RISING POWERS AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ORDER The redistribution and diffusion of power in the international system has reflected the rise of new centres of power demanding their legitimate say. Speculation on the preferred strategy of established powers towards the demands of rising contenders has become an important concern. While some scholars believe that it will be accommodation, others think that it will be containment. This paper analyses why established states prefer to accommodate some rising powers while opposing others and finds that, to comprehend the prospects of accommodation, one must understand the intentions of the challengers. Since intentions and perceptions are shaped by domestic variables, attention has been given to four such factors, namely regime type, economic system, human rights regime and social system. This paper concludes that the prospects for accommodating nations with revisionist intentions and wider differences in terms of domestic variables vis-à-vis established powers are poorer than for status quoists and those with large-scale similarities. VIKASH CHANDRA T he post-war liberal international order was established by the victors of the Second World War, with the United States of America (US) playing a pivotal role in the process. The defining features of the shift from the earlier international order was “the end of European imperialism and the evolution of a more multilateral and institutionalised economic order”. (Charles A Kupchan, “Reordering Order: Global Change and the Need for a New Normative Consensus” in Trine Flockhart (Ed), Liberal Order in a Post- 10 WORLD AFFAIRS SPRING 2018 (JANUARY – MARCH) VOL 22 NO 1 R I S I N G P OW E R S A N D T H E F U T U R E I N T E R N AT I O N A L O R D E R Western World, Transatlantic Academy, Washington DC, 2014, p3) relations theorist G John Ikenberry, According to noted international (Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the the present international order is nothing but a “hierarchical political order with liberal characteristics”. In the hierarchy, the US is at the zenith from where it organises and manages the order. The defining features of the post-World War Two international order include in theory “liberal democracy, industrial capitalism, secular nationalism and To maintain and expand liberal open trade”. (Kupchan, ibid) Ikenberry values such as the rule of law, American World Order, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011, pxi) (“Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order”, Perspectives on democracy and protection and preservation of human rights, the US envisaged a rule-based order characterised by multilateralism. In the post-Cold War era, when the distribution of power became unipolar, the US sought to expand the order to hitherto nonaccommodated states, especially the former constituents of the Soviet Union and of the Global South. also sees, “open markets, international institutions, cooperative security, democratic community, progressive change, collective problem solving and the rule of law” as the defining principles of the liberal international order. Thus, to maintain and expand liberal values such as the rule of law, democracy and protection and preservation of human rights, the US envisaged a rule-based order characterised by multilateralism. In the post-Cold War era, when the distribution of power became unipolar, the US sought to expand the order to hitherto non-accommodated states, especially the former constituents of the Soviet Union and of the Global South. In recent years, the redistribution of power in the international system has led to the emergence of new centres of power across the globe. With their rise, “the hegemonic aspect of the liberal order—that is, America’s role and the old hegemonic bargains that surround it—is under pressure”. (Ikenberry, 2011, ibid) The liberal order is in flux as not all rising powers give equal respect to the principles and values underpinning it. However, the rise of new power centres is inevitable and irreversible. Therefore, the question that arises is whether the power transition will be peaceful or conflictual? It would be peaceful if established powers accommodate rising powers and give them roles and responsibilities in Politics, vol7, no1, 2009, p71) VOL 22 NO 1 (JANUARY – MARCH) SPRING 2018 WORLD AFFAIRS 11 VIKASH CHANDRA accordance with their respective status. In this regard, TV Paul (“The Accommodation of Rising Powers in World Politics” in TV Paul (Ed), Accommodating Rising Powers: Past, Present and Future, Cambridge: argues that amidst the redistribution of power, while “structural conditions can lead to conflict ... (the) proper synchronisation of strategies for peaceful change by established and rising powers can mitigate the possibilities of violent conflict”. In accounting for the treatment of rising regional hegemons by leading states Evan B Montgomery (In the Hegemon’s Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016, p11) contends, “If a leading state is worried that a local actor might dominate a peripheral region ... then it will prefer parity to ensure that its own access to the area is not jeopardised. In this case, it