Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2023

Venezuela

Not Free
29
100
A Obstacles to Access 7 25
B Limits on Content 11 35
C Violations of User Rights 11 40
Last Year's Score & Status
30 100 Not Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the research methodology and report acknowledgements.

header1 Overview

With the government of President Nicolás Maduro firmly entrenched, internet freedom in Venezuela remains precarious. Due in part to the country’s worsening social, economic, and political crisis, Venezuelans often struggle to afford internet access, experience difficulties obtaining trusted information due to progovernment disinformation and blocks of independent media, and face potential reprisals for expressing their opinions on politically sensitive topics in the digital space. Infrastructure failures frequently cause disruptions to connectivity, rendering some users effectively disconnected. The state manipulates online discussion through influence operations and online platforms for government services, which also prompt privacy concerns due to their large-scale collection of citizens’ personal data. Independent journalists, the majority of whom work in online media, remain subject to arrest and harassment in retaliation for their work.

Venezuela’s democratic institutions have been deteriorating since 1999, but conditions have sharply declined in recent years due to harsh government crackdowns on the opposition and the ruling party’s use of thoroughly flawed elections to seize full control of state institutions. The authorities have closed off virtually all channels for political dissent, restricting civil liberties and prosecuting perceived opponents without regard for due process. Although the country’s economy has returned to growth after years of recession, a severe, politically driven humanitarian crisis continues to cause hardship and stimulate mass emigration.

header2 Key Developments, June 1, 2022 - May 31, 2023

  • Infrastructural failures, frequently driven by electricity rationing, and the prohibitive cost of internet services severely restricted access for ordinary Venezuelans. The average cost of many internet packages continued to exceed the country’s monthly minimum wage, exacerbating an already significant digital divide (see A1 and A2).
  • The Maduro government blocked at least 70 websites in 2022, most of them independent news sites. Both state-owned CANTV and private internet service providers (ISPs) were found to have implemented the blocks (see B1).
  • The government’s ongoing efforts to restrict or manipulate the online sphere—through website blocks, coordinated disinformation campaigns, and state-run online platforms—severely undermined the ability of Venezuelans to access credible information online, making it more difficult for independent digital journalists to inform the population. At least one progovernment disinformation campaign during the coverage period was generated by artificial intelligence (AI) (see B1, B5, and B7).
  • Activists, independent journalists, and ordinary citizens remained under threat from arrests in retaliation for their critical online activities—often on trumped-up charges of incitement to hatred. Most were briefly detained and released under precautionary measures (see C3).

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 2.002 6.006

Venezuela’s economic crisis, marked by multiple years of recession and hyperinflation, has hindered the country’s electrical and telecommunications infrastructure and the quality of internet access. The country’s decaying infrastructure suffers from failures, theft, and vandalism, resulting in frequent blackouts and poor connection speeds.1

According to statistics from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), mobile-broadband penetration stood at 49 percent in 2022, while fixed-line penetration remained much lower, at 9 percent.2 At the start of 2023, there were 17.59 million internet users in Venezuela, according to DataReportal.3

Electricity blackouts and other infrastructural limitations continue to affect connectivity in many states.4 According to the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Committee of People Affected by Blackouts (Comité de Afectados por Apagones), Venezuela experienced 138,200 power failures in the first nine months of 2022, with 27,569 failures across all 23 states in September alone.5 Electric power rationing schemes—often conducted at unpredictable intervals—persisted in various cities, such as Maracaibo and Mérida.6 Damage to the country’s fiber-optic cables also causes routine connectivity disruptions. On February 27 and 28, 2023, for example, damage to the fiber-optic infrastructure left users of state-owned provider CANTV without a connection for 18 uninterrupted hours in three states.7

During the coverage period, Venezuelan NGO VE Without Filter (VSF) used the Twitter hashtag #ReporteConectividad (#ConnectivityReport) to document connectivity disruptions caused by infrastructure failures in several states.8

Though new providers have emerged to fill demand and connection speeds have increased in some cities,9 most rural areas are served almost exclusively by CANTV and lack access to high-quality internet service (see A2). According to the Humanitarian Social Observatory (OSH), in 2022, less than 5 percent of CANTV users reported experiencing no connection failures and 30 percent of users reported having no service for several hours.10 One town in Sucre State has reportedly gone virtually without CANTV service for five years, primarily due to cable thefts.11

According to Ookla’s Speedtest Global Index, as of May 2023, Venezuela’s median mobile broadband speeds ranked among the slowest in the world, at 135th out of 140 countries reviewed.12 That month, Venezuelans saw a median mobile download speed of 7.91 megabits per second (Mbps) and median upload speed of 4.06 Mbps, along with a median fixed-line download speed of 26.08 Mbps and median upload speed of 22.05 Mbps.13

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 0.000 3.003

The ongoing economic crisis prevents most of the population from meeting their basic needs. This has impacted Venezuelans’ ability to afford internet services and devices, as many must devote their salaries to cover necessities such as food and health care.1 The de facto dollarization of the economy has exacerbated the gap between those who have access to US dollars or receive remittances to purchase goods and services and those who do not.

During the coverage period, the minimum wage for Venezuelans remained 130 bolivars per month, but the exchange rate varied from 5 bolivars per US dollar in June 2022 to 25 bolivars per US dollar in May 2023.2 As a result of this rate, the minimum monthly salary was $5.26 in May 2023.

Internet services remain unaffordable for most Venezuelans. The 2023 Internet Poverty Index, published by the Internet Society Foundation, found that more than 74 percent of Venezuelans could not afford a basic mobile internet package.3

The cost of internet service has become more expensive in response to the changing currency exchange rate, making access more unaffordable. CANTV increased its broadband internet rates six times during 2022 and private providers, such as Movistar, increased prices multiple times during the coverage period, as well.4 CANTV’s cheapest plans also tend to be unavailable for new contracts.5 In May 2022, CANTV began offering high-speed fiber-optic plans in East Caracas, where some of the country’s highest purchasing power is concentrated.6 By April 2023, this service, available with speeds up to 300 Mbps for $99.99 per month, was present in 15 states. However, the cheapest of these fiber-optic plans is priced at $8.99 per month, which is still more than the country’s monthly minimum wage, as of May 2023.7

New companies, which often provide higher-quality services, tend to offer internet plans that are unaffordable for most workers, with some of these plans reaching at least $75 per month.8 For wealthier Venezuelans who can afford such service, this type of offer has somewhat alleviated connectivity failures. This has created a significant divide between those who can afford to access reliable service—often paid in US dollars—and those who cannot.9 According to a study released by consulting firm ANOVA in April 2021, 86 percent of households in the poorest quintile of Venezuelans lack internet access, compared to 81.2 percent of households lacking access overall.10

The prices of electronic devices remain out of reach for many Venezuelans. A midrange smartphone, which would cost $400, represents over 76 months’ pay at minimum wage as of May 2023.

