

HEADQUARTERS III CORPS Office of the Commanding General APO #303. U. S. Army

* * *	****	¥
*	SECRET	*
*AUTH		¥
*INIT	CAW	¥
*DATE	1 Feb 45	¥
* * *	****	¥

GNNLF .

1 February 1945

SUBJECT:	Action Against Enemy, Reports After.
THRU :	Commanding General, Third U. S. Army, APO 403, U. S. Army.
то :	The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.
	And the second

Section I - Introduction. Section II - Narrative of Operations. Section III - Summary of Operations. Section IV - Intelligence Summary. Section V - Supply and Evacuation Summary. Section VI - Personnel Summary. Section VII - Civil Affairs Summary. Section VIII - Engineers Summary of Operations. Section IX - Signal Summary of Operations.

*Annexes:

- 1. Operations Maps 1 a through 1 h.
- 2. Map: Intelligence.
- 3. Engineer Operations Maps 3 a and 3 b.
- 4. Map: Supply and Evacuation.

- Station Lists.
 Roster of Officers, Hq III Corps.
 Roster of Officers, Hq III Corps A: Report, Hq & Hq Btry, III Corps Arty w/l Incl. (Incl withdrawn and forwarded separately.)

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

1. Authority: This After Action Report is submitted in compliance with paragraph 10, Change 3, AR 345-105. It is the second report of its kind submitted by this headquarters, and recounts the action which followed the relief of BASTOGNE, when the enemy was forced to withdraw from his penetration into BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG, and retreat to the Siegfried Line. It covers the period 1 January 1945 through 31 January 1945.

2. Command: During the month of January, III Corps, commanded by Major General John Millikin, was a part of Lt. General George S. Patton's Third United States Army.

#Annexes 5 through 7 included in original copy only.

-1-

3. Composition of the Corps:

On 1 January, III Corps was composed of the following units: (Major changes in attachments are discussed in Section II - Narrative of Operations. A complete record of changes and lists of units in support of Corps are found in Annex 5 - Station Lists.)

Hq and Hq Co, III Corps

DIVISIONS

26 Inf Div

CAVALRY

390 AAA AW Bn (SP) 949 FA Bn (155 How) 818 TD Bn (SP) 735 Tk Bn Co "A", 3 Cml Bn Co "B", 3 Cml Bn 2 Plat, 59 Field Hosp 35 Inf Div 448 AAA AW Bn (M) 654 TD Bn (SP) 179 FA Bn (155 How) Co "C", 3 Cml Bn Co "D", 3 Cml Bn 2 Plat, 16 Field Hosp 4 Armd Div 489 AAA AW Bn (SP) 704 TD Bn (SP) *444 QM Trk Co 3804 QM Trk Co 995 Engr Trdwy Br Co 1 Plat, 16 Field Hosp 6 Armd Div 777 AAA AW Bn (SP) 193 FA Gp 253 Armd FA Bn (105 How) 696 Armd FA Bn (105 How SP) 776 FA Bn (155 How) 177 FA Bn (155 How) 603 TD Bn (SP) 996 Engr Trdwy Br Co 642 QM Trk Co 3803 QM Trk Co 3 Plat, 60 Field Hosp

6 Cav Gp (Mecz)(Reinf) 6 Cav Rcn Sq 28 Cav Rcn Sq Co "C", 602 TD Bn (SP) Co "B", 293 Engr C Bn

ARTILLERY

III Corps Arty, Hq/Hq Btry 288 FA Obsn Bn 203 FA Gp 176 FA Bn (4.5 Gun) 731 FA Bn (155 Gun) *578 FA Bn (8^m How)

ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTY

32 AAA Gp, Hq/Hq Btry 467 AAA AW Bn (SP)(-Btry D) 468 AAA AW Bn (SP)

CHEMICAL

3 Cml Bn (Mtz) (-Cos A, B, C & D)

mal Tak ma

ENGINEER

2942 Engr	. Lec	in in	T T	sam
1137 Engr	. 0 0	3p		
145 Eng	r C	Bn		12
178 Eng	r C	Bn		
*183 Eng	r C	Bn		
188 Eng	r C	Bn		
249 Eng	gr C	Bn		
72 Eng	r L	Pon	Co	
513 Eng	r L	Pon	Co	
632 Eng	r L	co 2		
*770 Eng	r D	o Trk	CO	
998 Eng	gr Ti	rdwy	Br	Co

SECRET

- 2 -

MEDICAL

182 Med Bn, Hq/Hq Det 414 Med Coll Co 467 Med Coll Co 624 Med Clrg Co 3 Plat, 16 Field Hosp Hq 16 Field Hosp

MILITARY POLICE

MP Plat (Corps) 821 MP Co (Corps)

QUARTERMASTER

*2 Plat, 23 QM Car Co *3456 QM Trk Co

SIGNAL

94 Sig Bn 3256 Sig Serv Co

TANK DESTROYER

8 TD Gp, Hq/Hq Co (Atchd Corps Arty)

*Denotés Colored Personnel.

4. a. <u>Situation</u>: On 22 December, III Corps attacked from the vicinity of ARLON against the southern flank of the German penetration into BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG. It made a junction with the surrounded garrison at BASTOGNE and opened a corridor into that city, but on 30 December the enemy launched savage attacks against both flanks of that corridor. Although the attacks were repulsed, the enemy continued his efforts, and when the year ended, the fighting was continuing with neither side able to win a decision.

b. The difficulty of Corps task during the month of January was to be increased greatly by two uncontrollable factors: (1) the terrain, which ranged from sweeping hills and deep valleys to precipitous heights; and (2) the extremely severe winter, with sub-zero temperatures and blinding snow-storms. By the beginning of the month, the snow had reached a depth of one to two feet, with waist high drifts in many places, and infantry advances were made at the price of physical exhaustion. Tank and motor transport found icy roads hazardous, and continued snowfall throughout the month enhanced the difficulties. The terrain alone would have presented tremendous obstacles to an attack

- 3 -

SECRET

G-2 ATCHMTS


IPW Team #114 IPW Team #118 IPW Team #119 MII Team #413-G MII Team #421 CIC Det #203 OB Unit #36 PI Team #77 PI Team #77 PI Team #79 (DS Lucky) PI Team #84

G-3 ATCHMTS

Air Support Party

ADM UNITS


202 APU 48 MRU (Type Y) 92 Fin Disb Sec 3 Spec Serv Co



THE COUNTRY WAS BEAUTIFUL BUT DIFFICULT.

in even a mild and temperate season. In the right of the Corps zone the mountainous country, aptly named the "Luxembourg Alps", was in itself a formidable natural obstacle which defied assault. The entire Corps zone was crossed and re-crossed by numerous icy streams, which, with the hills and ridges between them, formed compartments across which the Corps advanced. The road net, especially in the right of the Corps zone, was poor; and dense forests covered a large portion of the area.

> - 4 -<u>S E C R E T</u>



SECTION II, AFTER ACTION REPORT

NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS


1 thru 8 January:*

During the first 8 days of the new year, neither Corps nor the enemy was able to muster sufficient force to break the deadlock which had followed the German counterattack of 30 December. The 6 Armd Div attacked on 1 Jan, but made little progress, and the fighting raged throughout the first several days, diminishing at times in intensity but never in stubbornness. CCB of the 6 Armd Div on 2 January fought off a strong counterattack, and on the 2d and 3d was able to advance several miles to OUBOURCY (vP6161), which was captured, and to MAGARET (vP6059); CCA advanced to WARDIN (vP6056), but on the 4th the division received five separate counterattacks, and both combat commands were forced to withdraw to the more favorable high ground West of those towns. For the remainder of the period the division was obliged to content itself with repulsing numerous counterattacks, which were launched frequently and which varied in strength from 1 company to 1 reinforced regiment. On the evening of the 7th, CCB was forced back approximately 1,000 yards but counterattacked in turn and regained the lost ground. This counterattacking and re-counterattacking characterized the fighting in this zone throughout these 9 days; the division attributed a great part of its success, and the large number of enemy casualties, to the volume of artillery fire which it was able to place on the enemy, both during and prior to his attacks.

The two infantry divisions continued to make repeated attempts to break through the German positions and to pinch off the enemy salient, but met with no more success than had the armored division. The enemy continued to resist strongly along the entire front, displaying a tenacious defense coupled with numerous counterattacks of company size. On the 5th the Commanding General, 35 Division, requested permission to dig in in the southern portion of his front, stating that although he hated to make such a recommendation, the battle had become a battle of attrition and that it had become impossible to continue to move forward in that area. Permission was granted and the division thereafter confined its offensive efforts to the Northern portion of its zone where it met with no success. On the 4th the 26 Division was able to move forward a few hundred yards, but was unable to better appreciably its position.

*See Annex No. 1a, Map: Situation as of 061200 Jan 45.

- 5 -



VILLERS-LA-BONNE-EAU WAS CAPTURED, LOST, AND RECAPTURED BY THE 35 INF DIV

On the Corps West flank the lOl A/B Division and 17 A/B Division (VIII Corps) received savage counterattacks on the 4th and 5th of January. These, coupled with the attack received by the 6 Armd Div on the 4th, made it apparent that the enemy was again making a bid to cut through the BASTOCNE Corridor. The lOl A/B Div repulsed the attack and the 17 A/B Div was forced initially to withdraw some 2,000 yards, but on 7 Jan attacked again and regained the ground it had lost, and more.

Operations Directive No. 2 (Ref FO #2, dated 30 Dec), was published on 5 January. It directed that the Corps continue the attack on the morning of 6 January, and further directed (1) that the 1 Bn 101 Inf move to vicinity of TINTANGE (vP5744) where it was to be under Corps control, prepared to reinforce 6 Cav Gp, 35 Inf Div or 6 Armd Div; (2) that the 35 Inf Div, 6 Armd Div and 6 Cav Gp be prepared to employ the 1 Bn 101 Inf on Corps order; (3) that the 28 Cav Rcn Sq fill the gap between the 134 Inf on North and the 137 Inf on South;

- 6 -

(4) that the 6 Cav Rcn Sq relieve the 1 Bn 320 Inf and maintain contact with 35 Inf Div on both right (East) and left (West). Co "C", 735 Tk Bn was relieved from attachment 26 Inf Div and attached to 35 Inf Div; and the 257 FA Bn (155 How) was attached to 203 FA Gp.

With the exception of 1, 2 and 5 Jan visibility was limited by dense fog and heavy snow, making it impossible for the supporting aircraft to take to the air, and hampering artillery observation. On the lst enemy air was fairly active, and at about 0145 on that day the Corps CP was bombed. The one 500 pound bomb which struck the CP building was a dud, however, and no damage was done. Despite the generally restricted visibility, Corps Artillery continued to support the divisions, firing intense harassing and interdiction missions and counterbattery programs, and placing concentrations, including TOT's, on both towns and enemy assembly areas. On 5 January PW's stated that a scheduled attack of from 1 to 2 battalion strength had been postponed because of the large number of casualties caused by our artillery.

(Annex #la, Map: Situation as of 6 Jan, shows the front lines as they existed during these 8 days.)

On 5 January the 90 Inf Div, which had been attached to III Corps by verbal order of CG, Third Army, began its movement from the vicinity of METZ to the III Corps area, and by nightfall RCT 357 had closed in its assembly area. On the following 2 days RCT's 358 and 359 closed, and on the 8th the 359 and 357 Inf Regts moved to final assembly areas in preparation for an attack which was to take place on the 9th. The move of the division from METZ, and all its activities prior to the time it made contact with the enemy were considered highly secret; Corps was instructed to make no mention of the division, either in telephone conversations or in official reports; all identification was removed from both vehicles and personnel; and it was hoped that the snow and fog had served to prevent enemy observation from noting the movement.

During the 7th and 8th, the 26 and 35 Divisions regrouped, effected minor reliefs, and prepared for the forthcoming attack. The 101 Inf (26 Div) relieved the 320 Inf (35 Div) and the 320 Inf (-1 Bn) was attached to the 6 Armd Div. FO 3, Hq III Corps was published and provided for an assault which was intended to pinch off the enemy bulge into the Corps zone SE of BASTOGNE, and permit the further advance of Corps to the NE. The 90 Inf Div, making the Corps' main effort, was instructed to attack in zone to the left of the 26 Div and close enemy escape routes from the pocket Southeast of BASTOGNE (vP 5557); the 26, 35 and 6 Armd Divisions were assigned zones of advance and objectives from which they could assist the advance of the 90 Div; VIII Corps Arty, XII Corps Arty, and 4 Armd Div Arty were to support

- 7 -

the Corps attack. Task Force Fickett (6 Cav Gp) (Reinf) and Task Force Scott (101 Inf) (Reinf) were each assigned a zone of advance. (For boundaries see Annex No. 1b, Map: Situation as of 121200 January.)

On 8 Jan 200 reinforcements were sent to the 6 Armd Div, and 581 were sent to the 35 Inf Div.

9 January:


At 1000 the carefully planned attack jumped off, and on both flanks met with success. The 90 Inf Div, attacking on a 3500 yard front with 3 Bns abreast, by mid afternoon had taken BERLE (vP6552). By sundown it had advanced to the right of and beyond that town to a point approximately 1500 yards Southeast of DONCOLS (vP6454), which lay astride the only East West highway remaining to the German, and which offered his primary escape route to the East. By nightfall it had become evident that the enemy on the East flank either had been caught by surprise, or had been entirely unable to cope with the powerful drive of the 90th Division. His resistance there had been fairly heavy, consisting primarily of mortar, artillery and Nebelwerfer fire, but he was nevertheless powerless to stop the assault and was steadily pushed to the North.

On the NW flank of the Corps, CCA of the 6 Armd Div by early afternoon had advanced about 1200 yards to the Southeast and seized its first objective. The northernmost elements (134 Inf) of the 35 Div advanced alongside the armor, and it began to appear as though the enemy's situation in the SW salient was becoming precarious. His main artery to the NE was in danger of being cut; and to the North he was in danger of being flanked. Nevertheless he defended stubbornly and bitterly in the center, and neither the 6 Cav Gp nor TF Scott were able to move forward appreciably. The 26 Inf Div attacked, but met strong resistance, and advanced only approximately 500 yards.

Because of low lying clouds and fogs, the XIX TAC was again unable to furnish support for the attack. The Corps Artillery, however, fired counterbattery and harassing and interdiction missions, and supported the advance of the divisions throughout the day.

During the night temporary boundaries between VIII and III Corps and between the 6 Armd and 35 Inf Div were established, so that the 4th Armd Div (VIII Corps) might attack through the 6 Armd Div; and so that the 6 Armd Div might move further to the SE to assist the advance of the 35 Div. Corps Operations Directive.#1 (Ref FO #3) directed that the attack be resumed in the morning.

> - 8 -<u>S E C R E T</u>



RUINS OF BERLE

10 January - The attack was continued in the morning, and the greatest advances of the day were again made on the right (East) flank, where the 357 Inf, 90th Div, advanced some 2000 yds and the 328 Inf of the 26 Div gained approximately 800 yds. Although the 359 Inf of the 90th Div was held up for the greater part of the day at TRENTELHOF (vP6552), the 357, on the left, by nightfall had advanced to the high ground a few hundred yards south of DONCOLS (vP6454), where it commanded the East - West road running through that place. The 359 overcame most of its resistance during the late afternoon, and planned a night attack to take place during the early morning hours of the 11th.