should accommodate the rising regional powers that are attempting to weaken local hegemons”. On the other hand, “if a leading state is more concerned about an outside power conquering a peripheral region, then it will prefer primacy instead because the strongest local actors are the best barriers to intervention”. (Montgomery, ibid) This paper is divided into four sections. The first defines accommodation while the second delineates some of its successful and failed cases. The third section explicates how the differences and/ or similarities in domestic variables shape the mutual intentions of established and rising powers. The last part throws light on the possible scenario of the emerging international order. Cambridge University Press, 2016, p2) WHAT IS ACCOMMODATION? T he redistribution of power and resources is a continuous process in the international system and as a result new states rise while the capabilities of existing powerful states decline either in absolute or relative terms. This leads to a problem of status recognition between established and rising powers, as the former demonstrate a conservative and reluctant attitude to the recognition of new states and the sharing of power while rising states want their status recognised at the earliest to claim new roles and responsibilities as per their status. For an amicable resolution, “the waning hegemon must cede influence to the rising challenger to the point where the latter’s prestige matches its actual power”. (Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981 cited in Randall L Schweller, Rising Powers and Revisionism in Emerging International Orders, Valdai Discussion Club Paper 16, Moscow, 2015, p3, online at http://eng.globalaffairs.ru) 12 WORLD AFFAIRS SPRING Such status recognition is 2018 (JANUARY – MARCH) VOL 22 NO 1 R I S I N G P OW E R S A N D T H E F U T U R E I N T E R N AT I O N A L O R D E R regarded as accommodation. Thus, a two-dimensional process takes place between established and rising powers, which has been defined and understood varyingly by scholars. According to Paul, (ibid, p5) accommodation stands for status adjustment and leadership role sharing between established and rising powers through membership and due roles in international institutions and acceptance of spheres of influence. He adds that the accommodation of rising powers simply implies that emerging powers are given the status and perks associated with the rank of great power in the international system, including in many instances a recognition of spheres of influence or the decision not to challenge them militarily. This does not however assume deep friendship or lack of competition. Thus, in essence, accommodation is nothing but a readjustment of status, manifest in two ways—membership in international organisations and regimes and the relative position of The accommodation of rising states in that conglomeration. (Jeffrey W Taliaferro, “Did the United States and the Allies Fail to Accommodate Japan in the 1920s and 1930s” in powers simply implies that emerging powers are given the status and perks associated with the rank of great power in the international system, including in many instances a recognition of spheres of influence or the decision not to challenge them militarily. This does not however assume deep friendship or lack of competition. That is, in the process of accommodation, established powers grant membership to rising powers in leading organisations and regimes, ample share in global governance and recognition and respect for spheres of influence. The accommodation lasts when power sharing is to the extent that the rising powers are content with it and voluntarily give up their revisionist intentions, at least for some considerable duration. Nevertheless, Paul believes that nonviolent accommodation is a rare phenomenon because the preferred strategy of established powers vis-à-vis rising powers is containment and preventive wars. Once the rising powers reach threshold capability, they often try to achieve higher status by altering the existing international order even at the cost of war. Accommodation is “peaceful” only when competition between the established and rising powers does not “lead to conflict and war” and “rising powers are willing to play by mutually acceptable norms and rules”. Paul, ibid, p175) (Paul, ibid, p5) VOL 22 NO 1 (JANUARY – MARCH) SPRING 2018 WORLD AFFAIRS 13 VIKASH CHANDRA ACCOMMODATION OR CONTAINMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE PAST S uccessful accommodation is subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions found at the domestic, transnational and systemic levels. Martin Claar and Norrin M Ripsman (“Accommodation and Containment: Great Britain and Germany Prior to the Two World Wars” in Paul, ibid, p152) suggest that accommodation is possible if three conditions are satisfied. First, if rising powers do not challenge the core interests of declining powers, at least in the short term. Second, even if established powers feel threatened, it is no more so than rising powers do. Lastly, if the dynamics of domestic group politics in the established power system prefer cooperation. Charles Kupchan too considers three conditions—institutionalised