In March 2023, the United Socialist Party (PSUV)–controlled National Assembly announced that it would convene a meeting that month with ISPs to address surging rates, generating concerns that government attempts to lower prices could cause the further deterioration of infrastructure and service quality.11

Venezuelans experience a significant geographical divide in internet access. In some border cities of Táchira and Zulia States, where Venezuelan ISPs aren’t available, residents rely on Colombian companies.12 According to the latest available official statistics from the first quarter of 2022, higher rates of internet use are concentrated in the Capital District and states on the more developed northern coast, such as Miranda, Aragua, and Carabobo. The state of Amazonas, which has a high Indigenous population, only reached 10.09 percent penetration, down from the 14.8 percent penetration reported in 2020.13

The lack of service in predominantly Indigenous areas has led to sometimes disastrous consequences, as in March 2022, when four members of the Yanomami community were killed by military officers in a confrontation over a shared Wi-Fi connection.14 Indigenous communities continue to raise concerns that CANTV service is inoperative in remote areas of the country.15

Plans for further expansions of high-speed internet service and the provision of licenses for service providers favor cities and areas with high purchasing power, further exacerbating the disparity in levels of access between high-income and low-income areas.16 In the Chacao municipality of Caracas—the smallest of the city’s five—for instance, there are about 50 ISPs.17

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 4.004 6.006

The state owns most of the infrastructure of the national network through CANTV. Deliberate shutdowns and throttling may seem practically unnecessary given the state of the country’s infrastructure and recurring power outages.

Users do not experience intentional, prolonged restrictions on fixed-line and mobile internet connectivity, though the government regularly blocks key websites and communications platforms to minimize coverage of politically sensitive news (see B1).1

In March 2020, the National Commission of Telecommunications of Venezuela (CONATEL), the country’s regulatory body, launched discussions with private operators about the creation of an internet exchange point (IXP). Academics and activists have opposed such a project, as administration of the IXP would fall to the government. The government’s control of this infrastructure would beget high risks of censorship and surveillance that would outweigh the technical benefits of the IXP’s creation.2 CONATEL announced that it would continue with the project, but it had not been implemented by the end of the coverage period.3

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 1.001 6.006

Although there are private providers, the state dominates the information and communications technologies (ICT) market. Telecommunications companies have struggled to remain financially sustainable during the ongoing economic crisis.

Smaller companies have been able to enter the market since the currency exchange market was partially deregulated in 2018.1 According to CONATEL, there were more than 200 authorized ISPs as of May 2023.2 However, some new operators that began providing services in 2021 were later suspended for noncompliance with CONATEL regulations.3 Representatives of newer ISPs express frustration about not receiving timely responses to their requests or about discriminatory treatment, since companies with government-linked managers are favored.4

According to two telecommunications companies’ chief executives, the Venezuelan ICT market is difficult and expensive for large operators that have high fixed costs. With smaller investments, in the absence of exchange-rate controls and the informal relaxation of some economic measures, new companies can provide services for consumers with high and medium purchasing power. Politically, companies must remain neutral and refrain from expressing any kind of opinions against the government.5

According to CONATEL’s first-quarter 2022 report, the most recent official data, 63.79 percent of the fixed-line broadband market is held by CANTV, while Digitel, InterCable, Telefónica, and Movilnet hold 19.28, 6.25, 3.14, and 2.76 percent, respectively; other small providers hold the remaining 4.78 percent of the market. The mobile broadband market is led by Movistar with 51.30 percent, followed by Movilnet with 26.55 percent and Digitel with 22.15 percent.6

A May 2019 government decree created a new state-run National Corporation of Telecommunications and Postal Services of Venezuela (CSTSPV), to be headed by CONATEL’s president. According to Article 3 of the decree, it aims to manage the state’s telecommunications companies, including through acquisitions and mergers.7 After the announcement, Maduro also said that Venezuela would sign agreements with Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE to promote the introduction of new technologies.8

In May 2022, Maduro announced plans to sell 5 to 10 percent of shares of various state-owned companies, including CANTV and its subsidiary Movilnet, to private investors.9 The first round of sales of CANTV shares took place in October 2022.10 More than 1.3 million CANTV shares had been sold by the end of the year.11

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 0.000 4.004

CONATEL is responsible for regulating and licensing the telecommunications sector and is administratively dependent on the Ministry of Popular Power for Communication and Information (MIPPCI). The Law on Social Responsibility in Radio, Television, and Electronic Media (Resorte-ME) grants the regulatory body the power to make decisions on the blocking or deletion of content and to sanction service providers, an ability it has exercised without granting due process to the affected parties.1

While Article 35 of the Organic Law of Telecommunications provides for CONATEL’s operational and administrative autonomy, Article 40 states that the president has the power to appoint and remove the agency’s director and the other four members of its board,2 highlighting CONATEL’s lack of independence from the executive.

In March 2021, Maduro announced the forthcoming promulgation of a set of laws, including a reform of Resorte-ME and a new “Cyberspace Law.”3 Although the forthcoming cyberspace legislation has not yet been published, a leak of a January 2019 draft indicates that it would establish a new regulator to oversee “policies regarding Venezuelan cyberspace.” Under the draft law, the regulator would consist of a director general and four directors who are appointed and can be dismissed by the executive. The regulator is tasked with determining the “correct” use of the online environment, which entails regulating service providers, critical infrastructure, and online speech. Under Article 5, the state would regulate access to the online environment, which is “of public interest… for the comprehensive defense of the nation.”4 Legislative proposals to regulate social media remained under consideration during the current coverage period (see B3).

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 2.002 6.006

The Maduro government blocked digital media outlets, virtual private networks (VPNs), and online platforms during the coverage period. Several private ISPs—including Movistar, Digitel, InterCable, NetUno, and SuperCable—continued to block news websites that had previously only been blocked by CANTV.

