



PAHAYAGAN SANG PARTIDO KOMUNISTA SANG PILIPINAS ★ ISLA SANG NEGROS

ANG Paghimakas

GINAUBAYAN SANG MARXISMO-LENINISMO-MAOISMO MARCH 2023

Frustrate the enemy's massive and intense attacks!

*Negros Island Regional Party Committee
March 29, 2023*



THE NEGROS ISLAND REGIONAL PARTY Committee extends glorious revolutionary and militant greetings to the Red commanders and fighters under the Apolinario Gatmaitan Command of the New People's Army in Negros (AGC-NPA), the revolutionary masses in mass organizations and the organs of political power, and the allies of the NPA on the 54th anniversary of its historical founding. The NPA that started with some 60 fighters armed with only

nine high calibre firearms in the second district of Tarlac when it was founded on March 29, 1969 has become a national revolutionary army of the people. It built 110 guerrilla fronts in 74 provinces out of 85 Philippine provinces. It frustrated all counterrevolutionary wars launched by successive regimes of the reactionary ruling class of big compradors and landlords.

Let us laud through a grand celebration our great victories by

continuing to advance the national democratic revolution thru a protracted people's war despite the worsening fascism and barbarism of the reactionary and fascist ruling classes.

In Negros Island, the strength of the NPA was established amid extremely tyrannical and barbaric counterrevolutionary wars of successive reactionary regimes and the current US-Marcos II regime. This counterrevolutionary war defends the exploitative and op-

pressive big landlord-hacenderos and big comprador bureaucrats on the island. It continues to destroy the lives of the people of Negros. Blood ceaselessly spills from the bodies of revolutionary martyrs, farmers and farm workers. The deadly counter-insurgency campaign of encirclement and constriction of the fascist military targets both NPA fighters and civilians.

Romeo Nanta, Jeren Vargas, Flor Ceballos, Kerima Lorena Tari-

man, Ericson Acosta, Marilyn Badayos, Cheene Dacalos, Virgilio Tamban, Rodolfo Leo John Azucena, Arjen Mahinay, Ricky Altariba, Andre Cose and many more comrades from the different guerrilla fronts in Negros have become revolutionary martyrs and heroes. Their names are additions to a long list of revolutionary martyrs and heroes in Negros who offered their lives for the revolution since the beginning of

the revolutionary struggle on the island in 1970 up to the present. They further fuel the fire of determination and militancy of revolutionary forces for the continuing advance of the national democratic revolution and the realization of national liberation, genuine democracy and social justice. Let us pay tribute to them and emulate their lives.



MARCH 2023



Nagapasalamat ang *Ang Paghimakas* sa mga kontribusyon agud mangin madinalag-on ang ini nga isyu. Sa pagpauswag sang aton *Ang Paghimakas*, ginapangabay sa tanan nga bumalasa nga padayon nga mag-amot sang mga balita, piktyur, istorya kag iban pa nga sinulat. Nagapangayo man kami sang inyo mga suhestyon kag komentaryo paano pa gid ini pauswagon.

ANG *Paghimakas*



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The basic principles and correct line to advance

In the mid-70s and 80s, as the socio-economic crisis of the semicolonial and semifeudal system of the country escalated, the revolutionary struggle of the Filipino people intensified and, with it, the advance of the national democratic revolution thru a protracted people's war. The broadest and strongest revolutionary armed struggle and legal democratic movement of the Negrosanon people vigorously made strides under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in Negros Island to contribute to the heightening of the revolutionary movement in order to attain national liberation and genuine democracy.

The revolutionary movement's great strength rapidly grew. The NPA was able to launch sustained annihilative tactical offensives, built an expansive mass base that influenced two-thirds of the people on the entire island and established organs of political power in the vast countryside. Agrarian revolution strengthened in the interior and intermediate areas because of solid mass organizations and NPA presence. Big landlords were forced to abandon their lands in the said areas.

In its strongest advance, the standpoint of the "left" opportunists, who were still within the Party, flew away from the truth. They fantasized of great leaps beyond the actual capacity and deviated from the basic principles of the Party.

