers and ensure more successful integration of immigrants into the economy and communities. The strategic outcome of the ELT is employment for immigrants that will be commensurate with their education and experience. In addition, ELT assists in providing employers with a broader pool of skilled workers ready to access the labour market.

18. <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/press/05/0514-e.html>

Investment In Enhanced Language Training Pays Off. The following is a news release regarding the benefits of enhanced language training (ELT), as per the ELT initiative of the Federal Government. It reports that the government currently spends about \$140 million a year on basic language training for about 50,000 adult immigrants outside of Quebec. The Enhanced Language Training initiative accounts for an additional \$20 million annually, and provides bridge-to-work assistance, including mentoring, work placement and other assistance in accessing the labour market. Mention is made of cooperation with the provinces on ELT projects, a listing of which is included with the document.

19. <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/newcomer/linc-2e.html>

Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC). The program described on this site is as per the above title. By providing basic language instruction to adult newcomers in English and French, LINC facilitates the social, cultural and economic integration of immigrants and refugees into Canada. In addition, the LINC curriculum includes information that helps to orient newcomers to the Canadian way of life. This, in turn, helps them to become participating members of Canadian society as soon as possible.

2. QUEBEC BILL 101 AND MANITOBA'S HERITAGE LANGUAGES PROGRAM

1. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/bill101/>

Background on Quebec Bill 101 (1977). This CBC website provides an in-depth overview of the history of Bill 101, and its consequent effects. Bill 101, otherwise known as the *Charter of the French Language*, included the declaration that French was to be the only language allowed on commercial signs in the province. With few exceptions, the use of English was banned. On the education front, English was to be restricted mostly to those already in the system, their siblings, those temporarily posted in Quebec, or children whose parents had received an English elementary education in the province. (Eventually that regulation was relaxed to allow children of people educated in English in Canada access to English schools). The Bill has been a point of great contention and the subject of much litigation as to its legality.

2. <http://www.oqlf.gouv.qc.ca/english/charter/index.html>

Charter of the French Language, Full-Text, as introduced by Bill 101. This link leads to information as per the title above. The most salient points of the Charter are explained in the foregoing paragraph.

3. <http://www.edu.gov.mb.ca/ks4/docs/policy/heritage/>

Province of Manitoba's Policy on Heritage Language Instruction. Herein the Government of Manitoba's policy, as per instruction in Heritage Languages, is found. The document acknowledges the culturally and racially diverse society in which all members have the freedom to preserve and share their respective cultural heritage while participating fully in all of its institutions. Accordingly, this includes instruction in Heritage Languages, as enabled by several amendments made in the 1980's to the *Public Schools' Act* of Manitoba. Heritage Language is also defined by the paper, along with program and implementation details of Heritage Language instruction for schools in Manitoba.

SECTION C. HUMAN RIGHTS, ABORIGINAL, MULTICULTURALISM AND WOMEN'S PROGRAMS

1. BROAD LEGISLATION / POLICY

1. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/c-12.3/28981.html>

Canadian Bill of Rights. The link herein is for the Canadian Bill of Rights. The Bill, in 1960, provides recognition and protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This includes the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law, as well as the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection of the law. It also brings forth freedom of religion, speech, assembly and association, and of the press.

2. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/index.html>

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This is the primary document of Human Rights and Freedoms in Canada, as it is part of the *Canadian Constitution of 1982*. It details the fundamental freedoms held by all Canadians, and rights under the following categories: democratic, mobility, legal, equality, official languages, and minority language education.

3. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/h-6/31435.html>

Canadian Human Rights Act. The following link details the *Canadian Human Rights Act*. Specifically, the Act prohibits discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability and conviction for which a pardon has been granted. This also includes a detailed articulation as to what constitutes a discriminatory act.

4. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/e-5.401/50293.html>

Employment Equity Act. The following link details the *Employment Equity Act*. In short, the purpose of this Act is to achieve equality in the workplace so that no person shall be denied employment opportunities or benefits for reasons unrelated to ability and, in the fulfilment of that goal. It is also to correct the conditions of disadvantage in employment experienced by women, aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities and members of visible minorities by giving effect to the principle that employment equity means more than treating persons in the same way but also requires special measures and the accommodation of differences.

5. http://www.pch.gc.ca/multi/plan_action_plan/overview_vue_e.cfm

A Canada for All: Canada's Action Plan Against Racism - An Overview. Detailed herein is the aforementioned Action Plan. Through programs, initiatives and legislation, Canada has demonstrated its unwavering commitment to combat racism and racially-based discrimination. A *Canada for All: Canada's Action Plan Against Racism* is the next step in the Government of Canada's response. In collaboration with partners across Canadian society, the ultimate goal is to wipe out racism altogether. To that end, this forward-looking plan seeks to enhance both existing and new initiatives across federal departments. A multi-year investment of \$56 million, included in the 2005 Federal Budget, further strengthens the government's ability to move full speed ahead.

6. http://www.pch.gc.ca/multi/plan_action_plan/tous_all/index_e.cfm

A Canada for All: Canada's Action Plan Against Racism – Full-Text. As suggested, this is the full-text version of the Action Plan. The overall objective of the Plan is highlighted in the above paragraph, though this document does delve into far more extensive details.

2. ABORIGINAL

1. http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/const/annex_e.html#II

Constitution Act (1982), Part II: Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada. This part of the *Constitution Act* speaks specifically as to the rights of Aboriginal peoples. The primary point of concern in this section is that existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are recognized and affirmed.

2. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/i-5/74596.html>

Indian Act. This is a central document relating to Aboriginal peoples in Canada. The legislation is quite broad in its effect, from eligibility for being named in the 'Indian Register' to administrative and functional issues related to Reserve lands.

3. http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/index_e.html

Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) Report. The Commission on Aboriginal Peoples' (1991-1996) examined the evolution of the relationship between Aboriginal peoples, the government of Canada and Canadian society as a whole. The Report led to a large number, and broad range, of recommendations aimed at strengthening the economic, social and cultural situation of Aboriginals in Canada.

4. <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0011169>

Summary of RCAP Report. This website provides as summary account of the aforementioned report. It refers to both the history that led up to the report, and the overall work of the Commission. It suggests that the main conclusion of the report was the need for a complete restructuring of the relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada. Some of the broader recommendations included the proposal for a new Royal Proclamation; that is, governmental commitment to a new set of ethical principles respecting the relationship which acknowledged and respected Aboriginal cultures and values, the historical origins of Aboriginal nationhood and the inherent right to Aboriginal self-determination.