A September 2023 report by VSF, covering 2022 and the first half of 2023, detailed widespread and persistent online censorship by the Maduro government.1 According to the report, at least 100 URLs belonging to more than 70 websites were blocked in 2022, with the majority of them being independent news sites. The blocks affected independent Venezuelan outlets such as Efecto Cocuyo, Armando.info, and El Pitazo, but also international media such as Infobae, El Tiempo, and NTN24.2 Several of the critical news sites found to be blocked during the coverage period had been heavily restricted previously, including Armando.info, which has developed extensive outreach methods through social media and email newsletters to distribute content.3 Other news sites, such as El Diario, were newly blocked by CANTV in the first quarter of 2023.4

Website blocks extend beyond news sites to other political and social content. Beginning in June 2022, the website of the Venezuelan human rights NGO Justice, Encounter, and Forgiveness (Justicia, Encuentro y Perdón) was also blocked by CANTV and at least one private ISP.5 Likewise, the website of the Venezuelan Finance Observatory, an organization that monitors inflation and other economic indicators, was blocked by CANTV and several private ISPs in May 2023.6

Network measurements from the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) indicated disruptions to some online platforms during the coverage period. SoundCloud appeared to be blocked on multiple networks,7 while OONI data suggested that Reddit had been blocked by at least one ISP.8

Experts have noted that this escalating censorship is becoming more sophisticated and harder to circumvent, as VPNs and anonymization services are needed to circumvent HTTP, HTTPS, and server name identification (SNI) filtering.9 According to VSF, the domains of both TunnelBear and Psiphon—two popular VPNs—remained blocked in 2022; in the case of TunnelBear, CANTV and some private ISPs also blocked its application programming interface (API), meaning that the block is more effective.10 Commentators have linked these increasingly sophisticated tactics with the Chinese government’s influence. Chinese technology firm ZTE notably won a contract with CANTV to implement the Homeland System (Sistema Patria) platform (see B5 and C5).11

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 1.001 4.004

Several laws provide avenues for limiting speech by making intermediary platforms and websites responsible for content posted by third parties. This legal framework has resulted in preemptive censorship among reporters and media executives who exert pressure on their reporters’ coverage for fear of closure or reprisals.1

Recent reporting has illuminated the continued operations of Spanish reputation management company Eliminalia in Venezuela, where it was first detected in 2016. The company has been found to use false copyright claims and legal notices to get online content taken down. According to investigative reports by Armando.info, Eliminalia's work in Venezuela is aimed at laundering the reputation of corrupt individuals linked to the government.2 As a contributor to the Story Killers project—a collaborative effort among 100 journalists to investigate the global disinformation industry—journalists at Armando.info identified at least 35 Venezuelan clients from a leak of almost 50,000 internal documents from Eliminalia. In one instance, reported by Armando.info in February 2023, María Eugenia Baptista Zacarías, the spouse of a former government minister, paid €30,000 ($31,084) for Eliminalia to remove at least 61 links from Venezuelan news outlets Tal Cual, El Pitazo, and Armando.info, in addition to international outlets Deutsche Welle (DW), Reuters, and the Associated Press (AP), among others. Baptista and her husband have previously been implicated in a high-profile corruption scandal.3

Separately, anonymous actors have also been behind similar efforts to remove critical content about government-affiliated individuals, filing claims with social media platforms that allege policy violations or damage to personal integrity.4

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 0.000 4.004

In the absence of rule of law and without institutions offering avenues for appeal, Venezuelan authorities have restricted digital content with no independent oversight and accountable procedures.

Blocking has been implemented by state-owned providers CANTV and Movilnet and by private companies (see B1).1 For years, digital rights organizations, media outlets, journalists, and activists have denounced the lack of transparency of blocking procedures that are not made public.

Legislation places excessive responsibility on intermediaries and leaves room for abuse. Resorte-ME establishes that intermediary websites can be held liable for content posted by third parties, and grants CONATEL discretionary capacity to impose severe penalties for violations. Its provisions notably forbid messages that promote anxiety among the population, alter public order, disregard legal authorities, or promote violation of existing laws. Promulgated in November 2017, the Law against Hatred for Peaceful Coexistence and Tolerance (known as the Law against Hatred) establishes that intermediaries must remove content containing “hate speech” within six hours of being posted or face fines. The law also empowers authorities to block websites when, in their opinion, they promote hatred or intolerance.2

In recent years, the Venezuelan authorities have considered additional proposals to regulate social media, including the so-called Cyberspace Law (see A5). In October and November 2022, it was reported that the PSUV–controlled National Assembly was discussing a law aimed at regulating social networks, including a requirement that platforms establish a representative office in Venezuela.3 A National Assembly commission had previously opened debate on the matter in March 2022.4 No social media regulations were passed by the end of the coverage period.

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 1.001 4.004

Detentions, imprisonment, and legal and extralegal restrictions on certain forms of online speech have encouraged increased self-censorship and preemptive censorship within media outlets. Impunity for those who threaten or attack journalists in retaliation for their work have reinforced this climate.1

In April 2022, the Press and Society Institute of Venezuela (IPYS Venezuela) reported that nearly 54 percent of communication professionals had omitted information of public interest specifically out of fear of reprisals.2 According to an annual report from NGO Public Space (Espacio Público) that tracked free expression in 2021 and the first quarter of 2022, less than 40 percent of the media report on the nation’s political and economic crisis, in part out of fear of retaliation.3

This situation does not only affect opponents of the Maduro regime and independent journalists, but also ordinary citizens—particularly as authorities have escalated arrests of everyday internet users for comments made on WhatsApp groups or social media (see C3). During the coverage period, Venezuelans were detained merely for recording odd situations on the streets,4 underscoring the potential risks of discussing politically-sensitive topics on social media. Some users report fear of discussing political or social topics online or in group messages, in case a person who cooperates with the government reports them.5 Journalists have also reported that Venezuelans refuse to give statements to the press for fear of reprisal.6

Survey results from human rights NGO A World Without a Gag (Un Mundo Sin Mordaza) indicated that 70 percent of respondents admitted to self-censoring on social media, with most saying that it was out of fear of being detained.7 In a June 2022 hearing before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the director of Espacio Público affirmed that self-censorship has grown due to the fear of legal consequences.8

The increasingly broad application of the Law against Hatred (see B3) limits the scope of content that people are willing to disseminate.9 An August 2022 joint statement by special rapporteurs for freedom of expression from the United Nations and the IACHR criticized several factors that encourage self-censorship in Venezuela, including the regime’s disproportionate application of the Law against Hatred.10