Questions on the correctness of the semicolonial and semifeudal analysis of the Philippine ruling system and the strategy of protracted people's war emerged. A few cadres were mesmerized by the big infrastructure projects of Marcos Sr. They laid down ideas that the Philippines was already semi-capitalist and the strategy of protracted people's war was no longer appropriate; that urban insurrection was the best fit considering the significant decrease of the peasant population and the increase of the number of workers. Based on this notion, a "war front strategy" was designed in Negros—that all fields of struggle were theaters of war.

The urban and town centers were heated by spectacular partisan attacks. The NPA carried out premature regularization through building absolutely concentrated platoons, companies and a battalion. These absolutely concentrated formations were difficult to sustain and were isolated from the masses. Basically, these were adventurism and "left" opportunism.

Not for long, from 1988 onwards, the absolutely concentrated formations lost the initiative in warfare until it resulted to failures, retreat and decline of the revolutionary armed movement. It was almost destroyed in 1993 when the entire NIRPC split from the Party. Instigated by Arturo Tabara, the NIRPC rejected the decision of the 10th plenum of

the CPP's Central Committee to launch a rectification movement and reaffirm the basic principles of the Party ingrained in the documents of the First Congress of the Party on December 26, 1968.

In 1993, the revolutionary forces of Negros Island experienced significant harm when the NIRPC led by Tabara and Etabag departed from the CPP and asserted the wrong line. They influenced more than 400 NPA members with their wrong thinking and measures. They founded small groups wherein the biggest was the Rebolusyong Partido ng Manggagawang Pilipino (RPMP) or Revolutionary Party of Filipino Workers. They also built their own armed wing, the Revolutionary Proletarian Army (RPA). The splittists became outright revisionist traitors. Nilo dela Cruz's Alex Bongcayao Brigade (ABB) in Manila merged with the RPA and became the RPA-ABB, the armed wing of the revisionist traitors in Negros Island.

The plans and measures of the revisionist traitors were more on sabotaging the advance of the revolutionary movement on the island. The revisionist traitors became complete counterrevolutionaries when they capitulated to the Estrada regime in 2000 and worked with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) on its counterinsurgency schemes against the revolutionary movement.

The SGRM in Negros Island

Amid the split of the revisionist traitors, 70 elements of the NPA in Central Negros stood for the basic principles of the Party and declared to take part in the Second Great Rectifica-

tion Movement (SGRM), similar with the cadres and the whole membership of the Regional Mass Movement Commission (RMMC) and Partisan Front Committee (PFC) based in the urban center.

They became the initial base of the Probisyunal nga Komiteng Tigpatuman (PKT) or Provisional Executive Committee—the Party leadership on the island that replaced the then splittist NIRPC.

In launching the SGRM on Negros Island in 1994, the political line of national democratic revolution through a protracted people's war was reaffirmed. The strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside was upheld as well. It was also made clear that armed struggle is the principal means to build the political strength of the revolutionary forces and seize political power. The wrong line of insurrectionism, military adventurism through premature regularization of the NPA, and parliamentarism were elucidated as forms of the "left" and right opportunist line in politics and were rectified. Upholding the correct political line was based on the explanation and reaffirmation of the correct analysis of Filipino society that is semicolonial and semifeudal.

The SGRM of the CPP shone radiantly when BGen. Raymundo Jarque defected from the reactionary AFP in 1996. According to then BGen. Jarque on his defection to the NPA, the ruling reactionary system in the Philippines is "rotten to the core." This defection to the revolutionary movement influenced the defection of a team of the Citizen

Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) bringing three high calibre firearms with them and the founding of the Negros Paramilitary Veterans Association or NPvA which participated in the legal democratic mass movement and pushed for their democratic rights and demands.

Simultaneous with the SGRM, the NPA was placed under reorientation, redefinition of tasks and redeployment. The Provisional District Committee was immediately established based in three barangays of Guihulngan, Negros Oriental. It had an undersized platoon with a center of gravity or *sentro de grabidad* (SDG) operating in a limited radius. Four squads were in its vicinity implementing mass work in a much wider radius. Rebuilding the guerrilla fronts as bases to launch extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare on an ever widening and deepening mass base was promptly given attention.