5. http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/gs/chg_e.html

Gathering Strength: Canada's Aboriginal Action Plan. This document was created in response to the RCAP report. Gathering Strength is an action plan designed to renew the relationship with the Aboriginal people of Canada. This plan builds on the principles of mutual respect, mutual recognition, mutual responsibility and sharing which were identified in the report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. That report has served as a catalyst and an inspiration for the federal government's decision to set a new course in its policies for Aboriginal people.

6. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/pa-app/progs/pcaa-afcp/index_e.cfm

PCH Aboriginal Friendship Centre Program. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The Program's objective is to improve the quality of life for Aboriginal Peoples in an urban environment by supporting self-determined activities which encourage equal access to, and participation in Canadian society; and which respect and strengthen the increasing emphasis on Aboriginal cultural distinctiveness.

7. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/pa-app/progs/ila-ali/index_e.cfm

PCH Aboriginal Languages Initiative. This page provides a description of the aforementioned initiative. The Initiative maintains and revitalizes Aboriginal languages for future generations by increasing the number of Aboriginal language speakers, by encouraging the transmission of these languages from generation to generation, and by expanding language usage in family and community settings.

8. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/pa-app/progs/paoar-arop/index_e.cfm

PCH Aboriginal Representative Organizations Program. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The Program's objective is to maintain a consultative framework of Inuit, Métis and Non-Status Indian representative organizations through which governments can address the social, economic, political and cultural issues affecting the lives of Canada's Aboriginal peoples.

9. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/pa-app/progs/ppfa-awp/index_e.cfm

PCH Aboriginal Women's Program. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The Program's objective is to enable Aboriginal women to influence policies, programs, legislation and decision making that affect their social, cultural, economic and political well-being within their own communities and Canadian society while maintaining their cultural distinctiveness and preserving cultural identity.

10. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/pa-app/progs/cupja-umayc/index_e.cfm

PCH Urban Multipurpose Aboriginal Youth Centre. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The Program's objective is to create a network of urban, multipurpose, Aboriginal youth programming. Programming provides accessible, Aboriginal community-based, culturally relevant and supportive projects, programs, services and counselling to urban Aboriginal youth, and will facilitate their participation in existing programs in order to improve their economic, social and personal prospects.

11. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/pa-app/progs/acctla-ctcaal/index_e.cfm

PCH Aboriginal Canada/Territorial Co-operation Agreements for Aboriginal Languages. This page provides a description of the aforementioned agreements. The objective of such agreements is to ensure the development, maintenance and revitalization of the Aboriginal languages of the three territories (Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut) by enabling and encouraging their use in their home, in the school and in the community.

12. http://www.pch.gc.ca/special/canada/11/aboriginal_e.cfm

National Aboriginal Day. This page provides details as per the preceding title. In cooperation with national Aboriginal organizations, the Government of Canada designated June 21 as National Aboriginal Day. This date was chosen because it corresponds to the summer solstice, the longest day of the year, and because for generations, many Aboriginal groups have celebrated their culture and heritage at this time of year.

3. MULTICULTURALISM

1. <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/936-e.htm>

Canadian Multiculturalism. The above link is to a document that offers an analysis of Canadian multiculturalism both as a demographic reality and as a public policy. It also refers to Multiculturalism on several levels. Ideologically, multiculturalism consists of a relatively coherent set of ideas and ideals pertaining to the celebration of Canada's cultural mosaic. Multiculturalism at the policy level is structured around the management of diversity through formal initiatives in the federal, provincial and municipal domains. Finally, multiculturalism is the process by which racial and ethnic minorities compete with central authorities for achievement of certain goals and aspirations.

2. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/c-18.7/32217.html>

Canadian Multiculturalism Act. This act is the foundational legislation for Canada's policy in regards to Multiculturalism. It covers a wide breadth of commitments in regards to Multiculturalism. For example, the Federal Government commits to recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage. Numerous other commitments of this nature are also made.

3. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ai-ia/ridp-irpd/02/index_e.cfm

Canada's Commitment to Cultural Diversity (PCH). Herein is a well-articulated document related to Canada's commitment to cultural diversity. It refers to cultural diversity from a Canadian perspective, a framework for Canadian perspectives on cultural diversity, and international action to realize the potential of cultural diversity.

4. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/multi/respect_e.cfm

Canadian Diversity: Respecting our Differences (PCH). This is another document that seeks to outline the Government of Canada's approach to Multiculturalism, or 'Respecting our Differences'. Reference is made to the historical origins of Canada's approach, Multiculturalism as a policy, healing Canada's relationship with Aboriginal peoples, valuing diversity and contributing to the world, and the challenges and opportunities ahead.

5. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/pdp-hrp/index_e.cfm

PCH Human Rights Program. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The mission of the Human Rights Program is to promote the development, understanding, respect for and enjoyment of human rights in Canada. To accomplish this, the program undertakes educational and promotional activities involving the public, educators, non-governmental organizations, government departments and others. This includes providing a selected number of grants and contributions to eligible organizations and distributing human rights publications upon request. The program is also responsible for coordinating, with provincial and territorial governments, the domestic implementation of international human rights instruments and the preparation of Canada's reports to the United Nations.

6. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/multi/program/guide/program_e.cfm

PCH Multiculturalism Program. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. Specifically, the Program focuses on the following objectives: Ethno-racial Minorities Participating in Public Decision-Making, Communities and the Broad Public Engaged in Informed Dialogue and Sustained Action to Combat Racism, Public Institutions Eliminating Systemic Barriers, and Federal Policies, Programs and Services Responsive to Ethno-racial Diversity.

7. http://www.pch.gc.ca/special/canada/11/multi_e.cfm

Canadian Multiculturalism Day. This page provides details as per the preceding title. On November 13, 2002, the Government of Canada, by Royal Proclamation, designated June 27 of each year as Canadian Multiculturalism Day. Canadian Multiculturalism Day is an opportunity to celebrate our diversity and our commitment to democracy, equality and mutual respect and to appreciate the contributions of the various multicultural groups and communities to Canadian society.