  • 1RELE-IACHR, Annual report of the office of the special rapporteur for freedom of expression, 2022.
  • 2Luis Daniel Cambero, “IPYS Venezuela: El periodismo en el país se ejerce con reservas #20Abr [IPYS Venezuela: Journalism in the country is exercised with reservations #20Apr],” El Impulso, April 20, 2022, https://www.elimpulso.com/2022/04/20/ipys-venezuela-el-periodismo-en-el…
  • 3Wincarlys Ramos, ”Por temor a represalias menos de 40% de los medios reportan la crisis política y económica del país [For fear of reprisals, less than 40% of the media report the country
  • 4Ronny Rodríguez Rosas, “Detienen a hombre en Apure por criticar a la PNB en Tik Tok [They arrest a man in Apure for criticizing the PNB on TikTok],” Efecto Cocuyo, June 18, 2022, https://efectococuyo.com/la-humanidad/detienen-a-hombre-en-apure-critic…; “Funcionarios del Cicpc detuvieron a una abogada por grabar un video [Cicpc officials detained a lawyer for recording a video],” Espacio Público, June 13, 2022, https://espaciopublico.ong/funcionarios-del-cicpc-detuvieron-a-una-abog…
  • 5Bautista de Alemán, P. (2021). Reflections on the anthropological damage in Venezuela. Forma (41-55).
  • 6Valentina Lares (@valentinalares),
  • 7Gustavo Ocando Alex, “Denuncian aumento de la autocensura en Venezuela por ley que penaliza opinar en las redes [They denounce the increase in self-censorship in Venezuela due to a law that penalizes giving opinions on the networks],” VOA, June 27, 2022, https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/opinar-whatsapp-venezuela-crimen/6632339….
  • 8Gustavo Ocando Alex, “Denuncian aumento de la autocensura en Venezuela por ley que penaliza opinar en las redes [They denounce the increase in self-censorship in Venezuela due to a law that penalizes giving opinions on the networks],” VOA, June 27, 2022, https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/opinar-whatsapp-venezuela-crimen/6632339….
  • 9Keneth Barjas,
  • 10Pedro Vaca Villarreal and Irene Khan,
B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 1.001 4.004

The government has sought to expand its influence online, using state-controlled media and progovernment trolls and encouraging loyal social media users to harass those with opposing views.1 During the coverage period, progovernment propaganda generated by artificial intelligence (AI) was viewed widely on social networks.2

Actors aligned with the Venezuelan government have deployed increasingly sophisticated disinformation strategies in recent years, including those that utilize AI. In February 2023, the NGO Fake News Hunters (Cazadores de Fake News) and the Spanish newspaper El País reported on the existence of a YouTube channel that used AI–generated avatars to publish progovernment messages.3 The channel, called House of News Español, presented itself as a legitimate news outlet and utilized paid advertising to boost its videos on the platform. The presenters, which appeared to be generated with Synthesia software, spread false information to portray a favorable image of the Maduro government and contributed to the broader narrative that “Venezuela is fixed”—an attempt by progovernment actors to downplay or discredit the country’s ongoing economic crisis.4 The videos, which had reportedly been viewed hundreds of thousands of times on YouTube by late February, were also shared widely on TikTok and broadcast on state television.5

Maduro disregarded criticism of the AI–generated propaganda by stating that it was “popular intelligence” and “revolutionary intelligence."6 On February 21, 2023, the MIPPCI also promoted the hashtag #SomosInteligenciaSocial (#WeAreSocialIntelligence) in order to deflect criticism and control the online narrative. The ProBox Digital Observatory estimated that more than 96 percent of tweets containing the hashtag stemmed from inauthentic activity.7

YouTube suspended the House of News channel in March 2023 alongside four other channels that together had formed a wider progovernment disinformation network. At least one of the suspended channels had been active since 2020.8

Progovernment accounts often work to manipulate online conversations and regularly receive cues from the government though the MIPPCI. Reporting by ProBox has revealed how the Maduro government works to shape online narratives on Twitter—espousing support for the government, attempting to divert attention from events that could harm the government or benefit the opposition, and seeking to fracture opposition groups.9 Several accounts that spread progovernment disinformation, many of them with tens of thousands of followers, have purchased Twitter Blue subscriptions to obtain a verification seal on the platform.10

One operation during the coverage period was carried out in February 2023 with the hashtag #AlexNobelDeLaPaz (#AlexNobelPeace), which referred to Alex Saab, a Colombian businessman who is imprisoned in the United States for his alleged involvement in corruption schemes linked with the Maduro government.11 After the MIPPCI used the hashtag to amplify Saab’s supposed nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize, the campaign was quickly adopted by progovernment trolls and appeared in at least 314,000 tweets. According to ProBox, more than 94 percent of tweets using the hashtag were posted by automated or inauthentic accounts aligned with the Maduro government.12 The MIPPCI regularly promotes hashtags that attempt to distance the Maduro government from allegations of corruption or discredit such claims.13

Though government critics and civil society organizations continue to mobilize online (see B8), progovernment trolls work to undermine these efforts. For example, in January 2023, teachers used the hashtags #ProtestaNacionalDelMagisterio (#NationalTeacherProtest) and #ParoNacional (#NationalStrike) to mobilize national labor rights protests for January 9, during the back-to-school period. The MIPPCI, meanwhile, promoted the hashtag #RegresamosALaEscuela2023 (#WeGoBackToSchool2023) to inauthentically saturate the online sphere with a “discourse of normality.”14

In a September 2022 report, Transparency Venezuela (Transparencia Venezuela) documented the various disinformation and influence strategies that have been jointly developed by Venezuela and Russia in recent years, including the MIPPCI’s use of pro-Kremlin social media campaigns to influence online conversation in Venezuela about Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.15

The government has continued to extend its online influence via Sistema Patria—a centralized online platform that allows users to access key government benefits and services (see C5)—which prominently displays online content associated with the Maduro government. The platform integrates users’ social media accounts and recommends who users should follow, primarily recommending accounts belonging to Maduro, and displays Maduro’s Twitter feed.