restraint, compatibility of social orders and cultural commonality—or the political, ideological and cultural similarity between the rising and established powers, as key to accommodation. (Ali Zeren and John A Hall, “Seizing the Day or Passing the Baton: Power, Illusion and the British Empire” in Paul, ibid, p117) He argues that the British accommodation of the US in the early twentieth century was a result of similarities between the two states. Both nations were liberal democracies with limited governments, checks and balances and the rule of law. The extension of the franchise in Britain coincided with a resolution of the north-south conflict in the US, which “created compatible social orders” in the two states. (Zeren and Hall, ibid, p129) There already existed a cultural commonality between the two. However, because of its limited explanatory power, Kupchan’s similarity argument has come under fierce criticism. Zeren and Hall (ibid) argue that the US’s accommodation “owes little to British skills” and the former could seize power from Britain as and when “it was able to do so”. Other scholars state that rather than similarities, domestic and systemic variables play a pivotal role in determining whether power transition is peaceful or conflictual. In the case of the US and China, domestic changes such as Richard Nixon’s coming to power, the death of Mao Tse Tung, Beijing abandoning its revisionist foreign policy goals and Deng Xiaoping’s four modernisations played a pivotal role in the US’s partial accommodation of China in the early 1970s. According to Lorenz M Lüthi, (“The US Accommodation of Communist China” in Paul, ibid, p132) context matters for accommodation. That is, structural factors like increasing nuclear parity between the US and the Soviet Union, the widening rift between China and the Soviet Union, the Afghan crisis, the beginning of the new 14 WORLD AFFAIRS SPRING 2018 (JANUARY – MARCH) VOL 22 NO 1 R I S I N G P OW E R S A N D T H E F U T U R E I N T E R N AT I O N A L O R D E R Cold War and the Iranian revolution compelled the US in the late 1970s to accommodate China fully. If the satisfaction of certain conditions paves the way for accommodation, the lack of it inevitably pushes leading states to opt for containment. Claar and Ripsman (ibid) point out that the failure to accommodate rising powers depends on environmental and volitional variables. They conclude that partisan domestic politics, competing national interests and a restrictive environment compelled Britain to contain Germany in the early twentieth century. On the basis of case studies of the Japanese–Russian rivalry (1894–1904), the South Asian crisis If leading states believe that (1971) and Iraq’s quest for primacy regional hegemons may challenge (1979–91), Montgomery (ibid, p23) their position, containment will asserts that “a leading state should be the preferred strategy. Here align with the weaker side in a regional the prospects of accommodating competition to ensure that the area rising powers increase if they does not fall under the sway of a single are in a position to challenge actor”. Thus if leading states believe regional hegemons that may that regional hegemons may challenge their position, containment will be the challenge the leading states. The preferred strategy. Here the prospects of US’s backing of Pakistan against accommodating rising powers increase India in the South Asian crisis if they are in a position to challenge of 1971 and sending its Seventh regional hegemons that may challenge Fleet was a case of balancing the the leading states. The US’s backing de facto regional hegemon. of Pakistan against India in the South Asian crisis of 1971 and sending its Seventh Fleet was a case of balancing the de facto regional hegemon. (Montgomery, ibid, pp102–25) Britain’s response to Japan’s rise in Southeast Asia and its war with Russia was based on the same logic that shaped the US response to the South Asian crisis—Britain wanted to contain Russia’s rise in Asia and therefore covertly supported Japan. The American response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the quest to gain primacy in the Gulf region was based on the assumption that after acquiring a hegemonic position in the regional system, Iraq would claim a sphere of influence that would be incompatible with the US’s sphere of influence. VOL 22 NO 1 (JANUARY – MARCH) SPRING 2018 WORLD AFFAIRS 15 VIKASH CHANDRA DECODING THE INTENTIONS OF RISING POWERS T he mere convergence or divergence of interests does not explain why established powers accommodate or contain rising powers. Rather, one has to look at the intentions of the rising powers, that is, whether they are “poised to reinforce, establish, undermine, or overturn the type of local order that leading states prefer”. (Montgomery, ibid, p17) Despite intentions being an important variable in shaping state behaviour, the problem that persists is that states cannot always be certain about the intentions of other states. (John J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: WW Norton, 2001, p31) On the basis of the behaviour and foreign policy goals of rising powers, two types of intentions may be discerned—revisionist and