4. WOMEN

1. <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0007674>

The Royal Commission on the Status of Women (Summary of Bird Commission). Herein the work of the above name Commission is summarized. The Royal Commission on the Status of Women, or the Bird Commission, was formed by Prime Minister Pearson in 1967 (final report was tabled in House of Commons in 1970). The Commission produced a report containing 167 recommendations on numerous matters: access of women to managerial positions, day care, educational opportunities, equal pay for work of equal value, and other important concerns. The Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women was also established in 1973, based upon the Commission's recommendations.

2. http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/about/index_e.html

Status of Women Canada. This website provides general background info as to Status of Women Canada (SWC). Status of Women Canada (SWC) is the federal government agency that promotes gender equality, and the full participation of women in the economic, social, cultural and political life of the country. SWC focuses its work in three areas: improving women's economic autonomy and well-being, eliminating systemic violence against women and children, and advancing women's human rights. SWC works to provide Canadians with strengthened and more equitable public policy by conducting gender-based analysis and promoting its application throughout the federal government. It supports research that brings the gender dimensions of policy issues into the public agenda. SWC also plays a vital role in supporting the work of women's and other equality-seeking organizations. It promotes women's equality in collaboration with organizations from the non-governmental, voluntary and private sectors. In promoting women's equality globally, SWC works with other countries and international organizations.

3. http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/funding/prf/prfmandate_e.html

SWC Policy Research Fund. This page provides a description of the aforementioned fund. The Fund's objective is to support independent, nationally relevant forward-thinking policy research on gender equality issues. The following types of research are supported by the Fund: research that identifies policy gaps, trends and emerging issues, research that examines the consequences of existing policies, and research that focuses on concrete recommendations for policies and practices that would improve the status of women

4. http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/funding/wp/wpguidetxt_e.html#mand

SWC Women's Program. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program's mandate. The mandate is to support action by women's organizations and other partners seeking to advance equality for women by addressing women's economic, social, political and legal situation. This is accomplished via financial assistance and technical support (e.g., linking different groups that share a common goal, helping groups gain access to various parts of the government, or providing access to resource materials and tools that help organizations to work more effectively).

SECTION D. PROGRAMS THAT PROMOTE A BETTER KNOWLEDGE OF CANADA
(Regional exchanges, International expositions, Major Anniversaries and Commemorative Days)

1. YOUTH PROGRAMS AND CELEBRATE CANADA! PROGRAMS

1. http://www.pch.gc.ca/special/ycw-jct/html/welcome_e.htm

Young Canada Works. This page provides a description of the aforementioned initiative. The Initiative's objectives are to offer students and young graduates the chance to put their skills to the test, build career equity, earn money for their education or get started on the right career path. Summer jobs and internships give young people access to unique opportunities to learn and work, whether it be to practise their second language in a museum, work in an Aboriginal friendship centre or even travel abroad. Young Canada Works is also an opportunity for employers to benefit from innovative ideas and competitive skills. Wage subsidies are available for eligible employers.

2. <http://www.exchanges.gc.ca/TwoWayExchanges.asp?Language=0&MenuID=2>

Youth Exchanges Canada. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The Program provides funding to support group two-way exchanges for Canadians between the ages of 11 and 18. Groups of 10 to 30 youth, from different regions of the country are twinned according to their age and interests. Each participant takes turns hosting their twin in their home. Participants play an active role in planning the exchange, communicate regularly with their twin, conduct research on the exchange communities and participate in fundraising. The Program's objectives are to enhance knowledge and understanding of Canada among participants, connect Canadians with one another, and develop a sense of Canadian identity and attachment to Canada by helping youth appreciate both the diversity and the shared aspects of the Canadian experience.

3. <http://www.exchanges.gc.ca/forums.asp?Language=0&MenuID=3>

Youth Forums Canada. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The Program provides funding to support projects that give Canadian youth between the ages of 15 and 30 inclusively, an opportunity to connect with one another. Different projects are eligible to the YFC program, such as youth forums, workshops, conferences or one-way exchanges. Participants are given the opportunity to learn about a variety of subjects and discover another region of Canada. The objectives of this program are the same as Youth Exchanges Canada.

4. http://www.pch.gc.ca/special/canada/invitation/funding_e.cfm

Celebrate Canada! This page provides information regarding the aforementioned program. The Program provides Financial assistance is provided to support Celebrate Canada! activities during the Celebrate Canada! period from June 21 to July 1, (including National Aboriginal Day, on June 21, Saint-Jean-Baptiste Day on June 24, Canadian Multiculturalism Day on June 27 and culminating with Canada Day on July 1). Eligibility, funding criteria, and application requirements are also detailed as well.

5. http://www.pch.gc.ca/special/canada/11/baptiste_e.cfm

Saint-Jean-Baptiste Day. This link provides details on Saint-Jean-Baptiste Day. Specifically, all across Canada, French Canadians express their cultural pride and rich heritage through colourful parades and lively parties marking Saint-Jean-Baptiste Day. These festivities combine the ancient rites of the summer solstice - a period of light and hope - with the traditional celebration in honour of the Patron Saint of French Canadians, who was officially proclaimed as such by His Holiness Pope Pius X in 1908.

6. http://www.pch.gc.ca/pc-ch/org/sect/publi/even_e.cfm

PCH Major Events and Celebrations Branch. This page gives a brief description of the Major Events and Celebrations Branch of PCH. Through various programs, both international and national, the Major Events and Celebrations Branch seeks primarily to promote and strengthen Canadian identity and pride in Canada, and to highlight our society's major accomplishments. It also seeks to commemorate and celebrate Canada, and the individuals, events and symbols that have shaped its specific character.

7. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/expo/gen_e.cfm

PCH International Expositions. This page provides a brief description of the International Expositions Branch of PCH. Canada participates in International Expositions to showcase its cultural achievements, linguistic duality, diversity and values, as well as its technological and scientific expertise in a broad range of areas. Participation is coordinated by the International Expositions Directorate of the Department of Canadian Heritage. The Government of Canada is clearly committed to advancing Canada's place in the world. Canada must, therefore, pursue effective strategies to promote its interests and project its values globally. International expositions are unique forums where Canadians share the stage with the world's best and showcase to the world what the Canadian model of society can achieve. The federal government's commitment to financially support and participate in international expositions will lead to significant benefits and legacies for Canadians.