In 1997, an NPA squad sent to do recovery work and reestablish a guerrilla front in the areas of Binalbagan, Himamaylan and Kabankalan, Negros Occidental and Tayasan and Jimalalud, Negros

Oriental eventually grew to an oversized platoon in 1999. A section-sized NPA unit dispatched to Canlaon City, Negros Oriental to build a guerrilla front in 1998 became a platoon a year after.

The Regional Committee of the CPP in Negros founded on January-February 1999 already had three guerrilla fronts with a total membership of 130 Red fighters. There were the small company-sized NPA unit of Front 1 in Guihulngan, oversized platoon of Front 2 in the Binalbagan-Himamaylan-Kabankalan-Tayasan-Jimalalud areas and a platoon of Front 3 in the areas of Canlaon City, and San Carlos and Don Salvador Benedicto, Negros Occidental. Mass organizations were built with a membership of 7,500 and a total mass base of 37,500. The tendency to overreach through leapfrog deployment of a squad to Cauayan-Hinobaan-Ilog-Candoni-Kabankalan-Sipalay (CHICKS area), Negros Occidental was immediately rectified in 1995. The said unit was recalled due to danger of annihilation given the considerable number of the RPA-ABB in those areas.

The call for deployment of urban-based forces to the countryside resulted to 78 cadres taking on full-time work in the countryside from 1994 to 1998 and fulfilling tasks in the armed struggle. According to the national leadership of the Party, this was the highest number of deployment of urban cadres to the countryside within the whole Party in this period.

The said deployment from the urban and white areas to the countryside invigorated the re-strengthening of the revolutionary forces for armed struggle. NPA units in the three guerrilla fronts were able to reach more than 100 barrios in 11 towns and three cities from 1994 to 1999.

However, the policy to "let



the enemy punch the air" became a one-sided policy that stressed mass work and recovery without tactical offensives for six years from 1994 to 1999. This was rectified in 2000 by mounting the first tactical offensive in the form of an ambush by a section-sized unit of combined forces of the Regional Strike Force and Front 2 against the CAFGU in Sitio Namulo I, Brgy. Payayo, Binalbagan on February 2000 that resulted to the death of two CAFGU members and one regular soldier, while another soldier was wounded. Four high calibre firearms were confiscated from them.

The established three guerrilla fronts in Central Negros became a target of the enemy's destructive campaigns. It noticed the re-strengthening of revolutionary forces and located these in specific areas in Central Negros. Due to this, the responsibility on Internal Security Operations was trans-

ferred back from the Philippine National Police (PNP) to the Philippine Army. At the end of 1998, the 61st Infantry Battalion (IB), 11th IB and 66th IB augmented the existing 6th Special Forces Battalion, 3rd Scout Ranger Company and 7th Regional Mobile Group (RMG) Battalion on the island. Negros Island was one of three regions targeted by the Estrada regime's Oplan Makabayan for neutralization of resurging "local communist movement."

On 1999 and 2000, the 303rd Brigade launched three counter-insurgency military campaigns against the renewed Communist Party and NPA units in Negros Island. The Party leadership and the Regional SDG became targets for decimation that resulted to three encounters. However, the enemy failed in its objective.


The Party saw that the three adjacent small guerrilla fronts in Central Negros were vulnerable to

destruction by the brigade-sized large-scale focused and sustained military campaigns of the enemy. The Party decided to "expand the focus of the enemy on a wide area through dispatching expansion units in the north and southwest parts of Negros so that guerrilla fronts in Central Negros can avoid the fatal blow of large-scale military campaigns of the enemy."

With this decision, the guerrilla fronts in North and Southwest Negros were victoriously built. Even though the guerrilla fronts were dispersed in distant areas in the north, central, southwest and southeast parts of Negros from 2005 and up, these were positioned in strategic areas and terrain and slowly eradicated the influence of the RPA-ABB in the said areas. Meanwhile, Southeast Negros was reopened as a separate theater of war on Negros Island through the entry of a NPA unit from another region.