Reporting has revealed how the government coordinates users of Sistema Patria to boost its narratives daily on Twitter. MIPPCI officials position certain trending topics on Sistema Patria, where users are rewarded with “bonuses,” which can include both payments and gamified digital achievement symbols, for Twitter posts about those topics.16 At times, the government has failed to pay monetary bonuses owed to these so-called “Homeland Tweeters” (Tuiteros de la Patria),17 who sometimes depend on such payments as a considerable source of their monthly income.18 A March 2021 report from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFR Lab) also identified a wide range of opportunities for Venezuelans to receive compensation for sharing government propaganda on social media.19 This practice continues and is openly disclosed by progovernment actors.20

The government’s March 2022 launch of Ven App, a Venezuelan social network and mobile app, sparked further concern about the government’s capacity to capture personal data and manipulate online narratives (see C5).21 Ven App maintains functions common to most social networking platforms, including messaging and file sharing functions and the option to join groups or channels. The government has promoted the app as a means of consulting and connecting with the public; for instance, the app’s “Line 58” channel allows registered users to submit complaints about public services directly to the government.22 Digital rights advocates have expressed concern that the app could potentially be used as a state tool for political organizing in the future, including during presidential elections scheduled for 2024.23 Should the government exclusively offer access to public services through Chavista or progovernment Ven App channels, for instance, users will be subject to state-peddled information when attempting to access these services.24 As of December 2022, the app had been downloaded more than one million times in the Google Play store.25

The magnitude of content manipulation in the Venezuelan digital sphere has spurred coordinated efforts by digital rights organizations and independent media to fact-check progovernment narratives and expose the government’s disinformation strategies. In November 2022, various organizations formed the C-Informa coalition, including the civil society organizations Medianálisis, Cazadores de Fake News, and ProBox, and the media outlets Efecto Cocuyo and El Estímulo.26

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 1.001 3.003

Digital media face various difficulties in Venezuela, hindered by the cost of equipment, the lack of financing, the exodus of professionals seeking better living conditions abroad, and the broader humanitarian crisis.

Independent media do not receive advertising from public entities. Although it is practically impossible to obtain public statements from private companies regarding the pressures they receive, the few companies that still exist in the country are under pressure to refrain from advertising in independent media. Some publishers have publicly said that independent Venezuelan businesses are not sustainable, and that “digital media exist thanks to Google Ads.”1

Digital media have tried various business and financing models: crowdfunding campaigns, international support, payment gateways, digital advertising, and media alliances.2 Some individual journalists have attempted to monetize their social media accounts—by posting advertisements for specific brands, for example—to make their work financially sustainable.3

A so-called International Cooperation Law,4 which would regulate and undermine the operation of NGOs operating in Venezuela, was introduced in the National Assembly in April 2021 and approved at the first reading in January 2023.5 If enacted, the law could potentially limit funding sources for independent digital media even further by imposing strict regulations on foreign financing.6 In a February 2023 statement, more than 400 civil society organizations expressed their opposition to the proposed law, saying that it would violate Venezuela’s constitution and international human rights treaties that the country has signed.7

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 1.001 4.004

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because the government’s ongoing efforts to manipulate the digital sphere have severely undermined Venezuelans’ ability to access credible and diverse information online.

Compared to traditional media, the digital sphere presents a relatively open space for political and social expression, though recurring blocks, the digital divide, and connectivity problems hinder access to diverse and independent sources of information online. During the coverage period, the government’s sustained efforts to manipulate the digital sphere saturated the online environment with false or misleading information.

In recent years, the Maduro government has constructed a sophisticated disinformation apparatus, capable of driving progovernment narratives online (see B5). On Twitter in particular, such narratives have come to dominate the online information environment. Between January and June 2023, a span extending one month beyond the coverage period, ProBox recorded 183 million tweets that contained a political or social hashtag in Venezuela. Progovernment posts accounted for over 97 percent of these messages, numbering more than 178 million tweets.1

Though independent media outlets and NGOs have introduced online fact-checking initiatives, such as the C-Informa coalition (see B5), to counter these narratives, false information and manipulation of the digital environment has hampered the efforts of such outlets to keep the public informed.2 According to Venezuelan journalist Andrés Cañizalez, “Venezuelans have seen their ability to construct what is real diminished” due to the pervasiveness of false information,3 eroding the credibility of the information landscape. In a December 2022 survey conducted by independent think tank Equilibrium CenDe, 76 percent of the 1,275 respondents were not able to provide the name of a specific media outlet that they trust.4

A June 2023 report by IPYS Venezuela, which analyzed data collected between October and December 2022, determined that 72 percent of Venezuelan localities are covered by at least one digital media outlet.5 However, the report also found that 21 percent of the population lives in so-called “news deserts,” with virtually no local coverage—an increase from 16 percent in 2020.6

Newspapers have migrated online due to restrictions on printed content, while broadcast media have also forged an online presence. Some long-established media such as El Nacional (which had to discontinue its print edition in December 2018)7 and Radio Caracas Radio (which has a digital broadcast), as well as most of the new digital media that have emerged since 2014, maintain an independent editorial line.8 However, other digital portals, such as La Iguana TV, Lechuguinos, and Orinoco Tribune, are aligned with the government.

Some online news initiatives have emerged in remote areas. The news portal Tana Tanae, for example, is directed by Indigenous Warao journalists. Based in Delta Amacuro State, it covers a range of stories relevant to Indigenous communities.9 In May 2022, independent media outlet El Pitazo launched the weekly Alatakaa podcast, which is disseminated via WhatsApp groups and covers news in the Indigenous Wayuu language.10 Efecto Cocuyo, meanwhile, is led by a team of women, and covers topics little explored by other outlets, such as migration, climate change, and gender and sexual diversity.11

The use of VPNs and other anonymization tools to access more reliable or diverse media is limited. In addition to being unknown to common users, free VPNs slow down already precarious connections, and some have been blocked (see B1). Digital media often use channels such as WhatsApp, Telegram, and electronic newsletters to spread their work. In March 2020, El Pitazo updated its app on Google Play, allowing its content to be downloaded and consumed offline.12

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 4.004 6.006

The repressive policies of the Maduro government restrict the right of Venezuelans to peacefully protest. Amid this repressive climate, and despite limitations to internet access, ordinary citizens and opposition leaders have actively used digital platforms to express their discontent over the country’s political and economic crisis and demand change.

ProBox continues to record a significant number of Twitter posts that are tagged with sociopolitical hashtags promoted by civil society organizations; however, these efforts are often overshadowed by the government's disinformation strategies (see B5 and B7),1 as well as the open repression of the groups that are protesting.