8. http://www.pch.gc.ca/pc-ch/org/sect/publi/celeb_e.cfm

PCH Celebration, Commemoration and Learning Directorate. This page gives a brief description of the Celebration, Commemoration and Learning Directorate of PCH. This Directorate is responsible to ensure a federal integrated and dynamic approach to celebrations, commemorations and learning. The Directorate through its Commemoration policy is responsible for also recognizing the country's diverse and exceptional figures, places and accomplishments as well as enhancing knowledge, appreciation and understanding of the history of Canada through a comprehensive national program of commemoration which complements other federal programs.

2. HERITAGE

1. http://www.pc.gc.ca/docs/pc/poli/princip/part1/part1d_E.asp

Parks Canada Guiding Principles and Operational Policies. The document herein details information as relates to the above title. A broad number of policy areas are covered, ranging from Ecological and Commemorative integrity to Public involvement. Of particular note is the reflection of Federal Governmental policy regarding Heritage within the stated principles and policies of Parks Canada.

2. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/pam-map/index_e.cfm

Museums Assistance Program (MAP). This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The Program provides financial assistance to Canadian museums and related institutions, for museum activities that support the objectives of Canada's museum policy. The priorities for funding under MAP are projects that tell Canada's story of the cultural and natural heritage diversity and promote Canada-wide perspectives (travelling exhibitions, outreach activities, collaborative initiatives, partnerships, etc.), projects that foster and support Aboriginal heritage activities, and those that strengthen the overall organizational capacity of museum institutions.

3. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/pcapc-cahsp/index_e.cfm

Canadian Arts and Heritage Sustainability Program (CAHSP). This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The Program aims to strengthen organizational effectiveness and build capacity of arts and heritage organizations. It is comprised of four program

components: Stabilization Projects, Capacity Building, Endowment Incentives, and Networking Initiatives.

4. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ph/pubs/mus-pol-mus/00_e.cfm

Towards a New Museum Policy - Discussion Guide. This discussion paper, regarding Museum policy in Canada, is intended to stimulate discussion about key issues that could be addressed in a new policy. The Department of Canadian Heritage is proposing that the overall theme for the new policy be revitalizing Canada's museums so that they can better serve the changing Canadian society. Under this broad theme, the Department has identified three broad priorities and accompanying objectives: participation, preservation, and sustainability. In all, the document provides good insight into the Government of Canada's position on Museums.

5. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ieh-hpi/pubs/0-662-66831-6/00_e.cfm

Towards a New Act - Protecting Canada's Historic Places. The above link leads to a discussion document as per protecting historic places in Canada. It provides an overview of the Historic Places Initiative, actions taken to date, actions in the near future (at the time of the document publication), and potential future actions. This paper allows for insight as to the Government of Canada's policy and plans for protecting historical places.

3. SPORT

1. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/sc/pol/pcs-csp/index_e.cfm

Canadian Sport Policy (Summary). This page provides details as to the *Canadian Sport Policy*. In short, the Policy challenges all stakeholders to open sport to every segment of Canadian society. It welcomes and seeks to involve all those who do not currently consider themselves a part of either the sport community or the sport system, but have the potential and the desire to contribute. Above all, the Policy seeks to improve the sport experience of all Canadians by helping to ensure the harmonious and effective functioning, and transparency of their sport system. The *Canadian Sport Policy* reflects a new approach to shared leadership and collaboration amongst all stakeholders to achieve the goals of enhanced participation, excellence, capacity and interaction in sport. The **Vision** of the *Canadian Sport Policy* is to have, by 2012 a dynamic and leading-edge sport environment that enables all Canadians to experience and enjoy involvement in sport to the extent of their abilities and interests and, for increasing numbers, to perform consistently and successfully at the highest competitive levels.

2. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/sc/pol/pcs-csp/2003/tdm_e.cfm

Full-text of the Canadian Sport Policy. This document is as per the aforementioned title. The most pertinent components of the Policy have been articulated in the preceding paragraph. The document also supplies some basic conclusions as concerns Sport in Canada, and the next steps for implementation of the Canadian Sport Policy.

3. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/sc/pol/aboriginal/2005/tdm_e.cfm

Sport Canada Policy on Aboriginal participation in Sport. Herein is found the Sport Canada policy, as related to the participation of Aboriginal peoples in sport. In 2002, federal, provincial and territorial governments, endorsed the *Canadian Sport Policy* that acknowledges the existence of barriers to sport participation for Aboriginal Peoples and has as a goal to increase access and equity in sport. Part of the aim of this policy is to help remedy this situation. The document articulates a vision of an enhanced Canadian sport system that is inclusive of, and adaptive to, Aboriginal Peoples in which barriers to Aboriginal participation, at all levels and across all contexts, are continually reduced and sport's potential to drive socio-economic change in Aboriginal communities is fully realized. It also entails a series of policy statements towards these aims, and a commitment to developing and implementing an Action Plan.

4. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/sc/pol/femmes-women/index_e.cfm

SC Policy on Women in Sport. Herein is found the Sport Canada policy, as related to the participation of women in sport. The document itself identifies a series of statements, or commitments, Sport Canada has made regarding women's sport participation. For example, Sport Canada commits to continuing its efforts to ensure that the needs of women in sport are identified, promoted and supported in all of its policies and programs. As new policies and programs are developed and others are updated, the particular concerns of women will be addressed. Other areas covered include Sport Stratification, Sport Infrastructure, Leadership Development, High Performance Competition, Participation Development, Resource Allocation, Liaisons, Research, Education, Promotion, Advocacy, Monitoring and Evaluation.

5. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/sc/mission/index_e.cfm

Sport Canada mission. This page, as suggested, articulates the mission of Sport Canada. In particular, the mission of Sport Canada is *to enhance opportunities for Canadians to participate and excel in sport*. In realizing this mission, Sport Canada's focus will be on providing leadership, expertise and targeted support, as an inclusive, responsive and valued partner within the sport community.

6. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/sc/mission/org-sport-canada_e.cfm

Organization of Sport in Canada. The subject matter of this article is as per the title. The sport system in Canada is made up of a number of organizations that provide sport programming and services at the national, provincial/territorial and municipal level. These groups serve either individual sports (single sport organizations), or cater to numerous sports sharing common needs (multisport service organization). National Sport Organizations (NSOs) are members of International Federations (IFs) that establish the rules of the sport and, among other things, determine where their respective international competitions will be held. National Games Organizations, such as the Canadian Olympic Association, belong to international games organizations like the International Olympic Committee, which are the franchise holders for major games.

7. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/sc/prog/index_e.cfm

Athlete Assistance Program (AAP), Sport Support Program (SSP), and Hosting Program summaries. This page provides a description of the aforementioned programs. The AAP objective is to is aimed at enhancing the Canadian high performance sport system. The AAP assists international calibre athletes with their training and competition needs, through the provision of a living and training allowance and, where applicable, tuition expenses. The AAP is also intended to assist carded athletes in dealing with the increasing demands of high performance sport and to enhance their personal and career development both during, and following, their athletic careers. The SSP is the Government of Canada's primary funding vehicle for initiatives associated with the *Canadian Sport Policy*. The SSP has three delivery components: national sport organization (NSO) component, multisport service organization (MSO) component, and the project stream component. The Hosting Program is a key instrument in the Government of Canada's overall approach to enhancing sport development in Canada and implementing the Canadian Sport Policy by assisting sport organizations or organizing committees to host international sport events or the Canada Games in Canada. The Hosting Program is viewed not only as a means to support the development of athletes and sport programming, but also as a support for the achievement of other Government of Canada objectives.

8. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/sc/prog/paa-aap/info_e.cfm

Athlete Assistance Program (AAP) backgrounder. The link here leads to a backgrounder page on the AAP. It covers information detailed in the above paragraph, but also includes information on the eligibility of both sports and athletes for Program support.

9. http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/sc/contributions/2004-2005/4_e.cfm

Sport Participation Development Program. This page provides a description of the aforementioned program. The Sport Participation Development Program (SPDP) is a contribution program for National Sport Organizations (NSOs) that is complementary to the vision and goals of the Canadian Sport Policy. The Program's objective is to support NSOs in their efforts to increase ongoing participation, recruit new participants and reduce the dropout rates, ideally in collaboration with current and potential partners such as municipalities, educational institutions, provincial and multi-sport organizations and corporate sponsors.

10. <http://www.canadagames.ca/Content/GamesHome.asp?langid=1>

Canada Games – An Introduction. The Canada Games are a long-running amateur sports competition held in Canada, for which this link provides background information. The thought of staging the Canada Games first arose in 1924, at a meeting in Winnipeg of the Amateur Athletic Union of Canada. For more than 40 years it remained a frequent subject of discussion. Finally, in 1966 in Quebec City, the governments of Canada and Quebec gave their joint approval to a proposal to hold the first Games the following year. Since 1967, at two-year intervals, even more ceremonial torches have been ignited to signal the start of successive Canada Games. With Prince Edward Island having hosted the 1991 Winter Games, each province has now hosted the Games at least once, with several having hosted twice already. An estimated 45,000 young Canadians have participated in the Games. Another 180,000 have engaged in try-outs and qualifying events. Many millions of Canadians have watched the Games either first-hand or on television, and over 67,000 have volunteered. As well, over 40 different sports have shared the spotlight in the Summer or Winter Games.

The CRTC

The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) evolved from a series of commissions, studies, hearings and legislation on the need to create an agency responsible for regulating broadcasting and telecommunications in Canada.

Today, we are an independent public authority in charge of regulating and supervising Canadian broadcasting and telecommunications. We serve the public interest and are governed by the *Broadcasting Act of 1991* and the *Telecommunications Act of 1993*.

The primary objective of the *Broadcasting Act* is to ensure that all Canadians have access to a wide variety of high quality Canadian programming.

The main objective of the *Telecommunications Act* is to ensure that Canadians have access to reliable telephone and other telecommunications services at affordable prices.

Not only must we comply with these Acts, but we also report to Parliament through the Minister of Canadian Heritage and are subject to orders from Cabinet. In addition, we must take into account the wants and needs of Canadian citizens, industries, and various interest groups.

Generally, our role is to maintain a delicate balance-in the public interest-between the cultural, social and economic goals of the legislation on broadcasting and telecommunications.

Our mandate is to ensure that programming in the Canadian broadcasting system reflects Canadian creativity and talent, our linguistic duality, our multicultural diversity, the special place of aboriginal people within our society and our social values. At the same time, we must ensure that Canadians have access to reasonably priced, high-quality, varied and innovative communications services that are competitive nationally as well as internationally.

Activities

With these considerations in mind, we regulate over 3,300 broadcasters, including television, cable distribution, AM and FM radio, pay and specialty television, Direct-to-Home satellite systems, Multipoint Distribution Systems, Subscription Television and Pay Audio. We also regulate over 78 telecommunications carriers including major Canadian telephone companies.

To get input from the public and interested parties, we hold public hearings, round-table discussions and informal forums. In addition, in 2001 we processed 1,107 broadcasting and 1,128 telecommunications applications. We also issued 919 orders and approximately 750 decisions. We responded to 21,400 letters of requests and complaints, as well as to over 35,300 telephone calls.

We also strive to expand our international dialogue, to better study the scope of the alliances and companies that are formed around the world, and to better understand the pressures that these new arrangements bring to bear on the Canadian market. For instance, at the 28th annual meeting of the International Institute of Communications in 1997, we proposed and initiated the organization of regular meetings with our counterparts in other countries.

In recent years, international communication has become increasingly important with the realization of the effects of globalization and convergence. Given that the CRTC is one agency with the authority to regulate both broadcasting and telecommunications, we feel that we are particularly well equipped to face these new challenges. This puts us in a unique position that allows us to help other regulators in the international community to become more prepared themselves.

The CRTC has been actively participating in forums twice a year (a tradition that the CRTC called on the international community to begin in 1997) involving about 30 regulatory agencies and 25 countries around the world.

Structure

Parliament set out our present structure and powers in the *Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Act*. This Act was amended by the *Broadcasting Act of 1991*.

Under the Act, the Cabinet may appoint up to 13 full-time and 6 part-time commissioners for renewable terms of up to 5 years.

Full-time positions include that of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson of broadcasting, and the vice-chairperson of telecommunications.

Only full-time commissioners are involved in the decision-making process for telecommunications, but all commissioners participate in broadcasting decisions.