Encounters between the NPA BSDG and Philippine Army (1999-2000)

- 1** August 15, 1999
Sitio Pinangimnan, Brgy. Trinidad,
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental
- 2** July 2000
Sitio Puting Bato, Brgy. Lag-it,
Tayasan, Negros Oriental
- 3** August 2000
Sitio Tahud Lahas, Brgy. Carabalan,
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental



Seizing the initiative and launching tactical offensives

From 2000 onwards, scores of sustained and daring small and big tactical offensives of the NPA in Negros were launched employing team, squad, section and platoon-sized units and, at one time, a company-sized unit. Annihilative and attritive tactical offensives were mounted in the form of raids, raids without firing a single shot, ambushes, disarming operations, harassments, sniping operations, and punitive actions.

Guerrilla warfare is characterized by letting the enemy bleed from a thousand wounds and dealing occasional blows to the head. The NPA on Negros Island have experienced launching tactical offensives employing platoon and company formations. These are the combat units that can deal "occasional head blows" while teams and squads "bleed the enemy from a thousand wounds." This is a concentration of superior force against a relatively weak point of the enemy and taking advantage of the element of surprise to ensure victory. There were also a significant number of attritive actions that were implemented by NPA teams and squads and the militia units that resulted to the confiscation of firearms and strengthening of the mass base.

The enemy is strategically superior to the NPA, ten soldiers to one Red fighter, but the NPA can attain tactical superiority against the enemy, ten Red fighters to one soldier, through concentrating a superior force against weak spots of the enemy in its tactical offensives. Based on experience and capacity level, NPA units can target relatively weak CAFGU detachments within or near the guerrilla fronts, police stations in towns, and armed goons of criminal syndicates. It is necessary to have sufficient intelligence buildup and reconnaissance, thor-

Basic Tactical Offensives (2004-2014)

***Total confiscated
high-powered
firearms: 18
NPA force used: Platoon***



- 1** February 2004
Raid of CAFGU detachment
Brgy. Mahalang, Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental
- 2** November 2007
Raid of PNP-La Libertad Station
La Libertad, Negros Oriental
- 3** May 2013
Ambush against 47th IB
Sitio Samac, Brgy. Camindangan,
Sipalay City, Negros Occidental
- 4** April 2014
Ambush against Philippine Army PDT
Sitio Madaha, Brgy. Buenavista,
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental

***Total confiscated high-powered firearms: 21
NPA force used: Company
Enemy was completely annihilated***

- 1** August 2010
Raid of CAFGU detachment
Sitio Pulupangyan, Sagay City,
Negros Occidental

oughly study the target, use the element of surprise and adequately prepare which includes constant training before the actual action. There were tactical offensives in Negros that became victorious and accumulated significant scores of firearms.

From 2008 to 2010, Negros Island was a priority of the AFP Central Command's counter-insurgency campaign. In 2011 up to 2013, it was included in the AFP's national priority.

Oplan Daba-daba, planned out by the NPA Negros Regional Operational Command in 2011, took the enemy by surprise. It was characterized by widespread harassments, sniping operations, punitive actions against landlords, partisan operations against specific targets, an ambush against a column of the RMG in North Negros and setting up more than seven "NPA checkpoints" in different areas. Twenty-two annihilative and attritive military actions

were launched confiscating seven high-powered firearms and three short arms. These wreaked havoc on the enemy wherein 12 soldiers were killed-in-action and five were wounded.

As a reaction of the enemy, it launched all-out large-scale military operations against all guerrilla fronts of the NPA on the island that resulted to the spread of guerrilla units to wider areas to avoid heavy blows from the enemy.

*Form of tactical offensive: **Baid***

Total confiscated

*high-powered firearms: 75
(2002-2015)*


- 1** 2002 - against RPA-ABB
Brgy. Biao, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental
- 2** 2003 - against RPA-ABB
Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental
- 3** 2004 - against RPA-ABB
La Castellana, Negros Occidental
- 4** 2004 - against CAFGU detachment
Brgy. Mahalang, Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental
- 5** 2007 - against PNP-La Libertad Station
La Libertad, Negros Oriental
- 6** April 2010 - against security personnel
of Philex Mining
Sipalay City, Negros Occidental
- 7** August 2010 - against CAFGU detachment
Sitio Pulupangyan, Brgy. Bug-ang,
Toboso, Negros Occidental
- 8** 2011 - against security personnel of
Sarosa-Marañon fishpond
Sagay City, Negros Occidental