status quoist. Revisionist states are not satisfied with their status and seek to “undermine the established order for the purpose of increasing their power and prestige in the system”. (Randall L Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest, New York: Columbia University Whereas satisfied states “accept the existing ordering principles of the international system” (Steve Chan, “Can’t get no Satisfaction: The Recognition of Revisionist States”, International Relations of the Asia–Pacific, vol4, no2, 2004, p216) and voluntarily show willingness to “preserve the essential characteristics of the existing international order”. (Schweller, 1998, ibid) States that have political regimes, economic systems, social systems and human rights regimes in line with the existing international order are less likely to be revisionists while those with distinct visions are more like to be so, as they believe they are discriminated against. Despite their respectable positions in the international system, the international order does not reflect their norms and values. Thus, the intentions of rising powers are important—for status quoists or states wanting to make only slight changes to the existing international order the prospects of accommodation are better than for revisionists. China’s preferences and behaviour show mixed motives. Its engagement in multilateral organisations indicates a status quoist stance. However, its political regime, economic system, closed society and human rights regime create suspicion. Although the West formally respects the principle of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, on grave human rights violation issues it appears to move away from the Westphalian notions of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic jurisdiction towards a pro-interventionist stance. China however Press, 1998, p24) 16 WORLD AFFAIRS SPRING 2018 (JANUARY – MARCH) VOL 22 NO 1 R I S I N G P OW E R S A N D T H E F U T U R E I N T E R N AT I O N A L O R D E R vociferously “tends to defend the principle of non-interference”. (Yang Razali Kassim, The Geopolitics of Intervention: Asia and the Responsibility to Protect, New York: Springer, 2014, p44) Contrary to American liberal values that put the individual and human rights at the centre, China believes that “sovereign rights will always be more valued than individual rights” because Chinese society, unlike Western liberal society, is organised around a group or society and not the individual. (Ashley J Tellis and Sean Mirski, “Introduction”, Crux of Asia: China, India and the Emerging Global Order, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, According to Chinese strategic culture “the optimal hierarchy of political priority should be tianxia (the world) > country/nation > family and not the current, undesirable order of individual > community > country/nation”. (Fei-Ling 2013, p8) Wang, “From Tianxia to Westphalia: The Evolving Chinese Conception of Sovereignty and World Order” in G John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi and Zhu Feng (Eds), America, China and the Struggle for World Order: Ideas, Traditions, Historical Legacies and Global Visions, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p57) The Chinese and American conceptions of human rights also vary. Henri Feron (“The Chinese Model of Human Rights”, China Legal Science, vol3, no5, 2015) highlights that America bestows universal abstract Beijing’s adherence today to human rights while China has cultural relativist Asian values. The multilateral institutions and the American model prioritises civil and international order is suspect political rights while the Chinese because many believe that once model prioritises social and economic it becomes powerful enough to values. While the universal conception alter the existing order, it will is based on individual rights, in the not hesitate to take measures to Chinese conception, society is above place itself at the centre of the the individual or the individual is international system. subordinate to society. Although China and the US share capitalism, Chinese style capitalism is distinct from its American counterpart. In this regard, Yasheng Huang (“Debating China’s Economic Growth: The Beijing Consensus or the Washington Consensus”, Academy of Management Perspectives, vol24, no2, 2010, argues that since the early 1990s, the “China model (has been) ... more statist in orientation ... (with an) emphasis on financial and political control”. These principles and practices are often referred to as the “Beijing Consensus”, whose defining features include gradualism, managed globalisation, export-led growth and state capitalism. It “offers an alternative to the policy toolkit offered to developing countries”. (Mustafa Yağci, “A Beijing Consensus in the Making: The Rise of Chinese p33) Initiatives in the International Political Economy and Implications for Developing Countries”, Perceptions, vol11, no2, VOL 22 NO 1 (JANUARY – MARCH) SPRING 2018 WORLD AFFAIRS 17 VIKASH CHANDRA Certain elements of China’s strategic culture also raise suspicion. For instance, the concept of tianxia (all under heaven) places China at the centre of the international system, where other “countries acknowledge its cultural and political superiority”. (Elizabeth C Economy, “History with Chinese Characteristics: How China’s Imagined Past Shapes its Present”, Foreign Affairs, July–August 2017) Fei-Ling Wang (ibid) avers that the worldview/concept of tianxia has made “a strong rearticulation in China”. It is not only “entirely different from ... (but also) opposing to the dominant Western worldview of nation-states that implies national sovereignty, competition and balance of power”. China for the most part has shown revisionist intentions. It believes that “the tianxia worldview is the precondition for a new, better, more harmonious and rational world order”. (Wang, ibid) With regard to Chinese revisionist intentions, Joshua Cooper Ramo (The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power, Foreign Policy Centre, London, 2004, p3) notes, “China is assembling the resources to eclipse the US in many essential areas of international affairs and constructing an environment that will make US hegemonic action more difficult”. Beijing’s adherence today to multilateral institutions and the international order is suspect because many believe that once it becomes powerful enough to alter the existing order, it will not hesitate to take measures to place itself at the centre of the international system. The institutionalisation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS (Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa) led New Development Bank support this argument. Moreover, China has as we have shown an authoritarian political regime, an economic system with features distinct from liberal conceptions, a human rights regime that keeps society instead of people at the centre and a social system that also keeps society at the core and the individual at the periphery. Unlike China’s mixed motives, non-democratic regime, divergent ideology and contrary organising principles of society that create mutual suspicion, there are greater similarities between India and the US that create positive mutual perceptions. India is the largest democracy in the world with an increasingly open market economy. Along the lines of Western liberal democracy, civil society in India is being strengthened even at the cost of state power. (Tellis and Mirski, ibid) To bring in transparency and empower the people, the government introduced the Right to Information Act in 2005. Further, New Delhi supports multilateralism and multilateral institutions, especially 2016, p30) 18 WORLD AFFAIRS SPRING 2018 (JANUARY – MARCH) VOL 22 NO 1 R I S I N G P OW E R S A N D T H E F U T U R E I N T E R N AT I O N A L O R D E R the United Nations and its principles and purposes and is a staunch supporter of a rule-based system. Instead of being a revisionist state seeking to challenge and disrupt the present international order, India is a “status quo power ... (that) aspires to a seat at the table”. (Aseema Sinha, “Partial Accommodation without Conflict: India as a Rising Link Power” in Paul, ibid, p226) In the post-liberalisation era, a consensus has emerged that state intervention in the economy should be minimal and the role of the public sector reduced. Consequently, the disinvestment process has been gradually intensified. India also advocates a human rights regime consistent with universal human rights. This however does not mean that India does not have any disagreement with the existing international order. Despite an adherence to a rule-based system, it opposes hegemonic adventurism in multilateral fora. India has reservations While India does not have against the way some norms and an alternative vision of the principles have been selectively international order, it does implemented. It stands for the principle disagree with the US on the of non-intervention and strongly existing international order. adheres to the national sovereignty and Therefore, it is likely that New territorial integrity norms enshrined Delhi will adhere to the present in the United Nations Charter and international order but with international law according to which slight modifications. intervention should be as a last resort. New Delhi believes that exceptional breaches of state sovereignty and nonintervention norms should require the consent of host states, in self-defence and/ or with the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council. Moreover, while India does not have an alternative vision of the international order, it does disagree with the US on the existing international order. Therefore, it is likely that New Delhi will adhere to the present international order but with slight modifications. Russia to a certain extent represents revisionism and its relationship with the US has been mired in mistrust and mutual suspicion. It does not support American-style unilateral adventurism in a rule-based system but instead believes in “collective leadership of the major states”. (Nicola Contessi, “Prospects for the Accommodation of a Resurgent Russia” in Paul, ibid, p275) Russia is unwilling to accept the US’s unilateral leadership model and regards incidents like the US led bombing in Serbia, VOL 22 NO 1 (JANUARY – MARCH) SPRING 2018 WORLD AFFAIRS 19 VIKASH CHANDRA which bypassed the