400 employees specializing in broadcasting and telecommunications also contribute their talents and services to respond to our immediate and long-term responsibilities concerning legislation, the Canadian public, government and industry.

Canadian Content

[What is Canadian Content?](#)

[Why is it important?](#)

[CRTC's Role](#)

[What is the Canadian broadcasting system?](#)

[Broadcasting Policy Monitoring Report](#)

[Related Information](#)

What is Canadian Content?

Simply put, it's about Canadian artists and Canadian stories having access to Canadian airwaves.

Why is it important?

- Culturally, Canadian programs and music give voice to Canadians, to their talent and their shared experiences.
- Economically, it means jobs for thousands of Canadians – from creation to production and distribution on the airwaves.

CRTC's Role

Canadian content is the cornerstone of Canada's *Broadcasting Act*. The CRTC has established policies and regulations to ensure that Parliament's objectives for the development and presence of Canadian content in our broadcasting system are met. These policies and regulations address the following:

- creation and production of Canadian programs and music;
- financial support by the broadcasting system for the creation of Canadian content;
- how much Canadian content must be aired on radio and television;

- ratio of Canadian and non-Canadian programming services distributed by Canadian cable companies, direct-to-home satellite services (DTH) and multipoint distribution systems (MDS);
- Canadian ownership and control of the broadcasting system.

What is the Canadian broadcasting system?

The Canadian broadcasting system is made up of all the Canadian programming and distribution services involved in broadcasting:

- programming services (such as radio, television, specialty or pay-television services) that decide what programs to carry; and
- distributions services (such as cable television, direct-to-home satellite (DTH) or multipoint distribution systems (MDS) that deliver programming services to the public.

The Canadian broadcasting system is composed of public, private and community elements.

Broadcasting Policy Monitoring Report

The CRTC produces an annual Monitoring Report. The report presents data as well as a number of performance indicators used by the CRTC to examine the broadcasting industry in Canada. The CRTC uses this information to measure the success of its broadcasting policies, regulations and decisions, as well as to identify areas that may require further review or adjustment. The report is also intended to help foster a more open and better-informed public discussion of broadcasting policy in Canada.

Canadian Content for Radio and Television

Radio

What makes a song Canadian?

Four elements, referred to as the MAPL system, are used to determine whether or not a song qualifies as Canadian.

Air time for Canadian songs

All radio stations must ensure that 35% of their popular musical selections are Canadian each week. In addition:

Commercial radio stations must ensure that 35% of the musical selections they air between 6AM and 6PM, Monday through Friday, are Canadian.

Ethnic radio stations must ensure that at least 7% of the musical selections they air each week during ethnic programming periods are Canadian.

French-language radio stations must ensure that at least 65% of the popular vocal music selections they broadcast each week are in the French language.

As well, at least 55% of the popular vocal music selections broadcast between 6AM and 6PM, Monday through Friday, must be in the French language.

See Related Policy Documents for details.

Television

What is a Canadian program?

The CRTC will certify programs as Canadian if they meet the following criteria:

- the producer is Canadian;
- key creative personnel are Canadian;
- 75% of service costs and post-production lab costs are paid to Canadians.
- Read the [Canadian Program Certification](#) factsheet for details.

Air time for Canadian programs

Private television stations and networks (e.g. CTV, Global, TVA) and **ethnic TV** stations must achieve a yearly Canadian content level of:

- 60% overall, measured during the day – i.e. 6AM and midnight;
- 50%, measured during the evening broadcast period – i.e. between 6PM and midnight.

CBC must ensure that at least 60% of its overall schedule, measured during the day – i.e. 6AM to midnight, is Canadian.

Requirements for **pay-tv, specialty and pay-per-view services** vary and are set by conditions of licence. Check decisions for individual services for details ([Search](#)).

Broadcasters can claim a 125% to 150% time credit for Canadian dramas when they're aired during peak viewing hours (7PM to 11PM).

Fact sheet

The MAPL System

The MAPL* system refers to the four elements in the Radio Regulations used to qualify musical selections as Canadian. These elements were selected, as part of the Canadian content regulations, following an extensive public hearing process. The MAPL system is designed to stimulate all components of the Canadian music industry and to be as simple as possible for the industry to implement and regulate.

Objectives

The primary objective - a cultural one - is to encourage increased exposure of Canadian musical performers, lyricists and composers to Canadian audiences.

The secondary objective - an industrial one - is to strengthen the Canadian music industry, including both the creative and production components.

How does it work?

1. To qualify as 'Canadian content' a musical selection must **generally** fulfill at least two of the following conditions:

M (music) - the music is composed entirely by a Canadian.

A (artist) - the music is, or the lyrics are, performed principally by a Canadian.

P (production) - the musical selection consists of a live performance that is

- (i) recorded wholly in Canada, or
- (ii) performed wholly in Canada and broadcast live in Canada.

L (lyrics) - the lyrics are written entirely by a Canadian.

2. There are four **special cases** where a musical selection may qualify as Canadian content.

- The musical selection was recorded before January 1972 and meets one of the above conditions.
- It is an instrumental performance of a musical composition written or composed by a Canadian.
- It is a performance of a musical composition that a Canadian has composed for instruments only.
- The musical selection was performed live or recorded after September 1, 1991 and, in addition to meeting the criterion for either artist or production, a Canadian who has collaborated with a non-Canadian receives at least half of the credit for both music and lyrics.

This document is available in alternative format upon request.

Winter 2001

Introduction

Canadian content definitions in the film/video, broadcasting and sound recording sectors are used for two main purposes:

1. to determine access to direct funding or to access the Canadian Film or Video Production Tax Credit Program and
2. to measure television and radio broadcasters' conformity with Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) Canadian content regulations. All the Canadian content definitions in these sectors can trace their origins to CRTC radio and television initiatives in the late 1960s and early 1970s under the chairmanship of Pierre Juneau.

One of the main factors in determining whether a work is "Canadian" relates to the key creative personnel involved in its making: a minimum number of key creative positions (e.g. director, screenwriter, actor, performer, composer, etc.) must be filled by Canadians. Points are ascribed for each of them. The minimum number of points required varies depending on the program or regulation. Additional eligibility requirements must be met to qualify for Canadian content designation (such as 75% of production costs spent in Canada) and these also depend on the program and regulation. As a general rule, production and distribution companies must be Canadian-owned and controlled.