*Form of tactical offensive: **Ambuscades***

Total confiscated

*high-powered firearms: 16
(2009-2016)*

- 1** December 2009 - against 61st IB
Sitio Indangawan, Brgy. Manlocahoc,
Sipalay City, Negros Occidental
- 2** May 2013 - against 47th IB
Sitio Samac, Brgy. Camindangan,
Sipalay City, Negros Occidental
- 3** April 2014 - against Phil. Army PDT
Sitio Madaha, Brgy. Buenavista,
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental
- 4** February 2016 -
against Candoni PNP
Candoni, Negros
Occidental
- 5** May 2016 -
against 62nd IB
Sitio Carbon,
Brgy. San Isidro,
Toboso, Negros
Occidental





The antifeudal mass movement

Victories gained in land struggles such as occupying lands of landlords in the northern, central and southern parts of the island during the 1980s weakened along with the diminished strength of the NPA and the mass base. Even though significant parts of the lands were no longer under the landlord's control, their power in the countryside grew again and they were about to grab once more the lands already occupied by farmers and farm workers.

During the SGRM, nearing the end of the 90s and in the early 2000s, wherein recovery was the focus of mass work, the legal use of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) or the application of beneficiaries for petition for coverage of lands especially those under Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS), Compulsory Acquisition (CA), and other land transfer schemes was pursued, as well as money claims and wage differentials.

Antifeudal struggles slowly expanded in all guerrilla fronts, however, in general, these were small-scale, sporadic and uncoordinated in the municipal level. Struggles against land grabbing, struggles for increasing farm-gate prices of banana, coffee and copra, and raising farmers' crop share were launched. Particularly in North Negros, the struggles for wage differentials achieved victory upon the decision of the Supreme Court ordering the landlord to pay Php1.4 million to the farm workers. In Southeast Negros, the opposition to planting jathropa in Tamlang Valley heightened to an inter-municipal struggle.

Starting 2008, land occupation struggles intensified initially in Bago City, Negros Occidental until it spread to vast haciendas in Negros. Intensification of land occupation was further encouraged through collective farming as the NPA's tactical offensives escalated in 2010 and 2011. Up

to 53 haciendas in North, Central and South Negros were under collective farming. It covered 2,317 hectares and in 899.39 hectares, sugarcane, rice, corn, banana, vegetables, root crops and others were planted. There were a total of 6,012 individual beneficiaries within 1,503 households.

Fifty-three percent of collective farms were in Escalante City, Negros Occidental and its borders along Sagay City and Toboso of the same province. It was no wonder that the 3rd Civil Military Operations Battalion (CMO) of the enemy was assigned in Escalante City in 2012 until 2014.

The great triumph of collective farming was heightening militancy and sharpening the antifeudal consciousness of peasant masses. The *kampuhan* or "camp-out" was a crucial component of the struggle for land occupation. It became a school for the organized movement of farmers

and farm workers in their struggle. It was a meeting place for making plans and organized measures to advance and defend the victories they achieved in their struggle. It became a place to hold study courses of the Pam-bansa Demokratikong Paaralan (PADEPA) or National Democratic School and trainings in production, organizing, propaganda and cultural activities.

As collective farming persisted, the relatively broad sympathy and support from other sectors especially the middle forces and some barangay and municipal officials slowly subsided. Mutual support of farmers from various haciendas also weakened. Impetuous tendencies and looseness in building the requisites to launch collective farming developed. It became vulnerable to intense reactions of big landlords.

Even though community farms made use of the fake CARP, it provoked the intense reaction of landlords because it challenged their land ownership through the peasants' occupation and initiation of community farms. The massacre of nine farmers who conducted community farming at Hacienda Nene in Sagay City on October 2018 was a result of this latest development.

Apart from that, antifeudal struggles one-sidedly focused on community farming and did not pay attention to the farm workers' struggles for wage increase, against corruption and refusal to give sugarcane farm workers access to the Social Amelioration Fund (SAF), and other issues.

But, in general, the victories of tactical offensives and anti-feudal struggles in this period broadened mass organizations, built further organs of political power in barrios and amplified the influence of the revolutionary movement on the broad Negrosan people.