During the coverage period, Venezuelans used hashtags such as #MaduroEsCorrupción (#MaduroIsCorruption) to criticize the regime and demand accountability.2

Though facing growing restrictions, NGOs and Venezuelan internet users have continued efforts to raise awareness online and create apps with civic uses. For example, programmers and entrepreneurs saw the opportunity to design applications to help internet users during the COVID-19 pandemic, producing online pharmacy and oxygen-rental directories, a directory that displays health-care sites using Google Maps, and a catalog of businesses that implement health measures.3 Likewise, NGOs and digital media have launched initiatives to convene online communities, which has allowed them to train citizens, expand their information sources, and build the loyalty of their audiences.4

  • 1C-Informa, “Protesta del gremio docente es opacada en Twitter por tropas y bots de Maduro [Protest by the teachers’ union is overshadowed on Twitter by Maduro’s troops and bots],” ProBox, January 29, 2023, https://proboxve.org/publicacion/protesta-del-gremio-docente-es-opacada….
  • 2“Chavismo promueve ‘lucha anticorrupción’ de Maduro en Twitter en medio del nuevo escándalo del desfalco a PDVSA [Chavismo promotes Maduro
  • 3
  • 4Cesar Lopez Linares, “El Pitazo lleva sus foros comunitarios a WhatsApp y crea un producto capaz de fidelizar audiencia [El Pitazo brings its community forums to WhatsApp and creates a product capable of building audience loyalty],” Fundación Gabo, September 8, 2020, https://fundaciongabo.org/es/blog/laboratorios-periodismo-innovador/el-….

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 1.001 6.006

Although the constitution guarantees freedom of expression,1 the government has passed laws and regulations that curtail this right. Several laws, such as the 2017 Law against Hatred and Resorte-ME, provide avenues for limiting speech that is deemed to incite hatred, violence, or “anxiety” among the population, including on the internet. Moreover, the prolonged state of exception, in place since 2016, included provisions on countering cyberthreats and authorizing regulations to prevent “destabilization campaigns.”2 In December 2020, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice’s (TSJ) constitutional chamber declared the state of exception constitutional.3

Power has increasingly concentrated in the executive, and the judiciary is highly politicized, often issuing legal decisions that threaten free expression online. For instance, in May 2021, court authorities took possession of the headquarters of El Nacional, an independent newspaper that has published online since authorities restricted its paper supply in 2018, in a civil suit initiated by Diosdado Cabello, PSUV’s first vice president. Cabello sued El Nacional in 2015, claiming moral damages after the newspaper republished a report linking him to drug trafficking. The courts agreed to Cabello’s request to index the 1-billion-bolivar fine to the current exchange rate, awarding Cabello damages of $13.2 million (rather than damages of $13,000 that would have been awarded if the fine was indexed to the article’s publication date of 2015).4

In August 2021, the TSJ dismissed El Nacional’s appeal and subsequently, in January 2022, after a so-called "judicial auction," the headquarters of the newspaper and its land were handed over to Diosdado Cabello. The judge presiding over the case is the sister of the comptroller of the Maduro administration.5

To bring more power to the executive, and acting against the provisions of the constitution, Maduro convened the National Constituent Assembly (ANC) by presidential decree in May 2017. Installed in August that year and composed exclusively of pro-Maduro supporters, this de facto legislative body was handed sweeping powers over other state institutions. Maduro announced the ANC’s dissolution in December 2020, after elections for the National Assembly were held.6 These elections were deemed fraudulent by the Organization of American States (OAS),7 and the PSUV–controlled National Assembly largely functions as a rubber-stamp for the Maduro government.8

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 0.000 4.004

The Maduro government has tightened its grip on online speech through a series of restrictive laws establishing criminal penalties for online activities. A vaguely worded anti–hate speech law enacted in 2017 imposes hefty prison sentences of 10 to 20 years for those who incite hatred or violence through any electronic means, including social networks. It also establishes that intermediaries can be fined if they do not remove the messages subject to sanctions within six hours of their dissemination, with amounts ranging between 50,000 and 100,000 tax units.1

Activists and journalists also face charges of defamation under the penal code, which sets out prison sentences for defamation against public officials and the publication of false information.2

Resorte-ME, which was amended by the National Assembly in 2010, also includes vague prohibitions and severe sanctions that grant authorities sweeping discretion to restrict speech (see B3). Article 27, for example, forbids messages that promote anxiety among the population, alter public order, disregard legal authorities, or promote the violation of existing laws.3

In March 2021, the National Assembly approved a plan to amend or pass 35 laws, including Resorte-ME and the Cyberspace Law, a leaked draft of which indicates that the government could further restrict freedom of expression online. Recent proposals have also included plans to regulate social networks (see A5 and B3).4

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 2.002 6.006

Arrests for online activities continued to occur during the coverage period, frequently under spurious pretenses alleging instigation to hatred and ending in release under precautionary measures.

Many such charges of incitement to hatred were made in response to online criticisms of law enforcement or public figures. In June 2022, Yohn Alejandro Noguera was detained in the state of Anzoátegui by officials from the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) after he questioned actions of the security forces in his WhatsApp statuses. He was charged with incitement to hatred and was then detained at the GNB command.1 It remains unclear whether Noguera was later released. That same month, a citizen in Apure State, Luis Colina, was also arrested for alleged incitement to hatred after he posted a video on TikTok in which he criticized the Bolivarian National Police (PNB).2 In November 2022, Denys Custodio and Roberto Yánez were arrested for allegedly inciting hatred after posting critical tweets about Chavista leader Antonio “El Potro” Álvarez, though it is unclear what the posts contained.3 In January 2023, three police employees in Bolívar State were arrested for incitement to hatred and rebellion after they allegedly used WhatsApp to encourage a state police strike.4

Also in January 2023, investigators reportedly interrogated and briefly detained the journalist and news editor of the now digital newspaper El Nacional, José Gregorio Meza, after the outlet published articles alleging links between President Maduro’s son and two individuals sanctioned by the US government for illegal gold mining.5 Another journalist for El Nacional, Carola Briceño, was the victim of a targeted harassment campaign following the publication of these articles (see C7).