The various systems used to define Canadian content are described below:

SOUND RECORDINGS AND RADIO BROADCASTING OF MUSICAL WORKS

I - MAPL SYSTEM

The MAPL system refers to the four elements in the Radio Regulations used to qualify musical selections as Canadian. These elements were selected by the CRTC following an extensive public hearing process in 1969 and since then have been reviewed periodically to ensure that they are still appropriate. The MAPL system is designed to stimulate all sectors of the Canadian music industry and yet be as simple as possible for the industry to implement and regulate.

The primary objective is a cultural one: to encourage increased exposure of Canadian musical performers, lyricists and composers to Canadian audiences. The secondary objective is an industrial one: to strengthen the Canadian music industry, including both the creative and production components.

To qualify as "Canadian content" for the purpose of radio broadcasting Canadian content quotas, a musical selection must generally fulfill at least two of the following conditions:

M (music): the music is composed entirely by a Canadian

A (artist): the music is, or the lyrics are, performed principally by a Canadian

P (production): the musical selection is:

- recorded wholly in Canada, or
- performed wholly in Canada and broadcast live in Canada.

L (lyrics): the lyrics are written entirely by a Canadian.

The MAPL system is used by both the CRTC to check Canadian content compliancy by licensees and as a basis for eligibility to the federal Sound Recording Development Program (SRDP).

In general, 35% of the sound recordings played on a radio station between 6 a.m. and midnight must qualify as "Canadian content" as defined by the MAPL system.

II - SOUND RECORDING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (SRDP)

The SRDP is administered by three organizations and the Department of Canadian Heritage, each of which has determined Canadian content requirements appropriate to the Canadian music sector it supports:

- **FACTOR** (Foundation to Assist Canadian Talent on Record) is a not-for-profit organization which administers the components of the SRDP related to the production, marketing, promotion, touring and business development of the English-language, mainstream sectors of the Canadian music industry. Applications requesting assistance for the production of sound recordings must meet the following Canadian content requirements: 1) the artist must be Canadian, 2) the record company must be Canadian-owned and controlled, 3) at least 50% of the material to be recorded on an album must be 100% Canadian (i.e. 4-part MAPL), and 4) the recording must be produced in Canada.

- **Musicaction** is the sister-organization to FACTOR for the French-language mainstream music industry in Canada. Musicaction requires that applicants requesting assistance for the production of sound recordings meet the following Canadian content requirements: 1) the artist be Canadian, 2) the record company be Canadian-owned and controlled, 3) at least 50% of the lyrics or music be written or composed by Canadians, and 4) the album be produced in Canada.

- **Canada Council of the Arts** administers the Specialized Music Production Assistance component of the SRDP (non-mainstream/non-market-driven music). The Council requires that 1) the artist be Canadian, 2) the record company be Canadian-owned and controlled, 3) the album be produced and manufactured in Canada, and 4) at least 50% of the music be written by Canadians (original compositions or original interpretations of traditional music).

- **The Department of Canadian Heritage** administers the component of the SRDP directly related to Canadian content - Specialized Music Distribution Assistance (non-mainstream/non-market-driven music). This component requires that 1) the distribution company be Canadian-owned and controlled and 2) the distributor distributes at least 6 record labels owned by Canadian companies. In addition, only the titles of the record catalogue that are Canadian specialized music receive

funding. To be Canadian, the recordings listed in the catalogue 1) must be by a Canadian artist; 2) 50% of the tracks on the recording must have two qualifying MAPL conditions; 3) must be produced by a Canadian record company; and 4) the ownership of the Canadian master recording must be held by a Canadian company.

FILM, VIDEO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING

I - CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE (CAVCO)

CAVCO recommends to the Minister of Canadian Heritage the certification as Canadian for productions that meet the criteria set out in the Income Tax Act and its Regulations. Certification allows the production to have access to the Canadian Film or Video Production Tax Credit. For a production to qualify for the credit, it must be of an eligible genre and obtain a minimum of six "Canadian content" points. In addition, the producer must be a Canadian and 75% of the production expenditures must be made in Canada. CAVCO limits eligibility to specific program categories. CAVCO uses one "Canadian content" points scale for live-action production and another for animation. A maximum of 10 points are available under each scale.

Live-Action

A live-action production of any length must earn six points, based on the following key creative people qualifying as Canadian:

Director	2 points
Screenwriter	2 points
Highest paid actor	1 point
Second highest paid actor	1 point
Head of Art Department	1 point
Director of photography	1 point
Music composer	1 point
Picture editor	1 point

Two mandatory criteria must be respected:

1. Director or Screenwriter must be Canadian, and
2. the highest or second highest paid actor must be Canadian.

In the case of a television series the points system is applied to each episode.

Animation

An animation production must earn six points, based on the following key creative people qualifying as Canadian, or the location where the function is performed is in Canada:

Persons

Director	1 point
Scriptwriter and storyboard supervisor	1 point
First or second voice (or 1st or 2nd leading performer)	1 point

Design supervisor (art director)	1 point
Music composer	1 point
Picture editor	1 point

Locations where functions are performed

Layout and background	1 point
Key animation	1 point
Assistant animation/In-betweening	1 point

Persons and Location where function is performed (i.e. the camera operator must be Canadian and the work must be performed in Canada)

Camera operator	1 point
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Three mandatory criteria must be respected:

1. director or scriptwriter and storyboard supervisor must be Canadian,
2. key animation must be performed in Canada, and
3. or second voice (or first or second leading performer) must be Canadian.

In the case of a television series the points system is applied to each episode.

Producer Requirement

The producer (i.e. the individual who controls and is the central decision-maker of the production from beginning to end) must be a Canadian. Provision is made for the extension of a courtesy Executive Producer credit to non-Canadians under certain specific conditions, such as when the non-Canadian arranges for financing and/or assists with the foreign distribution of the production.

Cost Requirements

The cost requirements provide that

1. 75% of total amounts paid in the production services category is paid to Canadians, and
2. 75% of all expenses incurred in the laboratory and post-production work category is incurred for services in Canada.

Production Requirement

The production must be completed within two years after the end of the taxation year in which the principal photography began. There must be an agreement to have the production shown in Canada in the two years following its completion.