Period of intense and massive FMOs/RCSPs of the AFP

During the Duterte regime, the basis for intense and massive attacks against revolutionary forces and the people in the entire country and in Negros Island was laid down. The Duterte regime cancelled the peace negotiations between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) in November 2017. It declared the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations in December 2017 and issued Memorandum Order 32 on Bicol region and the islands of Samar and Negros. It also decreed Executive Order 70 that established the National Task Force (NTF)-Elcac for the whole of nation approach that will serve to escalate their counter-insurgency campaign against the revolutionary movement in the whole country.

Through Joint Task Force-Kapanatagan and NTF-Elcac, Duterte directed, together with top military officials and retired generals, the mobilization of the entire AFP-PNP-CAFGU, all civilian government agencies, private sector in business, institutions and organizations, and personalities to isolate and destroy the revolutionary forces. Duterte commanded the all-out and large-scale military operations and anticommunist and black propaganda to utterly besmirch the CPP, NPA and NDFP, including legal and progressive organizations, personalities and oppositions.

The widespread and outright attack of the 79th IB and 6th Special Action Force Battalion (6SAF) in Brgy. Washington, Escalante City on November 2018, the bloody Oplan Sauron 1 and 2 of the AFP/PNP on December 2018 and March 2019, and the extensive APF/PNP joint operation in Canlaon City, Guihulngan City, Manjuyod, Bindoy and Sta. Catalina in Negros Oriental that killed more than 25 personages and arrested over 50 people were manifestations of the all-out fascism of the butcher Duterte regime on Negros Island.

Guerrilla fronts in Negros that were relatively small compared to the size of the enemy on the island became vulnerable to massive and intense military operations of the enemy. All guerrilla fronts since 2019 to 2022 were subjected to sustained focused military operations (FMO) and Retooled Community Support Programs (RCSP) in various levels, one to two battalions of the enemy at one time in the minimum.

The NPA suffered significant harm in the face of complicated and fierce FMOs/RCSPs of the enemy. The enemy took advantage of the persisting serious weaknesses and errors in some NPA units such as lingering in marked areas, loosened discipline in adhering to military rules, remaining within the perimeter of FMOs/RSCPs of the enemy, neglecting observable indicators of security threats, and lacking serious study of the existing military situation.

The Party has already issued a warning against the designs of the counterrevolutionary offensives of the enemy. These are large-scale force deployment, operations in-depth, gradual constriction, blockhouse warfare, venus flytrap, heartland attack, widespread RCSP operations, and full force support through modern military equipment to aid in the large-scale and intense

operations of the fascist AFP and PNP.

Despite the massive and sustained FMO/RCSP of troops of the 303rd and 302nd Brigade of the AFP and the battalions of the SAF and RMF of the PNP in all NPA guerrilla fronts, the NPA was able to put into play its initiative in

mounting tactical offensives employing a team, squad, platoon and over-sized platoon that confiscated several high-powered firearms and many short firearms, ammunition and other war materiel.

The NPA Negros even launched four countercampaigns in three guerrilla fronts in the second

half of 2020 and the first half of 2021 that caused damage to the enemy and preserved the NPA. Moreover, guerrilla fronts continued to expand its base areas. In newly regained areas, the masses rejoiced beholding the NPA once more after a few decades have passed.

Designs of the AFP's counterrevolutionary offensive

Large-scale force deployment - the enemy escalates the previous level of concentration of their fascist troops in its priority NPA areas.

Operations in-depth - AFP battalion command centers are based within the guerrilla fronts and their companies are positioned near focus areas; there are sustained large-scale operations combined with widespread RCSP operations, strike operations on centers of gravity of the revolutionary movement in the area and they are pursuing decisive engagements with NPA units.

Gradual constriction - aims to constrict the area for maneuver of the BHB similar to slowly strangling the target. This is the concept and method of win-hold-win and the enemy always pursues decisive engagements.

Blockhouse warfare - focusing on guerrilla fronts one-by-one and maintaining (hold) those they are done with.

Venus flytrap - attacking the center to push the NPA units into a trap set in weaker parts of the area where the enemy's intelligence network is positioned and their attack and pursuit forces are ready. The AFP may deliberately reduce operations in this prepared area to lure fleeing NPA forces toward it and ensnare them.