In the center of the Corps zone, after being held up throughout the morning, the 6 Cav Gp attacked and captured BETTLANGE (vP5849) and HARLANGE (vP6049). On the West and Northwest flank the enemy continued to defend strongly and neither the 35 Inf nor the 6 Armd Div were able to make progress. The 4 Armd Div, (VIII Corps), however, attacking through 6 Armd Div to the Northeast, advanced to the outskirts of MAGERET (vP6059).

> - 9 -<u>SECRET</u>

During the day Lt Generals Omar Bradley and George Patton visited the Corps CP and informed Major General Millikin that the 4 Armd Div (VIII Corps) was to be withdrawn immediately and placed in Army reserve; that the 6 Armd Div was to take over the zone of the 4 Armd Div; and that Corps immediate mission was to eliminate the German pocket in the Corps zone, and straighten its lines.

Operations Directive No. 2 (Ref FO #3) was published during the evening. It rescinded the temporary boundaries which had been established on the 9th between the III and VIII Corps and between the 6 Armd and 35 Inf Divs, and replaced in effect the boundaries which had been established by FO #3. It also rescinded the objective which had been assigned the 6 Armd Div by FO #3, and directed instead that the Armd Div relieve elements of the 4 Armd Div and hold the general line CR (vP592612) - high ground SW MAGERET (vP6059). Other provisions of the directive instructed the 35 and 26 Inf Divs to continue missions given in FO #3; the 949 FA Bn was relieved from attachment 26 Div and attached to 90 Inf Div; and the 320 Inf (-3 Bn) was relieved from attachment 6 Armd Div and returned to control of 35 Inf Div.

Although poor visibility during the morning prevented air operations, the two squadrons assigned to Corps flew four missions during the afternoon. SONLEZ (vP6353), BRAS (vP6255) and BOURCY (vP6264) were bombed, and motor transport and troop concentrations were strafed.


11 January:

On the 3rd day of the Corps attack enemy defenses in the southwesternmost portion of his salient appeared to give way. The 6 Cav Go, by aggressive action, made swift advances to the northeast, capturing TARCHAMPS (vP6051), and drove on during the night to the vicinity of SONLEZ (vP6353), where it made contact with elements of the 90 Inf Div. TF Scott, on the right of the Cav Gp, advanced about 500 yards.

The 90 Div during the night of 10-11 January had launched its night attack on the right flank with excellent results. The attack, made by the 359 Inf, caught the enemy unawares, disorganized his defenses, and carried the regiment to the crossroads immediately east of DONCOLS (vP6454). Although the resistance encountered at that point during the day prevented any further advance, the 357 on the left was able to capture DONCOLS (vP6454), and late in the afternoon entered SONIEZ (vP6353), where contact was made with the 6 Cav Gp.

On the west flank, the 6 Armd Div was directed to attack to the east in the direction of BRAS (vP6356) with the mission of effecting a junction with the rapidly advancing 90 Inf Div. That Div struck at

- 10 -



1220, and advanced approximately 1500 yards to a point Southeast of WARDIN (vP6056). The 35 Inf Div, advancing on the right of the Armor, also gained about 1 mile.

The 26 Inf Div, on the right, continued to meet strong resistance and made few gains.

At the close of the day, therefore, the neck of the salient had been tightened, and holes had been punched in the bottom of the enemy pocket; his losses had been severe, with 1120 prisoners taken during the day; and all indications pointed toward a rapid withdrawal.

Because of poor visibility no air missions were flown this day.

*12 January:

On this fourth day of the Corps assault the enemy defenses crumbled; his pocket of resistance collapsed under attacks from all sides; 1021 prisoners were captured. On the East, the 90 Div committed the 358 Inf and employed it to attack North along the Div West boundary to seize BRAS (vP6356), the Division objective. By mid-afternoon the town had been taken; and the 35 Div, advancing East through the woods toward BRAS (vP6356), established contact with the 90 Inf Div during the evening.

While these two Infantry Divisions on opposite flanks had been moving to pinch off the neck of the enemy pocket, TF SCOTT (101 Inf) and TF FICKETT in the center had been moving north against the bottom of the salient. TF SCOTT advanced to the general line TARCHAMPS -SONLEZ, and was there relieved during the afternoon by elements of the 6 Cav Gp (FICKETT). The Cav Gp continued the advance to the North, and as its zone became narrower was able to release all but one troop from the line. The 35 Div as it advanced narrowed its zone also, and at the close of the day had pulled all but one battalion from the line, and planned to assemble for a period of rest, rehabilitation and training.

The 6 Armd Div on the Northwest flank had not been inactive during the day. It attacked to the East, captured WARDIN, and advanced to a point only a few hundred yards West of BRAS. Between the 6 Armd Div and the 90 Div at BRAS, therefore, there was the one battalion of the 35 Inf Div and elements of the 6 Cav Gp already mentioned; and the pocket had been completely eliminated. The 101 Infantry (TF SCOTT) was returned to control of the 26 Division, which had been maintaing its position South of the WILTZ RIVER, making local attacks, and patrolling vigorously to the river. The 6 Cav Gp began to assemble, and prepared for a period of training and maintenance.

* See Annex No. 1b, Map: Situation as of 121200 January.

- 11 -

During the afternoon Operations Directive #3 (Ref FO #3) was published. It directed that the Corps continue the attack to seize high ground BOURCY (vP6264) - LONGVILLY (vP6460) preparatory to advancing Northeast in direction of ST. VITH. Its provisions were essentially as follows: The 26 Div was to destroy enemy South of WILTZ RIVER in zone, organize high ground South of WILTZ RIVER for defense, and be prepared to attack and seize high ground in vicinity of NOERTRANGE (vP6955) on Corps order. The 90 Div was to seize the high ground vicinity of NIEDERWAMPACH (vP6458), and the 6 Armd Div was to attack in zone and seize the high ground BOURCY (vP6264) - LONGVILLY (vP6460). The 35 Inf Div and 6 Cav Gp were directed to continue to mop up enemy pocket, and were then to assemble in Corps reserve. Btry C, 253 Armd FA Bn, was relieved from attachment 6 Cav Gp and reverted to En control; the 996 Engr Treadway Br Co was relieved from attachment to 6 Armd Div and attached to 1123 Engr C Gp; the 179 FA Bn was relieved from attachment 35 Inf Div and attached to 183 FA Gp; and 35 Div Arty was attached III Corps Arty upon completion of mopping up pocket. The 320 Inf was attached 6 Armd Div effective 121300 Jan. (Boundaries and objectives assigned are shown on Incl lc, Map: Situation as of 14 Jan.)

Although cloudy skies during the morning prevented air operations, a few missions were flown during the afternoon. Results were reported as "fair".

13 January:

Although the enemy pocket had crumbled swiftly under the attack of the past four days, the enemy on the 13th appeared to be determined to prevent any further advances. On the right flank the attack of the 90 Division met bitter resistance and the 358 Inf, in the left of the division's zone, was able to advance only about 1,000 yards. The enemy defended from positions on the reverse slopes of hills, and placed large amounts of artillery and Nebelwerfer fire on the attackers. The 26 Inf Div continued to improve its positions, and patrolled vigorously to the North.

On the left flank of the Corps, the 6 Armd Div attacked to the East and Northeast with CCB, and the 35 Div (-320 Inf), having been pinched out by the 6 Armd and 90 Divisions, began to assemble and reorganize in Corps reserve. The 6 Cav Gp was assembled in vicinity of NOTHUMB (vP5932), where it began to conduct a program of maintenance, training and refitting.

The day was clear throughout, and the two squadrons supporting the Corps flew five missions. A CP at BOURCY (vP6263) was strafed; motor transport was bombed and strafed with good results; and troop concentrations at BRACHTENBACH (vP6959), MICHAMPS (vP6162) and woods West of WILTZ (vP7053) were attacked.

- 12 -



THIS GERMAN SOLDIER DIED NEAR BENONCHAMPS. THE FROZEN AND HALF BURIED BODY TESTIFIED TO THE SEVERITY OF THE WINTER.

*14 January:

The advance of the Corps to the North and Northeast on the 14th was slow, but by the end of the day gains of up to one mile had been made. The 90 Div continued the attack with the 358 and 357 Regiments, and made small gains against heavy resistance. The 358 was bombed heavily during the afternoon, and this, plus severe ground action, prevented the regiment from making any appreciable gains.

The 26 Div, on the right, attacked at midnight on the 13th, advanced about 500 yards to the commanding ground South of the WILTZ RIVER and cleaned out small pockets of resistance. The 6 Armd Div advanced up to 1500 yards, mopped up MAGERET and captured BENONCHAMPS (vP6258). Elements of the Division advanced through the BOIS ST LAMBERT (vP6159), and the 320 Inf (atchd) cleaned out the woods West of OUBOURCY (vP6161). For the 2d consecutive day the weather was clear, and the three squadrons supporting the Corps gave excellent support. OUBOURCY was strafed and bombed, and the advance of the 320 Inf was materially aided by the dropping of Napalm bombs in the dense woods West

* See Annex No. 1c, Map: Situation as of 141200 Jan.

- 13 -

of OUBOURCY.

The 35 Div continued its program of training and rehabilitation.

Operations Directive No. 4 (Ref FO #3), confirming fragmentary orders already issued, was published. It designated minor changes in boundaries, and made several changes in attachments. The 654 TD Bn was relieved from attachment 35 Inf Div and was attached to 8 TD Gp; Co C 735 Tk Bn was relieved from attachment 35 Inf Div and reverted to control 26 Inf Div; Co D 3 Cml Bn was relieved from attachment 35 Inf Div and attached to 90 Inf Div; and lst Bn 134 Inf was attached to 6 Armd Div. (New boundaries shown in Annex #1d, Map: Situation as of 161200 January.)

15 January:

The Corps continued its advance in the face of increasingly bitter resistance. Although the enemy had by this time lost the initiative, it was evident that he intended to defend strongly. During the night he had sent additional troops to dig in along the line in front of the 90 Div, and that division reported that during the day it received the most intense small arms and automatic weapons fire that it had yet experienced.


The 90 Div, because of this heavy fire, was unable to advance all day on its right, and in some places was forced to give ground. During the afternoon, however, the 358 Inf on the left sent one battalion around the division's West flank to capture NIEDERWAMPACH. That town was taken during the late afternoon and evening.

During the morning one battalion of the 134 Inf was attached to the 6 Armd Div and moved to the division area. The 6 Armd Div attacked in the morning and the attached 320 Inf captured OUBOURCY, while other elements of the division captured ARLONCOURT (vP6160). Both of these places were defended strongly and fell only after determined resistance. About 140 prisoners were taken in OUBOURCY.

The 26 Div on the Corps right flank continued to improve its defensive positions and continued to probe into the enemy lines.

The weather was clear again throughout the day, and enabled the Air Corps to furnish close support to the ground forces. The three squadrons in support of Corps bombed KRETNICH (14303) and a tank concentration Northeast of BASTOCNE, where 6 tanks were reported destroyed and 2 damaged. A convoy between LIEDENBORN (vP9172) and HABSCHEID (vP9577) was strafed, and 46 motor transports were claimed destroyed.

> - 14 -<u>SECRET</u>



*16 January:

The enemy continued his stubborn defense, especially on the East, where the right of the 90 Division was unable to advance. The enemy defended there along an east west railroad, fighting from railroad tunnels which proved to be extremely difficult to reduce. On the division's left flank, however, two battalions of the 359 Inf were brought up from division reserve, advanced to the NW of NEIDERWAMPACH, and during the afternoon captured OBERWAMPACH (vP6559).

The 26 Div on the Corps right improved its position and sent out strong patrols. The 6 Armd Div on the west advanced in the face of decreasing resistance for about one mile, captured LONGVILLY, ARLONCOURT and MICHAMPS, and by nightfall had almost reached its objective, generally along the BOURCY-LONGVILLY road. During the evening it was directed that the 320 Inf would be relieved from attachment to the Armored Division, and the 134 Inf would be attached in its place.

Three squadrons of fighter bombers were in support of the Corps during the day. Five missions were flown; BASBELLAM (vP7473) was bombed with good results; and motor transport, troop concentrations and armored vehicles were strafed.

500 replacements were furnished the 26 Div; 300 were sent to the 6 Armd Div; and 100 were sent to the 35 Div.

17 January:

Activity on the 17th again was centered in the zone of the 90 Inf and 6 Armd Divisions. Although the 90th was able to advance on its right some 1000 yards to the railroad from which the enemy had been defending, on its left the Div met bitter and repeated counterattacks in the vicinity of OBERWAMPACH. These counterattacks, five in number, varied in strength from one company to one battalion of infantry, each supported by from 4 to 10 tanks. Although the attacks were fought off with high losses to the enemy, the division in this portion of its zone was unable to advance. A total of 17 enemy tanks was reported knocked out during the day, and the artillery was credited again with playing a highly important part in frustrating the attacks. At least one was repelled entirely by artillery concentrations placed on the enemy as the attack was forming; TOT's of up to 17 battalion strength were placed on the enemy armor and infantry assembly areas, and in one case enemy crews abandoned their tanks and ran for cover. By nightfall no ground had been lost.

* See Incl No. 1d, Map: Situation as of 161200 Jan.

- 15 -

The 26 Inf Div on the East flank improved its positions and maintained strong combat patrols.

On the Corps left the 6 Armd Div advanced to the East, reached its objective, consolidated positions there, and maintained positions during the night.

Information was received that the 35 Inf Div (-RCT 134) was to be detached from III Corps and attached to XX Corps. The division was directed to effect the relief of 320 Inf (atchd 6 Armd Div) by 1200 of the 18th, using RCT 134. The division (-RCT 134) was directed to move on the 18th and 19th to XX Corps area.

Clouds and snow during the day prevented air operations.

18 January:

The day was quiet along the entire Corps front. 90 Inf Div operated patrols to the high ground North and Northeast of OBERWAMPACH, while the 6 Armd Div maintained its positions generally along the BOURCY-LONGVILLY highway, maintained outposts, and sent patrols to the East. The 26 Inf Div maintained its positions and continued patrolling.

RCT 134 completed relief of the 320 Inf, which had been attached to the 6 Armd Div, and RCT 137 departed for the XX Corps zone.

Operations Directive No. 5 (Kef FO #3), confirming fragmentary orders already issued, directed that the boundary established between the 6 Armd and 35 Inf Divs be deleted; that RCT 134 be attached to the 6 Armd Div effective 181200 Jan; that RCT 320 revert to control of 35 Division; and that the 90 Inf and 6 Armd Divs consolidate positions on objectives, maintain contact with the enemy and be prepared to advance. 654 TD Bn was relieved from attachment 8 TD Gp, and was attached 35 Div. Co C of 602 TD Bn was relieved from attachment 6 Cav Gp, and was attached to 203 FA Gp. Co C of the 3 Cml Bn was relieved from attachment 90 Div, and reverted to control of 3 Cml Bn for rehabilitation.