Servando Marín, an architect and a columnist for the digital portal Aporrea, who has scrutinized the government’s historic preservation policies,6 was arrested in May 2023 and released under precautionary measures for allegedly inciting hatred by using social media to call for a press conference to voice criticism of officials.7

Humor is not exempt from being penalized. In May 2023, well-known comedian Luis Chataing was threatened with “legal action” by the minister of culture after he posted a tweet that alluded to the minister's repeated practice of allegedly hiding facts and lying in official reports.8 During the previous coverage period, in September 2021, the homes of humorists Napoleón Rivero and Reuben Morales were raided and their work equipment was seized by Venezuelan authorities9 after they published a parody YouTube video in which they referred to the poor state of public utilities and the scarcity of public services, for which they hold the PSUV responsible. They were charged with hate speech and computer crimes. Venezuelan arrest warrants have been issued for both Rivero and Morales, who live in Colombia.10

In February 2022, it was publicly announced that the case against Luis Carlos Díaz, a journalist, human rights defender, and cyberactivist, was ordered to be “archived”—meaning it can be reopened if additional evidence emerges—and the precautionary measures he was subject to, including a prohibition on leaving the country, were suspended.11 The case, over Díaz’s alleged involvement in a plot to cause a blackout, had been ongoing for nearly three years; it began when he was arbitrarily detained in March 2019 while covering an electricity blackout. He was released shortly thereafter under precautionary measures. Although the case has been archived, in May 2023, Díaz was again publicly linked with the 2019 power outage by PSUV officials.12

In October 2022, police confiscated Wikipedia editor Oscar Costero’s passport while he was attempting to renew it; Costero has since been prevented from leaving Venezuela. During a police interrogation, authorities informed Costero that he was being investigated for alleged incitement to hatred and money laundering in connection with his work for Wikimedia Venezuela.13

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 2.002 4.004

The constitution expressly prohibits anonymity. To buy a cell phone, a SIM card, or a USB modem to access mobile broadband, Venezuelan law requires customers to register their personal identification number, address, signature, and fingerprints.1 The government does not broadly restrict encryption technologies or other digital privacy tools, though VPNs have been blocked by several providers in recent years (see B1).

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

Although the constitution recognizes principles applicable to the protection of personal data—such as safeguards for honor, privacy, public image, confidentiality, and reputation, as well as access to information—there are no laws or telecommunications regulations dedicated to data protection. There are concerns about the government’s ability to misuse personal data collected for security, welfare services, and public programs. In the absence of personal data protection legislation, the destination, storage, and ultimate purpose of the government’s collection of information remains unknown.1

Government surveillance and counterintelligence activities have increased since 2013, when the government released its 2013–19 Plan de la Patria, which emphasized strengthening national defense among its priorities.2 Given the lack of independent oversight, there are concerns about the ease with which systematic content filtering and surveillance could be implemented. Digital activists have also expressed alarm regarding the government’s growing interest in investing in intelligence systems and operations.3

A decree issued in October 2013 created the Strategic Center for the Security and Protection of the Fatherland (CESPPA), a special body charged with monitoring and tracking social media and other online information.4 Agents of the National Guard have also reportedly been trained by the MIPPCI in the management of social networks for the “implementation of early warnings” in order to “truthfully” inform Venezuelans and detect threats “to defend… national sovereignty.”5

The government also has means of collecting citizens’ personal data through the implementation of public programs. The Sistema Patria collects basic data, including users’ address and date of birth, as well as other personal information, such as political party membership.6 According to reports, the Venezuelan government worked with Chinese telecommunications company ZTE to develop and manage the Patria’s database.7 Through this system, Venezuelans can register to receive social benefits to access a virtual wallet where they can receive payments, such as pensions.8 The Sistema Patria is also used to collect government-issued “bonuses” for spreading MIPPCI trends on Twitter (see B5). This virtual wallet has also been integrated with the country’s biopayment system, a biometric point-of-sale system that is available in the state-owned Banco de Venezuela and some stores.9 Beginning in June 2020, access to subsidized gas prices required the vehicle to be registered in Sistema Patria.10 Fuel customers are allowed to use Sistema Patria wallets or the biopayment system.11

The scope of Sistema Patria continues to expand. As of October 2020, it also incorporates payments for public services, such as water and electricity, and purchasing mobile phone data.12 In May 2022, the government announced the 1x10 of Good Governance system, which allows users to register through the Sistema Patria and send messages directly to local government officials.13 Venezuelans will also be able to connect with the 1x10 of Good Governance system through Ven App (see B5).14 Digital rights advocates have raised serious concerns over Ven App’s threats to user privacy. To download the app, users must allow access to their real-time geolocation and phone camera. Once downloaded, the app can modify users’ calendars, alter or delete content on SD cards, record audio from device microphones, and send emails from users’ accounts without their knowledge.15

In June 2023, after the coverage period, it was reported that Sistema Patria is requiring its users to update their home address and register the community where they reside. The government has ambiguously said that the updated information is meant for "social mapping,”16 raising concerns about how this data will be used—particularly ahead of the elections scheduled for 2024.

The Venezuelan government has taken other steps to build upon its surveillance capacities. According to human rights organizations, arrests of trade unionists, health workers, journalists, and others for messages on platforms such as WhatsApp and Twitter indicate that the government is exercising surveillance in these spaces.17

In November 2020, the US Treasury Department sanctioned Chinese technology firm China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation (CEIEC) for supporting the Venezuelan government’s digital surveillance efforts.18 An expert on the relationship between Beijing and Caracas affirmed that technological support for surveillance and social control is a central component.19

In September 2020, Haaretz reported that, despite US sanctions prohibiting exports to Venezuela, Israeli firm Cellebrite sold telephone hacking technology to the Maduro government, according to statements from government officials.20 In October 2021, the General Directorate of Military Counter-Intelligence (DGCIM) broadcast via state television their use of Cellebrite’s UFED, allegedly for crime-fighting purposes. The tool can unlock and extract data from mobile phones, including encrypted data. The broadcast raised alarm for human rights activists in the country, in part due to the DGCIM’s history of human rights abuses, including the torture of detainees in their custody.21 A September 2022 report by the fact-finding mission of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to Venezuela affirmed that the DGCIM uses a variety of means—including digital surveillance—to collect information on real or perceived opponents of the government, often without judicial authorization.22

In late May 2020, the Fake Antenna Detection Project reported that it had found anomalous activity in at least 33 cell antennas in Caracas, potentially indicating the use of international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) catchers. These antennas were found near the offices of critical media outlets, human rights organizations, and areas of protest, along with multiple fake antennas on the Colombia-Venezuela border.23 The project’s study, which observed that the teams operating the equipment are in headquarters of security agencies, led researchers to believe that the antennas can be operated by security forces for intelligence purposes.24