Heartland attack - the enemy unleashes a massive force and attacks what it considers the most solid part of the area.

Full force support of modern military equipment - this includes the use of attack and surveillance drones, detonating drones, scout and attach helicopters, jetfighters for aerial strikes, cannons and APC (armored personnel carrier) tanks. Currently, drones are utilized in battalion level tactical operations.

Challenges to confront and urgent tasks to fulfill

Currently, Negros Island is one of the national priority targets for large-scale and violent counterrevolutionary campaigns of the AFP and PNP. It exploited the assassination of Gov. Roel Degamo to justify augmenting the 47th IB and a 50-troop Light Reaction Company in an effort to further intensify military operations on the island. It unleashes deception machineries to white-wash its failed campaign and spread the narrative of "winning the war against the revolutionary movement."

The abominable counterrevolutionary war of the AFP and PNP serves the interest of the local ruling class. With the looming implementation of the Negros Island Region, the ruling class from the two Negros provinces are in a contest for domination. However, they are strongly united against the revolutionary movement that is the most formidable impediment to their interest on the island.

Large-scale and massive military operations aim to suppress the Negros masses and perpetually chain them to the monocrop sugar industry. Conditions of farm workers are worst with meagre wages (commonly P250 per day) while prices of basic commodities are skyrocketing. Contractualization in haciendas and sugar centrals is also rampant. The Negrosanons suffer further due to neoliberal policies and projects of foreign capitalists and big compradors like importation of sugar and rice, privatization of water, electricity and transportation, oil deregulation, and conversion of farm lands and fishing grounds into commercial use, mostly for economic zones, real estate and eco-tourism.



The socio-economic situation in Negros Island is fertile ground for greater growth of the revolution. Revolutionary forces, especially the NPA, must be ready to confront the current challenges and fulfil the urgent tasks.

1 Theory and practice must be closely linked. The two are opposites but are united in an endless process of change. Theory transforms into a higher level of practice while practice transforms to a higher level of theory. Their combination is constant; the old disappears and something new emerges. In war, problems complicate and develop; it does not cease.

Our military cadres must learn hard thinking so that even little by little and through painstaking ways problems of the people's war we are waging

can be correctly studied and solved. If we sharply observe the prevailing matters and situation, if our thinking corresponds to or closely approximates the objective conditions, our measures to solve prevailing problems will be correct. Principles and ideas reflect the changing objective matters outside the human mind and these are imperceptible to the naked eye. These can only be grasped through hard thinking. There is no other way.

We need to overcome mechanical and empiricist methods of study and solving problems in our particular revolutionary war. Study revolutionary theory to effectively integrate it to concrete conditions and practice. Use Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, dialectics and laws of contradiction to carry our people's war forward creatively.

It is important that we are good in studying the positive and negative lessons of our experiences and confront and resolve the prevailing errors and weaknesses. Ceaselessly know the enemy and ourselves and sharpen our grasp of the laws of people's war and guerrilla warfare in the current stage of strategic defensive. Give high importance to the policies and explanations of the Party that is timely issued.

2 Continue to advance extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare on an ever widening and deepening mass base. Oppose the existing current of military conservatism in regional NPA units and guerrilla fronts. Raise the determination, capabilities, and daring of NPA commands in various levels to give full play to initiative and flexibility, and excellent planning, command and coordination in different units. Developing their capability in fighting and their tactics and technique in different types of annihilative and attritive tactical offensives is a challenge to Red commanders and fighters.

Be prepared for further dif-

iculties and sacrifices. Elevate the determination of revolutionary forces to vigorously frustrate the fascist Marcos II regime's plan to destroy the revolutionary forces in the second year of his term.

Launch regionwide and guerrilla front-level countercampaigns against the enemy. NPA units are capable of defeating the FMOs and RCSPs of the AFP. Campaigns of solid basic tactical offensives that can destroy the enemy are the most effective means to confront FMOs. They can be dealt with head blows by the NPA through mass support, choosing favorable terrain, familiarizing the routes and patterns of their entry and exit, employing superior NPA forces relative to the target, effectively using command-detonated explosives and correct timing when enemy troops are exhausted after many days of operation. Combine it with a series of attritive military actions against big formations of mobile enemy troops and their communication, transportation and supply lines and many others.