No missions were flown during the day because of poor visibility and occasional light snow.

19 January:

With the exception of one counterattack launched in the zone of the 90 Div early in the morning, the Corps front remained quiet for a second day. The 90 Div repulsed that counterattack, and during the day sent patrols to the high ground West of DERENBACH. These patrols reported an enemy withdrawal, and fire was placed on enemy columns moving

- 16 -

generally to the east. Patrols of the 6 Armd and 26 Inf Divs also reported signs of withdrawal.

Operations Directive No. 6 (Hef FO #3) was published. That directive laid down new boundaries, which (1) gave the city of BASTOGNE to III Corps, (2) assigned the 6 Cav Gp a zone of action in the eastern portion of what had been the zone of the 26 Inf Div and (3) moved the 26 Inf Division's left (West) boundary to the West to include the town of DONCOLS. The Directive ordered that the 6 Cav Gp relieve elements of the 26 Div in its new zone, and contain enemy North of WILTZ RIVER; that the 26 Div assemble in its zone for attack North of WILTZ RIVER; and that the 90 Inf and 6 Armd Divs attack in zone on D-Day and H-Hour. (Boundaries shown on Annex #1e, Map: Situation as of 22 Jan.) Btry C, 253 Armd FA Bn, was relieved from attachment 6 Armd Div and attached to 6 Cav Gp; Co C, 602 TD Bn, was also attached to 6 Cav Gp. The 776 FA Bn (155 How) was relieved from attachment 6 Armd Div and attached to 26 Inf Div. All units were directed to maintain contact with flank units.

This night each division was directed to follow up signs of withdrawal with strong and aggressive patrols; and to follow up those patrols on the 20th with sufficient force to maintain contact and develop enemy positions preparatory to the attack outlined in Operations Directive No. 6.

The 35 Inf Div (- RCT 134) cleared the Corps area, and Corps prepared to establish its forward CP in the vicinity of MARTELANGE (vP5638). During the night the 6 Cav Gp began relief of elements of the 26 Inf Div.

Although clouds in the morning prevented air operations, two squadrons flew missions during the afternoon. No results were observed, however, because of overcast.

20 January:

Following the enemy withdrawal observed on the preceding day, the 90 Div moved to the Northeast and early in the day reached DERENBACH (vP6758) on its right flank, and captured ALLERBORN (vP6661) and CHIFONTAINE (vP6550) on the left. The 358 on the right, however, met quickened and determined resistance from enemy Infantry and tanks at DERENBACH, where it became engaged in a fierce fire fight. That regiment was forced to withdraw during the afternoon to its positions of the night before. During the night patrols were sent to the North and Northeast of ALLERBORN, but no contact with the enemy was made.

The 26 Inf Div on the right flank advanced during the night 20-21 January to the WILTZ RIVER against no opposition, and at approximately midnight the greater part of the 328 Infantry had crossed the river.

- 17 -

During the early morning hours of the 21st, patrols on the high ground north of the river reported contact with the enemy, but otherwise no resistance was encountered. During the night 19-20 January the 28 Cav Rcn Squadron, 6 Cav Gp, relieved the 101 and 104 Inf Regts, and during the night 20-21 Jan patrolled to the WILTZ RIVER. A few prisoners were taken during the night in WINSELER, but no resistance was encountered.

In the zone of the 6 armd Div enemy resistance was also light and scattered. After sending strong patrols to the Northeast, the Div advanced to and captured MONET, and moved to the high ground Northeast of that place.

Corps advance CP opened at HAUT-MARTELANGE (vP5738) at 1200. It was announced that the attack contemplated by Opns Dir No. 6 (Ref FO #3) would take place the following morning.

Poor visibility prevented air operations during the entire day.

#21 January:


The Corps attack jumped off according to schedule, and during the day moved rapidly to the north and northeast against little or no opposition. It was apparent that the enemy had made good his withdrawal, and the greatest difficulties encountered were the deep snow, bitter cold and rugged terrain. Advances of up to five miles were made; little or no artillery fire was received; and in only a few cases was small arms fire met. Our own artillery, for lack of targets, was also inactive. It did engage a few single gun positions, but in nearly all cases these appeared to be self-propelled guns.

The 26 Inf Div had advanced to and beyond the WILTZ RIVER during the night 20-21 January, and by 0430 had established a bridge in the zone of the 328 Inf. Early in the morning the Division launched its attack, and met no opposition. Of the 3 divisions, however, the 26 Inf Div had the most difficult terrain to traverse, and made comparatively slow progress. The 101 Inf during the afternoon entered WILTZ from the north and northwest, and by nightfall had cleared that portion of the city which lay north of the WILTZ RIVER. The 328 Inf by nightfall had advanced approximately three miles to BRACHENBACH (vP6959).

The 6 Cav Gp advanced north through ROULLENGEN (vP6952), and entered WILTZ from the south and southwest, where it met resistance only from snipers. It was reported by both the Cavalry Group and by the 101 Inf, however, that the city had been heavily mined and booby trapped. On its west, the Cavalry Group advanced to WINSELER (vP6753); dismounted; and established a small bridgehead in that area through

* See Annex No. le, Map: Situation as of 220600 Jan.

- 18 -



which elements of the 101 Inf crossed. By nightfall the Group was generally along the river, and in WILTZ.

Both the 6 Armd Div and the 90 Inf Div made rapid progress. The armored division attacked with the 134 Inf (atchd) on the left, CCB in the center, and CCA on the right. During the day CCB bypassed the 134 Inf, which had experienced difficulty with the snow and terrain, and advanced approximately 5 miles to HACHIVILLE (vP7069). CCA moved across the division right boundary into the zone of the 90 Div, and captured LULLANGE (vP7163), where it remained for the night.

The 90 Div moved north against no opposition, and by nightfall the 358 Inf on the left had reached WINCRANGE (vP7063), with patrols maintaining contact with the armor in LULLANGE. The 357 Inf reached a point approximately 3/4 miles southwest of BOEVANGE (vP7162).

The rapid advance necessitated close coordination among the III, VIII and XII Corps. On the Corps east flank, the advance of the 26 Division created a gap between the Corps right and the 80 Div (XII Corps), and contact became a problem. It was therefore decided to employ the 6 Cav Gp on the Corps right flank, and a temporary boundary running north along the CLERF RIVER was established between III and VIII Corps by agreement between the commanding generals of the two Corps. The Cav Gp was directed to clear enemy west of the CLERF RIVER in the new zone, and protect the Corps east flank. (Boundary established is shown in Annex No. le, Map: Situation as of 220600 Jan.)

No missions were flown by the supporting air because of poor weather conditions.

22 January:

On the second day of the Corps attack progress was again rapid, with only light and scattered resistance. Occasional small arms fire was received, and the 6 Armd Div reported encountering an estimated company of infantry at one point. Our artillery for a second day was generally inactive, for lack of targets, and was occupied for the greater part with displacement forward.

The 26 Inf Division, whose progress had continued slow because of extremely difficult terrain, was authorized to move into the zone of the 90 Division, in order to utilize roads in that area. It motorized elements of one Inf Bn, and during the morning these elements moved to BOUVANGE, receiving only scattered light artillery fire when they advanced to the high ground northeast of that place. By late afternoon the 328 Inf had reached its objective - the high ground southwest of DONNANGE (vP7264), and its attack to the north ceased. The Division continued to move, however, to the east, where it had been assigned

- 19 -

the mission of seizing, in conjunction with the 6 Cav Gp, the high ground west of the CLERF RIVER. The 6 Cav Gp took KNAPHOSCHEID (vP7358) and KLEINHOSCHEID (vP7359), and during the early part of the night elements of the 328 Inf entered those towns, where contact was established with the 28 Rcn Sq. Elements of the 101 Inf moved into ESCHWEILER (vP7156).

The 6 Cav Gp, upon receipt of its instructions to operate in the new zone on the Corps right flank, moved rapidly. At OlOO elements of the Group were crossing the WILTZ RIVER; by mid morning elements were moving north and east of ERPELDANGE-L-WILTZ (vP7154), where mines were encountered; by mid afternoon ESCHWEILER had been entered; and by midnight elements of the Group had passed through WEICHERDANGE (vP7461) and were nearing the northern limit of their zone. No resistance was encountered, although deep snow and mines delayed progress, and the Group continued to patrol in its zone.

Early in the morning of the 21st, the 90 Inf Div received heavy fire in the vicinity of HAMIVILLE (vP6862). The advance continued during the day, and the 358 Inf was withdrawn and replaced with the 357 Inf, which had been in an assembly area vicinity of BASTOGNE. When the attack was halted at the close of the day the division had reached ASSELBORN, (vP7468), an advance of approximately 5000 yards.

The 6 Armd Div continued its advance to the northeast, and during the morning CCA entered the zone of the 90 Inf Div to secure ASSELBORN, in order that it might continue its advance along the northsouth road just west of that place. It then advanced to the south of MASSEN (vP7570) where it encountered infantry dug in on the high ground south of that town, and where it was halted by a blown bridge. The division reported that enemy tanks had been observed across the river at this point. CCB advanced and captured BASBELLAIN (vP7473), where it was halted by a blown bridge, and reported enemy tanks and infantry observed in the vicinity of HALT (vP772).

The 134 Inf was moved to HACHIVILLE, prepared to continue the advance.

The three squadrons of fighter bombers assigned to Corps were turned over to XII Corps on request of XIX TAC. Columns consisting of approximately 1800 vehicles had been observed in the XII Corps zone, and the XIX TAC, by concentrating all available air power in that area, destroyed or damaged approximately 1700.

> - 20 -<u>SECRET</u>

23 January:

The attack was resumed, and although the advance was rapid initially, resistance was encountered during the afternoon and the attack was slowed.

The 6 Cav Gp on the East reported by noontime that it was in complete control of its zone, and as it moved along the CLERF RIVER, reported contact with the enemy at DRAUFFEL (vP7659) and CLERVAUX (vP7763).

The 90 Inf Div advanced to and across the CLERF RIVER in its zone and during the night reached BINSFELD (vP7870), where it received and repulsed a small counterattack. The 6 Armd Div, after receiving heavy artillery fire between ASSELBORN and MON LEGAY (vP7469), made crossings at MASSEN, where it engaged in a fire fight with an undetermined number of enemy. The division encountered mines in the river bed in the vicinity of the crossing site, which were removed, and captured TROISVIERGES (vP7570), which was defended by the enemy and which had been heavily mined. The 134 Inf (atchd) captured BASBELLAIN, which had been entered the previous night, but from which the armor had withdrawn. Elements of the regiment then advanced to the high ground southwest of that place, and in doing so, received sporadic mortar fire. Artillery fire was placed on enemy troop concentrations southwest of GOEDINGER (vP7673).

Operations Directive No. 7 (Ref FO #3), confirming fragmentary orders previously issued, was published. It confirmed the temporary boundary which had been established previously between the III and XII Corps; detached Company D (-1 Plat), 3 Cml Bn, from 90 Inf Div, and attached it to the 26 Inf Div; and relieved Co A, 3 Cml Bn, from attachment to 26 Inf Div.

Directive No. 7 was followed shortly by Operations Directive No. 8 (Ref FO #3), which further changed the III - XII Corps boundary, giving to the III Corps the general area bounded by CLERVAUS (vP7763), MARNACH (vP8062), LAUSDORN (vP8170). The zone thus created was assigned the 6 Cav Gp for reconnaissance, and the 26 Inf Div was directed to protect the Corps right flank and to be prepared to follow the 6 Cav Gp.

The plan outlined in Operations Directive No. 8, was short lived, however. During the afternoon, Amendment No. 2 to Third US Army's Operational Directive, dated 19 January 1945, was received, which changed the direction of the Corps attack from Northeast to East. As a result, III Corps Operations Directive No. 9 (Ref FO #3) was published during the night. This directive ordered each division to attack in zone (See Annex No. 1f, Map: Situation as of 240600 January) and gave the 6 Cav Gp the mission of protecting the Corps right flank from ERPELDANGE-L-WILTZ (vP7154) - DRAUFFEL (vP7659). That zone was to

- 21 -

be extended generally along road DRAUFFEL - MARNACH (vP8062) as the attack of the 26 Inf Div progressed through and relieved elements of the 6 Cav Gp.

Although cloudy skies during the morning prevented air operations, clear weather in the afternoon enabled the three squadrons assigned to Corps to fly five missions. HABSCHEID (P9577) and LASCHEID (P9886) were attacked, and motor transport, tanks and gun positions were bombed and strafed with good results.

The 26 Inf Div received 646 reinforcements; the 90 Inf Div received 202; and the 6 Armd Div received 221.

*24 January:

Early in the morning, Corps attacked in the new direction, and made contact with the enemy generally along the entire front. Resistance was not heavy, however, and it appeared that the enemy was conducting a delaying action, defending from strong points, and employing artillery, machine gun, and mortar fire to slow the Corps advance. Mines were again encountered.

6 Cav Sq, after a fire fight, cleared MECHER (vP7661) on the night of 23-24 January and during both morning and afternoon artillery and mortar fire was received. By mid-afternoon the 28 Cav Kcn Sq had been relieved by elements of the 26 Inf Div. The squadron moved to assembly areas vicinity of WILTZ, leaving the 6 Cav Sq to patrol and maintain contact with the 26 Inf Div and 80 Inf Div. The 6 Cav Sq (- 1 Tr) by midnight had assembled in WEICHERDANGE (vP7461), leaving Troop A to maintain contact.

The 26 Inf Div attacked at 0900, with the 101 Inf on right and the 328 Inf on the left. By afternoon, both regiments had elements at the CLERF RIVER, with the 101 Inf at MECHER. The attack was continued during the night, and by midnight the 101 Inf had elements across the CLERF RIVER occupying the high ground in the POLAR FOREST, with patrols entering DRAUFFEL. The division advance was opposed by increasingly heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy positions East of the CLERF RIVER; and interdictory and harassing artillery, Nebelwerfer and mortar fire fell in the division zone.

The 90 Inf Div attacked in the morning, but because of the poor road net in its zone, it was necessary to arrange for the use of roads in the zone of the two adjacent divisions. This was done, and at noontime it was reported that the 357 Inf on the left was moving well, but that the 359 Inf on the right was held up temporarily by small arms fire from across the CLERF RIVER. During the afternoon intense machine gun and small arms fire was received from prepared positions East of

* See Annex No. 1f, Map: Situation as of 240600 January.

- 22 -

the river, but the attack was continued during the night and crossings were made.

The 6 Armd Div, as it advanced, met small arms, automatic weapons tank, mortar and artillery fire; antitank and antipersonnel mines were encountered at all critical points along roads, bridges, and ford site crossings. CCA, however, by 0900 had taken the high ground Northwest of TROISVIERGES, and moved in the direction of DRINKLANGE (vP7772) and WILWERDANGE (vP7772), which were entered during the afternoon. During the evening, however, AT fire was received from the woods South of HULDANGE (vP7775), in the VIII Corps zone. VIII Corps was notified, and the 17 A/B Division moved to clear the woods. CCA continued the attack during the night, captured HOLLER (vP7970), and by 0200 on the 25th had cleared BREIDFELD (vP8070).