United Nations and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, where the US president did not convince allies to support him, as being against the rules of the current order. It believes in “the promotion of an international order based on international law, multilateralism, the principle of equality, mutual respect and non-interference”. (Contessi, ibid) Russia’s military actions in the Ukraine and Georgia however are “viewed by Western governments as flagrant affronts to the ideal of a rule-governed international order”. (Roy Allison, “Russia and the Post-2014 International Legal Order: Revisionism and Realpolitik”, International Affairs, vol93, no3, 2017, p519) On its part, Moscow is suspicious of American intentions in expanding the reach of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to its borders. It sees such a move as an infringement of its sphere of influence. Moreover, the emergence of a consensus in the mid-2000s about “the necessity of engaging the United States on Moscow’s terms” (Contessi, ibid, p274) has further increased distrust. In its political and human rights regimes, Russia represents a semi-authoritarian regime and is “reluctant to support US or European attempts to project democracy or human rights in other countries”. (Kassim, ibid) In contrast to Russia, Brazil does not have revisionist ambitions and believes that the benefits produced by the existing international order “are far too significant for the country ... (it) has little to gain from profound changes to the liberal order”. (Oliver Stuenkel and Matthew M Taylor, “Brazil on the Global Stage: Origins and Consequences of Brazil’s Challenge to the Global Liberal Order” in Oliver Stuenkel and Matthew M Taylor (Eds), While Brazil and the US share many goals such as democracy, economic growth and stability, they disagree on other issues. Brasilia’s major complaint against the liberal international order pertains to the “manner in which the rules are implemented”. (David R Mares, “Brazil: Revising the Status Quo with Soft Power” in Paul, ibid, p266) For instance, Brazil does not have a problem with the norm of intervention per se. That is, while it supports intervention against human rights violators, it contests “the hegemonic process by which such norms have been created, implemented and enforced”. (Stuenkel and Taylor, ibid, p12) It strongly believes that such initiatives should not be aimed at regime change. Unlike the American style of intervention, Brazil upholds “the philosophy of non-intervention and sovereignty”. (James Goldgeier, “Afterword: Emerging Powers and the Future of the American-Led Liberal International Order” in Stuenkel and Taylor, ibid, p189) It does not want to overthrow the existing international order but “to reform its structure and revise its institutional Brazil on the Global Stage: Power, Ideas and the Liberal International Order, New York: Palgrave, 2015, p8) 20 WORLD AFFAIRS SPRING 2018 (JANUARY – MARCH) VOL 22 NO 1 R I S I N G P OW E R S A N D T H E F U T U R E I N T E R N AT I O N A L O R D E R myth”. (Mares, ibid, p248) This is why when under the pretext of “responsibility to protect”, the West intervened in Libya and went beyond the protection of people to force regime change, Brazil presented the concept of “responsibility while protecting” to supplement the former. Brazil also wants a decision-making process based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all states. It seeks a greater say in the decision-making bodies of global governance, not to “show off ” its power but to “articulate its views and needs as a developing country”. (Mares, While Brazil supports intervention ibid, p265) Thus, “Brazilian diplomats try against human rights violators, it to promote Brazil’s position through the notion of ‘consensual hegemony’, contests the hegemonic process meaning that the country tries to play by which such norms have a leadership role through organising been created, implemented and multilateral dialogue rather than enforced. It strongly believes that through explicit coercion”. (Sean W Burges, such initiatives should not be “Consensual Hegemony: Theorising Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War”, International Relations, vol22, no1, 2008, pp65–84 cited in Xiaoyu Pu, “Ambivalent Accommodation: Status Signalling of a Rising India and China’s Response”, International Affairs, vol93, no1, 2017, p151) aimed at regime change. Unlike the American style of intervention, Brazil upholds the philosophy of A main point of difference non-intervention and sovereignty. between Brazil and the contemporary international order lies in the economic arena. Unlike the free trade and open market model capitalism of the US, the Brazilian model is “centred on state capitalist ideology that originates from an inward-looking development model” (Goldgeier, ibid) and until recently did not have an export-oriented economy. Despite the fact that some norms and practices of Brazilian foreign policy are quite different from the liberal international order, it “does not seek to upend that order”. (Goldgeier, ibid) CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER T he future of the international order will largely depend upon the