The following genres will not qualify as Canadian productions for the purpose of the Canadian Film or Video Production Tax Credit:

1. news, current events or public affairs, weather or market reports
2. talk shows
3. games, questionnaires or contests (except if directed primarily at minors)

4. sports
5. gala or awards
6. production that solicits funds
7. reality television
8. pornography
9. advertising
10. produced for industrial, corporate or institutional purposes
11. primarily stock footage (except if documentary), and
12. production for which public financial support would, in the opinion of the Minister of Canadian Heritage, be contrary to public policy.

II - CANADIAN TELEVISION FUND

The Canadian Television Fund (CTF) requires a production to have 10 points using the CAVCO scale. In addition, the underlying rights must be owned, and significantly and meaningfully developed, by Canadians, and the project must be shot and set primarily in Canada. The genres eligible for support through the CTF are Canadian drama, variety and performing arts, documentaries, children's and feature films with a Canadian broadcast licence.

To access the CTF (both the Equity Investment Program and the Licence Fee Program), a production must meet all of the following essential requirements:

1. The project must speak to Canadians about, and reflect, Canadian themes and subject matters.
2. The project must obtain 10 points on the CAVCO scale, as determined by the CTF. (Feature length films supported by the CTF require 8 points.)
3. Underlying rights must be owned and significantly and meaningfully developed by Canadians.
4. Eligible projects must be developed by Canadians. Canadian creators must have significant and meaningful involvement in the project, from concept to final script. The project may not be based on foreign television productions, foreign feature films (unless based on a published Canadian literary work) or foreign fully developed, final-version scripts.
5. 4. The project must be shot and set primarily in Canada.

These guidelines were strengthened in 1999-2000. Previously, productions required a minimum of 8/10 CAVCO points. However, given excess demand, the CTF Board raised the minimum access requirement to 10/10, giving the CTF the highest Canadian content entry threshold of any assistance program.

III - TELEFILM CANADA

Both Telefilm Canada's Canada Feature Film Fund and the feature film component within the CTF use the same basic requirements as those used by CAVCO, but require that a production obtain at least 8 points.

Official International Co-Productions

Telefilm Canada administers co-production treaties on behalf of the Government of Canada and can provide financial assistance with regard to the Canadian portion of the budget.

Official co-production agreements are binding international legal accords between governments. They are intended to encourage production by pooling creative, technical and financial resources under carefully prescribed conditions. Canada currently has more than 50 official co-production agreements with various countries around the world.

Official international co-productions receive 100% Canadian content credit; however, no points system is applied to co-productions. The creative portion must be equal to the financial portion. In other words, if a Canadian producer is responsible for 20% of the financing of a co-production, it is expected that the Canadian producer will have control over at least 20% of the creative elements of the production and 20% of the production costs must be spent in Canada.

Under these agreements, productions with a minimum of 20% Canadian participation (i.e. creative and financial) are recognized as Canadian content for broadcasting purposes. Moreover, the Canadian portion of the budget can have full access to the Canadian Film or Video Production Tax Credit Program and access to the CTF under certain conditions.

IV - CANADIAN RADIO-TELEVISION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CRTC)

The CRTC was established pursuant to the Broadcasting Act to provide for the regulation and supervision of the Canadian broadcasting system. The Commission specifies that Canadian broadcast licensees must broadcast a certain percentage of Canadian content productions (i.e. Canadian content quota).

In television, the CRTC pioneered the Canadian content points system in the late 1960s. Today, it uses the same basic criteria as those used by CAVCO in determining whether a production is Canadian, and also requires the producer to be Canadian. In addition to those production genres eligible under CAVCO, the Commission also recognizes sports, talk shows, news, video clips, etc., using an identical points scale.

For the largest conventional broadcasters, the CRTC has introduced a requirement of a minimum of 8 hours of priority programming per week between 7 and 11 p.m. The eligible categories of priority programs are: Canadian drama, music and dance, and variety programs, long-form documentaries, entertainment magazine programs, and regionally produced programs in all categories except news, current affairs and sports.

The CRTC also requires Canadian content from pay and specialty broadcasters, tailoring the requirement according to the service, setting individual levels of Canadian content as a condition of licence. This can take two forms - a minimum percentage of programming, and/or a specific level of expenditure for Canadian content. The Weather Network, for example, has a 100% Canadian content requirement. YTV has conditions of licence that require it to exhibit 70% Canadian programming in primetime (between 6 p.m. and midnight) and to expend 38% of annual gross revenues on Canadian programs.

International Co-Ventures

Unlike CAVCO, the Commission recognizes co-ventures as Canadian for broadcast purposes. Co-ventures are international co-productions that are not undertaken under an official co-production treaty signed by the Government of Canada and a foreign government.

Co-ventures are generally required to meet the same minimum 6 points and 75% cost requirements as under CAVCO to obtain credit as Canadian content. The increased flexibility with a co-venture stems from the fact that a non-Canadian producer is allowed an equal decision-making responsibility on creative elements of a production along with a Canadian producer. In such a case, however, the Canadian producer is responsible for the Canadian elements of the production budget.

Co-ventures with Commonwealth or member countries of La Francophonie provide additional flexibility. The production will be considered Canadian if the director or the writer, and at least one of the two leading performers, are Canadian, and if:

1. it meets a minimum of 5 points for key creative personnel;
2. a minimum of 50% of the total remuneration is paid to Canadians, and;
3. at least 50% of processing and final preparation costs are paid for services in Canada.

Canadian Content Bonuses

For the purpose of a broadcaster's Canadian content quota, the CRTC provides an incentive for programming certain production types and genres. For example:

- A non-Canadian program that
 1. is produced either in French, English or in a native Canadian language, and
 2. is dubbed in any other of those languages using Canadian resources, will be awarded a 25% Canadian content credit.
 3. On September 1, 2000, the CRTC implemented new Canadian content provisions for the largest TV broadcasters for prime time.
- Broadcasters will be required to schedule a minimum of 8 hours a week in the "priority programming categories of Canadian drama, music, variety, long-form documentaries and regionally produced programs in genres other than news, current affairs and sports."
- A bonus for Canadian drama programs:
 1. 150% for a 10/10 drama;
 2. 125% for a 6/10 to 9/10 drama;
 3. in the case of dramatic animation or live-action dramatic programming intended for children, the above bonuses are also applied to "appropriate children's viewing time".