During the afternoon, CCB assembled in the vicinity of HOFFELT and HACHIVILLE, and during the night moved to forward assembly area vicinity TROISVIERGES. Elements of the 17 A/B Div (VIII Corps) relieved the 134 Inf (Reinf) in its zone, and that regiment moved to assembly areas.

Three missions were flown during the afternoon by supporting aircraft. Motor transport, gun positions, and tanks were bombed and strafed with good results.

25. January:

The center of interest in the III Corps this day was the road running along the high ridge between the CLERF and OUR rivers, known as the "Sky Line Drive". This ridge was the objective of each division, and by nightfall, both the 6 Armd Div and 90 Inf Div had elements on the "Sky Line Drive" despite a strong enemy delaying action.

The 26 Inf Div, again having the most difficult terrain to traverse, made slow progress. It attacked during the night 25-26 January, and captured the high ground in the POLER FOREST, just East of the river. The 328 Inf by midday had cleared URSPELT (vP7965), and the 101 Inf entered and cleared CLERVAUX (vP7763). It was planned that the attack would be resumed early in the morning.

In the zone of the 6 Armd Div, CCA advanced rapidly to the East and by midafternoon was on its objective. By nightfall it had captured the town of LAUSDORN (vP8170). CCB met strong opposition, however, and at nightfall was forced to halt on the high ground West of WEIS-WAMPACH (vP8172), which it was unable to enter. It was planned to attack early on the following morning to secure that place.

> - 23 -<u>S E C R E T</u>

The 357 Inf of the 90 Inf Div advanced against a fairly strong delaying action and took HEINERSCHEID (vP8267), on the "Sky Line Drive." On the division's right, the 359 Inf captured GRINDHAUSEN (vP8066), and advanced several hundred yards East of that place, where it halted for the night, prepared to resume the advance in the morning.

During the day, information was received from Third US Army which was to change radically both the composition and mission of the Corps. In general, the 17 A/B Div (VIII Corps) was to relieve the 26 Inf Div, which was then to pass to control of XX Corps; the 6 Armd Div and 90 Inf Div were to relieve each other in zone; the 90 Inf Div was then to be attached to VIII Corps; and a change in boundaries was to take place between III and VIII, and III and XII Corps. Corps was instructed to aggressively defend to contain maximum number of enemy, and to be prepared to attack East and seize line of the KYLL River.

Liaison was established with the 17 A/B Div, which was scheduled to begin the relief of the 26 Inf Div in the morning; instructions were issued to the units affected by the new Army instructions; and details of movement and relief were coordinated among the divisions. The plan contemplated that the AAA, TD and Tk Bns attached to the 26 Div be relieved of attachment at the time the division passed from III Corps control. CG, 26 Inf Div, however, requested that the AAA Bn remain with him, and following approval by CG, Third US Army, it was decided that both the AAA Bn and the TD Bn would remain attached to the division and move with it. to the XX Corps area.

Because of cloudy weather and light snowfall no missions were flown by the supporting air.


*26 January:

The complicated reliefs caused by the change in boundaries and attachments were begun on the morning. By midnight the 90 Inf and 6 Armd Divisions had completed their mutual reliefs and the new boundary between the VIII and III Corps became effective at 1200. Elements of the 17 A/B Div arrived in the zone of the 26 Inf Div, and the 507 Parachute Regt was attached to the 26 Inf Div until such time as the zone passed to control of the 17 A/B Div.

The 6 Armd Div continued its attack, and by early morning CCB had seized WEISWAMPACH. By noontime it was on the high ground East of that place, and reported contact with the enemy along the entire front. The 26 Inf Div also pressed its attack, and by afternoon the 328 Inf had reached the crest of the ridge, while the 101 Inf had patrols entering MUNSHAUSEN (vP7860). The 90 Inf Div sent patrols to the East, and the 6 Cav Gp continued to protect the Corps East flank, maintaining contact

* See Annex No. 1g, Map: Situation as of 260600 Jan.

- 24 -<u>SECRET</u>



with the XII Corps on the right.

Operations Directive No. 10 (Ref FO #3) was published, confirming fragmentary orders already issued. It prescribed new division boundaries, and announced that the Southern Corps boundary would be placed in effect on Corps order. In addition to the reliefs of divisions (described in narrative 25 Jan), it (1) announced that Corps would continue attack to clear enemy from West bank of OUR RIVER, (2) directed the 17 A/B Div to relieve elements of 80 Inf Div (XII Corps) in zone on Corps order, and patrol to and across OUR RIVER, (3) directed 6 Cav Gp to continue present missions, and (4) directed the 6 Armd Div to patrol to and across OUR RIVER. A number of changes in attachments were made: Co D, 3 Cml Bn, was relieved from current attachments and attached to 17 A/B Div; 949 FA Bn (155 How) was relieved from attachment III Corps (90 Inf Div); 735 Tk Bn was relieved from attachment 26 Inf Div and attached to 17 A/B Div upon departure 26 Inf Div; 776 FA Bn (155 How) was relieved from attachment 26 Inf Div and attached 203 FA Gp upon departure 26 Inf Div; 578 FA Bn (8" How) was relieved from attachment III Corps; Btry C, 253 FA Bn, was relieved from attachment 6 Cav Gp and returned to Bn control.

Although the morning was cloudy, the weather cleared somewhat in the afternoon, and the three squadrons supporting Corps flew 3 missions. BINSCHEID (vP9369) was bombed, and motor transport and troop concentrations were bombed and strafed with good results.

27 January:

The Corps continued its regrouping, generally consolidated positions along the "Sky Line Drive", and patrolled to the East. The 26 Inf Div cleared MARNACH (vP8062) and MUNCHAUSEN (vP7860).

In the morning elements of the 317 and 318 Regts (80 Div) passed to operational control of 26 Inf Div, until such time as the 17 A/B Div assumed command of its new zone. During the day the 17 A/B Div completed relief of the 26 Inf Div, and CG, 17 A/B Div accepted command of the zone at 1800. The Division continued the relief of elements of the 80 Inf Div in zone.

Coincident to the changed Corps mission, the Corps Artillery was reorganized. The 183 FA Gp, consisting of the 253 Armd FA Bn, the 696 Armd FA Bn, and the 177 FA Bn (155 How), was placed in general support and directed to reinforce fires of the 6 Armd Div. The 193 FA Gp, consisting of the 179 FA Bn (155 How), 257 FA Bn (155 How), and 776 FA Bn (155 How) was placed in general support and directed to reinforce fires of 17 A/B Div. The 203 FA Gp, consisting of the 176 FA Bn (4.5 Gun), 514 FA Bn (155 Gun) and 731 FA Bn (155 Gun) was also placed in general support.

- 25 -

The 104 Inf, 26 Inf Div, departed from the zone of the III Corps.

Operations Directive No. 11 (Ref FO #3), confirming fragmentary orders already issued, was published. In general, it directed that all units continue missions assigned in Operations Directive No. 10, and confirmed attachments and reliefs already mentioned herein.

Except for occasional targets of opportunity, Corps Arty was generally inactive.

*28 January

Corps continued to consolidate positions along the ridge between the CLERF and OUR RIVERS, and sent patrols to the East. Resistance, primarily from small arms, light artillery and mortar fire, continued to be received, and elements of the 6 Armd Div found KALBORN occupied by the enemy. An early morning attack there was repulsed by the enemy.

By 0440 the 17 A/B Div had completed relief of all elements of the 80 Div in its zone, and at 0700 the new South Corps boundary went into effect. The 328 Inf departed from the Corps zone at 0230.

During the day it was decided that the 6 Cav Gp would be given a zone of action, approximately 1 Km in width, on the Corps right (South) flank. Operations Directive No. 12 (Ref FO #3) was published, and established a zone for the Cav Gp. It directed that the group clear the enemy West of OUR RIVER, establish defensive positions, patrol to and across OUR RIVER, maintain contact between XII and III Corps, and protect Corps right flank. (New boundaries are shown in Annex No. 1g, Map: Situation as of 280700 Jan.)

Information was received that the 735 Tk Bn was to be relieved from attachment III Corps.

The 26 Inf Div cleared the Corps area.


Because of poor visibility, no missions were flown by supporting aircraft.

29 January:

Patrols along the entire Corps front pushed to the river, and encountered light resistance in some places, with none in others. The 6 Armd Div captured KALBORN early in the morning, where it took 60 prisoners, and then sent patrols to the river in that zone. The 17 A/B

* See Annex No. 1g, Map: Situation as of 280700 January.

- 26 -<u>SECRET</u>



Div in the northern portion of its zone met no resistance, but in the South enemy outposts were encountered. Small arms, and some mortar and Nebelwerfer fire was received.

Information was received that RCT 134 was to be detached from Corps.

Although the one squadron of fighter bombers in support of Corps flew two missions during the morning, poor visibility and low ceiling prevented the accomplishment of their mission.

30 January:

Corps continued to organize its positions and send patrols to the OUR RIVER. In the zone of the 6 Armd Div scattered resistance was met in some places and elements of the 17 A/B Div, upon entering RODER, found that town occupied by the enemy. The 6 Cav Gp patrolled to the river in their zone but received heavy small arms fire from enemy East of the river.

Because of unfavorable weather conditions, supporting aircraft were unable to fly any missions.

31 January:

Corps continued to organize its positions, and patrolled to and across the OUR RIVER. The 6 Armd Div reported few suitable ford sites, because of poor approaches and soft river bottoms.

The 735 Tk Bn departed from zone of 17 A/B Div, and Co C, 15 Tk Bn (6 Armd Div) was attached to 6 Armd Div.

No missions were flown by supporting aircraft because of poor visibility.

- 27 -<u>S E C R E T</u>

SECTION III, AFTER ACTION REPORT

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS .

On 1 January the enemy assault which had penetrated deep into Belgium and Luxembourg during the latter part of December was nearing its climax. It had reached its high water mark late in December, had been stopped by the end of the month; but the enemy apparently had not then made his decision to withdraw. Rather, he was counterattacking furiously in the zone of both the III and VIII Corps, probably with the hope of reisolating Bastogne, securing the vital roadnet which that city controls, and then consolidating his gains. When the American troops repulsed his repeated assaults, however, he was forced to revise his plans and begin the withdrawal which was to result, by the end of the month, in the complete reduction of the "Ardennes Salient".

A noteworthy achievement of III Corps was its successful stand against the many and severe enemy counterattacks which continued during those first critical days of the New Year. For 9 days the Corps not only shattered all German efforts to penetrate its lines, but successfully enclosed and continued to attack the enemy in a pocket, approximately centered at Harlange. In this vicinity the fighting raged for several days, and, as was stated on 5 January by the Commanding General, 35 Inf Div, finally reached the point where it had become a battle of attrition, because of adverse weather and frontage conditions. With the arrival of the 90 Inf Division, the complex operation of reducing this pocket was begun and was Corps' second noteworthy achievement during this month. The semicircular shape of the Corps lines, with zones of advance of all units converging on one point, necessitated skill and coordination both in planning and execution. Because of the nature of the action and the rapidity of the advances, any failure in planning, control, or flow of information would have had tragic consequences to our own troops. All of the Corps units displayed an aggressiveness that took maximum advantage of every opportunity, and in four days the enemy had been driven from his pocket, killed or had been trapped and corralled in prisoner of war cages. In two days, 11 and 12 January, 2131 prisoners were taken.

With the complete reduction of the Harlange pocket, Corps was next faced with the task of driving the enemy to the East in preparation for an assault by Third US Army on the Siegfried Line. The enemy chose to defend aggressively, initially, and as the Corps continued its determined advance resorted to strong delaying actions which, coupled with the severe winter and rugged terrain, made rapid progress difficult.

- 28 -

The weather alone was enough to try men's courage. Near zero and sub zero temperatures prevailed; blinding snow and fogs limited observation; waist high snowdrifts exhausted advancing infantrymen; and icy roads made vehicular traffic hazardous. The terrain ranged from rolling hills to precipitous slopes, with great portions of both covered with dense evergreen forests. Until the very last, when Corps seized the high ridge between the Clerf and Our Rivers, the enemy had continuous observation, and fought from terrain ideally suited to defense. Nevertheless the Corps by the end of January had advanced approximately 20 miles as the crow flies; and had taken the high ridge between the Clerf and Our River.

During the entire action Corps losses were relatively low. A total of 13,456 men was lost from all causes. Of these, 761 were killed, and of 11,409 hospitalized approximately 46% were returned to duty. It is interesting to note that of all hospitalizations, about 25% were caused by frost bite.

The enemy, on the other hand, lost 7206 captured, alone, and there is evidence that the privation of a hard and bitter winter caused him great hardship. In many cases it was reported that both food, clothing and medical attention were inadequate. Another great factor which added to his difficulties was the great preponderance and accuracy of the artillery fire placed on him. In many cases artillery was credited with breaking up attacks; TOT's and massed fires were employed effectively; and harrassing and interdiction programs were carried on almost continuously.

Enemy losses in materiel were also great. He lost 96 Mark III and IV and 39 Mark VI tanks, as compared to 57 medium and 16 light tanks lost by Corps. He lost 96 artillery pieces (75mm and over) against Corps' 1, and 229 vehicles of all types as compared to Corps' 117.

All in all, it can safely be said that January was a costly month for the enemy, in terms of lost personnel, materiel, ground and prestige. That month saw him beaten in the Bastogne area, driven back 20 miles, and finally pushed back into the Siegfried Line. It saw the initiative wrenched from his hands, and his Ardennes Salient ended.

> - 29 -<u>SEGRET</u>

SECTION IV, AFTER ACTION REPORT, HEADQUARTERS III CORPS

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

PART O	NE :	Narrative
PART T	wo :	Outline of Enemy Order of Battle
PART T		Attrition and Replacements in Enemy Divisions
PART F	OUR :	Analysis of Prisoners of War
See al	so Ann	er 2 to After Action Report

See also, Annex 2 to After Action Report, "Enemy Front Lines, etc."

Map References:

GSGS Series 4336, Sheets 13, 17, 1/100,000. Series 4416, Sheets T-1, U-1, 1/100,000.

GSGS Series 4040, Sheets 106, 107, 121, 122, 136, 137, 1/50,000.

PART ONE - Narrative

L. General Summary.

In the latter part of December, 1944, III Corps attacked the south flank of the German ARDENNES salient, and relieved BASTOGNE (P5558) on 26 December. The principal enemy activity in the ARDENNES in the latter part of December was his attempt to reduce BASTOGNE, or at least to contain it. From 25 to 31 December, three additional German divisions were committed on III Corps front (9 and 167 VG, and 1 SS Pz Divs). Early in January, the enemy continued to commit additional divisions on our front (340 VG and 12 SS Pz Divs), and made his final offensive efforts against BASTOGNE 4 January. Though this failed, he still clung to his salient southeast of BASTOGNE until it was forcibly reduced 12 January. A general withdrawal on the Corps front followed, pivoting on the south flank, with the enemy delaying along three successive lines (See Annex No. 2) until forced out of the last positions, across the OUR RIVER, back into the SIEGFRIED LINE on 25 January, leaving only small outposts west of the river.