Reports indicate that the Operational Strategic Command of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (CEOFANB) has a so-called cyberdefense room that monitors campaigns to discredit the military, as well as official statements made against Venezuela and information that authorities believe could lead to a national crisis. The group also reportedly perpetrates cyberattacks against Venezuelan websites, including news sites (see C8), and coordinates with CANTV to block media outlets.25

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

Mandatory data retention requirements are in place for telephone companies, including those providing mobile telephone services. An administrative ruling issued by CONATEL in October 2017 established that operators must provide collected information to security services upon request, without specifying the need for a judicial order. Data to be collected includes internet protocol (IP) addresses, dates and times of connections, geographic locations, and details of calls and text messages sent or received. The regulation also states that to register for a mobile phone, customers must provide data such as email, fingerprints, and a digital photograph taken at the site of the transaction.1

Manuel Ricardo Cristopher Figuera, a former Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) director and refugee living in the United States, revealed in April 2020 to independent news outlet Tal Cual that telecommunications companies in Venezuela facilitate the state’s surveillance of opponents. One operation, for example, had companies clone phone numbers, intercept emails, and take down webpages. Figuera identified Movistar as one of the companies that have taken such action. In one instance, phone numbers belonging to soldiers who had opposed the government in April 2019 and fled Venezuela were reportedly cloned by the Maduro administration with telecommunications companies’ knowledge. Figuera further claimed the government then used the cloned phone numbers to create fake social media accounts purporting to be the soldiers, which were then used to reach out to other users and persecute or detain anyone who expressed support.2

In a 2021 transparency report, published in August 2022, Telefonica, which owns Movistar, revealed that more than 1.5 million phone lines belonging to Movistar users had been affected by the interception of communications that year. This represents around 20 percent of all Movistar users in the country.3 According to one analyst, this was evidence that "state surveillance has reached a massive scale” and is dependent on the cooperation of telecommunications companies.4

Other measures affect companies offering online services such as banking. In November 2020, the government agency that oversees banking operations, the Superintendency of Institutions of the Banking Sector (SUDEBAN), introduced a requirement to monitor the business and financial operations of nonprofit organizations, purportedly to demonstrate the existence of supporters linked to criminal activities; the monitoring requires the handover of bank customers’ sensitive information.5

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 2.002 5.005

Journalists, including those who work online, face violence, intimidation, threats, and sometimes physical attacks from the state, security forces, and civilians, within an environment of impunity.

In its September 2022 report, the fact-finding mission of the UNHRC to Venezuela identified torture in detention and extrajudicial executions during security operations among the human rights abuses perpetrated by the government. While the report noted that incidents of torture following arrests appear to have declined from a 2019 peak, it attributed this to the fact that “political dissent has been largely crushed” in Venezuela.1

Intimidation and harassment campaigns against journalists, sometimes promoted by state actors, are common. Some journalists have been forced into exile due to such threats,2 and the Venezuela-based family members of journalists living in exile sometimes face harassment from authorities. In October 2021, during the previous coverage period, Venezuelan authorities raided the Caracas home of Armando.info investigative journalist Roberto Deniz’s parents. The previous day, officials had issued an arrest warrant for Deniz, who was living in exile in Colombia at the time, on charges of incitement to hatred. The search reportedly lasted several hours; authorities did not confiscate anything, but brought Deniz’s brother to police headquarters and interrogated him, before releasing him without charge.3 Deniz was also targeted with coordinated online campaigns to discredit, harass, and spread disinformation about him, which continued during the current coverage period.4 Harassment campaigns against Deniz—connected with his reporting on businessman Alex Saab—are forged on social media, but are also disseminated through state television and radio.5

During the coverage period, another victim of this type of attack was Carola Briceño, a journalist for El Nacional. In January 2023, a targeted online campaign labeled Briceño as belonging to an “extortion network” after she helped write a series of articles on alleged corruption plots linked to President Maduro’s son, Nicolás Maduro Guerra.6 Other employees of El Nacional were detained and interrogated by authorities in response to the reporting (see C3). Following the online campaign against her, Briceño, who has lived in Colombia since 2019, expressed concern for her physical safety if she were to return to Venezuela and sought protective measures from the Colombian government.7

Independent journalists and activists, especially women, are frequently harassed for spreading critical content on social networks. Espacio Público has documented a trend of online, gender-based violence against women users and journalists. Such violence takes the form of online harassment and threatening language, sometimes directly from state actors, as well as blackmail threatening to expose women’s personal information.8 A June 2023 report, published after the coverage period by Espacio Público and other Latin American digital rights organizations, noted that women in Venezuela often face difficulties reporting and accessing justice in a timely manner in cases of online gender-based violence.9

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 0.000 3.003

Technical attacks often target digital media outlets and human rights organizations, and there is strong suspicion that the state is frequently behind them. During the coverage period, several media sites reported cyberattacks.

In September 2022, the digital news portal Alberto News reported being the victim of a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. The attack against the outlet, which is blocked by various ISPs, lasted for approximately one day and caused temporary outages of the website.1 In May 2023, independent digital outlet Aporrea also suffered a DDoS attack over the course of two days. Its cofounder stated that the attack was carried out by an international actor "at the request of 'someone' who pays for it in Venezuela."2

Cyberattacks and hacking attempts have also targeted the social media accounts of digital media outlets. In November 2022, unidentified actors hacked El Pitazo’s YouTube channel; the hackers uploaded two videos before staff members retook control of the account.3 In December 2022, Palpitar Trujillano, a media outlet with more than 100,000 followers on its primary Instagram account, was the victim of a series of hacks on that platform throughout the month. At least three new accounts that Palpitar Trujillano attempted to open were subsequently suspended by Meta, making it difficult for the outlet to resume operations on Instagram.4

In April 2022, VSF reported documenting an increase in phishing attempts over WhatsApp over the past few years. The organization also reported that it had assisted more journalists, activists, and civil society members targeted with these attacks in 2021 than in previous years. In one incident, an NGO lost control of a WhatsApp account that it used to communicate with victims of human rights violations in an attack that was likely perpetrated by or in coordination with state actors.5

The Special Law against Computer Crimes, in force since 2001, has provisions that penalize these cyberattacks, though they have not been applied.6

On Venezuela

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Country Facts

  • Global Freedom Score

    15 100 not free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    29 100 not free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Not Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    Yes

  • Pro-government Commentators

    Yes

  • Users Arrested

    Yes