129.) ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR. vs.

AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC

FACTS:
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its
officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of Operations, with the RTC of
Maasin City, Southern Leyte.

The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) " "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member
of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the other hand,
defendant (respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit
and other credit facilities and allied services with office address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village,
Makati City." The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX
credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him,
jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

Respondents raised the affirmative defense of improper venue. It prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and on the
ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. Petitioner Saludo was not
allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City. To
buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and
signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo. Saludo asserted that any
allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that he was the
congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. As a member of Congress, he possessed
all the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a resident of his district. He was also a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his admission to the Bar.
His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and the office messenger
obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax certificate is not determinative of one's residence.

The court a quo denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly laid. It reasoned, thus:
[T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is, the incumbent
Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte,
is enough to dispell any and all doubts about his actual residence. As a high-ranking government official
of the province, his residence there can be taken judicial notice of. As such his personal, actual and
physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in some other place but in
Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte.

Respondents filed with the appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the presiding judge of the court a quo. The appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting respondents'
petition for certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid. It directed the court a quo to vacate and set aside its
Orders.

Hence, this petition for review

ISSUE:
Whether the appellate court committed reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo in Civil
Case No. R-3172 because not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff therein, was a resident of
Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.

RULING:
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal action. As such, it is
governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads:

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or
in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the court a quo which is in Maasin
City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was a member of the House of Representatives and a resident
of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the residency requirement of the rule.
However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made the finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of
Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint. It hinged the said finding mainly on the fact that petitioner Saludo's
community tax certificate, indicated in his complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at
Pasay City. That his law office is in Pasay City was also taken by the appellate court as negating petitioner Saludo's claim
of residence in Southern Leyte.
The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the
time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo.

There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte
at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo
was correctly deemed by the court a quo as possessing the requirements for the said position, 20 including that he was
then a resident of the district which he was representing. Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term "residence" is
synonymous with "domicile," thus:

x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence," as used in the
election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. x x x 21 It can be readily gleaned that
the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more stringent in that it is equated with the term
"domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence" imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 22 When
parsed, therefore, the term "residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular place; and
(2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is understood to
mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."

Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or
domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his
residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile
of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is
not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."

Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals 25 is misplaced. Contrary to its holding, 26 the facts of the
present case are not similar to the facts therein. In Koh, the complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance in San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias, Quezon City. Save for the fact that he
grew up in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and that he manifested the intent to return there after retirement, plaintiff therein had
not established that he was actually a resident therein at the time of the filing of his complaint. Neither did he establish
that he had his domicile therein because although he manifested the intent to go back there after retirement, the element
of personal presence in that place was lacking. To reiterate, domicile or residence, as the terms are taken as synonyms,
imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention."

In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his
complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to possess the qualifications for the
said position, including that he was a resident therein. And following the definition of the term "residence" for purposes of
election law, petitioner Saludo not only had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had personal presence
therein, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in
Southern Leyte, was sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be considered a resident therein for purposes of venue.

The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:

Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have two
or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the
other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence
has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in
some other place.
Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his domicile in Quezon City. If he also has
a house for vacation purposes in the City of Baguio, and another house in connection with his business in the City of
Manila, he would have residence in all three places (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1,
Page 212, 1990 Edition) so that one[']s legal residence or domicile can also be his actual, personal or physical residence
or habitation or place of abode if he stays there with intention to stay there permanently.

In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his profession or doing business
and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for election or political purposes where
he also lives or stays physically, personally and actually then he can have residences in these two places. Because it
would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern
Leyte without also recognizing him as actually, personally and physically residing thereat, when such residence is
required by law.

The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment because
granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his having a residence in
Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but
he may have numerous places of residence.29