The fighting in January completed the reduction to KAMP GRUPPE

SECRET

- 30 -

(Battle Group) proportions of 5 Para, 340 VG, 167 VG and 26 Divs, and the Pz Gren elements of 2, 9, 1 SS and 12 SS Pz Divs, in spite of enemy attempts to feed replacements to them. The relatively weak 9 VG Div escaped destruction because of its favorable location along the WILTZ River line out of the area of the heaviest fighting. The newly reinforced regiments of the 15 Pz Gren Div were badly mauled in the fight around TROISVIERGES (P7570), 22 - 23 January. A total of 7,206 prisoners of war were processed through Corps cages in January. (See Part Four).

Enemy infantry was generally left to its fate in the ARDENNES as the major enemy tank elements were withdrawn early in the month for refitting behind the SIEGFRIED LINE. However, the infantry continued to receive support from numerous self-propelled guns, and generally all counterattacks were supported by tanks. Enemy air was active 1 and 2 January; however, for the remainder of the month only 6 strafing and bombing sorties by enemy planes were reported. Prior to our attack on 9 January, enemy artillery fell mostly in vicinity of BASTOGNE. From 9 to 12 January, most of the moderately heavy artillery fire fell on forward elements of 90th Infantry Division. After 13 January, artillery fire received was principally from selfpropelled guns, and varied from light to moderate, falling off at the end of the month to practically none.

Ground and weather conditions favored withdrawal and delay. Visibility was poor throughout the month; successful tactical reconnaissance missions in the whole Third US Army area were reported only 16 days in the month. Snow was generally two to three feet deep and drifted to a depth of five or six feet; in many places it constituted the principal obstacle to our advance.

A total of 309 Belgium and Luxembourg towns were liberated during the advance in January.

2. Enemy Activity, January 1945.

Enemy preoccupation with the BASTOGNE area carried over into January; 340 VG Div was committed 1 - 2 January in the zone of the 6th US Armored Division, E of BASTOGNE, and 12 SS Pz Div moved into a reserve position northeast of BASTOGNE about 1 - 2 January. Total enemy divisions then on line or in immediate reserve in III Corps zone was six, plus elements of three more.

The newly arrived 340 VG Div counterattacked immediately on arrival early 2 January assisted by elements of 12 SS Pz Div. Again on 4 January, five separate tank-supported infantry counterattacks were received by 6th US Armored Division in the MAGERET (P6059) - WARDIN (P6056) area, east of BASTOGNE. These attacks resulted in some withdrawal of 6th US Armored Division units, but otherwise failed. Only one more enemy counterattack was mounted prior to US attack 9 January; this was made by the entire 387 Regt of 167 VG Div night of 7 January, and failed.

<u>SECRET</u> - 31 -

Bulk of 1 SS Pz and 12 SS Pz Divs are believed to have moved east 7 - 8 January. The central and eastern portion of the Corps zone remained relatively quiet up to 9 January. However, the enemy bolstered his relatively poor 9 VG Div by committing 276 VG Div on the line east of WILTZ on 5 and 6 January, thus narrowing the 9 VG Div sector.

The III Corps attack to reduce the enemy HARLANGE (P6059) -VILLERS (P5670) salient, SE of BASTOGNE jumped off early 9 January, and by 12 January the salient was eliminated. Evidence of withdrawal of enemy artillery was received late 8 and 9 January, and on the ninth the enemy began his forced withdrawal from the salient, resisting strongly at the shoulders while attempting to disengage his troops inside. The 90th US Infantry Division advanced rapidly against strong resistance and cut off the northeastern escape route of the enemy along the SONLEZ (P6353), DONCOLS (P6454) road; and the 6th Cavalry Group and 35th Infantry Division, by heavy pressure on the salient, completed the disorganization of the retreating enemy units. Between the start of the attack and final reduction of the salient 12 January, only one enemy counterattack was received, on 10 January, by an estimated 200 to 300 Infantry, against the 90th Infantry Division.

With the loss of his HARLANGE salient, the enemy began a general withdrawal from the ARDENNES. Thereafter, in the III Corps zone, he was able only to delay on favorable terrain, hinging on the WILTZ RIVER and finally on the junction of the WILTZ and CLERF RIVERS.

By early 13 January, the first of his delaying positions was hastily established on the general line (P6062) - MAGERET - RR Station (P622575) - BRAS (P6255) - (P6554), thence east along WILTZ RIVER. The 331 and 339 Regts of 167 VG Div, assisted by remnants of 2 SS PCR, 1 SS Pz Div, failed to hold BRAS against the determined assault of 90th US Infantry Division later 13 January; while on 13 and 14 January the 6th US Armored Division cleared MAGERET, BOIS ST IAMBERT (P6159) and WARDIN against moderate resistance by the 340 VG Div and part of 167 VG Div and 10 PCR of 9 Pz Div, which had been moved east to meet our attack.

The BRAS line failed to hold long enough, and OBEFWAMPACH (P6559), key to the next enemy delaying position, fell 16 January to 90th Infantry Division. The importance of this town to the enemy was evident in his desperate attempts to retake it next day, when five strong tank-supported infantry counterattacks were made and repulsed. The sixth and last unsuccessful counterattack on this town was made at 0400, 18 January. For these attacks, the Germany-bound 2 PGR, 2 Pz Div, operating as KG GUTMAN, was recalled and employed, as was KG SANDIG, formerly 2 SS PGR, 2 SS Pz Div. Practically all the tanks of 2 Pz Div remaining in the ARDENNES salient, plus some borrowed from 9 Pz Div were destroyed. These were the last strong enemy counterattacks received in January.

- 32 -

After his failure to retake OBERWAMPACH, the enemy abandoned any attempt at further delay long that line and made a precipitate withdrawal lasting 4 days for a distance of 8-10 miles in the north. This necessitated his abandonment of the WILTZ River positions west of WILWERWILTZ (P755); however resistance in the south was heavier and the enemy withdrawal slower. The next and last delaying position was along the CLERF River line between TROISVIERGES (P7570) and WILWERWILTZ, and the high ground between the CLERF and OUR Rivers. From 18 to 22 January while this withdrawal was taking place, contact was made with small delaying forces only. The extent of the enemy's disorganization in the Northern part of the Corps front is illustrated by the taking of prisoners from 10 enemy divisions on 22 January by 6th US Armored Division alone.

The final delaying position was reached by our forces 22 January. In TROISVIERGES the enemy was forced to commit two battalions each of 104 and 115 PGR, 15 Pz Gren Div which had been either in process of reorganization or immediately scheduled for it. 6th US Armored Division cleared the town on 23 January, and those battalions of 15 Pz Gren Div again became candidates for reorganization.

The enemy continued to delay with small covering forces and many anti-tank mines until 26 January when all divisions of the Corps reached their objectives on "Skyline Drive" along the ridge between CLERF and OUR Rivers.

The enemy was inactive for the remainder of the month. Only small enemy patrols and outposts remained west of the OUR River. In the III Corps zone, the enemy was back where he had begun 6 weeks earlier, east of the OUR River in the SIEGFRIED pillboxes, somewhat the worse for wear.

<u>SECRET</u> - 33 -

	SECRET
PART	TWO: Outline of Enemy Order of Battle January 1945
l Jan:	Major enemy units in contact W to E:
	3 Pz Gren Div (Elms)
	26 VG Div (Elms)
	130 Pz Div (Elms)
	1 SS Pz Div
	167 WG Div
	5 Para Div
	9 VG Div
1 - 2 Jan:	340 VG Div committed between 26 VG Div and 130 Pz Div
	12 SS Pz Div arrived in NOVILLE (P5864) - BOURCY (P6263)
	area.
3 Jan:	Elements of 26 VG Div were withdrawn and 130 Pz Div and
	3 PG Div shifted out of Corps zone.
4 Jan:	47 GHQ Engr Bn identified in line, probably attached to
i ni s	9 VG Div
1 7000	OF TO Die consistent in the Die Die O NO Die
6 Jan:	276 VG Div committed in line E of 9 VG Div.
7 Jan:	12 SS Pz Div began withdrawal to unknown destination; prob-
	ably bulk of 1 SS Pz Div also moved East
8 Jan:	Major enemy units in contact W to E:
	12 SS Pz Div (Elms)
	340 VG Div
	1 SS Pz Div (Elms)
	167 VG Div
	5 Para Div
	9 VG Div
	276 VG Div (Elms)
	As the enemy withdrawal became general, elements of the above
	divisions, except 1 SS Pz Div, were almost continuously in
	contact the remainder of January. While elements of 1 SS
	Pz Div were not believed continuously in contact they were
×.	employed from time to time at critical points. 12 SS Pz Div
	was not contacted further
14 Jan:	10 PGR, 9 Pz Div committed on N part of Corps zone vic woods
	(P6062). This unit was last identified in strength in the
	final counterattack on CBERWAMPACH 18 Jan.
15 Jan:	Remnants of 2 Pz Gren Regt, 2 Pz Div committed at OBERWAMPACH
22 Jan:	Bulk of 104 and 115 PGR, 15 Pz Gren Div committed in defense
	of TROISVIERGES, and remnants of 26 VG Div identified S of
	it along CLERF RIVER line.
	S TO TH
	SECRET

- 34 -

Typical scattered resistance encountered during latter part of January is shown by list of units identified by PWs this date:

> 340 VG Div 15 Pz Gren Div 26 VG Div 9 Pz Div 5 Para Div 9 VG Div 276 VG Div 130 Pz Div 130 Pz Div 12 Inf Div 12 SS Pz

23 - 31 Jan: Only scattered strong points, small patrols and outposts of some of units previously in contact were identified during this period.

Units in contact N - S, as follows:

31 Jan:

26 VG Div 340 VG Div

5 Para Div, Rems 276 VG Div, Elms

said to negative with with a or of the

and and the case that the second seco

add has all sain below to be rearrant is and in only and the second state of the secon



PART THREE: ATTRITION AND REPLACEMENTS IN ENEMY DIVISIONS

The following information is taken from statements of Prisoners of War: No doubt some are exaggerated and erroneous, however, the information herein is believed substantially correct and generally representative of attrition of Infantry units.

5 Para Div:

Known to have received 60 replacements on 18 Jan in addition to 5 Para Repl Bn of 450 men which arrived 2 Jan.

Last known strength is as follows: KG Sailer (13 Regt) 160 men as of 24 Jan; KG Schlemminger (14 Regt) 80 men as of 23 Jan; KG Barnaeke 120 men as of 18 Jan, and stragglers were still being collected.

340 VG Div:

Little is known of strength of 694 Regt.

1 and 3 Cos of 695 Regt were captured practically intact 15 Jan and a Regimental reserve of 27 men was committed and wiped-out 16 Jan.

In the 696 Regt KG Kierski (1 Bn, 13 and 14 Cos) lost 80 of 120 men as PWs including Captain Kierski on 14 and 15 Jan and was disbanded; 2 Bn strength on 23 Jan was 90 men, but replacements received that date brought it up to 150 men.

According to an officer PW, 340 Fus Bn was reduced to 80 men by 6 Jan and to 6 men by 13 Jan; on 15 Jan additional personnel from Bn trains and headquarters brought strength up to 60, divided into two KGs, one of which was captured practically intact that date.

This Division received 300 replacements 16 Jan which put the strength of all 3 Regts to about 500.

167 VG Div:

l and 2 Bns of 331 Regt were combined into KG Froelich on 17 Jan, estimated strength 40 men.

1 FW claims the 339 Regt was dissolved 18 Jan and formed into an Alarm Co under Lt. Mueller with strength of 65 men.

The 2 KGs of 387 Regt defended near BRAS 10 Jan and were reduced to strength of 100 men and 80 men respectively.

The 167 Engr Bn was reported dissolved during Jan and its remaining personnel transferred to rifle companies.

<u>SECRET</u> - 36 -

All 18 pieces of 1 Bn, 167 Arty Regt were lost, the last three being captured intact 16 Jan.

This Division received some replacements about 12 Jan, 11 of which went to 167 Arty Regt.

26 VG Divs

On 25 Jan strength of 77 Regt was estimated 150 men formed into 2 KGs.

On 21 Jan 78 Regt was also formed into two KGs, total strength about 120 men. Division received 300 replacements 14 - 18 Jan and strength figures above, given by FWs, are believed an understatement.

9 Pz Div:

1 Bn of 10 PGR received about 30 replacements per Co 13 Jan which brought its Co strength to about 70 men each; Bn was dispersed by US attack 14 Jan, and one Co commander was killed and two others captured.

2 Bn of 10 PGR suffered heavy casualties 15 Jan and its 5, 6 and 7 Cos were combined into one.

9 Pz Div received about 250 replacements 16 Jan which could not be used immediately because of lack of weapons; on 20 Jan 10 PGR is reported as receiving 40 replacements, probably some of the 250 previously received by Division.

2 Pz Div:

2 PGR received replacements 30 Dec and had a strength of 600 to 700 men. By 17 Jan the Regt was known as KG Gutman which included also some elements of 3 Pz Regt, and 33 Pz Regt of 9 Pz Div, with strength of about 250 men with 10 Mk IV tanks, 3 Panther tanks and 3 assault guns. KG Gutman was committed at OBERWAMPACH 17 Jan and lost practically all of its tanks.

12 SS Pz Div:

1 PW stated strength of 25 SS PGR about 80 men and 26 SS PGR about 150 men at time of their withdrawal on 8 Jan.

1 SS Pz Div:

On 10 Jan the two Pz Gren Regts were operating as KG Sandig, including KG Keil (1 SS PGR) with strength 50 - 60 men and KG Imedeche (2 SS PGR), strength 70 to 80 men. On 17 Jan, Major Sandig formed KG of 35 men of the 1 SS PGR and counterattacked OBERNAMPACH.

SECRET

- 37 -

It is not believed these KGs represent all the remnants of either 1 SS or 2 SS PGR; probably at least a cadre was withdrawn prior to formation of KG Sandig.

The 1 SS Pz Rcn Bn which had a strength of 550 men at the beginning of the ARDENNES offensive was reduced to 60 men by 12 Jan.



PART FOUR: Analysis of Prisoners Processed Through Corps Cages, January 1945

1. During the period 7,206 prisoners were processed through III Corps cage.

2. The bulk of the 6,005 Infantry Troops processed was furnished by four divisions which were in contact either throughout the period or a larger part of it. Among these, 5 Para Div tops the list with 1,881 PWs. This figure represents over one-half that division's effective combat strength 1 Jan 45, since by that date it had already been reduced to half strength by our action. It no longer has any semblance of organization, the remnants operating as several Kampfgruppen by end of January. 167 VG Div, having been engaged in numerous counterattacks, ran second with 1,712 prisoners. This Div, which was one of the better Volksgrenadier formations encountered, had more than its share of the fighting, and was decimated to approximately one-quarter its original strength. Third place is taken by 340 VG Div with 917 prisoners. This Div, which arrived on our front with only half of its original strength, has also been all but eliminated. Fourth was 9 VG Div with 825 PWs. One of the poorest VG Divs committed in the West, it was saved from larger losses by its location in a comparatively inactive sector, but suffered heavily in our advance after 9 January 1945.