Countercampaigns enrich the NPA's experience in warfare; develop capability in command and

coordination, intelligence, planning and operation, and in tactics and technique; and raises the combat capability of NPA guerrilla units.

So the NPA can effectively confront the massive and intense counterrevolutionary campaign of the AFP and PNP, the conduct of its movement needs to adhere firmly to the principle of force structure. The main unit in relative concentration, the secondary units in relative dispersal and positive correlation of units for coordination, cooperation and support in implementing work especially tactical offensives. Through this, initiative is firmly maintained against the attacking enemy and passivity is surmounted in a situation where the enemy is superior in terms of number of troops, military equipment, training, and others.

To seize the initiative, flexibly employ teams, squads, platoons and companies in launching tactical offensives. Concentrate forces in mounting annihilative tactical offensives; disperse for mass work, propaganda, and organizing; and shift to evade heavy blows of the enemy or to carry out other tasks in other areas. We must





be good in guerrilla tactics of concentration, dispersal and shifting according to the prevailing conditions in the entire area.

While we are still developing the correct force structure and considering the uneven development of guerrilla fronts on the island, assign a main unit and secondary units. The main unit must be in relative concentration and the secondary unit in relative dispersal that in general has a positive correlation with mobile units for coordination, cooperation and support in case of unexpected circumstances in the implementation of tasks in confronting enemy attacks.

Positive correlation of NPA units results to a relatively higher level of initiative and flexibility. Even in a short time, it can create tactical superiority against the enemy. However low the tactical superiority if it is correctly used, it is already a big matter to the NPA that in general is inferior and the enemy strategically superior.

The enemy does not also maintain absolute concentration in its large columns. They are obligated to disperse in various small columns because of the difficult terrain in Negros Island. Here, the daring and creativity

of commanders and members of NPA units emerges. Positive correlation will not arise from absolutely dispersed NPA units. Likewise, it does not mean that there is positive correlation in too concentrated or lengthily concentrated large units. What is significant is that the main unit is in relative concentration and the secondary units in relative dispersal. Initiative and flexibility are major concerns in the conduct of a revolutionary army in its development from small and weak to big and strong. Passivity will take the NPA to the opposite direction.

This way new military cadres especially those among the ranks of young NPA members who have potential will develop faster. There are no ready-made military officials. Potential that we can develop surrounds us. In relatively dispersed units, young people who have potential to become military leaders can be assigned tactical responsibility. There is no other way to build the new generation of cadres to lead and take on responsibility in the different levels.

Employing semi-legal teams to areas that cannot yet be reached by NPA units is also needed to

further hasten expansion to wider areas.

3 Raise the determination to extensively arouse, organize and mobilize the broad masses. Carry forward broad opposition to militarization in the countryside, rampant human rights violations like bombings that sow terror on the people, forcing civilians to surrender as NPA members and supporters, grave threats, extrajudicial killings, controlling the movement of farmers that affects their livelihood, and occupying homes of the masses, barangay halls, churches and schools that violate international humanitarian law and human rights.

Widely push arousing, organizing, and mobilizing workers, farm workers, semi-proletariat, and farmers to demand for wage increase and benefits amid the unceasing increase of prices of oil and other basic commodities.

Reverberating and victorious tactical offensives of the NPA give inspiration to the Negrosanon people and further engage their support and direct participation in the advance of the revolutionary armed struggle. This also inspires and emboldens the workers,

farmers, farm workers, urban poor, jeepney drivers, fisherfolk, and urban petty-bourgeoisie to launch various forms of struggle to put forward their economic and democratic demands against exploitation and oppression of the ruling class of big compradors, big landlord-hacienderos and big military bureaucrats on the island.

Through intensifying armed struggle, invigorating agrarian revolution, and continuing to build and strengthen organs of political power on Negros Island, revolutionary forces grow stronger and the united front broadens further against the reactionary enemy in the middle of an aggravating crisis of the semicolonial and semifeudal reactionary system in

the country and the crisis of the world capitalist system.

Long Live the New People's Army!

Long Live the Communist Party of the Philippines!

Long Live the fighting Negrosanon people! *AP**



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