response of established powers to the emergence of rising powers. The intentions of the latter group will decisively shape perceptions about them. As a consequence of divergences in cultural and political spheres as well as confrontations in spheres of VOL 22 NO 1 (JANUARY – MARCH) SPRING 2018 WORLD AFFAIRS 21 VIKASH CHANDRA influence, there is a strong possibility that Russia may not be accommodated— its demands may be seen as greater than its actual weight in the international system. In fact, Moscow has been carving out its own place and rebuilding its international influence in defiance of the US. On the other hand, given Brazil’s low profile in the international system, lack of significant differences with the principles of the existing international order and the absence of a long list of required changes, its prospects of accommodation seem brighter. The degree of accommodation however remains uncertain and may be partial or region specific. The question now is whether the US is still capable of preventing the global system from accommodating rising powers on their own terms. Given China’s high degree of economic interdependence and nuclear deterrence, the US may accommodate it but only if it shows a willingness to accept the fundamental principles and premises of the liberal international order and compete and cooperate within the stipulated framework. This may remain a distant dream as Chinese and American policies increasingly diverge. The alternative model of political regime, economic system, social system, human rights; ambitions in the South China Sea; the Belt and Road Initiative; channelling aid to African and other states that are not interested in taking aid on Western terms and the creation of alternative institutions could create hurdles in its accommodation. The US’s “pivot to Asia” policy gives the initial signals in this regard. Consequently, China will have to wait for accommodation in regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, even if it applies immediately. With the Sino–US rivalry in Asia, the prospects of India’s accommodation have improved. China’s rise poses a challenge to Indian national security and sphere of influence in South Asia, contests the American sphere of influence in the South China Sea, threatens the US’s allies in the Asia–Pacific and has forced America and India to put their differences aside and devise strategies to tackle it. Therefore, in line with Montgomery’s (ibid) argument—to contain a regional hegemon an established power may assist the regional hegemon’s challenger—the US may accommodate India with the goal of preventing China from acquiring dominance in Asia and the Asia–Pacific region. In Washington’s containment strategy, India might become what Mearsheimer (2001, ibid, p139 and pp269–72) calls a buck-catcher. Thus, the US could bleed its rising rival without bearing the cost of containment. 22 WORLD AFFAIRS SPRING 2018 (JANUARY – MARCH) VOL 22 NO 1 R I S I N G P OW E R S A N D T H E F U T U R E I N T E R N AT I O N A L O R D E R However, the path of India’s accommodation will not be smooth. In analysing the prospects one cannot solely rely on accommodation by established powers. Rather, one must give due attention to ongoing accommodation among rising states as well and China will play a China’s rise poses a challenge crucial role in this regard. It may block to Indian national security and India’s entry into elite clubs, especially bodies like the Nuclear Suppliers sphere of influence in South Asia, Group and the United Nations Security contests the American sphere Council, where China is a member of influence in the South China and the decision-making process is Sea, threatens the US’s allies in consensus based. These organisations the Asia–Pacific and has forced may witness greater diplomatic America and India to put their confrontations between the US and differences aside and devise China on the issue. In this regard, strategies to tackle it. Therefore, a rising nation showing flexibility the US may accommodate India may derive certain benefits while an with the goal of preventing China excessive alignment with established or from acquiring dominance in Asia rising powers may hamper possibilities. In displaying excessive proximity to and the Asia–Pacific region. the US, India’s entry into elite groups may be blocked by China. Therefore, a prudent strategy for New Delhi would be to strike a balance. As a consequence of the selective use of accommodation and containment strategies, it is possible that the international order may eventually turn into what Morton A Kaplan (System and Process in International Politics, London: John Wiley, 1957) called a “loose bipolar system”—a system with two poles in universal bodies like the United Nations. These poles may initially evolve around states but not for long and the two would soon turn into conglomerations of states, as during the Cold War era. In such a situation, international organisations and regimes could turn into battlegrounds between the two camps, as was the case during the Cold War and as the Nuclear Suppliers Group has been currently witnessing on the issue of India’s accommodation. 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