Some of the 500 prisoners left by 26 VG Div were taken in the fighting around BASTOGNE, but most of them were captured in the rear guard action which the Div fought to delay our advance to the OUR River after 22 January. During the general enemy withdrawal after 18 January, isolated and discouraged prisoners were taken from a multitude of units that had been engaged on all sectors of the enemy salient, including 560 VG Div, 245 VG, 326 VG, 12 VG and 3 Para Divs.

276 VG Div, elements of which reinforced the 9 VG Div sector on III Corps right flank provided 114 PWs, and stragglers (4) were also taken from 79 VG Div located further E and out of III Corps area.

3. With the exception of the FUHRER GRENADIER Brigade (204 prisoners), which was in action generally throughout the month, prisoners from Panzer type units were taken in sporadic commitment. The list is headed by 15 Pz Gren Div with 294 prisoners, most of them taken on and after 22 January. 9 Pz Div (155 prisoners) and 2 Pz Div (9 prisoners) were committed between 14 and 26 January to protect the enemy withdrawal. 152 prisoners were captured from 1 SS Pz Div, which supported sporadic counterattacks throughout the month. The Div has been badly mauled and has reached the Kampfgruppen stage.

SECRET

- 39 -

Two of the weaker type Pz Divs, 3 Pz Gren Div and 130 Pz Lehr Div, furnished 66 and 51 prisoners respectively in the fighting around BASTOGNE at the beginning of the month. 12 SS Pz Div provied 8 PWs in a counterattack during the first week of the month. Prisoners from two other Divs, 2 SS Pz and 116 Pz Divs were taken in the disorganized withdrawal after the 18 January.

4. GHQ and MISC UNITS accounted for only 252 prisoners. In their ARDENNES offensive, the Germans had drawn heavily on miscellaneous and supporting units to reinforce the Divs in the line. It is characteristic, that a list of these units is headed by a Russian Labor Bn with 76 PWs. Other contributors were a number of Volks Arty Corps, GHQ AT Bns and GHQ Engr units, the later mostly having been committed as Infantry.

5. A marked discrepancy existed between the numbers of Officers and men taken. Of 7,072 prisoners, only 83 were Officers, little over 1%, and none of them was above the rank of Captain. This probably indicates a German plan to save the Officers to fight again another day.

6 Break down of PWs processed 1 - 31 Jan 45.

- a. By Units:
 - (1) Infantry type units.

5 Para Div	1881
167 Volksgren Div	1712
340 Volksgren Div	917
9 Volksgren Div	825
26 Volksgren Div	500
276 Volksgren Div	114
REMER Brig	34
560 Volksgren Div	14
79 Volksgren Div	4
245 Volksgren Div	1
326 Volksgren Div	1
12 Volksgren Div	1
3 Para Div	1
	6005

(2) Panzer and Panzer type divisions:

15 Pz Gren Div	294
Fuhrer Gren Brig	204
9 Pz Div	155
1 SS Pz Div (LSAH)	152
3 Pz Gren Div	66
130 Pz Lehr Div	51
2 Pz Div	9
12 SS Pz Div (HJ)	8
2 SS Pz Div (Das Rei	ch) 6

116 Pz Div

949

(3) Miscellaneous units.

Russian Labor Bn	76
657 GHQ AT Bn	47
47 GHQ Engr Brig	45
408 Volks Arty Corps	32
207 GHQ Engr Bn	9
6 Med Repl Bn	5
401 Volks Arty Corps	4
208 Res Engr Bn	
506 GHQ AT Bn	3
388 Volks Arty Corps	43332
59 AA Regt	3
200 GHQ Aslt Gun Bn	2
59 Construction Bn	2
677 Construction Bn	2
Organization RODT	2
20 AT Repl Bn	2
731 Construction Bn	2
45 GHQ Engr Brig	2
406 Volks Arty Corps	1
11 Para Asslt Gun Brig	1
409 Volks Arty Corps	1
2 Pz Gren Repl Bn	1
1 AA Asslt Regt	1
1 Pz Regt, 1 Pz Corps	1
911 Asslt Gun Brig	ı
Annual manage and and	Concession in which the

GRAND TOTAL 7,206

b. By Dates:

	1	-	163		17		581	
	2	-	323		18	-	40	
	3	-	444		19	-	95	
	4	-	105		20	-	31	
	5	-	265		21	-	none	
	6	-	98		22	-	80	
	7	1	107		23	-	176	
	8	-	none		24	-	91	
	9	-	93		25	-	275	
	10	-	332		26	-	413	
(*):	11		389		27	-	27	
	12	-	1914		28	-	39	
	13	-	253		29	-	none	
	14	-	204		30	-	40	
	15	-	266		31	-	32	
	16	$\dot{-}$	330	GRAND TOTAL		7	,206	

SECRET

- 41 -

SECTION V, AFTER ACTION REPORT

SUPPLY AND EVACUATION SUMMARY

1. SUPPLY

- a. Class I (Rations)
 - During the period 1 January to 31 January, rations were issued from Quartermaster Class I Supply Point Number 68 in the following proportion:

Balanced "A" - 72% Operational - 28%

- (2) Ration stocks were maintained at a high level throughout the period, except "K" rations which were in short supply until approximately the 15th of the month.
- b. Class III
 - (1) POL
 - (a) The average daily issue of V-80 gasoline for the month was approximately 90,000 gallons.
 - (b) No shortage of V-80 gasoline was experienced during the period. There was a shortage of R-73 gasoline, but those units using this gasoline were not hampered in their operations.
 - (c) Adequate stocks of allied products were on hand at all times. Information was received from Headquarters Third United States Army that SAE-10 oil was in short supply, but shipments adequate to meet requirements were received at the Quartermaster Class III supply point.
 - (2) Solid Fuel

A shortage of coal and coke during the latter half of the month was experienced. On 14 January, allowances for all units except hospitals with patients were cut 50%. On 23 January, the shortage became more critical and the issue of solid fuel was restricted to hospitals.

> - 42 -<u>S E C R E T</u>

- c. Class V
 - (1) Ordnance
 - (a) Items of ammunition which were critical during the month were as follows:

Sabot, 57mm Gun Shell, HE, 81mm Mortar with Fuze, PD, M77 Shell, Smoke for 105mm and 155mm Howitzer Trip Flares HVAP, 3" Gun and 76mm Gun Shell, HE, M101, 155mm Gun, M1

- (b) Early in the period, artillery and mortar ammunition expenditures within Third Army exceeded the rate of ammunition resupply. It became necessary for Third Army to establish a ration on the basis of ammunition availability in rounds per weapon per day.
- (c) German ammunition was obtained and fired against the enemy in the following type of captured weapons:
 - 8.0 cm Mortar 8.8 cm Gun 10.5 cm Howitzer 12.0 cm Mortar 15.0 cm Gun
- (d) Large quantities of American ammunition in an area formerly used as ASP No. 128 for the First United States Army before the enemy penetration was recaptured. The ammunition of larger calibers was scattered but not destroyed, and is now being reissued for use by our troops.
- (2) Chemical
 - (a) The supply of 4.2" chemical mortar ammunition became critical this month. During the last week of the month, no high explosive ammunition was available.
 - (b) During the month, the following amounts of 4.2ⁿ ammunition were allocated:

HE ammunition - 18,700 rounds WP ammunition - 21,000 rounds FS ammunition - 835 rounds

> - 43 -<u>S E C R E T</u>

- (c) Because accidents resulting from faulty ammunition caused death and injury to mortar crew members, large amounts of the ammunition received were frozen. Of the total amounts of ammunition received, only about 50% (approximately 9,000 rounds) high explosive ammunition and 33% (approximately 7,000 rounds) WP ammunition was found safe and expended.
- (d) Difficulty was experienced in firing the ammunition because of the many different lot numbers found in the relatively small total number of rounds received.
- (3) Engineer
 - (a) A Corps Class V dump was maintained and stocked a small reserve of mines and explosives. Toward the end of the period, all explosives were moved to an ordnance ASP.
 - (b) During the period, a small quantity of mines and explosives were required to fill shortages in basic loads.
- d. Class II & IV

(1) Quartermaster

- (a) Critical shortages of certain items still existed. Among those items critically short were gasoline lanterns and replacement and repair parts for lanterns, small size field jackets, EE size shoes, one-burner stoves, brushes, candles, and scap.
- (b) During the period, a previous critical shortage of overshoes was materially reduced. Also, a large number of mackinaws were issued in lieu of field jackets to reduce the shortage of this item.
- (c) An allotment of special winter clothing including shoepacs and inserts, ski socks, mittens with shells, was distributed to divisions and a cavalry group.
- (2) Ordnance
 - (a) The following items of ordnance supply continued critical during the period:

Trucks, all types Tires and tubes

> - 44 -<u>S E C R E T</u>

Hot patches Tire chains Prestone Launcher, rocket Mounts, machine gun, caliber .30 Bayonets and scabbards, all types Aiming post lights Fire control equipment Screw valve assemblies for Grenade Launcher, M7 Bore brushes for 105mm and 155mm Howitzers.

- (b) Arrangements were made during the period to send personnel from troops under III Corps to pick up vehicles from ANTWERP and deliver them to their units as releases were received.
- (c) The large number of requests for gun tube replacements resulted in a new method of determining need for replacement. Previous criteria had been the number of rounds fired. Under the new plan, a calibration team from Army is dispatched to check guns for which requests for replacement of tube has been made. This team determines whether the tube needs replacement.

(3) Chemical

- (a) Units were advised that 4.2" chemical mortars were now available to troops other than chemical units.
- (b) Arrangements were made to have flame throwers mounted on 6th Armored Division medium tanks for trial. Results of experiment will determine whether the division will equip all medium tanks for expected future operations against fortified positions.
- (c) A survey of gas masks revealed that of the masks on hand, 55,118 had black rubber face pieces and 16,556 had gray rubber face pieces. Of the masks with gray rubber face peices, 83 (or less than 1%) were reported as having a permanent set.
- (4) Medical

Medical supplies were adequate and no critical shortages were reported.

- 45 -<u>S E C R E T</u>

(5) Signal

- (a) An acute shortage of field wire W-llO-B existed throughout the period. Allotments were received but requirements were in excess of the amounts allotted. Contributing factors were: first, the shifting of troops within the Corps zone which made a more than normal number of wire nets necessary, and second, the difficulties of recovering field wire from under the snow.
- (b) Though other signal shortages existed, but few were of a critical nature.
- (c) Early in the period, units were instructed to fill T/E shortages of Panel Sets AP 50-A. Units not authorized these sets by T/E were authorized a special issue of one per ten trucks, 3/4-ton or larger.
- (6) Engineer
 - (a) Corps Engineers operated a Corps bridge dump as a forward supply point to furnish Bailey bridging when required. Bailey bridges when replaced by timber bridges or when taken up where a bridge became tactically unnecessary were returned to the dump. The stockage was from two to four sets. Each set was sufficient for 130 feet of double-double Bailey bridge.
 - (b) Critical items of Engineer supply which impeded operations included the following:
 - 1. 12 KW and 3 KW Generators.
 - Large tractors, D-6 or D-7, due largely to shortage of the necessary trailers and prime movers.
 - Surveying Equipment Sets and Command Post and Fire Direction Sets for artillery battalions.
 - 4. Tires for motorized graders and trailers at the beginning of the period.
 - (c) A sufficient quantity of commercial lime and carbide residue was available for camouflage purposes and was stocked at the Corps bridge dump.
 - (d) Snow suits were furnished by Army throughout the month. Approximately 4,000 suits were received and issued to six divisions and a cavalry group.
 - (e) Map supply is covered in Engineer annex to After Action Report.

- 46 -

2. OPERATION

a. Quartermaster

- (1) Laundry
 - (a) A section of a Quartermaster laundry company was placed in close support of each division and one section supported Corps troops.
 - (b) Divisions reported that excellent service was received from these laundry sections.
- (2) Fumigation and Bath
 - (a) Two fumigation and bath platoons were available. They
 were located so as to give close support to the divisions.
 By placing the fumigation and bath units close behind
 the divisions, the haul was reduced and greater use was
 made of the service by combat troops.
 - (b) In the operation of the units services, difficulty was experienced due to lack of repair parts for power units and the extremely cold weather.
- (3) Salvage
 - (a) During the latter part of the period, a section of a Quartermaster service company was placed at the disposal of each division to assist in the recovery of the considerable amount of salvage found in the break-through area.
 - (b) Although somewhat hampered by the snow, 46 truck loads of salvage were recovered during the period.
- (4) Burial and Graves Registration
 - (a) During January, 1190 American and 999 enemy dead were evacuated through the Division graves registration collecting points.
 - (b) Of the total American dead evacuated during January, five, or four tenths of one percent, remain unidentified.

b. Ordnance

- (1) An Ordnance Technical Intelligence Team consisting of one officer and one enlisted man was assigned this headquarters.
- (2) Ordnance units in general were in close support of combat units.

- 47 -

- (3) Several difficulties developed as a result of cold weather, icy road conditions, and frozen grounds:
 - (a) Tracked vehicles with either rubber or steel tracks were unable to get traction or avoid side slipping. Studs, however, were welded to steel tracks and gave satisfactory results. The most effective design consisted of a set of three studs, each stud approximately 5/8" x 5/8" x l¹/₂". One stud was placed across the track to give traction and two studs were placed parallel with edge of the track to prevent side slipping. Six sets were welded to each track.
 - (b) In firing the first round from artillery pieces, trail spades bent rather than digging themselves into the ground. Units were instructed to dig holes for the spades sufficiently deep to prevent bending.
 - (c) Equilibrators and recoil mechanisms failed in some cases due to cold weather.
- (4) During January, 96 Mark III and IV tanks, 39 Mark VI tanks, 96 enemy artillery pieces (75mm or over in caliber), and 229 enemy vehicles were captured or destroyed by III Corps units. III Corps losses through enemy action were 16 light tanks, 59 medium tanks, 1 artillery piece (75mm or over), and 117 vehicles of all types.

c. Engineer

- (1) Bridging
 - (a) The total amount of Bailey bridging built during the period was 1,300 feet. Five hundred ten feet were replaced or removed without replacing. The largest amount committed at any one time in the zone was 1,170 feet.
 - (b) The total amount of treadway bridging built was 600 feet. A total of 540 feet was replaced or removed during the period. The greatest amount committed at any one time was 432 feet. No floating bridges were committed.
 - (c) Materials for timber trestle bridges were hauled from the depot to bridge sites in order to avoid unnecessary stock piles. Total length of both one and two way bridges built was 611 feet.

SECRET

- 48 -

- (2) Supply of spare parts and evacuation of engineer equipment was accomplished through the Engineer Maintenance attached to III Corps.
- (3) Snow Removal and Road Maintenance
 - (a) Eight snow plows were procured early in the period for use on 4-ton and 6-ton trucks. This number was increased to 21 by the end of the period.
 - (b) Drags made of large I-beams were improvised for use in road maintenance.
 - (c) One rock crusher (36 cubic meters) was put into operation and traction material was obtained from four pits.
 - (d) A limited quantity of salt for deicing was obtained from an abandoned stock pile at BASTOGNE.
- (4) Portable snow fences were made from lumber procured from nearby saw mills.
- 3. EVACUATION

See Inclosure 1.

1 Incl: Incl 1 - Summary of Casualties: Admissions and Dispositions

> - 49 -<u>SECRET</u>

	B.I. : TOTAL: <u>B.I.</u> : TOTAL: <u>SIA LIA: ADM</u> : <u>DUTY</u> EVAC <u>DIED</u> <u>REM'G</u> : <u>DISP'S</u> :	69 : 0	34 : 2905:	: 3518:	65 : 2074	1 : 3231:	14 : 488:	33 : 337:	2 :12622:					
	NS		1084	1025	9	331	294	ŝ	2832					
	DIED	0	9	2	0	6	0	0	17					
	DISPOSITIONS	64	142 1673	212 2479	4 2005	2820	163	298	9502					
	I	5				77	31	9	271					
	TOTAL:	:69	2905:	3518:	2074:	3231:	488:	337:	:2367 970 329:12622:		ion			
	LIA:		615:	:981			85:	84:	1:692		1 Acti			
		0	356 183	590 282 1186:	476 150 562:	332 731:	9	17	670 3		ss led ir d in			
5	F.B.	Ħ	356	590	476	820	55	59	2367		njuri e Mound Iound e			0
ADMISSIONS AND DISPOSITIONS for month ending 31 January 1945	N.B.I.	9	205	132	136	171	14	 M	643 :		Battle Injuries Frost Bite Severely Wounded in Action Lightly Wounded in Action Remaining			
ADMISSIONS AND DISPOSITIONS r month ending 31 January 1	ADMISSIONS	37 :	842 :	965 :	: 099	: 968	232 :	148 :	3780 :		асода IIIII	1	년 121 121	
ONS AND en di ng	DI SEASE X N.P.	0	50	Ч	ŝ	ч	m	0	58		B.I. F.B. SIA LIA REM'G	- 50	ଧା ସା ରା	
MISSI	DI B.EX	6	376	321	5	158	FI	9	956	20	m			
AD for 1	III.	0	:278	[] []	*r: :	:176	: 50	50	:579	ŝ	ustion atrics Injurie			0
	DATES	1 thru 3	4 thru 31	1 thru 28	l thru 18	8 thru 26	1 thru 31	27 thru 31		Abbreviations:	Trench Foot Battle Exhaustion Neuropsychiatrics Non-battle Injuries		*:	
	L]	d Div	d Div	f Div	f Div	f Div	ps Clr			tion of	TF B.EX N.P N.B.I			
	LIND	4th Armd Div	6th Armd Div	26th Inf Div	35th Inf Div	90th Inf Div	III Corps Clr	17th A/B Div	TOTAL	Explanation of	Ean		Incl 1	
										8				

SECTION VI, AFTER ACTION REPORT

PERSONNEL SUMMARY

1. <u>Battle and Non-Battle Casualties</u>: See the following Table No. 1 for casualties incurred by this corps during the period 1 January to 31 January 1945, indicated by major components and type. Figures given indicate casualties only for the period during which units were under command of III Corps.

Table No. 1

8	:		:	:	2	Total		Sick &	:	Total	:	Days in:
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		KIA	:	WIA :	AIA :	BC	•	Non BC	:	Casualties	•	Corps :
Corps Troops	:	28	:	181:	8:	217	:	476	:	693	:	:
26 Inf Div	:	188	:	1569:	329:	2086	:	1224	:	3310	:	28 :
:35 Inf Div	\$	95	\$	937:	607:	1639	-	1129	:	2768	:	18 :
:90 Inf Div	:	225	\$	1194:	108:	1527		1043	:	2570	:	18 :
4 Armd Div	:	9	:	20:	0:	29	:	85	:	114		1 :
6 Armd Div	:	197	:	1347:	229:	1773	:	1761	:	3534	:	31 :
17 AB Div	•	19	:	207:	15:	241		236	:	477	:	5 :
: Total		761	•	5455:	1296:	7512	*	5954	:	13466		1

2. <u>Prisoners of War Captured</u>: See Table No. 2 for the total number of prisoners captured by major components of the corps, indicated by unit and by date.

3. <u>Reinforcements Received</u>: See Table No. 3 for total number of reinforcements received during January, including hospital returnees, indicated by unit and by date. Reinforcements were a very major problem during the first half of the period but improved materially during the latter half. The principal shortage continued to be in Infantry Riflemen (MOS 745). Total shortage in strength at 2400 on 31 January 1945 was 6185 of which 4842 were airborne personnel from the 17th Airborne Division.

4. <u>Grave Registration</u>: American, allied and enemy burials were made in U.S. Military Cemetery No. 1, vicinity of GRAND FAILLY and U.S. Military Cemetery No. 1, vicinity of HAMM, during the entire period.

5. <u>Awards and Decorations</u>: This headquarters awarded 13 Silver Star Medals, 124 Bronze Star Medals, 6 Air Medals and 2 Soldier's Medals during the month of January. In addition, recommendations for 14 Legions of Merit, 3 Distinguished Service Medals and 13 Distinguished Service Crosses were approved and forwarded to the Commanding General, Third United States Army.

6. Special Service:

a. During the month, service clubs were opened in Longwy,

- 51 -<u>SECRET</u>

France, and Arlon, Belgium, for troops in those areas. Civilian theaters were opened and operated in Longwy, France, Virton, and Arlon, Belgium.

b. Approximately 346,000 troops received special service benefits of one type or another. 657 movie shows were presented to 136,167 troops; films were loaned to 258 units for 789 additional showings. Dance bands played 29 programs for 8,655 troops; 28 soldier variety shows played to 9,398 troops; 38 U.S.O. shows were presented for 18,100 troops.

c. In addition to the regular issue of Stars & Stripes, Yank, and The Army Talks, publications and miscellaneous supplies were issued as follows: 20,590 books; 3,425 magazine kits; 19 phonographs; 36 radios; 3,853 packs of playing cards, 559 small games; 200 harmonicas; 603 phonograph records; 6 ukuleles; 1,968 ping-pong balls; 30 kraft kits; 206 articles of athletic equipment; numerous other items such as song books, stationery and game kits.

d. The attached Cinemobile was loaned to the 26th Infantry Division during the period 16-28 January where they presented movies and rendered regular club service to members of the division and to three hospitals.

7. American Red Cross:

a. The Red Cross served all units of the Corps and non-organic units within the Corps zone. Forty clubmobile units served doughnuts and coffee to approximately 34,000 troops during the last half of the period.

b. For the most part, comfort articles were distributed through medical clearing and collecting companies, but special distribution was made to many units who were unable to avail themselves of PX facilities. Items distributed were: 1,700 packages of gum; 1,066 packs of cigarettes; 1,150 candy bars; 280 combs; 300 bars of soap; 600 tooth-brushes; 275 tubes of tooth-paste; 270 packages of tobacco; 250 packages of chewing tobacco; 200 home-town newspapers; miscellaneous magazines, stationery, et cetera.

c. Much of the Field Director's time was occupied in handling welfare cases such as delivering death messages, securing health and welfare reports, locating lost relatives and rendering legal assistance. 229 such cases were handled.

8. Leaves, Furloughs and Passes:

- 52 -<u>SECRET</u>

a. <u>Rotation to the United States</u>: The policy of returning officers and enlisted men to their homes in the United States for 30 days rest and recuperation has an excellent effect on morale. During the period a total of 172 were returned from III Corps units under this plan. Allocations to major components were as follows:

Corps Troops	40
26th Inf Div	20
35th Inf Div	42
4th Armd Div	35
6th Armd Div	35

This personnel was assembled by the AGF Reinforcement System on 8 January 1945 for transportation to the port of embarkation. Not more than eight percent of the total were officers. Priority was given to those who had: (1) been hospitalized for wounds received in action, (2) been decorated for gallantry, and (3) for length of service overseas.

b. <u>Hospital Attendants Returned to the United States</u>: In addition to the rotational quota the corps received an allocation for the return of 68 enlisted men to the United States as medical attendants on a hospital ship. This was broken down as follows:

6th Armd	Div	20
26th Inf	Div	15
90th Inf	Div	25
Corps Tr	oops	8

Upon arrival in the United States these men were to receive a 10-day furlough at home, exclusive of travel time. Selection of personnel was based upon directives covering return of personnel for rest and recuperation. All reported to the AGF Reinforcement Depot on 27 January 1945.

c. <u>Passes to Paris</u>: Paris pass privileges became effective again on 17 January 1945 with an extension of the pass period from 48 to 72 hours. Quotas were allotted as follows for pass parties to arrive in Paris on 17 January 1945 and each 72 hours thereafter:

26th Inf Div	16 Off - 55 EM	4
35th Inf Div	16 Off - 55 EM	1
90th Inf Div	16 Off - 55 EM	i
6th Armd Div	16 Off - 55 EM	1
Corps Troops	8 Off - 30 El	ĩ

- 53 -

Under this plan a total of 320 officers and 1100 enlisted men were granted passes.

9. <u>Rest Centers</u>: No corps rest center was in operation during the period. Each division, however, operated a rest center in the vicinity of its administrative echelon to which groups of officers and enlisted men were withdrawn for rest and re-fitting. Flans for opening a corps rest center were nearing completion at the close of the period.

> - 54 -<u>SECRET</u>

<u>SECRET</u>

PRISONERS OF WAR CAPTURED

		:	1.0	:2	6th Inf	1:35	th In:	f:90)th Inf	::6t	ch Armo	1:17	th AB	:4t]	n Armo	i:	:
		: Co	orps	: 1	Div w/	: 1)iv w/	: 1)iv w/	: 1)iv w/	: D.	iv w/	: D:	iv w/	1	
Da	ate	:T)	roops	:A	tchmts	:At	chmts	:At	chmts	;At	chimts	:At	chmts	:At	chmts	:T	otal:
:	1		5	:	16	:	38	:	*	:	123	:	*	:	6	:	188
	2		1	:	58	:	91	:	*	:	196	:	*	:	*	:	346
:	3	:	0	:	. 40	:	29	::	*	: 1	128	:	*	: 1	*	:	197
:	4	:	0	:	81	:	162	2	*	11	78	:	*	: 0	*	:	321
:	5	:	0	:	15	:	68	:	*	:	7	:	*	: :	*	:	90
:	6	:	1	:	62	:	50	:	*	:	51	:	*	: 3	*	:	164
:	7	:	1	:	13	:	11	:	*	:	5	:	*	:	*	:	30
:	8	:	3	:	4	1	6	:	0	:	66	:	*	: :	*	:	79
:	9		0	:	117	:	28	:	82	:	61	:	쓝	:	*	:	288
:	10	:	43	:	47	:	82	2	167	:	23	:	*	:	*	:	362
:	11	:	218	:	22	:	22	. :	634	:	224	:	*	: 7	*	:	1120
:	12	:	75	:	22	:	32		804	:	88	:	*	: 2	*	:	1021
:	13	:	4	:	39	:	8	1	145	:	84	:	*	: :	*	:	280
:	14	:	77	:	26	:	2	:	212	:	121	:	*	:	*	:	438
:	15	:	0	:	9		131	:	78	:	375	:	*	: :	*	:	593
:	16	:	0	:	8	:	26	:	352	:	266	:	*	:	*	:	652
:	17	*	0	:	12	:	16	:	167	:	34	:	*	:	*		229
:	18	:	0	:	13	:	0	:	30	:	18	:	*	:		:	61
:	19	:	0	:	10	:	*	:	24	:	0	:	*	:	*	:	34
:	20	:	7	:	7	:	*	:	24	:	91	:	*	: :	*	:	129
:	21	:	0	:	49	:	*	:	17	:	0	:	*	:	*	:	66
:	22	:	0	:	48	:	*	:	45		93	:	*	::	×	:	186
:	23	:	103	:	16	:	*	:	18	:	0	:	*	:	*	:	137
:	24	:	2	:	6		*	:	20	:	241	:	*	:	*	:	269
:	25	:	2	:	145	:	*	:	134	:	35	:	*	:	**	:	316
:	26	2	0	:	91	:	*	:	*	:	90	:	*	:	*	1	181
:	27	:	0	:	34	:	*	:	*	:	19	:	0	:	*	:	53
:	28	:	0	:	*	:	*	:	*	:	15	:	20	:	*	:	35
:	29	:	5	:	*	:	*	:	*	:	20	:	25	:	*	:	50
:	30	:	0	:	*	:	於	:	*	:	10	:	27	:	*	:	37
:	31	:	2	:	*	:	*	:	*	:	1	:	27	:	*	:	30
:2	Cota.	1:	549	:	1010	:	802	:	2953	:	2563	:	79	:	6	:	7982

* Not assigned to III Corps on this date.

- 55 -

REINFORCEMENT'S RECEIVED (Including RTD's)

															th Armo		1
1															Div w/		
D	ate	:1		3:4	Atchints	5 :A	tchmts	: A		: A	tchmts	:At		5:A		:3	Cotal
: .	1	:	3		447	:	123	:	*	:	16	:	*	:	11	:	600
	2	:		:	0	:	132	:	*	÷.,	11	:	*	:	*	:	197
1	3		2	:	36	:	12	:	*	:	14	1	*	:	*	:	64
:	4	:	3	:	61	:	4.2	:	*	:	86	:	*	:	*	\$	192
5	5	:	9	:	11	1	99 .	:	×	:	65	۰.	*	:	*	:	184
	6	*	12	:	32	2	117	:	*	-	34	:	*	:	*	:	195
:	7	:	14	:	20	:	130	:	*	:	83	:	*	:	*	:	247
	8	4	2		51		635	:	0	2	249	:	*	2	*	2	937
	9	:	13	:	52	:	72	:	138	:	48	:	*	:	*	:	323
:	10	:	27		27	:	54	:	0	:	5	:	*	:	*	:	113
:	11		21	:	18	:	92	:	0	:	29	:	*	:	*	:	160
:	12	:	24	5	27	:	87	:	102	:	127	:	*	:	*	2	367
	13	:	14	:	41	:	69	:	1	:	14	:	*	:	*		139
	14	:	33	:	1.2	:	61	:	70	:	269	:	×	:	*	:	475
:	15	:	27	:	1	:	146	:	47	:	57	:	*	:	*	:	178
	16	:	12	:	149	:	57	:	2	:	362	:	*	:	*	:	582
	17	:	35	:	711	:	451	:	0	:	101	:	*	:	*	:	1298
:	18	:	19	:	13	:	8	:	4	:	48	:	*	:	*	:	92
	19	:	81	:	232	:	*	:	234	2	181	2	*	:	*	:	728
:	20	:	36		83	:	*	:	2	:	68	:	*	:	*	:	189
	21	2	44	2	253	:	*	:	445	:	383	:	*	:	*	:	1125
	22	-	12		50		*	:	234	:	23	:	*	:	*	:	319
	23	3	10	:	673	:	**	:	218	:	285	:	*	:	*		1186
:	24	:	21		48	:	*	. :	237	:	57	:	*	:	*	:	363
	25	:	0 54	:	34	:	×	2	439		80	:	*		*		607
	26		81		0		*		*		48		*	:	*		129
	27	1	39	:	519	:	*	:	×		538	:	0	:	*		1146
	28	:	30	-	*	:	*	:	*	:	40		98	:	*		168
:	29		160	:	*		*	:	.*		50		58		\$5		268
	30	:	82		*		*		*		266		83		*		431
2	31	:	34		*	:	*	:	*	-	46		39		*	:	119
T	otal	-	1008	:	3631	:	2287	:	2173	:	3733	:	278	:	11		13121

* Not assigned to III Corps on this date.

- 56 -

SECTION VII, AFTER ACTION REPORT

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUMMARY

1. Situation

a. III Corps Zone of Operations during this period was contained in the eastern portion of Province of Luxembourg, Belgium and western portion of Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

b. As a result of military operations during the period, approximately 15,000 civilians were made homeless, large percent of this number were people from the northern part of Duchy of Luxembourg and Province of Luxembourg, Belgium, who fled to areas south of the "bulge". Approximately 75% found refuge with friends, relatives and even with strangers in towns and villages in southerly portion of Canton of Redange and in City of Luxembourg and vicinity, others were evacuated and housed in Refugee-Displaced Persons Centers. Many residents in forward areas of military operations refused to leave their homes upon the opening of the enemy counter offensive, or later, and persisted in remaining despite damage and destruction of their property.

c. During most of the period there was a general shortage of foodstuffs, due almost entirely to lack of transportation. Army CA trucks which were engaged in transfer and evacuation of refugees during first half of the period, were later used to bring food supplies from interior of Belgium and CA Food Supply Depot in France. With the receipt of supply of gasoline and availability of civilian trucks for transportation and distribution of foodstuffs, the food situation improved considerably. It is to be noted that with the improvement of the military situation in the later stages of this period, tactical units and Corps G-4 Section rendered immeasurable assistance by loaning trucks to evacuate refugees, haul and distribute food supplies. In spite of general shortage of foodstuffs, black market operations were negligible.

d. Many officials of towns and villages who fled upon reentry of Germans, returned to their posts when the areas were cleared of Germans. It may be said that in reliberated areas, local government is satisfactory: in localities where civic officials have not yet returned, their duties are being carried out by temporary substitutes appointed by CA Detachments with consent and approval of the local population. Officials and population are very cooperative. Despite considerable number of civilians killed and wounded and heavy damage and destruction of real and personal property, the people of all liberated communities expressed

- 57 -

their satisfaction of being freed of Germans, and are eager to begin the work of reconstruction. On 25 January, Prime Minister of Belgium, accompanied by Ministers of Interior and of Food called upon General Millikin to express their satisfaction and appreciation for effective assistance and cooperation rendered by U. S. Forces to local population and authorities in Corps Area.

e. Public Health and Welfare were generally satisfactory, although during second half of period, approximately 30 cases of diphtheria (mostly children) were reported. Effective cooperation of Belgian Red Cross at Arlon, Luxembourg Red Cross, Army M.C. and Public Health Officers of G-5 Section Army, resulted in quick disposition of cases and prevention of the spreading of the disease. Several mobile ambulance teams, consisting of driver, nurse and doctor, received Corps' permission to travel throughout Corps area, including forward of 'No Passage Line! to evacuate wounded and sick civilians.

2. Assignment of Detachments and Operations

a. During the period 1 January to 31 January 1945, CA/MG Detachments were assigned as follows:

City	Coord	Detachment	Period						
Arlon	P6222	CIAL	1 January - 31 January						
Arlon	P6222	G3B2	1 January - 4 January						
Arlon	P6222	I17G2	3 January - 24 January						
Redange	P6732	I6G2	1 January - 31 January						
Martelange	P5638	G3B2	7 January - 24 January						
Martelange	P5638	G3B2	27 January - 29 January						
Martelange	P5638	I17G2	24 January - 31 January						
Bastogne	P5558	117G2	1 January - 3 January						
Bastogne	P5558	G3B2	24 January - 27 January						
Folschette	P6637	D6B1	1 January - 21 January						
Wiltz	P7054	D6B1	21 January - 31 January						
Clervaux	P7863	G3B2	29 January - 31 January						

b. Detachments were assigned to areas as military exigencies required and the needs for the control of civilian circulation, security control, relief and evacuation of refugees and displaced persons and billeting of troops occurred.

c. Two Displaced Persons-Refugee Centers were established, one at Clairefontaine (P6421) and the other at Guirsch (P6526). These centers are operated under Army controlled detachment, C112. MMLA (Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative), Detachments and French and

- 58 -SECRET

American Red Cross personnel supplemented normal civil affairs personnel in welfare, refugees and displaced persons control.

d.. Detachments redistributed available food supplies to towns and villages where critical shortages existed. CA Supplies were called forward to alleviate food shortages throughout Corps area. Some medical supplies and diptheria serum from CA Depot were drawn and distributed to Belgian and Luxembourg Red Cross. Five tons of American Red Cross assorted civilian clothing was distributed to needy refugees and displaced persons in Belgium and Luxembourg.

e. Civil authorities were assisted in reorganizing and reconstructing local government administration. Detachments coordinated and supervised the control of civilian circulation and "freezing" refugees in place so as not to interfere with or impede military operations, and as a security measure.

f. Detachments supervised enforcement of curfew and blackout orders.

g. Surveyed the areas for available accomodations and assisted in billeting of troops.

h. Assisted military units in procurement of necessary civilian labor.

i. Protected troops from being overcharged by unscrupulous merchants and black market operations.

- 59 -<u>S E C R E T</u>

SECTION VIII, AFTER ACTION REPORT

ENGINEER OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

At the beginning of the month's operations, engineer troops of the III Corps consisted of the 1137th Engineer Combat Group, with five combat battalions, two light ponton companies, a light equipment company, dump truck company, and treadway bridge company attached. In addition, the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions had as attachments, the 995th and 996th Engineer Treadway Bridge Companies respectively. On 3 January the 961st Engineer Maintenance Company was attached to Corps. Also on the 3rd of January, the 1123rd Engineer Combat Group arrived, having just come to the continent from England. On 4 January the engineer means of the Corps were split approximately in half and half attached to each of the two groups. The 280th Engineer Combat Battalion was attached to III Corps and reported in on the 5th of January. The list below shows the organization and attachments of the engineer units as of 7 January:


1123rd Engineer Combat Group - Attached III Corps Attached 280th Engineer Combat Battalion 178th Engineer Combat Battalion 188th Engineer Combat Battalion 72nd Engineer Light Ponton Company (-1 Plat) 1 Platoon, 632nd Engineer Light Equipment Company 1137th Engineer Combat Group - Attached III Corps Attached 145th Engineer Combat Battalion 183rd Engineer Combat Battalion 249th Engineer Combat Battalion 513th Engineer Light Ponton Company 632nd Engineer Light Equipment Company (-1 Plat)

- 770th Engineer Dump Truck Company
- 998th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company

961st Engineer Maintenance Company - Attached III Corps 2942nd Engineer Technical Intelligence Team - Attached III Corps

This general organization remained substantially the same throughout the month's operations. The only changes which occurred were the transfer of the 72nd Engineer Light Ponton Company on 22 January and of the 998th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company on 12 January, both units going to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group of Third Army. On the former date, the

- 60 -



996th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was relieved from attachment to the 6th Armored Division and attached to the 1123rd Engineer Combat Group, where it remained for the rest of the month.

2. Operations

Principal engineer operations for the month of January consisted of assisting the advance of the attacking divisions by maintenance and clearance of roads, bridge construction and mine laying and clearing.

a. Road Maintenance

The month of January was marked by particularly heavy falls of snow which greatly impeded traffic and occupied most of the time of the engineer units. One main supply road for the Corps and one for each of the three attacking divisions were maintained in good condition throughout the month. In addition to these, many minor roads were kept open in order to provide access for artillery and other supporting Corps troops to and from their bivouac or operational areas. First priority for snow clearance was given to the main supply routes and at no time during the month were any of these routes impassable. On many occasions special engineer assistance was given to field artillery units in order to help them move from their emplaced positions onto the nearest road, and occasionally assistance was given these units in negotiating particularly steep and slippery hills on which their prime movers could not gain traction. Road maintenance consisted almost entirely of snow removal and the sanding of roads to provide traction. Eight snow plows were available to the Corps troops at the beginning of the month and this number was increased to twenty-one by the end of the month with the addition of plows obtained from Army and some constructed by the 961st Engineer Maintenance Company. Many types of drags constructed of wood or steel I beams were improvised. Sand pits were located, opened and put into operation at strategic locations throughout the Corps zone and traction material was hauled from these and spread on the roads with hand shovels (see Fig 1). Since most of the roads throughout the area were constructed along tops of ridges where the wind velocity was high, certain parts of the roads were susceptible to heavy drifting of snow (see Figs. 2, 3 and 4). At these locations snow fences were improvised from several types of materials. The first snow fences constructed usually consisted of small pine trees, and as time and materials permitted, snow fences built of strips of wood held together with wire were used (see Fig 5).

b. Bridging

At first glance of a map of this country, it would appear that very little bridging would be required. As the attack progressed, however, it became apparent that what had seemed to be small creeks with extremely short bridges actually necessitated construction of some

- 61 -

fairly long bridges. This was caused by the fact that the streams had high and steep banks and while the water gap itself was small, the width of the crossing at the top of the bank was often considerably greater. In most cases fixed treadway bridges of spans from twentyfour to forty-eight feet were thrown across the streams to provide a erossing for the leading vehicles. As soon as possible, the supporting engineers replaced this treadway with bailey bridge and as time permitted the bailey was in turn replaced by fixed timber bridges. During the month fifteen treadway bridges, totaling 600 feet, eighteen bailey bridges, totaling 1300 feet, and twelve timber bridges, totaling 611 feet were constructed. In addition numerous culverts were constructed, often replacing treadway bridges which had been thrown across the gap as an expedient.

c. Mines

Very little laying of minefields was performed by the Corps engineer troops, this function normally being performed by the divisional battalions. As the divisional battalions moved forward, however, many minefields were left behind and were either cleared or marked by the support battalions. Many friendly and enemy minefields were located and removed. During the month, 1067 friendly mines and 1274 enemy mines were lifted.


d. Camouflage.

The fact that the ground was snow covered throughout the month made necessary the providing of camouflage materials to the front line troops. Near the beginning of the period a detail consisting of one sergeant and three men from the 602nd Engineer Camouflage Battalion were attached to the Engineer Section for assistance in camouflage work. 4,000 white camouflage suits were supplied to foot troops and whitewash was provided for the camouflaging of tanks and other vehicles. The camouflage detail made continuous visits to the divisions and the Cavalry Group to give them technical assistance in the methods of application.

e. Map Reproduction and Supply.

Although the Corps has not been assigned a topographic company, it is provided with a small reproduction detachment consisting of six men with one press and one camera truck. A map depot detachment consisting of one officer and nine enlisted men attached to the Corps Headquarters provided map supply for all Corps troops including divisions. Twenty-eight reproduction jobs were run by the reproduction detachment with an average run of 300 copies of each job. These jobs consisted of seven photo maps, eight special maps, one terrain study,

- 62 -



two town plans, and other miscellaneous posters and illustrations. The map depot detachment distributed 118,862 maps during the month.

3. Annexes

3a - This map shows the bridges constructed during the month and the main routes cleared and maintained. Minor routes and access roads are not shown on this map.

3b - This map shows Corps lateral boundaries, division rear boundaries, and the forward boundaries of Corps engineer support and also CP locations of all engineer units. The forward boundary of Corps engineer support is the line in rear of which Corps Engineer units perform all engineer work, thereby relieving the divisional battalions of responsibility for a large portion of their area. This boundary is normally five to ten kilometers forward of the division rear boundary. In addition to taking over responsibility for engineer work in this area, Corps engineer units often perform special task missions ahead of this boundary of engineer support.

> - 63 -<u>5 E C R E T</u>

SECTION IX, AFTER ACTION REPORT

SIGNAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

1. The III Corps signal communication problem for the month of January was the expansion and maintenance of the facilities installed during the last two weeks of December. The solution of this problem was made more difficult by the shifting of corps boundaries and by the shuffling of divisions. In only two instances did enemy action seriously interfere with signal activities. Heavy snows throughout the month caused maintenance difficulty on wire lines. The movement of armored elements and snow removal activity coupled with carelessness on the part of drivers accounted for the destruction of several stretches of wire. In several instances, wires and cables were deliberately cut, but no evidence was found to indicate that such sabotage was caused by the enemy.

2. The greatest communication burden was carried by the telephone system. Peg counts show that telephone calls averaged approximately six thousand a day with a high point of five hundred calls an hour. To substitute for the wire channels in cases of wire failure, telephone carrier equipment was used on very high frequency radio circuits. After the relief of Bastogne and the pivoting of the corps front east, the wire lines became over extended, sometimes as far as thirty-five miles, and this factor, coupled with impediments caused by the action of the weather on the lines, caused some difficulty in maintaining the talking quality of the circuits. Some relief was found for this by the establishment of the TAC Headquarters at Haut-Martelange and the use of carrier equipment on land lines.

3. Teletype facilities were little used during January, except for the transmission of Situation Reports and Intelligence Summaries. It was found that, although teletype service to and from subordinate units was rapid, congestion and the use of high priorities by other headquarters made it difficult to clear traffic to higher headquarters within a reasonable time. Facsimile service was established to higher and lateral headquarters, but no occasion was found to use this facility.

4. Radio was used only for emergency communication during January. The services of the Twelfth Army Group radio monitoring team was used to check the efficiency of the Corps radio nots. They were found to be operating at better than average efficiency. Minor corrections in operating procedures were made to improve radio security. The use of periodic net calls to test the status of the net was discontinued and a nightly time signal substituted therefor.

5. Message center and messenger service was continuous. Messenger traffic averaged nine hundred items a day, approximately a third of which was registered.

- 64 -<u>s e c r e t</u>

6. Owing to the use of high security teletype lines, the volume of enciphered traffic decreased during January.

7. Figeons were made available to subordinate units but only the 26th Infantry Division availed itself of this service. Difficulty was found in training local birds to fly over snow and the training of locally procured birds was delayed by inclement weather. The personnel of the pigeon platoon were utilized to investigate civilian pigeon lofts to ascertain the possibility that enemy agents were using pigeons for communication. No evidence was found that such was the case in this area.

8. Signal Intelligence activities were carried out by the 3256th Signal Service Company working directly with Corps G-2. After the relief of this organization and pending the arrival of a new signal service company, signal intelligence data, coming into the possession of signal personnel, was forwarded to the Army Signal Intelligence Service through G-2 channels.

9. Signal security was emphasized during January, especially in relation to telephone conversations. No important breaches of signal security were reported in the radio transmissions, enciphering processes or by the compromise of SOI. Numerous reports were received of enemy radio jamming activities but, in general, these efforts were ineffectual in disorganizing our communications.

For the Commanding General:

H. PHILLIPS.

ZJ. H. PHILLIPS, Colonel, G.S.C., Chief of Staff.

7 Inclosures: (Forwarded Separately)

- 1 G-1 Journal
- 2 G-2 Journal
- 3 G-3 Journal
- 4 G-4 Journal
- 5 Engr Journal
- 6 Letter, Special and
- General Orders. 7 - Journal, Hq/Hq Btry, III Corps Arty.

- 65 - $\underline{S E C R E T}$